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| NOTAT               |   |        |                |
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## Baggrund

Det multilaterale samarbejde for øget frihandel udvikler sig gennem en række forhandlingsforløb, de såkaldte runder. Uruguay-Runden, der er den seneste af disse, afsluttedes i 1994 og førte bl.a. til etableringen af WTO i 1995. Det var forventet, at en ny frihandelsrunde ville blive lanceret på WTO's tredje ministerkonference i Seattle i december 1999. Dette lykkedes imidlertid ikke, og forhandlingerne om lanceringen af en ny runde måtte ved konferencens tning suspenderes.

Siden da har mulighederne for indledning af en ny runde været diskuteret i en lang række fora, herunder WTO, OECD, EU, samt ved diverse internationale topmøder. Arbejdet har generelt været rettet mod at imødekomme udviklingslandenes ønsker til en ny runde, at genopbygge tilliden til WTO samt at skabe en fælles forståelse af handelspolitiske emner.

Et af problemerne med hensyn til igangsættelse af en ny runde har bestået i en kløft mellem i- og u-lande, der er kendetegnet ved, at udviklingslandene i høj grad afviser emner, der ikke hører til den klassiske handelspolitiske dagsorden, såsom miljø, arbejdstagerrettigheder, forbrugerbeskyttelse samt investerings- og konkurrenceregler. Fra EU's side har man på den anden side hidtil ønsket en bred dagsorden, der også omfatter disse nye emner, ud fra det synspunkt, at alene inddragelsen af alle handelspolitiske emner kan sikre vedtagelse af en samlet pakke med fordele for alle parter.

Ligeledes har der været en forskel i USA's og EU's ønsker om bredden af dagsordenen for en ny runde. Fra USA's side har man tilstræbt en relativt smal runde koncentreret om afvikling af landbrugssubsidier, nedsættelse af industritoldsatser, regler for offentligt udbud, elektronisk handel og arbejdsrettigheder.

Konkret er kløften mellem i- og u-landene blevet forsøgt reduceret ved at tilbyde u-landene en såkaldt minipakke, der bl.a. indeholder øgede midler til finansiering af faglig bistand, bedre markedsadgang og overgangsperioder for implementering af de forpligtelser, som u-landene påtog sig som en del af Uruguay-Aftalen.

Den fjerde ministerkonference skal i henhold til WTO-aftalen afholdes senest i december 2001. Nye frihandelsrunder er traditionelt blevet lanceret på ministerkonferencer, men der eksisterer ingen formelle krav, hvad det angår.

Grundlaget for EU's arbejde er de rådskonklusioner, der blev vedtaget den 26. oktober 1999, og som i vid udstrækning afspejler det danske regeringsgrundlag, Folketingets vedtagelser af 11. maj 1999 (V 81) og 4. november 1999 (V 16) samt det af Folketingets Europaudvalg tiltrådte forhandlingsoplæg forud for vedtagelsen af ovennævnte rådskonklusioner.

## Oplæggets indhold

Kommissionen har i artikel 133-komiteén fremlagt et oplæg til en mere fleksibel EU-holdning i spørgsmålet om igangsættelse af en ny multilateral forhandlingsrunde i WTO.

Hovedtanken i Kommissionens oplæg er, at det er nødvendigt for EU at imødekomme udviklingslandenes krav på en række områder. Kommissionen finder således, at EU bør inkludere spørgsmålene om bedre markedsadgang for tekstiler og lempeligere anti-dumping-regler i forhandlingerne.

Et andet element i Kommissionens oplæg er, at det ikke skønnes realistisk at opnå WTO-medlemslandenes opbakning til, at der skal indledes WTO-forhandlinger om en multilateral investeringsaftale og om en WTO-aftale på konkurrenceområdet. Kommissionen foreslår derfor, at der i WTO åbnes for forhandlinger om disse to spørgsmål, men at det til sin tid vil være op til hvert enkelt WTO-medlemsland at afgøre, om man ønsker at tilslutte sig en eventuel aftale eller ej. Derved vil der kunne indgås såkaldte plurilaterale aftaler, hvor et antal WTO-medlemslande undertegner en aftale fra begyndelsen, hvorefter de øvrige WTO-medlemslande vil kunne tilslutte sig aftalen på det tidspunkt, de måtte ønske det.

Et tredje element vedrører miljøområdet, hvor Kommissionen foreslår, at EU går bort fra tanken om, at der skal foretages egentlige regelændringer i WTO-aftalesystemet. En sådan regelændring kunne være en omskrivning af GATT's artikel XX, der vedrører fravigelse af ikke-diskriminationsprincippet, hvis der er tale om beskyttelse af menneskers eller dyrs liv eller sundhed (forsigtighedsprincippet).

Et fjerde element i Kommissionens oplæg er, at EU opgiver tanken om at få handel og arbejds-tagerrettigheder (under overskriften "trade and social development") inkluderet i selve WTO-runden. Kommissionen foreslår, at der med inddragelse af flere internationale organisationer (f.eks. ILO, UNCTAD og Verdensbanken) etableres en dialog med udviklingslandene, men uden at et resultat af drøftelserne gøres til en forudsætning for indgåelse af en ny WTO-aftale. Forslaget indebærer, at handel og arbejdstagerrettigheder tages ud af konceptet om "single undertaking" (intet er vedtaget før alt er vedtaget), der har været et hovedelement i den hidtidige EU-strategi.

Endelig ønsker Kommissionen, på samme måde som med arbejdstagerrettigheder, at spørgsmålet om reformer af WTO's funktionsmåde gøres uafhængigt af selve rundeforhandlingerne.

Formandskabet og Kommissionen sigter mod en vedtagelse af ændrede rådskonklusioner under rådsmødet (udenrigsministre) den 26.-27. februar 2001. Forud herfor vil sagen på sædvanlig vis blive forelagt for Folketingets Europaudvalg.

N.4, den 3. januar 2001



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Trade

Brussels, 13 December 2000

I.D.1/JC D(2000)

**Note for the Attention of the 133 Committee (Full Members)**

**Subject:** State of Play and Strategy for the New WTO Round

**Purpose:** document for discussion attached

**Origin:** DG Trade

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| <b>133 COMMITTEE</b>            |
| <b>MD :</b> 574/00              |
| <b>SOURCE :</b> Commission      |
| <b>FOR :</b> Discussion         |
| <b>DATE RECEIVED :</b> 13/12/00 |

**Note for the Attention of the 133 Committee**

**STATE OF PLAY AND STRATEGY FOR THE NEW WTO ROUND**

**Introduction**

The next WTO Ministerial should launch the New Round of trade negotiations, on a basis which will be in the interests of all Members, developed and developing. However, in pursuing the launch of a Round, WTO Members, including the EU, must learn from the lessons of the failed Seattle Conference, which are still relevant. In particular, it must be recognised that Seattle failed, not simply because of faulty preparation and bad organisation, but also because the agenda was not sufficient to accommodate the interests of the membership as a whole {{SPA}} and in particular of developing countries. Seattle both

confirmed the growing weight and importance of developing countries in the multilateral system, and at the same time demonstrated that the WTO system has not, so far, adequately responded to their interests and needs {{SPA}} and in particular those of the least developed countries.

Until and unless all WTO Members recognise this, and make efforts to make the WTO more relevant and responsive to developing countries{{PU2}} needs {{SPA}} in particular the aims of sustainable economic growth, institutional stability and the alleviation of poverty - the multilateral system is condemned to continue to drift, contrary to the long term interests of all Members of the WTO.

The Community is well positioned to defend and promote the WTO{{PU2}}s system of multilateral co-operation, trade liberalisation and rule-making. Our initiative to launch a New Round of trade negotiations is the most visible example of this role, and our belief in the value to all Members of such a round is undiminished. However, following extensive contacts with developing country partners over the last year, and having reflected carefully on the underlying reasons for the failure of Seattle we have concluded that, if a new round is to be launched, it can only be launched - or indeed be successfully concluded - if the interests of developing countries are more explicitly and firmly integrated in all areas and at all stages.

**Although most industrialised, and some developing countries do share the thrust of our approach towards a round, substantive difficulties came from the United States and or from a number of developing countries, the common denominator being a certain scepticism or resistance towards further deepening and broadening of multilateral co-operation, negotiation and rule-making. We therefore need to rebuild developing country support for the WTO and for its further development through new negotiations, which as noted above can only be done if their interests are firmly reflected. The remainder of this note identifies the different areas in which WTO Members, including the EU, need to pay much greater attention to resolving problems identified by developing countries while still safeguarding our own substantive interests.**

### Current State of Play

Over the last year the EU has continued to press the case in favour of a comprehensive trade round, but with uneven success. Although a number of developing WTO members support negotiations beyond the built in agenda, there is opposition to what is still perceived as an excessively ambitious, or in other respects insufficient, rule-making agenda, including that relating to investment and competition or measures taken for the protection of the environment. Notwithstanding this reticence over the rule-making agenda, several developing countries have nonetheless pressed for a wide review of WTO rules under the heading of implementation, as well as for improved access to developed country markets. As regards market access issues, while developing countries welcome our readiness to negotiate, there is growing insistence that any further WTO negotiations should have a specific developmental focus.

Opposition to any discussion of trade and labour standards remains strong, due to the fear that this could also lead eventually to the imposition of trade sanctions for non-observance of core labour standards.

The resistance of a number of Asian developing countries to a comprehensive Round covering some or all of the rules issues was seen clearly at the recent APEC Summit in Brunei. Several Asian members of APEC remain adamant that a new Round can only be launched once there is consensus on a carefully defined agenda and they reject the idea of a comprehensive, potentially open-ended approach in which any issue, including labour, risks (in their view) being introduced into negotiations.

The majority of African and least developed countries have also stressed, most recently in Libreville, that their priority is implementation of existing Uruguay Round commitments, and better market access for their agricultural and other products, together with measures to build domestic capacity and carry out structural adjustment.

Against this background, some developed and developing countries have argued for a more limited negotiation, as can be seen in the proposals for, variously, a market access-only Round, an incremental approach (beginning with market access and possibly trade facilitation and progressively adding any other issues on which there is agreement to negotiate), or the division of the negotiations into different {{PU1}}phases{{PU2}}, {{PU1}}clusters{{PU2}} or {{PU1}}baskets {{PU2}}. All of these aim to launch negotiations soon on a limited agenda (the built in agenda, market access, possibly trade facilitation and, for some, issues like procurement transparency, a few selected TRIPS issues,

E-commerce), while either dropping entirely or postponing to a later date any decision regarding the negotiation of any other topics.

The risk inherent in all these approaches is the same, namely that, once negotiations begin on a limited agenda, a consensus would never be reached to start negotiations on the other issues. This may or may not be the intention of those countries suggesting an incremental or phased approach, but it is very likely to be the result.

There are both strong economic and systemic reasons why all Members of the WTO should welcome the introduction of investment and competition rules in the WTO, while for equally important reasons it is essential to clarify further the WTO's rules pertaining to environment and consumer health and safety. A negotiation confined to market access alone will also make it impossible to address developing country objectives in areas such as trade defence, TBT and other areas. Strengthening O rules in all these areas is necessary if the WTO is to come to grips with real obstacles to market access in a globalising economy, and to reduce the risk of friction or contradiction between trade policy and other public policy issues.

Indeed, a multilateral agenda which includes investment, competition and the environment entails substantial benefits both for developing countries and for the strength and continued relevance of the multilateral system. This would particularly so if three conditions are met : a) new rules should be realistic and sufficiently flexible to meet developing country needs ; b) any new rules should go together with a substantial capacity building exercise ; and c) country market access concerns must be an integral part of any trade and environment agenda.

More broadly, public support for the WTO system is likely to be undermined if the WTO is (however wrongly) seen as an obstacle to legitimate action on issues like environment, health and safety etc, and if governments are seen as being incapable of working together to resolve issues. In cases where WTO rules are uncertain, it is essential that Members themselves, rather than the dispute settlement system, take the lead to clarify and interpret the law through discussion and negotiation.

In sum, the multilateral system will be at risk through inaction on the part of its members. There is a real risk of the WTO becoming sclerotic or regarded as irrelevant or, worse, an obstacle to legitimate national action in the « trade and environment » areas, unless negotiations encompassing both market access and rule making can be launched soon. In the longer term this situation will be in the interests of no-one.

### **The Need for a New Approach**

Against this background the approach to the Round needs to be reassessed, and the interests and concerns expressed by developing countries fully recognised and reflected in its agenda. The EU is probably the best placed to bridge the differences between interests of the industrialised and developing countries and to build a consensus that would firmly integrate the priorities of developing countries within a new Round. We should now seek to do this, through a negoti agenda that would reflect developing country interests in a substantive way, be this in relation to the built in agenda, market access, rule making or other areas. The negotiating process in itself should also be transparent and designed in a way that facilitates the greatest possible participation by developing countries.

As far as the specific rule making agenda is concerned, we must launch negotiations that would include investment, competition and environment. But we need to examine, in each area that has met with significant developing country opposition, the reasons for this and how best to accommodate these concerns. The particular circle to be squared therefore is : how can a Round be launched that includes investment, competition and environment, but in a way that responds to the interests of all Members, and in particular developing countries?

The remainder of this note seeks to identify the specific adjustments of approach that would be necessary and feasible in order to make the development aspects of a new round more operational, both in respect of the three rules-related questions referred to above (investment, competition, environment) and other issues.

### **Investment and Competition**

Investment and competition have been constantly mischaracterised as issues on which the EU is demandeur and for which, therefore, the EU should « pay » in order to have them on the agenda of a new round. The reality is different, since the introduction of basic rules in both areas is likely to benefit developing countries at least as much as industrialised members, whether it be in terms of attracting investment (which developing countries need), or addressing anti-competitive practises (on which, paradoxically, the ldc's have for many years sought international disciplines).

Notwithstanding this misperception of investment and competition, it is clear that if we are to break the logjam and launch a Round, we will have to adapt our approach. There are two possible ways forward. The first would be to accept a degree of phasing within these two subjects : launching negotiations on a modest agenda and reserving for a later consensus decision any extension of negotiations to those aspects that are currently more disputed.

The advantage of this approach is that it would bring both subjects under basic multilateral discipline. It would also, by definition, go a long way to meet developing country concerns over an excessive agenda : negotiations covering only, for example, a number of very insubstantial provisions would not be burdensome or, in most cases, entail any or much domestic policy change. The major disadvantage of such an approach is inherent in its very modesty : it would condemn the WTO to a very low level of ambition without any guarantee that further commitments could be negotiated in the future. The current agenda on both investment and competition is already quite modest and it is difficult to see how it could be made even more so without making it virtually meaningless.

A second and better - option would be to provide that agreements on investment and competition need not be concluded by all WTO members ie openness to plurilateral agreements. Negotiations on both subjects would be launched and concluded at the same time as the other subjects in the Round and be open for participation by all Members, but the negotiating mandate for a Round would state, explicitly, that countries will retain their freedom to subscribe or not to these two areas at the end of the Round. The objective would of course continue to be to negotiate agreements that would be attractive to and which can be concluded by all WTO Members. The substance of the negotiating mandates should therefore be based on the flexible approach reflected in our current proposals.

This approach has two advantages. First, we would not have to dilute further our already modest level of ambition in either area in order to make the negotiations acceptable to all. Second, such an approach would respond to concerns of developing countries about entering into a negotiation that is beyond their capacity to handle. They could participate in the negotiations and choose at the end of the process whether to join or not, based on their own assessment of the merits of the agreements (which they would have helped to design) , and their own domestic absorption capacity. If some developing country resistance is also tactically motivated, it could hardly be sustained if such an approach were chosen.

Openness to a plurilateral approach however entails certain risks. The first is that one may at the end of the day not have the necessary critical mass to make the agreements worthwhile. Our assessment is that notwithstanding this risk, in both areas we should be able to get the key countries into both agreements. In the case of investment, countries will have an incentive to join an agreement, since to stay away would send a negative signal to foreign investors. In the case of competition, countries with a competition law (ie the great majority) should have no substantive problem in joining and should be attracted by a basic WTO agreement of this type.

The other potential disadvantage of a plurilateral approach is that it opens the possibility of a two tier system of rules - different levels of commitment by different Members. Some Members may then seek plurilateral approaches to other areas of negotiation, such as environment, trade facilitation or TRIPS, or existing areas of WTO. We tend however, to expect (for the reasons suggested above) that most Members will join in the end, and that the systemic risks can be contained.

Overall, the plurilateral approach suggested above would show that we have learned about the need to take account of the capacity of developing countries to negotiate and implement new rules. It would at the same time increase the likelihood of the US being more supportive of a broad round. The suggested approach would give developing countries the necessary guarantee that they would retain their freedom to make a judgement about the developmental benefits of such agreements all the way up to the point of conclusion of the new negotiations.

## **Trade and the Environment**

Trade and environment, and related consumer health and safety questions are areas of the WTO's existing rule-book that will continue to require adjustment and fine tuning as our societies develop. Here, the Community has a carefully defined and non-protectionist agenda, the aim of which would be to obtain a multilaterally agreed clarification of existing GATT/WTO rules as they pertain to environment and consumer safety issues Such an approach will not result in legitimate forms of trade restrictions, but would instead increase predictability for traders and environmental policy makers alike, and at the same time address developing country market access concerns and capacity constraints in the areas of TBT and SPS, which are of high priority to some developing countries.

Already the EU has begun in the WTO to present elements of its approach (starting with the relationship between WTO and MEAs). Our belief firmly remains that developing countries have nothing to fear from a negotiation, but nonetheless confidence levels would rise if we make it clear that a) the exercise is focused on the clarification of existing rules, rather than the amendment of the WTO rule book; b) the agenda is sufficiently precise and self-contained (essentially seeking to clarify the WTO/MEA relationship, the extent to which Members may use labelling schemes, and the application of

the precautionary principle); and c) any mandate will spell out explicitly that the negotiations should not result in any arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or to any form of disguised restriction on trade, and should address developing country market access concerns and capacity constraints.

## **Other Rules Questions**

**Trade defence** continues to be an important issue for many developing countries who {{SPA}} as we have seen from the discussions on WTO implementation {{SPA}} are interested in modifying the provisions of the Anti Dumping and Subsidies Agreements, in particular to make more operational the concept of special and differential treatment. While some concerns of developing countries may be resolved through the implementation work programme, it is likely that most questions can only be addressed by negotiation as they may imply modifying the agreements. The EU is not seeking modification of either agreement but, as noted in the October 1999 Council conclusions on the new round, we recognise the right of developing countries to seek improvements, and we must be prepared to address this in a Round.

We should therefore in the coming months as we seek agreement on the launch of a Round indicate openness to negotiate on anti dumping and subsidies, without prejudice of course to the outcome, and provided that core elements of the Agreements concerned remain. The EU should seek to act as an honest broker by finding a compromise between those countries advocating an ambitious agenda on trade defence and those who are more cautious. One way might be to include a strengthening of the disciplines of the Agreements, in particular in the area of reviews, in addition to addressing questions relating to the application of special and differential treatment.

**Other rules areas** such as the review of the **DSU**, and the extension of the **TRIPS** agreement to cover additional geographical indications, are also important for some developing countries. In these areas our current approach is already largely compatible with the interests of developing countries, and we should seek agreement with them on the negotiating agenda. We should in addition indicate openness to addressing the concerns raised by developing countries over the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the question of traditional knowledge, and the WTO-related aspects of access to medicines.

As regards **Trade Facilitation**, this is an issue of interest to both developed and developing WTO Members and one in which all stand to benefit. However, in seeking in a Round to create a suitable framework for the simplification of trade procedures, the capacity constraints of developing countries, as well as the needs of small and medium sized enterprises in these countries, should be addressed in a satisfactory way. Any rules should, among other things, answer the real needs of developing country importers and exporters, and programmes of technical assistance to build capacity should be developed in parallel with negotiations.

As regards **Government Procurement**, we continue to believe that conclusion of a multilateral agreement on transparency is both in the interest of all Members and is feasible in the near future. The negotiating mandate for the Round could set this aim, while leaving open the possibility thereafter of further improvements to market access in procurement.

As regards existing measures providing Special And Differential Treatment for developing countries, proposals have been made to review these provisions across the board in order to see if they should be made more operational. The EU should be receptive to such a review of S&D provisions as part of a mandate to review existing WTO rules within a Round.

Last but certainly not least, regarding **Electronic Commerce**, clarification within a Round of the applicable rules, while certainly of interest to the US, EU and Japan, is also of interest to a number of developing countries and is clearly an issue where there is no North/South divide but where all Members stand to gain. Future work in the context of a new round should aim to create new opportunities for the expansion of trade and, in particular, for greater participation in international trade on the part of developing country Members and for their small and medium sized enterprises. The EU and other Members should ensure that, in any future discussions, developing countries' interests in the field of electronic commerce are addressed and that no new barriers are created to transactions carried out electronically.

## **Market Access Issues**

In a new round industrialised countries will have to demonstrate that the market access component will benefit developing countries. As far as **agriculture** is concerned, we must create opportunities for increased market access for developing countries, including stability and predictability of such access, while accepting the possible need for the most fragile

developing countries to maintain protection in order to have adequate time for adaptation. We must also be ready to reduce trade distorting measures that may adversely affect developing country producers and exporters, while offering greater scope to developing countries within the rules on domestic support to meet non-trade concerns of special relevance to them, such as poverty alleviation and food security. Finally, we must work to ensure that the interests of net food importing developing countries are safeguarded, particularly in the context of ensuring that food aid in no way damages local food production and the marketing capacity of the recipient country.

As part of the launch of a Round, any further elaboration, of the negotiating mandate for agriculture, should open such prospects to developing countries.

Developed countries should also, while maintaining the right to maintain SPS or TBT measures at the level appropriate to fulfil legitimate health, safety and other policy objectives, focus significant attention and resources on enabling developing countries to meet such regulatory requirements, so that the compliance burden does not become a de facto hindrance to their export efforts.

As regards **non-agricultural** tariffs, the EU should persuade other industrialised countries to support a comprehensive tariff cutting approach with no exclusions, in order to address among other things tariff peaks and tariff escalation, both of which are of great interest to developing countries. At Seattle we also supported the concept of differentiation in the tariff negotiating mandate. These elements should all feature in any future new round mandate on industrial tariffs, and the EU should seek to persuade other industrialised countries of the merits of doing so.

As regards **Services, industrialised countries** will similarly need to show readiness to open further their markets in respect of those sectors and modes of interest to developing countries, and to work constructively on the areas of services rules of importance to them. Again, greater precision and commitment in these directions can be given within the SPA but only within - a more substantive GATS mandate agreed as part of the launch of a Round. Both agriculture and services would, at the same time, fall under any deadline established for a Round as a whole.

## **Trade and Social Development**

As regards **trade and social development**, it has become increasingly apparent since Seattle that our objective of a dialogue on this issue will only be secured if the issue is not limited to core labour standards but is extended explicitly to social development, and if it is promoted on its own merits: outside a single undertaking, on its own timeframe, and in a multi-institutional setting involving all relevant international organisations among which the WTO would be only one. In the coming months as we work towards the launch of a Round, this clarification will be essential to reduce suspicion.

A continued clarification of our approach on trade and social development would therefore constitute an important element of our overall presentation and message on how we approach a Round and the further development of the WTO. The same basic logic is also true of the SPA admittedly less sensitive SPA issue of **WTO reform**, where we seek to establish a work programme to look at possible institutional improvements that would be of interest to all Members SPA but which agreed on their own merits in parallel to, rather than as an integral part of, a Round.

## **Conclusion**

The Community should seek to build consensus around the approach described in this paper. As regards rules, this implies pursuing a plurilateral approach for investment and competition, and giving greater precision as to our aims in trade and environment. In other rule making areas industrialised countries should indicate openness to negotiations in areas of interest to developing countries, while as regards the built in agenda negotiations we should be prepared, as part of a decision to launch a Round, to agree upon negotiating guidelines that encompass in explicit ways the objectives of developing countries. Any mandate to negotiate on non-agricultural tariffs should, similarly, encompass the objectives of developing countries. In parallel to negotiations we should further develop programmes of technical cooperation to build capacity and to help developing countries participate in negotiations. Institutional reform and the question of trade and social development should be pursued on their own merits outside a Round.

The approach set out above is intended to ensure that the WTO can continue to be the principal forum for the management of the international trading system in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and avoid a drift SPA that may otherwise become irresistible - towards bilateral or regional trade arrangements. This can only be accomplished if the WTO SPA's future agenda remains sufficiently broad and ambitious to meet the interests of all Members and the various challenges of globalisation rather than taking issues away from the agenda of a Round, we believe that industrialised countries should make adjustments to their positions to better meet the concerns of developing countries, notably by strengthening considerably the development dimension of future negotiations and, in the areas of investment and competition, adjusting the approach. In these ways, without in any way sacrificing the comprehensive round, we will have clearly demonstrated our readiness to learn from Seattle and from the experience of the past year, and to place the development agenda at the heart of a new trade round.

