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Europaudvalget 2000-01
EUU Alm.del Bilag 860
Offentligt

Modtaget via elektronisk post. Der tages forbehold for evt. fejl

Europaudvalget

(Alm. del - bilag 860)

udenrigsministerråd

(Offentligt)

_____________________________________________

URU, Alm. del - bilag 232 (Løbenr. 12740)

UPN, FT del - bilag FT 114 (Løbenr. 12741)

Medlemmerne af Folketingets Europaudvalg

og deres stedfortrædere

Bilag

Journalnummer

400.C.2-0

Kontor

EU-sekr.

6. marts 2001

Til underretning for Folketingets Europaudvalg vedlægges nedklassificeret rapport fra Den Høje Repræsentant

om Fælles Strategier, 14871/00.

Folketingets Europaudvalg har den 17. januar 2001 modtaget rapporten til fortrolig underretning.

COVER NOTE

from :

General Secretariat

to :

Council

Subject :

Common Strategies: report by the Secretary-General / High Representative

Following the Council{{PU2}}s conclusions of 9 October 2000 on the effectiveness of the Union

{{PU2}}s external action, delegations will find attached an evaluation report from the Secretary-

General / High Representative on the subject of Common Strategies.

ANNEX

COMMON STRATEGIES REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The General Affairs Council of 9 October 2000 drew conclusions on the effectiveness of the Union's

external action. On Common Strategies, the Council noted "the importance of common strategies for the

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coordination, coherence and effectiveness of external action. It calls on the Secretary-General/High

Representative to submit, for the first policy debate in January or February 2001, an evaluation report on the

operation of the common strategies already adopted and on ways of ma king optimum use of this instrument

in the future."

2. This internal evaluation report which it is intended should remain confidential, is in three parts: The first

recalls the instrument of Common Strategies, the second deals with "lessons learned", and the last section

draws conclusions and makes recommendations on improving the effectiveness of Common Strategies. The

report also takes into account internal reflections by the Commission.

3. The Common Strategies adopted so far have not yet contributed to a stronger and more effective EU in

international affairs. At the same time, they have contributed to putting together all EU objectives and

means in the areas covered in a comprehensive, cross-pillar approach. We should now draw the lessons from

the shortcomings of our present Common Strategies and take the steps necessary to improve both the

development and the implementation of Common Strategies in the futu re. Otherwise we will widen even

further the gap between their poor effectiveness on the one hand and on the other hand the high expectations

they raise.

II. THE INSTRUMENT OF COMMON STRATEGIES

4. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced into the Treaty on European Union the instrument of common

strategies. The idea behind them was to create an instrument setting the global vision of the Union within

the area of external relations in the medium or long run towards a specific area or theme and, in the CFSP

(second pillar) to provide for decision-making by QMV in implementing decisions, notably in the adoption

of common positions and joint actions.

5. Accordingly, Article 13, paragraph 2 provides that the European Council shall decide on common

strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where Member States have important interests in

common. While common strategies must be compatible with the principles and general guidelines for the

common foreign and security policy, the TEU offers the European Council great flexibility as to their

content. The Treaty prescribes, however, that they should set out three constituent ele ments, namely their

objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States. This gives

common strategies an operational nature, going well beyond declarations of policy.

6. As far as the means are concerned common strategies can cover the possibilities open to the Union,

including those under the EC Treaty. In the latter case, the instruments covered by the EC Treaty must be

adopted in accordance with the procedures provided for by that Treaty. As far as CFSP measures (title V

TEU) are concerned, since a common strategy provides automatically for adoption by qualified majority of

any implementing act there is no need for the common stra tegy itself to provide for a legal base for

implementation on CFSP.

7. The common strategies adopted by the Council so far have been published in the Official Journal. This is

however not mandatory either under the Treaty provisions or under the rules of procedure of the Council.

Each time the Council adopts a common strategy, therefore, it can decide whether to publish it. A decision

on publication must be adopted by unanimity (Article 17 (3) of the rules of procedure of the Council).

III. LESSONS LEARNED

Scope of Common Strategies

8. The EU wanted to use the first common strategies to focus on relations with the geographical areas

surrounding the Union (Russia, Ukraine, Balkans, Mediterranean), not least in order to underline the

importance it attaches to relations with all its immediate neighbours. These were, however, areas for which

broad-based policies and established mechanisms of cooperation already existed or were being developed

(PCAs with Russia and Ukraine, Barcelona Process, Stabilisation and Associa tion Process, Stability Pact),

putting in question the added value of CS in areas where policies were already so well established. The

choice of such complex, high-profile and well trodden areas put the instrument of the common strategy to a

very public test, the risk of which might have been reduced by choosing less ambitious and less well-worn

themes. One of the tests is whether the Union has been able to use CS to implement policies on issues which

really matter. In the case of Russia for example, th e CS is comprehensive in scope, and yet it has not proved

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useful in helping the Union to address the important specific issue of Chechnya. These considerations have

led to the implicit dropping of the Balkan CS, but they raise the question: what next?

9. The European Council at Vienna, which set in motion work on the first four CS, also foresaw future CS

on thematic issues. Although none has so far been decided, considerations similar to those above could

apply to thematic subjects.

Methods used to draw up existing CS

10. The European Council gave very little by way of guidelines, so successive Presidencies have had to develop their

own approaches, which were subject to long and detailed negotiating processes in working groups and special

committees, using traditional bottom-up working methods. Orientation discussions at Council, Coreper and POCO level

did little to change this, but confirmed the wide range of views. The wide scope of the CS and the particular, sometimes

detailed concerns of i ndividual Member States resulted in a "Christmas tree" approach based on the "lowest common

denominator" where Member States and the Commission insisted on covering all possible aspects of relations, including

so many different issues in the CS that in the end it became difficult to distinguish priorities from questions of secondary

importance.

Publicity

11. The question of non-publication in whole or in part so that CS could be real and unvarnished internal

policy documents was decided early on in favour of full publication. This has made them smooth, declaratory

texts, well-suited for public diplomacy purposes. But they are less useful as internal working tools balancing

pros and cons, reconciling different objectives and generally prioritising EU action. They cannot in particular

address se nsitive questions such as EU interests and goals not suited for publication, areas of disagreement

with external partners or difficulties/ contradictions in the EU's approach.

12. The fact that the CS are public documents has reinforced their nature of "fair-weather" instruments, making it

difficult to handle them in times of crisis or to develop them in light of new developments. This could be seen for

example when the Union reviewed its relations with Russia at the height of the Chechnya crisis.

Impact of CS on relations with the countries involved

13. The CS succeeded in emphasising the importance the Union attaches to its relations with the specific countries

involved (a fact clearly appreciated by them), notably by developing the concept of "strategic partnerships" with Russia

and the Ukraine. But as far as substance was concerned the CS did not cover new ground and instead tended to

become inventories of existing policies. At the same time, once Russia and the Ukraine knew that the EU was working

on a CS with them, they tried actively to influence their content.

14. In Russia and the Ukraine the drawing up of the CS first led to uncertainty about the relationship of the new

instruments with the existing comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. This was followed by efforts

to water down the central role of the existing contractual arrangements by trying to give the CS a "quasi-contractual"

connotation and by stressing a hierarchical order putting CS above the PCAs.

15. In the case of Russia, the publication of the CS prompted our partner country to formulate and publish its own

strategy towards the EU; the Russians then wanted to engage the EU in negotiations on areas of both agreement and

disagreement between the two strategies, which actually distracted from the bilateral relationship and tended to

relativise the CS itself.

16. Regarding the Mediterranean region, the perceived lack of added value of the CS compared with the already

comprehensive Barcelona Process and the difficulties in defining the relationship between the CS and the EU's role in

the Middle East Peace Process have put the consistency of the EU's approach towards the region into question. The

unspoken competition between the CS and the ongoing effort to draw up a "Charter for Peace and Stability" in the

Barcelona framework has added to t his confusion.

CS as basis for QMV

17. So far, CS have not been used as basis for QMV decisions in CFSP. In fact the Pillar 2 content of CS devoted to a

comprehensive review of the whole of the EU's relations with a country or region has, at least so far, been close to

minimal, so the question of QMV has not arisen - with one exception in the drafting of the Mediterranean CS.

Agreement was finally reached on excluding the MEPP as such from that CS, but the discussion pointed to a possible

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future difficulty: the br oader the nature, the more Member States may be reluctant to commit themselves to CS, since

they cannot foresee clearly on which decisions QMV might be mandatory.

CS as coordinating instruments

18. The Presidency work-plans mandated by the CS have in principle helped to make CS implementation more focused and

to improve intra- as well as inter-Presidency coordination. But if the truth be told, these have in practice fallen into the

category of routine exercises to which little attention is paid. No sense of priority or urgency emerges from them at the

political level.

19. The instrument of CS should be well adapted to improve coordination and synergy between CFSP, Community action

and Member States' activities. Experience has shown that already the first step towards this goal, the compilation of

inventories of what is done bilaterally in the field of CS, will not be achieved in the short run, notably given the

comprehensive scope of the existing CS. This seems to indicate that the review process in Member States to bring their

national policy act ions in line with CS is at best at an early stage.

20. Little thought has been given to how different CS should be coordinated with each other (there is, for example, a clear

read-across between the CSs on Russia and the Ukraine). In addition, the possibility of aligning the associated countries with

our CS have not been used.

21.

Summing up: The existing Common Strategies tend to be too broadly defined in scope to be truly effective and

to have added value. They are sometimes so thoroughly negotiated among the Member States that they do not

contain real priorities or posteriorities and have become little more than inventories of existing policies and

activities. Whilst having these comprehensive statements of policy in a single document no doubt has its uses as a

reference document, the CS has t ended increasingly to become a bureaucratic exercise. The fact that they are

written to be published has resulted in texts that lack the sharpness needed to make them a truly useful internal

strategy. The introduction by each presidency of a new working plan with new priorities has so far failed to add to

the objective of deploying a consistent and coherent EU approach and has strengthened the impression of stop

and go policies. Precisely because they are so comprehensive, Common Strategies lack f lexibility: too often they

cover a wide range of issues but do not enable the Union to implement policies on specific issues that really

matter. Last but not least, policy issues related to CFSP are formulated in such a manner that the main aim of

Common Strategies to introduce QMV in CFSP has not so far been realised.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

How to make a better use of the C.S.?

22. In order to make the Common Strategies efficient internal working instruments of the Union, and not only

public declarations of already stated policies, they need a new focus. Ultimately they can only become a strong

and useful EU instrument if the necessary political will can be generated to turn them into a real foreign policy

asset of the Union. Their value added could be in concentrating on:

bringing together all EU and Member States policies and resources in a specific area, and

- CFSP issues which can then be implemented by using Qualified Majority Voting.

23. How to do this? the following criteria are suggested:

Common Strategies should be internal EU policy documents.

An alternative would be to

keep a part of the Common Strategy confidential. This should not only be applied to new Common

Strategies, but also to the existing Common Strategies when revised.

Common Strategies should be focused and selective in their scope;

political correctness or

the importance of a topic is not enough, as experience to date shows. They should in the future not

aim at a very broad subject, such as an entire country or region or a wide theme, but deal with a

clearly defined and limited area.

These considerations apply to thematic as to geographical subjects. Additionally for thematic

subjects, it might make sense to avoid themes which would, in the implementation of a legally

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binding instrument, inevitably expose possibly glaring contradictions in applying well accepted

principles where other factors are also important.

Common strategies should have a clear added value which should be identified before the

CS is decided on by the European Council.

This value added could, for example, come from a

will to identify areas for subsequent implementing common positions and joint actions by QMV.

This way the drafters would have a clear mandate for their task.

Common strategies should identify verifiable objectives

against which progress in

implementation can be measured.

Common Strategies must enhance coherence

by bringing together all means and resources

available to the EU. Member States should act coherently in non-EU institutions and promote

Common Strategy objectives in the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and possibly the World Bank,

IMF, Paris Club etc. They also should use Common Strategies as the main framework for their

bilateral policies.

24. The following procedural suggestions could help to the above-mentioned criteria:

* When the European Council invites the Council to prepare a Common Strategy, it should give

clear strategic directions on the priority areas, scope, means and timeframe. A Common Strategy

should not be the subject of detailed bottom-up approach negotiations among Member States.

* To ensure that the above criteria are adhered to, suggestions for a Common Strategy could be

made by the SG/HR after consultations with the Presidency and the European Commission. This

should help guard against short-termism and avoid stop-and-go policies.

* Presidencies should build their work plans on the previous ones in order to promote consistency

and continuity, at the same time allowing for flexibility in the light of new challenges. An incoming

Presidency should therefore not necessarily need to propose a largely new work plan; it could also

reconfirm or supplement an existing one. By narrowing the scope of new Common Strategies as

proposed above, the problem of having diverse workplans will probably tend to solve itself.

* In order to improve coordination, work plans should also include the review of CS

implementation by both the Union and the Member States.

25. In order to mobilise fully the added value of Common Strategies, all instruments, including those of the

Community and of Member States must at all times be used in a coherent way. Therefore, proper articulation

between the CFSP area and the other "pillars" and adequate cross-pillar coherence is essential, and indeed

obligatory under article 3 TEU. In order to achieve this without encroaching upon the respective prerogatives

and competences, a practical approach is needed.

* The European Council should note the Commission's intention to focus its action on the

realisation of the objectives of the Common Strategies through relevant Community measures and,

as necessary, invite it to act appropriately.

* The General Affairs Council should retain overall responsibility for ensuring coherence in the

implementation of Common Strategies. In doing so it should draw on the advice and

recommendations of expert committees such as the EFC, the Article 36 Committee and the Article

133 Committee.

* There should be a clearer division than at present within the Common Strategy between the

CFSP-proposals (laying the legal basis for QMV) and the broad policy orientations in other pillars.

27.

In conclusion, Common Strategies will be more credible if used to develop a limited, specific

foreign policy objective with the priorities and value added identified in advance and the necessary

budgetary and policy means linked directly with it.

_______________________