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Europaudvalget 2005
KOM (2004) 0861
Offentligt

KOMMISSIONEN FOR DE EUROPÆISKE FÆLLESSKABER

Bruxelles, den 7.1.2005

KOM(2004) 861 endelig

MEDDELELSE FRA KOMMISSIONEN TIL EUROPA-PARLAMENTET OG

RÅDET

Euratoms Sikkerhedsaktiviteter i 2003.

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INDLEDNING

Euratom-traktaten, som blev underskrevet samtidig med traktaten om Det

Europæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab, er det vigtigste grundlag i Den Europæiske

Unions lovgivning for Kommissionens aktiviteter inden for nuklear sikkerhed og

strålingsbeskyttelse. Denne meddelelse beskriver de aktiviteter, Kommissionens GD

for Transport og Energi (GD TREN) har udført på grundlag af Euratom-traktatens

afsnit II, kapitel 3 og 7. Andre aktiviteter i henhold til Euratom- traktaten, f.eks.

forskning, omfattes ikke af denne rapport.

2.1.

EURATOMS SIKKERHEDSAKTIVITETERS FORMÅL, RETSGRUNDLAG

OG OMFANG

SUNDHEDSBESKYTTELSE (Euratom-traktatens afsnit II, kapitel 3)

Euratoms vigtigste opgave på det område, som hører under Euratom-traktatens

kapitel 3, er at fastsætte grundlæggende sikkerhedsnormer for at beskytte

arbejdstagerne og befolkningen mod de farer, der er forbundet med ioniserende

stråling. Kapitel 3 giver også Kommissionen udvidede beføjelser til at sikre, at disse

grundlæggende sikkerhedsnormer bliver korrekt anvendt.

Domstolen

har udtrykkelig anerkendt Fællesskabets beføjelser til at lovgive for det

nukleare sikkerhedsområde, der hører under Euratom-traktaten afsnit II, kapitel 3.

Domstolen fastslog navnlig, at Fællesskabet har juridiske beføjelser til af

sundhedsbeskyttelseshensyn at indføre et godkendelsessystem, som medlemsstaterne

skal anvende foruden de grundlæggende normer.

2.2.

Sikkerhedskontrol (Euratom-traktatens afsnit II, kapitel 7)

Kommissionens opgave inden for nuklear sikkerhed og at sikre, at nukleart materiale

ikke benyttes til andet end det planlagte formål, og at de kontrolforpligtelser

Fællesskabet har påtaget sig i kraft af aftaler med tredjelande eller internationale

organisationer, opfyldes. Kapitel VII i Euratom-traktaten og Euratoms

gennemførelsesforordning nr. 3227/76 med senere ændringer er retsgrundlaget for

Euratoms sikkerhedskontrol

OMLÆGNING

Den 16. februar 2003 blev afdelingen for strålingsbeskyttelse flyttet fra GD Miljø til

GD Transport og Energi (GD TREN). Desuden blev to GD TREN-afdelinger, som

beskæftiger sig med juridiske og tekniske spørgsmål og internationale forhold på det

nukleare område, flyttet fra Bruxelles til Luxembourg. To af GD TREN’s

direktorater, Nuklear Energi (H) og Nuklear Sikkerhedskontrol (I) er nu ansvarlige

for alle sikkerhedsaktiviteter, som Kommissionen udfører i henhold til Euratom-

Dom i sagen C-29/99 af 10. december 2002, Sml. [2002] I-11221.

Nærmere enkeltheder findes i KOM(2001) 436 endelig udg., kapitel 2 og 3.

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traktaten, herunder også dem, der hørte under det tidligere Europæiske Kontor for

Sikkerhedskontrol (ESO).

4.1.

SUNDHEDSBESKYTTELSE - NUKLEAR SIKKERHED

Den nukleare pakke

Den 30. januar 2003 vedtog Kommissionen to forslag til rådsdirektiver om

henholdsvis nuklear sikkerhed og forvaltning af radioaktivt affald efter at have

rådført sig med Artikel 31-Gruppen og Det Europæiske Økonomiske og

Sociale Udvalg.

Det første direktivforslag,

som fastsætter de grundlæggende forpligtelser og

generelle principper for sikkerheden på nukleare anlæg, går ud på at sikre, at der

sørges for sundhedsbeskyttelse mod ioniserende stråling i hele det nukleare anlægs

levetid - lige fra opførelsen til den endelige nedlukning. Direktivet går ud fra de

grundlæggende forpligtelser og generelle principper i de relevante internationale

konventioner og giver dem retskraft i Fællesskabet. For at sikre ordningens

troværdighed indfører forslaget en ordning, hvorefter sikkerhedsmyndighederne fra

andre medlemsstater foretager en ekspertbedømmelse. Dette initiativ søger også at

sikre, at der er tilstrækkelige finansielle ressourcer til at dække omkostningerne i

forbindelse med nedlukning af nukleare anlæg.

Formålet med det andet direktivforslag,

som drejer sig om behandlingen af brugt

nukleart brændsel og radioaktivt affald er at forpligte medlemsstaterne til at indføre

nationale programmer for behandling af radioaktivt affald, at fastsætte fælles frister

for bortskaffelse af radioaktivt affald og at prioritere løsningen med deponering i

dybtliggende geologiske formationer. Forslaget søger også at fremme

medlemsstaternes samarbejde om forskning og teknologisk udvikling i forbindelse

med behandling af brugt brændsel og bortskaffelse af radioaktivt affald.

Direktivforslagene blev den 2. maj 2003 sendt til Rådet, som i overensstemmelse

med Euratom-traktaten forelagde dem for Europa-Parlamentet. Rådets drøftelser af

forslagene, der også fik bidrag fra Europa-Parlamentet, førte til ændring af

dokumenterne.

4.2.

Tilsynsmy ndighedernes arbejdsgrupper

CONCERT-gruppen og de nukleare tilsynsmyndigheders arbejdsgruppe (NRWG)

består af højtstående repræsentanter for de nukleare tilsynsmyndigheder i Den

Europæiske Union, Central- og Østeuropa og den tidligere Sovjetunion. i 2003 blev

en række dokumenter, der drejede sig om tidlig lukning af kernekraftværker, ikke-

destruktiv prøvning af nukleare komponenter og økonomiske forskrifters betydning

for den nukleare industri, drøftet og færdiggjort.

KOM(2003) 32 endelig udg.

KOM(2003) 32, endelig udg.

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4.3.

Radioaktiv affald og nedlukning

I april 2003 offentliggjorde Kommissionen den 5. situationsrapport om forvaltning af

radioaktivt affald i Den Europæiske Union, som beskrev situationen i det udvidede

EU. Rapporten viser som et af de vigtigste resultater, at affaldsproduktionen fortsat

falder på grund af affaldsbegrænsende foranstaltninger inden for de lavaktive

kategorier.

I forbindelse med nedlukning har GD TREN øget sin deltagelse i de internationale

nedlukningsfonde (IDF) forud for sin overtagelse af ansvaret for forvaltning af

midlerne til Ignalina i Litauen og Bohunice i Slovakiet efter udvidelsen i maj 2004.

GD TREN har også fortsat deltaget i arbejdet i en række internationale

organisationer og komitéer (især IAEA og OECD/NEA), som beskæftiger sig med

radioaktivt affald og nedlukning. Her har arbejdet med sikkerhedskrav til deponering

af radioaktivt affald i geologiske formationer været særlig vigtigt.

4.4.

Radioaktiv transport og SURE-programmet

Den vigtigste aktivitet i 2003 var udarbejdelsen af den stående arbejdsgruppes (SAG)

femte rapport om transport af radioaktive materialer og udarbejdelsen af en

meddelelse til Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet på grundlag af denne rapport.

Rapportens formål er at beskrive situationen i forbindelse med transport af

radioaktivt materiale i EU, påvise eventuelle særlige problemer og om nødvendigt

foreslå foranstaltninger, der kan forbedre sektorens virksomhed og øge

sikkerhedsniveauet.

Desuden blev der gennemgået tre afsluttende rapporter, som drejede sig om

statistikker over nukleare transporter, forbedring af IAEA's transportbestemmelser

for LSA/SCO-materialer og vurdering af sikkerhedsdata for nuklear kritikalitet og

grænserne for aktinider i transport. Også to foreløbige rapporter om

attesteringsmetoderne i medlemsstaterne og tiltrædelseslandene og om aerosolbåret

udslip af radioaktivt materiale ved transportulykker blev taget op til behandling.

5.1.

SUNDHEDSBESKYTTELSE - STRÅLINGSBESKYTTELSE

Den generelle udvikling

Det samvirke, som opstår ved, at afdelingen for strålingsbeskyttelse flyttes fra GD

ENV til GD TREN, forventes at frigøre ressourcer. Mens der i 2003 kun blev

foretaget én kontrol i henhold til artikel 35, blev der i 2004 truffet foranstaltninger til

at udføre et omfattende kontrolprogram.

Selv om lovgivningsprogrammet har været udsat for en vis forsinkelse, lykkedes det

dog Kommissionen at få to vigtige retsakter vedtaget ved årets slutning. Det drejer

sig om Kommissionens henstilling om standardiserede oplysninger om udslip fra

nukleare anlæg

, og Rådets direktiv om kontrol med lukkede højaktive strålekilder

EUT L 2 af 6.1.2004, s. 36.

EUT L 246 af 31.12.2003, s. 57.

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5.2.

Gennemførelse af lovgivning

Omsætning til medlemsstaternes lovgivning

Korrekt og fuldstændig gennemførelse af Fællesskabets lovgivning blev sikret med

de hjælpemidler, Euratom- traktaten fastsætter, nemlig henstillinger, kontrol,

udtalelser og overtrædelsesprocedurer. Særlig opmærksomhed gjaldt gennemførelsen

af de seneste direktiver om grundlæggende sikkerhedsnormer

og medicinsk

bestråling,

som skulle omsættes til national lovgivning inden den 13. maj 2000.

Traktatens artikel 33 pålægger medlemsstaterne at forelægge nationale lovforslag for

Kommissionen. Kommissionen har modtaget fire sådanne forslag, som i to tilfælde

har givet den anledning til bemærkninger. Kommissionen har i 11 tilfælde afgivet

udtalelse om planer for bortskaffelse af radioaktivt affald, som blev forelagt i

henhold til artikel 37. På grundlag af artikel 141 blev der indledt i alt 26

overtrædelsesprocedurer. Kommissionen besluttede at indbringe to sager i

forbindelse med artikel 37 og direktivet om oplysninger til offentligheden for

Domstolen. I alt blev 10 sager afsluttet, og i to af dem fastslog Domstolen, at den

pågældende medlemsstat havde undladt at give meddelelse om foranstaltningerne for

omsætning af direktivet om grundlæggende sikkerhedsnormer og direktivet om

medicinsk bestråling til national lovgivning. Pr. 31 december 2003 var 16

overtrædelsessager stadig i gang.

5.3.

Praktisk vejledning

Praktisk vejledning i anvendelse af de grundlæggende normer for beskyttelse af

arbejdstagernes og offentlighedens sundhed mod farerne fra ioniserende stråling

gives af den videnskabelige ekspertgruppe, der omtales i Euratom-traktatens artikel

31. I 2003 godkendte gruppen et dokumentudkast om dosisbegrænsning. Den

endelige vedtagelse forventes i 2004. Et videnskabeligt seminar, som blev afholdt af

Kommissionen, førte til enighed om de fremtidige foranstaltninger for

erhvervsbetinget overdosis inden for det medicinske område og om eventuel øget

risiko ved nye teknologier inden for medicin.

Andre initiativer drejede sig om flybesætningers udsættelse for stråling (EURADOS-

projektet), en europæisk oversigt over erhvervsbetinget bestråling (ESOREX 2000),

vurdering af gennemførelsen af direktivet om strålingsbeskyttelse af eksterne

arbejdstagere og om iværksættelsen af et europæisk uddannelsesprogram.

5.4.

Lovgivningens udvikling

Et rådsdirektiv om kontrol med lukkede højaktive strålekilder og ukontrollerede

strålekilder (LHS-direktivet) blev vedtaget i december 2003

. Direktivet fastsætter, at

tilladelse til enhver aktivitet, hvori der indgår en højaktiv strålekilde, kræver

Rådets direktiv 96/29/Euratom af 13. maj 1996 om fastsættelse af grundlæggende sikkerhedsnormer til

beskyttelse af befolkningens og arbejdstagernes sundhed mod de farer, som er forbundet med

ioniserende stråling, EFT L 159 af 29.6.1996, s. 1.

Rådets direktiv 97/43/Euratom af 30. juni 1997 om beskyttelse af personers sundhed mod faren ved

ioniserende stråling i forbindelse med medicinsk bestråling, direktiv 180/466/Euratom

EFT L 180 af 9.7.1997, s. 22.

Rådets direktiv 2003/122/Euratom, EFT L 346 af 31.12.2003, s. 57.

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forudgående undersøgelse for at sikre, at der er truffet foranstaltninger ikke blot for

sikker anvendelse af kilden, men også for rigtig behandling af den, når den ikke

længere benyttes. Direktivet indeholder også bestemmelser om registrering,

opbevaring og overflytning af strålekilder og om ansvaret for ”ukontrollerede”

kilder.

Til vejledningsformål udsendte Kommissionen to henstillinger om de radiologiske

følger af Tjernobyl- ulykken

og om standardiserede oplysninger om radioaktive

udslip til miljøet fra kernekraftværker og oparbejdningsanlæg

Efter Domstolens dom af 10. december 2002 om Euratoms beføjelser inden for

strålingsbeskyttelse vedtog Rådet en afgørelse om ændring af ordlyden i Euratoms

kompetenceerklæring i henhold til artikel 30, stk. 4, nr. (iii), i konventionen om

nuklear sikkerhed

5.5.

Katastrofeberedskab

Afdelingen for strålingsbeskyttelse har en 24 timers vagttjeneste, kendt som

ECURIE, for at kunne iværksætte udveksling af oplysninger i tilfælde af en

strålingsulykke. Der blev foretaget tekniske forbedringer af ECURIE’s

kommunikationssystemer, og der blev foretaget regelmæssige afprøvninger.

For at kunne opnå øjeblikkelig reaktion i katastrofetilfælde har ECURIE-systemet

direkte forbindelser med overvågnings- og informationscentret (OIC), som forestås

af GD ENV inden for rammerne af Fællesskabets civilbeskyttelsesordning.

I maj blev der afholdt et ECURIE-uddannelseskursus for tiltrædelses- og

kandidatlandene. Bulgarien, Ungarn og Litauen tilsluttede sig formelt ECURIE-

systemet i efteråret. Andre tiltrædelses- og kandidatlande er blevet inddraget i

ECURIE og forbereder medlemskab, selv om den tekniske gennemførelse af

ECURIE-kommunikationssystemet i nogle tiltrædelseslande ikke er gået så glat som

ventet.

SUNDHEDSBESKYTTELSE - ANSVARET FOR NUKLEARE SKADER

Paris-konventionen af 29. juli 1960 om ansvar over for tredjemand på den nukleare

energis område indeholder bestemmelser om det erstatningsansvar over for

tredjemand, som påhviler nukleare anlægs driftsledere, og om reglerne for erstatning

i tilfælde af nukleare ulykker. En ændringsprotokol fastsætter en mere end

tredivedobbelt forhøjelse af det erstatningsbeløb, det nukleare anlægs driftsleder skal

afholde, idet det er blevet forhøjet til mindst 700 mio. EUR. Den udvider også

Kommissionens henstilling 2003/274/Euratom af 14. april 2003 om beskyttelse og information af

offentligheden med hensyn til eksponering for vedvarende radioaktiv cæsiumforurening i visse vilde

fødevareprodukter

som

følge

ulykken

på

kernekraftværket

Tjernobyl,

EFT L 99 af 17.4.2003, s. 55.

Kommissionens henstilling 2004/2/Euratom af 18. december 2003 om standardiserede oplysninger

vedrørende radioaktive luftbårne og flydende udslip til miljøet fra nukleare kraftværker og

oparbejdningsanlæg ved normal drift, EFT L 2 af 6.1.2004, s. 36.

Vedtaget den 15.12.2003. Se også Kommissionens afgørelse 2004/491/Euratom af 29.4.2004, L 172 af

6.5.2004, s. 7.

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konventionens geografiske anvendelsesområde, så der kan gives erstatning til ofre i

stater, som ikke er parter i konventionen, og den udvider det materielle

anvendelsesområde til miljøskader og til omkostningerne ved sikkerhedskontrol. Da

ændringsprotokollen berører Fællesskabets jurisdiktionsbestemmelser skulle

underskrivelses- og ratifikationsprocessen vedtages af Rådet og drøftes i Europa-

Parlamentet, hvilket skete i 2003.

7.1.

NUKLEAR SIKKERHED -– EURATOMS SIKKERHEDSKONTROL

Den generelle udvikling

I 2002 vedtog Kommissionen en ny opgavebeskrivelse for de afdelinger, der udfører

dens kontrolopgaver i forbindelse med sikkerhed (”Euratoms sikkerhedskontrol”), og

bad de pågældende direktorater om at omlægge deres overvågningsmetoder efter

anlægstype og ændre deres inspektionsprocedurer i overensstemmelse hermed.

Kommissionen udpegede også en gruppe for videnskabelig rådgivning om Euratoms

sikkerhedskontrol (SAGES), som skulle give ekspertråd. I 2003 blev der på fælles

møder mellem SAGES og Kommissionens repræsentanter drøftet ændrede metoder

for en række anlægstyper samt en overordnet strategi. Forslagene er en omlægning i

forhold til den traditionelle sikkerhedskontrol. Begreber som tidsfaktoren får en

mindre rolle end tidligere. Der vil blive lagt større vægt på at sikre, at driftsledelsen i

tilstrækkelig grad kontrollerer og overvåger nukleart materiale, som er i dens

besiddelse. Teknikker, der benyttes uden for sikkerhedskontrollen, f.eks.

systemrevision, vil blive indført. Omfang og tidsplanlægning af Kommissionens

kontrol vil blive mindre forudsigelig for driftslederne. Inspektionerne vil blive

planlagt, så der tages hensyn til det indbyrdes forhold mellem de forskellige stadier i

den nukleare brændselscyklus.

Drøftelserne af forslaget til den nye forordning om sikkerhedskontrol (KOM(2002)

99), der drejer sig om den tekniske udvikling inden for sikkerhedskontrol og skal

udgøre retsgrundlaget for gennemførelse af tillægsprotokollerne til kontrolaftalerne

med IAEA blev videreført i Rådets atomgruppe (AG). Drøftelserne førte til en række

forklaringer, forståelser og aftaler mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaternes

delegationer, som blev samlet i et dokument med titlen "retningslinjer for anvendelse

af KOM(2002) 99", der vil blive offentliggjort i form af en henstilling fra

Kommissionen og give driftslederne en uforpligtende vejledning. Rådet forventes at

godkende forordningen i begyndelsen af 2004.

Der blev afholdt bilaterale møder med de pågældende medlemsstater for at drøfte

spørgsmål i forbindelse med den reviderede forordnings bestemmelser om affald og

enkelthederne i gennemførelsen af TP. Samtlige medlemsstater blev indbudt til et

møde i Luxembourg i december 2003 for at drøfte gennemførelsesspørgsmålene,

ikke mindst de områder, der er fælles for Euratoms og IAEA’s opgaver på de

nukleare anlæg i Europa. De positive tilbagemeldinger tyder på, at sådanne møder

også kunne være nyttige i fremtiden, og det planlægges derfor at afholde et eller to

om året for eftertiden.

De nøjagtige resultater af kvalitetsundersøgelsen af Euratoms sikkerhedskontrol i

2002 findes i bilag 1. Driftslederne gav i det store og hele udtryk for deres tilfredshed

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med situationen og med Euratoms sikkerhedskontrols udførelse af sine opgaver på

deres anlæg.

Arbejdet med udvikling og gennemførelse af nye sikkerhedskontrolteknikker blev

videreført. Nærmere enkeltheder findes i bilag 2.

I betragtning af EU’s kommende udvidelse blev der lagt særlig vægt på forberedende

arbejde for hurtigt at kunne iværksætte kontrolinspektioner i disse lande. Den

nukleare industri i tiltrædelseslandene er for det meste begrænset til kraftreaktorer og

oplagringsanlæg. Der blev foretaget rejser til de enkelte lande for at skabe

arbejdskontakter og forklare meningen med det fremtidige inspektionsarbejde. En

udvidelsesarbejdsgruppe mødtes i november med repræsentanter for IAEA for at

forberede fremtidige inspektionsaktiviteter. Et program for saglige undersøgelser og

tekniske opgaver blev opstillet og vil blive udført i første kvartal 2004.

7.2.

Sikkerhedskontrolaktiviteter

De nukleare anlægs driftsledere opgav deres beholdninger af nukleart materiale og

materialebevægelserne til Kommissionen. Over 1 mio. regnskabsposteringer blev

modtaget i årets løb, i de fleste tilfælde ad elektronisk vej. Alle data blev kontrolleret

med henblik på intern og ekstern overensstemmelse (transit matching) og

overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i samarbejdsaftalerne med tredjelande. Alle

fejl og uoverensstemmelser blev fundet og rettet efter samråd med de pågældende

driftsledere. Der blev også sendt regnskabsberetninger til IAEA for at opfylde EU’s

forpligtelser i henhold til kontrolaftalerne med IAEA.

I 2003 udgjorde de inspektioner, som blev foretaget af Kommissionens

sikkerhedsinspektører, 6 366 inspektions- manddage, dvs. næsten 13% mindre end i

2002. Denne nedgang skyldes fortrinsvis yderligere tilpasning og prioritering af

inspektionsaktiviteterne. De vigtigste problemer og/eller resultater i forbindelse med

inspektionsaktiviteterne for hver enkelt af de kontrollerede anlægstyper er i korthed

gengivet i bilag 3.

Som resultat af Euratoms kontrolaktiviteter i henhold til Euratom-traktatens kapitel 7

blev der ikke fundet tegn på, at nukleart materiale var blevet benyttet til andet end

det oprindelige formål. Der var heller ingen tegn på, at særlige kontrolforpligtelser,

som Fællesskabet havde påtaget sig efter aftale med tredjelande, ikke var blevet

opfyldt.

NUKLEAR SIKKERHED - SAMARBEJDE MED IAEA

Kommissionen samarbejder med Den Internationale Atomenergiorganisation

(IAEA), der er ansvarlig for sikkerhedskontrollen på verdensplan ifølge ikke-

spredningstraktaten, som alle Den Europæiske Unions medlemsstater har tilsluttet

sig. Nærmere enkeltheder om dette samarbejde findes i bilag 4.

NUKLEAR SIKKERHED - ILLEGAL HANDEL

Kommissionen har fortsat deltaget aktivt i det arbejde, der udføres af ikke-

spredningsekspertgruppen (NPEG) under G8’s internationale tekniske arbejdsgruppe

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vedrørende smugling af nukleare materialer (ITWG). Der forekom tre tilfælde af

illegal handel med nukleart materiale i Den Europæiske Union i 2003, og de drejede

sig om afskærmningssystemer af forarmet uran og artikler, der indeholdt thorium.

Desuden var der 10 tilfælde af illegal handel med radioaktive kilder.

10.

NUKLEAR SIKKERHED - SAMARBEJDE MED ANDRE REGIONALE

ORGANISATIONER

Som led i ”energidialogen” mellem EU og Rusland blev den fjerde udviklingsrapport

fremlagt på topmødet mellem EU og Rusland i Rom i november 2003 i overværelse

af Romano Prodi og Vladimir Putin. Rapporten indeholdt en erklæring om, at EU og

Rusland vil opstille et samarbejdsprogram for regnskab og kontrol med nukleart

materiale for at skabe et mere snævert samarbejde om nuklear sikkerhed.

Kommissionens nukleare sikkerhedseksperter har ført indledende drøftelser med

deres russiske kolleger for at opstille et fælles samarbejdsprogram. Der er allerede

blevet udarbejdet et arbejdsprogram, som bl.a. fastlægger inspektionsprocedurerne

for oparbejdnings- og brændselsfremstillingsanlæg, fælles udvikling af

computersystemer til opfølgning af indeslutningen af nukelart materiale og lignende

hjælpemidler

til

databehandling

inden

for

sikkerhedskontrol,

fælles

uddannelsesprogrammer og tilrettelæggelse af konferencer i Rusland om nuklear

sikkerhed.

11.

NUKLEAR SIKKERHED - FYSISK BESKYTTELSE

Euratom er part i konventionen af 1979 om fysisk beskyttelse af nukleare materialer

(KFBNM), der fortrinsvis drejer sig om fysisk beskyttelse af nukleare materialer

under international transport. I marts 2003 færdiggjorde en særlig arbejdsgruppe en

rapport, der foreslog en ændring for at stramme konventionens bestemmelser. Den

foreslåede ændring skulle styrke den fysiske beskyttelsesordning ved at udvide

konventionens anvendelsesområde til også at omfatte nukleart materiale under

indenlandsk anvendelse, oplagring og transport samt beskyttelse af anlæggene mod

sabotage. Den foreslåede ændring bekræfter, at hovedansvaret for fysisk beskyttelse

påhviler den enkelte stat. Desuden foreslås det at indføre en juridisk forpligtelse til at

benytte de målsætninger og principper for fysisk beskyttelse, IAEA's styrelsesråd har

godkendt. Der var i slutningen af 2003 endnu ikke truffet beslutning om nogen

ændringskonference.

12.

INTERNATIONALT SAMARBEJDE

I 2003 blev aftalerne om nukleart samarbejde med USA, Canada og Australien

iværksat til alle parters tilfredshed. Bilaterale aftaler mellem Kommissionen og

henholdsvis Canada og USA bekræftede det gode forhold mellem parterne.

Aftaleforhandlingerne med Japan og Kina har gjort visse fremskridt. Selv om aftalen

med Japan ikke kunne indgås på grund af vanskeligheder med proceduren for

forslagets godkendelse i Japan, er der imidlertid håb om, at der kan opnås enighed

om en kompromistekst i 2004. Kommissionens mandat fra Rådet til at forhandle en

nuklear samarbejdsaftale med Kina er blevet vedtaget, og forhandlingerne vil blive

indledt i den nærmeste fremtid.

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13.

RESSOURCER

Euratom-traktatens artikel 174 nævner udtrykkeligt, at Kommissionens budget skal

afsætte bevillinger til driftsudgifterne i forbindelse med nuklear sikkerhedskontrol. I

2003 var de særlige aktionsbevillinger på EU’s budget til Euratoms

sikkerhedskontrol på 18,8 mio. EUR. Heraf blev 13 mio. EUR (70%) faktisk

forpligtet. Nærmere enkeltheder findes i bilag 5.

I slutningen af 2003 var et personale på i alt 302 ansatte beskæftiget med nuklear

sikkerhed, heraf var 182 nukleare inspektører. Nærmere enkeltheder om

personaleressourcerne og deres udnyttelse findes i bilag 5.

14.

GENERELLE KONKLUSIONER

2003 var et vigtigt år for omlægningen af Kommissione ns aktiviteter på det nukleare

område, og resultatet forventes at blive et omfattende praktisk samvirke, som f.eks.

vil sætte Kommissionen i stand til at øge antallet af inspektioner på

medlemsstaternes nukleare anlæg.

Lovgivningspakken vil, når den bliver vedtaget, som årets vigtigste

lovgivningsinitiativ føre til ensartede sikkerhedsstandarder af højt niveau på de

nukleare anlæg i hele det udvidede EU og sikre, at der tages tilstrækkelige

forholdsregler i forbindelse med nedlukning af nukleare anlæg og behandling af

brugt brændsel og radioaktivt affald. Vedtagelsen af direktivet om kontrol med

lukkede højaktive strålekilder vil bidrage til at sikre, at potentielt skadelige kilder

registreres, behandles og bortskaffes korrekt. Kommissionen har også aktivt søgt at

sikre, at medlemsstaterne omsætter Fællesskabets lovgivning til national lovgivning

korrekt.

Kommissionen har deltaget aktivt i internationale fora, som beskæftiger sig med

nuklear sikkerhed, affaldsbehandling, sikkerhedskontrol, strålingsbeskyttelse og

radioaktive transporter. Den har fortsat været en af de vigtigste deltagere i

Fællesskabets ordninger for indsats i tilfælde af større strålingskatastrofer.

Hvad Euratoms sikkerhedskontrol angår, har Kommissionen gjort gode fremskridt

med den praktiske udførelse af den nye opgavebeskrivelse. En ændring af

forordningen om sikkerhedskontrol rykkede nærmere under drøftelserne med Rådet.

Kommissionen gjorde også gode fremskridt med de praktiske forberedelser til

gennemførelsen af tillægsprotokollen. En undersøgelse af driftsledernes opfattelse af

Euratoms sikkerhedskontrol viste, at de i det store og hele var tilfredse med den

måde, hvorpå Kommissionen udfører kontrollen.

På grundlag af inspektionerne og vurdering af regnskaberne fra indehaverne af

nukleart materiale blev der ikke fundet tegn på, at nukleare materialer var blevet

anvendt til andet end de oprindelige formål, brugerne i Den Europæiske Union havde

opgivet i 2003. Der var heller ingen tegn på, at kontrolbestemmelserne i

internationale aftaler ikke blev overholdt. Statistiske vurderinger af

regnskabsberetningerne viser, at alle de store anlægs systemer for regnskab med

nukleart materiale opfylder de internationale standarder.

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Det arbejde, som er blevet udført i 2003, danner et solidt grundlag for, at TREN kan

videreudvikle sine aktiviteter på det nukleare område. De vil medvirke til, at

kernekraftmuligheden holdes åben, og kan således føre til en bæredygtig

energisammensætning, mindre afhængighed af energiimport og miljøbeskyttelse i

kraft af en formindskelse af de samlede CO2-emissioner.

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ANNEXES

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ANNEX 1

Euratom Safeguards Performance – Detailed evaluation of the survey of operators 2002

The survey contained 29 questions, divided into five groups (general safeguards issues,

transmission of data to Euratom Safeguards, quality of Euratom Safeguards’ information on

inspections, evaluation of inspection issues, and wider issues).

A total of 72 questionnaires were sent to all the major nuclear installations as well as to a

representative sample of all the other nuclear installations in the European Union (EU). 84%

of the questionnaires were returned and between 82% and 100% of the individual questions

were answered. Thus, the size of the response permits conclusions to be drawn about the

image and performance of the Euratom Safeguards authorities. Overall, operators noted their

satisfaction concerning the image and the performance of Euratom Safeguards in their

installations.

The costs to the operators of a safeguards infrastructure to meet Euratom requirements

compared to the costs of meeting other statutory obligations were felt to be not very high.

Operators expressed reservations concerning remote transmission of real-time accountancy

data, surveillance images, and non-destructive assay results from their facilities to Euratom

Safeguards headquarters in Luxembourg.

With regard to the quality of information on inspections, operators appear to be very satisfied

with communication with Euratom Safeguards inspectors during inspections, and most

operators welcome the follow-up letters sent after inspections. Nonetheless, the evaluation

indicated that communication channels outside inspections need to be improved.

Regarding the evaluation of inspection issues, the answers revealed that the majority of

operators of power reactors, enrichment plants and reprocessing plants are not satisfied with

coordination/cooperation between Euratom Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA). This is an important finding which needs to be followed up. On the other

hand, there is reasonably good continuity in the approaches followed during two consecutive

inspections conducted by Euratom Safeguards inspectors. The replies concerning the

professional abilities of Euratom inspectors confirmed their knowledge and thorough

understanding of their working environment.

The balance between cost and effectiveness in the way in which inspections are organised and

conducted is rated as medium. However, operators did not suggest measures to increase the

effectiveness and efficiency of inspections, nor did they identify ways to improve the balance

between cost and effectiveness. Most operators were not very enthusiastic about providing

more support to Euratom Safeguards in exchange for a less intrusive inspector presence.

As to the wider framework, operators were opposed to the inclusion of safety, security,

physical protection, and radiological protection in the tasks of the Euratom Safeguards

inspectors. The views were somewhat divided on the question of whether or not the Euratom

Safeguards system contributes to improving the quality of the nuclear accountancy system,

the commercial relations/image, and the quality control system of the operators. The

consensus view was that two to three years would be a suitable interval between future quality

surveys.

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ANNEX 2

Progress in Safeguards Technology

In 2003, work continued on the development and implementation of new safeguards

technologies including the new digital surveillance systems. These systems have motion

detection and image data treatment applications already incorporated in the delivered systems.

These advanced features provide valuable assistance and they save time when viewing or

reviewing images. The installation of one of these units at the Trillo nuclear power plant

(Spain) was the first in the presence of the IAEA. This was an important step on the path to

approval of the equipment for routine use by the IAEA.

With regard to existing equipment, development work has continued on the improvement of

hand-held instruments and associated software for measuring gamma radiation.

A special instrument for the measurement of fresh, highly enriched fuel elements was

developed in 2003 and installed at the FRM2 reactor in Munich.

In terms of new equipment, the Commission partic ipated in a demonstration of a Digital

Cerenkov Device for viewing irradiated nuclear fuel stored under water at the Ringhals power

plant in Sweden. The device has the potential to view irradiated fuel with a cooling time in

excess of 20 years or a low burn-up.

The Commission has also been exploring the possibility of using Virtual Private Networks

over the telephone network to provide a secure means of data transmission. Following a

workshop held in Luxembourg in March 2003 the requirements and boundary conditions were

established for secure data transmission from nuclear sites to Luxembourg.

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ANNEX 3

Euratom Safeguards: Detailed inspection findings

In 2003 inspection activities conducted by Commission Safeguards inspectors amounted to

6366 person- inspectio n days, down by almost 13% in comparison with 2002. This fall mainly

resulted from further streamlining and prioritisation of inspection activities.

The main concerns and/or results achieved in the course of the inspection activities for each

type of installations under control are summarised below.

Reprocessing facilities

The nuclear fuel reprocessing installations at THORP, Sellafield, UK, and at UP2/UP3, La

Hague, France are characterised by their high throughput

, automation, and limited access to

the process areas. The current safeguards approach for these plants comprises high frequency

inspections and automated unattended instrumentation to verify the nuclear material flow, a

significant part of which is plutonium. Both sites have on-site laboratories, operated by

analysts from DG JRC-ITU, in which verification measurements are performed.

THORP was in normal production mode throughout 2003 with the exception of a planned

shutdown during the months of October and November. Investigations continued on the

apparent bias of the operator's input sample results from 2001 with particular emphasis on the

calibration of the material used for verification of input solutions. The annual Physical

Inventory and the Material Balance presented by BNFL were accepted.

Apart from a few short technical shut-down periods, the

Magnox reprocessing facilities

Sellafield were in operation at a high throughput during the year. The first plutonium was

introduced in the new Store 9 Extension in November 2002. Verification activities in these

plants and in other Magnox related facilities on the Sellafield site were satisfactorily

concluded. Some reservations however, had to be made in respect of some old plutonium

stores where access is restricted due to radiological conditions, as well as in respect of some

very old plants being decommissioned.

The UP2/800 reprocessing plant was in operation during the whole of 2003. Efforts were

made to optimise inspection activities. In particular, a revised safeguards approach was

successfully tested in the irradiated fuel storage ponds; this will halve the inspection

manpower needed to safeguard these ponds. The annual physical inventory verifications were

successful in the plutonium stores. With respect to the UP2/800 chemical process, the

verifications performed confirmed a problem concerning high values of Material

Unaccounted For (MUF) for uranium and uranium 235 which had already been detected in

2002. The issue is still under investigation by COGEMA. The cumulative “Shipper-Receiver

Difference” declarations for the unit for recycling of aged separated plutonium are higher than

expected and might represent a new problem. This issue is also being examined by

COGEMA.

At reprocessing plants, irradiated fuel assemblies received from power reactors are processed

chemically to separate uranium and plutonium from the highly radioactive fission products. The

separated nuclear materials can be re-introduced into the fuel cycle.

The total annual throughput of these three facilities adds up to over 3000 tonnes of fuel containing more

than 20 tonnes of plutonium.

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The

UP3

reprocessing plant was in operation from January to December 2003. The annual

physical inventory carried out in August 2003 was satisfactorily completed. The installed

instrumentation to verify the plutonium product input and output was upgraded and updated

satisfactorily. The operator announced the start of reprocessing of research reactor fuel in

2005; this will have an impact on the safeguards strategy for the plant as it will involve

handling highly enriched uranium.

Enrichment facilities

At the three

Urenco centrifuge enrichment plants

at Almelo (NL), Gronau (D) and

Capenhurst (UK), sample taking for subsequent High Performance Trace Analysis (HPTA) is

now routinely used to confirm that only low-enriched uranium is produced. The analysis of

the samples started in 2003.

Meetings were held between Urenco, the Member States involved, the IAEA and the

European Commission to prepare for the implementation of the Additional Protocol in the

Urenco plants at Almelo, Gronau and Jülich (D).

The diffusion enrichment plant,

Eurodif Production

at Pierrelatte, France, was subjected to

weekly import and export verifications throughout 2003. The operator cooperated with the

Commission’s request concerning the presentation of product for verification and sealing

before export from the European Union.

The annual inventory verification was carried out in the first week of February 2003.

Additional verification activities in two other installations were required before the annual

inventory verification could be successfully concluded.

Constraints placed by France on the inspectors due to the “particular

status”

of the

installation remain in force, which create unsatisfactory verification conditions.

Within the limits set by these constraints, no evidence of diversion of nuclear material under

safeguards was found.

Installations for the Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuels (MOX)

At the

Belgonucléaire MOX fuel fabrication plant

at Dessel, Belgium, there is an apparent

trend in the cumulative MUF. Although the individual MUF figure for the year 2003 was

statistically acceptable, the quantities of nuclear material established during all recent annual

physical inventory takings were systematically higher than the declared book figures. The

operator is conducting a joint investigation with DG TREN to identify the possible cause for

this trend.

Modern Light Water Reactors need fuel with about 3 to 5 percent of the fissionable uranium isotope

U235. As natural uranium contains only 0.7 percent of this nuclide, an enrichment process is needed to

achieve the desired concentration. In the European Union, two companies offer this service for civil

customers: URENCO and EURODIF.

Due to the presence of material not under safeguards in the material balance area of EURODIF

Production S.A.

In MOX Fuel Fabrication Plans, the plutonium oxide produced in reprocessing installations is used in a

mixture with uranium oxide to fabricate MOX fuel elements for subsequent use in nuclear power plants.

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Active commissioning of the

Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP)

in the UK continued. However,

operational problems caused production delays throughout the year. These problems were one

of the causes of the higher than expected MUF. The operator has started remedial work and

has planned improvements of the concerned systems. Progress has been made in discussions

with the operator and UK national authorities on data transfer to Luxembourg for evaluation.

The decommissioning of the

Siemens Mixed Oxide fuel fabrication plant

in Hanau,

Germany is progressing well and is expected to lead to a reduction of the inspection

frequency there in 2004.

The results of the annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) at the

COGEMA MOX

fabrication plant

at Cadarache in France were not entirely satisfactory owing to the high

values of MUF. There is, however, no evidence that safeguarded nuclear material has been

diverted from its intended use. The operator has made a commitment to re- measure all

materials identified as being a potential source of the discrepancies.

LEU and HEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, Conversion Facilities

BNFL Springfields in the

UK, a large natural and low-enriched uranium conversion and

fuel fabrication plant, the annual Physical Inventory Verification revealed shortcomings in the

stocktaking arrangements for a limited area of the plant. A task force was set up by the

operator to improve the nuclear material management.

Fabbricazione Nucleare LEU fabrication plant

in Bosco Marengo, Italy, the operator

has finished the repackaging of the low enriched and natural uranium oxide which remained

in the installation after fabrication activities were stopped. The material was verified and

sealed; it will be kept contained for a long period of time.

At the

FBFC LEU fabrication plant Romans

, France, a systematic error was discovered in

the declared tare weights of uranium powders shipped to FBFC in Dessel, Belgium. The

accountancy declarations have since been corrected accordingly.

Following evaluation, satisfactory explanations were also found for a series of positive MUF

values at the

FBFC LEU fabrication plant

Dessel

in Belgium.

Nuclear Power and Research Reactors

, other installations and facilities

The formal status of Unit 1 of the

Gundremmingen

power plant in Germany was changed

from closed down to decommissioned as was the status of the

Zwentendorf project

Austria, which was abandoned before Austria became an EU member. Both power plants are

At LEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, fuel assemblies are produced from low enriched uranium (LEU) for

subsequent use in nuclear power plants. In HEU Fuel Fabrication Plants, fuel elements for research

reactors that use high-enriched uranium (HEU) are manufactured.

Most of the nuclear power reactors operated in the European Union are of the Light Water Reactor type

(LWR), i.e. the reactors are cooled and moderated with normal water. In addition, the UK operates

MAGNOX and Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) which are moderated with graphite and cooled

with CO2 gas. The operation of LWRs using LEU is characterised by long periods (12-18 months) of

continuous operation. These periods, when the in-core fuel is inaccessible, are followed by outages

typically lasting 2-4 weeks when about one third of the (used) core fuel is exchanged for fresh fuel from

Fuel Fabrication Plants. LWRs are inspected during this outage period when all the fuel is accessible for

verification.

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still being decommissioned but inspection visits confirmed that massive reconstruction would

be needed before the plants could be made usable.

Initiatives are underway to remove the

Dodewaard

reactor in the Netherlands from the list of

safeguarded plants, the remaining action being the final shutdown of the facility and the

subsequent shipments of the remaining nuclear material, accompanied by the necessary

inspections.

During a check of the spent fuel pond at the

Oskarshamn Power Plant

in Sweden the

operator found that a fuel rod appeared to be missing from a storage cassette. The matter was

treated seriously and it took concurrent investigations by the Commission and the IAEA to

clarify the situation which goes back to the time before Sweden joined the EU.

Finland

the start of inspection work in two power plants was delayed because of plant

security not accepting the inspector’s passport as a valid document. In both cases, the matter

could only be resolved by negotiation and through the intervention of the Finnish State

Authority (STUK). Inspectors also experienced difficulties in gaining access to facilities in

France

where an operator’s health physics service refused to accept the inspector’s radiation

protection passport, even though it was properly in order and up to date.

Operators’ uncertainty with respect to the progress/handling of verification requests led to

growing pressure for clarification. This was specifically felt in plants in Belgium:

Doel,

Tihange,

and

Belgonucléaire

At the

BR2 reactor

in Mol, Belgium, an Advanced Thermal Power monitor was installed by

the IAEA to verify the declaration of the operating history and guarantee the absence of

undeclared production of plutonium. The BR2 reactor is the first research reactor in the EU to

be equipped with such a monitor. The device is still being tested.

Inspections to verify

the transfer of spent fuel to CASTOR casks

continued to be of

particular concern. In view of the envisaged medium to long term storage of these containers

at reactor sites in

Germany, Belgium and Spain,

their contents were measured by DG TREN

I befo re loading and subsequently brought under multiple containment and surveillance

systems. Due to recurring technical problems during the loading, drying and closing of the

CASTOR flasks, inspections proved to be difficult to plan. As the above countries have to

empty their reactor ponds for operational purposes, these activities required more human

resources than expected.

A new store for spent fuel and plutonium (MAGENTA) is to be constructed at

Cadarache

France and is expected to be operational in 2009. The French authorities and the plants’

management presented the project to the Commission at an early stage in order to allow DG

TREN’s requirements to be met.

Anticipating the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA insisted on visiting a

large number of locations containing small quantities of nuclear material (Locations

Outside

Facilities - LOF).

This caused a substantial additional inspection burden for DG TREN.

However, on occasions these inspections led to unexpected findings, for example at the

University of Vienna a small sample of highly enriched uranium, which had not been

recorded as such, was found.

Material Balance Evaluation of Bulk-Handling Facilities

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In bulk handling facilities (Conversion Plants, Enrichment Plants, Fuel Fabrication Plants,

and, Reprocessing Plants) nuclear material is mostly processed in loose forms, such as

powders or liquids. Measurement uncertainties and particularities of the process lead to

differences between the book inventory and the physical reality (known as

Material

Unaccounted For,

MUF). The MUF is established at the operator’s own annual physical

inventory taking. It is verified by the inspectors of DG TREN, who do their own verifications

and measurements.

In 2003, the Material Balance Evaluation focused on

–

the evaluation of differences between operators’ declarations and inspectors’

measurement results obtained by Destructive Analysis (DA),

evaluation of the MUF declared by the facility,

evaluation of the cumulative MUF, which is the algebraic sum of the MUF for

a Material Balance Area (MBA) over time, and

Shipper-Receiver Differences (SRD)

The entire evaluation of MUF, cumulative MUF and SRD was based on data collected from

the Euratom Safeguards accountancy database which means that the French bulk-handling

MBAs for which no declarations exist were excluded from the evaluation. Small bulk-

handling MBAs with a physical ending or a throughput less than two significant quantities

as well as those plants decommissioned in 2003, were excluded from the evaluation.

No evidence was found to suggest that, in the bulk- handling facilities of the EU, source

materials or special fissile materials were diverted from their intended uses as declared by the

operators. It found that, without exception, operators’ measurement systems comply with the

most recent international standards. Nevertheless, some problems were revealed. At the large

BNFL uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plant at Springfields in the UK, the MUF

cannot be explained by measurement uncertainties alone. In addition, there was still evidence

of biases in the cumulative MUF for some bulk-handling facilities, which have to be further

investigated to identify the required corrective actions.

‘Shipper-Receiver Difference’ means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch

as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area.

Significant quantities are used in establishing the quantity component of the safeguards inspection goal,

e.g. 8 kg plutonium, 25 kg high enriched uranium and 75 kg low enriched uranium.

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ANNEX 4

CO-OPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)

The SIR 2002 concluded that there was no evidence of diversion of nuclear material or

misuse of equipment or facilities placed under safeguards in the European Union.

The SIR 2002 acknowledged that collaboration with Euratom and Member State support

programmes made it possible to achieve significant advances in safeguards technology and

verification procedures. Trials were carried out in various EU installations in the areas of

surveillance systems, short notice random inspections, and remote monitoring, as were field

tests on implementing the Additional Protocol (research centres in Finland and in the

Netherlands). A workplan for Flowsheet Verification (FSV) of neptunium was discussed and

agreed with the ITU at Karlsruhe and the implementation of FSV measures is expected to

begin shortly.

In line with the New Partnership Approach arrangements and in order to save resources, the

IAEA and Euratom Safeguards continued to share the purchase, operationa l and maintenance

costs of equipment installed in facilities under IAEA safeguards.

A seminar on the New Partnership Approach, jointly developed by the Agency and Euratom,

was held in Vienna. Many of the IAEA’s routine training courses were attended by inspectors

from DG TREN and conversely, IAEA inspectors attended courses given by DG TREN, thus

maintaining cooperation on training.

In addition to its global conclusions, the SIR 2002 made recommendations for improvement

in specific areas. These recommendations may be summarised as follows:

•

Problems occurred when nuclear material remained in closed shipping containers at

reactors over long periods. The practicalities of extending the area under surveillance and

of sealing the shipping containers before their removal are being investigated.

•

The issue of verifying that there has been no undeclared production of plutonium in the

EU’s three large research reactors will be settled once power monitors are installed at the

reactors concerned. Indeed, the first power monitor was installed in 2003 at the BR2

reactor in Belgium.

•

Corrective actions need to be taken as soon as possible after a Containment and

Surveillance (C/S) failure is detected. The IAEA intends to install a newer generation of

C/S equipment, improve equipment reliability, and provide backup measures for C/S

applied to reactor cores (particularly during open core periods).

Several meetings of Working Groups and the Liaison Committee took place to discuss these

and other topics. Because the Euratom Safeguards Office underwent extensive reorganisation,

which will lead to changes in the implementation of safeguards with the IAEA, the New

Partnership Approach (NPA) arrangements need to be reviewed to reflect these changes and

to seek new efficiency and enhanced cooperation. The IAEA has called for a meeting to

discuss forthcoming changes and their potential impact.

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Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards

The aim of the Additional Protocols is to increase the IAEA’s capabilities to detect

undeclared nuclear materials and activities in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In 2003, Euratom Safeguards continued to play a key role in preparing for the implementation

of the Additional Protocol in the European Union, on issues such as harmonising and

standardising reporting under the Additional Protocol

, arrangements for users with small

quantities of nuclear material for non- fuel cycle related activities and joint visits with the

IAEA to confirm the status of decommissioned facilities. Dedicated reporting software

developed by the Commission, was supplied to all the Member States for trials. The

conceptual work on site definitions, developed jointly by DG TREN H and the EU Member

States, is now reflected in the revised IAEA Guidelines for reporting and can be considered as

the international standard on site definition.

By the end of 2003, all EU Member States had ratified the Additional Protocol and the

majority had put the corresponding implementing arrangements in place. In line with Annex

III of the EU-NNWS (non-nuclear Weapons States) Additional Protocol, known as the “Side

Letter”, the Commission the Commission agreed to accept the transfer of certain activities

which are the responsibility of the Member States. Provision for the acceding Member States

to become parties to the EU-NNWS Additional Protocol

was made in close cooperation

with the Commission’s Legal Service and the IAEA.

The implementation paper for the so-called Side Letter and non-Side Letter Member States has been

merged as the differences turned out to be of only minor relevance.

CAPE, Commission Additional Protocol Editor.

The Additional Protocol does not provide for its own accession clause, but the Safeguards

Agreement does.

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ANNEX 5

RESOURCES

Budget Appropriations for Nuclear Safeguards

Article 174 of the Euratom Treaty specifically mentions the necessity to include

appropriations in the Commission's budget for operational expenditure related to nuclear

safeguards activity.

On this legal basis, safeguards activities are financed from two types of budget

appropriations:

A general “administrative” appropriation involving the costs of Euratom

Safeguards overheads such as general IT equipment, telecommunications, etc.

(Part A of the Budget, chapters A-70 and A-24), as well as a specific

appropriation for the medical survey and the radiation protection of the

inspectors (Part A of the Budget, line A-1420);

Specific “operational” appropriations allocated for expenditure directly related

to nuclear safeguards such as mission costs, rental of offices on site (including

on site laboratories), purchase of technical equipment and samples taking and

analysis, contracts for services (i.e. maintenance and repairs), transportation of

equipment and samples, training, etc., necessary for Euratom Safeguards

activities (Part B of the Budget, chapter B4-20).

For 2003, specific operational appropriations in the EU budget for Euratom Safeguards came

to €18.8 million. Of that amount, €13 million (70%) was actually committed. The expenditure

was broken down as follows:

•

Inspection mission costs (travel, daily allowances)

Rental of offices for the inspectors on inspected sites

(and related equipment costs)

Purchase, installation, maintenance and repair of

equipment on site, including IT, analysis of samples,

and related costs such as transport, consumables,

spare parts, etc.

Investments made in large scale plutonium bulk

handling plants and related maintenance, operation

and logistics

Administrative and technical assistance, training for

inspectors, and other expenses (including special

insurance coverage)

€3.8m (29.2%)

€0.5m (3.8%)

€2.0m (15.4%)

•

€6.0m (46.2%)

•

€0.7m (5.4%)

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Staff Resources and Utilisation

As of 31 December 2003, 95 officials were working in Directorate H (Nuclear Safety and

Security), and 189 officials in Directorate I (Nuclear Inspection). In addition, the office of the

deputy Director General, charged with the coordination of nuclear matters, comprised 5

persons. In addition, a total of 13 officials of Directorate A in Luxembourg were allocated to a

number of administrative tasks related to both Directorates.

Thus, an overall total of 302 officials were working in the field of nuclear safety and security,

of which 182 were Nuclear Inspectors.

In addition, the work of both Directorates was supported by a total of 19 external personnel.

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ANNEX 6

Table 1 - Quantities of nuclear material under Euratom safeguards (t)

End 1990

Plutonium

Uranium

Total

HEU

)

LEU

Thorium

End 1995

406

End 2001

)

548

End 2002

569

End 2003

590

203

200 400

32 000

44 000

124 400

2 600

269 100

46 700

51 400

171 000

4 600

314 610

57 000

52 700

204 900

4 500

318 710

58 500

47 700

212 500

4 500

325 510

59 700

42 600

223 200

4 400

Quantities based on final reported data

High enriched uranium

Low enriched uranium

Natural uranium

Depleted uranium

Table 2 - Inspection activities of Euratom Safeguards

Person days of

inspection in:

Non-Nuclear

Weapon States

France

Total

1999

2412

3492

2871

8775

2000

2113

3426

2895

8434

2001

2328

2934

2399

7661

2002

2348

2539

2404

7291

2003

1990

2266

2110

6366

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Table 3 – Euratom Safeguards budget 2003

Expenditure committed for the specific appropriations

Table 3A: Line B4-2000

Safeguard inspections, training and retraining of inspectors

Topics

a) Studies, convocation of experts, publications

b) Mission costs

c) Transportation for staff and equipment

d) Rental of offices and special services on sites

e) Internships and training

f) Special insurance

TOTAL

Expenditure (€ ’000)

3,744

640

456

4,960 (out of 5,700)

Table 3B: Line B4-2020

Sampling and analyses, equipment, specific work, provision of services and transport

Topics

Expenditure

( € ’000)

135

463

118

a) Administrative and technical assistance

b) Purchase of surveillance equipment

c) Purchase of measurement equipment

d) Purchase of equipment for seals

e) Purchase and maintenance of computing equipment directly linked to inspections

Costs for destructive analysis

109

g) Equipment spares, repairs, accessories and maintenance

h) Consumable items, purchase of sources, transport of radioactive materials

Monitoring (warning system based in Luxembourg)

Software (accountancy program, management and firewall)

TOTAL

282

794

2,000 (out of 5,500)

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Table 3C:

Line B4-2021: Specific safeguards for large-scale plutonium processing plants

Topics

a) Sellafield – BNFL (THORP, MOX)

b) La Hague – COGEMA (UP3, UP2)

c) Cadarache – COGEMA

d) Marcoule – MELOX

e) Dessel – BELGONUCLEAIRE

f) On site laboratories (initial investments

and operations)

g) Software (on sites)

h) Maintenance & repairs (equipment,

hardware and software support)

i) Software development (new applications,

new equipment )

TOTAL

Expenditure (€ ’000)

294

205

3,563

223

1,129

531

6,000 (out of 7,400)

Table 3D:

Line A0-1420: Health checks for staff exposed to radiation

Topics

a) Gamma spectrometry and toxicological

analysis (non-standard)

b) Measurement equipment (dosimeters)

c) Maintenance and calibration

d) Material,

services

contamination controls

and

other

Expenditure (€ ’000)

150 (out of 215)

e) Mission costs (for body-counter)

f) Other running expenses

TOTAL

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Table 4 – DG TREN Safeguards budget 1991-2003 ( € million)

Evolution of expenditure for the specific budget appropriations

Budget Line

Safeguard inspections,

training and retraining

of inspe ctors

(B4-2000)

Sampling and analyses,

equipment,

specific

work,

provision

services and transport

(B4-2020)

Specific safeguards for

large-scale

plutonium

processing plants

(B4-2021)

Health checks for staff

exposed to radiation

(A0-1420)

TOTAL

7.5

17.7*

18.8

0.1

0.3

0.2

2.6

7.4

2.3

3.2

5.5

1991

2.5

1995

4.2

2003

5.7

*In addition, €1.8 million was spent on cooperation with Russia.