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DANMARKS
NATIONALBANK
FINANSTILSYNET
23
august
2010
Sagsar
118061
Dokumentar
:
1048869
Danmarks
Nationalbank
To
The Basel
Committee
on
Banking
Supervision
Havnegade
5
DK
Fax
-
1093 København
K
Phone
33
63 63
63
33 63
71
03
Danmarks
Nationalbank
Basel
Committee's
and
Finanstilsynet strongly
supports the
aim
of
the
capital
and liquidity
reform
package.
We
are
howeveT
[email protected]
www.nationalbanken.dk
deeply
concerned
with
the
treatment
of Danish
covered
bonds
in
the
definition
of liquid
assets
in
the
Liquidity Coverage
Ratio.
It
is
our
assess-
that
the proposal of
the
26th
of July 2010 is
more
likely
to
increase the
risk
of
instability
in
the Danish
financial
system
and
thus
run
counter
to
the
ment
FINANSTILSYNET
Arhusgade
110
2100 København
Tlf
Fax
Ø
overall
aim
of
the
reform
package.
33 55
82
82
33
55
82 00
10
59 81 84
First,
the
proposal
accords
a
much lower
weight
to
covered
bonds than
gov-
bonds
in
the
Liquidity
Coverage
Ration
(LCR)
formula.
We
do
not
ernment
CVR-nr
[email protected]
www.finanstilsynet.dk
SMONOMI-
OG
find
that this is
warranted
by empirical evidence.
In
fact,
the
liquidity
of
Danish covered
bonds
has
proven
on
par
with
that
Danish
Government
bonds
in
times
of
severe
financial
.
ERHVERVSMINtSTERIET
stress.
Second, covered
bonds
are
market, and
an
important
ity
management.
This
is clearly illustrated
by
the
shortfall
in
liquid
assets
for
Danish
banks
under
the
proposal.
This
will
be
equivalent
to
approxi-
mately
8
1
per
cent
of
the
total
outstanding
amount
of
DKK
denominated
government
the
predominant
asset
in
the Danish
financial
component
of Danish financial institutions liquid-
bonds
at
end-2009.
suggest that
a
solution
is
found
under
which
the
li-
quidity of high quality covered
bonds
like
Danish
covered bonds is
taken
more
appropriately into
account.
Please
concerns
see
We,
therefore,
strongly
the
accompanying
and
a
note
for
a
more
detailed
explanation
of
our
possible
solution.
Yours
sincere
ils
Bernstein
Ulrik Nødgaard
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23 august 2010
Sagsnr.: 118061
Dokumentnr.: 1048979
Danish covered bonds and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
Danmarks Nationalbank
Havnegade 5
DK - 1093 København K
Phone 33 63 63 63
Fax
33 63 71 03
[email protected]
www.nationalbanken.dk
Covered bond liquidity is on par with that of Government bonds
Danmarks Nationalbank is currently carrying out a study comparing the li-
quidity of the Danish government bond and covered bond markets before,
during, and after the financial crisis based on a micro dataset. Due to the
perspective of the study on liquidity risk management the study focuses on
wholesale trades in the large bonds of the two markets. So far the empirical
evidence does not support the idea that government bonds are more appro-
priate instrument in banks' liquidity pools than Danish covered bonds to the
extent reflected in the revised LCR proposed on the 26th of July 2010. In
fact, there was an increase in the number of trades, the median trade size as
well as the turnover rate in the short end of the covered bond market during
the crisis.
Thus during the financial crisis long term covered bonds were just as liquid
as long term government bonds, while short term covered bonds were actu-
ally more liquid than government bonds.
This can be documented by looking at an often used measure of illiquidity,
namely the percentage price change divided by trade size
1
. Based on this
measure a tendency can be seen that before the crisis government bonds
were slightly more liquid than covered bonds, cf. chart 1 and 2, and this
normal relationship has be re-established. Furthermore the short term cov-
ered bond market has been as liquid as the long term government bond mar-
ket.
FINANSTILSYNET
Århusgade 110
2100 København Ø
Tlf
Fax
33 55 82 82
33 55 82 00
10 59 81 84
CVR-nr
[email protected]
www.finanstilsynet.dk
ØKONOMI
-
OG
ERHVERVSMINISTERIET
1
Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Ef-
fects.
Journal of Financial Markets 5(1),
31-56.
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2
MONTLY MEDIAN OF PERCENTAGE PRICE CHANGE DIVIDED BY TRADE SIZE
0.00045
0.0004
0.00035
0.0003
0.00025
0.0002
0.00015
0.0001
0.00005
0
Apr-2005
Apr-2006
Apr-2007
Apr-2008
Apr-2009
Chart 1
Long term covered bonds
Note:
Long term government bonds
Long term covered bonds are defined as long term callable mortgage-bonds. Long term government bonds are defined as
government bonds with time to maturity of more than five years.
Source: Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, Nasdaq OMS and own calculations.
The illiquidity measure for both the long term government and covered
bond market increased significantly during the crisis. However, the level of
the illiquidity measure was almost the same for the two markets during the
peak of the crisis. This does not take into account the temporary measures
undertaken during the financial crisis to support the Danish pension sector.
In the short end of the markets the illiquidity measure was higher for gov-
ernment than covered bonds during several months of the crisis. Part of this
result can be explained by the fact that the short term government bonds,
being defined as bonds with time to maturity of less than five years, gener-
ally have a longer time to maturity than the short term covered bonds.
However, the very short end of the government bond market would by no
means be sufficient to cover the banks need for liquid assets under the Basel
proposal. Actually, the Basel proposal would induce the banks to hold long
term government bonds as liquidity, cf. the calculations below based on the
Quantitative Impact Study (QIS).
Apr-2010
Jan-2005
Jan-2006
Jan-2007
Jan-2008
Jan-2009
Oct-2005
Oct-2006
Oct-2007
Oct-2008
Oct-2009
Jan-2010
Jul-2005
Jul-2006
Jul-2007
Jul-2008
Jul-2009
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3
MONTLY MEDIAN OF PERCENTAGE PRICE CHANGE DIVIDED BY TRADE SIZE
0.00045
0.0004
0.00035
0.0003
0.00025
0.0002
0.00015
0.0001
0.00005
0
Apr-2005
Apr-2006
Apr-2007
Apr-2008
Apr-2009
Chart 2
Short term covered bonds
Short term government bonds
Note:
Short term covered bonds are defined as fixed-rate bullet mortgage bonds. Short term government bonds are defined as
Source: government bonds with time to maturity of less than five years.
Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, Nasdaq OMS and own calculations.
The high liquidity of Danish covered bonds during the crisis can in large
part be attributed to the history and institutional setup of Danish covered
bonds. In Denmark there is a very long history for issuing covered bonds
under a strict legislative framework. Danish covered bonds are, on top of the
general characteristics of covered bonds, issued under a very strict "balance
principle" that strongly limits the issuers' ability to assume any risks other
than credit risk. In practice the vast majority of loans financed by covered
bonds have loan terms including interest rate and method of prepayment
which are set with direct reference to the terms of the covered bonds issued
to fund the loan. As the bonds are exchange-listed the system is highly
transparent. The close link between loans and bonds makes it possible for
the borrowers to repay their loans by buying the underlying bonds. Thus the
covered bonds cannot trade with a very large discount compared to the
credit quality of the cover assets without attracting buy-side interest from
the borrowers. The strict balance principle also strongly limits the mortgage
banks’ ability to assume any other risks than credit risk. The credit risk is
contained by a number of measures. Besides the maximum loan-to-value
ratio of 80 pct. at all times of the loan, mortgages have a strong legal posi-
tion in Denmark. The mortgage banks possess a senior claim on the pro-
ceeds from a property sale in the event of a borrowers default. The Danish
foreclosure processes are fast at relatively low cost and strategic default by
borrowers is eliminated by borrowers’ personal liability in the Danish legis-
lation.
The high quality of the Danish covered bond system has also been demon-
strated by the fact that the system has worked well in providing a stable
source of credit to households and firms during the financial crisis. In fact
increased lending funded by covered bonds has offset a fall in lending by
Apr-2010
Jan-2005
Jan-2006
Jan-2007
Jan-2008
Jan-2009
Oct-2005
Oct-2006
Oct-2007
Oct-2008
Oct-2009
Jan-2010
Jul-2005
Jul-2006
Jul-2007
Jul-2008
Jul-2009
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4
the rest of the banking system. Its significance can also be illustrated by the
fact that the market value of all covered bonds is more than EUR 300 bil-
lion. This is equivalent to 1.4 times Denmark's GDP and 7.6 times as large
as the Danish government debt.
Covered bonds are central to Danish banks liquidity management
The results of the Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) underline the importance
of the covered bond market to the Danish financial sector. Table 1 shows
weighted average estimates of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio for the Danish
institutions taking part in the QIS.
LCR ESTIMATES FOR DANISH QIS BANKS (WEIGHTED AVERAGE)
Limit on Level 2 assets
Baseline scenario of
Broad buffer scenario of
December 2009 proposal December 2009 proposal
Table 1
Scenario of GHoS press
release of 26 July
0 per cent
40 per cent
50 per cent
100 per cent
34 per cent
56 per cent
68 per cent
81 per cent
59 per cent
71 per cent
89 per cent
Note: Calculations under the GHoS scenario are made under simplifying assumptions given the level of detail in the original QIS
While the GHoS scenario stipulates a limit on level 2 assets in the portfolio of liquid assets at 40 pct., calculations have also
been made based on alternative limits but using the same stress scenario. Own issued covered bonds currently held in the
portfolio of liquid assets are excluded from the calculation
Under the baseline scenario of the Basel December 2009 proposal the Dan-
ish banks obtain a weighted average Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of 34
per cent. Allowing covered bonds to be included in the portfolio of liquid
assets significantly improves the LCR, up to a level of 89 per cent given full
inclusion. The substantial impact on the LCR is due to the relatively small
government debt market in Denmark and a large and well developed cov-
ered bond market. Covered bonds are the predominant asset in the Danish
financial market, and an important component of Danish financial institu-
tions liquidity management. In 2009 one third of the Danish mortgage bonds
were held by monetary financial institutions.
Under the July 26th scenario of the Group of Governors and Heads of Su-
pervision (GHoS) the total shortfall in liquid assets is EUR 28 billion for the
Danish banks taking part in the QIS. This is equivalent to 49 per cent of the
total outstanding amount of DKK denominated government bonds exclud-
ing holdings in government funds at end-2009, c.f. table 2.
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5
NOMINAL AMOUNT OF DKK GOVERNMENT BONDS AND DKK COVERED BONDS IN
CIRCULATION AT END 2009, DISTRIBUTED BY REMAINING TIME TO MATURITY
time to maturity
<= 5 years
5 years < time to
maturity <= 10 Time to maturity
years
> 10 years
Table 2
Billion EUR
Total
Outstanding amount of DKK govern-
ment bonds
- Amount held by government funds
- Amount held by Danish monetary
financial institutions
Remaining amount of DKK government
bonds in free circulation
Outstanding amount of DKK covered
bonds
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank
29,9
7,2
3,1
19,6
197,9
22,9
1,9
4,2
16,7
29,8
15,2
1,3
0
13,8
135,2
67,9
10,4
7,3
50,2
362,9
Extrapolating the shortfall figure to the entire Danish banking sector on the
basis of total assets, and subtracting any current holdings of Danish gov-
ernment bonds by Danish monetary financial institutions, the shortfall is
equivalent to 81 per cent of Danish government bonds in circulation. Re-
quiring Danish financial institutions to hold such a very large proportion of
the government bonds in circulation in a liquidity buffer would in itself
negatively impact the liquidity of these bonds.
Finally, as evident from table 2, a large proportion of Danish government
bonds outstanding are very long-term bonds, not well suited as liquidity risk
management instruments. In contrast, a large amount of short term covered
bonds exist.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Danish covered bonds have proven to be very liquid even
during times of stress and are subject to a very strict legal structure. Hence,
there is no evidence to support the treatment of Danish covered bonds vis-a-
vis government bonds in the current proposal. In addition, the large and im-
portant Danish covered bond market in combination with a significant short-
fall of government bonds under the current proposal may create severe ten-
sions in the Danish financial system. We therefore strongly suggest that a
solution is found under which the liquidity of high quality covered bonds
like Danish covered bonds is taken more appropriately into account.
High quality covered bonds should be included in the definition of "level 1"
liquid assets. If not, the cap on high quality covered bonds should be lifted
considerably. Given the insufficient availability of currently defined "level
1" assets in Denmark, a solution must be found so that Danish high quality
covered bonds can be included as liquid assets in the LCR of Danish banks
to a higher extent than the current proposal allows.