Europaudvalget 2012-13
EUU Alm.del Bilag 412
Offentligt
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RepoRt June 2013
country
cSo
roadmapS
How EU delegations can strengthen
engagement with civil society
country cso roadmaps
1
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design: Anne mousten
ACKnoWLeDGeMentS
The report on country CSO roadmaps is a continuation of Concord Denmark’s work plan
for the Danish EU Presidency in 2012, which included a high-level EU Presidency confer-
ence ‘Engaging Civil Society and Local Authorities: Civil Society Organizations, Human
Rights and Development’, several lobby meetings in Denmark and Brussels around the
Council conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council in May 2012 and strong coordination
with the Cypress EU Presidency on the Council conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council
in October 2012. I am grateful for this opportunity to take part in the follow-up.
Also thank you to partners and stakeholders in Ghana and Uganda for contributing with
their valuable insights and analysis. About 20 interviews with representatives from civil
society, donors, think tanks and private consultants, was conducted in Kampala and Ac-
cra during February and March 2013. The lack of up-to-date and comprehensive analysis
of civil society in Ghana and Uganda has been a major challenge and the report could not
have been made without their input.
Early conclusions of the report were summarized in a policy note on ‘EU Cooperation in
the Evaluation of Danish Civil Society Strategy’ (January 2013) and at a seminar on ‘EU
Development Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty’ at the Danish Institute for Interna-
tional Studies (DIIS) and a workshop on “How civil society can strengthen its engagement
with the EU Delegations” organized by Concord Denmark (April 2013).
A special thank you to Mads Hove, Laust Leth Gregersen and Christian Juulsgaard Olsen
from Concord Denmark for their valuable support and comments to drafts versions.
AccrA, June 2013
Morten Emil Hansen
AUTHOR OF REPORT
@:
[email protected]
W:
www.policyadvice.dk
2
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contEntS
rEcommEndatIonS
dEFInItIonS
LISt oF acronymS
ForEWord
1. IntroductIon
civil society in a new era
cSo funding trends
aid Effectiveness
3
4
5
6
8
8
8
9
2. BacKGround
Eu’s legal commitments
new institutions and new challenges
Lack of strategic civil society involvement
the complexity of Eu funding
10
10
11
11
12
3. a nEW Eu paradIGm
agenda for change
Eu’s engagement with civil society in external relations
13
13
13
4. cSo roadmapS
a joint Eu approach to civil society
14
15
5. Eu dELEGatIonS
6. Eu and cIVIL SocIEty In GHana
a weak and uncoordinated civil society
Eu delegations
multi-donor financing
conclusion and recommendations
16
17
17
17
18
18
7.
Eu and cIVIL SocIEty In uGanda
civil society under pressure
rigid and inflexible civil society funding
opposing views on civil society dialogue
conclusion and recommendations
19
19
19
19
20
8. cIVIL SocIEty anaLySIS and dIaLoGuE
9. concLuSSIon
rEFErEncES
21
22
23
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rEcommEndatIonS
European development actors; the European Commission (EC), EU Delegations, national Member States
and civil society organizations all have important roles to play in promoting a more strategic and systematic
collaboration at all levels between EU and civil society. Everyone must recognize that the EU’s new CSO
communication is a paradigm shift in EU development cooperation. The collaboration must take a human
rights based approach that ensures non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, transparency and ac-
countability for all actors at all levels.
european Commission (eC)
Must
urgently clarify the role of civil society
in the
process of developing country CSO roadmaps. The
lack of clarity risks undermining the CSO ownership
and thereby also the quality and impact of the coun-
try CSO roadmaps.
Must increase the financial and human resources at
the EU Delegations and ensure capacity building and
training of EU Delegation staff. Regular evaluations
of civil society involvement in specific policy process-
es must be undertaken in order to
facilitate a culture
of learning, which continuously improves the tools
and mechanisms for civil society dialogue.
Must
promote multi-stakeholder dialogue ap-
proaches,
which create a space for dialogue and
interaction between EU Delegations and Member
States, civil society and government. This approach
must be used in all areas of government policies and
must also include broader EU policies on e.g. trade,
migration and human rights.
.
eu Delegations
 Must
develop
clear and predictable schedules and
guidelines for consultations,
which ensure that
civil society gets the necessary documentation, suf-
ficient time for preparations and proper feedback and
follow-up. The institutional mechanisms for dialogue
must be described in the country CSO roadmaps.
 Must
share guidelines and toolboxes for country CSO
roadmaps in order to
build confidence, trust and
ownership
among local and national civil society ac-
tors. Ideally, EU Delegations should initiate civil soci-
ety-led assessments of the CSO context.
 Must
include Policy coherence for development
(Pcd) and human rights obli¬gations in its civil
society dialogue
and ensure that civil society views
are included in annual delegation reports, evidence-
based PCD reports and national human rights reports.
Civil society organizations
Must
demonstrate a strong commitment to the
country cso roadmaps
and engage in a constructive
dialogue with the EU Delegations, where CSOs them-
selves promote broad participation from local CSOs
and community-based organizations by providing
technical expertise and capacity building.
Must
contribute to the analysis of an enabling envi-
ronment for civil society
by monitoring key elements
such as fundamental human rights e.g. freedom of
opinion and expression, right to information and
freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
Must
monitor and evaluate national processes of
developing country cso roadmaps
in order to hold
EU Delegations accountable to its obligations, and
facilitate regional learning among CSOs as well as the
EU and Member States.
european Member States
Must
take active part in the development of country
cso roadmaps from the early stages
and support the
EU Delegations with analysis, contacts and simply
bring credibility to the process.
Must build partnerships with civil society organiza-
tions and
ensure an enabling funding environment,
which is long-term, predictable and supporting in-
stitutional capacity building.
Must be more vocal about human rights violations
and the shrinking policy space and
be supportive of
civil society views in the political dialogue with gov-
ernments.
4
country cso roadmaps
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dEFInItIonS
country cso roAdmAPs
are the basis for a new and more structured dialogue and strate-
gic cooperation between EU Delegations and civil society. Country CSO roadmaps must pro-
vide a sound understanding of a diverse local civil society, including their roles, capacities and
constraints, legitimacy, interests and dynamics. Country CSO roadmaps are in principle ‘EU
Country CSO strategies’ shared by the EU and its Member States and will be updated annu-
ally. It is the ambition to finalize country CSO roadmaps at all EU Delegations by the 1st of
January 2014 (EC 2012b).
Policy diAlogue
is an ‘open and inclusive dialogue on development policies’ (Accra Agenda
for Action 2008). But a genuine policy dialogue needs to be structured, institutionalized and
take place at all levels of government. Holding governments accountable is vital in order to
translate the principle of “democratic ownership” into practice.
civil society orgAnizAtions
(CSOs) include a wide range of formal and informal organiza-
tions created voluntarily by citizens, which can vary in structure, governance and scope. Their
aim is to promote an issue or an interest, either general or specific. In a broad sense, CSOs in-
clude all non-market and non-state organizations and structures in which people organize them
to pursue shared objectives and ideals (EC 2012b).
PArticiPAtory develoPment
recognizes civil society organizations as legitimate actors in
the development process. They should be enabled to express voice, participate in political, social
and economic dialogue processes, demand accountability and be involved in monitoring public
action (EC 2011).
enAbling environment
is a functioning democratic legal and judicial system that ensures
- in law and in practice - the freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly
and association, and the possibility to secure funding and to participate in public affairs with
the aim of effectively and freely contributing to the public sphere (EC 2012).
country cso roadmaps
5
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LISt oF acronymS
AAA
AcP
concord
csP
cso
csr
dAc
devco
ec
ecA
ecdPm
edF
eeAs
eiti
eu
eud
gbs
ingos
ldcs
mFF
ngos
nsA
odA
Pcd
PrsP
sPsP
sWAP
Accra Agenda for Action
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries
European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development
Country Strategy Paper
Civil Society Organisation
Cooperate Social Responsibility
Development Assistance Committee
Directorate General for Development and Co-operation EuropeAid
European Commission
European Court of Auditors
European Centre for Development Policy Management
European Development Fund
European External Action Service
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
European Union
European Union Delegation
General Budget Support
International Non Governmental Organizations
Least Developed Countries
Multiannual Financial Framework
Non-governmental organizations
Non-state actors
Official Development Assistance
Policy Coherence for Development
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Sector Policy Support Programmes
Sector Wide Approaches
6
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ForEWord
In October 2012 the EU Council adopted “The roots of
democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s en-
gagement with Civil Society in external relations”, also
known as the CSO communication. It was the culmina-
tion of a long dialogue and consultation process, called
‘Structured Dialogue’, organized by the EU Commission,
which involved more than 700 stakeholders and repre-
sentatives from civil society, partner countries, Member
States, the European Parliament and the European Ex-
ternal Action Service (EEAS), including EU Delegations.
The CSO communication has been positively welcomed
and acknowledged by European civil society organiza-
tions. CONCORD Europe called it ‘the most constructive
official EU document on CSOs in many years’ (CONCORD
Europe 2012). The ambitious goals and objectives are
shared and European civil society recognizes the signifi-
cant improvement in dialogue at Brussels level. But in
partner countries the implementation of the CSO com-
munication has not yet begun. Most southern civil so-
ciety organizations are not even aware of EU’s renewed
commitment and EU Delegations are still waiting for in-
structions and guidelines.
This report analyses the EU decision to promote a more
enhanced and strategic engagement with civil society or-
ganizations at EU Delegation level. It includes illustrative
case studies from Ghana and Uganda in order to identify
the challenges and opportunities arising from the EU de-
cision. While Ghana is relatively democratic, but has weak
and uncoordinated civil society structures, Ugandan civil
society is experiencing a narrowing of the political space,
but the CSOs are comparably better organized. Still, the
experiences with EU policy dialogue are comparable and
call for an urgent rethinking of current practices and in-
stitutional setups at EU Delegations.
It is the objective of this report to establish a solid foun-
dation for Concord Denmark’s member organizations and
European partners to support their southern partners in
the dialogue with EU Delegations on country CSO road-
maps. In addition, the report should build a solid and
evidence based contribution to a strong civil society per-
spective in Denmark’s future strategy on EU’s Develop-
ment Policy and incorporation of the EU dimension in
Denmark’s forthcoming policy on civil society in develop-
ment cooperation.
DG DEVCO is responsible for the implementation of the
CSO communication and has generally been open to dis-
cuss and meet with Concord representatives. But disap-
pointingly, this has not been the case in this study. Re-
quests for interviews and background information on
country CSO roadmaps have continuously been submit-
ted over a period of four months, but DG DEVCO has not
shared any materials. The lack of transparency seems to
be one of EU’s biggest challenges in order to enhance its
cooperation with civil society. A recent study from OECD
strongly recommends that donors promote a transpar-
ent and inclusive process on CSO strategies in order to
create trust and ownership among CSO stakeholders
(OECD 2011b).
Civil society organizations must naturally acknowledge
that it takes time to translate new policies into practice.
But the role of civil society in EU development coopera-
tion and the principle of participatory development has
been a formal mandate of EU Delegations since 2000.
There are consequently no good excuses for lack of per-
formance in the past – nor for delays in implementing a
genuine participatory process in the future. It is time for
action.
country cso roadmaps
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1
IntroductIon
Civil society in a new era
Over just a few decades, civil society organizations (CSOs)
have grown massively in size and numbers and are play-
ing an increasingly prominent role in international devel-
opment assistance due to their ability to serve the needs
of the poorest and most marginalized communities
through grassroots and participatory approaches. Civil
society organizations, movements, alliances and net-
works have also risen to become a global political power.
The global financial crisis and the spontaneous uprisings
and transformations during the Arab Spring have funda-
mentally changed the public perception of governments
and institutions, which needs to be more transparent,
accountable and inclusive.
A strong and vibrant civil society is generally regarded as
important in its own right and even a public good, which
promotes better democratic practices and policy out-
comes. Civil society organizations have therefore gained
official recognition as stakeholders, which need to be
consulted and involved at national, regional and interna-
tional levels. The aid-effectiveness agenda in the OECD
and the post-2015 process in the UN reaffirm the con-
sensus among governments and international agencies.
But at the same time the political space for civil society
is shrinking, in particular in Africa. Two-thirds of African
governments have introduced legislation that reduces
the space for civil society organizations, especially affect-
ing civil society organizations that are politically active
or receive international support. National civil society is
increasingly facing difficulties in accessing funding from
international donors, being legally registered as national
organizations or engaging in rights-based activities (CI-
VICUS 2013).
CSo funding trends
Global funding for civil society has increased substan-
tially in the last decade and reached 16.2 percent of total
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2010. Accord-
ing to OECD, the total CSO funding for all DAC donors
increased by 25 percent between 2007 and 2009 (OECD
2011b). The increase has mainly been composed of aid
channeled through CSOs, while the volume of core aid
has remained relatively stable (Keijzer 2011). In many
countries the distribution of government funding for
CSOs has been ‘historically grown’. Bilateral donors have
supported CSOs that had long standing relationships and
based on a ‘privileged’ position with more or less auto-
matic or guaranteed funding (Keijzer 2011).
Still, many donors do not see civil society actors as stra-
tegic intermediaries in reaching their own development
objectives (INTRAC 2010), and CSO funding therefore
tend to follow changing donor policy preferences and
other opportunities (Keijzer 2011). Donors still prefer to
support the urban-based CSOs and networks, which can
meet the financial requirements. It also seems that there
is a growing tendency to favor big projects and funding
consortiums of CSOs at the expense of small-scale ac-
tions at grassroots level (Keijzer 2011). In the case of EU,
the calls for proposals clearly tend to favor the best-re-
sourced, mainly urban-based, organizations over under-
resourced and mainly rural-based organizations (ECA
2009).
The decentralization of donor funds has created a push
for stronger accountability and representation from the
national CSOs towards local partners and constituencies.
INGOs must prove their added value and comparative
advantage and many donors, especially the Nordic-plus
8
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group, are engaged in southern based funding mecha-
nisms, which enable southern CSOs to access funds di-
rectly. But the southern-based funding mechanisms are
criticized for favoring the fewer, larger and urban-based
CSOs and thus undermining the donors’ own objectives
of supporting a sector-wide and diverse civil society. The
emerging consensus to support southern civil society
directly from local embassies and delegations could po-
tentially lead to more isolated and stand-alone activities
since ‘embassy funds’ are often small scale and targeted
at a wide range of local and often very small CSOs (IN-
TRAC 2010).
But aid effectiveness initiatives have largely been donor-
driven, state-centric and technocratic, most notably in
the case of general budget support. EU cooperation on
budget support often fails to include CSO consultation
and the EU communication on budget support describes
a limited role for civil society in monitoring and holding
governments accountable (CONCORD Europe 2012). The
aid effectiveness agenda may potentially lead to aid con-
centration as donors align priorities, which is a threat to
a diverse and vibrant civil society in the south (INTRAC
2011 and EC 2011).
Donors move toward joint funding to align with the Paris
Agenda principles of harmonization and alignment but
also due to cost-saving measures and reduced transac-
tion and administration costs. As a result, the burden
of coordination is pushed onto civil society, as CSOs are
expected to work in consortia with a lead agency tak-
ing the contractual responsibility (Keijzer 2011). Donors
acknowledge that the use of southern based funding
mechanisms and different types of intermediaries im-
pact negatively on the strength and diversity of southern
civil society and agree that the southern based fund-
ing mechanisms need to be better understood (INTRAC
2010). But a recent evaluation shows that the EC gener-
ally has a limited reflection on the impact of the new aid
architecture on civil society (EC 2011).
Aid effectiveness
The Aid Effectiveness Agenda has led to a renewed em-
phasis on ‘ownership’ and state-led development strate-
gies. This marks a radical shift from traditional project
approaches to sector approaches, implemented through
new aid modalities such as General Budget Support
(GBS), Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) or Sector Policy
Support Programmes (SPSPs).
The Aid Effectiveness Agenda recognizes the importance
of broad ownership of national development policies,
transparency and accountability to citizens. Article 20 of
the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and article 22 of the
Busan Declaration explicitly refer to civil society organi-
zations (CSOs) as independent development actors in
their own right (OECD 2008 and OECD 2011).
Photo
JonAs leegAArd Andersen
country cso roadmaps
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2
BacKGround
eu’s legal commitments
The
cotonou Agreement
signed in 2000, was the first
major EU policy document which legally committed the
EC to civil society participation as a fundamental prin-
ciple of development cooperation. This changed civil
society from mere beneficiaries of EC funding to actors
in development processes and was seen as a major step
forward in EC approaches towards civil society (Keijzer
2011, EC 2008).
The EC communication on the
Participation of non-
state Actors in ec development cooperation
from
2002, covered all actors other than government, i.e. in-
cluding local government, private sector, trade unions
and economic partners (both profit or non-profit). This
communication was an attempt to clarify the principle of
participatory development agreed in the Cotonou Agree-
ment. The communication reaffirms that working with
non-state actors (NSAs) is a legal obligation for both EU
and its developing partners (Keijzer 2011).
non-discriminatory access to basic services, participation
in democratic political processes, transparency and ac-
countability, justice and the rule of law, and with a focus
on poor and vulnerable groups. And it acknowledges that
an empowered civil society is a crucial component of any
democratic system and is an asset itself (EC 2012d).
The
eu strategic Framework on human rights and de-
mocracy,
adopted in 2012, sets out principles, objectives
and priorities for Europe’s shared human rights work
and includes a strong commitment to develop a genuine
partnership with civil society. In order to respond to the
particular needs of individual countries, EU-delegations
will develop national human rights strategies for almost
160 countries worldwide. National human rights strate-
gies will establish country-specific priorities and objec-
tives in order to achieve stronger impacts on the ground
(EC 2012a).
the ec’s communication ‘the roots of democracy
and sustainable development: europe’s engagement
with civil society in external relations’,
adopted by
the Council on 15 October 2012, is EU’s new CSO strat-
egy which promotes a more strategic and systematic ap-
proach to EU’s engagement with civil society. It covers
EU’s engagement with local CSOs in developing, neigh-
borhood and enlargement countries (EC 2012b).
‘ … NSAs ought to be permanently and systematically in-
volved across the definition of country strategies and the
programming process’
(EC 2002).
The
european consensus on development
was agreed
on in 2005 by the EU Heads of States, the European Par-
liament and the EC and recognizes the vital role of civil
society in particular as promoters of democracy, social
justice and human rights. It also commits the EU to en-
hance its support for building capacity of non-state ac-
tors in order to strengthen their voice in the development
process and to advance political, social and economic dia-
logue (EC 2005a).
The
lisbon treaty
was signed by the Heads of States and
Governments and entered into force on 1st of December
2009. The Lisbon Treaty reinforces EU’s long-term objec-
tive to eradicate poverty and actively promote an open,
transparent and regular dialogue with civil society. It re-
quests the EC to undertake broad consultations with rel-
evant stakeholders in order to ensure that EU actions are
coherent and transparent (EC 2009).
The
Agenda for change
was adopted during the Dan-
ish EU Presidency in 2012, and calls for a human rights-
based approach, promoting the right to universal and
‘THE rooTs of
dEmocracy and sUsTainablE
dEvElopmEnT’:
‘The roadmaps should identify long term objectives
of EU cooperation with CSOs and encompass dia-
logue as well as operational support, identifying ap-
propriate working modalities. This exercise should be
linked to the programming of EU external assistance,
namely bilateral, regional and thematic cooperation.
The human rights country strategies currently being
developed by the EU will be an important reference.
The roadmaps should be developed taking into ac-
count the views of civil society, be regularly updated
and where appropriate, made publicly available and
shared with national authorities’ (EC 2012b).
10
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new institutions and new challenges
The Lisbon Treaty has fundamentally changed the or-
ganization of Europe’s foreign policy, which has con-
sequences for EU’s development assistance and the
mandates and responsibilities of the European Exter-
nal Action Service, DG DEVCO, EU Delegations and EU
Member States.
The creation of the European External Action Service
(EEAS) was one of the most significant changes of the
Lisbon Treaty aimed at having a more unified and coher-
ent position on international affairs. EEAS is responsible
for the programming, planning, and implementation of
development assistance and is functionally autonomous
from other EU bodies - but has a legal responsibility to
ensure consistency with other EU policies (ECDPM 2012b).
The first evaluation on the functioning of the EEAS by
the High Representative in December 2011 had a narrow
focus on the immediate ‘Lisbon tasks’ and therefore no
mentioning of civil society (EEAS 2011).
DG DEVCO was created in 2011 (a merger between DG
DEV and DG EuropeAid) and is responsible for the man-
agement and implementation of EU development as-
sistance. DG DEVCO is likely to experience staff reduc-
tions and budget cuts, as a consequence of the new
Multi-annual Financial Framework 2014-2020 (ECDPM
2011, APRODEV 2013). DG DEVCO and EEAS are supposed
to collaborate and develop joint programming, but EU
Member States have already raised concern about the
lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities between DG
DEVCO and EEAS. DG DEVCO is currently present in ap-
proximately 150 worldwide EU Delegations.
The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the role of EU Del-
egations, which represent EU in third countries on e.g.
diplomatic issues, political relations, security, and trade
and development assistance. EU Delegations consist of
staff from EEAS, DEVCO, Trade and other directorates,
and while EEAS has the overall responsibility for the del-
egations, including programming, DEVCO has the admin-
istrative responsibility, including the implementation of
development assistance. But EU Delegations are often
understaffed to fulfill the role expected of them under
the Lisbon Treaty (ECDPM 2011).
cussions, both at country level and globally. Most bilat-
eral and multilateral donors recognize that consultations
with civil society bring added value to their policy making
and they generally believe that their dialogue with civil
society is satisfactory (OECD 2011).
But findings from the OECD peer reviews show that the
donor satisfaction is often not shared by civil society or-
ganizations (OECD 2012a). The inclusion of civil society
‘voice’ is mostly ad-hoc or tokenistic (INTRAC 2010), and
it appears as civil society consultations are tick-the-box
exercises which undermines the donor credibility (OECD
2011a).
In 2009 the European Court of Auditors found that the
EU Delegations did not systematically involve Non Stake
Actors (NSAs). Instead the EU Delegations typically in-
vited for one-shot consultations on their overall strategy
development, whereas CSO involvement in implementa-
tion, monitoring and evaluation was non-existing. The
European Court of Auditors therefore concluded that the
EC involvement of NSAs falls short of the sustained and
structured dialogue envisaged by the EU legislation and
the EC’s own guidelines (ECA 2009).
An EC evaluation from 2008 also found major gaps be-
tween the EC commitments towards civil society and
the actual implementation. The evaluation concluded
that there was limited strategic reflection and dialogue
with the various stakeholders on how best to use the
CSO channel in a specific country or sector context (EC
2008).
The official assessment of lack of performance of the
EC is generally shared by civil society. CONCORD Europe
recently described the EC staff in HQs and EU Delega-
tions as having an ‘instrumental or limited vision of civil
society that is not conducive to building confidence and
structured relationships’ (CONCORD Europe 2012).
CONCORD Europe also analyzed the on-going consulta-
tion on the next Multi-annual Indicative Programme
(2014-2020) and concluded that exercises involved lit¬tle
more than presentations from the delegations to civil so-
ciety of their plans and left civil society participants with
a feeling that they were part of a tick-the-box proc¬ess
(CONCORD Europe 2013). The lack of performance is gen-
erally explained by an absence of clear mechanisms for
managing consultations, late invitations, delays in dis-
tributing documents, consultations at a late stage in the
programming process, limited NSA participation, and in-
sufficient feedback to NSAs on the results of the consul-
tations (ECA 2009).
Lack of strategic
civil society involvement
Government and donor interest in civil society dialogue
and political advocacy has been growing substantially in
the last decade, and most donors have increased their
support for civil society to engage actively in policy dis-
country cso roadmaps
11
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KEy rEcommEndaTions from
Eca (2009) and Ec (2008):
Ensure political and managerial leadership (particu-
larly in ‘difficult partnerships’).
Adopt a country specific overall strategic approach to
working with NSAs.
Improve consultation mechanisms.
Mainstream participation across sectors and areas.
Invest in knowledge on civil society processes; and
identify more suitable procedures to engage strategi-
cally with NSAs.
to engage in domestic political processes. Donors gen-
erally allocate earmarked funding rather than core sup-
port (OECD 2012). But the strengthening of civil society
in democratic gov¬ernance and the defense of human
rights re¬quires a flexible set of funding modalities,
including small-scale grants and dedicated human re-
sources at the headquarters and delegation levels in
dia¬logue with their partners in civil society (CONCORD
Europe 2013).
EU requirements are exceptionally cumbersome. In
2008, only 404 applications under the thematic budget
line covering non-state actors were selected out of 5339
concept notes received, which is a success rate of only
7 percent (OECD 2012). The EU funding procedures and
administrative rules have evolved into an accountant
and administration based logic, to the detriment of an
approach oriented towards results. This leads CSOs to
dedicate a lot of time and resources to the management
of EU funding and to present projects without innovative
elements (CONCORD Europe 2012).
DG DEVCO is acknowledging the need for more flexibility
and one of the outcomes of the Structured Dialogue was
12 technical fiches on funding modalities, but it is doubt-
ful if the EC can become less control-orientated and rigid
in order to accommodate the needs from a fluid and con-
stantly evolving civil society (EC 2008).
Photo
yilmAz PolAt
the complexity of eu funding
The OECD Peer Review of the EC (2012) found that the
complexity of EU funding procedures is a serious obsta-
cle, which must be addressed if EU wants to fulfill its
goal of a stronger civil society (OECD 2012). In particular
the ‘Calls for Proposals’ regime is an inherent contradic-
tion as it supports and favor large international CSOs
with the ‘right’ set-up and institutional capacity rather
than small CSOs and NSAs, which are often times most
in need (ECA 2009).
But even worse, EU funding is viewed as a serious hin-
drance due to its lack of core funding, which is key for
advocacy CSOs who need legitimacy and independence
12
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a nEW Eu paradIGm
A number of new EU policies and strategies have created
a new paradigm in Europe in terms of EU’s commitment
to promote and engage strategically with civil society.
proach to development and recognizes civil society as an
asset for any democratic system and its role in building
just, equitable and inclusive societies. EU encourages
and supports partner countries in promoting a meaning-
ful and structured participation of CSOs, in the context
of their domestic policies’ dialogue as well as budget pro-
cesses (EC 2012d).
According to the CSO communication, local civil society
is at the heart of EUs future development assistance
and EU will promote civil society participation in do-
mestic policies, although many governments in partner
countries is not necessarily sharing EU’s commitment to
‘transparent and accountable governance’.
3
An Agenda for Change
The EC communication on Agenda for Change (2011) has
a rather limited and instrumental understanding of civil
society mainly as ‘watchdogs’, when governments fail on
human rights and democracy. But the civil society per-
spective was even worse in the EC Green Paper on EU
development policy (2010) and it was mainly due to the
instrumental role of civil society during the Arab Spring
that the EC communication evolved from a narrow strat-
egy on economic growth to a broad development strat-
egy which included a focus on civil society (EC 2011).
During the Danish EU Presidency in the first half of 2012,
the role of civil society was strengthened remarkably in
the negotiations on EU Council conclusions on Agenda
for Change (May 2012), which calls for a human rights-
based approach, promoting the right to universal and
non-discriminatory access to basic services, participation
in democratic political processes, transparency and ac-
countability, justice and the rule of law, and with a fo-
cus on poor and vulnerable groups. And it acknowledges
that an empowered civil society is a crucial component
of any democratic system and is an asset itself. EU and
the Member States will also support and promote an
enabling environment for an independent, pluralistic and
active civil society (EC 2012d). EU Council conclusions
on Agenda for Change therefore include stronger state-
ments and commitments on civil society than in any pre-
vious EU documents.
EU’s THrEE prioriTiEs for sUpporT
(Ec 2012b):
1:
Promoting a conducive and enabling environment for
CSOs
Strong focus on the country level and
empowerment of local actors
CSOs in regional and global settings
2:
Promoting meaningful and structured participation of
CSOs in:
Domestic policy making
EU programming cycle
Policy processes and debates
3:
Increasing the capacity of local CSOs to perform their
roles more effectively
Interestingly, the CSO communication, which affects the
EU’s external actions as a whole, was only issued by the
EC. This raises some concern that the European External
Action Service (EEAS) is not fully committed to the stra-
tegic inclusion of civil society and it is notable that the EU
High Representative has not yet taken a huge interest in
EU’s development policies and the role of civil society. In
the 2012 Peer Review of EU development assistance, the
OECD also recommends that EEAS build its knowledge
on CSOs and integrates this into its own agenda (OECD
2012).
The first reporting on progress and implementation of
the CSO communication is set for 2016.
eu’s engagement with
civil society in external relations
‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development:
Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external rela-
tions’ and the Council Conclusions, adopted on the 15th
October 2012, was a result of a 18 month dialogue and
consultation process, called ‘Structured Dialogue’.
The CSO communication promotes a more enhanced,
strategic and systematic approach to EU’s engagement
with civil society. It adopts a human rights-based ap-
country cso roadmaps
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4
cSo roadmapS
The CSO communication has a strong emphasis on civil
society at country level. The contribution of local CSOs as
partners in dialogue and oversight is ‘at the heart of the
EU engagement’. EU Delegations are therefore requested
to develop country ‘CSO Roadmaps’ - a new way of work-
ing for EU Delegations, allowing for a more structured
dialogue and a strategic cooperation with civil society (EC
2012d).
The CSO communication affirms that a sound under-
standing of local CSOs is a first step for a meaningful
engagement with CSOs and promotes CSO mapping as
a tool for gaining better understanding of a diverse lo-
cal civil society, including their roles, capacity and con-
straints, legitimacy, interests and dynamics. It may also
include an analysis of their relationship with the state
and other stakeholders and their enabling environment
(EC 2012b).
Many donors mention the importance of conducting CSO
mapping exercises in order to make more informed part-
ner choices (INTRAC 2010). But CSO mapping is seldom
done as an exercise in itself and is often linked to specific
sectors or programmes. CSO mapping exercises may also
have a limited scope and will not necessarily grasp the lo-
cal dynamics between CSOs or between local and north-
ern CSOs. It takes ongoing dialogue to understand a fluid
and rapid changing civil society sector.
In the 2009 evaluation of the 9th EDF it was highlighted
that the EU needed to view the civil society sector ‘from
a systems perspective’ rather than the classical project
approach (INTRAC 2010). A civil society analysis must
therefore consider the entire landscape and enabling en-
vironment, including the relationship between different
actors, rather than mapping individual CSOs indepen-
dently.
GUidinG principlEs for
coUnTry cso roadmaps
(dG dEvco 2012):
Sound understanding of the CSO arena
Dialogue schemes are country-, sector-
and actor-specific
 Dialogue
happens at all levels
Dialogue must be timely, predictable,
transparent
Importance of multi-stakeholder dialogue
EU Delegations must enhance their dialogue beyond the
usual actors or ‘top of the pyramid civil society’ (ECDPM
2012c), e.g. faith-based organizations, unions, and the
less formalized groups such as social movements. A
sound understanding of the civil society landscape must
derive from a broad dialogue with various categories of
CSOs, which include both local and international CSOs.
New operational guidelines on “how to engage more
strategically with civil society” are currently being de-
veloped to support the EU Delegations. The plan is to fi-
nalize templates and guidelines as soon as possible and
have country CSO roadmaps ready at all EU Delegations
by the 1st of January 2014.
Roadmaps are intended to
be updated annually in parallel with the annual program-
ming process. It is still being discussed if and how coun-
try CSO roadmaps can be made publicly available. DG
DEVCO argues that the country CSO roadmaps are likely
to have analysis of sensitive issues and must be handled
with care.
14
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‘The roadmaps should be developed taking into account
the views of civil society, be regularly updated and where
appropriate, made publicly available and shared with na-
tional authorities’(EC
2012b).
The process has already been seriously delayed, due
to the delay in the programming process and concerns
from EU Delegations that the country CSO roadmaps
are to comprehensive and resource demanding. DG
DEVCO therefore recently changed the language on
country CSO roadmaps and now talks about a lean ex-
ercise which focuses on mainstreaming and synergies
and capitalization of existing programming cycles. It
might be a pragmatic and practical solution, but it will
not deliver the more comprehensive paradigm shift
envisaged in ‘The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable
Development: Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society
in External Relations’.
There still seems to be a lack of clarity of roles and re-
sponsibilities between DG DEVCO and EEAS on the im-
plementation of country CSO roadmaps. While the de-
velopment of country CSO roadmaps is being supported
and guided by DG DEVCO staff in Brussels, the overall
responsibility at EU Delegations lies with the staff from
the EEAS. This raises concerns, since the EEAS has not
yet shown any interest in a more strategic inclusion of
civil society in its policymaking. Moreover, EU member
state staff at embassies is generally not aware of the EU
process for country CSO roadmaps and due to the lim-
ited timeframe, this raise serious concern about national
member state involvement.
From a donor perspective a joint CSO analysis and strat-
egy would bring significant efficiency gains, reducing
transaction costs and administration, and increase coor-
dination, coherence and capacity. EU Country CSO strat-
egies are therefore likely to get strong political support
from EU Member States at country level. But staff at na-
tional embassies is not yet updated on neither the CSO
communication nor the envisaged process on country
CSO roadmaps.
While CSO roadmaps can potentially improve the coor-
dination, synergy and impact of EU support, they need
CSO ownership in order to work. Lessons from reviews of
CSO strategies from OECD members are clear; the design
of CSO strategies must take place in close consultation
with CSOs and donors must foster understanding and
ownership, identify common goals and opportunities for
partnerships, and ensure matching expectations. In addi-
tion, civil society strategies must be based on analysis of
the civil society sector and an understanding of how civil
society organizations contribute to development (OECD
2012).
The concept of national CSO studies already featured
in the guidelines to the EC communication on the ‘Par-
ticipation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Co-
operation’ (2002), which recommended that the EC del-
egations undertook a detailed situation assessment or
mapping study to assess the capacity, constraints and
potential of local and national NSAs, as well the work of
other donors (EC 2004).
It naturally takes time to translate new policies into prac-
tice. But the role of civil society in EU development co-
operation and the principle of participatory development
has been a formal mandate of EU Delegations since 2000,
and the previous CSO communication also encouraged
the EU Delegations to undertake CSO mappings, which in
the accompanying guidelines appear comprehensive and
detailed, similar to the country CSO roadmaps.
In a period of 10 years the EU Delegations have been en-
gaged in a total of 64 CSO mappings, of which 70 percent
took place in ACP countries (EuropeAid 2012). This raises
a serious concern about resources, since Europe now has
more than 160 EU Delegations which must develop coun-
try CSO roadmaps before the end of 2013 and be updated
on an annual basis. The EC must therefore substantially
increase the financial and human resources at the EU
Delegations and ensure capacity building and training of
EU Delegation staff. The EC must also urgently clarify the
role of civil society in the process of developing country
CSO roadmaps. The lack of clarity risks undermining the
CSO ownership and thereby also the quality and impact
of the country CSO roadmaps.
A joint eu approach to civil society
Most donors have a more comprehensive understand-
ing of civil society than previously and see the develop-
ment of strong civil societies in the south as an end in
itself. But the new EU consensus on increased support to
southern civil society demands a more in-depth analysis
and understanding of the civil society landscape.
A more structured and strategic EU cooperation with civil
society will potentially improve the impact of EU actions
and ensure consistency and synergy. Country CSO road-
maps are in principle
‘eu country cso strategies’
shared
by the EU and its Member States. Country CSO roadmaps
are therefore likely to replace individual donor analysis
and strategies and could potentially lead to an in-country
division of labour and even joint CSO programming and
joint CSO funding mechanisms.
‘Civil society participation in public policy processes
and in policy dialogues leads to inclusive and effective
policies’(EC
2012b)
country cso roadmaps
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Photo
yilmAz PolAt
5
16
Eu dELEGatIonS
The European Commission is among the few donors,
which legally requires delegations to involve civil society
in developing and monitoring programmes, and EC has
for years requested delegations to consult civil society on
the development of national strategies and has provided
guidelines and instructions. But the guidelines give the
Heads of Delegations maximum flexibility in the design
of such a dialogue (EC 2004).
Until this date, the EU Delegations have mainly consulted
civil society in the development of national strategies,
policy dialogue on sector-interventions, implementation
of programmes and monitoring and evaluation. The Court
of Auditors concludes that the EC has not yet invested the
sufficient time and resources to really engage EU Delega-
tion staff with NSAs at all levels (ECA 2009). The DAC Peer
Review from 2012 also notes that the EU Delegations dia-
logue with CSOs has increased, but is not yet sufficiently
structured, systematic or strategic (OECD 2012).
‘Colleagues in Delegations are overburdened by paper-
work; they are so concerned about doing things right
(procedures), that they have little time to think about
whether they are doing the right thing’
(from EC online
consultation 2012).
A blog post from ECDPM called the new CSO communica-
tion for ‘Innovative on paper, conservative on the ground’
(ECDPM 2012c), and this might be EU’s biggest challenge.
Without a transformation of the mindset of civil servants
at the EU Delegations, new comprehensive and resource
demanding approaches are likely to be met with skepti-
cism and reluctance. In addition, the lack of clear guid-
ance could even generate institutional divergence and
potentially weaken civil society support to the process. It
is thus of fundamental importance to create transparent
and structured dialogue in relation to country CSO road-
maps to avoid ‘consultation fatigue’ and to build trust
and confidence in EU Delegations among CSOs.
country cso roadmaps
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Eu and cIVIL SocIEty In GHana
6
With economic growth rates consistently above 6 per-
cent, and six democratic elections, including two peace-
ful transitions of power since 1992, Ghana is being pro-
moted as an African success story. Ghana scores high on
participation in the 2012 Mo Ibrahim Index and is ranked
as the seventh most democratic country in Africa.
The rule of law and the principles of participation, trans-
parency and accountability are generally recognized and
the space for participation and policy influence has in-
creased substantially in recent years. Civil society is in-
creasingly invited to contribute in policy and legislation
processes and government and donors send invitation
letters and sometimes even make follow-up phone calls
for civil society to attend meetings (Alliance 2015 2011).
CSOs are free to publish research reports and comment
or criticize government policy and interventions without
fear of being harassed. And the Ghanaian government
must be commended for its commitment to improve
transparency and accountability, e.g. the Freedom of In-
formation Bill and the signing up to the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative (STAR Ghana 2013).
Still, government accountability and responsiveness is
generally directed towards the donors rather than the
public. Ghana’s public service is exceptionally weak and
suffers from poor capacity, lack of resources and inef-
ficiency. The accountability at district and municipality
levels is also very weak (STAR Ghana 2013).
Despite the enabling environment for participation, civil
society organizations are generally not actively involved
in policy and decision-making processes. Even when
civil society participation is institutionalized, e.g. in the
policy formulation, planning and monitoring of Ghana’s
decentralized planning system, civil society has not fully
utilized the space for participation (IMF 2012 and STAR
Ghana 2013).
A major challenge for Ghanaian civil society is the frag-
mented nature of CSOs and the lack of overall coordination.
INGOs have tried to establish national umbrella networks
in the past, but not very successfully. In addition, the link-
ages between the urban-based policy networks and the
grassroots organizations are very weak and governments
and donors often question the legitimacy of organizations
talking on behalf of the poor and excluded. It is evident
that civil society is missing key policy opportunities due to
the lack of a structured and strategic collaboration.
eu Delegations
CSOs are being invited for meetings with the EU Delega-
tion in Accra, but often do not have time or simply do
not prioritize the meetings. Many CSO representatives
characterized the EU dialogue as ad-hoc and the window
for influencing was almost non-existing. The dialogue
is often demand driven, e.g. when high-level EU repre-
sentatives are visiting Accra. Civil society typically does
not receive background information before meetings and
seldom receives feedback or follow-up.
Many CSOs stress that the EU Delegation is not their
first choice of donor and expressed serious reservations
against the EU Delegation taking a lead role in the EU civil
society dialogue. They described the EU Delegation as be-
ing focussed on the government, whereas civil society is
mostly under their radar. The EU Delegation in Accra has
not undertaken any recent analysis or mappings of Gha-
naian civil society and some CSO representatives warned
A weak and uncoordinated civil society
There are about 3,600 organizations registered with the
Department of Social Welfare and the majority of or-
ganizations is found in the rural areas, and have limited
financial resources, few staff and considerable capacity
building needs. Still, visibility of urban-based CSOs’ is
high and they generate the bulk of civil society activity
that is visible to the public (STAR 2013).
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against a speedy process on the country CSO roadmaps,
arguing that ownership takes time and cannot be rushed.
Conclusion and recommendations;
The space for Ghanaian civil society to participate in
national policy processes has expanded in recent years.
But due to weak civil society structures and the lack of
national umbrella networks (e.g. a national NGO-forum),
Ghanaian CSOs are generally not actively engaged in pol-
icy processes and the limited policy capacity among local
civil society organizations impacts on CSOs’ participation.
Although Ghanaian civil society is being invited for meet-
ings with the EU Delegation in Accra, most CSOs do not
prioritize the meetings and many CSOs stress that the
EU Delegation is not their first choice of dialogue part-
ner. The EU dialogue is described as demand driven and
civil society typically do not receive background infor-
mation before meetings and seldom receives feedback
or follow-up. Some civil society organizations directly
warned against the EU Delegation taking the lead and
raised concerns about a rushed process on the country
CSO roadmaps.
EU Member States must actively contribute to the de-
velopment of country CSO roadmaps and as a pilot coun-
try for EU joint programming, the harmonization and
alignment among EU donors is already fairly advanced.
The chances for a successful EU Ghana CSO strategy
are therefore relatively high. But the EU Delegation and
EU Member States must seriously consider establish-
ing a formal EU-civil society dialogue forum, to ensure
a strong civil society participation in the development of
country CSO roadmaps.
European civil society organizations must provide tech-
nical expertise and capacity building to partner organi-
zations in order to strengthen their policy dialogue on
country CSO roadmaps, including the impact of other EU
policies on e.g. trade, migration and human rights.
Multi-donor financing
Funding remains a key challenge and civil society organi-
zations are heavily dependent on international donors.
Donors are increasingly pooling their support in basket
funding arrangements for civil society, e.g. the Business
Sector Advocacy Challenge (BUSAC), the Ghana Research
and Advocacy Programme (G-RAP) and the Strengthen-
ing Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in
Ghana (STAR-Ghana). Many civil society organizations
felt that they are implementing donor priorities instead
of their own and they have limited influence on the pri-
orities. Civil society has tried to introduce core-funding in
STAR Ghana but donors disapproved.
limiTEd cso ownErsHip
in sTar-GHana (sTar 2013):
STAR Ghana is a multi-donor pooled funding mechanism
funded by EU, DANIDA, DFID and USAID to increase the
influence of civil society. It has rightfully been criticized
for being donor-driven, since the priorities and work plans
for STAR Ghana were developed exclusively by the donors
without prior consultation. Consequently, civil society
views STAR Ghana as a funding facility rather than a po-
litical platform. The EU delegation acknowledges the lack
of civil society involvement in the start-up and agrees
that it has affected the CSO ownership. A mid-term re-
view of STAR Ghana in mid-2013 intends to address the
issue of local ownership.
18
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Eu and cIVIL SocIEty In uGanda
Uganda scores medium on participation in the 2012 Mo
Ibrahim Index and is ranked number 19 among African
democratic countries, however Freedom House’s annual
report on political rights and civil liberties only ranked
Uganda as ‘partly free’. Freedom House expresses its
concern about the governments increasing harassment
of the opposition and the systematic campaign to ob-
struct and shut down civil society groups that engage
the government on sensitive issues such as gay rights,
corruption, term limits, and land rights (Freedom House
2013).
Donors are increasingly harmonizing their CSO funding in
different basket mechanisms, e.g. the Democratic Gov-
ernment Fund (DGF), Independent Development Fund
and the Civil Society Fund (UM 2012). This limits the ex-
posure of individual donors and can potentially create a
stronger platform for CSO agendas.
in the Uganda NGO-forum, the international organiza-
tions have created their own forum.
7
Rigid and inflexible
civil society funding
It is estimated that 95 percent of civil society funding
comes from international donor agencies and with the
harmonization and rationalization of funding facilities,
civil society organizations are likely to become even more
dependent on donor priorities (UM 2012).
Donor funding in Uganda is commonly described as over-
ly programme specific or linked to particular policy agen-
das rather than core funding for organizations or for CSO
capacity building (UM 2012). The lack of strategic funding
for civil society was highlighted in a 2009 evaluation of
EC aid to Uganda which concluded that ‘the interventions
and sub-projects of the EC are overly spread out over too
many recipients and will not, in all likelihood, have much
of a long-term effect’. The evaluation also noted that the
EU Delegation has overly-limited formal working rela-
tionships with civil society (EC 2009a).
CSO representatives describe the EU Delegation as very
technocratic and some CSO representatives even found
it difficult to become a close partner with the EU, as long
as the financing instruments are so rigid and inflexible.
INGOs explained that their local partners were not capa-
ble of administering EU financing and pointed out that
they often considered other donors before applying for
EU funding due to administrative burdens.
Civil society under pressure
Uganda is experiencing a narrowing of political space,
both legally and in practice. There have been several ex-
amples of political intimidations of national civil society
organizations that oppose the government position on
controversial issues such as corruption, gay rights or oil.
Many civil society representatives described the policy
environment as undermining the rule of law and the
freedom to exercise civil and political rights in important
areas and used expressions such as ‘disenabling’ and
‘disempowering’.
Government involvement of civil society in policy mak-
ing is generally weak. Civil society and other non-state
actors are represented in thematic donor coordination
committees, but their level of influence is fairly limited
(EC 2009a). Government sees civil society as part of the
opposition and a close partnership with international
organizations is perceived by government as foreign
agents promoting non-Ugandan interests. The Uganda
NGO Act is by many CSOs seen as directly undermining
the right to full and meaningful civil society participation.
The collaboration between local and international civil
society is a challenge and while local organizations meet
opposing views
on civil society dialogue
Most CSOs argue that they are hardly ever invited for
meetings with the EU Delegation in Kampala and the
dialogue are mainly demand driven, e.g. when high-level
EU representatives are visiting Kampala. Most CSO rep-
resentatives characterized the EU dialogue as ad-hoc and
one-way. Even CSOs with long-term financing relation-
ships with EU described the EU dialogue as unstructured
and not institutionalized. Civil society is typically asked
to present their views at EU meetings, but never receives
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feedback and there is no preparation or follow-up. When
civil society participates in meetings with the EU and
members states, they feel that the EU Delegation is not
always acting constructively and some feel that the EU
Delegation dominates the discussion. Generally, CSOs
were of the clear opinion that the EU Delegation’s dia-
logue with CSOs had to be taken to a new level.
This is in stark contrast to statements from the EU Del-
egation in Kampala. The EU Delegation has an open-door
policy and all meetings with CSOs are welcomed. EU
Delegation representatives characterized their dialogue
with civil society as both structured and institutional-
ized, in particular in the thematic working groups on e.g.
Northern Uganda. But the EU Delegation believed that
the government policies on CSOs might have impacted
on the general CSO dialogue. They acknowledged that
the dialogue could improve, but could not identify spe-
cific areas which needed improvement. The EU Delega-
tion has not undertaken any recent analysis or mappings
of Ugandan civil society.
CSO representatives also criticize other donors for their
lack of civil society involvement but the EU Delegation
was highlighted for its particular poor performance.
None of the CSO representatives interviewed described
their dialogue with the EU Delegation as a partnership
and most did not see the EU Delegation as an obvious
dialogue partner and preferred bilateral donors like Den-
mark, Sweden and the UK. Many pointed to the lack of
civil society background and knowledge as an explana-
tion for the EU Delegation’s limited understanding of civil
society.
global process, which was well received by CSOs in
Uganda. After the meetings, the Uganda NGO-forum, a
national CSO platform with over 400 members, devel-
oped a concept paper for a structured dialogue process
in Uganda and even committed to allocate own funds
and resources to engage in the process. The concept note
was sent to the EU Delegation in 2011, but they never re-
ceived any response. When we asked the EU Delegation
about the NGO-forum proposal, they could not recognize
the lack of response and suggested that it was a misun-
derstanding. Whatever the cause, the stranded proposal
seems like a missed opportunity for the EU Delegation to
revitalize its dialogue with civil society.
Conclusion and recommendations
Ugandan civil society is not consistently invited for dia-
logue meetings with the EU Delegation in Kampala and
dialogue is generally characterized as ad-hoc, one-way
and demand driven. CSOs do not receive information be-
forehand and rarely receive feedback after meeting with
the EU Delegation in Kampala. Many CSOs expressed a
lack of trust and confidence in the EU Delegation in Kam-
pala, which is a serious challenge on the brink of a more
enhanced and strategic cooperation.
There is clearly a need for more self-reflection among
donors and CSOs. A mutual partnership is a two-way re-
lationship and both parties must invest in order to gain.
It is necessary to rethink the CSO dialogue at the EU Del-
egation in Kampala and introduce institutional changes
and mechanisms. An obvious first initiative would be
a discussion on the Uganda NGO Forums proposal for
a new Structured Dialogue forum, formed and steered
jointly by the EU Delegation and the Uganda NGO Forum,
e.g. with the support from the Democratic Government
Fund (DGF).
EU Member States must take active part in the develop-
ment of country CSO roadmaps from its early stages and
support the EU Delegation in Kampala with analysis, con-
tacts and simply bring credibility to the process. Ugandan
civil society is facing enormous challenges from a repres-
sive government which is likely to worsen in the run up
to the national elections in 2016. This reemphasizes the
need to strengthen the policy dialogue between civil so-
ciety and donors.
European CSOs can potentially play a pivotal role in pro-
viding technical expertise and capacity building on EU
development assistance and responsibilities of EU Del-
egations. But support must be responsive to CSOs needs
and requests.
blacK monday movEmEnT
Ugandan civil society was recently invited to a donor
meeting to present the Black Monday movement, which
promotes anti-corruption by wearing black clothing every
Monday. The meeting was hosted by the Dutch embassy,
but after the presentation, civil society representatives
were thanked and asked to leave the room. They never
received feedback or follow-up.
Trust and confidence building is a common feature in civil
society responses and even small things could potentially
make a considerable change. Some CSO representatives
e.g. suggested that dialogue meetings were hosted on
neutral ground or rotated among donors and civil society.
The EU Delegation in Kampala hosted a series of three
Structured Dialogue meetings in 2011 inspired by the
20
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cIVIL SocIEty
anaLySIS and dIaLoGuE
The EC is eager to identify good practices and success-
ful examples on policy dialogue. But there are few shared
guidelines, benchmarks or documented good practices
that donors can learn from when partnering with civil
society (OECD 2012). Internal monitoring and evaluation
systems are therefore vital to improve the dialogue. But
until now, the EU has conducted no formal evaluations
or lessons learned on civil society involvement, although
CSO involvement has been a legal commitment for more
than 10 years (ECA 2009).
In order to avoid a repetition of previous tick-the-box dia-
logues, future dialogue sessions must be evaluated on
the basis of formal evaluations of the quality of the dia-
logue, which could include issues such as modalities and
format of consultations, predictability and timing, access
to background material etc. Indicators should ideally be
developed and monitored in collaboration with civil so-
ciety.
It seems relatively straightforward to improve EU’s per-
formance on CSO consultations based on the experiences
from Kampala and Accra. But EU Delegations must de-
velop systematic and harmonized engagement mecha-
nisms which cover all aspects of the EU Delegation man-
date, so that civil society involvement is not dependent
on individuals.
8
analyTical ElEmEnTs of
coUnTry cso roadmaps:
Mapping of the legal and regulatory framework
Mapping of funding resources for CSOs to
engage in policy dialogue
Analysis of government dialogue and
responsiveness to policy interaction
with civil society
Analysis of coalition building and
collaboration among civil society actors,
both local and international
Analysis of donors dialogue with civil society
In order to ensure the necessary political focus and
support, CSO dialogue must be a key indicator in the
EU Delegations’ annual performance review and a key
objective for all staff at EU Delegations, most impor-
tantly the Head of Delegation and the governance and
civil society teams.
The main objective of the country CSO roadmaps must
be civil society involvement in key policy issues and
processes, such as development of country CSO road-
maps, development of national development strat-
egies (e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), EC
programming processes (either national development
strategies or Country Strategy Papers), EU Delega-
tions reporting on Policy Coherence for Development
(PCD) and human rights and development of EC sup-
ported capacity building programmes.
A strategic and systematic inclusion of civil society
must always be founded on a comprehensive analysis
of the challenges and opportunities for strengthening
the civil society involvement in key policy issues and
processes.
fUndamEnTals in an
insTiTUTionalizEd civil
sociETy dialoGUE:
Clear institutional mechanisms
Inclusion of all relevant civil society actors
Jointly agreed agendas
Rotating venues for dialogue meetings
Sufficient time provided for participation
Preparatory resources delivered timely beforehand
Feedback on results from dialogue
country cso roadmaps
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9
concLuSSIon
This study clearly shows that the
eu delegations are not
consistently involving civil society in a strategic dia-
logue beyond aid-programming.
The civil society con-
sulted criticized the EU Delegations for being too ad-hoc,
one-way and demand driven. CSOs did not receive rel-
evant information on time and rarely received feedback
from the outcome of consultations. This is far from the
‘strategic and sustained political dialogue’, which is en-
visaged in EUs new CSO communication.
A strategic civil society support must always start from a
comprehensive context analysis of the diversity of roles
and agendas in civil society. But the EC and most EU Mem-
ber States apparently do not undertake regular analysis or
mappings of civil society. As pointed out in a number of
evaluations,
donors lack a nuanced understanding of the
civil society landscape,
which consequently affects the
overall impact of their civil society support.
Working with civil society is no longer an option – but a
prerequisite for development. EC and the EU Member
States must recognize that the
cso communication
signals a paradigm shift in eu development assistance
and demands a change in the mindset at all levels.
The
genuine improvement in the dialogue at HQ level in Brus-
sels must be translated to the EU Delegations.
There is generally a
lack trust and confidence in eu as an
institution
among CSOs in Uganda and Ghana and if the
development of country CSO roadmaps does not improve
the dialogue there is a serious risk of ‘consultation fa-
tigue’. This is a major challenge and to restore trust, the
EU Delegations must allow civil society to take an active
part in the development of country CSO roadmaps from
its early stages. In some instances civil society organiza-
tions must even be allowed to lead the analysis, e.g. in
self-assessments of the CSO context.
There is clearly a need for more self-reflection among do-
nors and civil society organizations. A mutual partnership
is a two-way relationship and both parties must invest in
order to gain. It is necessary to rethink the civil society
organization dialogue in both Kampala and Accra and EU
donors and civil society must jointly introduce
institu-
tional changes and the establishment of new dialogue
forums.
The capacity constraints at the EU Delegations is a seri-
ous hindrance for a more systematic and strategic CSO
involvement. The EC must therefore substantially in-
crease the financial and human resources at the EU Del-
egations and ensure capacity building and training of EU
Delegation staff. The EC must also
urgently clarify the
role of civil society
in the process of developing country
CSO roadmaps. The lack of clarity risks undermining the
CSO ownership and thereby also the quality and impact
of the country CSO roadmaps.
Civil society dialogue must become
a key indicator in
the eu delegations annual performance review
and a
key objective for all staff at EU Delegations, most impor-
tantly the Head of Delegation and the governance and
civil society teams. Civil society dialogue should not be
assigned to a CSO focal point, but must be a key priority
and responsibility for all.
Despite the poor track record, EC and EU Member States
have a common interest in making the country CSO road-
maps a success. Europe has a long tradition in supporting
civil society and EU civil society cooperation could poten-
tially become a
comparative advantage
which would con-
tribute immensely to EUs development objectives.
Photo
Peter høvring
22
country cso roadmaps
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rEFErEncES
Alliance 2015 (2011); Towards Democratic Ownership in Ghana
APRODEV (2013); The EU and Civil Society: what to be expected?
CIVICUS (2013); State of Civil Society 2013: Creating an enabling environment
CONCORD Europe (2012); Response to the EC Communication on CSOs in Development Cooperation
CONCORD Europe (2013); Concord position; EEAS Review 2013
DG DEVCO (2012); several power point presentations from Schmidt, Baglio og Manzitti
EC (2002); Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Cooperation
EC (2004); Guidelines on Principles and Good Practices for the Participation of Non-State Actors
EC (2005a); European Consensus on Development
EC (2005b); GHANA: Country strategy evaluation
EC (2008); Evaluation of EC aid delivery through civil society organizations
EC (2007); Treaty of Lisbon
EC (2009); Country Level Evaluation Uganda
EC (2011); increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change
EC (2012a); EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy
EC (2012b); The roots of Democracy and sustainable development
EC (2012c); EuropeAid Annual Report 2012
EC (2012d); Council conclusions, ‘an Agenda for Change’, Brussels, 14 May 2012
ECA (2009); The Commission’s Management of ‘Non-State Actors’
Involvement in EC Development Cooperation, Special Report No. 4.
ECDPM and Particip (2008); Study on the Legal Instruments and
Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit
ECDPM (2011); EU development cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty
ECDPM (2012a); Gearing up for the 2013 EEAS Review
ECDPM (2012b); Reprogramming EU development cooperation for 2014-2020 (Discussion Paper 129)
ECDPM (2012c); Blog post - Innovative on paper, conservative on the ground?
EEAS (2011); Report by the High Representative
EuropeAid (2012); Mappings and Civil Society Assessments
Freedom House (2013); Freedom in the World 2013
IMF (2012); Ghana: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
INTRAC (2010); Civil Society Policy and Practice in Donor Agencies
Keijzer and Spierings (2011): Comparative analysis of EU donor policies
towards working with Civil Society Organizations
Mo Ibrahim Index (2012); 2012 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)
OECD (2011a); Partnering with Civil Society – 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews
OECD (2011b); How DAC members work with CSOs in development co-operation
OECD (2012); OECD DAC Peer Review of European Commission 2012
STAR Ghana (2013); Strengthening Democratic Governance in Ghana
Van Reisen (2011a); EU policy on South-South cooperation
Van Reisen (2011b); EU policy on civil society organizations
UM (2012); Support to civil society engagement in policy dialogue- Uganda country report
World Economic Forum (2013); The Future Role of Civil Society
country cso roadmaps
23
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country cso roadmaps
telephone: +45 61 70 49 72