Europaudvalget 2012-13
Det Europæiske Råd 13-14/12-12 Bilag 4
Offentligt
5 DECEMBER 2012
TOWARDS A GENUINE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council
In close collaboration with:
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Eurogroup
Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank
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TOWARDS A GENUINE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
At the June 2012 European Council, the President of the European Council was invited
“to develop, in close
collaboration with the President of the Commission, the President of the Eurogroup and the President of the
ECB, a specific and time-bound road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union".
Building on the Interim Report and the Conclusions of the October 2012 European Council, this Report
provides the background to the roadmap presented at the December 2012 European Council. It suggests a
timeframe and a stage-based process towards the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
covering all the essential building blocks identified in the report “Towards a genuine Economic and
Monetary Union” presented at the June European Council. It incorporates valuable input provided by the
Commission in its communication "A Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU – Launching a European
Debate" of 28 November 2012. The European Parliament has also made a valuable contribution. As
requested by the European Council, this report explores further mechanisms in the context of an integrated
budgetary framework, including an appropriate fiscal capacity for the EMU, as well as the idea of euro area
Member States entering into arrangements of a contractual nature with the EU institutions on the reforms
they commit to undertake and their implementation.
Under the Treaty, the Union has established an Economic and Monetary Union whose currency is the euro.
The views set out in this report focus on the euro area Member States as they face specific challenges by
virtue of sharing a currency. The process towards a deeper EMU should be characterised by openness and
transparency and be fully compatible with the Single Market in all aspects.
This report lays down the actions required to ensure the stability and integrity of the EMU and calls for a
political commitment to implement the proposed roadmap. The urgency to act stems from the magnitude of
the internal and external challenges currently faced by the euro area and its individual members.
The euro area needs stronger mechanisms to ensure sound national policies so that Member States can reap
the full benefits of the EMU. This is essential to ensure trust in the effectiveness of European and national
policies, to fulfil vital public functions, such as stabilisation of economies and banking systems, to protect
citizens from the effects of unsound economic and fiscal policies, and to ensure high level of growth and
social welfare.
The euro area is confronted with a rapidly evolving international environment characterised by the rise of
large emerging economies. A more resilient and integrated EMU would buffer euro area countries against
external economic shocks, preserve the European model of social cohesion and maintain Europe‟s influence
at the global level.
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Together, these challenges make indispensable a commitment to, and subsequent implementation of, a
roadmap towards a genuine EMU. They underscore that „More Europe‟ is not an end in itself, but rather a
means for serving the citizens of Europe and increasing their prosperity.
The actions deemed necessary to ensure the resilience of the EMU are presented therein as a staged-process.
Irrespective of their time horizon, all policy proposals have been conceived and designed as elements of a
path towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Given the strong linkages between the building
blocks, they should be examined as part of a mutually reinforcing comprehensive package. The creation of
an integrated financial framework has important fiscal and economic implications and therefore cannot be
envisaged separately. Similarly, the proposals put forward in the fiscal and economic policy sphere are
closely intertwined. And, as all the proposals imply deeper integration, democratic legitimacy and
accountability are essential to a genuine Economic and Monetary Union.
Overview of sequencing
The process could rest on the following three stages (see also diagram in annex):
Stage 1 (End 2012-2013)
Ensuring fiscal sustainability and breaking the link between banks and sovereigns
The completion of the first stage should ensure sound management of public finances and break the link
between banks and sovereigns, which has been one of the root causes of the sovereign debt crisis. This stage
would include five essential elements:
The completion and thorough implementation of a stronger framework for fiscal governance ('Six-Pack';
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance; 'Two-Pack').
Establishment of a framework for systematic
ex ante
coordination of major economic policy reforms, as
envisaged in Article 11 of the Treaty on Stability Convergence and Governance (TSCG).
The establishment of an effective Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for the banking sector and the
entry into force of the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR/CRDIV).
Agreement on the harmonisation of national resolution and deposit guarantee frameworks, ensuring
appropriate funding from the financial industry.
Setting up of the operational framework for direct bank recapitalisation through the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM).
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Stage 2 (2013-2014)
Completing the integrated financial framework and promoting sound structural policies
This stage would consist of two essential elements:
The completion of an integrated financial framework through the setting up of a common resolution
authority and an appropriate backstop to ensure that bank resolution decisions are taken swiftly,
impartially and in the best interest of all.
The setting up of a mechanism for stronger coordination, convergence and enforcement of structural
policies based on arrangements of a contractual nature between Member States and EU institutions on
the policies countries commit to undertake and on their implementation. On a case-by-case basis, they
could be supported with temporary, targeted and flexible financial support. As this financial support
would be temporary in nature, it should be treated separately from the multiannual financial framework.
Stage 3 (post 2014)
Improving the resilience of EMU through the creation of a shock-absorption function at the central level
This stage would mark the culmination of the process. Stage 3 would consist in:
Establishing a well-defined and limited fiscal capacity to improve the absorption of country-specific
economic shocks, through an insurance system set up at the central level. This would improve the
resilience of the euro area as a whole and would complement the contractual arrangements developed
under Stage 2. A built-in incentives-based system would encourage euro area Member States eligible for
participation in the shock absorption function to continue to pursue sound fiscal and structural policies in
accordance with their contractual obligations. Thereby the two objectives of asymmetric shock
absorption and the promotion of sound economic policies would remain intrinsically linked,
complementary and mutually reinforcing.
This stage could also build on an increasing degree of common decision-making on national budgets and
an enhanced coordination of economic policies, in particular in the field of taxation and employment,
building on the Member States' National Job Plans. More generally, as the EMU evolves towards deeper
integration, a number of other important issues will need to be further examined. In this respect, this
report and the Commission's "Blueprint" offer a basis for debate.
I.
Integrated financial framework
The current European arrangements for safeguarding financial stability remain based on national
responsibilities. This is inconsistent with the highly integrated nature of the EMU and has certainly
exacerbated the harmful interplay between the fragilities of sovereigns and the vulnerabilities of the banking
sector. The set-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) will be a guarantor of strict and impartial
supervisory oversight, thus contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks and diminishing
the probability of future systemic banking crisis.
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In its October 2012 Conclusions, the European Council invited the legislators to proceed with work on the
legislative proposals on the SSM as a matter of priority, with the objective of agreeing on the legislative
framework by 1 January 2013. It called for the rapid conclusion of the single rule book, including agreement
on the proposals on bank capital requirements by the end of the year. It also called for the rapid adoption of
the provisions relating to the harmonisation of national resolution and deposit guarantee frameworks.
The SSM will constitute a first step towards a financial market union. It is imperative that the preparatory
work can start in earnest at the beginning of 2013, so that the SSM can be fully operational from 1 January
2014 at the latest. It will be crucial that the ECB is equipped with a strong supervisory toolkit, and that the
ECB‟s ultimate responsibility for banking supervision is coupled with adequate control powers. In this
regard, establishing an appropriate framework for macro-prudential policy that takes due account of both
national and Europe-wide dimension will be important. The ECB has confirmed that it will establish
organisational arrangements guaranteeing a clear separation of its supervisory functions from monetary
policy.
Once an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, for banks in the euro area the ESM could,
following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly. The legal and operational
framework for ESM direct bank recapitalisation should be finalised by end-March 2013. In order to move
towards an integrated financial framework, the SSM will need to be complemented by a single resolution
mechanism, as well as more harmonised deposit guarantee mechanisms.
Single resolution mechanism
Since the beginning of the crisis, support to financial institutions has been substantial. It has unduly weighed
on public finances and reduced the ability to use fiscal policy to stave off the effects of the recession. A
strong and integrated resolution framework would contribute to limiting the cost of bank failures to
taxpayers. The current legislative proposal on recovery and resolution will ensure that harmonised tools
necessary for orderly bank resolutions are available in all EU Member States, including early interventions,
bailing-in and the creation of bridge banks.
In a context where supervision is effectively moved to a single supervisory mechanism, it is however
essential that the responsibility of dealing with bank resolution is also moved to the European level. The
Commission has already announced its intention to propose a single resolution mechanism once the
proposals for a Recovery and Resolution Directive and for a Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive have been
adopted. This single resolution mechanism – built around a single resolution authority – should be
established as the ECB assumes its supervisory responsibility in full. This mechanism covering all banks
supervised by the SSM should be based on robust governance arrangements, including adequate provisions
on independence and accountability, as well as an effective common backstop, which is indispensable to
complete an integrated financial framework.
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The need for a single resolution mechanism
Establishing a single resolution mechanism is indispensable to complete an integrated financial framework:
It would ensure a timely and impartial decision-making process, focused on the European dimension.
This would mitigate many of the current obstacles to resolution, such as national bias and cross-border
cooperation frictions. This would reduce resolution costs, as early and prompt actions contribute to
maintaining the economic value of banks that need to be resolved.
It would make resolution costs as low as possible and break the bank-sovereign nexus. A strong and
independent resolution authority, backed by an efficient resolution regime, would have the financial,
legal and administrative capability as well as the necessary independence to carry out effective and least-
cost resolution. By ensuring that the private sector bears the primary burden of bank resolution costs, the
authority would increase market discipline, and minimise the residual costs for the taxpayers of bank
failures.
The single resolution mechanism would complement the SSM by making certain that failing banks are
restructured or closed down swiftly. The SSM would provide a timely and unbiased assessment of the
need for resolution, while the single resolution authority would ensure actual timely and efficient
resolution.
Under the single resolution mechanism, resolution actions should follow a least-cost strategy and could be
financed according to a pecking order of bailing-in shareholders and some creditors, and relying on the
banking industry. The latter would be organized through a European Resolution Fund, which would be a
crucial element of the new resolution regime. It would be funded through
ex ante
risk-based levies on all the
banks directly participating in the SSM. The single resolution mechanism should include an appropriate and
effective common backstop. This could possibly be organized by means of an ESM credit line to the single
resolution authority. This backstop should be fiscally-neutral over the medium-term, by ensuring that public
assistance is recouped by means of
ex post
levies on the financial industry.
Deposit guarantee mechanisms
The history of financial crises has illustrated the destabilising effect uncertainty surrounding bank deposits
could have on individual financial institutions and on entire banking systems. The proposal
on the
harmonisation of national deposit guarantee schemes includes provisions to ensure that sufficiently robust
national deposit insurance systems are set up in each Member State, thereby limiting the spill-over effects
associated with deposit flight between institutions and across countries, and ensuring an appropriate degree
of depositor protection in the European Union. A rapid adoption of this proposal is important.
II.
Integrated budgetary framework
The crisis has revealed the high level of interdependence and spill-overs between euro area countries. It has
demonstrated that national budgetary policies are a matter of vital common interest. This points to the need
to move gradually towards an integrated budgetary framework ensuring both sound national budgetary
policies and greater resilience to economic shocks of the euro area as a whole. This would contribute to
sustainable growth and macroeconomic stability. The October Interim Report stressed the need for stronger
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economic governance and suggested, as an additional step, the possibility to develop gradually a fiscal
capacity for the EMU, which could facilitate adjustment to economic shocks. Following the conclusions of
the October European Council, this section explores the options for a euro area fiscal capacity and its guiding
principles.
Sound national budgetary policies are the EMU's cornerstone
The near term priority is to complete and implement the new steps for stronger economic governance. In the
past few years, significant improvements to the rules-based framework for fiscal policies in the EMU have
been enacted ('Six-Pack') or agreed (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance), with greater focus
on prevention of budgetary imbalances, on debt developments, on better enforcement mechanisms, and on
national ownership of EU rules. The other elements related to strengthening fiscal governance in the euro
area ('Two-Pack'), which are still in the legislative process, should be finalised urgently and be implemented
thoroughly. This new governance framework will provide for ample
ex ante
coordination of annual budgets
of euro area Member States and enhance the surveillance of those experiencing financial difficulties.
Towards a fiscal capacity for the EMU
The history and experience of other currency unions shows that there are various ways of progressing
towards a fiscal union and the EMU‟s unique features would justify a specific approach. Yet, while the
degree of centralisation of budgetary instruments and the arrangements for fiscal solidarity against adverse
shocks differ, all other currency unions are endowed with a central fiscal capacity. In this respect, the
European Council in October 2012 asked to explore further mechanisms, including an appropriate fiscal
capacity, for the euro area. It would support new functions which are not covered by the multiannual
financial framework from which it is clearly separated.
In stage 2, structural reforms could, in specific cases, be supported through limited, temporary, flexible and
targeted financial incentives as Member States enter into arrangements of a contractual nature with EU
institutions. These arrangements would be mandatory for euro area Member States and voluntary for the
others (see section III below). The Commission intends to make a proposal on specific ways to put in place
such contractual arrangements and on the means to support their implementation, building on EU
procedures.
The implementation of contractual arrangements and the associated incentives would support a convergence
process, leading in stage 3 to the establishment of fiscal capacity to facilitate adjustment to economic shocks.
This could take the form of an insurance-type mechanism between euro area countries to buffer large
country-specific economic shocks. Such a function would ensure a form of fiscal solidarity exercised over
economic cycles, improving the resilience of the euro area as a whole and reducing the financial and output
costs associated with macroeconomic adjustments. By contributing to macroeconomic stability, it would
usefully complement the crisis management framework based on the European Stability Mechanism.
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Since a well-functioning shock absorption function would require a further degree of convergence between
economic structures and policies of the Member States, the two objectives of supporting growth-enhancing
structural reforms and cushioning country-specific economic shocks are complementary and mutually
reinforcing.
Economic rationale for such a fiscal capacity
In a common currency area, the burden of adjusting to country-specific economic shocks falls on labour and
capital mobility, price and cost flexibility, and fiscal policy. In order to protect against negative fiscal
externalities, it is important that fiscal risks are shared where economic adjustment mechanisms to country-
specific shocks are less than perfect. This is clearly the case in the euro area, where labour mobility is
comparatively low, capital flows are susceptible to sudden swings that can undermine financial stability, and
structural rigidities can delay or impede price adjustments and the reallocation of resources. In such cases,
countries can easily find themselves pushed into bad equilibria with negative implications for the euro area
as a whole.
In this context, setting up risk-sharing tools, such as a common but limited shock absorption function, can
contribute to cushioning the impact of country-specific shocks and help prevent contagion across the euro
area and beyond. However, this needs to be complemented with a mechanism to induce stronger economic
convergence, based on structural policies aiming at improving the adjustment capacity of national economies
and avoiding the risk of moral hazard inherent to any insurance system. Hence, in addition to fulfilling their
intrinsic purpose, successfully implementing reforms specified in a contractual arrangement could also serve
as a criterion for participating in the asymmetric shock absorption function established in stage 3. This would
provide countries with an additional strong incentive to implement sound economic policies both before and
once they join the shock absorption mechanism. In the transition towards establishing this automatic
stabilisation function, and depending on their specific circumstances, limited, temporary and flexible
financial incentives could be provided to Member States to promote structural reforms. In order to avoid the
relapse or emergence of macroeconomic imbalances once countries have gained access to the shock
absorption function, the contractual approach to reforms would continue. In addition, net transfers under the
shock absorption function could be modulated to reflect ongoing compliance with the commitments
undertaken under the contractual arrangements.
Options for the shock absorption function of the euro area fiscal capacity
An EMU fiscal capacity with a limited asymmetric shock absorption function could take the form of an
insurance-type system between euro area countries. Contributions from, and disbursements to, national
budgets would fluctuate according to each country's position over the economic cycle.
The specific design of such a function could follow two broad approaches. The first would be a
macroeconomic approach, where contributions and disbursements would be based on fluctuations in cyclical
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revenue and expenditure items, or on measures of economic activity. The second could be based on a
microeconomic approach, and be more directly linked to a specific public function sensitive to the economic
cycle, such as unemployment insurance. In this case, the level of contributions/benefits from/to the fiscal
capacity would depend directly on labour market developments. In this scenario, the fiscal capacity would
then work as a complement or partial substitute to national unemployment insurance systems. Transfers
could, for example, be limited to cyclical unemployment by covering only short term unemployment.
Assessing the individual merits of each approach would require a more in-depth analysis. Importantly, the
magnitude of the shock absorption function assigned to the fiscal capacity would depend largely on its size,
and the financial implications for national budgets would depend on its precise design and parameters.
However, it will be important to ensure that, irrespective of the approach that is followed, establishing this
function does not affect the overall level of public expenditure and tax pressure in the euro area. Equally, the
exact conditions and thresholds for the activation of transfers would need to be studied carefully, as only
country-specific shocks of a sufficient magnitude should be absorbed centrally. For example, in the case of
the microeconomic approach, unemployment-related transfers could be activated only once the increase in
short-term unemployment exceeds a certain threshold.
Financial resources of the fiscal capacity and ability to borrow
Specific resources would have to be raised to finance both functions – promoting structural reforms and
absorbing asymmetric shocks. These resources could take the form of national contributions, own resources,
or a combination of both. In a longer term perspective, a key aspect of a future fiscal capacity, which would
need to be examined carefully, would be its possible ability to borrow. A euro area fiscal capacity could
indeed offer an appropriate basis for common debt issuance without resorting to the mutualisation of
sovereign debt. The question of applying a fiscal golden rule, such as the balanced budget rule enshrined in
both the Stability and Growth Pact and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, to this fiscal
capacity should then be explored. Finally, an integrated budgetary framework would require the
establishment of a Treasury function with clearly defined responsibilities.
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Guiding principles for the shock absorption function of an EMU fiscal capacity
Irrespective of the approach – macro or micro-economic – the design of such a shock absorption function
should rest on a number of guiding principles reflecting also the EMU‟s specific features:
Elements of fiscal risk-sharing related to the absorption of country-specific shocks should be
structured in such a way that they do not lead to unidirectional and permanent transfers between
countries, nor should they be conceived as income equalisation tools. Over time, each euro area
country, as it moves along its economic cycle, would in turn be a net recipient and a net contributor
of the scheme.
Such a function should neither undermine the incentives for sound fiscal policy making at the
national level, nor the incentives to address national structural weaknesses. Appropriate mechanisms
to limit moral hazard and foster structural reforms should be built in the shock absorption function.
Linking it tightly to compliance with the broad EU governance framework, including possible
arrangements of a contractual nature (see section III below), should be envisaged.
The fiscal capacity should be developed within the framework of the European Union and its
institutions. This would guarantee its consistency with the existing rules-based EU fiscal framework
and procedures for the coordination of economic policies.
The fiscal capacity should not be an instrument for crisis management, as the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) has already been established for that purpose. By contrast, the fiscal capacity's
role should be to improve the overall economic resilience of the EMU and euro area countries. It
would contribute to crisis prevention and make future ESM interventions less likely.
The design of the fiscal capacity should be consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, and its
operations transparent and subject to appropriate democratic control and accountability. Equally, it
should be cost-effective and not lead to the undue development of costly administrative procedures
or unnecessary centralisation. It should not lead to an increase in expenditure or taxation levels.
III. Integrated economic policy framework
The sovereign debt crisis painfully exposed that the unsustainable economic policies pursued by some euro
area countries in the past and the rigidities existing in their economies have negative repercussions for all
members of the EMU. An integrated economic policy framework is necessary to guide at all times the
policies of Member States towards strong and sustainable economic growth to produce higher levels of
growth and employment.
In the near term, it is essential to complete the Single Market as it provides a powerful tool to promote
growth. In addition, there is a need for a thorough assessment of the performance of labour and product
markets in the euro area. In the absence of exchange rate adjustments, a well functioning EMU requires
efficient labour and product markets. This is essential to fight large scale unemployment, and to facilitate
price and cost adjustments that are key for competitiveness and growth. Urgent attention should be paid to
promoting labour mobility across borders and addressing skills mismatch in the labour market. The
Commission could undertake this assessment as a matter of priority. Finally, a framework for systematic ex-
ante coordination of major economic policy reforms, as envisaged in Article 11 of the Treaty on Stability
Convergence and Governance (TSCG), should be put in place.
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In order to remain a highly attractive social market economy and to preserve the European social models, it
is important for the Union to be globally competitive and to avoid excessive divergences in competitiveness
among EMU members. The reforms introduced to the EU surveillance framework through the creation of the
European Semester with country-specific recommendations and of a new Macroeconomic Imbalances
Procedure with possible sanctions are a step in the right direction. But there is a need to go further and to put
in place a stronger framework for coordination, convergence and enforcement of structural policies. In this
context, the October European Council Conclusions called for further exploration of the idea of
arrangements of a contractual nature between Member States and the EU institutions on reforms promoting
competitiveness, growth and jobs that countries commit to implement. A staged approach would be used to
put in place these arrangements.
Arrangements of a contractual nature need to address vulnerabilities at an early stage
Macroeconomic imbalances tend to build up slowly and are often masked by favourable economic growth
and liquidity conditions. But given structural rigidities in labour, product and services markets, and
institutional settings, once identified they are often difficult to correct quickly. It is therefore important to
address the root causes of imbalances at an early stage, including by ensuring that these essential markets can
adjust quickly to shocks and that national frameworks facilitate growth and employment. Contractual
arrangements would thus need to focus on microeconomic, sectoral and institutional bottlenecks, and aim at
enhancing the competitiveness and growth potential of the economy. The future contractual arrangements
should therefore be mandatory for all euro area countries, but voluntary for other Member States.
Contractual arrangements need to focus on key weaknesses
Not all economic inefficiencies represent a burden for the functioning of the EMU. Also, the degree of
competitiveness and growth challenge varies across countries. Content and breadth of the reform agreements
would reflect this diversity and would adapt to country-specific needs (e.g. efficient labour market to fight
youth unemployment; improve judicial systems). However, for these arrangements to take this heterogeneity
into account, an intense dialogue between each Member State and the EU institutions, both at technical and
political levels, would be essential. This would take the form of an in-depth analysis by both parties,
providing the basis for a tailor-made and detailed agreement on some specific reforms. Depending on the
type of measures necessary, the length of these agreements would vary for each country, but would likely be
of a multiannual nature. In order to maintain the focus on key weaknesses, such arrangements would need to
allow for some flexibility to deal with major shocks and changing economic circumstances and priorities.
Depending on the specific situation of each country, in stage 2, this could be supported by targeted, limited
and flexible financial support under the fiscal capacity.
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Contractual arrangements need to be integrated into existing EU processes
The crisis has led to a strengthening of the EU economic governance framework. Every year, integrated
country-specific recommendations by the Council, based on a proposal by the Commission, are addressed to
all Member States. In addition, a Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) has been put in place to
detect and correct imbalances at an early stage. To avoid inconsistencies and duplication, contractual
arrangements should be included in the European Semester. They should be consistent with and support the
overall policy mix resulting from the Annual Growth Survey and should be based on the country-specific
recommendations. In accordance with the objective of early detection, the in-depth reviews would be
generalised to all EMU countries. In-depth reviews would need to be based on a very thorough and on-the-
ground dialogue and on analysis of Member States' economies. Based on the conclusions of the in-depth
review, the Commission's country-specific recommendations would be the basis for a dialogue with each
country on the specific and detailed measures contained in the reform arrangements, including a timeframe
for implementation. For Member States under the corrective arm of the MIP, the agreement would be the
corrective action plan, and as foreseen in the current regulation non-compliance would lead to sanctions.
Contractual arrangements need to benefit from full domestic and European ownership and accountability
National ownership is pivotal to implementation of structural reforms. A national debate on the priority
measures and approval of reform agreements by national parliaments are essential to ensure national
ownership. The Commission should be able to inform the European and national parliaments of the necessity
of these measures from an EMU perspective. Both contractual parties would be responsible for content and
implementation of their part of the convergence and competitiveness agreement, and for reporting to their
respective parliaments (national and European) on progress achieved. Full accountability of both parties can
only be ensured if the agreed reform agenda is specific, detailed and measurable. This requires
ex ante
agreement on concrete timelines, on the specific modalities for monitoring and on access to information. The
agreements and compliance reports would be published on a regular and timely basis. Significant economic
changes or altering political circumstances, such as the election of a new government, could lead to a
renegotiation of the precise measures and steps to reach the reform objectives.
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Key elements of arrangements of a contractual nature on structural reforms
In summary, such arrangements embedded in the EU governance framework could rest on the following
principles:
They would be embedded in the European Semester, be consistent with and support the overall euro
area policy mix; they would be mandatory for euro area Member States but voluntary for the others,
on the basis of thorough, on-the-ground reviews of the main bottlenecks to growth and employment.
These reviews would be conducted by the Commission.
They would cover a multiannual, specific and monitorable reform agenda jointly agreed with the EU
institutions and focussed on competitiveness and growth that are crucial for the smooth functioning
of the EMU.
Member States and the Commission would be accountable, respectively, to national parliaments and
the European Parliament on the content and implementation of their duties under the agreements.
Structural reforms would be supported through financial incentives and would result in temporary
transfers to Member States with excessive structural weaknesses. This targeted support should be
financed through specific resources.
Compliance with the agreements can be ensured by an incentive-based framework. Compliance
could be one of the criteria for participating in the shock absorption function of the fiscal capacity. In
addition, national contributions to the fiscal capacity could be increased in case of non-compliance.
V. Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability
In its October Conclusions the European Council stressed the need for strong mechanisms for democratic
legitimacy and accountability. One of the guiding principles is that democratic control and accountability
should occur at the level at which the decisions are taken. The implementation of this guiding principle is
key to ensuring the effectiveness of the integrated financial, budgetary and economic policy frameworks.
This implies the involvement of the European Parliament as regards accountability for decisions taken at the
European level, while maintaining the pivotal role of national parliaments, as appropriate.
Decisions on national budgets are at the heart of Member States' parliamentary democracies. At the same
time, the provisions for democratic legitimacy and accountability should ensure that the common interest of
the union is duly taken into account; yet national parliaments are not in the best position to take it into
account fully. This implies that further integration of policy making and a greater pooling of competences at
the European level should first and foremost be accompanied with a commensurate involvement of the
European Parliament in the integrated frameworks for a genuine EMU.
First, in an integrated financial framework: while accountability of both the European Central Bank as single
supervisor and of a future single resolution authority should take place at the European level, this should be
complemented by strong mechanisms for information, reporting and transparency to national parliaments of
the participating Member States.
Second, in the context of integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks: Members States should
ensure the appropriate involvement of their national parliaments in the proposed reform arrangements of a
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contractual nature and more broadly in the context of the European Semester. In this spirit, the European
Council asked in October to explore ways to ensure debates in the European Parliament and national
parliaments on the recommendations adopted in the context of the European Semester. New mechanisms to
increase the level of cooperation between national and European parliaments, for example building on
Article 13 of the TSCG and Protocol 1 of the Treaty, could contribute to enhancing democratic legitimacy
and accountability. Their precise organisation and modalities are a responsibility of the European Parliament.
Third, the creation of a new fiscal capacity for the EMU should also lead to adequate arrangements ensuring
its full democratic legitimacy and accountability. The details of such arrangements would largely depend on
its specific features, including its funding sources, its decision-making processes and the scope of its
activities.
Finally, the crisis has shown the need to strengthen not only the EMU's surveillance framework but also its
ability to take rapid executive decisions to improve crisis management in bad times and economic
policymaking in good times. Some intergovernmental arrangements have been created as a result of the
shortcomings of the previous architecture but these would ultimately need to be integrated into the legal
framework of the European Union. This is already foreseen under the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance, and could be envisaged also for other cases. Reinforcing the capacity of the European level to
take executive economic policy decisions for the EMU is essential. Finally, as the EMU evolves towards
banking, fiscal and economic union, its external representation should also be unified.
Ultimately, these far-reaching changes undertaken by the European Union in general and the Economic and
Monetary Union in particular require a shared sense of purpose amongst Member States, a high degree of
social cohesion, a strong participation of the European and national parliaments and a renewed dialogue with
social partners. The openness and transparency of the process as well as the outcome are crucial to move
towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union.
14
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ANNEX
Stages Towards a Genuine EMU
Ensuring fiscal sustainability and
breaking the link between banks
and sovereigns
SSM and Single Rulebook
Completing the integrated financial
framework and promoting sound
structural policies at national level
Establishing a EMU country-
country
-
specific shock absorption
function
Integrated
financial
framework
Harmonised national DGS
Harmonised national resolution
frameworks
ESM direct bank recapitalisation
Six pack, Two pack, TSCG
Single Resolution Mechanism
with appropriate backstop arrangements
Integrated
budgetary
framework
Financial incentives linked to
contractual arrangements
Temporary/flexible/
targeted support
Conditional participation
based on entry
criteria/compliance
Country-specific shock absorption
Conditions of
participation depend on
ongoing compliance
Integrated
economic
framework
Arrangements of a contractual nature
integrated in European Semester
Framework for ex-ante coordination of
ex
-
economic policy reforms (TSCG, Art. 11)
Political
accountability
Commensurate progress on democratic legitimacy and accountability
Stage I
Completed end 2012-2013
Stage II
Start 2013 – completed 2014
Stage III
Post 2014