EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Europaudvalget 2015-16
EUU Alm.del Bilag 99
Offentligt

6 May 2015

Twenty-third Bi-annual Report:

Developments in European Union

Procedures and Practices

Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny

Prepared by the COSAC Secretariat and presented to:

LIII Conference of Parliamentary Committees

for Union Affairs of Parliaments

of the European Union

31 May-2 June 2015

Riga

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs

of Parliaments of the European Union

COSAC SECRETARIAT

WIE 05 U 041, 50 rue Wiertz, B-1047 Brussels, Belgium

E-mail:

[email protected]

| Tel: +32 2 284 3776

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Table of Contents

Background..................................................................................................................................................... iv

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER 1: EU ENERGY POLICY: STATE OF PLAY, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

......................................................................................................................................................................... 11

i. Parliaments' discussions on the European Commission's "Framework Strategy for a Resilient

Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy" (COM (2015) 80 final) .......................... 11

ii. The concept of the European Energy Union (EEU) and its sources ................................................. 13

iii. Scope and content of concept of European Energy Union.............................................................. 17

iv. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council entitled

European Energy Security Strategy [COM(2014)330] ............................................................................. 18

v. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European

Energy Security Strategy [SWD(2014)330].............................................................................................. 21

vi. The concept of Energy Security and its sources............................................................................... 21

vii. Scope and content of the concept of energy security ..................................................................... 24

viii. Closer cooperation and coordination among EU Parliaments in the realm of energy policy ......... 25

CHAPTER 2: FUTURE OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF EU AFFAIRS ............................... 29

Section A: Improving the procedure for reasoned opinion/political dialogue ..................................... 29

Section B: "Green card" procedure ........................................................................................................ 31

i. Support to the idea of introducing a "green card procedure" that would build on the existing

political dialogue ..................................................................................................................................... 31

ii. Scope of the proposed "green card"................................................................................................ 33

iii. Parliaments' position on the "green card"....................................................................................... 33

iv. The UK

House of Lords'

discussion paper on the "green card" and its main elements/ proposals . 35

v. The role of the European Parliament in the procedure................................................................... 38

vi. Examples of proposal that Parliaments would be willing to put forward within the framework of

the "green card" ...................................................................................................................................... 39

vii. Different terms proposed for the procedure................................................................................... 39

Section C: Cooperation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament ...................... 40

CHAPTER 3: EU TRADE POLICY AND THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS....................................... 42

Section A: Parliaments' engagement in the debate on the EU free trade agreements ........................ 42

i. Policy for defining priorities in relation to EU trade and investment negotiations with third

countries.................................................................................................................................................. 42

ii. Parliaments' engagement in the debate on the impact that the EU trade and investment policy

and the procedures/ practices followed ................................................................................................. 43

iii. Scrutiny of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA) and the

plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)...................................................................................... 46

Section B: Discussion process on the EU-US Translantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)

..................................................................................................................................................................... 47

i. Market access .................................................................................................................................. 48

ii. Regulatory cooperation ................................................................................................................... 49

iii. Investment protection ..................................................................................................................... 50

Section C: Transparency and access to information on ongoing EU trade negotiations .................... 51

i. National Parliaments' and the European Parliament's right to access to information on ongoing EU

trade and investment negotiations processes ........................................................................................ 51

ii. Scrutiny of the European Commission’s transparency initiative for TTIP negotiations .................. 54

The future role of Parliaments in the area of EU trade and investment policy ........................................ 55

iii

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Background

This is the Twenty-third Bi-annual Report from the COSAC Secretariat.

COSAC Bi-annual Reports

The XXX COSAC decided that the COSAC Secretariat should produce factual

Bi-annual Reports, to be published ahead of each ordinary meeting of the

Conference. The purpose of the Reports is to give an overview of the

developments in procedures and practices in the European Union that are

relevant to parliamentary scrutiny.

All the Bi-annual Reports are available on the COSAC website at:

http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/

The three chapters of this Bi-annual Report are based on information provided by the national

http://www.cosac.eu/en/documents/biannual/

Parliaments of the European Union Member States and the European Parliament. The deadline for

submitting replies to the questionnaire for the 23rd Bi-annual Report was 23 March 2015.

The outline of this Report was adopted by the meeting of the Chairpersons of COSAC, held on 2

February 2015 in Riga.

As a general rule, the Report does not specify all Parliaments or Chambers of which the case is

relevant for each point. Instead, illustrative examples are used.

Complete replies, received from 40 out of 41 national Parliaments/Chambers of 28 Member States

and the European Parliament, can be found in the Annex on the COSAC website. The Greek

Vouli

ton Ellinon

did not answer the questionnaire due to recent elections.

Note on Numbers

Of the 28 Member States of the European Union, 15 have a unicameral Parliament

and 13 have a bicameral Parliament. Due to this combination of unicameral and

bicameral systems, there are 41 national parliamentary Chambers in the 28

Member States of the European Union.

Although they have bicameral systems, the national Parliaments of Austria, Ireland

and Spain each submitted a single set of replies to the questionnaire.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER 1: EU ENERGY POLICY: STATE OF PLAY, CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES

The first Chapter of the 23rd Bi-Annual Report of COSAC presents the content that

Parliaments/Chambers of the EU Member States attribute to the European Energy Union (EEU) and

energy security, the basis of these concepts, as well as Parliaments' views on a number of key

relevant energy policy issues relevant to these. In this context, Parliaments/Chambers are asked to

provide information on the outcome of their discussions on documents such as the European

Commission's "Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate

Change Policy"

[

COM(2015)80], the Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council titled European Energy Security Strategy [COM(2014)330] and the

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European

Energy Security Strategy [SWD(2014)330]. Furthermore, Parliaments are asked to present their

views on closer cooperation among EU Parliaments in matters of common interest in the realm of

energy policy.

Very few Parliaments/Chambers have issued an opinion on the European Commission's

"Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change

Policy", while a few have debated the topic informally. However, the majority of those responding

intend to hold a debate.

The Report shows that, while there is an official position/formal interpretation of the concept of the

EEU adopted at the national level (parliamentary or governmental level) in the vast majority of

those responding, that was not the case for the concept of energy security. As regards the sources of

the EEU, a number of Parliaments/Chambers mentioned their Governments' position and

Parliaments' discussions at Committee and/or plenary level. As regards the sources of energy

security, the information given by Parliaments/Chambers is considerably less, with Parliaments

referring to their Governments' position, or discussions at committee level, or discussions at

relevant conferences, or relevant inquiries.

Regarding the concepts/actions/policies that are, or can be, associated with the EEU, responding

Parliaments/Chambers mostly associate the EEU with energy security and energy savings and

energy efficiency. The EEU is the least associated with the energy production portfolios of the EU

Member States and long-term contracts between producers of energy producers (suppliers) and

consumers. Other concepts/actions/policies that are, or can be, associated with the EEU cited by

Parliaments/Chambers include the strict implementation of legislation, decarbonisation of transport,

use of low-carbon and renewable energy sources, resetting the EU energy policy, remodelling the

EU energy system, affordable energy pricing for consumers, building and modernising the energy

infrastructure, regional collaboration and synchronisation of the Baltic States' electricity market

with Europe's continental networks, and the decarbonisation policy of the Energy Union.

Regarding concepts/actions/policies that are or can be associated with the concept of energy

security, responding Parliaments/Chambers mostly associate energy security with the diversification

of energy supply resources and the EEU, as well as with energy savings and energy efficiency.

Energy security is least associated with the energy production portfolios of the EU Member States.

Regarding other concepts/actions/policies that are or can be associated with the concept of energy

security, regional collaboration, synchronisation of the Baltic States' electricity market with

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Europe's continental networks, better interconnection and elimination of "energy islands", transition

to a low-carbon economy by 2050, improvement of energy storage facilities, diversification of

energy supply among different geopolitical areas and improvement of European reverse flow

capacity are mentioned among others.

Parliaments/Chambers have given detailed ideas on the scope and content of the EEU concept

mostly summarising it along the main pillars of EU energy policy: 1) security and solidarity, 2) an

integrated internal energy market, 3) reduction of energy demand, 4) decarbonisation, 5) research

and innovation.

As regards the scope of energy security, Parliaments' views vary; some of the objectives cited

include the diversification of energy supplies and delivery routes, including consultations on

necessary infrastructural investments, assistance to building key interconnectors, enhancement of

energy storage facilities, respect of the

Member States’ competence on how

to determine their

energy mix, use of the potential for significant energy savings, and measures designed to meet

energy efficiency targets. In a number of cases, less dependency or maximising energy

independence are supported.

One third of the respondents have discussed and issued an opinion on the Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament and the Council titled European Energy Security Strategy

[COM(2014)330], three have informally debated the topic, while eight intend to do so. Two thirds

of those responding have not discussed the Commission staff working document In-depth Study of

European Energy Security accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to

the Council and the European Parliament on European Energy Security Strategy [SWD(2014)330],

while four have debated the topic informally, six intended to do so and only two had discussed it

and issued an opinion.

The idea of closer cooperation among EU Parliaments in matters of common interest in the realm of

energy policy is unanimously supported by the respondents. In terms of how this could be achieved,

several Parliaments/Chambers identify COSAC and/or interparliamentary meetings of sectoral

committees as a platform for discussion or sharing best practices in this field, while a few suggest

holding specific "cluster of interest" meetings.

The majority of the respondents have replied positively to the question whether they consider the

distributed energy production an important tool for moving away from the import of fossil energy

sourced from third countries.

Closer policy coordination among EU Member States regarding renewable energy and overall

energy policies among EU Member States is supported by a wide majority of the respondents.

The Member States' competence to decide on their national energy mix is stressed by several

Parliaments, while the need for closer coordination leading to more harmonisation of the energy

mix and a more consistent compliance with renewable energy goals is also noted.

Concerning the question how closer coordination could be achieved in the field of renewable

energy, some of the respondents suggest organising regular meetings and discussions.

There is almost unanimous support among respondents for further energy efficiency measures and

increased financing for energy efficiency, seen as important tools for reducing imports of energy

sourced from third countries.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

CHAPTER 2: FUTURE OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF EU AFFAIRS

The second Chapter of the 23rd Bi-annual Report on the future of parliamentary scrutiny of EU

affairs explores the role played by national Parliaments in the EU decision-making process aiming

at fostering the debate on strengthening the role of national Parliaments in the EU. To this end, it

collects Parliaments’/Chambers’ views regarding the short-term

and long-term evolution of

parliamentary scrutiny of the EU decision making process, exploring at the same time national

Parliaments' cooperation with the European Parliament.

In terms of how to further improve the quality of national Parliaments' contributions and to facilitate

the European Commission's response to them rendering reasoned opinions and political dialogue

procedures more structured and effective, the majority of Parliaments/Chambers support issuing

informal guidelines on how to draft reasoned opinions and contributions in the context of political

dialogue.

The greatest number of those supporting such guidelines indicate that they would prefer these to be

non-binding, a tool for the exchange of best practices highlighting basic legal issues, so as to draw a

sharp distinction between the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, but not in the form of a

standardised template. A small number of Parliaments/Chambers (eight) state that there is no need

for establishing informal guidelines on how to draft reasoned opinions. As to who should be

entrusted with the task of drafting such guidelines, the majority (eight) express their preference for a

specific working group established within COSAC, at staff level (permanent representatives in

based in Brussels or staff in capitals) or at political level (six), often proposing a combination of

those options. Seven Parliaments/Chambers express their preference for COSAC.

Only a few Parliaments/Chambers (seven) support creating a standard form for reasoned opinions

and contributions in the context of political dialogue. As to who should be tasked with creating such

a standard form, the majority of the respondents (four) express their preference for a specific

working group established within COSAC, at staff level (permanent representatives based in

Brussels or staff in capitals), or at political level (two respondents), in a couple of cases proposing a

combination of those options.

The idea of introducing a "green card" procedure that would build on the existing political dialogue

without any formal Treaty amendments is shared by the vast majority of the responding national

Parliaments, though only six Parliaments/Chambers have adopted an official position on the "green

card". As regards the scope of it, there is broad consensus among responding Parliaments on the

fact that the "green card" should provide a tool for conveying to the European Commission

Suggestions for new legislation

as well as

Suggestions to amend existing legislation.

A majority of

the respondents are in favour of including

Suggestions to repeal existing legislation

and

Suggestions

to amend or repeal delegated or implementing acts.

The UK

House of Lords'

recent proposal on how the "green card" procedure could be implemented

in practice is seen by an overwhelming majority of national Parliaments/Chambers as a basis for

further discussion. Parliaments largely support the elements put forward by this proposal, in

particular those providing that any national Parliament/Chamber may issue a "green card" according

to its own internal procedures, that informal consultations and contacts with other

Parliaments/Chambers, as well as that possible cluster meetings may take place and that the

initiating Parliament/Chamber prepare a draft letter to the European Commission and disseminate it

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

to all other Parliaments/Chambers. However, some Parliaments have voiced their concern

regarding the deadline, as well as the threshold in relation to the initiation of the proposed

procedure.

Only a few Parliaments/Chambers support that the European Parliament should play a role in the

"green card" procedure. For most of the respondents, the European Parliament, pursuant to Article

225 TFEU, already enjoys the right to ask the European Commission to submit legislative

proposals. Though the question as to what this role involves is not wholly clear, most of the

respondents see a need to keep the European Parliament informed about the initiatives taken in the

framework of the "green card".

A wide majority are in favour of calling the new mechanism "green card" procedure and only four

Parliaments Chambers have submitted concrete proposals as to alternative terms that may be

attributed to the "green card".

The Report also collects Parliaments'/Chambers' views and positions on proposed forms of

cooperation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament with the aim of facilitating

exchange of information, best practices and debate on the implementation and transposition of EU

legislation, EU spending programmes, as well as parliamentary monitoring.

Half of the responding Parliaments/Chambers have discussed and/or replied to the letter of the

President of the European Parliament of 5 June 2014, while most of those responding have provided

a reply.

The vast majority of the respondents express their willingness to share their best practices and/or

ideas with the European Parliament on parliamentary monitoring on transposition, implementation

and enforcement of the EU law.

Most of those Parliaments/Chambers responding negatively highlight the fact that they are not

dealing with the monitoring of transposition and/or have no information to share, while a few

expressly mention they have no formal position on the issue.

The overwhelming majority is also willing to share already existing positions, information or

background knowledge on the extent to which EU legislation/EU policies/EU spending programs

are implemented and applied and on whether these have produced the intended effects. Those

Parliaments/Chambers opposing such cooperation stress the role of the Government in the field of

implementation and enforcement of EU law and the European Commission's responsibility foreseen

in the treaties.

The proposed relevant methods or networks for facilitating cooperation vary from information-

sharing via national Parliament representatives in Brussels to sending a direct reply from the

Speaker of Parliament/Chamber to the President of the European Parliament.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

CHAPTER 3: EU TRADE POLICY AND THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

The third Chapter of the 23rd Bi-Annual Report begins by setting forth the extent to which the

Parliaments/Chambers have been engaged in the debate on the impact of EU free trade agreements

over the last few years. It then looks at the state of play of the debates on some specific free trade

agreements currently being negotiated, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

(TTIP) and the EU-Canada trade agreement (CETA), identifying the most important issues for the

Parliaments/Chambers during this negotiation process. Last, this Chapter addresses the issue of

access to information for parliamentarians on ongoing EU trade negotiations.

Most responding Parliaments/Chambers, although they do not have a role in defining national

priorities in relation to EU trade and investment negotiations, scrutinise such negotiations and exert

parliamentary oversight over their Government’s activities in the EU Council throughout

the

negotiation process. A few Parliaments/Chambers usually grant a mandate to their Government

ahead of the European Council and EU Council meetings.

In terms of the extent to which Parliaments/Chambers have been engaged in the debate on the

impact of the EU free trade agreements over the last few years, most responding

Parliaments/Chambers state that they have discussed the estimated national and EU-wide impact of

such agreements, mainly of the TTIP. The discussions usually have taken place at Committee level,

but some Parliaments/Chambers also refer to the debates in plenary session. Most

Parliaments/Chambers have informed about a wide range of parliamentary initiatives, including

conferences, meetings and hearings involving different stakeholders (e.g. the Commissioner for

trade and other members of the European Commission, members of the European Parliament, Chief

trade negotiators, Ambassadors, Non-Governmental Organisations).

The vast majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers do not carry out public consultations on

EU trade and investment policy, and almost none of respondent Parliaments/Chambers prepare their

own impact assessment on trade issues.

The EU negotiations on free trade agreements with third countries, in particular the ongoing

negotiations between the EU and the United States on TTIP, have lately generated an

unprecedented level of interest within the EU and on the part of the national Parliaments.

Almost all responding Parliaments/Chambers either have already discussed various aspects of the

TTIP or are planning to do so in the near future, thus confirming the high level of interest in this

agreement among the national Parliaments. About half of responding Parliaments/Chambers have

looked at CETA, and fewer respondents have discussed the multilateral agreement on trade in

services (TiSA).

The Treaty of Lisbon has granted new trade negotiation powers to the EU: the Commission has

exclusive competence to negotiate trade deals in several new areas, and all trade agreements must

be approved by the European Parliament. Nevertheless, several Parliaments/Chambers have urged

enhancing the legitimacy of those key trade agreements through ratification by Member States.

Parliaments/Chambers' replies highlight the aspects of TTIP deemed key to concluding those

negotiations. Easier market access in a wide range of market segments is seen as instrumental in

providing significant opportunities to both the European and the US economies, but issues related to

certain products, such as in the agricultural, chemical, metal and automotive industries are raised by

several Parliaments/Chambers. Resolving the differences between the regulatory systems of the EU

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

and the US is seen by many Parliaments/Chambers as a major contribution from TTIP, but at the

same time a strong signal is sent for upholding high consumer protection, health, labour and

environmental protection, as well as social rights and food safety in the EU.

The replies on protection of investments, particularly the Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement

process (ISDS), are indicative of various and sometimes clashing opinions ranging from supporting

the current mandate for the negotiations and seeing this as an opportunity to set modern standards of

protection for the legitimate rights of foreign investors, to calling for completely excluding the

ISDS provisions from the TTIP.

The last section of this Chapter analyses the available data on access to information on ongoing EU

trade negotiations for parliamentarians, especially in the light of the well-received recent decisions

by the Commission on the transparency of TTIP negotiations.

Half of the responding Parliaments/Chambers indicate they have the right to access the information

on trade and investment negotiations, including negotiation documents, in keeping with any of the

following: specific constitutional/legislative/regulatory provisions; standard governmental scrutiny

and/or cooperation procedures; upon notification and/or request to the Governments. The

overwhelming majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers receive information on ongoing

EU trade and investment negotiations processes from their respective Governments. However, there

are important differences between existing practices within the responding Parliaments/Chambers,

in terms of the nature of the information received (ranging from very general and accessible to the

public to very detailed, confidential information only accessible under strict confidentiality

arrangements) and the time when it is made available (from the very outset of the negotiation

process or at certain stages during the negotiations).

Valuable insights are provided on the practices currently adhered to in the course of the TTIP

negotiations, and on the impact of the Commission's transparency initiative launched in November

2014. While several respondents acknowledge the importance of the initiative, the vast majority of

the responding Parliaments/Chambers affirm that further steps towards enhancing transparency

concerning TTIP negotiations are needed and have made corresponding suggestions, such as,

ensuring that negotiation meetings are open and that more relevant documents are released to the

general public, strengthening the political dialogue through the involvement of all stakeholders,

granting parliamentarians access to negotiation documents, devising an effective communication

strategy informing citizens on the agreement, among others.

Only few Parliaments/Chambers have presented their views on the future role of Parliaments in the

area of EU trade and investment policy. These stress the importance of ensuring,

inter alia,

the

involvement of national Parliaments in the debate on the negotiation mandate, with representatives

of the European Commission taking part; the provision of information on the progress of

negotiations in a more detailed and transparent way than has hitherto been the case; greater

involvement of national Parliaments in the debate on the EU trade and investment policy,

particularly in the agreements viewed as 'mixed agreements'; striking the right balance between the

provision of information to national Parliaments; their involvement in the negotiation process and

the necessary confidentiality of the negotiations.

___________________________________________________

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

CHAPTER 1: EU ENERGY POLICY: STATE OF PLAY, CHALLENGES AND

OPPORTUNITIES

The purpose of the first Chapter of the 23rd Bi-Annual Report of COSAC is to present the content

that Parliaments/Chambers of the EU Member States attribute to Energy Security and the European

Energy Union (EEU) and their views on a number of essential energy policy issues relevant to

energy security and the EEU. In this context, it compiles Parliaments’/Chambers’

views as to how

the EEU could be designed and, in particular, how to best address the challenges in the main areas

that will likely constitute the backbone of the future Energy Union: energy security, completion of

the internal market, energy efficiency, decarbonisation, research and innovation, with the aim of

contributing to an exchange of information among Parliaments. It also examines which particular

aspects Parliaments/Chambers would set as their priorities within this broad range of issues.

The concept of "a resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change policy" has been

put forward as one of the top priorities of the new European Commission, and it is one of the key

points in the Commission’s work programme for 2015. Parliaments/Chambers,

in this Chapter, are

asked, among others, to give their views on recently published documents, such as the European

Commission's "Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate

Change Policy"

, the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the

Council titled European Energy Security Strategy

and the Communication from the Commission to

the Council and the European Parliament on European Energy Security Strategy

. Furthermore,

Parliaments are asked to present their views on closer cooperation among EU Parliaments in matters

of common interest in the realm of energy policy.

Parliaments' discussions on the European Commission's "Framework Strategy for a

Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy" (COM (2015) 80

final)

The abovementioned European Commission's Framework Strategy, published on 25th February

2015 sets out, in five interrelated policy dimensions, the goals of an Energy Union, as well as the

detailed steps that the Commission will take to achieve it.

Only three of the responding Parliaments/Chambers had issued an opinion on the framework

strategy, while nine Parliaments/Chambers had debated the topic informally. However, the majority

of those responding (21 out of 37) intended to hold a debate.

A number of Parliaments/Chambers reported their views on the Energy Union in general and on the

abovementioned Strategy. Some of them expressly stated that such discussions or reporting had

taken place in relation to the Energy Council held on 5th March 2015 and the European Council of

19-20 March 2015 (Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Dutch

Tweede Kamer,

Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati,

Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

Swedish

Riksdag,

Czech

Senát).

The Polish

Sejm

stated that energy security and diversification had been discussed at a meeting of

the European Union Affairs Committee and that the Communications had been welcomed.

COM (2015) 80

COM(2014)330

SWD(2014)330

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The relevant Committee of the Estonian

Riigikogu

expressed the view that the Energy Union’s

goals should be defined precisely and focused on solving the energy policy’s issues strategically

and that the long-term goal was to synchronise the Baltic electric system with Central European

systems.

The Romanian

Senat

said that the Commission’s document represented a good basis for discussion,

considering, among others, that a support mechanism should be created for projects of common

interest and for identifying a clearer definition of the protection of final consumers with a view to

solving the issue of energy poverty.

The European Parliament's

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE Committee)

had

discussed the issue with the Vice President for Energy Union on 26 January 2015 before the

European Commission adopted its strategy. The discussions focused on: the need to enhance EU's

security of supply by diversifying its sources and supply routes and by reinforcing its negotiating

power with suppliers; the creation of a competitive single internal energy market by bringing down

technical and regulatory barriers and fostering regional cooperation; the importance of energy

efficiency; the decarbonisation of Europe's energy system and the EU's contribution to finding an

agreement at the forthcoming 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP) in Paris; the investments for boosting renewable

energies.

Although the formal position of the Czech

Senát

on Communications (COM(2015)80, 81, 82) was

expected in May, in a Resolution

it supported further integration in the field of energy, pointing out

the importance of speeding up the linking of energy infrastructure in the EU; the need to fully

implement and enforce existing energy legislation; the necessity to further diversify the sources and

transit routes (the construction of the Southern Gas Corridor); and the need to maintain full

competence of Member States in determining their structure of energy sources.

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

said that different parties held different views, although there was a

majority in favour of the Government’s

preliminary position that existing EU legislation

such as the

Third Energy Package must be implemented rapidly and fully. A well-functioning energy

marketplace enabled by a requisite infrastructure, supplemented by the Climate and Energy

package, should constitute the basis of the Energy Union. This included agreement that a well-

functioning energy marketplace would

strengthen the EU’s negotiating

stance with third countries,

and hence opposition to anything that would weaken such stance.

The Croatian

Hrvatski sabor

said that security of supply, as well as Croatian projects on the short

list of Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) for the Southeast Europe, were the most interesting

topics to Croatian members. Emphasis was given to cooperation with non-EU countries in the

region.

The Committee on Industry and Trade of the Swedish

Riksdag

had requested supplementary

information to the Government’s position that implied that social challenges, including poverty,

The European Parliament's replies to all sections of the questionnaire represent the position of the competent organs of

the European Parliament, rather than the European Parliament's position.

The European Parliament's ITRE Committee is expected to request authorisation to draw up an own initiative report

on the Commission Communication.

Resolution No. 99, 18th March, 2015.

The Swedish

Riksdag

clarified that the Committee on Industry and Trade had deliberated with the Government

regarding the Swedish Government’s position on

the Energy Union Communication and that the Committee supported

the Government’s

position. The position of the Committee

should not be understood to be the position of the

Riksdag.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

should be combatted by means of social policy and not energy policy measures. With this

supplementary information, seven out of the eight parties in the

Riksdag

supported the

Government’s position. In the opinion of the Government, a well-functioning

internal market was a

fundamental prerequisite for the development of the Energy Union. Measures to contribute to the

EU’s

three energy-policy pillars (ecological sustainability, competitiveness and security of supplies)

should be mutually reinforcing and taken in parallel. The Government welcomed the fact that the

position of consumers in the energy markets was highlighted in the Energy Union. The Government

supported further the correlation between an innovation-driven Energy Union and opportunities for

economic growth and jobs.

Regarding security of supplies, the Government considered, among others, that a fully functioning

internal market was a key measure for increasing security of supplies and reducing the need for

capacity mechanisms, but that greater energy efficiency and a higher share of renewable energy

could also contribute. The

Riksdag

also shared the

Government’s opinion that a well-functioning

EU Emission Trading Scheme is crucial for reduced emissions of greenhouse gases.

Although the Danish

Folketing

had not adopted an official position on the specific elements of the

proposal, the proposal had been scrutinised by the European Affairs Committee, which by a

majority supported the Danish Government in stressing that the Energy Union should focus on

realising the long-term goals for a low emission economy in 2050. The Committee also underlined

the need to create an efficient energy market.

ii.

The concept of the European Energy Union (EEU) and its sources

Concerning the concept of the EEU, the vast majority of the respondents (23 out of 33) replied that

there was an official position/formal interpretation of it adopted at the national level (parliamentary

or governmental level).

Regarding the sources of such official positions/formal interpretations, the Slovenian

Državni zbor

referred to the first position of the Republic of Slovenia for the meeting of the Transport

Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE) meeting presented at the Committee on EU Affairs

before the Council Meeting took place on 5 March 2015.

The German

Bundesrat

referred to a position paper on the Energy Union submitted by the Federal

Government to the Commission and the Member States, not yet made available to itself, and to the

Federal Government's position on plans for the Energy Union in response to a minor interpellation

from the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen parliamentary group

(official document also referred to by the

German

Bundestag).

The Slovak

Národná rada

cited the Slovak position on the Energy Union in view of the European

Council, while the Hungarian

Országgyűlés

referred to the Government's position presented in a

verbal procedure at the meeting of the Committee on European Affairs and a written report

transmitted to the members of the Committee by the Ministry of National Development. The

Estonian

Riigikogu

also referred to the Government position confirmed by the EU Affairs

Committee on 27 February and 9 June 2014 after hearing explanations from the Government

representative. The Committee on European Affairs of the Lithuanian

Seimas

had also approved the

Government’s position on the concept of the European Energy Union, which had been submitted to

the committee before the TTE Council of 5 March 2015. Similarly, both the Czech

Poslanecká

German

Bundestag

Official Document 18/4006.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

sněmovna

and the Czech

Senát

referred to the Czech Government's framework position. The

Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati

also referred to the Government's opinion in the Statement to the

House, according to which Malta was satisfied with the clear political direction that had been given

in the Communication on the establishment of the Energy Union. The Croatian

Hrvatski sabor

referred to the position of the Republic of Croatia for the 3372nd meeting of the Council of the

European Union.

In Portugal's case, the Parliament had noted the country's ability to produce electricity from

renewable energy (solar, hydro and wind) and that its strategic position and geopolitics could be an

alternative energy vehicle for Europe, which highlighted the importance of EU funding for the

interconnections between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe. The Portuguese

Assembleia

da República

had not concluded its discussion on this subject. The Government noted that the

climate and energy package was facilitating the advent of a true EU internal energy marketplace.

The inclusion in the agreement of the 10% target for interconnections by 2020 and 15% in 2030

were objectives that had been proposed by Portugal.

According to the information given by the Spanish

Cortes Generales,

no official position/formal

interpretation of the concept of the European Energy Union had been adopted either at

governmental or parliamentary level. Nevertheless, the plenary of the Spanish

Congreso de los

Diputados

adopted, on 26th February 2015 and after the Debate on the State of the Nation, a

resolution (Resolution no. 12) in which it urged the Government to develop an energy policy

allowing sufficient interconnection of the Iberian Peninsula with the rest of the EU in order to

complete the development of the internal market, and develop renewable energy sources compatible

with competitive energy prices. It recommended taking into consideration specific projects for

improving electricity interconnections between the Iberian Peninsula and France, under the

supervision of the European Commission and with the commitment of technical operators of the

electrical systems in France, Portugal and Spain, in order to implement the agreement reached at the

European Council.

The Romanian

Senat

referred to a non-paper on the concept of the European Energy Union

approved by the Romanian Prime Minister in February 2015.

The French

Assemblée nationale

referred to a definition provided in a contribution by the

Government's general secretariat for European Affairs, on 6 February, based in a balanced way on

three priority objectives: the combat against climate change, energy security and competitiveness.

The French

Sénat

specified that France's position was defined by the Government and taken to the

European level in the context of discussions with other States. It aimed at promoting energy

transition towards a low carbon economic model; adapting the internal electricity market so as to

integrate the development of intermittent renewable energy; supporting the development of power

generation capacity and network infrastructure; supporting industrial competitiveness of intensive

consuming sectors, leaving Member States to determine the necessary steps compatible with EU

law; supporting a transparent system of governance without unnecessary administrative burdens,

fully respecting the freedom of Member States to determine their own energy mix; strengthening

the external dimension of the EU energy policy and solidarity among Member States; fostering

solidarity among citizens, contributing to the strengthening of growth and employment and

supporting the implementation of energy efficiency objectives; and maintaining regulated tariffs for

small consumers.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The Belgian

Chambre des représentants

referred to the federal coalition agreement presented to the

House in the form of a Governmental Policy Declaration and adopted by the House on 16 October

2014 and to the Minister for Energy’s

General Policy Statement.

The Italian

Senato della Repubblica,

referring to its Resolution adopted on 4 March 2015 on the

Commission Work Programme for 2015

, stated that the Committee on EU Policies welcomed the

development of a strategic framework for the Energy Union designed to secure energy supply and

the integration of national energy markets and to enhance energy efficiency by reducing

dependence on imports, decarbonising the energy mix and promoting industry research and

innovation. On 18 March 2015 the Italian Government reported the Italian position to the Senate in

view of the European Council on 19-20 March 2015. After the debate, the Senate voted a

resolution, which called on the Government to support a balanced approach on energy issues that

included all aspects of the Energy Union project, namely energy security, internal market, energy

efficiency, decarbonisation, research and development. Furthermore, the Senate called on the

Government to promote the accomplishment of the internal energy market and regional

cooperation, especially with neighbouring countries, and the use of all financial resources, including

the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), to build the infrastructure necessary to ensure

a secure supply of energy.

The UK

House of Commons

had not discussed the Communications in plenary, but the European

Scrutiny Committee had reported on it, and holding them under scrutiny, concluded that they

covered ground which had already been well trodden. The same Chamber also referred to the UK

Government's explanatory memorandum of 12 March 2015 on the Communication, which stated

that the Government welcomed the Communications, and agreed with the Commission's broad

approach, referring to the Minister's comments on the different elements of the package. The

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Energy and Climate Change

particularly welcomed the fact that this encompassed a forward looking climate policy, the

centrality of completing the internal energy market, and initiatives to strengthen the EU's bargaining

power and reduce dependency on Russian gas in order to enhance energy security.

Regarding the concepts/actions/policies that were or could be associated with the EEU,

Parliaments/Chambers

responding mostly associated the EEU with energy security (20 out of 24,

and the European Parliament's ITRE Committee, its Committee on Environment, Public Health and

Food Safety [ENVI Committee] and its Committee on Foreign Affairs [AFET Committee]) and

energy saving and energy efficiency (20 out of 24 and the European Parliament's ITRE, ENVI,

AFET and Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection [IMCO Committee]). The EEU

was the least associated with energy production portfolios of the EU Member States (five out of 22

and the European Parliament's ENVI Committee) and long-term contracts between energy

producers (suppliers) and consumers (five out of 20).

Doc XVIII, n. 87.

The Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

stated that the left wing party, AKEL-Left New Forces, disagreed that the

following concepts/actions/policies were or could be associated with the European Energy Union: Common external

EU energy policy, Harmonised energy policy

vis-à-vis

third countries, Harmonisation of EU internal energy policy,

Energy production portfolios of the EU Member States and Common, free and effective EU energy market; it also

mentioned that the position with regard to the concepts/actions/policies in the field of Secure supply of energy should

be marked as indefinite.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Concept/Action/Policy

Number of Parliaments/Chambers

associating with the EEU

Number of

Parliaments/Chambers

responding

Energy security

and

Energy saving and energy efficiency

Secure supply of energy

Diversification of energy supply

sources

and

Energy research and innovation

and

Common, free and effective EU

energy market

Harmonisation of EU internal energy

policy

and

Coordination of decisions on

development of energy infrastructure

and

Minimising energy dependency

and

Projects of common interest (PCIs)

Common external EU energy policy

and

Support

for

renewable

energy

resources

Harmonised energy policy vis-à-vis

third countries

and

Reduction of CO2 emissions

Emissions Trading System (ETS)

Preventing climate change

Support for indigenous energy

resources

Long-term contracts between

producers of energy resources and

energy producers

Energy production portfolios of the EU

member states

and

Long-term contracts between energy

producers (suppliers) and consumers

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

Other concepts/actions/policies that were or could be associated with the EEU cited by

Parliaments/Chambers included strict implementation of the legislation, decarbonisation of

transport, use of low-carbon and renewable energy sources (Slovenian

Državni svet),

resetting of

the EU energy policy, remodelling the EU energy system, affordable energy price for consumers,

building and modernising energy infrastructure (Romanian

Senat),

regional collaboration and

synchronisation of the Baltic States' electricity market with continental Europe networks

(Lithuanian

Seimas),

decarbonisation element of the Energy Union (European Parliament's ENVI

Committee).

The Czech

Senát

stated that all of the given aspects could be associated with the EEU, but what

mattered was a consideration a concrete form of each and every aspect.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The UK

House of Commons

referred to the UK Government's explanatory memorandum on the

Communication and the Minister's comments on energy security, internal energy market, energy

efficiency, decarbonisation, research and innovation

and i

nterconnection. In relation to

decarbonisation, the UK Government expressed its disappointment that the Commission had

focused almost exclusively on the role of renewable energy at the expense of other low carbon

technologies (notably nuclear power and carbon capture and storage).

iii.

Scope and content of concept of European Energy Union

The Lithuanian

Seimas

summarised the concept of the EEU as including the main pillars of EU

energy policy: 1) security and solidarity, 2) an integrated internal energy market, 3) reduction of

energy demand, 4) decarbonisation, 5) research and innovation.

Indeed, Parliaments/Chambers provided many and varied detailed ideas on the scope and content of

the concept in question along those axes.

The majority of members of the European Parliament's ITRE Committee agreed on the key

importance of creating an Energy Union based on these abovementioned five main pillars, while the

European Parliament AFET Committee's opinion in relation to the report

, though supportive,

asked for more synergies between the energy policy and EU external policies.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

stated that the concept should also involve providing EU households

and businesses secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy; ensuring the evaluation of

the implementation of the Third Energy Package; establishing an integrated continent-wide energy

system; strengthening global commitments to low-carbon and climate-friendly economy; speeding

up the diversification of energy supply and routes, including necessary infrastructural investments;

providing assistance to building key interconnectors; respecting

Member States’ competence on

how to determine their energy mix; using the potential of significant energy savings; and stepping

up measures to meet energy efficiency targets.

The Polish

Sejm,

among others, stated that, irrespective of their party affiliation, the members opted

for the separation of the energy and climate policies and supported that the EU should seek to

undertake joint negotiations of contracts with major suppliers for the purchase of energy resources,

especially gas, while the Estonian

Riigikogu

supported that the Energy Union’s goals should be

defined precisely and focus on solving the energy policy’s issues strategically and that the EU’s

2030 energy and climate package and Energy Security Strategy should be part of Energy Union.

The Romanian

Senat

believed that the Commission’s document represented a good basis for

discussion, stressing the tools available to the internal energy market and the aim of consolidation

of the energy security. It emphasised the potential of own energy resources, such as those in the

Black Sea. It nevertheless underlined, among others, its desire to see references to nuclear energy in

relation to achieving the decarbonisation targets, highlighting the need to observe the freedom to

choose one’s energy mix. Nuclear energy was also referred to by the Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna

as a useful tool in fighting climate change and strengthening energy security. The French

Sénat

referred to a report

of the Committee on European Affairs adopted in May 2014 on French-

AFET Opinion on the European Energy Security Strategy of 24 March 2015, AFET_AD(2015)549118 PE

549.118v02-00.

"La coopération énergétique franco-allemande : naissance d'une Europe de l'énergie ?", rapport d'information de M.

Jean BIZET n° 534 (2013-2014)

http://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2013/r13-534-notice.html

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

German energy cooperation where it was stated that Europe had to think of a real energy policy.

According to the Committee, the low cost characterising the nuclear power industry was the only

available source capable of financing energy transition which was a long term evolution.

The Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

supported that the EEU should foster Europe’s energy

sustainability and independence while respecting Member States’ competence for

choosing their

own energy mix.

Members of the European Parliament's ENVI Committee, among others, stressed

the need for the

European Parliament's involvement in the Energy Union proposal. They also advocated for a

unified EU strategy in the lead up to the Paris climate change Conference and pushed for concrete

plans to coordinate cross-border energy connections and fund research and development in clean

energy and renewables. Some MEPs voiced concern about the differing energy mix policies in EU

countries (which are of national competence), emphasising the need for cooperation in order to

achieve energy mix policy convergence.

Certain Parliaments/Chambers (e. g. Romanian

Senat)

referred to, among others, the need for

common EU negotiations on behalf of all Member States with the energy suppliers and the

definition of a common interest regarding supply when it came to external suppliers in order to

diminish the EU's dependence and minimise environmental impact of energy consumption (e.g.

French

Assemblée nationale).

The Belgian

Chambre des représentants

defined the EEU's scope and content as to ensuring a

secure, affordable and renewable supply of energy within the framework of the EU energy policy,

on the one hand, and the Belgian institutional landscape, on the other.

The Croatian

Hrvatski sabor

underscored the importance of ensuring security of supply, while the

Austrian

Nationalrat and Bundesrat

supported that the latter should also be ensured by

diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes and by enhancing energy efficiency, as well

as sharing of renewables in an efficient way. The latter referred also to the need for respect of the

principle of subsidiarity.

The Latvian

Saeima

underlined that, whatever the content of the EEU, Member States should

benefit from it in terms of energy independence and energy security.

iv.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council

titled European Energy Security Strategy [COM(2014)330]

Twelve out of 36 responding Parliaments/Chambers had discussed and issued an opinion on the

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council titled European

Energy Security Strategy, three had debated the topic informally, while eight intended to do so.

The European Parliament's INTA, ENVI and IMCO Committees had issued an opinion, while ITRE

had debated the topic informally (Strategic own-initiative report European Energy Security

Strategy) and AFET intended to discuss it.

At an exchange of views with the Vice-President

of the Commission responsible for Energy Union, Mr Maroš

ŠEFČOVIČ, on the forthcoming Strategic Framework for the Energy Union.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The European Parliament's ITRE Committee considered a draft report at its meeting on 21-22

January 2015, where the rapporteur welcomed the Commission's Communication. The rapporteur

recalled that moderation of energy demand through energy efficiency was triply crucial, impacting

positively

on the EU’s energy security, competitiveness and sustainability, and pointed

to the need

to reduce energy demand in buildings. In the debate, several members welcomed the prospects of a

more unified European approach to energy policy and stated that the Parliament should take an

active part in it. The discussion on amendments on 24 February 2015 showed that there was broad

consensus on the draft report.

The German

Bundesrat

deliberated on the Communication on Security of Energy Supply on 19

September 2014 and adopted an Opinion addressed to the Federal Government

. In its Opinion, the

German

Bundesrat

expressed its vigorous support for discussing security of supply at the European

level and advocated cutting the cost of energy imports by both reducing demand for energy and

stepping up energy production in the EU, with a focus on low-CO2 and renewable energy sources.

It also called for greater coordination of national energy policies and emphasised that structuring the

Member States’ energy markets as a Single Market would strengthen the Member States’

negotiating position

vis-à-vis

third parties. It advocated looking at mechanisms whereby the

Member States could voluntarily pool demand, thus strengthening the European clients' negotiating

position with supplier countries. It also underscored the need for a more comprehensive debate on

protecting strategic energy infrastructure. It considered improving energy efficiency and the greater

use of renewable energies as the key tools towards cutting energy demand and thereby making the

EU less dependent on energy imports from abroad.

The Slovak

Národná rada

referred to the conclusions of the meeting of the Committees on

European Affairs of the Visegrád Group countries (V4 countries), which had taken place in October

2014, stating, among others, that the energy policy of the EU was determined by three primary

objectives, namely sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness, and welcomed the

European Commission's European Energy Security Strategy (EESS). It considered that before the

winter of 2014/2015 short term priority must be given to energy security, by fully exploiting the

available gas storage facilities, interconnectors and by speeding up the diversification of energy

supply and routes. It further called for increased efforts to reduce Europe's high energy dependency

and underlined the importance of energy efficiency, further development of domestic production

and integrating the European energy market based on regional approach, while it deemed it

necessary to strengthen the external dimension of EU energy policy and the link between energy

security and foreign policy.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

said that the Communication was debated at the meeting of the

Committees on European Affairs of the abovementioned V4 countries in Hernádvécse, Hungary,

which adopted conclusions focusing on energy efficiency and its contribution to energy security In

addition, it referred to the EU Consultative Body, an

in camera

meeting convened prior to each

European Council meeting by the Speaker of the Hungarian

Országgyűlés

where the positions

regarding the EESS were on the agenda.

An opinion was adopted by the European Union Affairs Committee of the Polish

Sejm

at its 276th

meeting on 27 August 2014. The Committee supported the position of the European Commission

on the establishment of the EESS based on eight pillars and believed that the document could serve

as a good basis for further discussions, while it supported the negative position of the Government

of the Republic of Poland, in particular with regard to the inclusion of the energy security strategy

Bundesrat Official Document 258/14 (Decision).

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

in the climate and energy package, pointing out that the EU’s energy policy was based on three

equivalent and interrelated pillars: energy security, competitiveness and sustainable development. It

also supported the position of the Government, which was opposed to tying the construction of

coal-based energy facilities to the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology and its

position on ensuring public aid opportunities for the construction of energy facilities based on clean

coal technologies and nuclear energy. It drew attention to the necessity of creating favourable

conditions for the use of unconventional natural gas sources in the EU, which would help lessening

the dependence on natural gas imports from outside the EU. Finally, it fully supported the European

Commission’s recognition of energy security as an important part of the EU’s common foreign

policy and at the same time pointed out that the strategy made only minimal proposals in terms of

new instruments for leading the EU’s external energy policy.

The EU Affairs Committee of the Estonian

Riigikogu

discussed the Communication on 9 June

2014. Estonia supported the goal of the EESS of diminishing the dependence on outside EU energy

and the abolition of energy islands; it supported an initiative aiming at investigating the possibility

of centralised EU gas purchases.

The Committee for European Affairs of the Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna

at its 19th meeting held on

2 October 2014, in its resolution No. 91, welcomed the effort to coordinate the policies of Member

States towards partners from third countries and the effort to establish a common external energy

policy and supported the Czech Government's framework position to the Communication.

The UK

House of Lords

referred to an exchange of letters between its competent Committee and the

UK Government which explored the difficulties associated with collective gas purchasing and the

progress of the Third Energy Package. Both the UK Government and the UK

House of Lords

were

enthusiastic about the establishment of a fully functioning internal energy market, but

acknowledged that there was a great deal of work to be done to increase strategic energy

infrastructure and address technical barriers, such as electricity network codes.

The Czech

Senát

debated the Communication in August and October 2014. In general, it welcomed

the initiatives aimed at ensuring energy security, not only with regard to the current unstable

situation in Ukraine and some other countries exporting oil, but primarily with regard to the high

dependence of the Member States on energy imports from third countries. Among others, it pointed

out that the EU must act in a collective and coordinated manner while addressing issues of energy

self-sufficiency and security; according to its view, it was necessary to prevent some Member States

from undertaking partial steps in the field of energy policy which harmed or may harm the others.

The Czech

Senát

also considered it essential that the EU should diversify its energy resources and

its transit routes, so as to reduce dependence on existing dominant suppliers of raw materials from

countries outside the EU. It further supported nuclear energy as a low carbon source of electricity.

Finally, it expressed the view that free market principles could not by themselves

ensure the EU’s

energy security, and therefore considered it essential to strengthen the EU single energy market by

measures aimed at enhancing energy security such as by establishing cross-border interconnections

of energy networks or ensuring the possibility of reverse flows of gas, as well as by technical

measures against unscheduled loop flows on grid networks arising from the unstable output of solar

and wind power plants.

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

stated that different parties held different positions, but that it generally

supported the Government’s position. A committee meeting to discuss the Government’s position in

Council meetings took place on 18 June 2014.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee of the Finnish

Eduskunta

expressed

their opinion in the course of the normal scrutiny procedure in September 2014. Both Committees

underlined the integral link between the energy security and the general security policy. The

Defence Committee considered that the strategy should focus on promoting resilience to external

energy shocks and disruptions to energy supplies in the short term and reducing dependency on

particular fuels, energy suppliers and routes in the long-term.

The Communication was recommended for debate by the European Scrutiny Committee of the UK

House of Commons

in July 2014, and debated in European Committee in November 2014

. The

House welcomed the Government’s support for the Commission’s energy security strategy, in

particular the recognition in the Communication that energy security was central to the EU’s

prosperity;

and supported the Government’s efforts to work to ensure that in the implementation of

the strategy, the existing balance of competence between the Member States and the Commission

was not altered.

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on

European Energy Security Strategy [SWD(2014)330]

The majority of Parliaments/Chambers (24 out of 36) had not discussed the Commission staff

working document In-depth Study of European Energy Security accompanying the document

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European

Energy Security Strategy, while four had debated the topic informally, six intended to do so and

only two had discussed it and issued an opinion.

The European Parliament's IMCO Committee had debated the topic informally, while the ENVI

Committee had not debated it.

Most of the respondents had not examined the document in question, while the German

Bundesrat

clarified that it had examined it in conjunction with the Communication on Security of Energy

Supply. The Slovak

Národná rada

referred to the discussions of the Committees on European

Affairs of V4 countries in October 2014.

vi.

The concept of Energy Security and its sources

The vast majority of Parliaments/Chambers (26 out of 33) had no formal position on the concept of

energy security.

Regarding references to the source of formal positions on the concept of Energy Security, the

Portuguese

Assembleia da República

replied it had not yet concluded its debate on the concept, but

that energy efficiency and its contribution to energy security and the 2030 Framework for climate

and energy policy had been the subject of discussion in the European Affairs Committee in the

context of scrutiny of COM(2014) 520, which highlighted the role that energy efficiency could play

towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing greater energy security to reach the goal

of 20% improvement in energy efficiency by 2020.

The Estonian

Riigikogu

and the Lithuanian

Seimas

referred to the competent Committee's support

of the Government positions on 9th and 13th June 2014 respectively.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmgeneral/euro/141125/141125s01.htm

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The Romanian

Senat

reported that energy security in the Black Sea area was an important debate

subject during a conference organised between 19-21 November 2014, at the Palace of Parliament,

with high ranked officials and business representatives.

The French

Assemblée nationale

referred to its resolution on the second energy-climate package,

adopted by its Committee on Sustainable Development on 7th November 2014, which affirmed the

absolute necessity of reducing EU energy dependence by improving the security of energy supply in

Europe and by completing the internal energy market.

The UK

House of Commons

referred to an inquiry on this topic by the relevant select committee,

the Energy and Climate Change Committee

The French

Sénat

referred to its report

where the issue of energy security had been explored

without formally engaging the Chamber. It also explored this issue, without having adopted a

formal position, in the context of a debate on climate and energy in Europe which took place on

21st May 2014

Regarding concepts/actions/policies that were or could be associated with the concept of energy

security, Parliaments/Chambers

responding mostly associated energy security with diversification

of energy supply resources (19 out of 22 and the European Parliament's ITRE, AFET and ENVI

Committees) and the EEU (19 out of 24 and the European Parliament's ITRE and AFET

Committees), as well as with energy saving and energy efficiency (19 out of 22 and the European

Parliament's ITRE, AFET, IMCO and ENVI Committees). Energy security was least associated

with energy production portfolios of the EU Member States (six out of 20).

http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/energy-and-climate-change-

committee/news/ukes-report-findings/

See footnote no. 10 above.

http://www.senat.fr/seances/s201405/s20140521/s20140521_mono.html#Niv1_SOM3

The Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

stated that the left wing party, AKEL-Left New Forces, disagreed that the

following concepts/actions/policies were or could be associated with the concept of energy security: Common external

EU energy policy, Harmonised energy policy

vis-à-vis

third countries, Harmonisation of EU internal energy policy,

Energy production portfolios of the EU member states and Common, free and effective EU energy market; it also stated

that the position with regard to the concepts/actions/policies in the field of Secure supply of energy should be marked as

indefinite.

Regarding point 6, the Latvian

Saeima

replied yes in particular in the light of the EU establishing common rules on the

internal electricity and natural gas market in the Member States through implementing the Third Energy Package, which

harmonises requirements for the effective functioning of the energy market.

Regarding point 12 and 13, the Latvian

Saeima

replied no due to the fact that there is currently no clarity among policy

and decision-makers about how the Emission Trading Scheme is going to evolve and whether it is going to add to

energy security.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Concept/Action/Policy

Number of Parliaments/Chambers

associating with energy security

Diversification of energy supply

sources

and

Energy saving and energy efficiency

and

European Energy Union

Minimising energy dependency

and

Common, free and effective EU

energy market

Secure supply of energy

and

Coordination of decisions on

development of energy infrastructure

and

Projects of common interest (PCIs)

Common external EU energy policy

and

Harmonisation of EU internal energy

policy

Harmonised energy policy vis-à-vis

third countries

Support for indigenous energy

resources

Support

for

renewable

energy

resources

Long-term

contracts

between

producers of energy resources and

energy producers

Reduction of CO2 emissions

Long-term contracts between energy

producers (suppliers) and consumers

Emission Trading System (ETS)

and

Preventing climate change

Energy production portfolios of the

EU member states

TOTAL RESPONDENTS

Number of

Parliaments/Chambers

responding

Regarding other concepts/actions/policies that were or could be associated with the concept of

energy security, the Romanian

Senat

stated that almost all concepts could be associated with the

energy security, except for long term contracts between producers of energy resources and energy

producers. The Lithuanian

Seimas

cited regional collaboration, synchronisation of the electricity

market of the Baltic States with continental Europe networks, better interconnection and elimination

of "energy islands". The European Parliament's ENVI Committee specified ensuring the transition

to a low-carbon economy by 2050. The Italian

Senato della Repubblica

referred to the improvement

of energy storage facilities; diversification of energy supply among different geopolitical areas; and

improvement of European reverse flow capacity.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

vii.

Scope and content of the concept of energy security

The German

Bundesrat

referred to its comments on the Communication from the Commission to

the European Parliament and the Council titled European Energy Security Strategy

[COM(2014)330], while the Slovak

Národná rada

to the discussions of the Committees on

European Affairs of the V4 countries in October 2014.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

stated that the concept of energy security should include the following

main objectives: speeding up the diversification of energy supply and routes, including

consultations on the necessary infrastructural investments; providing assistance for building key

interconnectors; enhancing energy storage facilities; respecting

Member States’ competence on

how

to determine their energy mix; using the potential of significant energy savings; and stepping up

measures to meet energy efficiency targets.

The Polish

Sejm

supported the EU energy security concept which should be based on building

energy infrastructure and creating crisis solidarity mechanisms. Among others, it stated that the use

of local energy sources and resources, as well as the diversification of oil and gas supplies to the

EU, should be taken into account. It stressed that strengthening energy security of the EU

neighbours in the Energy Community was key. Furthermore, it underlined the need to maintain

technological neutrality and to include in the Energy Union concept

the role of the EU’s own

resources in reducing the dependence of the Member States on the import of resources. Climate

policy issues, according to the Polish

Sejm's

view, should not dominate further work on the Energy

Union.

The Romanian

Senat

said that the concept would ensure uninterrupted availability of energy sources

at an affordable price, both over the short term (ability of the energy system to react immediately to

sudden demand and/or supply changes) and over the long term (timely investments to supply energy

in line with evolving economic and environmental factors). It referred to ten objectives. The

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor

also emphasised the need to ensure reasonable pricing and stressed

that energy security also meant that uninterrupted supplies be ensured at reasonable pricing levels

over time for both individual consumers and companies. The French

Assemblée nationale,

among

others, argued that energy security was indeed synonymous with less dependence and a more long-

term vision of energy costs, critical for the production costs.

The European Affairs Committee of the French

Sénat

considered it essential to have a secure

energy, which would be cheap and benefiting from large interconnections on European territory.

In terms of energy security, it considered it necessary to "develop" smart grids "and storage

capabilities before increasing the share of intermittent renewable energy."

The concept, according to the Lithuanian

Seimas,

included a plan for maximising energy

independence, namely, completion of the common internal energy market, implementation of the

Third Energy Package, elimination of "energy islands" and development of a common external

energy policy.

The UK

House of Lords'

European Union Committee supported the link that the Strategy made

between energy security

and the EU’s 2030

Climate and Energy framework. Long-term planning

and an integration of energy and climate change objectives should be at the heart of energy security

policies.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The European Parliament ENVI Committee, in its own-initiative report on the Energy Security

Strategy, overall stressed the importance of a comprehensive approach to increase energy security

and meet climate objectives at the same time, in particular, in view of the needed transition to a

low-carbon economy. Most members saw targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions,

renewable energy use and energy efficiency as key policy (and investment) drivers, though

differences prevailed as to the level of ambition and degree of binding nature at EU and national

levels. Many felt that increasing energy efficiency should be a top priority, along with reducing

import dependence and energy demand. There was strong support for stronger coordination of the

national policies (in securing and diversifying supply, improving supply routes and

interconnections, R&D into innovative energy technologies, ensuring access and affordability).

Nonetheless, the widely differing situations/interests in Member States and their competence for

their energy mix remained a prominent concern.

The European Parliament's AFET Committee referred to the European Parliament resolution of 12

March 2015 on the Annual Report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament

, which emphasised the importance of

building a European Energy Union aiming at increasing coherence and coordination between

foreign policy and energy policy. It also stressed that energy security should be part of the

comprehensive approach to the EU’s external action, and believed

that energy policy must be in line

with the Union’s other priority policies, including its security, foreign and neighbourhood, trade,

and development policies, as well as its policies in defence of human rights. It underlined the need

to significantly reduce dependence on Russia and find alternative sources of energy, emphasising

that efforts to diversify the EU’s energy supply should be accelerated in order to strengthen the

energy independence of the EU.

The Croatian

Hrvatski sabor

stated that energy security concerned mostly the security of supply and

ability to react in urgent situations, underlining that emphasis must be given to interconnections and

development of own energy resources, while the German

Bundestag

stated that the main aspects of

the energy security concept were the diversification of suppliers and energy resources, and the

development of infrastructure for energy delivery.

The Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

stated that energy security in the EU could be increased by

completing the internal energy market, which included implementation of existing rules as well as

putting in place the necessary infrastructure. Among others, it stressed further the need for

diversifying sources and routes of energy supply, e.g. by making progress on the Southern Corridor.

Energy security should focus on supply security and production security. All potential costs related

to the production of energy had to be internalised in order to create a level-playing field on the

energy market.

viii. Closer cooperation and coordination among EU Parliaments in the realm of energy

policy

All responding Parliaments/Chambers supported the idea of closer cooperation among EU

Parliaments in matters of common interest in the realm of energy policy. In terms of how this could

be achieved, several Parliaments/Chambers identified COSAC and/or interparliamentary meetings

of sectoral committees as a platform for discussions or sharing best practices in this field. Three

Chambers (Polish

Sejm,

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

Dutch

Tweede Kamer)

suggested holding

specific "cluster of interest" meetings. The European Parliament's AFCO Committee mentioned that

www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

interparliamentary cooperation could play an essential role in driving the European integration

process forward. The Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor

proposed to set up an electronic platform and

a dedicated Secretariat, hosted by the European Parliament. The Lithuanian

Seimas

pointed out that

a closer cooperation among Member States should be developed on the basis of regional

cooperation and implementation of Projects of common interest. The regional dimension was also

considered by the Hungarian

Országgyűlés

and the French

Assemblée nationale.

The latter

mentioned the establishment of regional energy hubs between interconnected countries as possible

objectives. The Romanian

Senat

suggested that any form of energy blackmail on the part of supplier

countries be firmly rejected. The Belgian

Chambre des représentants

mentioned an

ad hoc

interparliamentary conference, while the Latvian

Saeima,

the Austrian

Nationalrat

and the Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna

proposed regular exchange of information.

The majority of the respondents (14 out of 20) and the European Parliament's ENVI and ITRE

Committees replied positively to the question whether they considered the distributed energy

production an important tool for moving away from the import of fossil energy resources from third

countries. The UK

House of Lords

found that the potential offered by the distributed generation

must be recognised more clearly in energy strategies

. The European Parliament's ITRE

Committee, recalling a resolution on microgeneration -small-scale electricity and heat generation

affirmed that microgeneration must be a vital element in future energy generation and pointed out

that Member States facilitating microgeneration at the individual and community level could

empower consumers to become active players in the energy sector. Several Chambers/Parliaments

focused on the potential offered by the renewable energy production. Among them, the German

Bundestag

mentioned the revised Law on Renewable Energies, approved on 4 December 2014,

which was the basis for the Energy Agenda of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and

Energy, and the French

Assemblée nationale

recalled the law on the French energy transition,

approved on first reading, containing specific measures aimed at encouraging local renewable

energy projects.

The Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

mentioned the measures adopted for promoting the installation

of small photovoltaic systems for electricity production on domestic, industrial and commercial

buildings, as well as the creation of photovoltaic parks and wind farms on an industrial scale. The

Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

pointed out that the change in the production structure should

be reflected in a new market design, which would allow not only to integrate renewable energy

sources, but also to ensure that there was enough back up capacity available when needed.

Among the Parliaments/Chambers which expressed a negative view, the Romanian

Camera

Deputaţilor

considered that setting a framework to allow such small units to function was very

expensive and time-consuming and added that small-scale hydropower systems had proved to be

environmentally damaging; the Polish

Sejm

pointed out that distributed energy sources may be

complementary to basic electricity production and as such of local significance, but decisions on

their deployment should be taken at national level.

A wide majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers, and the European Parliament's ITRE and

ENVI Committees, were in favour of closer policy coordination among EU Member States

Report of the European Union Committee: "No

Country is an Energy Island: Securing Investment for the EU’s

Future"(http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-d/energy/euenergypolicyfinalreport.pdf).

P7_TA(2013)0374, adopted by the European Parliament on 12th September 2013.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0374+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

regarding renewable energy (23 out of 28) and, in general, overall energy policies (25 out of 29,

including European Parliament's ITRE Committee).

Among them, however, the Finnish

Eduskunta

noted that the energy sector had important

development needs that called for joint EU action, but the fundamental choices in energy policy

(such as the security of supply and the choice between energy sources) should be kept in the

national competence. The Member States' competence to decide their national energy mix was

stressed by several other Parliaments; among them, the Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna

expressed its

negative position also on setting binding targets. The Member States' competence on the national

energy mix, of which the renewable energy was regarded as part, explained the Latvian

Saeima’s

negative reply to the question on closer policy coordination among EU Member States regarding

renewable energy. However, the latter clarified that in the future its position might be aligned to

renewable energy policy trends stemming from the new EEU policy framework, despite renewable

energy policy being considered part of Member States' discretion regarding national energy mix.

The Italian

Senato della Repubblica

noted instead that closer coordination should lead to more

harmonisation in the choice of energy mix and a more consistent compliance with renewable energy

goals.

Concerning the question how closer coordination could be achieved in the field of renewable

energy, some of the respondents suggested organising regular meetings and discussions on this

subject; among them, the German

Bundestag

proposed to hold exchanges of views about national

energy plans or agenda and the Slovak

Národná rada

mentioned in particular the

European Forum

for Renewable Energy

(EUFORES). The Romanian

Senat

added that a centralised coordination of

this activity, using examples of best practices at European level, and the availability of financial

resources for such viable projects would bring us closer to energy security. The European

Parliament's ITRE Committee, mentioning a resolution adopted on 21 May 2013

, suggested

establishing joint support schemes, moving forward the debate about greater convergence and a

suitable European system of support for the post-2020 period and pointed out that a more integrated

system for promoting renewable energy sources at EU level was necessary in the long haul.

The UK

House of Lords

highlighted that there was scope for further regional cooperation in this

area, for example, regarding the North Sea Countries Offshore Grid Initiative. The impact of

national policies on neighbouring states was mentioned by the German

Bundesrat,

for example in

the fields of grid and network development, market design and promotion of renewable energies.

The French

Assemblée nationale

stressed the importance of the European support to research and

innovation in the field of renewable energies, which could be of particular benefit at local level if

they participated in experimental modes of energy use and consumption

. The French

Sénat

suggested establishing research partnerships concerning the techniques for producing electricity

from renewable resources, "intelligent energy networks" and the energy storage, and proposed a

map of intelligent energy networks in France and Germany

Among the Parliaments/Chambers in favour of closer coordination of overall energy policies,

however, the Latvian

Saeima

clarified that coordination should be regarded as positive as long as it

P7_TA(2013)0201

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0201&language=EN&ring=A7-

2013-0135

Rapport d'information déposé par la Commission des affaires européennes sur la loi de transition énergétique

française et présenté par Mme Danielle AUROI.

See footnote no. 10 above.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

did not necessarily imply compulsory actions related to the national energy portfolio, whereas the

Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

pointed out that some policy areas were better left in the

competence of Member States. The Polish

Sejm

underlined that closer coordination could contribute

to creating optimised national energy mixes and lead to the creation of regional energy markets,

whereas the Lithuanian

Seimas

focused on the need to complete the common energy market. A

closer coordination was considered necessary in the field of energy security (Czech

Senát),

PCIs,

interconnection plans, energy purchasing from third countries and development of

complementarities on the basis of unified rules (French

Assemblée nationale).

The support for

closer coordination with third countries was also expressed by the AKEL-Left-New Forces of the

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon.

The UK

House of Lords

believed that consideration should be

given to annual obligatory reporting by Member States to the Commission on their national energy

policies, with assessments conducted by the Commission on the implications of emerging national

policies for neighbouring countries and the EU as a whole, and recommended that the Commission

provided further clarity regarding the EU rules on state aid and the compatibility of national energy

policies. The latter added that further communication would be valuable. The French

Sénat

proposed to strengthen the energy cooperation between France and Germany, a cooperation which

could also soon include other countries

All responding Parliaments/Chambers saw further energy efficiency measures and increased

financing for energy efficiency as important tools for reducing the import of energy resources from

third countries. However, the Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna

pointed out that certain limits in

financing such measures must be taken into account. The UK

House of Lords

and the

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

acknowledged the important role that energy efficiency can play in

achieving long-term energy security objectives. The European Parliament's ITRE Committee

mentioned a specific article on financial instruments, which was included in the Energy Efficiency

Directive at the request of the European Parliament, but containing no mandatory provisions due to

resistance of Council. The European Parliament's ENVI Committee underlined the importance of

fully implementing the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Energy Performance of Building

Directive. The Polish

Sejm

stressed the need of scientific cooperation leading to innovative

technologies, whereas the Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

mentioned the subject of thermal

restoration. The French

Senate

recommended that the French-German cooperation gave more

importance to saving energy and a greater interest in the techniques of "energy recovery". The

Hungarian

Országgyűlés

mentioned specific national measures enhancing the energy efficiency.

See report on the energy cooperation between France and Germany, footnote no. 10 above.

See the above mentioned report of the European Union Committee of the UK

House of Lords,

footnote no. 20 above.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

CHAPTER 2: FUTURE OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF EU AFFAIRS

The second Chapter of the Bi-annual Report, building on the findings of the 22nd Bi-Annual Report

presented at the LII COSAC meeting in Rome in July 2014, explores further the role played by

national Parliaments in the EU decision-making process aiming at fostering the debate on

strengthening the role of national Parliaments in the EU. To this end, it collects

Parliaments’/Chambers’ views regarding the short-term

and long-term evolution of parliamentary

scrutiny of the EU decision making process.

Section A collects Parliaments'/Chambers' views on how reasoned opinions and political dialogue

procedures could be improved and made more structured and effective.

Section B explores new ways of involving national Parliaments in the decision-making process of

the EU without any formal Treaty amendments focusing on Parliaments'/Chambers' views on the

proposed "green card" procedure that would build on the existing political dialogue and make it

possible for Parliaments/Chambers to make constructive suggestions regarding policy or legislative

proposals to the European Commission and its potential practical implementation.

Section C aims at collecting Parliaments'/Chambers' views and positions on proposed forms of

cooperation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament recently proposed by the

European Parliament, with the aim of facilitating exchange of information, best practices and debate

on the implementation and transposition of EU legislation, EU spending programmes, as well as

parliamentary monitoring.

Section A: Improving the procedure for reasoned opinion/political dialogue

With a view to further improving the quality of the national Parliaments' contributions and

facilitating the European Commission's response, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether they

supported the idea of issuing informal guidelines on how to draft reasoned opinions and

contributions in the context of political dialogue.

A clear majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (21 out of 29) were in favour of issuing

such informal guidelines, but 24 out of 31 Parliaments/Chambers were against creating a standard

form for reasoned opinions and contributions in the context of political dialogue.

The greatest number of the responding Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they would prefer the

guidelines on how to draft reasoned opinions and contributions in the context of political dialogue to

be non-binding, rather as a tool for the exchange of best practices and containing basic legal issues,

so as to draw a sharp distinction between the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (such as

the legal basis, the facts, the reasoning and the findings of reasoned opinions), but not in the form of

a standardised template.

By way of example, the UK

House of Lords

expressed its view that a set of "best practices" could

be drawn up, with an aim to sharing such amongst the Parliaments/Chambers. These could however

also include a format for reasoned opinions and contributions; a mechanism used for

communicating contributions within the context of political dialogue to the European Commission,

a mechanism for sharing contributions within the context of political dialogue with other national

Parliaments and EU institutions. Also the Belgian

Sénat

and the Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati

would

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

seek guidance on what format would work best for reasoned opinions, but the Lithuanian

Seimas'

Statute already provided a specific form for reasoned opinions.

The Latvian

Saeima

was of the opinion that informal guidelines would bring about a greater degree

of uniformity among national Parliaments in drafting their reasoned opinions and political dialogue

contributions, which, in turn, could greatly facilitate the European Commission’s

task in responding

to these submissions. The European Commission’s experiences in drafting replies to political

dialogue contributions could be used in this exercise, as suggested by the UK

House of Lords.

The European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI Committee) argued that only the

effective functioning of the mechanism of reasoned opinions could benefit from such guidance, in

particular, as regards criteria which qualified as considerations of subsidiarity and concerning the

distinction between the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The European Parliament's

AFCO Committee reiterated that the control of subsidiarity was not a collective exercise and

commented that, as recipient of such documents, it could have an interest in better and harmonised

drafting. However, it considered that such "informal guidelines" or "standard forms" for reasoned

opinions and contributions should be issued in the framework of Article 9, Title II, of Protocol no. 1

of the Treaty of Lisbon on interparliamentary cooperation.

Eight out of 28 Parliaments/Chambers stated that there was no need for informal guidelines on how

to draft reasoned opinions, with the Finnish

Eduskunta

strongly opposing this idea. The Dutch

Eerste Kamer

believed that Protocol no. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon already provided

sufficient guidance. The Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

the Czech

Senát,

the Italian

Camera dei

deputati,

the Polish

Senat

underscored that the manner in which each national Parliament

formulated its opinions should be left wholly to its discretion according to its own established

procedures and practices.

When asked who should be entrusted with the task of drafting such informal guidelines, a majority

of Parliaments/Chambers expressed their preference to a specific working group established within

COSAC, at staff level (an equal number of eight Parliaments/Chambers would prefer at the level of

permanent representatives in Brussels and at the level of staff in the capitals) or at political level

(six), often proposing to combine those options. Seven Parliaments/Chambers expressed their

preference for COSAC. The European Parliament's JURI committee suggested that a working group

established within COSAC at staff level could prepare a draft under the supervision of a working

group established at political level. Similar ideas were expressed by the Romanian

Senat

and the

Dutch

Tweede Kamer.

The latter also suggested using the framework of a potential working group,

which may be set up this spring in order to look at improvements on the yellow card procedure.

Several Parliaments/Chambers underscored the importance of approving such informal guidelines at

the COSAC political level, even if the drafting process takes place at another level.

Nine out of 22 Parliaments/Chambers said that they would prefer another option. Only two

provided a specific proposal. The Lithuanian

Seimas

suggested that the COSAC Secretariat could

prepare the draft, then to be endorsed by COSAC. The Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor

suggested

entrusting this task to the European Parliament AFCO Committee or the European Parliament’s

ante

Impact Assessment Unit or the Committee of the Regions.

Only seven out of 30 Parliaments/Chambers were in favour of creating a standard form for reasoned

opinions and contributions in the context of political dialogue, and even fewer were supporting, in

their extended replies, the development of a standard form meant for political dialogue

contributions. In those few cases, the Parliaments/Chambers were looking for an opportunity to

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

indicate clearly the nature of the submission (e.g., whether it was a reasoned opinion on subsidiarity

or a political dialogue contribution). The Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas

warned that a ‘standard

format’ for reasoned opinions may not be in line with the provisions of the Treaty, thus it would

support only the development of a ‘non–binding'

standard form for use. The Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

expressed its concern as to the possibility that such a form would rather complicate

matters and unnecessarily bureaucratise the process.

When asked who should be entrusted with the task of creating such a standard form for reasoned

opinions and contributions in the context of political dialogue, only ten Parliaments/Chambers

responded. As in the case of drafting informal guidelines, on how to draft reasoned opinions and

contributions in the context of political dialogue, Parliaments/Chambers expressed their preference

to a specific working group established within COSAC, at staff level (an equal number of four

Parliaments/Chambers would prefer at the level of permanent representatives in Brussels and at the

level of staff in the capitals) or at political level (two), in a couple of cases proposing to combine

those options.

Neither in the case of drafting informal guidelines nor in the case of creating a standard form for

reasoned opinions and contributions, did the responding Parliaments/Chambers choose the EU

Speakers Conference.

Section B: "Green card" procedure

Support to the idea of introducing a "green card" procedure" that would build on the

existing political dialogue

A vast majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers expressed (23 out of 27) their support to

the idea of introducing a "green card" that would build on the existing political dialogue and make it

possible for Parliaments/Chambers to make constructive suggestions regarding policy or legislative

proposal to the European Commission without any formal Treaty changes. Three

Parliaments/Chambers

indicated their opposition to the introduction of a "green card"

The Finnish

Eduskunta

indicated that it was highly sceptical of any proposals to make institutional

or quasi-institutional arrangements outside the treaties, because this would add to the complexity of

the decision-making procedure at European level. It also pointed out that national Parliaments

individually or collectively, already had the ability to write to the European Commission and

therefore questioned the added value of a "green card".

The Italian

Camera dei deputati

recommended a careful consideration of any proposals concerning

a "green card" procedure in order to assess its compatibility with the current treaties and

institutional balance. The Romanian

Senat

also pointed out that the "green card" lacked a legal basis

in the Treaty and that it was only possible to use it to make informal proposals to the European

Commission.

Some Parliaments/Chambers further expressed their views on the introduction of a "green card" in

general terms.

"Green card procedure" is abbreviated throughout this section as "green card".

Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

Finnish

Eduskunta

and Italian

Camera dei deputati.

The Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor

indicated that it answered no to all question in this section, because it had not

reached an official position on the issue yet.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The Dutch

Eerste Kamer

stressed that it was in favour of using the existing instruments for national

Parliaments, such as the political dialogue, to their full potential, as long as this was in line with the

competences of the EU institutions as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Polish

Senat

supported the idea of strengthening the position of national Parliaments. However,

there were formal problems with engaging in the "green card" since there were doubts about the

compliance with the existing treaties. Moreover, there was no legal basis for proactive actions in

external and European relations within the framework of Polish Constitution and law. According to

the Polish Constitution, only the Government had a right to pursue an external policy, while the

Parliament could only control and verify it. It did not have a legal basis for creating a formal

procedure of issuing positions under such a procedure. Furthermore, it added that a formal position

was going to be worked out in the nearest future and would be based on further legal analysis. The

Swedish

Riksdag

underlined that on the basis of the constitutional conditions that applied in

Sweden, the Government had the main responsibility for representing Sweden in the EU. The

political dialogue between the Commission and Sweden therefore took place through Government,

which was accountable to the

Riksdag.

It was only within the framework of the subsidiarity-check

mechanism concerning draft legislative acts that the

Riksdag,

on the basis of the treaties, could

communicate directly with the Commission.

The

Irish Houses of the Oireachtas

explained that it had stated its openness to the idea of other

Parliaments on various cards, their scope, thresholds and time period in a political contribution to

the European Commission in January 2015. It also acknowledged that some of these measures

would require Treaty changes. Having regard to this, it proposed to integrate any new mechanism

into an informal inter-institutional agreement because it would then be easier to integrate new

changes into any new Treaty as actors and stakeholders would have seen them work or not work in

practice.

The European Parliament's AFCO Committee had not taken a formal position on the "green card",

however, it considered it as a positive suggestion to enhance the existing political dialogue with

national Parliaments as long as it did not amount to a real right of legislative initiative of national

Parliaments, which was not foreseen by the treaties. The Committee saw this initiative as one of the

most promising ways to enable national Parliaments to contribute actively to the good functioning

of the Union. As expressed in the European Parliament's resolution of 16 April 2014

, even the

early warning mechanism should be used as a channel for consultation and cooperative dialogue

between the various institutions within the EU’s multilevel system. This positive mechanism could

increase the feeling of ownership of the legislation adopted, contribute to render it more adapted to

national realities and facilitate its transposition and implementation. In this sense, a better use of the

provisions of the existing treaties could allow for national Parliaments to express their opinions

concerning the need for European legislation.

Some Parliaments pointed out that the reason for not responding at all to the questions of the section

related to the "green card", or only partly, was that they had not adopted an official position yet.

The Portuguese

Assembleia da Républica

added that although it had not yet discussed the issue, it

was traditionally in favour of strengthening the involvement of national Parliaments as concerns the

scrutiny of European affairs and would most likely agree to a "green card". The UK

House of

Commons

European Scrutiny Committee indicated that it supported initiatives to strengthen the role

of national Parliaments in general terms, which included the "green card", but that it had not

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2014-0430

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

expressed a view on specific aspects of the "green card". The Estonian

Riigikogu

also declared its

support to the idea of a "green card" in principle.

The Belgian

Chambre des représentants

warned that this new procedure should not overstretch the

national Parliaments' capacities. The German

Bundestag

recommended putting the new procedure

in line with the position of the European Parliament. The German

Bundestag

stated further that the

exchange of best practice and dialogue about interinstitutional cooperation should be enhanced.

ii.

Scope of the proposed "green card"

All responding Parliaments were of the opinion that the new procedure should provide for a

mechanism allowing Parliaments to make

Suggestions for new legislation

as well as

Suggestions to

amend existing legislation.

When it came to conferring the competence to national Parliaments to make

Suggestions to repeal

existing legislation

and

Suggestions to amend or repeal delegated or implementing acts,

the views

expressed were not unanimous; three Parliaments/Chambers (Slovenian

Državni zbor,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Latvian

Saeima)

were against the first proposal and three (Slovenian

Državni zbor,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Belgian

Chambre des représentants)

against the latter. The Latvian

Saeima

clarified that national Parliaments should be able to formulate suggestions to amend

delegated or implementing acts, however they should not have the power to repeal delegated or

implementing acts.

The UK

House of Lords

would also like to include in the related competences the possibility to

make

suggestions to review existing legislation

as well as

suggestions for non-legislative action in a

particular field.

As for the French

Assemblée nationale,

the "green card" should allow national Parliaments to

propose amendments to a draft legislative act before its adoption by the European Commission as

well as to propose new draft legislation not linked to any initiative of the European Commission.

iii.

Parliaments' position on the "green card"

Only a minority of Parliaments/Chambers had adopted an official position on the introduction of a

"green card"

The Lithuanian

Seimas

considered that the broad dialogue of national Parliaments, including their

dialogue with European citizens, should contribute to the formation of EU policies. It was of the

opinion that in order to give national Parliaments the opportunity to play a constructive role in

policy formulation at EU level, it was necessary to improve cooperation among national

Parliaments and coordination of their actions, and therefore to strengthen not only the political

dialogue with the European Commission but also communication among national Parliaments. It

believed that the developed political dialogue, by creating a "green card" (without amending the

treaties), which encouraged the European Commission to put forward new legislative actions, and

to revise, amend or repeal existing legislative acts, including delegated or implementing acts, could

be useful.

Lithuanian

Seimas,

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon,

Czech

Senát,

Dutch

Tweede Kamer,

Danish

Folketing

and Italian

Camera dei deputati.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

stated that the "green card" would further enhance the role of

national Parliaments in the EU decision-making. The relevant discussion paper presented by the UK

House of Lords

provided a good starting point. The left wing party, AKEL

–

Left New Forces, was

of the opinion that an amendment of the existing EU treaties constituted a prerequisite to the

introduction of a "green card".

The Czech

Senát

was of the opinion that the "green card" allowed for coordination of national

Parliaments within the framework of the political dialogue and that coordination could lead to

suggestions to call for a new legislative action or the amendment or repeal of existing legislation. It

would also enhance the political dialogue with the European Commission. The

Senát

agreed in

principle with the measures described in the discussion paper, however it suggested to add that the

national Parliament initiating the "green card" included an English translation, and to extend the

period for co-signing the draft to six months. Lastly, it underlined that, given the importance of the

"green card", the adoption by national Parliaments should be taken by a body that was also

competent to adopt written contributions addressed to the European Commission within the

framework of the political dialogue (in its own case, the plenary).

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

adopted an official position in May 2014, in which it pointed out its

support to the introduction of a "green card" and declared that this procedure should include the

competence to amend or revoke existing legislation. Furthermore, the

Tweede Kamer

believed that

nothing stood in the way of Parliaments making such a proposal now. A group of countries gathered

around a theme (cluster of interest) could issue such a card. It welcomed the proposals made by the

House of Lords.

The European Affairs Committee of the Danish

Folketing

had issued a discussion paper outlining

23 recommendations on how to enhance the role of national Parliaments in EU decision-making,

one of which concerned the introduction of a "green card".

In its official document adopted in December 2013, the Committee on EU Policies of the Italian

Camera dei deputati

stated that the political dialogue should continue to take place following the

well-established practice of bilateral exchanges between the European Commission and individual

Parliaments, without entering into any kind of collective dialogue between the Commission and

groups of national Parliaments.

Some other Parliaments/Chambers had not adopted a formal position, but discussed the introduction

of a "green card" at Committee level.

The European Affairs Committee of the Estonian

Riigikogu

discussed the concept in general and

underlined that it welcomed the idea of further strengthening the role of national Parliaments in EU

decision-making; that the present legal framework allowed to initiate this idea via political dialogue

with the Commission, however, further steps may require the amendment of the treaties. Even in the

case of the introduction of a "green card", the Estonian

Riigikogu

underlined that it would be

concentrating on its current practices of scrutinising its Government´s EU activities, as well as

giving its position on EU proposals via its Executive.

The European Parliament's AFCO Committee was open to consider further developments of the

current forms of interparliamentary cooperation and other ways to foster the dialogue between

national Parliaments and European institutions. In this framework, AFCO intended to organise an

interparliamentary committee meeting in autumn, which could be a good opportunity to discuss all

those issues.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The European Affairs Committee of the UK

House of Lords

recalled that it had submitted a

proposal on the mechanisms of the "green card", however, this paper had not been adopted by the

plenary.

The Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas

reiterated that they would prefer the adoption of the "green

card" in an inter-institutional agreement.

iv.

The UK

House of Lords'

discussion paper on the "green card" and its main elements/

proposals

An overwhelming majority of responding Parliaments/Chambers (26 out of 28) acknowledged the

recent paper of the UK

House of Lords

as a basis for further discussion on the "green card"; two

Chambers did not consider the paper in question as a basis for further discussion (Belgian

Sénat

and

the Italian

Camera dei deputati).

The UK

House of Lords'

discussion paper outlined some concrete proposals on the main elements

of the "green card".

The replying Parliaments/Chambers expressed unanimous

support to the following elements:



A "green card" may be issued by any national Parliament/Chamber according to its own

internal process.



Informal consultations and contacts with other Parliaments/Chambers, as well as cluster

meetings may take place.



The initiating Parliament/Chamber prepares a draft letter to the Commission and

disseminates it to all other Parliaments/Chambers, inviting them to sign the "green card".



Each national Parliament has two votes.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

voiced concerns on these elements:



Once the threshold is reached, the initiating Parliament/Chamber sends the co-signed text to

the Commission.



Any Parliament/Chamber may propose amendments to the initial draft. The initiating

Parliament/Chamber must respond to the proposed amendments. Amending the draft does

not affect the 16-week deadline.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

and the Croatian

Hrvatski Sabor

replied that the following elements

should not be integrated in the mechanism.



Draft "green card" outlines the substance of the proposal in sufficient detail, contains a

summary of the reasons behind the proposed action, describes the anticipated benefits,

specifies the preferred type of legislation and specifies a possible legal base.

The Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

the Lithuanian

Seimas,

and the Latvian

Saeima

opposed the

proposed minimum threshold of one fourth of all the votes in order to launch a "green card". The

latter proposed to create an analogy with the "yellow card" procedure, and foresaw a threshold of

one third of all votes.

The Romanian

Camera Deputatilor

answered “No”

to this whole section, because it had not reached a position yet.

The French

Assemblée nationale

underlined that it has responded "no" to the deadline, the threshold and the

amendments because those issues had not been discussed rather than because it wished to mark its opposition.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport



The minimum threshold necessary for agreeing on a "green card" is reached when

Parliaments/Chambers representing one fourth of all available votes have co-signed the draft

according to their own internal procedure.

Parliaments'/Chambers' views on the deadline to co-sign the "green card" were mixed

. Six

Parliaments/Chambers commented on this element.



Parliaments/Chambers have 16 weeks to co-sign the draft "green card" from the date when

the initiating Parliament/Chamber circulated it.

Some Parliaments/Chambers provided additional information

implementation and formal requirements of the "green card".

the

scope,

practical

According to the Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

the COSAC Chairpersons’ and plenary meetings

provided the right framework for the discussion of any "green card" proposal. It added that at this

very early stage it was very difficult to describe the benefits of the main elements of discussion

paper.

The Slovenian

Državni zbor

proposed to have a shorter timeframe of eight weeks for the signing of

the "green card".

The Portuguese

Assembleia da Républica

pinpointed the language issue. As stated in the initial

discussion paper, the initial drafts would be presented in the language of the initiating Parliament,

which would imply difficult practical issues to overcome for national Parliaments. The drafts should

also be circulated in the most common languages used in COSAC (English or French).

The Dutch

Eerste Kamer

indicated that it had not taken a specific position on the main elements in

the paper.

The Polish

Sejm

proposed to allow for informal consultations and cluster meetings before the stage

of the initiation of a "green card". However, sending the draft letter to the European Commission

initiating the "green card" as soon as it was circulated to national Parliaments should mark the

beginning of a formalised procedure. It further proposed to have a shorter deadline for co-signing,

namely eight weeks. The

Sejm

also agreed to the proposal that any Parliament/Chamber may

propose amendments, however this should not lead to opening a wide discussion; only the initiating

Parliament should have the right to respond. Furthermore, every initiative should be posted in a

single register accessible to all Chambers (a web platform), allowing to follow the discussions on

the different initiatives.

The Romanian

Senat

underlined that the involvement of national Parliaments in EU decision-

making was an ongoing debate and that the "green card" was part of it. Reducing the democratic

deficit is important for Member States, EU institutions and the citizens of Europe.

The UK

House of Lords

replied that the final paper circulated suggested that Parliaments/Chambers

have 6 months to co-sign a draft "green card", rather than 16 weeks.

The question in the questionnaire for the 23rd Bi-annual Report of COSAC regarding the deadline, formulated before

the UK

House of Lords'

revised proposal was drafted, is based on an initial idea of a 16-week deadline. The UK

House

of Lords'

final revised working paper, circulated to Parliaments' on 28th January 2015, proposed a six-month deadline

for co-signing the "green card".

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The French

Assemblée nationale

had not debated yet on the deadline, the threshold and the

amendments in detail. It pointed out, however, that, although the proposals circulated constituted a

useful basis for discussion, the document in question was not the only possible basis for discussion.

The Czech

Senát

suggested that the time limit for co-signing of the "green card" should be at least

six months. This would provide the necessary time for translations and deliberations. In its view,

there was no need to impose time limits that would curtail the political consideration of proposed

"green cards".

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

pointed out that, as it was the case in the "yellow card" procedure, some

informal guidelines could be formulated as long as they facilitated the possibility for national

Parliaments to act in a positive way. It considered that a specific deadline of 16 weeks did not

contribute to this. It also suggested that the initiating Parliament/Chamber should wait until the end

of the deadline for co-signing a "green card" before sending it to the European Commission in order

to collect as many signatures as possible.

For the Finnish

Eduskunta,

points 5 to 9 of the elements outlined in the discussion paper concerned

procedural matters. It added that as it was agreed during the COSAC Chairpersons’ Meeting to

discuss the procedure during the LIII COSAC, it seemed too early to already state a position on

these issues.

The Italian

Senato della Repubblica

replied that the "green card" should follow the model of the

European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) as to the power of the EU Commission. The answers to the

initiatives under such procedure should fall under the political dialogue, and the European

Commission should reply possibly within three months. For the Croatian

Hrvatski Sabor,

a draft

"green card" should not be too detailed. Based on the model of the ECI, it should only contain the

main ideas of the proposal.

In the eyes of the Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati,

further consideration should be given to what was

expected of the European Commission once a "green card" was reached.

The German

Bundestag,

the UK

House of Commons

and the French

Sénat

notified that they had not

reached a formal position concerning the proposals outlined in the UK

House of Lords'

discussion

paper yet. Nevertheless, the European Affairs Committee of the French

Sénat

considered the

proposal in a positive light. It added that it considered the UK

House of Lords'

proposal a useful

contribution that should be discussed in COSAC. However, in the absence of a specific legal basis

in the treaties, it considered it delicate to create anything going beyond an informal cooperation.

The Italian

Camera dei deputati

reiterated its position that a "green card" needed to be compliant

with the current treaties and should not alter the institutional balance.

The Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna

underlined that the "green card" should build on the existing

political dialogue without any formal Treaty amendments.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The role of the European Parliament in the procedure

Only six Parliaments/Chambers (out of 30) were of the opinion that the European Parliament should

play a role in the "green card" procedure, considering the right that it already enjoyed pursuant to

Article 225 TFEU

The Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie

made the remark that there needed to be further discussions on the

role of the European Parliament.

In the view of the Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

a regular informal exchange of information with the

European Parliament would contribute to the main objective of the "green card". The Romanian

Senat

also believed that the "green card" could provide the frame for informal consultations

between national Parliaments and the European Parliament.

For the Lithuanian

Seimas,

the involvement of the European Parliament would signify that the latter

could be informed about the initiative to raise a "green card".

The European Parliament's AFCO Committee believed that a closer cooperation between national

Parliaments and European Institutions could enhance policy output and would be an asset to all

European citizens, for the benefit of democratic legitimacy. Respecting the existing Treaty

provisions, and the overall institutional EU balance, and in the light of a wider EU

interparliamentary cooperation in the framework of Title II of Protocol 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon,

AFCO was open to consider further developments of the dialogue with national Parliaments in the

framework of the right of initiative that the European Parliament already enjoyed according to

Article 225 TFEU.

The Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati

replied that in the spirit of interparliamentary cooperation, the

European Parliament should inform national Parliaments of any request made to the Commission in

terms of Article 225 of the TFEU. Conversely, the instigator of a "green card" should inform the

European Parliament of the initiative and keep it informed of any further developments.

Those Parliaments/Chambers that did not see a role for the European Parliament in the "green card",

added the following explanations.

The Polish

Sejm

responded that the European Parliament should not be involved in the "green card",

but it should be kept informed about it. In addition, the support of the European Parliament would

lend greater strength to national Parliaments’ initiatives. Finally, the European Parliament could

exercise legislative initiative in the cases where national Parliaments, even if they reached the

minimum threshold for such a card, would be unable to win the Commission over to its proposals.

The Czech

Senát

did not see a necessity for a formal role of the European Parliament in the "green

card", but it would support informal discussions with MEPs on a potential proposal for one. It

added that the European Parliament should be informed by the initiating Chambers about any

"green card" proposals and it may indeed provide its opinion. It may use its right pursuant to Article

225 TFEU concurrently with the national Parliaments’

"green card". Therefore, it was not necessary

to formally include the European Parliament in the procedure. The inclusion of the European

Parliament into the procedure would also require re-thinking the counting of votes and thresholds.

Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Lithuanian

Seimas,

Italian

Senato della Repubblica,

AFCO

Committee of the European Parliament and Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The "green

card’s"

added value should come from the experience with EU policies gained by the

national Parliaments in the Member States. The European Parliament may have a different point of

view and this may be expressed separately in the Article 225 TFEU procedure.

The UK

House of Lords

explained that the European Parliament had its own rights and

responsibilities, and mechanisms for communicating with the European Commission. As the "green

card" was an extension of the existing political dialogue between the European Commission and

national Parliaments, it would not seem logical for the European Parliament to be eligible to co-sign

a "green card". The Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas

commenting on its position stated that the

European Parliament enjoyed its own privileges.

The Dutch

Eerste Kamer,

the German

Bundestag

and the UK

House of Commons

stated that they

had not adopted a formal position yet.

vi.

Examples of proposal that Parliaments would be willing to put forward within the

framework of the "green card"

Nineteen Parliaments/Chambers replied, a number of which indicated that they had not taken an

official position on this issue or that they had not put forward any proposals yet.

Some Parliaments/Chambers gave the following examples of proposals:



A proposal on tackling food waste that could provide suggestions for non-legislative action

and steps for the Commission to take (e.g. producing a roadmap), which could be

incorporated into a new circular economy proposal if the Commission does, indeed,

withdraw the existing proposal (UK

House of Lords);



a proposal establishing a European Business Forum (European Affairs Committee of the

Danish

Folketing);



a proposal for a Directive on access to justice in environmental matters (Latvian

Saeima);



proposals on Energy Union, Digital Agenda and Fight against terrorism (French

Sénat).

The Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

replied that it may identify proposals in a future Committee

meeting, while the Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie

and the Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

advocated to have further discussions on this topic.

vii.

Different terms proposed for the procedure

Four Parliaments/Chambers expressed their preference for a different term for the "green card".



"Green Card Exercise" or "Reverse Subsidiarity Exercise" (see Casini Report

) (European

Parliament's AFCO Committee, adding that it should not be called "procedure", because it

would be confusing and could question the overall EU institutional balance as established by

the Treaty of Lisbon

The Slovak

Národná rada,

the Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

the Spanish

Cortes Generales,

the Italian

Senato della

Repubblica

and the UK

House of Commons,

the Dutch

Eerste Kamer,

the Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

the Czech

Senát

and the Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati.

See European Parliament resolution of 27 March 2014 on relations between the European Parliament and the national

parliaments, P7_TA(2014)0430.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-

0255+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

See European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2009 on the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the development of the

institutional balance of the European Union, P6_TA(2009)0387.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport



"Own Initiative Card" (Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati)

"Enhanced Political Dialogue" (Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas,

Luxembourg

Chambre des

Députés)

The Belgian

Sénat

underlined that the name of the procedure did not matter.

Section C: Cooperation between national Parliaments and the European Parliament

Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether they had discussed and/or replied to the letter of the

President of the European Parliament of 5 June 2014, which offered a new form of cooperation with

the European Parliament enabling national Parliaments to share their positions or background

knowledge on the implementation of legislation that the Commission intends to amend.

Half of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (19 out of 37) confirmed that they had discussed

and/or replied to the letter mentioned above. Moreover, most of them had replied to the European

Parliament.

Parliaments/Chambers' replies fell into two main groups: those who welcomed the initiative of the

European Parliament and considered it as a good practice for further cooperation between national

Parliaments and the European Parliament, and those who used this opportunity to elaborate on their

Parliament’s/Chamber’s opinion on particular proposals listed in the letter.

By way of example, the Dutch

Eerste Kamer

explained the way in which it published

information about the implementation of European legislation into national legislation through its

website

. The Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés

stated its readiness to communicate documents,

but that at the moment it did not have any.

The vast majority (26 out of 32) of the responding Parliaments/Chambers confirmed their

willingness to share their best practices and/or ideas with the European Parliament on parliamentary

monitoring on transposition, implementation and enforcement of the EU law.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

supported that cooperation between the European Parliament and

national Parliaments should focus on issues of common interest. On parliamentary monitoring of

EU law, the current level of information-sharing, primarily on an

ad hoc

basis, provided an

adequate level for cooperation.

Most of those Parliaments/Chambers responding negatively had responded in that way not because

they were against sharing their best practice, but due to the fact that they were not dealing with the

monitoring of transposition and/or had no information to share (Portuguese

Assembleia da

República,

Spanish

Cortes Generales,

Polish

Sejm,

Austrian

Nationalrat,

Maltese

Kamra tad-

Deputati),

while a few expressly mentioned they had no formal position on the issue.

The Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat

commented that it was the Government, not the

Parliament, tasked with implementing EU legislation, except for the transposition of Directives into

national law.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0387+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

www.europapoort.nl

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The overwhelming majority (25 out of 28) of the responding Parliaments/Chambers expressed

willingness to share with the European Parliament already existing positions, information or

background knowledge on the extent to which EU legislation/EU policies/EU spending programs

were implemented and applied and whether these had produced the intended effects.

The proposed relevant methods and/or networks that could be used were listed in the following

order: overwhelming number of responding Parliaments/Chambers supported information sharing

via national Parliament representatives in Brussels, during discussions with MEPs at

interparliamentary meetings at the European Parliament, using the IPEX platform for

communicating relevant information, and during discussions with MEPs in side-lines of COSAC.

Slightly fewer Parliaments/Chambers considered as relevant in this regard discussions between

parliamentary committees (i.e. video conference) or a reply from the Chairman of a parliamentary

committee. The least supported option was sending a direct reply from the Speaker of

Parliament/Chamber to the President of the European Parliament.

The Belgian

Chambre des représentants

referred to practical difficulties in sharing information,

given the complexity of Belgium's institutional landscape, but reminded that these positions and

background information were already available on IPEX, whereas information on the extent to

which EU legislation/EU policies/EU spending programs were implemented and applied was

available through more appropriate channels, such as e.g. the Commission’s annual report

on the

transposition of Directives and the European Court of Auditors’ reports.

The UK

House of Lords

pointed out that there was rarely any feedback from MEPs or European

Parliament officials regarding the information shared. It noted that many of its political dialogue

contributions had been already submitted to the European Parliament secretariat, including staff

working on relevant Committees and DG Presidency, in order for the contributions to be included in

the European Parliament’s database.

On a more general note, the Finnish

Eduskunta

strongly opposed to any European Parliament's

initiatives on implementation and enforcement of EU law, stressing that the treaties expressly

reserved for the European Commission the duty and right to monitor the implementation of EU law.

Therefore, the European Parliament's activities in this area would be contrary to the treaties and

would risk harming the institutional balance. Also the Polish

Sejm

said that monitoring and

evaluation of the transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU law fell into the

responsibility of the European Commission.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

CHAPTER 3: EU TRADE POLICY AND THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS

The aim of the third Chapter of the Bi-annual Report is to establish both the current and the future

role and involvement of Parliaments in different Member States throughout the process of the EU

negotiations on free trade agreements with third countries; these negotiations have recently

generated a lot of interest within the EU Member States, mainly triggered by the negotiations on the

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US.

In this context, Section A presents the extent to which Parliaments/Chambers have been engaged in

the debate on the impact of the EU free trade agreements over the last few years.

Section B collects information on the state of play of the debates on the EU-US TTIP negotiations

at the national and EU levels, and identifies the most important aspects for Parliaments/Chambers

during this negotiation process.

Section C presents the extent to which both national Parliaments and the European Parliament have

access to information on ongoing EU trade negotiations and analyses related data. It further

provides Parliaments'/Chambers' assessment of the welcomed Commission's transparency initiative

for TTIP negotiations launched in November 2014.

Section A: Parliaments' engagement in the debate on the EU free trade agreements

Policy for defining priorities in relation to EU trade and investment negotiations with

third countries

Most of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (23 out of 34) stated that there was an established

policy for defining

their country’s priorities for EU trade and investment negotiations with third

countries.

When asked about their role in it, six Parliaments/Chambers pointed out that they did not have any

role in defining such priorities since they were set at the executive level

. Some

Parliaments/Chambers referred to their role in the ratification of mixed agreements

Eight Parliaments/Chambers

noted that they scrutinised EU trade and investment negotiations

through the normal scrutiny process. Some Parliaments/Chambers specified that they scrutinised

their Government’s activities in the EU Council in this field

and gave mandate ahead of Council

and EU Council meetings

. The German

Bundestag

and the Swedish

Riksdag

informed that they

also scrutinised initial negotiating mandates to be given to the European Commission, whereas the

House of Commons

could discuss at earlier stages and conduct parliamentary inquiries.

Polish

Senat,

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon,

House of Lords,

Romanian

Senat,

Swedish

Riksdag,

French

Sénat.

Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

Slovenian

Državni svet,

Romanian

Senat,

House of Lords, French Assemblée

nationale,

Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

Belgian

Chambre des représentants.

Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

Estonian Riigikogu, Lithuanian

Seimas,

House of Lords,

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

French

Assemblée nationale,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Italian

Senato della Repubblica,

House of

Commons,

German

Bundestag,

Polish

Senat.

Polish

Sejm,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Italian

Senato della Repubblica,

Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

German

Bundestag,

French

Sénat,

Slovenian

Državni zbor,

Polish

Senat,

Belgian

Chambre des représentants,

Swedish

Riksdag,

French

Assemblée nationale.

Slovak

Národná rada,

Estonian

Riigikogu,

Lithuanian

Seimas,

Danish

Folketing,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

Latvian

Saeima,

Swedish

Riksdag.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

and

Eerste Kamer,

the Danish

Folketing,

the Latvian

Saeima

and the

Swedish

Riksdag

informed that they discussed their government's position paper on trade and

investment, in most cases, with competent Ministers.

The European Parliament's INTA Committee pointed out that it was responsible for matters related

to the establishment, implementation and monitoring of the EU's commercial policy and it defined

its priorities through debates and votes.

The Lithuanian

Seimas

also informed that both officials and members of the Parliament took part in

the meetings of the Commission - Economic Diplomacy Council, set up by the Lithuanian

Government and of the Working Group for External Economic Relations in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.

The Polish

Sejm

referred to an

ad hoc

meeting on TTIP co-hosted by the Ministry of Economy,

during which the Minister of the Economy gave an overview of Poland’s trade and investment

policy and its priorities in the common trade policy area.

ii.

Parliaments' engagement in the debate on the impact that the EU trade and investment

policy and the procedures/ practices followed

The majority of responding Parliaments/Chambers (28 out of 37) stated that they had been engaged

in recent years in the debate on the impact that the EU trade and investment policy may have on the

EU and/or their country.

Two Parliaments/Chambers stated that they had scrutinised such impact, but not as a matter of

course (Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

Polish

Sejm).

Several Parliaments/Chambers stated that they discussed the estimated national and EU wide

impacts of agreement during the scrutiny process and at Committee and/or Plenary levels

. The

Portuguese

Assembleia da República

added that it had also debated the impact on relationship

between Portugal and other countries and the participation of national Parliaments in the negotiation

process.

The European Parliament's INTA Committee replied that it was totally engaged in the debate and it

held committee meetings, workshops, technical briefings and requests of technical studies. The EP

AFET Committee stated that, during the past parliamentary term, it dealt with 19 procedures for

consent for international agreements and gave 8 opinions to various EU agreements related to trade

with third countries; it also held exchanges of views on those agreements, including on their impact

on the EU.

Some Parliaments/Chambers informed about their scrutiny on the TTIP negotiations and on the

possible national impact of this agreement

. The UK

House of Lords

referred to its EU Committee

report on the TTIP and hearings on various aspects of the agreement, in particular the Investor State

Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

Spanish

Cortes Generales,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Slovenian

Državni zbor,

Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Polish

Senat,

French

Assemblée nationale,

Belgian

Chambre

des représentants,

House of Commons,

Austrian

Nationalrat and Bundesrat.

Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

House of Lords,

Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas,

Austrian

Nationalrat,

French

Sénat,

Dutch

Tweede Kamer,

German

Bundesrat,

Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Dispute Settlement process (ISDS)

, while the Italian

Camera dei deputati

mentioned a motion

adopted by the Plenary. The Italian

Senato della Repubblica

and the Italian

Camera dei deputati

also informed about the scrutiny of their Committees on Agriculture on the impact of TTIP on the

Italian Agriculture and Food sectors. The French

Sénat

pointed out that a group of senators were

appointed the year before to follow the ongoing negotiations on the TTIP. The Dutch

Tweede

Kamer

stated that the Committee on Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation held an

camera

meeting with scientists to discuss legal and economic consequences of the TTIP.

Some Parliaments/Chambers referred to parliamentary debates on the impact of other EU

Agreements: the Canada and European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement,

(CETA) (Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

Austrian

Nationalrat,

French

Sénat,

Swedish

Riksdag),

the Free Trade Agreement between EU and its Member States and the Republic of Korea

(Italian

Senato della Repubblica

and Swedish

Riksdag),

the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement,

including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (Estonian

Riigikogu)

and Trade Agreement

between the European Union and Colombia and Peru (Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas).

The German

Bundestag

informed about its resolutions on the EU Annual Reports on Human Rights

and Democracy in the World 2012 and 2013 which also referred to the consequences of free trade

agreements between EU and third countries.

The Dutch

Eerste Kamer

mentioned a meeting between its representatives and former

Commissioner for Trade, Mr Karel DE GUCHT, to discuss the general EU trade and investment

policy, which took place in March 2013.

When asked at what level the discussions on EU trade and investment policy took place, the large

majority of respondent Parliaments/Chambers replied at Committee level. According to the replies,

the main Committees involved were the Committee on EU Affairs, the Committee on Economy and

the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Six Parliaments/Chambers pointed out that several standing Committees were involved according to

topics

. Ten Parliaments/Chambers

referred to the role of the Plenary sitting, mainly but not

exclusively during the ratification process.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldeucom/179/17902.htm

Committee on EU Affairs, Committee on Economy and Committee on Foreign Affairs (Slovenian

Državni

zbor,

Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

Polish

Sejm,

Estonian

Riigikogu,

French

Assemblée nationale).

Committee on Industry and Trade, Committee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs (Swedish

Riksdag).

Committee on EU Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs (Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Polish

Senat,

Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati,

Latvian

Saeima).

Committee on EU Affairs, Committee on Economic Affairs or Committee on finance (Bulgarian

Narodno

sabranie,

Romanian

Camera

Deputaţilor,

Spanish

Cortes Generales,

German

Bundestag).

Committee on Foreign Affairs (Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

Dutch

Tweede Kamer).

Committee on Foreign and European Affairs (Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

Luxembourg

Chambre des

Députés).

Committee on EU Affairs (German

Bundesrat, Slovak Národná rada,

House of Lords,

Danish

Folketing,

Austrian

Nationalrat).

Lithuanian

Seimas,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Belgian

Chambre des représentants,

Italian

Senato della Repubblica

and

Camera dei deputati,

House of Commons.

Polish

Senat,

Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

House of Lords,

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

Spanish

Cortes

Generales,

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon,

French

Assemblée nationale,

Danish

Folketing,

Belgian

Chambre des

représentants.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The Austrian Parliament also informed that the plenary of the Austrian

Nationalrat

discussed TTIP

and CETA during a meeting and that TTIP was also the

item for a “topical debate” in the plenary of

the

National Council.

Concerning the actors/stakeholders involved in the discussions, responding Parliaments/Chambers

referred to hearings/meetings with:

Commissioners for Trade and other Commissioners (French

Assemblée nationale,

German

Bundesrat,

Dutch

Eerste Kamer

and

Tweede Kamer,

Spanish

Cortes Generales,

Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat,

Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés),

and European Commission

officials (Estonian

Riigikogu,

Lithuanian

Seimas,

Italian

Senato della Repubblica);

a variety of stakeholders including those listed in the question, European Commission

Representation, Commission/DG Trade, NGOs, businesses, trade unions, foreign embassies

(Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

House of Lords,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

House of Commons,

Italian

Camera dei deputati);

Members of the European Parliament, Chief trade negotiators, Ambassadors, NGOs and

other national and European stakeholders

;

Government representatives (Italian

Senato della Repubblica,

Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati,

Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas,

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon,

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

Polish

Sejm,

Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

French

Assemblée nationale,

French

Sénat

Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés);

European Commission representations in their countries (Polish

Sejm,

Romanian

Camera

Deputaţilor,

Austrian

Nationalrat,

French

Sénat,

German

Bundestag).

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

informed that its Committee on Foreign Trade had planned a visit to

Brussels to discuss trade issues in April this year.

The large majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (25 out of 36) stated that they did not

carry out public consultations on EU trade and investment policy.

Five Parliaments/Chambers informed that they organised such consultations, but on a

case-by case

basis (Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

Estonian

Riigikogu,

House of Lords,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

House of Commons).

The Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés

stated that the Conference of

Presidents could authorise the organisation of a hearing upon demand by a parliamentary

committee.

Hearings of MEPs, Ambassadors, Portuguese Agencies, Confederations and Associations and other relevant

stakeholders on TTIP and CETA (Portuguese

Assembleia da República).

MEPs (Polish

Sejm).

Business, trade unions, NGOs, diplomatic corps (Lithuanian

Seimas).

Ambassadors, enterprises, NGOs (French

Assemblée nationale).

NGOs and business can ask to appear before the European Affairs Committee, for instance Médicins Sans

Frontières on the Free Trade Agreement with India (Danish

Folketing).

Social partners and NGOs (Latvian

Saeima).

Agencies, Experts, NGOs, MEPs, Representatives of other EU Institutions (Italian

Senato della Repubblica).

US and EU TTIP negotiators, Canada's chief trade negotiator on CETA, Foreign Embassies, (Austrian

Nationalrat).

French Permanent representation, visits to Bruxelles (French

Sénat).

Ministers, Agencies, Experts, NGOs, MEP, Representatives of other EU institutions (Italian

Camera dei

deputati).

MEPs, Associations, Professional Chambers and Trade Unions, representatives of the Stop TAFTA Movement

Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

When asked to specify, responding Parliaments/Chambers referred, among others, to: invitation of

representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders to Committees

meetings (Slovenian

Državni zbor);

Committee meetings open to civil society representatives

(Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie);

a public meeting of the EU Affairs Committee on the Anti-

Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) with NGOs and stakeholders participating which was

web streamed and gave the possibility to ask questions via Twitter to the participants during the

meeting (Estonian

Riigikogu);

public hearings (Lithuanian

Seimas,

EP INTA Committee, Finnish

Eduskunta

and Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

German

Bundestag,

Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas),

inquiries and contributions from the public and from stakeholders groups (UK

House of Lords

and

House of Commons).

Almost all respondent Parliaments/Chambers (34 out of 36), including the European Parliament's

INTA Committee, stated that they had not prepared their own impact assessment on trade issues.

The Polish

Sejm

specified that it could ask its services and external experts to draw up opinions on

the issue, whereas the UK

House of Commons

noted that it was not a matter of course, but a

Committee could choose to do so. The French

Sénat

referred to report or hearings of experts.

When asked to provide additional information, some Parliaments/Chambers referred to debates on

the involvement of national Parliaments in the negotiation process (Portuguese

Assembleia da

República)

and to the former European Commissioner for Trade, Mr DE GUCHT

(Latvian

Saeima,

Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati

and Polish

Sejm).

iii.

Scrutiny of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA)

and the plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)

The scrutiny of individual EU trade and investment agreements with third countries was mainly

carried out under the respective individual processes in force within each Parliament/Chamber for

the purposes of scrutinising EU legislation. Various systems are in place within different EU

Member States.

The Parliaments/Chambers who had granted their respective Governments a mandate ahead of the

negotiations in the Council, looked at the free trade agreement proposal from the moment the

Council had given a mandate to the European Commission to open a particular round of

negotiations (Danish

Folketing,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Latvian

Saeima,

Swedish

Riksdag).

Other Parliaments/Chambers used different approaches in carrying out parliamentary scrutiny,

depending on the level of importance given to the particular document. They either merely ratified

agreements, when such fell under the shared competencies of the EU and its Member States, or

looked at them more in-depth, in different arenas, such as debates at the committee or the plenary

levels, expert hearings, written questions to the Government, or through setting up a Monitoring

Group (in the case of the European Parliament).

Eighteen out of 37 Parliaments/Chambers, including the European Parliament's INTA Committee,

had scrutinised the EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA), whereas

only 11 (out of 35 Parliaments/Chambers), including the European Parliament's INTA Committee,

had indicated scrutiny of the multilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA).

Letter of 25 June 2014 signed by the Chairs of the relevant Committees in 20 Chambers.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The main aspects which various Parliaments/Chambers viewed as the most important towards

concluding the negotiations on CETA were as follows:

The agreement's legal status: it was deemed a

mixed agreement,

therefore to be ratified by

national Parliaments (Dutch

Tweede Kamer,

French

Assemblée nationale,

German

Bundestag,

Polish

Sejm,

Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

Slovenian

Državni zbor).

The part dealing with the investment protection and ISDS was deemed to be of key

importance (German

Bundestag,

German

Bundesrat,

Dutch

Tweede Kamer,

French

Sénat);

including its effect on national regulatory powers (Finnish

Eduskunta),

and the common

understanding of issues relating to investments, so as to ensure the protection of both investments

and investors (Latvian

Saeima).

The French

Assemblée nationale

specifically required a substantial

modification of chapters 10 and 33 dealing with the protection of investments, whereas the UK

House of Lords

considered that the ISDS provisions within CETA provide a useful template for

TTIP.

The need to obtain genuinely reciprocal access to the market, especially to services and

public procurement markets, including at sub-federal level (European Parliament's INTA

Committee), as well as the establishment of balanced services and investment market access

conditions (Latvian

Saeima).

The need to improve the protection of intellectual property rights (including trademarks,

patents and geographical indications) (European Parliament's INTA Committee).

The upholding of major areas of interests, such as public services, consumer safety and

geographical indications (French

Sénat).

The implications of the fracking regulation as foreseen in this Agreement (Spanish

Cortes

Generales).

The need for higher transparency in negotiations (Austrian

Nationalrat,

French

Sénat).

The main aspects which various Parliaments/Chambers considered as the most important towards

concluding the negotiations on TiSA were as follows:

Safeguarding public services, the digital sector, and information technology and

communication (French

Sénat).

Higher transparency in negotiations and inclusion of the stakeholders in the process

(Slovenian

Državni zbor).

Several Parliaments/Chambers reported the ongoing scrutiny of this agreement without providing

further details.

Section B: Discussion process on the EU-US Translantic Trade and Investment Partnership

(TTIP)

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aims to remove trade barriers between

the EU and the US, and to create the largest free-trade area in the world, thereby contributing to

enhanced economic prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic.

TTIP had been discussed by the large majority of responding Parliaments/Chambers (32 out of 38),

and many others had indicated their intention to do so in the near future. The debates had been

carried out on a number of occasions and in various arenas. In this context, Parliaments/Chambers

highlighted public hearings, discussions in Committee meetings and debates in plenary that had

taken place, as well as relevant reports issued. Two Parliaments/Chambers specifically indicated

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

that it had been proposed to carry out a study or impact assessment of the economic impacts on their

country economies of such a trade agreement (Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas

and Latvian

Saeima).

The agreement's legal status: several Parliaments/Chambers referred to the agreement's legal status

and to the letter

to former Commissioner DE GUCHT, in which the European Commission was

urged to enhance the legitimacy of both TTIP and CETA agreements through ratification by

Member States.

Parliaments/Chambers were asked to highlight what they viewed as most important in three main

areas covered by the negotiations: market access; regulatory cooperation and rules; and investment

protection.

Market access

The EU mandate in this area covers the fields reconciling EU and US approaches to removal of

tariffs, rules of origin, trade defence measures, aiming at furthering access for transatlantic trade in

services, and opening up access to government procurement markets at all levels of the US

government.

The main aspects which various Parliament/Chamber viewed as key to concluding the negotiations

in this area were as follows:

- Easier market access in a wide range of market segments provided significant opportunities for

both the European and the US economies to create high-quality jobs and increase prosperity

(German

Bundesrat),

but a common level of ambition was needed from both sides taking into

account the specific national circumstances, such as in the field of agriculture (Hungarian

Országgyűlés);

- Lowering tariff barriers

–

some Parliaments/Chambers supported the objective of removal of

nearly all customs duties and other barriers to transatlantic trade, for instance, supporters of TTIP in

the German

Bundestag

and the Lithuanian

Seimas.

The latter suggested that longer transition

periods or tariff quotas be provided for a very limited number of only the most sensitive agricultural

products.The Slovak

Národná rada

promoted principles of symmetry and reciprocity. Reduction of

tariffs should therefore be tied to the satisfactory resolution of outstanding regulatory issues.

The UK

House of Lords

recommended that the European Commission and the UK Government

should commission more detailed analyses of the possible practical effect of tariff reductions for

consumers of particular goods and services in the EU.

- Issues related to the opening of the EU market to certain products were raised by several

Parliaments/Chambers. According to the information provided by the Lithuanian

Seima,

the

Lithuanian industry was said to have identified certain vulnerabilities related to the opening of the

EU market to certain products, which could be compensated by maintaining the terms and

conditions provided for in the EU tariff proposal. The Slovenian

Državni zbor

mentioned the

possible negative impacts on agriculture, chemical, metal and automotive industries. More

specifically, the issue of access of genetically modified agricultural products to European markets

was brought up (Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Polish

Sejm,

some parties in the

Dutch

Tweede Kamer).

Ibid

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

- Market liberalisation in the services sector, and particularly effective removal of non-tariff barriers

to trade in goods and services, was mentioned as one of key aspects by the supporters of TTIP in the

German

Bundestag

and the French

Assemblée nationale.

The European Parliament INTA

Committee considered that market access for services would have to be built based on the, so called

'positive list approach'; the Slovak

Národná rada

considered that the US would have to undertake

obligations at the level of federal states as in the CETA.

- Public procurement - opening up access to Government procurement markets at all levels of the

US Government in a balanced manner was supported by the European Parliament INTA and IMCO

Committees. The Slovak

Národná rada

reiterated that the US would have to undertake obligations

at the level of individual US States on transparency. The Polish

Sejm

listed the changes in this area

as one of the steps to take.

- Some Parliaments/Chambers indicated their opposition to opening the markets. Opponents of

TTIP in the German

Bundestag

raised concerns about possible negative impact on labour rights and

collective bargaining. Slovenian

Državni svet

pointed out their concerns about a possible increase in

unemployment.

ii.

Regulatory cooperation

Regulatory cooperation aims at facilitating trade and investment, while ensuring high levels of

protection in health and safety, consumer protection, labour and environmental legislation and

maintaining the existing cultural diversity within the EU. The goal of this aspect of the negotiations

is to make EU and US regulations more compatible, by tackling such barriers to trade, as different

safety, environmental or health and hygiene standards.

Several Parliaments/Chambers pointed out that this part of the agreement could bring about great

benefits, since resolution of the differences between the regulatory systems of the EU and the US

would represent a major contribution of TTIP (Slovak

Národná rada),

stimulate investments and

trade (Hungarian

Országgyűlés),

but at the same time it represented the greatest negotiating

challenge (Polish

Sejm).

The Lithuanian

Seimas

further highlighted that, once such technical regulations were agreed, the

EU and the US would thereby set high standards as a model for third countries to emulate (in

particular emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil, which had a steadily growing

impact on international trade).

The main aspects which various Parliament/Chamber viewed as key towards concluding the

negotiations were as follows:

- Lowering non-tariff barriers - the UK

House of Lords

highlighted that it would entail reductions in

costs for producers and traders, therefore increasing productivity. This would lead both to potential

investment and worker income gains. The Slovak

Národná rada

reminded that non-tariff barriers

posed a considerable additional administrative and trade burden for businesses (mainly for small

and medium-sized enterprises). The Polish

Sejm

referred particularly to sanitary and phytosanitary

(SPS) issues as significant barriers to access to the US market.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

Among the fields where regulatory cooperation was deemed to be particularly important, motor

vehicles, machinery and textiles (European Parliament IMCO Committee), the automobile sector,

the chemical and engineering sectors were mentioned (Slovak

Národná rada).

The inclusion of a separate and ambitious chapter on energy and raw materials to the current scope

of agreement was suggested by Slovak

Národná rada

with a view to removing barriers to the

importation of liquefied natural gas and oil to the EU, thus buttressing the goal of a diversification

of sources.

- Whilst supporting the need for improvement in regulatory cooperation, several

Parliaments/Chambers called for upholding high consumer protection in the EU, health, labour and

environmental protection, social rights and food safety, as well as SPS rules (German

Bundestag,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas,

Slovenian

Državni zbor,

Slovak

Národná

rada,

French

Sénat,

Latvian

Saeima,

Czech Senát, Finnish

Eduskunta

and Swedish

Riksdag).

The

French

Sénat

and Polish

Sejm

expressed concerns about the protection of intellectual property.

The European Parliament INTA Committee commented more generally that negotiations on market

access and regulatory cooperation were to be combined with the establishment of ambitious rules

and disciplines, e.g. on sustainable development, energy, SMEs, investment and intellectual

property.

iii.

Investment protection

The overall purpose in this area is to secure investment liberalisation at both federal and sub-federal

levels and potentially, to establish investment protection provisions. Investment protection and the

ISDS provisions have turned out to be among the most controversial parts of TTIP.

Various and sometimes clashing opinions on this matter were expressed by the responding

Parliaments/Chambers.

The Parliaments/Chambers in countries, where existing bilateral investment agreements with third

countries already included the provision on the ISDS, called on the Commission to carry on with

their current mandate aiming at concluding a comprehensive and ambitious agreement, including

the part on ISDS (Croatian

Hrvatski sabor,

Latvian

Saeima

and Lithuanian

Seimas).

The Lithuanian

Seimas

stressed that thorough discussions on the ISDS provisions and the establishment of

appropriate safeguards would allow for the development of a transparent and inclusive ISDS

mechanism, which would not in any way impinge upon the domains of competence of neither

national courts, nor any State's regulation rights.

The Slovak

Národná rada

saw this as an opportunity to agree on a more up-to-date and balanced

ISDS, which would replace their currently existing legislation. In their view, a new ISDS must stick

to modern standards of protection of the legitimate rights of foreign investors, accruing from their

foreign investments, and take into account the States' right to enforce regulations, especially in

areas related to public policy (e.g. human rights, environmental protection).

Another group of Parliaments/Chambers were more cautious towards including ISDS provisions in

the TTIP, or they had as of yet made no clear decision on this respect. For instance, supporters of

the TTIP in the German

Bundestag

stressed the importance of the rule of law within ISDS. The

Czech

Senát

considered it essential to prove that a potential inclusion of the ISDS into TTIP would

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

not result in a limitation of the right to regulate because of a threat of arbitrations, triggered by the

possibly negative impact of any new regulation on foreign investment projects.

The UK

House of Lords

highlighted public concerns about the risks that these provisions could pose

to the National Health Service in the UK. The French

Sénat

asked for the formulation of a

procedure upholding the sovereignty of the State in relation to investors (e.g., built on the appeal

procedure in the WTO system).

Among the potential risks stemming from the ISDS provisions, the marginalisation of national

courts in the resolution of disputes on matters of national interest was also mentioned (Portuguese

Assembleia da República,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

French

Assemblée nationale).

The European Parliament reported that no position had been taken yet on whether an ISDS

mechanism was needed or not, but an extensive debate on the subject had been carried out in the

relevant committees. The JURI committee considered ISDS as one of the key aspects of the

negotiations. The INTA committee reminded that the outcome of the public consultation had to be

taken into account to achieve investment protection and equal treatment of investors. It considered

that foreign investors should have a fair opportunity to seek redress of grievances, and domestic

investors not be discriminated against.

The Finnish

Eduskunta

identified investment protection as one of the core negotiating issues,

pointing out that it could apply in Finland only to investments made in accordance with Finnish and

EU law.

At the other end of the spectrum were those Parliaments/Chambers that advocated the removal of

ISDS provisions altogether from the scope of TTIP; for instance, opponents of TTIP in the German

Bundestag

and the Slovenian

Državni zbor.

The latter believed that current legal tools provided by

the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation gave sufficient support. The French

Assemblée nationale

expressed its opposition to any specific dispute resolution mechanism between

investors and States.

When asked specifically about the public consultation organised by the European Commission

between 27 March and 13 July 2014 on ISDS in TTIP, only two Parliaments/Chambers indicated

that they had taken part (French

Assemblée nationale

and Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas).

The UK

House of Commons

added that it had taken note of this consultation and drawn on it. Dutch

Tweede Kamer

informed that the relevant Committee debated this matter during the Dutch

Government′s

consultation and that different political parties held different views.

Section C: Transparency and access to information on ongoing EU trade negotiations

National Parliaments' and the European Parliament's right to access to information on

ongoing EU trade and investment negotiations processes

More than half of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (18 out of 35, including the European

Parliament's INTA Committee) indicated they had the right to access the information on trade and

investment negotiations, including the negotiation documents.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

According to the information provided, this was done in application of specific

constitutional/legislative/regulatory provisions (Latvian Saeima, German

Bundesrat,

French

Sénat)

and/or normal scrutiny or cooperation procedures with the Government (German

Bundestag,

Lithuanian

Seimas,

Estonian

Riigikogu,

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

Polish

Sejm,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Austrian

Nationalrat,

Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés)

upon notification and/or

request to the Governments (Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

Lithuanian

Seimas,

Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

Czech

Senát,

Belgian

Chambre des représentants).

Some Chambers mentioned that they had access only to the information made available to the

general public (Slovak

Národná rada,

Czech

Senát),

accessible on special databases (Dutch

Eerste

Kamer)

or published on the European Commission's relevant webpages (Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat,

Portuguese

Assembleia da República).

Members of the European Parliament Committee

on International Trade (INTA) had access to information on trade and investment negotiations,

including the negotiating documents as outlined in the Framework Agreement with the Commission

and in the TTIP Transparency Initiative announced by Commissioner for Trade, Ms Cecilia

MALMSTRÖM, on 25 November 2014. The German

Bundestag

explained that, in practice, it

scrutinised all proposals for negotiating mandates to be given to the European Commission. The

House of Lords

mentioned that only certain documents relating to this process (such as Draft

Council Decisions) were depositable. The members of the Committee on Industry and Trade of the

Swedish Riksdag had access to the documents that had been made available to the Members of the

European Parliament as a result of Commissioner Malmström’s openness initiative;

secrecy

regulations applied to these documents. The Latvian

Saeima

explained that until now there was no

need for its European Affairs Committee to require additional information on trade issues. It also

mentioned that, when considering Latvia’s national positions on EU matters, the Committee was

provided with access to all relevant information and that, in theory, the classification of information

could not stand in the way of the decision-makers being fully informed, and of ruling on relevant

issues. The Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés

mentioned that there was access to all public

documents of the European Commission and that the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign

Affairs had access to the Ministry's documents.

The Finnish

Eduskunta

replied that, although the possibility of requesting access to negotiation

documents existed, this was seldom used because the focus was placed on the Government’s

positions. It also mentioned that, subject to EU-imposed secrecy rules, Governments did not

normally have physical possession of EU negotiating documents, but only the ability to read them

and make notes. The Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati

replied that access to such documents had never

been requested.

The Danish

Folketing

informed that on TTIP the Government did provide the Committee with

confidential

information on the Council’s mandate to the Commission before it was published. The

Dutch

Tweede Kamer

replied that partial access was granted and that, in the case of TTIP, the

negotiating mandate was put at the disposal of the members confidentially, from the outset and long

before it was made public, which was not the case for the negotiating papers on specific issues. It

further noted a special concern regarding the negotiating papers from the US: while the US

Congress and Senate could access these

in special ‘reading rooms’ and could also find the EU

negotiating papers online, this was not the case for their EU counterparts. The French Sénat referred

to access granted to the members of its Committee on European Affairs to documents relating to the

negotiation of the most important trade agreements (with the United States, EU-Canada

Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA), the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA))

under specific rules of confidentiality governing their consultation and dissemination.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

The overwhelming majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (32 out of 37) informed that

they received information on ongoing EU trade and investment negotiations processes from their

respective Governments:

upon request (Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Slovenian

Državni

svet,

Romanian

Camera Deputaţilor,

Polish

Sejm,

Spanish

Cortes Generales, Czech Senát,

Dutch

Tweede Kamer,

Croatian

Hrvatski Sabor);

within the existing framework of exchange of documents between the Government and the

Parliament/Chamber (German

Bundesrat,

German

Bundestag,

Slovenian

Državni zbor,

Slovak

Národná rada,

Dutch

Eerste Kamer,

Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

French

Assemblée nationale,

Swedish Riksdag, Danish

Folketing,

Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat,

French

Sénat);

or both (Estonian

Riigikogu,

Lithuanian

Seimas,

House of Lords,

Finnish

Eduskunta,

Belgian

Chambre des représentants,

Italian

Senato della Repubblica,

House of Commons,

Latvian

Saeima,

Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés,

Italian

Camera dei deputati).

The Portuguese

Assembleia da República

explained that the state of play of the EU trade

agreements under negotiation was on the agenda of the hearing held with the Secretary of State for

European Affairs in the European Affairs Committee, after each European Council. It also

mentioned that its European Affairs Committee became aware of the Communication to the

Commission of 25 November 2014 concerning transparency in TTIP negotiations as part of

monitoring negotiation for this agreement.

The Irish

Houses of the Oireachtas

gave a negative reply and mentioned that it had no access to

Limité/Council working documents. The Maltese

Kamra tad-Deputati

informed that it received

such information only if it was contained in a Commission Communication.

The Danish

Folketing

answered that the oral and written information communicated by the

Government was very general and that no specific confidential insights in the negotiations process

were provided. The Belgian

Sénat,

the Romanian

Senat

and the Slovak

Národná rada

underlined

the need for more transparency. While arguing that the amount of information received from the

Government was sufficient, the latter stressed the need of granting access to negotiation documents

for the representatives of EU Member States and parliamentarians and explained that the

establishment of the 'reading rooms' on the premises of the US embassies could be only a temporary

solution.

The Polish

Senat

indicated that external policy trade negotiations fell under the Government’s

competence and that the Chamber exercised its scrutiny function at the final stage of the ratification

process; similarly, the Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon

replied that it had no role in defining the

country’s priorities for EU trade and investment negotiations with third countries, due to the clear

separation of powers according to the Cyprus Constitution, but referred to the possibility of holding

meetings on the on-going negotiations and of being informed to a certain extent by the Government.

The European Parliament's INTA Committee informed that its Chairman and the Commissioner for

Trade were in the process of agreeing on precise modalities of access arrangements to confidential

information, like in the previous legislature

. It added that the Commission was to provide broad

access to “EU Restricted” and “Limited” negotiating

documents to all Members of the European

Parliament and to certain categories of staff while ensuring the confidentiality of the information,

including taking the appropriate steps in the event of unwarranted disclosure of the documents or

Under Article 3.2 of Annex 2 of the Framework agreement relations between the European Parliament and the

European Commission

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

their content. It further mentioned that this implied extending the use of the 'reading room' and that

the access to joint EU-US texts on TTIP ("consolidated texts") was for Members of the European

Parliament with a direct "need to know" because of their specific responsibility in monitoring the

negotiations.

ii.

Scrutiny of the European Commission’s transparency initiative for TTIP negotiations

Fifteen out of 37

responding Parliaments/Chambers looked into the Commission’s transparency

initiative for TTIP negotiations launched in November 2014. It was assessed as excellent by 2

responding Parliaments/Chambers, very good by three and good by three.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

and the Czech

Senát

welcomed the transparency initiative for the

TTIP negotiations of the new European Commission, notably the de-classification of the mandate

given by the Member States to the Commission or the creation of a dedicated website. The Latvian

Saeima

also underlined that the Commission made very positive steps towards more transparency in

the TTIP negotiations, and that it was necessary to maintain the highest possible level of

transparency in those negotiations. The UK

House of Commons

underlined that the Commission’s

efforts regarding parliamentary scrutiny had, so far, centred on Members of the European

Parliament not on national parliamentarians and that the Chamber supported efforts by the UK

Government to secure equivalent access to documents for national parliamentarians while still

preserving the confidentiality of sensitive documents.

The European Parliament's INTA Committee informed that its Chairman was currently working

with the Commissioner for Trade towards the proper and efficient implementation of the

transparency initiative.

The vast majority of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (21 out of 27, and the European

Parliament's INTA Committee) affirmed that further steps towards enhancing transparency

concerning TTIP negotiations were needed. The proposed steps to achieve this goal included:

ensuring greater transparency in conducting the negotiations (German

Bundesrat,

Finnish

Eduskunta);

ensuring that negotiation meetings were opened and that more relevant documents were

released to the general public (Croatian

Hrvatski sabor);

strengthening the political dialogue with the involvement of all stakeholders (Bulgarian

Narodno sabranie);

granting parliamentarians access to negotiation documents similar to the one ensured to the

representatives of the government (Slovak

Národná rada,

French

Assemblée nationale);

increasing participation by national Parliaments in monitoring the trade agreement

negotiation process and EU investment in cross-coverage, which potentially include matters of

shared or exclusive competence of Member States (mixed agreements) (Portuguese

Assembleia da

República);

devising an effective communication strategy informing citizens on the real pros and cons of

the agreement in order to counter the myth that TTIP was the biggest threat to democracy in Europe

(Czech

Senát);

using plain language to explain the technical aspects in order to ensure better

communication with citizens (Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés);

ensuring that the Council of the EU provides the European Parliament with negotiating

directives of TTIP and other trade negotiations (European Parliament's INTA Committee);

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

the creation of a new Ministerial Advisory Board on Trade that would include a full range of

interested parties-representatives of business, trades unions, civil society groups and consumers;

publication of a series of UK explanatory notes on key aspects of the negotiations and ongoing

publication of information about progress in the negotiations (UK

House of Commons).

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

noted that more pressure had to be put on the US to release their

documents, in order to ensure an equal amount of openness on both sides in the negotiations and the

French

Sénat

also supported the need to receive more information from the US side. The Belgian

Chambre des représentants

argued that the final outcome was what mattered and that negotiations

should be preferably conducted in a discreet atmosphere, provided regular reporting on the outcome

was ensured. The Danish

Folketing

replied that further transparency had not been requested by the

parliamentary committee, but rather by several members.

The Spanish

Cortes Generales

had debated, amongst other topics referred to TTIP, the

Commission’s transparency initiative for TTIP negotiations, but so far

no official position on the

assessment of the initiative had been approved. Several respondents, among which the Dutch

Eerste

Kamer,

the Spanish

Cortes Generales,

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon,

and the Danish

Folketing,

answered that the matter had not yet been examined or that there was no official position. The

German

Bundestag

replied that there was no formal decision on that matter and that the assessment

of the initiative differed strongly between the political groups.

The UK

House of Commons’s

Scrutiny Committee reported that, given the potential scale of the

agreement and its impact on many areas of Government policy, its engagement in TTIP scrutiny

was shared by other Select Committees

—notably

the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee,

the Environmental Audit Committee and the Health Committee. It noted that TTIP was likely to be

the subject of scrutiny by the successor Committee and received assurances from the Government

that information would be made available during the weeks (or months) in the new Parliament

before a new Scrutiny Committee met, so that there was not a gap in documentation.

The Committee on European Affairs of the Slovak

Národná rada

expressed the view that a visit of

the Commissioner for Trade would contribute to a better understanding of the TTIP itself and the

positive effects it might have for EU Member States and referred to the lack of response over the

last year regarding the availability of the Commissioner to participate in such a visit. The Polish

Sejm

mentioned that its European Union Affairs Committee was in the process of appointing an

extraordinary subcommittee for the EU’s trade agreements with third countries.

The future role of Parliaments in the area of EU trade and investment policy

Several Parliaments/Chambers presented their views on the future role of Parliaments in the area of

EU trade and investment policy. The replies focused on the following points:

Involvement of national Parliaments in the debate on the negotiation mandate, with the

participation of representatives of the European Commission (French

Assemblée nationale,

Polish

Sejm;

Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon,

Latvian

Saeima);

provision of information on the progress of negotiations (Slovenian

Državni zbor

–

which

however had not held a specific discussion on this topic; Polish

Sejm,

French

Assemblée nationale)

especially by the European Commission, in more detailed and transparent way than before, during

and after concluding agreements regarding EU Trade (Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon);

greater involvement of national Parliaments in the debate on the EU trade and investment

policy (Lithuanian

Seimas,

German

Bundesrat,

Czech

Poslanecká sněmovna,

Slovak

Národná

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

rada),

particularly in the agreements considered as 'mixed agreements' that require ratification in

national Parliaments (Cyprus

Vouli ton Antiprosopon,

Danish

Folketing)

and a more important role

in defining future trade negotiations (Romanian

Senat);

stronger role of Parliaments and regular

provision of reports about the progress of negotiations and of access to documents being discussed

during negotiations (Austrian

Nationalrat

and

Bundesrat);

discussion of the policy directions and priorities of EU trade and investment policy during

COSAC meetings (Polish

Senat);

further provision of information under the current legal basis which was a far reaching one,

on EU projects, such as negotiating mandates to engage in negotiations on international agreements

of the EU and negotiations in the framework of the common commercial policy (German

Bundestag);

advisory role, facilitation of regular information exchange between relevant stakeholders,

organisation of informed and constructive debates (Croatian

Hrvatski sabor);

improvement on the Council's side when it came to transparency concerning TTIP and other

trade negotiations, for example providing the European Parliament with negotiating directives

(European Parliament's INTA Committee);

more openness and transparency during negotiation processes, as the growing interest on the

part of citizens in trade negotiations and their impact on their countries' economies was a positive

development (Latvian

Saeima);

striking the right balance between the provision of information to national Parliaments, their

involvement in the negotiation process and the necessary confidentiality of the negotiations (French

Sénat);

direct information from the European Commission to national Parliaments in the context of

political dialogue (Luxembourg

Chambre des Députés).

The European Parliament's INTA Committee stated that, as co-legislator in the field of the Common

Commercial Policy, the European Parliament took its responsibilities very seriously and was taking

a more active role also to exercise parliamentary scrutiny of the agreements, to which it had given

its consent based on the position and conditions expressed.

Several respondents expressed the opinion that the CETA and TTIP agreements should be

considered as mixed agreements, as they concerned both the competences of the Commission and

the Member States (Slovak

Národná rada,

Hungarian

Országgyűlés,

Portuguese

Assembleia da

República,

Czech

Senát,

Polish

Sejm,

German

Bundesrat

- based on deliberations to that date, as the

question had not been specifically addressed); it was argued that it was essential to share

information and link the process of negotiation with Parliaments and give them a ratification role.

The Hungarian

Országgyűlés

stressed that Vice-President

ŠEFČOVIČ's

reply to the letter addressed

to former Commissioner DE GUCHT

mentioned that the TTIP would be most probably

considered as a mixed agreement, an aspect which in its view should be considered throughout the

negotiations. The Chamber also recommended that particular attention was paid to the approval of

CETA by the Council and the European Parliament in 2015, as well as to its entry into force.

The Dutch

Tweede Kamer

contended that the discussion on whether a trade agreement was mixed

or of EU-only competence should be concluded on the basis of the negotiating mandate, at the

beginning of the negotiating process, not at the end, thus enabling national Parliaments to influence

the negotiations. It expressed its hope that the opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union

See footnote no. 53 above.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 99: COSAC-sekretariatets 23. halvårlige rapport

on the EU-Singapore deal, requested by the European Commission, would confirm this point of

view.

The Finnish

Eduskunta

stated that the Government’s negotiation positions on EU trade

and

investment policy related issues were subject to the normal parliamentary scrutiny procedures and

deemed the current position to be "close to optimal". The Latvian

Saeima

noted that the

negotiations on TTIP and their potential results might set a standard not only within the global

economy, but also in terms of how future free trade negotiations may be conducted.