Europaudvalget 2016
KOM (2016) 0134
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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 11.3.2016
SWD(2016) 57 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL
on the conservation of fishery resources and the protection of marine ecosystems
through technical measures, amending Council Regulations (EC No 1967/2006, (EC)
No1098/2007, (EC) No 1224/2009 and Regulations (EU) No 1343/2011 and (EU) No
1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Council
Regulations (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 850/98, (EC) No 2549/2000, (EC) No 254/2002,
(EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005
{COM(2016) 134 final}
{SWD(2016) 56 final}
EN
EN
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This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not
prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission
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Table of Contents
1.
2.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES .. 1
2.1. Organisation and timing .................................................................................... 1
2.2. Internal consultations ........................................................................................ 1
2.3. Regulatory Srcutiny Board ................................................................................ 2
2.4. Consultation with stakeholders ......................................................................... 3
2.5. Expert advice ..................................................................................................... 4
2.6. Other relevant studies ........................................................................................ 4
3.
POLICY CONTEXT ................................................................................................... 4
3.1. What are technical measures? ........................................................................... 4
3.2. The history of technical measures in the CFP ................................................... 5
3.3. The current governance structure of technical measures .................................. 5
3.4. Technical measures in the new CFP ................................................................. 7
3.5. The landing obligation ...................................................................................... 8
3.6. Regionalisation .................................................................................................. 9
3.7. Technical measures and other elements of the CFP ........................................ 11
4.
PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................ 12
4.1. Sub-optimal performance ................................................................................ 12
4.2. Difficult to measure effectiveness ................................................................... 15
4.3. Prescriptive and complex rules........................................................................ 16
4.4. Lack of flexibility in the management framework .......................................... 17
4.5. Insufficient involvement of key stakeholders in the decision making
process ............................................................................................................. 18
4.6. Underlying drivers of the problems ................................................................ 19
4.7. The affected stakeholders ................................................................................ 20
4.8. Evolution of the problem................................................................................. 21
4.9. Necessity and subsidiarity ............................................................................... 22
5.
OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 23
5.1. General objectives ........................................................................................... 23
5.2. Specific and operational objectives ................................................................. 23
6.
7.
CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER EU POLICIES ..................................................... 25
POLICY OPTIONS................................................................................................... 25
7.1. Selection of policy options .............................................................................. 25
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7.2. Baseline scenario ............................................................................................. 26
7.3. Option 1: Consolidation .................................................................................. 27
7.4. Option 2: Framework Approach ..................................................................... 29
7.4.1.
Sub-option 2.1 – Framework Approach without baselines ............... 31
7.5. Option 3: Elimination of technical measures .................................................. 31
7.6. Summary of policy options ............................................................................. 32
8.
ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ....................................................................................... 35
8.1. Methodology ................................................................................................... 35
8.2. Baseline scenario ............................................................................................. 36
8.2.1.
8.2.2.
8.2.3.
8.2.4.
8.2.5.
8.3.1.
8.3.2.
8.3.3.
8.3.4.
8.3.5.
8.4.1.
8.4.2.
8.4.3.
8.4.4.
8.4.5.
8.5.1.
8.5.2.
8.5.3.
8.5.4.
8.5.5.
8.6.1.
8.6.2.
8.6.3.
Economic impacts ............................................................................. 36
Social impacts.................................................................................... 38
Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 39
Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 40
Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 41
Economic impacts ............................................................................. 41
Social impacts.................................................................................... 43
Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 43
Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 45
Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 46
Economic impacts ............................................................................. 46
Social impacts.................................................................................... 48
Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 49
Simplification, Administrative Costs and Burden ............................. 49
Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 50
Economic impacts ............................................................................. 50
Social impacts.................................................................................... 51
Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 52
Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 52
Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 53
Economic impacts ............................................................................. 53
Social impacts.................................................................................... 54
Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 54
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8.3. Option 1: Consolidation .................................................................................. 41
8.4. Option 2: Framework Approach ..................................................................... 46
8.5. Sub-option 2.1: Framework approach without baselines ................................ 50
8.6. Option 3: Elimination of technical measures .................................................. 53
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8.6.4.
8.6.5.
Simplification, administrative costs and burden ............................... 54
Impacts on SMEs............................................................................... 55
8.7. Summary of impacts........................................................................................ 55
9.
COMPARING THE OPTIONS ................................................................................ 58
9.1. Qualitative assessment against the general, specific and operational
objectives ......................................................................................................... 58
9.2. Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability ................................... 61
9.3. Risk Assessment .............................................................................................. 64
10. RANKING THE OPTIONS ...................................................................................... 67
11. MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................... 67
11.1. Monitoring ....................................................................................................... 67
11.2. Evaluation........................................................................................................ 68
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 70
LIST OF ANNEXES ......................................................................................................... 75
ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION ............................................. 76
ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATIONS.................... 83
ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES ....................................................................................... 88
ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS ........ 89
ANNEX V CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL
MEASURES.............................................................................................................. 97
ANNEX VI DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNENCE STRUCTURES FOR TECHNICAL
MEASURES BY REGION ..................................................................................... 100
ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY ............ 102
ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES ................................... 105
ANNEX IX DETAILED BEAKDOWN OF CATCHING SECTOR BY MEMBER
STATE AND BY GEAR TYPE ............................................................................. 107
ANNEX X DESCRIPTION OF BASELINES AND THE CRITERIA FOR THEIR
ESTABLISHMENT ................................................................................................ 110
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Executive Summary Sheet
Impact assessment on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council for the
conservation of fishery resources and for the protection of marine organisms through technical measures
A. Need for action
Why? What is the problem being addressed?
The current technical measures regime (31 regulations) is no longer fit for achieving the sustainability objectives
of the new CFP. Specifically the current measures are:
based on negative, mostly coercive incentives in a top-down governance system creating mistrust
amongst stakeholders as measures are seen as inequitable, leading to non-compliance
;
impossible to measure their impact on the achievement of the conservation objectives of the CFP;
numerous and overly complex making compliance and control more difficult;
controlling too many aspects of fishing operations undermining the sector's confidence in the measures;
providing little incentive to fish selectively where there is no cost to discarding, or of catching vulnerable
species or impacting adversely on the seabed; and
sub-optimal in respect of achieving broader environmental and ecological policy objectives
The catching sector
(
around 82,000 vessels, employing 98,500 FTE
)
is most affected
.
What is this initiative expected to achieve?
This initiative aims to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Optimise the contribution of technical measures to achieving the key objectives of the new CFP that
came into force on 1 January 2014.
Create the flexibility required to adjust technical measures by facilitating regionalised approaches
(consistent with the objectives in EU law).
Simplify the current rules in line with Commission's REFIT programme. The current rules are overly
complex and difficult to enforce, and simplification will lead to reductions in administrative costs and
burden. It also addresses the need for simplification of technical measures outlined in an earlier
Commission Communication on the implementation of the CFP.
What is the value added of action at the EU level?
Provisions in the proposal relating to the conservation of marine biological resources falls under the exclusive
competence of the EU according to Article 3(1d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Therefore, the subsidiarity principle does not apply for those provisions. However, at the heart of this proposal is
the concept of regionalisation whereby Member States should cooperate regionally to develop and implement
conservation measures.
B. Solutions
What legislative and non-legislative policy options have been considered? Is there a preferred
choice or not? Why?
The baseline scenario maintains the existing set of 31 Regulations.
Option 1: Consolidation – A new regulation with a limited scope which would bring together and consolidate in
one Regulation for common rules with regionally specific rules remaining in the existing regulations.
Regionalisation would happen if and where the Member States submit joint recommendations for multiannual
plans.
Option 2: Framework – A framework regulation containing general provisions and corresponding standards;
common rules and technical provisions; and baseline standards by region corresponding to identified results
which would function as a default measures in the context of regionalisation. The baselines and default technical
measures that correspond to the objectives would be applicable unless and until regionalised measures are
designed and introduced into Union law. A sub-option (2.1) is a framework regulation without defined baselines.
Option 3: Elimination of existing rules – Repeal of the majority of the existing regulations (except for essential
nature conservation measures). Any necessary technical measures in the longer term would be developed
regionally under multiannual plans. This option assumes that the landing obligation is a result-driven measure in
itself and will lead to clean fisheries.
Option 2 best meets the objectives set and provides a level of security that conservation objectives will continue
to be met while regionalisation develops.
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Who supports which option?
Retaining the baseline scenario was not considered an acceptable option by any of the stakeholders
Option 1 received very little support from any of the key stakeholders.
Option 2 was supported by some of the catching sector, Member States and NGOs. They were divergent views
in the content of the framework amongst stakeholders. The catching sector argued for a framework without
baselines (sub-option 2.1) but Member States, NGOs and some of the Advisory Councils argued against this.
Option 3 was favoured by certain sections of the catching sector but was rejected by Member States, NGOs and
other parts of the catching sector who considered it a high-risk strategy.
C. Impacts of the preferred option
What are the benefits of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)?
The economic impacts would be positive as the framework approach would drive regionalisation, leading to the
delivery of MSY for all stocks and reductions in unwanted catches. This would lead to increased fishing
opportunities and increase revenues from landing bigger more valuable fish (estimated at 10-40%). This would
steadily improve over time.
Employment levels should stabilise quickly under this option and there is potential for increased employment.
Once MSY levels are achieved, fishing opportunities will increase (by at least 20% by 2020). Such a significant
increase has a potential to create new jobs in the catching sector. Fishing on sustainable stocks would also
increase income and wages and therefore job attractiveness. Average wages will nearly double as a result of
fishing sustainably.
Environmental impacts would be positive. The framework would manage the transition to regionalisation and
ensure that the environmental sustainability objectives of the CFP are not jeopardised. In the longer-term there
would be positive benefits to fish stocks and better protection for sensitive species and habitats.
What are the costs of the preferred option (if any, otherwise main ones)?
There will be some costs associated with the move to regionalisation for Member States and the Advisory
Councils as key stakeholders as described below. Any other costs would be eligible for financing under the
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).
How will businesses, SMEs and micro-enterprises be affected?
Administrative costs and burden would be reduced in that there would be immediate simplification of the current
regulations and a greater role for the catching sector through the Advisory Councils in the development of
technical measures. In addition the potential move to a results-based system in the longer-term would lead to
further simplification of the technical rules but implies a shift in the burden of proof onto the catching sector.
Will there be significant impacts on national budgets and administrations?
The move to regionalisation will lead to increased costs for national administrations (estimated at €80,000-
120,000) for the development of a single multiannual plan. Not all of these costs are directly associated with
technical measures which form only part of such plans. These costs would be largely front-loaded during the
development of these plans. In the short-term costs for control will reduce as a result of simplification although
there will be some extra costs for implementation of the landing obligation. In the longer-term control costs
should diminish considerably particularly if regions move towards results-based management where the need for
enforcing prescriptive rules at sea diminishes
.
Currently costs for enforcing technical measures at sea are very
high.
Will there be other significant impacts?
The approach simplifies the structure: One regulation will replace 6 Regulations, partially replace 3 Regulations
and repeal 10 Commission Regulations. It provides a direct route to regionalisation in line with the CFP
.
D. Follow up
When will the policy be reviewed?
An ex-post evaluation should be carried out before 2022 when the landing obligation should be fully operational,
MSY achieved for all stocks and Good Environmental Status achieved for marine ecosystems. This evaluation
would directly feed into the retrospective evaluation of the CFP scheduled to begin in 2022.
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GLOSSARY
Acoustic
(ADD)
Deterrent
Device
Devices to make species such as marine mammals aware and warn them
from fishing gears
The Advisory Councils were established under the CFP to promote a
balanced representation of all stakeholders and to contribute to the
achievement of the objectives of the CFP.
Biomass refers to the size of the stock in unit of weight. Often, biomass
refers to only one part of the stock (e.g. spawning biomass, recruited
biomass or vulnerable biomass, the latter two of which are essentially
equivalent).
The part of a trawl net where the catch is retained.
Descriptive of a fish which lives at or near the bottom of the water
column, e.g. cod or haddock.
Unwanted catches returned to the sea as a result of fishing operations.
How fishing pressure is distributed across the age profile of a stock
An expression of the rate at which fish are removed from the stock from
fishing operations (including fish subsequently discarded). It is
approximately the stock annual removal expressed in percentage.
Fishing opportunities or Total allowable catches (TACs), are catch limits
(expressed in tonnes or numbers) that are set for most commercial fish
stocks. The Commission prepares the proposals, based on scientific
advice on the stock status from advisory bodies such as ICES and
STECF.
A biological reference point. It is the fishing mortality rate that, if
applied constantly, would result in an average catch corresponding to the
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and an average biomass
corresponding to B
MSY
.
The environmental status of marine waters where these provide
ecologically diverse and dynamic oceans and seas which are clean,
healthy and productive
Fish species or stocks that carry out extensive migrations and can occur
in both EEZs and high seas. (e.g. tuna and tuna-like species, marlins and
swordfish)
A joint deployment plan (JDP) is a plan for coordinated joint
deployment of national means (inspection vessels, surveillance aircraft,
mobile mixed inspection teams, etc.) to monitor and inspect fishing
activities that fall under the rules of the CFP. The JDP gives effect to a
specific control and inspection programme which sets out the objectives,
priorities and benchmarks for control and inspection by Member States.
Theoretically the largest yield (or catch) that can be taken from a
species' stock over an indefinite period. It is the maximum use that a
renewable resource can sustain without impairing its renewability
through natural growth and reproduction.
Mesh size of a towed net refers to the mesh size of any codend or on
board a fishing vessel and attached to or suitable for attachment to any
towed net.
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Advisory Council
Biomass
Codend
Demersal
Discards
Exploitation pattern
Fishing mortality (F)
Fishing Opportunities
F
MSY
Good Environmental Status
(GES)
Highly migratory species
Joint Deployment Plan (JDP)
Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY)
Mesh size
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Minimum conservation
reference size (mcrs)
The size of a living marine aquatic species taking into account maturity,
as established by Union law, below which restrictions or incentives
apply that aim to avoid capture through fishing activity; such size
replaces, where relevant, the minimum landing size
The size of a marine organism below which, if caught must be returned
to the sea.
A network of nature protection areas in the territory of the European
Union. It is made up of Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) and
Special Protection Areas (SPAs) designated respectively under the
Habitats Directive and Birds Directive
In relation to fish, the term 'pelagic' refers to fish which live in the upper
layers of the water column, e.g. herring, sprat and mackerel.
The number of new fish added to the exploitable portion of the stock
resulting from growth of juvenile fish into adults, or migration of
smaller fish.
The process by which the Member States with direct interest for
fisheries of a given geographical region organize themselves with the
aim to agree on common management measures. The agreed measures
as joined recommendation are submitted to the Commission and after
scientific assessment adopted as Commission delegated acts.
An electronic system, that remotely monitors fishing vessels' catches
through a system of sensors and CCTV cameras
Refers to a fishing method's ability to target and capture organisms by
size and species during the fishing operation allowing non-targets to be
avoided or released unharmed.
Gear modifications or devices fitted which allow the escape of unwanted
catches by species (i.e. species selectivity) or by size (i.e. size
selectivity).
Numbers (weights) of individual fish which are old enough to
reproduce. This generally corresponds to the minimum landing size and
so defines the 'fishable' population.
The population of a given species that forms a reproductive unit and
spawns little if at all with other units. The “total stock” refers to both
juveniles and adults while “spawning stock” refers to the adult
population (see above).
Total allowable catch; the maximum biomass of fish that can be caught
from a given stock in a given year.
Measures that regulates the composition of catches by species and size
and the impacts on components of the ecosystems resulting from fishing
activities by establishing conditions for the use and structure of fishing
gear and restrictions on access to fishing areas.
Minimum landing size
Natura 2000
Pelagic
Recruitment
Regionalisation
Remote Electronic Monitoring
(REM)
Selective fishing
Selectivity devices
Spawning Stock Biomass
Stock
TAC
Technical measures
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AC
ADD
BSAC
CC
Advisory Council
Acoustic Deterrent Devices
Baltic Sea Advisory Council
Catch Composition
CCALMR Convention on Conservation on Antarctic Living Marine Resources
CCTV
CFA
CFP
CQM
DCF
EAPO
EESC
EFCA
EFF
EMFF
EP
ER
EWG
FMC
F
msy
FTE
GES
GVA
IA
ICCAT
ICES
JDP
LIFE
MCRS
MLS
MPA
MS
MSFD
Closed-circuit television
Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture
Common Fisheries Policy
Catch Quota Management
Data Collection Framework
European Association of Producer Organisatins
The European Economic and Social Committee
European Fisheries Control Agency
European Fisheries Fund
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
Exploitation Pattern
Exploitation rate
Expert Working Group
Fishery Monitoring Centre
Fishing mortality that produces MSY
Full-time Equivalents
Good Environmental Status
Gross Value Added
Impact Assessment
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
Joint Deployment Plan
Low Impact Fishers of Europe
Minimum Conservation Reference Size
Minimum Landing Size
Marine Protected Area
Member States
Marine Strategy Framework Directive
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MSY
NAFO
NEAFC
NUTFA
NWWAC
NSAC
PO
RBM
REFIT
REM
RFMO
SAC
SME
SSB
STECF
SWFPA
TAC
TFEU
VMS
Maximum Sustainable Yield
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission
New Under Ten Fishermen's Association
North Western Waters Advisory Council
North Sea Advisory Council
Producer Organisation
Results-based Management
Vessel Monistoring Systems
Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme
Remote Electronic Monitoring
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations
Special Area of Conservation
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Spawning Stock Biomass
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
Scottish Whitefish Producers Association
Total Allowable Catch
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Vessel Monitoring System
Fishery Monitroign Centres
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Lead DG: DG MARE
Other departments involved:
SG, SJ, DG ENV, DG EMPL, DG FISMA, DG SANTE, DG
RTD.
Agenda planning/WP reference:
2013/MARE/002
1.
I
NTRODUCTION
This impact assessment (IA) concerns a proposal to simplify and modernise in light of the
new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP
1
) a set of 31 regulations containing technical measures
(such as minimum mesh sizes, closed areas and minimum landing sizes) that define where,
when and how individual fishing operators can exploit and interact with marine resources and
the wider marine ecosystem.
This initiative aims to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Optimise the contribution of technical measures to achieving the key objectives of the
new CFP that came into force on 1 January 2014.
Create the flexibility required to adjust technical measures by facilitating regionalised
approaches (consistent with the objectives in EU law).
Simplify the current rules in line with Commission's REFIT programme
2
. The current
rules are overly complex and difficult to enforce, and simplification will lead to
reductions in administrative costs and burden. It also addresses the need for
simplification of technical measures outlined in an earlier Commission
Communication on the implementation of the CFP
3
.
P
ROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Organisation and timing
2.
2.1.
The proposal for a new technical measures regulation is provided for in ‘Agenda Planning’
(2013/MARE/002), in the 2011 Management Plan of the Directorate-General for Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE). It has been included since 2012 in the Commission Work
Programme (CWP) as a policy output under the activity "Conservation,
management and
exploitation of living aquatic resources",
as well as, since 2013, in the Commission's REFIT
programme
4
.
This IA has progressed in several steps following adoption by the Commission of the proposal
for the new CFP "Basic Regulation"
5
in mid-2011. As a first step, an internal DG MARE
Working Group made up of the relevant units was set up in July 2011 to carry out initial
scoping work.
In December 2012, an evaluation of technical measures
6
was externally contracted to a
consortium led by the consultancy firm MRAG. This study consisted of a retrospective
evaluation of the existing technical measures regulations in place in terms of their relevance,
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptance. During the course of this evaluation
extensive consultations were held with representatives of the fishing industry, national
administrations and the research agencies of seven Member States
7
. This was completed in
June 2013
8
. It was followed by a prospective evaluation of the likely economic, social and
environmental impacts as well as the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability of
different defined policy options. This study was completed in July 2014
8
.
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2.2.
Internal consultations
An Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) was formed in January 2013, which in
addition to DG MARE comprised of representatives from seven other Directorates-Generals
(DG) and services - Secretariat General (SG), the Legal Services (SJ), DG Environment (DG
ENV), DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL), DG Health & Food Safety
(DG SANTE), DG Research & Innovation (DG RTD) and DG Financial Stability, Financial
Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA). The IASG met on five occasions - 14
February 2013, 9 July 2013, 10 January 2014, 28 February 2014 and 15 April 2015 and
worked to finalise a draft of the IA by written consultation following the last meeting.
Between these meetings regular contact was maintained with the members of the IASG.
2.3.
Regulatory Srcutiny Board
The impact assessment report has been revised considerably following the opinion received
from the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 19 June 2015. This opinion listed three main
recommendations for improvement:
(1)
The scope of the initiative: The policy context section has been redrafted to provide
more detail on the governance structure of the current technical measures regulations
as well as providing more detail on what has been decided in the CFP. A section on
how regionalisation would work in practice and in particular the role of stakeholders
in the process has also been added. Additional information has been provided in
annexes (Annexes IV, V, VI and VII) to support this section of the report.
Content of the technical measures proposed: The policy options section has been re-
drafted to provide more detail on the different measures and structures that would be
included under the different options. A table clarifying the difference between
common and regional measures has been added. An annex (Annex X) describing the
criteria for developing the baseline standards has also been included. A sub-option has
been added to option 2 in line with the comments received from the stakeholders
during the public consultation. This sub-option comprises a framework without
baseline standards included. Further sub-options with different levels of baseline
standards have not been considered as technical measures such as mesh sizes, closed
and minimum sizes cannot be considered in isolation. In the context of regionalisation
more detail on what incentives are foreseen to encourage compliance with the rules
and ensure a level playing field have been included in the policy options section and
also discussed further in section 8.2. Detail of how the framework would be monitored
is included under section 10.
The effectiveness of the options: The impacts section has been enhanced with
additional examples illustrating the likely impacts. However, this remains very much a
qualitative analysis. Section 9 comparing the options has been expanded to provide a
more detailed description of the effectiveness of the options and sub-option and how
they will tackle the sub-optimal performance of the current regulations. The table
providing a qualitative assessment against the general, specific and operational
objectives of each option has been revised to better explain the scoring for each option.
The issue of uneven implementation or creation of an uneven playing field is
addressed in section 8.3.
(2)
(3)
In addition to these points the objectives of the initiative have been revised to link better with
the options and identified problems. A section assessing the likely impacts of the different
options on the competitiveness of the catching sector has been added. The problem definition
has been re-structured and the examples put into boxes as suggested. The examples in the
impacts section have similarly been moved into boxes to improve readability. A glossary of
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technical terms has also been added. The executive summary and executive summary sheet
have been redrafted in line with the changes made to the new report.
On the basis of the second opinion received on the 30 October 2015 on a revised IA, several
additional elements have been included to improve clarity. These relate to three aspects as
follows:
(1)
Content of the options: The options have been re-drafted in line with the comments of
the RSB to avoid inconsistencies. A summary table has been added at the end of
Section7 which summarises the main elements of the different options and sub-option
and illustrates the differences between them in terms of content, structure, mechanisms
for regionalisation and also the level of simplification introduced by each option and
sub-option. Reference to measureable targets that will act as success indicators has
been added into Section 7 for the different options (Options 1 and 2 and sub-option 2.1
would contain such targets). Additional clarifications have been added to sections 9.2
and 9.3 on the incentives that are foreseen under the preferred option to encourage
compliance and also on the positives and negatives that would ensue in the event of
uneven implementation across regions.
Assessment of impacts: The analysis of impacts section (Section 8) has been screened
and for the preferred option a justification for why there would be rapid improvements
in the economic, social and environmental impacts compared to the baseline scenario.
It is also highlighted that the positive benefits predicted will be dependent on the speed
of regionalisation. There is likely to be period of adjustment to the new governance
structure introduced by the framework regulation where economic impacts would be
similar to the baseline scenario. After this transitional period regionalisation of
technical measures should be accelerated provided Member States pro-actively
embrace the regioanlisation process.
Effectiveness of the options: In section 9, clarification is provided to explain how
regionalisation will tackle the problems of poor effectiveness of the current technical
measures. It is also clarifies that even if regionalisation is a slow process, the
simplification introduced throughout the framework approach in the preferred option.
There will be immediate benefits to the catching sector in complying with the
technical rules remaining in place pending regionalisation and for Member States in
controlling and monitoring compliance with these rules. In section 11 more detail on
the operational monitoring arrangements to assess the effectiveness of the new
framework has been provided.
(2)
(3)
In addition the IA has been checked for inconsistencies and grammatical errors. The
Executive summary has also been revised in line with the changes detailed above.
2.4.
Consultation with stakeholders
A 12-week internet-based public consultation was launched from January to May 2014
9
. A
total of 59 detailed contributions were received from fifteen Member States, five of the seven
Advisory Councils (ACs), the main industry representative organisations (covering more than
80% of the catching sector), eleven of the main NGOs dealing with fisheries issues, consumer
protection groups and the general public. The contributions received have been published
11
.
Annex I contains a summary of the findings from this consultation. The stakeholders' views
are reflected throughout this report but the main conclusions were as follows:
(1)
(2)
Any new technical measures regulation(s) should move away from micromanagement
towards a results-based management approach.
Fishermen should become more accountable for what they catch rather than the
construction and operation of the fishing gears they deploy.
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(3)
Simplification of the rules is a fundamental objective but simplification should not
create inequalities in the management systems across Member States (“maintaining a
level playing field”).
Regionalisation is seen as an important opportunity to introduce simplification of
technical measures regulations.
A framework approach is preferred. This should contain overarching objectives and
minimum common standards to be applied across the EU. It should also contain
safeguards to ensure action can be taken if problems in fisheries emerge.
Improvements in selectivity have been achieved in the past when incentive structures
have been aligned with management objectives. Such structures need to be built-in to
any new regulatory framework for techncial measures.
(4)
(5)
(6)
Apaprt from the public consultation, numerous workshops, consultations and meetings were
held during the period from 2011 to early 2015 with the key stakeholders (i.e. Member States,
European Parliament, Advisory Councils, the catching sector and NGOs). A full list of these
meetings is provided in Annex II. The combination of the public consultation and the
extensive follow-up dialogue with the key stakeholders (i.e. the catching sector, NGOs and
Member States) have ensured that the views expressed fully represent the different
stakeholder groups.
2.5.
Expert advice
Two meetings of an Expert Working Group (EWG) of the Scientific, Technical and Economic
Committee for Fisheries (STECF) were convened in October 2012
11
and March 2013
12
. These
meetings explored the potential of technical measures as a management tool in the context of
the reform of the CFP. The findings of these reports helped to define the options that were
considered in the perspective evaluation carried out by the external consultants to support this
IA. In addition to these meetings, several ad hoc requests were made to STECF and also the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) on specifc issues relating to:
– Fishing gear selectivity
13
– Replacing mesh size and catch composition rules
14
– Bycatch of marine mammals and other protected species
15&16
– Existing closed and restricted areas
17
2.6.
Other relevant studies
The findings from impact assessments carried out to support a previous revision of technical
measures in 2008
18
(this proposal was subsequently withdrawn) and the CFP
19
have provided
information for the preparation of this IA. In addition a number of externally contracted
studies and several studies undertaken on behalf of the European Parliament have also
provided background material on specific issues. These are listed in Annex III.
3.
3.1.
P
OLICY
C
ONTEXT
What are technical measures?
Technical measures are rules governing how and where fishermen may fish. They aim to
control the catch that can be taken with a given amount of fishing effort and also to minimise
the impacts of fishing on the ecosystem. They form an integral part of most fishery
management systems including the CFP.
Technical measures can be grouped into:
4
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– measures that regulate the operation of the gear (e.g. prohibitions of certain gear
types, maximum limits on how long or what type of gear can be deployed);
– measures that regulate the design characteristics of the gears that are deployed (e.g.
mesh size and catch composition rules);
– minimum landing sizes below which fish must be returned to the sea (e.g. for cod the
minimum landing size is set at 35cm);
– measures that set spatial and temporal controls (e.g. closed/limited entry areas and
seasonal closures) to protect aggregations of juvenile or spawning fish; and
– measures that mitigate the impacts of fishing gears on sensitive species (e.g.
cetaceans, seabirds or sea turtles) or closed areas to protect sensitive habitats (e.g.
coldwater coral reefs) referred to hereafter as "nature conservation measures".
3.2.
The history of technical measures in the CFP
The history of technical measures applying in European fisheries legislation within the
framework of the CFP is one of numerous regulations, amendments, implementing rules and
temporary technical measures introduced as stop-gaps to resolve emerging problems. Since
1980, no less than 90 different technical measures regulations or regulations containing
technical measures have been enacted by the EU across the different sea basins and in non-EU
waters
11
. Figure 3.2.1 shows the progression of these regulations over time. A full list of
regulations enacted since 1980 is provided in Annex IV.
Figure 3.2.1: Cumulative number of technical measures regulations introduced since 1980
(Source: STECF 2012a page 18)
3.3.
The current governance structure of technical measures
The regulatory structure of technical measures has become highly complex and somewhat dis-
jointed. Across all EU sea basins and non-EU waters in which Union vessels operate there are
31 regulations which contain technical measures. Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the regulatory
structure in place. Annex V provides more detailed information on the scope and content of
these different regulations while Annex VI illustrates the governance structure across sea
basins.
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NE Atlantic, Black Sea &
Outermost Regions
International Regulations
containing Technical
Measures
Regs: 600/2004, 520/2007,
734/2008, 302/2009
Reg: 850/98 & Supporting Regs:
3440/86, 517/2008, 1922/1999,
494/202, 254/2002, 2056/2001,
2549/2000, 2602/2001, 727/2012
Mediterranean
Regs: 1967/2006, 1343/2011 &
National Management Plans
CFP
Indepedent Regulations
containing Technical
Measures
Regs: 2347/2002, 724/2010,
894/97, 1185/2003, 812/2004,
1434/98, 1224/2009,
1954/2003
Annual Fishing Opportunities
for NE Atlantic, Baltic Sea,
Black Sea, Deep sea species
Baltic Sea
Reg: 2187/2005 & Supporting
Regs: 1098/2007, 636/2010
Figure 3.3.1: Current Regulatory Structure for Technical Measures
(Source: Author)
Within this complex structure, there are three detailed technical measures regulations enacted
under the ordinary legislative procedure covering the main sea basins as follows:
Regulation (EC) No 850/98
20
covering the North-eastern Atlantic including the North
Sea, Skagerrak and Kattegat; the outermost regions (e.g. Guyana, Martinique and
Réunion) and the Black Sea (since 2013);
Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006
21
covering the Mediterranean; and
Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005
22
covering the Baltic Sea.
These regulations contain a mixture of common rules applying across sea basins which
mainly relate to the operation of fishing gears and regionally specific rules that regulate the
design characteristics of the gears used (e.g. mesh sizes), set minimum landing sizes and
establish closed or restricted areas to protect juvenile and spawning aggregations of fish
species. They also contain limited nature conservation measures which tend to be regionally
specific although similar mitigation measures apply across sea basins in some cases.
Each of these regulations contained limited empowerments to allow the adoption of detailed
rules relating to specific gears types or gear construction or relating to specific area closures.
In addition Regulation (EC) 850/98 contains a specific empowerment for the Commission
(Article 45) to adopt technical measures in cases where the conservation of specific stocks
calls for immediate action (e.g. Regulation (EC) 2056/2001
23
which sets out emergency
measures to protect cod in the North Sea).
The regulations in the Northeast Atlantic and Baltic also allow for Member States to
implement technical measures applying to their own vessels under national law provided such
6
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measures are more stringent than Union law. Member States have tended to use this
empowerment to introduce technical measures into fisheries for shellfish (e.g. minimum sizes
for crab, clam and lobster) inside their own territorial waters. However, there are examples of
Member States introducing measures applying to their own vessels in fisheries outside their
own territorial waters in response to specific stock conservation problems (e.g. Denmark have
introduced a requirement for Danish vessels to use sorting grids in the industrial fishery for
Norway Pout in the North Sea).
Specific to the Mediterranean, there are provisions allowing for the development of national
management plans adopted under national law (Article 19). In most cases these national plans
contain technical measures for certain fisheries and/or gears as well as rules for the protection
of sensitive habitats and sensitive species. To date
28 such national management plans
involving fisheries with trawl nets, purse seines and other type of surrounding nets, and boat
seines have been adopted by Member States
24
. There is also an empowerment to allow
the
Council to adopt management plans for specific Mediterranean fisheries, in particular, in
areas totally or partially beyond the territorial waters of Member States. They can include
specific technical measures, including where appropriate temporary derogations to the
common rules. No such plans have been adopted into Union law to date.
Additional flexibility for amending technical measures or introducing new measures was
afforded in the past through the Fishing Opportunities Regulations setting annual TACs and
quotas in the Northeast Atlantic, Baltic, Black Sea and for deepsea species. These were a
mixture of supposedly temporary technical measures with a mixture of regionally specific
measures and derogations from general provisions contained in other regulations. Following
the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
25
such
measures could no longer be included in the Fishing Opportunities Regulation except for
those measures with a direct functional link to the catch limits of a particular stock or stocks.
Therefore only a limited number of such measures are now contained in the Fishing
Opportunities Regulations. For example there is a closed area off the west coast of Ireland to
protect Norway lobster (Nephrops
norvegicus)
relating to the TAC for this species in this
area
26
.
There are several co-decided regulations that transpose technical measures agreed for third-
country waters covered under Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) such
as the Convention on Conservation on Antarctic Living Marine Resources (CCALMR) and
the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Measures
emanating from other RFMOS such as the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission
(NEAFC), Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) are also still included in the
Fishing Opportunities Regulation for the North-east Atlantic as temporary measures.
3.4.
Technical measures in the new CFP
Technical measures are considered an integral part of the new CFP. The CFP aims to ensure
that fishing and aquaculture are environmentally, economically and socially sustainable and
provide a source of healthy food for EU citizens. Its goal is to foster a dynamic fishing
industry and ensure a fair standard of living for fishing communities. Annex VII presents the
main elements of the CFP in more detail.
The CFP has three key objectives:
– Exploitation of living marine biological resources restores and maintains populations
of harvested species above levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) for all stocks by 2015 and by 2020 at the latest (Article 2.2).
– The gradual elimination of discards on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the best
available scientific advice, by reducing unwanted catches and gradually ensuring that
catches are landed (Article 2.5(a)).
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– Coherence with Union environmental legislation, in particular the objective of
achieving a good environmental status (GES) by 2020 under the Marine Strategy
Framework Directive (MSFD
27
), as well as with other Union policies
28&29
(Article
2.5(g)).
Technical measures as tools to contribute to achieving the main objectives CFP have an
important and significant role in attaining each of these objectives as follows:
The
attainment of MSY
will be facilitated by the application of
technical measures
which regulate
exploitation pattern
(i.e. how fishing pressure is distributed across the
age profile of a stock). Obtaining MSY from a given stock will require that the
exploitation pattern avoids fishing on younger age groups. To achieve this will require
a combination of effective technical measures (i.e. measures that regulate the
operation and design of the gear, minimum conservation reference sizes (mcrs) and
spatial/temporal closures).
The
gradual elimination of discards and minimisation of unwanted catches
will
require the application of technical
(gear
operation and design) as well as tactical
changes (closed or restricted areas) to drive increased selectivity and avoidance of
unwanted catches (i.e. fish below mcrs). The landing obligation (see section 3.5)
introduced to achieve this objective will require a rethink on the current governance
structure of
technical measures
to allow for more flexibility to achieve this goal.
Ensuring fishing activities are consistent with wider ecological considerations will
depend on the application of
technical measures that minimise the impacts of
fishing gears on the ecosystem
(e.g. mitigation measures or closed areas).
Specifically technical measures can contribute to the attainment of Good
Environmental Status (GES) with respect to 4 out of the 11 descriptors included under
the MSFD - Biological diversity (Descriptor 1); Maintaining exploited populations
within safe biological limits and with a healthy age-distribution (Descriptor 3);
Maintaining all elements of marine food webs at normal abundance (Descriptor 4);
and Maintaining sea-floor integrity (Descriptor 6).
The CFP "Basic Regulation" outlines a range of measures for the conservation and sustainable
exploitation of marine biological resources which include technical measures (Article 7). The
types of measures available are listed. Specific reference is made to fish stock recovery areas
to protect juveniles or spawning aggregations (Article 8) and to minimum conservation
reference sizes (mcrs) that replace minimum landing sizes (Article 15) in the context of
regionalisation (as described in the following section).
The new CFP also acknowledges the contribution technical measures can make to sustainable
fishing. Article 17
30
provides the opportunity for Member States to incentivise the use of
selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact through
the allocation of increased fishing opportunities. This is the first time that a direct link
between "responsible" fishing and fishing opportunities has been included in the CFP.
3.5.
The landing obligation
The new CFP includes a new approach to solve the long-standing problems of overfishing and
discarding, through an obligation to land all catches. This "landing obligation", which
constitutes a ban on discarding, applies to all catches of species subject to catch limits (TACs)
and, in the Mediterranean, also catches of species which are subject to minimum sizes (only
blue-fin tuna is under TAC in this sea basin). It is to be introduced gradually over the period
2015 and 2019 and follow a fishery based approach. It is designed to trigger behavioural
change and encourage fishermen to improve selectivity voluntarily to avoid catching small,
low value fish that will now have to be landed and counted against quotas. The landing
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obligation aims to trigger innovation in fishing gears, techniques and strategies, linking it
directly with technical measures.
In addition to improvements in selectivity anticipated, the landing obligation comes with a set
of potential exemptions and flexibility instruments to make the transition to, and timely
implementation of, the landing obligation possible. These include quota flexibilities,
exemptions for species that have a high survival rate and a de minimis exemption to cater for
residual unwanted catches that are unavoidable and cannot be eliminated through improved
selectivity.
3.6.
Regionalisation
The concept of regionalisation
The new CFP promotes
regionalisation
as a new governance approach. It represents a
fundamental shift in the governance structure of fisheries policy. It moves away from
centralised micro-management to regionalised decision-making with direct involvement of
stakeholders in developing specific conservation measures, tailored to the specificities of the
fisheries in a region. Regionalisation provides an opportunity to utilise technical measures
much more
as a driver for the achievement of sustainable fisheries rather than simply as
restrictive and coercive
measures complementing TAC and quota and effort restrictions.
However, regionalisation is an option that Member States can choose to use rather than an
obligation.
The regionalisation process and role of stakeholders
Article 18 of the CFP "Basic Regulation" describes the process of
regionalisation.
It allows
groups of Member States from the sea basin concerned to formulate “joint
recommendations”.
These joint recommendations can contain technical measures, specific measures to implement
the landing obligation allowed for in the CFP, as well as the establishment of nature
conservation measures within Natura 2000 sites. Provided such measures are consistent with
the objectives of the CFP, the Commission can transpose these joint recommendations into
Union law through
delegated or implementing acts.
The CFP recognises the
Advisory Councils
(AC) as the key stakeholder representative groups
in the context of regionalisation. It contains an obligation for Member States to consult the
AC on joint recommendations and for the advice of the AC to "be
taken into account"
in
formulating regionalised measures
31
. Other stakeholders such as individual industry
representative groups or NGOs do not have any formal role in regionalisation as the ACs are
considered representative of these groups although they may be consulted informally by
Member States in developing measures or assist the ACs in formulating their advice.
The main tools for regionalisation
The main tools for regionalisation are
multiannual management plans.
These plans aim to
establish a framework for the sustainable exploitation of stocks or combinations of stocks and
marine ecosystems concerned. Multiannual plans are established as separate co-decided
regulations containing the objectives, quantifiable targets, clear time-frames to reach the
quantifiable targets and safeguards to ensure that quantifiable targets are met. Within these
plans, it is possible to include an empowerment for the Commission to adopt specific
technical measures
to facilitate the implementation of the plan by means of a
delegated/implementing act.
These technical measures are agreed as joint recommendations.
The scope of what technical measures can be included is not defined so potentially any
combination of measures deemed necessary for the implementation of the plan can be
included.
Since the inception of the CFP the Commission has come forward with one proposal for a
multiannual plan for fisheries in the Baltic Sea
32
and intends to adopt further proposal for
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multiannual plans for demersal fisheries in the North Sea and Northeast Atlantic and pelagic
fisheries in the Mediterranean during 2015 and 2016.
As a temporary measure in the absence of a multiannual plan, Member States may also
choose to develop
discard plans
for the implementation of the landing obligation under
regionalisation. These plans are limited in duration to 3 years and are implemented through a
Commission Delegated act. Within discard plans technical measures that are specifically
required to implement the landing obligation can be included. Principally these are
derogations to existing measures that regulate the design and characteristics of fishing gears,
minimum conservation reference sizes (that replace minimum landing sizes) and closed areas
to protect juveniles or spawning grounds. Discard plans have been enacted for fisheries for
pelagic species and for most fisheries in the Baltic Sea at the beginning of 2015 to implement
the first timeline of the landing obligation
33
. However, these plans have contained only
limited technical measures.
Regionalisation of
nature conservation measures
necessary for compliance with obligations
under Union environmental legislation (e.g. MSFD, Habitats and Birds Directives) is also
envisaged under Article 11 of the CFP. These Directives impose certain legal obligations on
Member States as regards Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) and Marine Protected Areas
(MPAs) where specific technical measures may be needed. Such measures can be developed
by way of joint recommendations agreed regionally by Member States and enacted into
legislation through a delegated act. Principally these are closed or restricted areas where the
use of certain fishing gears is restricted. The first of these delegated acts was recently adopted
for several areas in the Baltic and Kattegat
34
.
Figure 3.6.1 summarises the options for regionalising technical measures under the new CFP.
As a safeguard measure, in all cases where MS cannot agree on joint recommendations or the
joint recommendations are incompatible with the objectives of the CFP, the Commission can
step-in and propose measures under ordinary legislative procedure. Further safeguards to
avoid the collapse of fisheries are provided in the CFP under Article 12 and Article 13 which
allow the Commission or Member States respectively to adopt emergency measures on the
basis of evidence of a serious threat to conservation of a stock or to the marine ecosystem
from fishing which requires immediate action to alleviate the threat. Such measures can
include technical measures (e.g. closure of a specific area) but they are strictly time limited.
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Pre-CFP
Technical Measures under Regionalisation
Discard Plans
Delegated Acts with
maximum duration of 3
years
Regionalised Technical
Measures as part of
Delegated Act
Technical Measures under 31
Separate Regulations
No Regionalisation
Multiannual Plans
under co-decision
which include the
objectives for
technical
measures
Regionalised Technical
Measures as part of
multiannual plans under
Delegated Act
Nature Conservation
Measures under
Delegated Acts
Regionalised Technical
Measures as part of
Delegated Act
Figure 3.6.1: Regionalisation under the CFP
(Source: Author)
3.7.
Technical measures and other elements of the CFP
Technical measures are inextricably linked to other elements of the CFP particularly control
and enforcement and the provision of scientific data.
To ensure that the rules of the CFP are followed in practice, the policy includes a control
system with the necessary tools to enforce them. The system is laid down in the Control
Regulation
35
which entered into force on 1 January 2010. Under Article 118 of the Control
Regulation an evaluation of the impact of this Regulation on the CFP must be undertaken by
the Commission five years after its entry into force. This evaluation is currently being
undertaken and the Commission are due to report by the end of 2015. The effectiveness of
technical measures regulations in contributing to the objectives of the CFP is dependent on
them being coherent and consistent with the control system and vice-versa. Therefore any
future revision of the control Regulation arising from this evaluation needs to take account of
changes to the technical measures and equally in revising the technical measures,
controllability must be a central consideration.
Measuring the effectiveness of technical measures relies heavily on the provision of accurate
scientific data. Article 25 of the CFP sets out the key principles for data collection and
requires Member States to collect data on fleets and their fishing activities in particular
biological data on catches and on the potential environmental impacts of fishing activities on
the ecosystem under a Data Collection Framework (DCF) Regulation
36
. A Commission
proposal to update and enhance the DCF is currently being prepared. Ensuring that data needs
to monitor and measure the effectiveness of technical measures will be an integral part of this
proposal.
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4.
P
ROBLEM
D
EFINITION
The main benefit of the current technical measures identified by stakeholders is that measures
(e.g. minimum landing sizes) which are harmonised across EU fisheries have established a
"level-playing field" amongst the catching sector of different Member States. However, this is
in contrast to a number of studies, including the retrospective evaluation that show technical
measures in their current format have largely not delivered on the objectives of the CFP
effectively. This is more evident in some sea basins than others but the general perception is
one of multiple complex and ineffective rules contained in an inflexible governance structure.
With the new challenges thrown up by the new CFP, including the move to fishing at MSY,
the introduction of the landing obligation and the achievement of GES the current regulatory
structure will continue to fail to deliver. The current structure is also out of line with the new
governance approach introduced by regionalisation. In this context, there are five identifiable
weaknesses with the existing technical measures.
4.1.
Sub-optimal performance
Progress has been made in moving towards sustainably fisheries in the last decade. Currently
26 stocks (out of the MSY assessed total of 62) are being fished sustainably at or below MSY
in the Atlantic EU waters, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea from only 5 stocks in 2009
37
. For
many of these stocks the move to sustainable fishing has been as a result of a decrease in
fishing pressure following from reductions in fishing opportunities or fishing effort or for
economic reasons (market forces) fishermen have been forced out of business. However, there
are stocks where technical measures collectively have contributed towards regulating
exploitation pattern
8&11
(how fishing pressure is distribution across the age profile of a stock).
One such example is provided in example 1.
Example 1:
According to ICES, in the Baltic Sea there have been significant improvements
in exploitation patterns for cod. This has been brought about largely through the use of more
selective gears with larger mesh sizes and escape windows in fisheries for cod in combination
with closed areas to protect juvenile cod. Discarding of undersize fish in these fisheries has
been reduced significantly to less than 10% compared to 50-60% in the early 1990s
11
.
In other fisheries, in combination with technical measures at Union level, Member States have
taken their own measures to improve selectivity with good results. Such measures have been
developed with direct consultation with the fishing industry giving them a level of legitimacy
with the catching sector (See example 2).
Example 2:
In the Norway Pout fishery in the North Sea, Danish fishermen are required to
use sorting grids to reduce bycatch of non-target species such as haddock, whiting and saithe
under national legislation. Discards of haddock and whiting in these fisheries have been
reduced by 57% and 37% respectively following this initiative which resulted from an
acceptance that catches of undersize cod and haddock in these fisheries were unacceptably
high
38
. Similarly Swedish fishermen in the Skagerrak fishing for
Nephrops
are required to use
sorting grids in this fishery to reduce bycatch of cod. Since their introduction unwanted
catches of cod have been reduced by approximately 90% from previous levels
39
.
Technical measures have also delivered positive benefits in reducing ecosystem impacts. For
example the limited number of spatial measures taken to protect sensitive habitats such as
coldwater corals in the Northeast Atlantic and seagrass beds in the Mediterranean have been
effective
8
, while some strict restrictions on the use of certain gear types have also provided
protection to sensitive species such as cetaceans, seabirds and sea turtles as illustrated by
example 3.
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Example 3:
Regulation (EU) No 894/97
40
, which established a prohibition on the use of
large-scale driftnets above 2.5km for highly migratory fish (e.g. tunas and swordfish) have
also had positive benefits. This prohibition has succeeded in significantly reducing incidental
catches of sensitive species such as cetaceans and seabirds which were frequently caught in
these gears
41&42
.
Technical measures have performed less well in other fisheries and sea basins as evidenced by
the retrospective evaluation
6
, the Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP
43
, the IA report
accompanying the Commission's proposal for the new CFP
19
as well as the reports from
STECF
11&12
. Currently out of 176 assessed stocks there are 19 stocks in the North-east
Atlantic, 88 stocks in the Mediterranean and 5 stocks in the Black Sea which are considered to
be fished unsustainably (i.e. above MSY)
37
. For some of these, technical measures have failed
to control exploitation patterns and discards for these stocks are generally high. Table 4.1.1
and Annex VIII provide some examples of fisheries where these problems are most acute.
This information was collated in a study carried out as part of the IA to support the CFP
44
.
Fishing Gear
Beam Trawls
Area
North Sea,
English
Channel, Irish
Sea and Celtic
Sea
Southern North
Sea
English
Channel, Irish
Sea, Celtic Sea,
Bay of Biscay
No of Vessels
~470
Target Species
Sole, Plaice
Discarded
Species
Plaice dab,
whiting, grey
gurnard
Indicative
Discard Rates
60-90%
Beam Trawls
Bottom Trawls
~450
~2500
Crangon shrimp
Nephrops
&
mixed demersal
species and
Plaice, dab,
whiting
Nephrops,
whiting ,
haddock,
anglerfish,
megrim, cod,
hake
Hake, horse
mackerel, blue
whiting
Multiple species
Multiple species
56-72%
36-70%
Bottom Trawls
Iberian
Peninsula
~450
hake, horse
mackerel,
anglerfish,
megrim
Nephrops
Red shrimp
30-60%
Bottom Trawls
Bottom Trawls
Adriatic
Ionian Sea
~1000
~500
40-50%
20-50%
Table 4.1.1 Examples of fisheries with high discard rates
(Source: Vessel numbers extracted from STECF 2013b; Discard rates taken from IA report to support the
CFP
44
)
In these cases this
sub-optimal performance
is caused by a number of factors relating to the
effectiveness of the measures themselves and the management framework they operate in as
follows:
(1)
Technical measures, particularly measures that regulate the operation and design
characteristics of the gear (e.g. mesh size regulations) are viewed by fishermen as a
way to restrict their activities and which result in losses of revenue through direct (loss
of fish) and indirect costs (cost of gear replacement) with no apparent benefit. This is
particularly prevalent in the demersal fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and
Mediterranean. Their reaction has been to mitigate the impacts of such measures
through technical innovation as illustrated by example 4.
Example 4:
The use of illegal gear attachments (so-called “blinders”) which obstruct the
mesh opening nets, contravening the mesh size rules has been widespread in fisheries heavily
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reliant on young fish that may be close to or just above the minimum landing size (e.g. beam
trawl fishery for sole and trawl fisheries for
Nephrops).
This is because the current mesh size
results in loss of marketable catch of these fish above the minimum size providing an
incentive to circumvent the mesh size rules
45
.
(2)
Despite there being many ways to improve selectivity through the use of selectivity
devices such as square mesh panels, sorting grids or increases in mesh sizes, the
innovation potential of the fishing industry has been directed away from the
deployment of more selective fishing towards a sub-optimal harvesting strategy where
the sole objective is to reduce losses. The result has been uptake of selective gears has
been limited to fisheries where legislation making the use of such gears mandatory has
been introduced, despite such gears providing the means to reduce unwanted catches.
This is particularly the case in trawl fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and the
Mediterranean targeting a number of different species (i.e. mixed fisheries) where a
range of species are caught together (e.g. cod, haddock and whiting). In these fisheries,
fishermen often discard large amounts of both undersized and marketable fish species
to remain legal as illustrated by example 5.
Example 5:
In the North Sea flatfish fishery for which the legal gear (beam trawl with a mesh
size of 80 mm) may be effective to support a relevant exploitation pattern for the target
species, sole, this gear is unselective for other species caught during the same fishing
operations such as plaice. This imbalance results in high rates of discards (for plaice greater
than 60%
44
).
(3)
The use of minimum landings size (mls) and catch composition (CC) regulations in
the Northeast Atlantic, the North Sea and to a lesser extent in the Baltic Sea have
created an obligation for fishermen to discard in some circumstances. As highlighted
by STECF
11
these were introduced to act as coercive incentives to avoid areas with
high concentrations of juveniles or unwanted species. There is no clear evidence to
suggest that this has been the case. The predominant reaction by fishermen to both
these rules has been to comply through discarding of fish below mls or in excess of
permitted CC percentages, particularly if moving to other areas would result in a
reduction in potential revenue (i.e. movement to an area with fewer marketable fish).
See example 6.
Example 6:
The catch composition rules require that catches of species which exceed the
catch composition percentages laid down in the regulations must be discarded prior to each
landing. A skipper is required to reconcile his catch with the catch composition rules and
record it in the logbook within 24 hours. Depending on the species mix on any particular day,
a skipper may be obliged to discard fish to meet the catch composition requirements for that
day. A day later he may catch and keep on board more of the species he discarded the day
before because it fits within the rules after the catch composition changed as a result of
fishing that day, and so on during the rest of the trip. In practice fish in excess of the
percentages are either discarded just before return to port or misreported and landed illegally.
(4)
The effectiveness of nature conservation measures to minimise interactions with
sensitive species or to reduce the impacts of fishing gears on vulnerable habitats (e.g.
coldwater corals) has also been sub-optimal. This is not necessarily because the
measures themselves are ineffective but more that coverage has been limited, the
process to put such measures in place has been lengthy
6
or they have been rendered
ineffective through the introduction of multiple derogations. In some cases they have
been targeted in the wrong areas or fisheries or relied on unproven mitigation devices.
This is illustrated by example 7.
14
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Example 7:
Regulation (EC) 812/2004
46
requiring the use of Acoustic Deterrent Devices
(ADDs) to reduce the catches of cetaceans (i.e. dolphins and whales) in gillnet and pelagic
fisheries has not delivered the desired results
47&48
. The devices have been shown to be
effective at reducing incidental catches of one species in one gear type (i.e. harbour porpoise
in gillnet fisheries) but ineffective for other cetacean species (e.g. common dolphins) or for
other gear types (e.g. pelagic trawls). Additionally only vessels greater than 12m are required
to use these devices yet scientific evidence
48
shows that significant numbers of cetaceans are
incidentally caught by such vessels fishing in inshore waters. This has resulted in incidental
catch of cetaceans remaining a problem in a number of fisheries
49
.
4.2.
Difficult to measure effectiveness
The objectives set for technical measures are broadly defined in legislation but quantifying the
effectiveness of these measures individually or collectively in a Union context has proved
difficult. This is for several reasons:
(1)
There is an absence of any defined metrics on which to measure success as illustrated
by example 8.
Example 8:
Regulation (EC) 850/98, the overarching regulation covering the Northeast
Atlantic states without specified targets that technical measures should "ensure
the protection
of marine biological resources and the balanced exploitation of fishery resources in the
interests of fishermen and consumers in line with the objective of the CFP".
This Regulation
also includes a number of broad, rather non-specific sub-objectives such as "reducing
the
capture of juveniles of marine organisms through mesh size and catch composition rules".
The result has been that it is impossible to measure the success of this Regulation due to the
lack of quantifiable targets
11
. The Mediterranean Regulation (Reg. (EC) 1967/2006) is even
less specific and in fact contains no specific objectives or targets whatsoever.
(2)
In trying to assess effectiveness, it has only really been possible to compare the
measures taken collectively with the outcomes observed and not to quantify what the
linkages between these are in practice
6&11
. This is further confounded as technical
measures are often part of an overall package of complex input and output controls
including fishing effort and Total allowable catches (TACs) preventing any
comparative analysis. It is often impossible to quantify whether specific measures
have had any impact or contributed to the achievement of the overall conservation
objectives of the CFP as illustrated by example 9.
Example 9:
Closed areas put in place in the Celtic Sea to protect cod were assessed as part of
a wider review of closed areas by STECF
17
. They concluded that while the closures had
benefits for conservation of the cod stock, it was not possible to give a quantitative
assessment of the impact of these closures area as it was difficult to disentangle the effect of
the closure from other factors such as the impact of TAC reductions.
(3)
From a political perspective, technical measures, particularly mesh sizes, restrictions
on specific gears and closed areas often form part of a negotiation strategy, potentially
leading to a dilution of the final measures agreed, rendering them sub-optimal. This
can often be driven by perceived negative impacts (losses of marketable catches) in the
fishery and the desire of managers to broker a deal, even though the measures agreed
may prove ineffective. This results in measures being introduced without any scientific
basis, making any judgment on how they may benefit the overarching policy
objectives, impossible. See example 10.
Example 10:
A closed area introduced into the Irish Sea to protect cod under Regulation (EC)
No. 300/2000
50
has been diluted by multiple derogations for certain fleet segments to fish
within the closure on economic grounds. The introduction of these derogations have negated
15
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the benefits of the closure and reduced the protection provided to the cod stock, which was the
original intention of the closure
17
. A similar assessment has been made of the plaice box in the
North Sea
51
.
4.3.
Prescriptive and complex rules
The current management approach to technical measures as input tools (e.g. defining mesh
sizes or imposing restriction on fishing gears) has resulted in a large number of complex and
highly prescriptive rules particularly in the Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean. These
rules attempt to control many technical aspects of fishing operations, rather than focusing on
the desired outputs (e.g. a specific catch profile or level of fishing pressure). This has led to
the following difficulties:
(1)
The focus on regulating the technical inputs rather than the output has introduced a
strong incentive to negate the regulations. This has led to the adoption of more
legislation to counter circumvention of the rules, increasing complexity in the
regulations. This is demonstrated by the cumulative growth in technical measures in
the EU many of which are simply ‘catch-up’ regulations across the different sea
basins. Figure 4.3.3.1 below illustrates how the current framework of technical
measures in the EU has led to the introduction of more and more legislation, affecting
control and enforcement activities and undermining confidence in the measures by the
catching sector. Example 11 provides a practical example of what has occurred.
Introduction of
new measures
Adding more
technical
regulations
Industry
response to
mitigate impact
Technical solution
to initial industry
response
Scientific
evaluation of
response
Dilution of
control
effectiveness
Requirement to
enforce more
regulations
Figure 4.3.1: The effects of how the current framework of technical measures in the EU affects control
and enforcement activities
(Source STECF 2012a page 25)
Example 11:
The use of stiffer twine to offset previously introduced increases in mesh size
from 90 to 100mm in the North Sea (Regulation (EC) No 345/92
52
) became widespread in the
early 1990’s. This subsequently led to research into the potential impact on codend selectivity.
The results of the research were subsequently used as the basis to introduce additional
legislation which limited the thickness of twine that could be used (Regulation (EC) 850/98).
However, it took another five years to develop and objective method to measure twine
thickness and implement this into legislation through Regulation (EC) 129/2003
53
.
(2)
Not enough attention has been given to the practicalities of control and enforcement
when introducing technical measures or during the negotiation of particular measures,
controllability considerations have been overlooked. This has resulted in the
introduction of measures that have been difficult and costly to enforce. Most technical
16
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rules can only be monitored effectively through seaborne or airborne inspections. The
retrospective evaluation
6
estimates that the control costs for Denmark, Ireland, the UK,
France and Spain combined to be around €163 million euros annually (an average of
around EUR 33 million per Member State). Of these costs for these Member States, 25
% are land-based inspection, 57% seaborne, 6% airborne, 2% VMS/FMCs with 10%
administration costs (i.e. approximately €102 million euros is spent on seaborne and
airborne inspections). While all of this expenditure is not directly attributable to the
enforcement of technical measures, interviews with inspectors carried out as part of
the retrospective evaluation
6
, showed the costs for measuring elements of fishing gear
construction such as mesh size and twine thickness are questionable. The variation in
measured selectivity associated with fishing gears is high while the actual
conservation benefit of strictly controlling such measures is relatively low.
Additionally according to fisheries inspectors monitoring technical measures at sea
can be extremely challenging particularly in bad weather
6&11
. This has not been taken
into account when defining the technical rules. The difficulties in controlling technical
measures are illustrated in example 12.
Example 12:
Under a broad objective of protecting deep-sea species (principally deep-sea
sharks), regulations first introduced under the fishing opportunities regulations and now
incorporated into Regulation (EC) 850/98 regulate the use of fixed nets likely to interact with
these species. Whilst the legislation prohibits use of fixed nets at charted depths greater than
200 metres, derogations are possible for fishing with fixed nets in waters with a charted depth
of more than 200 metres but less than 600 metres under certain conditions. The derogations
also require prescriptions on the maximum height of nets, maximum length, maximum
soaking time and hanging ratios. These conditions vary according to the mesh sizes used. In
practice, Member State control authorities report that this legislation is not controllable; not
only because the hanging ratio and procedures to measure it are not defined, but also because
controlling compliance would require a disproportionate amount of time and effort at sea for
determining the soak time, checking depths, and controlling dimensions of series of nets that
can measure up to 100 km in length per vessel
6
.
4.4.
Lack of flexibility in the management framework
Although there are in-built flexibility mechanisms (section 3.3) in the current regulations,
technical measures have tended to be adopted under ordinary legislative procedure. Prior to
the adoption of the TFEU this was by the Council, and, now under co-decision, by the
Council and European Parliament. This has created the following difficulties:
(1)
The ordinary legislative procedure is a complex, lengthy and politically-driven process
which is not well suited to defining detailed technical rules that may need frequent
updating as illustrated by example 13.
Example 13:
No political agreement for a new package of technical measures for the
Northeast Atlantic has been reached in the last ten years. Previous Commission proposals in
2002
54
and in 2008
55
failed for a number of reasons even those these were presented by the
Commission as consolidations. Member States argued that the text had grown too complicated
and difficult to interpret. In addition, they did not reflect regional differences while the
advantages of harmonising measures across different areas were questioned. More recently a
recent amendment (Regulation (EU) No. 227/2013
54
), which was principally to make
temporary measures introduced through the fishing opportunities regulation, permanent, took
more than 9 months to complete due to disagreements between the co-legislators on the scope
of this regulation.
(2)
There is a lack of flexibility in the decision-making process for technical measures that
has restricted the ability to adjust or revise them or to react to changes in fishing
17
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conditions or to take advantage of innovation in gear technology. This has created
frustration and a level of mistrust amongst the catching sector. The lack of in-built
flexibility in the current legislative regime is demonstrated in example 14 concerning
the haddock stock in the Celtic Sea.
Example 14:
Scientific advisory bodies identified a strong recruitment of juvenile haddock at
into the Celtic Sea at the end of 2009. This incoming year class was identified as being under
threat if the selectivity of legal fishing gears was not modified to take account of this pulse in
recruitment. However, following long discussions with Member States and the NWWAC it
was not until the end of 2012 that the Commission was able to adopt an ‘emergency act’ to
enforce more selective fishing techniques, Member States having failed to agree on national
measures. By that time, this year class had been heavily fished, resulting in a failure to reap
the long-term stock benefits that would have resulted if the strong year class had been
protected
8
.
(3)
Stakeholders argue that measures brought in on a temporary basis either as in cases
where the conservation of specific stocks calls for immediate action or under the
Fishing Opportunities, have actually become permanent measures. They argue that the
flexibility mechanisms have been used as a way to impose long-term restrictions on
their operations under the guise of short term, reactionary measures. This is illustrated
by example 15.
Example 15
Regulation (EC) 2056/2001 introduced technical measure to recovery the cod
stock in the North Sea as short-term emergency measures. However, these measures which
included increased mesh sizes significantly and the use of certain selectivity devices which
resulted in losses of marketable catches have been in place for more than 14 years without
amendment. Another example is a temporary derogation for use of an electric pulse trawl in
the North Sea to catch flatfish. This was introduced to allow scientific research into the
impacts of this fishing gear but 10 years later and despite extensive research being carried out
it remains unchanged.
(4)
Inflexibility is apparent in the implementation of nature conservation measures to
protect sensitive habitats. There is little dispute amongst stakeholders
6
that such
habitats need to be protected but the introduction of such measures has been slow and
out of line with available knowledge. To designate an area closed to fishing currently
requires a change to the technical measures regulations often resulting in lengthy
negotiation and dilution of the final measures agreed, either through the introduction
of derogations or a reduction in the size of the area protected. This is illustrated by
example 16.
Example 16:
The delineation of closed areas to protect coral reefs off the coast of Ireland
took more than 3 years to negotiate
6
because Member States could not agree on the extent of
the closures proposed. The main issues were related to the size of the areas and agreeing on
continued access to vessels using fishing gears that have minimal or no impacts on the seabed.
4.5.
Insufficient involvement of key stakeholders in the decision making process
Several independent reviews of the management framework of technical measures
57,58&59
have
concluded that successful use of technical measures depends largely on their acceptance by
fishermen. This is in contrast to the current technical measures which are mostly coercive
resulting from a hierarchical governance system (i.e. top-down rather than bottom-up
approach) with little or no incentive for fishermen to comply.
Fishermen and other stakeholders generally do not feel part of a participatory process where
measures are agreed and often do not consider them as legitimate or equitable. Their
hierarchical formulation lead fishermen to perceive that technical measures are impractical,
18
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they do not represent current fishing practice and are sometimes contradictory as illustrated by
example 17.
Example 17:
Interviews with the fishing industry conducted as part of the retrospective
evaluation
6
identified that the industry believe that many closed areas are “set in stone”. They
have highlighted closed areas to protect Norway Pout and herring in the North Sea which
have remained unchanged since the 1980s yet the fishing patterns and fishing practices in
these fisheries have changed significantly since their introduction and the closures now serve
no conservation purpose.
4.6.
Underlying drivers of the problems
The conclusion from the retrospective analysis
6
, the public consultation
9
, the previous IA on
technical measures (2008 proposal
18
) and also from STECF
11&12
is that
technical measures
have an important role to play in fisheries management but the governance framework
in which they operate needs to be re-examined in light of the challenges generated by the
new CFP.
The underlying drivers of the problems are regulatory rather than market driven.
Table 4.4.1 summarises the identified problems, the drivers of these problems and their
effects. The drivers are very much interlinked.
Problems
Drivers
Effects
Failure to control exploitation patterns
leading to high levels of discards in
mixed fisheries.
Circumvention, both legally and
illegally, of technical rules to minimize
the economic impacts.
Sub-optimal performance
Technical measures are viewed by the
catching sector as restrictive and
provide little incentive to fish
selectively.
Limited uptake of selective gears or
mitigation measures to reduce
incidental catches of sensitive species.
Limited protection
sensitive habitats
afforded
to
Mitigation measures are targeted in the
wrong areas or fisheries.
Impossible to quantify whether the
technical measures have had any
impact or contributed to the
achievement
of
the
overall
conservation objectives of the CFP.
Dilution of the final measures agreed
as they are the outcome of a political
negotiation resulting in measures being
introduced without any scientific basis
making
assessment
of
their
effectiveness impossible
Difficult to measure effectiveness
There is an absence of any defined
metrics on which to measure success.
Technical measures are part of an
overall package of complex input and
output controls including effort and
TACs.
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Undermines the catching sector's (i.e.
fishermen) confidence in the measures
and provide a strong incentive to
negate the regulations.
Prescriptive and complex rules
Technical measures attempt to control
too many technical aspects of fishing
operations.
Adoption of more legislation
counter circumvention of the rules
to
Difficult for control authorities of
Member States to enforce the measures
and fishermen to comply with them.
Imposes a
high
burden and
administrative costs on the control
authorities of Member States.
Lack of flexibility
Technical measures are decided
following a complex, inflexible and
lengthy politically-driven process
which is not well suited to defining
detailed technical rules that need
frequent updating and periodic review.
Restricts the ability to adjust or revise
technical measures to react to changes
in fisheries, fishing conditions or to
take advantage of innovation in gear
technology.
Supposedly temporary rules or
derogations have remained in place
unchanged for long periods.
Fishermen and stakeholders do not feel
part of a participatory process.
Fishermen perceive that technical
measures are impractical, they do not
represent current fishing practice and
are sometimes contradictory.
Insufficient involvement of key
stakeholders in the decision- making
process
Technical measures are based on
negative, mostly coercive incentives in
a hierarchical governance system (i.e.
top-down rather than bottom-up).
Table 4.4.1: Summary of problems underpinning the current technical measures
(Source: Author)
4.7.
The affected stakeholders
Technical measures are tools to support the CFP and contribute to achieving its objectives.
Therefore the stakeholders directly affected are a sub-set of those identified in the CFP reform
IA report as summarised in table 4.5.1.
Stakeholder
Catching sector in the EU
Description
EU vessel owners, operators and crew
Key interests
Maintaining
livelihoods
profitability
and
Sector regulators
National, regional and local bodies
regulating fishing
Scientific research bodies contributing
to the conservation and management of
stocks; improvements in the selectivity
of fishing gears; and reducing the
ecosystem effects of fishing on the
ecosystem
Non-governmental
organizations
advocating sustainable management of
fisheries.
Ensuring an efficient, effective and
practical management framework that
balances a wide range of stakeholder
needs
Contribution to an effective fisheries
management regime through the timely
access to fishing vessels to measure
selectivity, impacts on the ecosystem
and new low impact fishing.
To maintain fish populations, marine
biodiversity, and the amenity value of
the oceans
Sector research
NGOs
Table 4.5.1: Summary of stakeholders affected by the reform of the technical measures regulation and of
their respective key interests (adapted from the IA supporting the reform of the CFP)
(Source: Author)
The catching sector comprising 82,047 vessels and employing 98,500 FTE
60
is the most
affected by potential changes to the technical measures regulations. Of these approximate
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82,000 fishing vessels, almost 98% of them would be classified as micro-enterprises
employing fewer than 10 persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total
does not exceed €2 million
61
. Annex IX provides a more detailed breakdown of the catching
sector in terms of number of vessels, gears deployed and numbers employed.
Other stakeholders affected are the sector regulators in the Member States. This comprises
national administrations, regional and local bodies with a fisheries management role and the
control and enforcement agencies within the Member States. Any changes to the regulatory
structure will require a re-adjustment of the management and control regime.
Sector research agencies within Member States as well as ICES and STECF who are the main
providers of advice to the Commission will also be affected. Changes in technical measures
will require experimentation and evaluation of any new measures.
NGOs have a direct interest in ensuring technical measures are effective given that they are
one of the main tools of the CFP to regulate the impacts of fishing on the marine ecosystem.
The main NGOs as members of the ACs will have a direct involvement in the development of
technical measures under regionalisation.
Other sectors indirectly affected under this initiative include:
– Dependent business and communities;
– Processing and marketing sector;
– Third Countries fishing in Union waters (e.g. Norway, Faroes in the northeast Atlantic
and Turkey, Morocco and Ukraine in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea); and
– Consumers.
4.8.
Evolution of the problem
This section focuses on summarising the evolution of the presented problems in the context of
the objectives of the CFP. The baseline scenario is based on the current regulatory structure
illustrated in Figure 3.1.1 and presented in section 6.2. The evolution of the identified
problems in terms of economic, social and environmental impacts is assessed in section 7.2.
For the purposes of this IA, two assumptions are made. Firstly, the three main technical
measures Regulations (NE Atlantic
20
, Mediterranean
21
and Baltic
22
) have been aligned with
the TFEU concerning establishment of current Commission empowerments under delegated
or implementing Acts. Commission proposals to make these alignments are currently under
negotiation with the Council and European Parliament
62,63&64
.
Secondly, it is assumed that certain provisions within the current regulations that run contrary
to the landing obligation and oblige fishermen to discard fish have been removed or amended.
This technical adjustment has been achieved through a recently adopted Regulation (EU)
812/2015 (the so-called "omnibus"
65
). The omnibus, which is very much a “quick fix”
solution, amends a number of technical measures regulations by requiring all unintended
catches (defined as incidental catches the fishing for which is prohibited in the relevant
conditions) subject to the landing obligation caught in excess of legal provisions (catch
composition rules, bycatch provisions) must be landed and counted against quota. It also
requires the definition of minimum conservation reference sizes (mcrs) to replace the current
minimum landing sizes and minimum catching sizes in the Mediterranean. This is a change in
name only and the sizes remain as they are currently. All catches below the mcrs subject to
the landing obligation must be landed and counted against quota.
Based on the history of technical measures over the last 25 years within successive CFPs
11
,
these changes alone are unlikely to improve the contribution of technical measures to
achieving the objectives of the new CFP in a relevant and coherent way across sea basins. The
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effectiveness and efficiency of the current measures will not improve without changes to the
governance structure and simplification of the measures. There will continue to be a low level
of acceptability of the measure amongst stakeholders and the identified weaknesses will
continue or persist or even intensify over time. Specifically:
Attainment of the MSY objective for overfished stocks will be impeded through a
failure to improve selectivity in fisheries for these stocks. This will result in significant
cuts in fishing opportunities for these stocks and in the Mediterranean, where there are
no fishing opportunities, reductions in fishing effort or additional technical measures.
Levels of unwanted catches will remain high in many mixed fisheries. Economic
viability will be threatened because under the landing obligation those unwanted
catches would have to be landed for non-human consumption purposes and counted
against quota. Quotas are likely to be exhausted faster and vessels would risk having
to tie-up earlier in the year even allowing for the flexibility mechanisms
66
included
under the CFP (i.e. De minimis, high survivability and quota flexibilities) that will
alleviate some of these problems.
The adoption of nature conservation measures will continue to be a slow process.
Delays in enacting such measures will likely result in damaging or even irreversible
impacts on sensitive species and habitats and threatened the attainment of GES under
the MSFD.
The current regulatory structure will not create any new incentive for fishermen to
improve selectivity. Any new measures introduced will continue to be mostly coercive
that add new rules or impose increases in selectivity that lead to economic losses.
Regionalisation of technical measures would be possible through discard plans and
multiannual plans but is likely to only add on new rules that derogate from existing
technical rules where applicable rather than simplify or introduce opportunities for
adaptive management. The Advisory Councils as the key stakeholder in
regionalisation are unlikely to engage openly with such an approach.
The strong focus on control of technical measure
in situ
and the inflexible framework
based on low regional specificity and acceptability will continue to undermine cost
efficiency.
4.9.
Necessity and subsidiarity
According to Article 3(1d) of the TFEU, the Union shall have exclusive competence in the
conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP. Other aspects of fisheries are,
under Article 4(2d) of the TFEU, share competences between the Union and the Member
States. Article 43(2) of the TFEU establishes the Union’s power to adopt the provisions
necessary for the pursuit of the objectives of the CFP. As technical measures relate to the
conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP (i.e. the Union has exclusive
competence) there is no need therefore necessarily to justify measures with regards to the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Under regionalisation the role of the co-legislators will change fundamentally. Focus will be
much more on setting the objectives and targets centrally for managing fisheries, leaving the
detailed rules needed to achieve these objectives to be set regionally by Member States and
stakeholders. This has added value in that the role of the co-legislator in agreeing detailed
technical measures has often been criticised by stakeholders. The catching sector believe the
measures finally agreed usually lead to economic losses and are unrealistic and impractical,
while NGOs claim the measures are often diluted during the political process rendering them
ineffective. Leaving the definition of technical rules to the regional level has added value in
giving certain legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders.
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5.
5.1.
O
BJECTIVES
General objectives
As tools to support the implementation of the CFP, the general objectives of technical
measures are to contribute to:
– the bringing of all European fish stocks to a state where they can produce the
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by 2015 or 2020 at the latest;
– the reduction of unwanted catches and elimination of discards in fisheries subject to
catch limits by 2019; and
– the achievement of Good Environmental Status (GES) by 2020, as established under
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD).
In achieving these general objectives the regulation of technical measures should be guided by
the principles of good governance set out in Article 3 of the CFP. In particular point (b) which
expresses the need to take account of "regional
specificities, through a regionalised
approach"
and point (f) which states that "appropriate
involvement of stakeholders, in
particular Advisory Councils, at all stages – from conception to implementation of the
measures"
are important.
5.2.
Specific and operational objectives
In order to achieve these general objectives and address the main problems identified a
number of specific and operational objectives can be defined.
Specific objectives
Develop a regulatory structure for technical measures that:
– leads to an improvement in the effectiveness of technical measures;
– defines clear objectives, targets and success criteria for technical measures;
– eliminates over-regulation and simplifies the current technical measures;
– creates a more flexible legal framework and acts as a vehicle for regionalisation of
technical measures; and
– promotes a transparent and participatory approach to the definition and specification
of technical measures.
Operational Objectives
The following operational objectives will contribute to the achievement of these specific
objectives:
– Establish incentive structures linked to the added flexibility offered by regionalisation
and rewarding of "responsible fishing" in line with Article 17
30
of the CFP that will
deliver improvements in the effectiveness of technical measures;
– Establish targets for the reduction of unwanted catches and for the reduction of the
negative impacts of fishing on marine ecosystems that can be achieve through
technical measures;
– Establish indicators to measure the success of technical measures in achieving these
defined targets respecting the timelines contained in the CFP;
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– Delete redundant rules and simplify other rules from the 31 regulations that currently
contain technical measures to make them understandable and controllable in line with
the Commission's REFIT programme
2
;
– Manage the transition to regionlisation in the period up to 2020 by defining baseline
standards based on current exploitation patterns and consolidate measures that will
apply pending the development of regionalised plans;
– Establish the necessary legal architecture to allow deviation from these baseline
standards and provide for the development of alternative measures to achieve the
overarching objectives under regionalisation; and
– Establish linkages with the CFP to allow for stakeholder involvement in the
development of technical measures at the regional level.
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Figure 5.2.1 illustrates the problem tree with the links between problems, the drivers and the
objectives.
Figure 5.2.1 Problem tree with the links between problems, their drivers and the objectives
6.
C
ONSISTENCY WITH OTHER
EU P
OLICIES
– Implement the ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management so as to ensure
that negative impacts of fishing activities are minimised (Article 2 paragraph 3); and
– Ensure coherence with Union environmental legislation (Article 2 paragraph 5(j)).
25
Two of the specific objectives contained in the CFP are to:
 kom (2016) 0134 - Ingen titel
Given that implementation of the MSFD is a legal requirement under the Treaty, dedicated
measures to reach GES for marine resources are implicitly required in compliance with the
Directive. Technical measures, as tools to support the implementation of the CFP consitute an
important element in achieving this objective.
Technical measures must also be coherent with other Union enviromental legislation notably
the Birds
28
and the Habitats Directives
29
. The full implementation of these Directives is part
of the EU’s response to its commitments under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity,
and is reinforced by the commitment made by EU Heads of State "to
halt the loss of
biodiversity [in the EU] by 2010";
it is further reiterated in the EU Biodiversity Strategy to
2020
67
.
Technical measures have also the potential to contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy
68
, in
particular its resource efficiency flagship initiative through better use of fish stocks. In
addition, the reform of technical measures will contribute to the REFIT programme
2
through
the simplification and deletion of a number of existing regulations and specific measures.
7.
7.1.
P
OLICY OPTIONS
Selection of policy options
A screening of different policy options has led to the identification of a number of options that
are most likely to meet the objectives and address the problems identified in section 4. An
initial evaluation indicated that improving flexibility and creating incentive structures within
the CFP to achieve improvements in the general effectiveness should be the focus rather than
making wholesale changes to the measures themselves. This is for three reasons:
(1)
Previous attempts in 2002
54
and 2008
55
made to introduce changes to the structure and
the substance of the regulations failed to reach political agreement. Member States
strongly argued that such changes would lead to negative socio-economic impacts on
different fleets.
Regionalised decision-making was introduced into the CFP by the co-legislators to
avoid having to make frequent changes to the substance of technical measures
contained in co-decided acts. Making changes to the substance under this initiative
would go against this philosophy.
The stakeholder consultations showed that changing the substance of the technical
measures was clearly not an option preferred by the key stakeholders (i.e. the catching
sector and the Advisory Councils) or the Member States. Adapting the regulatory
structure and simplifying the rules should be the key objectives.
(2)
(3)
As a result of this initial evaluation, three policy options with one sub-option have been
considered against the baseline scenario. It was decided that the policy options defined would
cover all sea basins except non-Union waters, where technical measures would continue to be
part of international agreements with the measures emanating from these agreements.
Regionalisation is not applicable in non-Union waters.
7.2.
Baseline scenario
The current regulatory architecture of the technical measures would be retained: a 'web' of
regulations with the CFP as the central element, elaborated in a series of technical and other
conservation regulations surrounding the CFP Regulation. See Figure 3.3.1.
The prescriptive, means-oriented architecture without clear expected outcomes or results
would be retained. The Regulations would include recent adjustments that remove legal
contradictions with new obligations under the new CFP (as described in Section 4.8), in
26
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particular the landing obligation and that all of the existing Regulations on technical measures
would be aligned with the TFEU concerning establishment of current Commission
empowerments under delegated or implementing Acts. Changes to the principle regulations in
the northeast Atlantic, Baltic and Mediterranean would continue to be under co-decision.
Flexibility would mainly be through the existing mechanisms and empowerments included in
the current regulations (i.e. detailed rules to define gears, national measures or measures for
stocks of immediate conservation concern).
Regionalisation would be possible through the mechanisms set out in the CFP (i.e.
multiannual plans, discard plans and Article 11 for nature conservation measures within
Natura 2000 Sites) but would be very much "piece meal" and essentially limited to adding on
new rules at the regional level that derogate from existing measures, simply expanding the
'web' of regulations further.
Figure 6.2.1 illustrates the regulatory structure for technical measures under this option.
Emergency Measures
Commission Acts
National measures
or management
plans
Fishing
opportunities
Regulations
(Council only)
Multiple Technical Measures regulations
Rules defining the
specifications of gears
Commission Acts
(Co-decided Regulations and
Commission Acts)
Nature Conservation
Measures
Commission Acts under
Article 11 of the CFP
Multiannual Plans
Framework
Co-decided Act under
Article 10 of the CFP
Temporary Discard
Plans
Commission Acts under
Article 15(6) of the CFP
Regionalised Technical Measures
Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC
Stakeholder opinion
Figure 6.2.1: Regulatory Structure under Baseline Scenario
(Flexibility mainly provided through national measures and specific empowerments as well as to a limited
extent under annual fishing opportunities regulations. Regionalisation is an alternative)
(Source: Author)
In the public consultation
9
there was no support for maintaining the current situation from the
catching sector, the Member States or the NGOs. The
catching sector
gave a clear message
that the complexity of the current regulations and their multiple amendments should serve as
an example of "what
not to do".
Respondents from the
national administrations and control
agencies of the Member States
pointed to enforcement issues with the current regulations (e.g.
measuring twine thickness has proved problematic as the measuring instrument used is highly
subjective). The
NGOs
highlighted the lack of compliance as a major weakness (e.g. the
illegal landing of undersize fish). Member States and the catching sector also pointed to a
range of unintended consequences that have in fact forced fishermen to discard and run
27
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counter to the principal objective of the measures (i.e. to protect juveniles and minimise the
impacts of fishing on the ecosystem) although some of these unintended consequences have
been resolved through the omnibus regulation.
7.3.
Option 1: Consolidation
This option implies a minor change in the governance structure and limited adaptation of the
rules to the requirements of the CFP and to new conditions as they evolve.
It would involve a proposal for a new Regulation with a limited scope: to bring together and
consolidate in one Regulation (under co-decision) the
common rules
for all fisheries in all
areas (for instance generic prohibitions of a certain fishing method) as well as introducing
specific objectives for technical measures and specific targets to be used for measuring
success. The common rules would be considered as
de facto
permanent as there is no need or
justification for changing them and would be separated from regionally specific rules (with
potential for regionalisation). The latter regionally specific technical rules (the large majority
of them) would remain in place in the existing regulations. These measures would constitute
the baseline standards. This consolidation should take account of any recent amendments or
changes to the regulations under the omnibus regulation, emergency measures taken to protect
certain stocks (e.g. measures taken for sea bass) as well as alignment of the regulations with
the TFEU
Splitting these measures into those that are common and those that are regionally specific is
straightforward as it follows from the existing regulations (i.e. it is clear from the regulations
which are common and which are regionally specific). Table 6.3.1 shows this differentiation.
Common Rules
Prohibited fishing gears and practices – e.g. fishing
with explosives or poisons
Restrictions on fishing gears and conditions for their
use – e.g. common rules governing the construction of
gears such as twine thickness, the circumference of
codends or size of gears allowed to be used
Measurement of minimum conservation reference
sizes – how to measure mcrs for different organisms
and the treatment of marine organisms below mcrs
Common measures to reduce discarding in where the
landing obligation does not apply – high-grading and
slipping
Conducting scientific research – derogation allowing
scientific research for gears not complying with the
common rules and the permissible uses for catches
made during scientific research of selective gears
Restocking and transplantation - general derogation
from the common rules to allow these practices
On board processing - prohibition of certain processing
on board fishing vessels
Regionally Rules
Mesh sizes – mesh sizes linked to target species or
groups of species that can be used in different sea
basins
Closed or restricted area to protect juveniles or
pawning aggregations
Minimum conservation reference sizes – setting sizes
for marine organisms to apply in different sea basins
Nature conservation measures – closed areas to protect
sensitive habitats and mitigation measures to reduce
capture of sensitive species
Other specific derogations or restrictions on the
operation of gears and conditions for their use -
allowance to use electric pulse trawls in the North Sea
or restrictions on the use of gillnets below 600m in the
North eat Atlantic
Table 6.3.1 Differentiation of common and regional specific measures
(Source Author)
As with the baseline scenario, flexibility would be mainly through the existing mechanisms
contained in the Regulations. Regionalisation of technical measures would be possible
through discard plans adopted by the Commission as Delegated Acts, and through Delegated
Acts adopted by the Commission on the basis of the new multiannual plans adopted in co-
decision in the longer-term. These would provide an additional opportunity for introducing
flexibility but would be very much a means to introduce additional rules or derogate from
existing rules rather than incentive-based with opportunities for adaptive management.
28
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Regionalisation would happen if and where the Member States decided to submit joint
recommendations for discard plans with technical measures included in the short-term. These
changes, once incorporated into Delegated Acts by the Commission, would derogate from the
existing body of rules for a maximum duration of 3 years. After that period, maintaining these
derogations in place would require the adoption of Delegated Acts that are adopted by virtue
of an EU multiannual plan that would ultimately replace these temporary plans. In light of the
existing need for flexibility and adaptation of rules for a successful implementation of the
CFP, this option requires to a certain degree a speedy adoption of discard plans and in the
longer-term multiannual plans. As with the baseline scenario, technical measures relating to
nature conservation measures could similarly be adopted under Article 11.
Figure 6.3.1 illustrates the regulatory for technical measures under this option.
Emergency Measures
Commission Acts
Rules defining the
specifications of gears
Commission Acts
Common Rules
Consolidated into a single Co-decided
Regulations
National measures
or national
management plans
Fishing
opportunities
Regulations
(Council only)
Regional Rules -
Remain under multiple Co-decided Regulations & Commission Acts
Nature Conservation
Measures
Commission Acts under
Article 11 of the CFP
Multiannual Plans
Framework
Co-decided Act under
Article 10 of the CFP
Temporary Discard
Plans
Commission Acts under
Article 15(6) of the CFP
Regionalised Technical Measures
Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC
(Derogations from existing regional rules)
Figure 6.3.1: Regulatory Structure of Option 1
(Flexibility mainly provided through national measures and specific empowerments as well as to a limited
extent under annual fishing opportunities regulations. Regionalisation is an alternative)
(Source: Author)
Stakeholder opinion
In the public consultation
9
there was little support for this approach from
Member States, the
catching sector
or the
Advisory Councils.
They very much saw this as a re-working of the
proposal tabled in 2008 by the Commission. Most advocated a complete overhaul of the
regulatory structure of technical measures rather than a simple consolidation that does not
depart too much from the status quo or link directly to regionalisation. They shared the view
that simplification and flexibility cannot be achieved by maintaining the majority of technical
29
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measures under ordinary legislative procedure even in the short-term. It is too cumbersome a
process to be able to react to changes in fisheries. Nonetheless it carries a low-risk in the
short-term that the current situation will not deteriorate further. It also provides potential for
improvement in the longer-term through regionalisation and introduction of clear objectives
and success indicators in the form of targets relating to the level of unwanted catches (linked
to the landing obligation), thresholds for incidental catches of sensitive species such as
cetaceans and seabirds and reductions in the impact of fishing gears on the seabed. These
latter targets relate to the achievement of good environmental status under the MSFD.
7.4.
Option 2: Framework Approach
This option implies a more radical change in the governance structure of technical measures
involving the bringing to together of technical measures into one regulation rather than
maintaining the multiple regulations that currently exist. It entails a proposal for a new
framework Regulation with the following structure:
General Provisions –
Scope, overarching objectives, principles of good governance
success indicators in the form of concrete targets
as defined for option 1 and
definitions.
The definitions relate primarily to the definition of fishing gears and
fishing operations and are common to all regions.
Technical Provisions –
Common rules
currently contained in all of the primary
technical measures regulations but applicable to all sea basins and considered as de
facto permanent as there is no need or justification for changing them. These are the
same rules outlined under option 1 (see table 6.3.1).
Nature Conservation Measures – A mixture of
common rules across sea basins
and
considered as de facto permanent (e.g. obligation to return incidental catches of rare
fish species to the sea immediately) and
regionally specific closed or restricted areas
to protect NATURA 2000 sites.
Baseline Measures by region –
Existing regionally specific measures
contained in the
current regulations that would apply in the absence of plans regionally. These would
be
baseline mesh sizes, minimum conservation reference sizes, closed or restricted
areas to protect juvenile and spawning areas
and any
other regionally specific
measures.
Further detail on the baselines and the criteria for their establishment
including the basis for deleting redundant measures is provided in Annex X.
Regionalisation – Empowerments for regionalisation from the
baseline mesh sizes
(e.g. different gear options that give the same result as the baselines in terms of
selectivity),
changing minimum conservation reference sizes, amending or deleting
existing closed areas or adding new closures
and
creation of other specific measures
needed for the regions to meet the overarching objectives.
Most of the existing regulations would be repealed and/or rationalised. It would recast the
structure (one regulation instead of the numerous regulations in place) and it would give a
new orientation to technical measures (clear standards, results orientation instead of
prescriptive top-down approach with a large number of derogations) with regionalisation
being the main tool to provide flexibility. At the same time, it would safeguard existing
technical measures from being eliminated overnight – which would jeopardise the
achievement of the objectives of the CFP. The existing empowerments relating to the
definition of gears deemed necessary and national measures would be retained (i.e. those
linked to measures that will remain in the framework regulation).
The baselines and default technical measures that correspond to these objectives would be
applicable unless and until regionalised measures are designed and introduced into Union law
(by the Commission through Delegated Acts). Where no regionalised action is developed, the
baseline would continue to function as a default rule. Over time the importance of the default
30
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measures would diminish and the weight of regionalised measures will increase, as
multiannual plans are developed across the sea basins.
Member States would have options in choosing to move further away from more rigid
technical rules (the default measures) and to move to a more flexible, results-based
management approach to meet the projected results and objectives of a plan. As with the other
options, nature conservation measures relating to Natura 2000 sites could be adopted under
regionalisation. The baselines would be used to introduce an empowerment for the
Commission to adopt Delegated Acts based on joint recommendations from the Member
States containing detailed technical measures as part of multiannual plans or in the absence of
such plans, temporary discard plans.
This option would allow a smooth transition from technical measures as a separate body of
measures to a situation with multiannual plans that integrate technical measures as one of the
management tools for a fishery in a region. The temporary discard plans would form a stop-
gap and allow for a level of flexibility while multiannual plans are developed.
Figure 6.4.1 illustrates the regulatory structure under this option.
National Measures
or national
management plans
Technical Measures Framework
Co-decided Regulation
Fishing
opportunities
Regulations
(Council only)
Rules defining the
specifications of
gears (Commission
Acts)
Nature Conservation
Measures
Adopted as Commission
Acts under Article 11 of
the CFP
Multiannual Plans
Framework adopted under
Article 10 of the CFP as co-
decided act
Temporary Discard Plans
Adopted as Commission
Acts under Article 15(6) of
the CFP
)
Regionalised Technical Measures
Adopted as Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC
Figure 6.4.1: Regulatory Structure of Option 2
(Focus is on regioanlisation of technical measures. Flexibility provided through national measures and
specific empowerments relating to definition of gears and to a limited extent through the fishing
opportunities regulations)
(Source: Author)
Stakeholder opinion
The public consultation
9
showed that
the catching sector, Member States
and
NGOs
favoured
a framework approach, covering all sea basins. There were divergent views on the content of
the framework. Some of the industry groups (Europeche and EAPO), while accepting the
merit of a framework, advocated a minimalistic approach with few (if any) rules under the
framework and any detailed rules that are required to be developed at regional level.
Particularly they queried the need for baseline measures (mesh sizes, mcrs or closed areas) to
be included in the framework. The NGOs highlighted the strong need for some high-level
overarching objectives and minimum common standards that should apply across the EU to
31
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ensure no gaps in management occur. Simplification should not happen at the expense of the
environmental protection. Many NGOs also advocated the inclusion of safeguards to react to
emerging conservation problems. Most Member States and the AC agreed on a framework
type approach with baseline measures but highlighted the importance of simplifying the rules
while insisting on maintaining a level playing field. They accepted this will result in some
rules (e.g. existing closed areas) remaining under co-decision.
7.4.1.
Sub-option 2.1 – Framework Approach without baselines
Given certain sectors of the catching sector queried the need for the baseline measures, a
possible sub-option of option 2 –
Sub-option 2.1
- is also considered.
As with Option 2, the
general provisions, objectives, targets, technical provisions, nature
conservation measures and empowerment for regionalisation
would be maintained. These
empowerments would allow for the establishment of measures that regulate the design and
operation of fishing gears, closed areas, minimum conservation reference sizes and other
specific measures required regionally to meet the objective of the CFP through Delegated
Acts as part of the discard and multiannual plans. However, the
baseline measures
relating to
mesh sizes, minimum conservation reference sizes and closed areas defined in Option 2
would be omitted.
In effect, this is a results-based approach. The framework regulation would constitute a basic
set of rules and overarching objectives as well as essential nature conservation measures
relating to prohibitions of fishing for certain species or with certain gears and closed areas for
the protection of sensitive habitats. As under option 2, any detailed measures required would
be developed regionally under discard plans in the short-term or through multiannual plans in
the longer-term and nature conservation measures relating to Natura 2000 sites adopted under
Article 11 of the CFP. .
This option relies on multiannual plans being developed swiftly and in the intervening period
detailed technical measures included in temporary discard plans to ensure the objectives of the
CFP would be met.
7.5.
Option 3: Elimination of technical measures
This option is similar to sub-option 2.1. It assumes that the objectives of the CFP (e.g. MSY,
landing obligation and GES) are result-driven measures and as such will lead to clean
fisheries. They would thus provide enough incentives for fishermen in the short-term to fish
selectively and to adapt fishing strategies that avoid and reduce unwanted catches. Under
these assumptions, in this option there is no need for most of the existing technical rules in
EU legislation (other than some very basic notions already expressed in the CFP Regulation).
This option would imply repealing all of the existing technical measures regulations
immediately with the exception of essential nature conservation measures relating to
protection for sensitive habitats and species. Progress in reaching the objectives of the CFP
and, MSFD in the case of GES, would be used to assess effectiveness but there would be no
defined objectives or targets specifically for technical measures. These would be defined in
the multiannual plans.
It would be based on an identified and agreed result (minimise unwanted catches, clean
fisheries) and it would provide maximum flexibility for fishermen individually, and also for
Member States to decide regionally what technical rules, if any, are required. Any technical
measures needed in the longer term would be developed regionally under multiannual plans
(with the possibility of temporarily incorporating technical measures into discard plans as a
short-term option). Technical measures relating to Natura 2000 sites could be adopted under
Article 11 of the CFP as with the other options.
32
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In effect, the development of new technical measures would start from scratch, under the
assumption that the fishermen and Member States respond to the CFP with the adequate
actions and measures – simply effectuated by fishermen themselves in their daily fishing
practice, or where considered necessary and to a limited extent deposited in regionally
decided measures.
This approach would represent a complete change in governance. It would imply a shift in the
burden of proof to fishermen and Member States to document that they are meeting the
general objectives and agreed results of the CFP and specific objectives and results identified
in multiannual plans. It would be entirely dependent on significant change of behaviour of
fishermen and it would strongly rely on peer pressure and self-regulation to ensure that
unselective fishing does not prevail and clean fishing becomes the daily norm.
Figure 6.5.1 illustrates the regulatory structure under this option.
Nature Conservation
Measures
Commission Acts under
Article 11 of the CFP
Multiannual Plans
Framework Co-decided acts
under Article 10 of the CFP
Temporary Discard Plans
Commission Acts under
Article 15(6) of the CFP
)
Regionalised Technical Measures
Commission Acts on the basis of joint recommendations from MS & AC
Figure 6.5.1: Regulatory Structure of Option 3
(Flexibility through de-regulation and regionalisation)
(Source: Author)
Stakeholder opinion
This approach was advocated by some of
the catching sector
(representatives of
EUROPECHE, EAPO and LIFE) who did not see the need for a framework regulation
9
or
only a very limited one. With the landing obligation, in particular, as a driver for improved
selectivity they suggested it should be possible to repeal immediately the vast majority of the
existing regulations. Other parts of the catching sector including several of the ACs (North
Sea and Mediterranean) did not agree that this was an approach that could be followed in the
short-term, seeing the need for some rules while regionalisation evolves. Member States and
NGOs were similarly negative about this option as a short-term option as they considered it
risky. They saw de-regulation or partial de-regulation of technical measures as an objective to
work towards in the longer-term.
7.6.
Summary of policy options
Table 7.6.1 summarises the structure, content, mechanisms for regionalisation and level of
simplification
for
each
of
the
policy
options
and
sub-option
2.1.
33
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Baseline Scenario
Structure
All
existing
remain in place
regulations
Option 1
Consolidation of common
rules under one regulation.
All
other
regulations
containing regional rules
remain in place.
Option 2
Existing measures brought
together into one framework
regulation with a set of
regionally specific annexes
containing
baseline
measures
Sub-option 2.1
Same as option 2 except
the framework would not
contain the regional
annexes
Option 3
Most of the existing
regulations would be
totally
or
partially
repealed
immediately.
Only essential nature
conservation
measures
(protection of sensitive
habitats and species)
would be maintained in
the existing regulations.
Only nature conservation
measures would remain
in place
Content
No change other than
technical
adjustment
to
remove legal inconsistences
and alignment with the
TFEU
Limited adaptation and
consolidation of the rules to
the requirements of the CFP.
Technical adjustment to
remove legal inconsistences
and alignment with the
TFEU.
The
regionally
specific
rules
would
constitute
the
baseline
standards
Clear objective linked to
targets would be defined.
Common provisions would
be maintained and specific
empowerments to allow for
regionalisation would be
included.
The
existing
technical measures would
be retained as baseline
measures in the regional
annexes to apply in the
absence
of
regional
measures being in place.
Possible through discard
plans, multiannual plans and
Article
11
for
environmental
measures.
Specific
empowerments
allowing for regionalisation
from the baseline technical
measures included in the
framework. Measures could
be amended or derogate or
deleted
entirely.
New
Clear objective linked to
targets would be defined.
Common
provisions
would be maintained and
specific empowerments
to
allow
for
regionalisation would be
included
Regionalisation
Possible through discard
plans, multiannual plans and
Article 11 for environmental
measures. Limited to adding
new rules that would
derogate from existing rules.
No specific driver or linkage
to regionalisation other than
what is in the CFP.
As baseline scenario
Possible through discard
plans, multiannual plans
and Article 11 for
environmental measures.
Empowerments allowing
for the development of
specific
technical
measures at regional
level included in the
framework
Possible through discard
plans, multiannual plans
and Article 11 for
environmental measures.
Empowerments allowing
for the development of
specific
technical
measures at regional
level included in the
plans
34
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measures could also be
introduced.
Simplification
All
existing
remain in place
regulations
Common provisions from
Regulations (EC) 850/98,
2187/2005 and 1967/2006
would be moved into one
new regulation. Regionally
specific
measures would
remain in these regulations
and all other regionally
specific measures contained
in Council and Commission
regulations would remain in
place
Regulations (EC) 850/98
and 2187/2005 would be
repealed. Regulation (EC)
1967/2005
would
be
partially
repealed.
Supporting regulations (EC)
254/2002,
894/97,
2549/2000 and 812/2004
would
be
repealed.
Regulations 1098/2007 and
1224/2009
would
be
amended.
Commission
Regulations
(EC)
2056/2001,
3440/86,
1922/1999,
494/2002,
2549/200,
727/2012,
636/2010, 724/2010 would
be repealed. The provisions
from all of these regulations
where required would be
incorporated into the new
framework regulation
Regulations (EC) 850/98
and 2187/2005 would be
repealed.
Regulation
(EC) 1967/2005 would
be partially repealed.
Regulations
(EC)
254/2002,
894/97,
2549/2000 and 812/2004
would
be
repealed.
Regulations 1098/2007
and 1224/2009 would be
amended. Commission
Regulations
(EC)
2056/2001,
3440/86,
1922/1999,
494/2002,
2549/200,
727/2012,
636/2010,
724/2010
would
be
repealed
entirely. The common
provisions from all of
these regulations where
required
would
be
incorporated into the new
framework
regulation.
The regionally specific
measures
would
be
repealed.
Regulations (EC) 850/98
and 2187/2005 would be
repealed
except
for
nature
conservation
measures contained in
these
regulations.
Regulation
(EC)
1967/2005 would be
partially repealed except
for
non-technical
measures provisions and
any nature conservation
measures contained in
this
Regulation.
Regulations
(EC)
254/2002, and 2549/2000
would
be
repealed.
Regulations 1098/2007
and 1224/2009 would be
amended. Commission
Regulations
(EC)
2056/2001,
3440/86,
1922/1999,
494/2002,
2549/200,
727/2012,
636/2010,
724/2010
would
be
repealed
entirely
Table 7.6.1 Summary of structure, content, mechanisms for regionalisation and level of simplification
(Source: Author)
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8.
8.1.
A
NALYSIS OF IMPACTS
Methodology
The following sections present an analysis of the potential impacts of the different policy
options described on the key stakeholders identified in section 4.5. The impacts on other
stakeholder groups indirectly are also indicated where relevant.
The different options largely present different governance structures for the specification and
implementation of technical measures. Changes to the substance are primarily restricted to
deletion or simplification of existing measures or the establishment of baselines based on
existing rules.
Regionalisation is a new concept and other than the first discard plans adopted earlier this
year there is little experience as to what impact it will actually have. Therefore how the
different governance options, and the possibilities they provide for specification of different
technical measures under regionalisation, might actually translate under the different options
is based on the limited experience of regionalisation to date.
Determining or disentangling whether, and to what extent, a specific technical measure such
as a closed area or a mesh size would impact on a particular stock, compared to an output type
measure such as quota management, which may also be in place for the same stock, is
challenging. Isolating the costs of enforcing technical rules is similarly not straightforward as
monitoring tends to be carried out as part of routine inspections monitoring a range of rules
including checking for valid fishing licences and catch reporting.
For this reason the analysis is based on a qualitative assessment of the impacts, supported
with an evaluation of the likely risks of the different options (section 8.3). It describes the
potential expected direction of change (i.e. will the situation deteriorate, stay the same, or
improve under the different options). The assessment of environmental impacts and related
indicators such as stock status, a monetisation of economic impacts, and a numerical
assessment of social impacts in terms of jobs, is qualitative and largely based on specific
examples or case studies. The impacts of the policy options considered in the IA to support
the CFP
19
remain valid and where relevant are used to support the analysis.
The options are assessed in terms of the short-term impacts up to 2019 corresponding to the
full implementation of the landing obligation and in the longer-term covering the period up to
2022 and beyond when the CFP is due to be reviewed
69
.
The key impacts considered are:
Economic impacts
Economic sustainability is assessed using as indicators the contribution that technical
measures under the different options can make to reaching the MSY objective and to reducing
unwanted catches under the landing obligation. Economically these two core elements of the
CFP will have a huge bearing on future economic viability in terms of growth and investment,
sectoral competitiveness and also providing stability for SMEs. The costs for the adaptation of
gears to adjust to any new approach to technical measures is also considered along with the
likley impacts of the different options on the competitveness of the catching sector.
Social impact
Social sustainability is assessed in terms of the contribution of technical measures to
employment evolution in fisheries and the attractivenesses of the catching sector measured by
the likely impacts on wages and working conditions of the different options.
36
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Environmental impacts
Environmental sustainability is assessed in terms of protecting biodiversity, preserving the
quality of natutral resources and fostering the sustainable use of resources. The contribution
technical measures can make to the achievement of GES for MSFD Decriptor 1,3 and 4 (i.e.
biological impacts on fish stocks and vulnerable species such as marine mammals and
seabirds) and Descriptor 6 (i.e. physical impacts on the seabed) are used as indicators.
Simplification, Administrative Burden and Costs
Governance issues are considered in terms of the degree of simplification achieveable; the
involvement of the catching sector and national administrations in the decision-making
process under regionalisation. The increase in workload and costs for national research
institutes as well as STECF and ICES; and the costs for the catching sector and national
administrations incurred as a result of regionalisation are also assessed as well as the costs for
controlling technical measures under the differing governance structures.
Impacts on SMEs
Impacts on SMEs are broken down into economic impacts as a result of additional costs and
responsibilities associated with regionalisation.
8.2.
8.2.1.
Baseline scenario
Economic impacts
MSY and the landing obligation
The economic impacts will continue to be negative. No improvements in current exploitation
patterns are likely in the short-term for stocks currently fished above MSY. This will result in
significant reductions in fishing opportunities or fishing effort for stocks in the Mediterranean
where there are no TACs will be required to bring fishing mortality to MSY levels. Currently
out of 176 assessed stocks there are 19 stocks in the North-east Atlantic, 88 stocks in the
Mediterranean and 5 stocks in the Black Sea which are considered to be fished unsustainably
above MSY
37
. Some of these are highly depleted and even if the timeframe for reaching MSY
is pushed out to 2020, the adjustments required to reach Fishing mortality corresponding to
MSY (i.e. F
msy)
) will be significant
70
. Example 18 provides an example of the scale of the
economic impacts for such stocks.
Example 18:
The cod stock in the west of Scotland has been overfished for many years with
low spawning stock biomass (SSB) and low recruitment of young fish into the stock. ICES
has advised that catches should be reduced to the lowest possible level and further technical
measures should be implemented to improve the exploitation pattern
71
in all fisheries catching
cod. Large reductions in fishing mortality will be required to bring the stock to MSY by 2020.
Leaving aside the economic impacts of a prolonged period of low TACs for this species, this
will have knock-on effects on other stocks. The Scottish White fish Producers Association
(SWFPA) estimated that to recover the cod stock to a TAC aligned to MSY (ICES advised a
quota of 38 tonnes for 2015) would result in catches of only around one fifth of the tonnage
required to maintain and fully prosecute the target fishery of anglerfish
72
. The anglerfish
fishery in this area is worth approximately €25 million euros to the Member States concerned.
In practice these knock-on effects on associated species have provided fishermen with a
strong incentive to discard legal sized cod caught as bycatch while fishing for other species
such as anglerfish to continue fishing. ICES reported in 2014 that discards of cod were
roughly four times greater than landings
72
. It will no longer be possible to discard this fish
once cod comes under the landing obligation meaning the fishery is likely to close very early
in the year with substantial losses.
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The current levels of unwanted catches will continue and under the landing obligation these
catches will have to be landed but only sold for non-human consumption purposes. For some
species (e.g. plaice in the sole fishery in the North Sea) these unwanted catches will remain at
high levels. Table 4.1.1 provides examples of fisheries with similarly high levels of unwanted
catches. Economic returns will reduce given the low value of such unwanted catches. The
scale of the economic impacts arising from unwanted catches is illustrated in example 19.
Example 19:
A study
73
which looked at the economic effects of the landing obligation for
Dutch fisheries showed the scale of economic losses that could be expected. The study
assumed that selectivity and all fishing activities are the same as in the baseline year (2011).
The implementation of the landing obligation results in projected additional costs for the
entire Dutch offshore fishing fleet (around 315 vessels) of €21 million euros. This fleet had
total landings of €306 million and a Gross Value Added (GVA) of €41.6 million in 2011.
These additional costs were offset by additional revenues from the unwanted catches sold for
non-human consumption estimated at €8 - €15 million euro, assuming a cost for the unwanted
catches of €0.15 - €0.30/kg (based on current market prices for fish meal). This results in net
losses of between €6 to €14 million euros across the Dutch fleet. The study concludes that
such losses are likely to be unsustainable given that according to STECF a large proportion of
this offshore fleet segment (54%) made losses in 2011
60
. While not entirely representative of
other fleets in the North Sea or elsewhere, the costs and revenues for the landing of unwanted
catches are considered indicative. The impacts would depend on the profitability of the other
fleets concerned but would in all likelihood be negative.
Fishing opportunities will also be exhausted more quickly in fisheries in the Northeast
Atlantic and Baltic. Unwanted catches which will have to be landed and counted against
quotas will accelerate quota uptake. Exhausted fishing opportunities will force vessels to stop
fishing earlier in the year with related negative impacts on their financial performance as
shown by example 20.
Example 20:
In the Irish Sea, a UK study
74
suggests that the whiting fishing opportunities
available to Northern Ireland
Nephrops
trawlers would be exhausted after only 10 days at sea
before all the UK quota is used up if steps to improve selectivity or avoidance measures are
not taken. This would result in closure of the
Nephrops
fishery in early January. Landings
from this fishery are valued at approximately €42 million euros and involve 140 boats from
the UK and Ireland
60
.
Adaptation costs
Given the baseline option does not envisage any changes in the existing measures then no
additional costs for adapting gears would be expected, at least in the short-term. Research into
developing and testing selective gears would continue at current levels but without changes to
the regulatory structure the uptake of such gears by the catching sector would remain low
based on past experiences. Any additional costs that would be incurred would not be directly
related to technical measures but as a result of adaptations to vessels to handle unwanted
catches as a consequence of the landing obligation.
In the longer term such costs may increase as the economic impacts associated with moving to
MSY, the landing obligation and meeting environmental targets under the MSFD would
eventually force fishermen to adapt their gears and fishing practices or go out of business.
Such costs could be offset through funding under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
(EMFF
75
) in the short term so would not necessarily be significant. This may change in the
longer-term after the end of the EMFF in 2020 if there is no such funding mechanism in the
future.
Competitiveness
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There will be no change in the competitiveness of the catching sector. Fishermen will
continue to be governed by the same sets of detailed rules with limited flexibility.
Other stakeholders
Related impacts in downstream business could be expected to result from the landing of
unwanted catches. These costs are not directly related to technical measures but to the
implementation of the landing obligation. This will have negative impacts on the wider
economy and will have knock-on impacts on other enterprises providing inputs to fishing, and
processing, marketing and trading catches.
There are likely to be gains for non-human consumption outlets that can utilise and profit
from previously discarded catches. There are also likely to be economic benefits for transport
companies and storage companies (including markets) that will handle the previously
discarded catches. These gains are difficult to estimate given the uncertainty regarding the
actual level of unwanted catches that may result once the landing obligation is introduced and
are short-term (see example 21).
Example 21:
A UK study
76
showed that additional staff time and equipment is expected to be
required at the markets to handle the previously discarded fish, as well as investment in
additional storage facilities. Up to three additional staff and an additional forklift truck would
be required to deal with the extra material landed in one specific port. Fish markets focus on
the sale of human-consumption fish and the receipt of large volumes of low value material do
not fit well with their business models.
Any costs of handling material for non-human consumption would likely be passed onto
vessel operators although some of these costs could be partially offset by funding through the
EMFF.
Third countries, particularly Norway and the Faroe Islands will be impacted in that reduced
fishing opportunities arising from a failure to reach MSY will result in lower fishing
opportunities for these countries in Union waters. They will have to comply with the landing
obligation when fishing in Union waters which may lead to increased costs depending on the
species being targeted. Third countries fishing in Union waters in the Mediterranean will be
impacted in that a failure to reduce overfishing and the level of unwanted catches will impact
on available resources.
For consumers, the need to halt biodiversity loss is of increasing importance and this has
created a demand for sustainably and responsibly caught fish products. This was apparent
from some of the submissions in the public consultation. Failure to revise the technical
measures could indirectly lead to increasing difficulties for the catching sector to sell products
in the market because of reduced demand for products not considered to be caught in an
environmentally friendly manner.
8.2.2.
Social impacts
The social impacts will continue to be negative. They will be most acute for fleet segments
having significant levels of unwanted catches (typically the vessels highlighted in table 7.2.1).
In the short-term, extra crew will be required to handle unwanted catches onboard which will
have to be stowed onboard separately from marketable catches. The study referred to in
section 7.2.1
73
estimated in the Dutch fleet an additional 1-2 FTE's would be required to
account for the additional work load on board (approximately 300-400 FTEs for the Dutch
fleet) in the short-term. However, these increased levels of employment would be short-lived
as the increase in costs for extra crew would be unsustainable when combined with the
reductions in fishing opportunities forecasted with the move to MSY.
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In the longer term, the number of FTEs in the catching sector would reduce further in these
fleet segments. The most affected groups of workers will be those which are employed on
fishing fleet segments currently discarding the most. In the fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic
(including the North Sea) this would be the beam trawl fleets exploiting flatfish species and
otter trawls targeting
Nephrops
and demersal fish in mixed fisheries. These fleets would
consist of approximately 3,500 vessels, employing around 17,200 FTE
60
. This is around 34%
of the total workforce employed on fishing vessels working in the North East Atlantic
6
. All of
these are micro-enterprises.
In the Mediterranean the demersal trawl, shellfish dredge and beam trawl fleets have the
highest discards. These fleets consist of approximately 4,200 vessels, employing around
10,586 FTE. This represents around 34% of the total workforce employed on fishing vessels
in the Mediterranean
60
. In other fleet segments the impacts are likely to be less significant as
the levels of unwanted catches are much lower and employment levels would remain at
current levels. Taking the projection made under the baseline scenario in the IA supporting
the CFP
19
of a 20% reduction in employment by 2022, which remain valid for this analysis,
would mean a loss of FTEs of around 5,560 FTEs in these fleet segments.
The increased workload and reduction in wages that will result from moving to MSY and
from the handling and landing of unwanted catches under the landing obligation will result in
deterioration in job quality for most sectors of the catching sector. The attractiveness of the
sector will reduce. This was identified as the outcome under the baseline scenario considered
in the CFP IA
19
where crew wages were expected to continue below national averages leading
to the attractiveness of the sector remaining constant at best or more likely declining. The
scale of decline in wages predicted is further illustrated by example 22:
Example 22:
A UK study
77
estimated that
Nephrops
trawlers would have to reduce the annual
number of trips undertaken by 52% compared to 2008–2010 if unwanted catches of other
species (e.g. cod and whiting) were not avoided, leading to a 38% reduction in income. This
fleet segment is estimated to currently discard ≈ 76% of its cod catches. Failure to improve
the selectivity of fishing practices under the landing obligation would lead to substantial
decrease in the number of trips (typically between -30% and -50%) and to a corresponding
decrease of income (between -15% and -30%) compared to the 2008-2010 situation.
Other stakeholders
Indirect impacts on downstream business are expected to result from the landing obligation.
With increased incomes likely for non-human consumption outlets that can utilise and profit
from unwanted catches, employment will increase in the short-term. There are also likely to
be employment benefits for transport companies and storage companies (including markets)
that will handle the previously discarded catches. The actual extent of any increases in
employment numbers is difficult to quantify as it will depend entirely on the level of
unwanted catches that would be landed. In the longer term as with the catching sector it is
doubtful whether these increased levels of employment are sustainable.
Other ancillary businesses such as gear suppliers and net manufacturers would be negatively
impacted under the baseline scenario. Reductions in income for the catching sector will have a
knock-on effect on such businesses as fishermen will try to increase cost efficiencies by
reducing gear maintenance and replacement gear costs.Overall reductions in downstream and
ancillary businesses are likely to be in line with the projections in the CFP IA
19
of -15% by
2022.
8.2.3.
Environmental impacts
Environmental impacts on fish stocks will continue to be mostly negative in the short-term
and at best may stabilise in the longer-term. Any improvements in selectivity will develop
40
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only when the economic impacts force fishermen to react. Exploitation patterns for stocks will
not change and those stocks that are overfished (as indicated in section 7.2.1) will remain
under pressure. Reaching MSY and GES under the MSFD (descriptor 3) within the target
timeframe will be extremely difficult without significant cuts in fishing opportunities and
reductions in fishing pressure.
The impacts on incidental catches of protected species including marine mammals and
seabirds (MSFD descriptor 1) will be neutral in the short-term. Existing mitigation measures
will remain in place but continue to be rather piecemeal and not necessarily targeted in the
right fisheries or areas.
For cetaceans, ICES
16,47&48
have concluded that in a number of fisheries incidental catches
remain of concern. These include:
– harbour porpoises in static nets in the Baltic, Kattegat, North Sea and Skagerrak,
Atlantic and Black Sea;
– common and striped dolphins in static nets in the Atlantic and Black Sea;
– common dolphins in pelagic trawls for bass and tuna in the Atlantic; and
– bottlenose dolphins in both pelagic trawl and static net fisheries in the Mediterranean.
For seabirds
16&78
an ICES report classified bycatch by the EU fishing fleet at c.a. 200,000
seabirds annually in EU waters with at least 25 species of seabirds in EU waters as being of
conservation concern either globally or at a local population level. Incidental catches of other
marine mammals such as seals and marine reptiles such as sea turtles are also frequently
reported.
The Natura 2000 sites already established to protect vulnerable deep-sea ecosystem both
inside the waters under Union jurisdiction as well as non-EU waters would remain in place.
However, the creation of new closed areas, although possible, will continue to be a slow
process (no new areas have been adopted outside territorial waters since 2009). For such
habitats delays in taking protection measures could lead to significant or irreversible
impacts
79
. Failure to protect areas will impair the achievement of objectives relating to
descriptors 1 and 6 of the MSFD.
Other stakeholders
Media campaigns by NGOs have undoubtedly raised awareness on discards and the
environmental impacts of fishing in general. Therefore failure to revise the technical measures
leading to environmental sustainability objectives not being met will provoke a negative
reaction from the general public as a result of such media campaigns.
8.2.4.
Simplification, administrative costs and burden
There would be no simplification of the regulations. Regionalisation of technical measures
through multiannual and discard plans would be minimal and even if did happen in the
longer-term would merely add additional rules rather than simplifying the current ones.
Administrative costs and burden will remain high for the Member States. Amending the
technical measures legislation will remain a costly and lengthy process. There will be
additional costs to Member States managing authorities related to the development of discard
plans that may contain technical measures. In the longer term, pressure to minimise economic
impacts may drive the sectors of the catching sector indicated with the highest level of
unwanted catches to actively press Member States and the Commission to develop
regionalised measures as part of multiannual plans. This will result in additional costs for
Member States.
41
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Costs to the scientific community would not be expected to change as there would be no
additional workload expected related to technical measures in the short-term. Scientists would
continue to have to develop, test and evaluate technical measures in response to requests from
the catching sector, Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament.
Costs for enforcement of technical measures would remain extremely high due to the
continued need for a high level of monitoring at sea. The retrospective analysis estimated
costs of control of around €33 million per Member State of which 57% is spent on control at
sea. Any additional costs over and above this would not be directly related to technical
measures but to implementation of the CFP and in particular the landing obligation.
Other stakeholders
There are no indirect administrative costs or burden on other stakeholders.
8.2.5.
Impacts on SMEs
Administrative burden and costs on the catching sector, most of which would be classified as
micro-enterprises (98%), would remain high. The current complex regulatory structure would
remain in place requiring fishermen to comply with multiple technical rules. There would be
also additional burden and costs resulting from the landing obligation, which would be
indirectly linked to technical measures. These costs would mainly be associated with handling
and storing unwanted catches on board, as well as for the landing, storage and transport of
such unwanted catches ashore prior to disposal or sale for non-human consumption purposes.
Costs will vary considerably from fleet segment to fleet segment depending upon the extent of
unwanted catches and the reaction of the vessel owners to deal with these problems. Reactions
could vary between hiring additional crew members, to choosing to voluntarily improve
selectivity to reduce the level of unwanted catches, choosing to illegal discards such catches
or downsizing their business.
8.3.
8.3.1.
Option 1: Consolidation
Economic impacts
MSY and the landing obligation
In the short-term the economic impacts will be similarly negative to the baseline scenario.
Any immediate changes to the regulations under discard plans or the existing legislation
would see the introduction of additional measures to reduce unwanted catches. These
measures would result in consequential short-term economic losses from reductions in
marketable catches. Past experience has shown that if these economic losses are significant
then there will be little industry buy-in and fishermen will explore ways to minimise these
losses once the measures are introduced. This is illustrated by example 23 below:
Example 23:
Several changes in codend mesh size and construction were introduced in the Baltic
cod fishery in the early 2000s to improve exploitation patterns. One of these changes was the
introduction of a BACOMA escape window of 120mm mesh size (previously a BACOMA
window of 105mm had been the legal requirement). Based on simulations and experimental
studies this gear modification was forecasted to reduce discarding by 30-40%. On this basis it was
introduced into legislation in 2002. However, no assessment was carried out prior to introduction
as to the short-term economic losses. Soon afterwards, losses of up to 40-50% were reported by
fishermen with the result that widespread gear manipulation, legal and illegal occurred. There was
no improvement in the catch profile and in September 2003 the size of the BACMA window was
reduced to 110mm
57
.
In the longer term, it is possible that driven by the need to maintain stocks at MSY and reduce
unwanted catches under the landing obligation, the catching sector will explore how different
42
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technical measures could contribute to achieving better selectivity under regionalisation.
Shifts of exploitation patterns towards the most valuable target size classes/species would
optimise the economic returns for the catching sector associated with fishing opportunities.
Larger fish will tend to achieve a higher price and this will focus selectivity in such a way as
to avoid the capture of younger age classes. The economic gains will be dependent on
whether the incentives are big enough to encourage the catching sector to accept these losses
in the short-term and adjust exploitation patterns
12
for potential gains in the longer-term.
Adaptation costs
In the short-term, costs for adapting gears to new legislation will be the same as the baseline
given this option only consolidates the current regulations. In the longer-term the move to
regionalisation where fishermen may be forced to adopt more selective gears under legislation
implies costs for adapting their fishing gears. Improving the selectivity of fishing gears by
adding specific devices into existing gears is not necessarily expensive. The retrospective
evaluation indicated that the direct cost of modifying the gears of trawlers of 12-16 m is
typically less than €1,000 and for larger vessels may be higher (€2,000-€3,000), depending on
the gear modification required
6
.
Considering a conservative average estimate of a one-off payment of €3,000 per vessel (based
on discussions with fishermen and net manufactures carried out as part of the retrospective
analysis) for purchasing and rigging into the trawl, the total cost borne by the catching sector
in the North East Atlantic and in the North Sea would be in the region of €16.4 million, if
only vessels operating active gears, the most in need of selectivity improvements, are
considered
6
. This represents ≈ 0.9 % of the annual value of their landings (See table 7.3.1).
Funding is available through the EMFF for grant aid towards those costs. Direct costs for the
catching sector can therefore be assumed to be negligible compared to the amounts to be
disbursed and the long-term benefits of improved selectivity.
Cost of selectivity
Gear
Number of vessels
Need
(€ Million)
Beam trawlers
Demersal trawlers and/or demersal seiners
Dredgers
Drift and/or fixed netters
Inactive
Pelagic trawlers
Purse seiners
Vessel using other active gears
Vessels using active and passive gears
Vessels using hooks
Vessels using other passive gears
Vessels using passive gears only for vessels < 12m
Vessels using polyvalent active gears only
Vessels using polyvalent passive gears only
Vessels using pots and/or traps
TOTAL (need = Y)
739
2 792
1 109
2 637
2 177
449
290
162
1 627
1 250
119
4 841
144
3 571
3 655
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
2.2
8.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
4.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
16.4
(€ Million)
377.5
1 297.3
140.5
217.7
346.9
243.7
5.5
85.1
86.4
1.4
38.4
35.9
72.1
181.8
377.5
1 801.3
Landing value
Table 7.3.1: Estimate of direct cost of purchasing and rigging selectivity devices into existing gears (NE
Atlantic). The "Need" column reflects the need of fleet segments to improve their current selectivity
performances
(Source: MRAG et al 2014 page 47 of prospective evaluation)
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The EMFF may also support gear adaptations that limit and, where possible, eliminate the
physical and biological impacts of fishing on the ecosystem or the sea bed and equipment that
protects gear and catches from mammals and birds protected by environmental legislation.
The costs are estimated to be similar to the above although will vary greatly from sector to
sector (e.g. incidental catch cetaceans and seabirds are higher in passive gear fisheries
compared to demersal trawl fisheries).
Competitiveness
In the short-term there will be no change in competitiveness amongst the catching sector. In
the longer-term regionalisation may introduce a degree of competiveness into the sector
between regions. Fishermen operating in those fisheries where regional measures are in place
may gain a competitive advantage over operators in other sea basins continuing under the
detailed rules imposed at Union level. This is dependent on industry buy-in into the regional
measures on the basis that they result in improved economic returns.
Other stakeholders
Impacts on downstream businesses such as fish processors, transport, storage companies and
gear suppliers would be similar to the baseline (i.e. positive for some, negative for others) in
the short-term and longer term.
The catching sector from third countries will be negatively impacted on the short-term as the
under the baseline scenario. However, they may benefit in the longer term from stable or
increased fishing opportunities if there are improvements in stock levels.
8.3.2.
Social impacts
Short-term social impacts will be negative as under the baseline. The simple change to the
governance structure of technical measures envisaged will not halt the general decline
forecasted as a result of implementation of the CFP. As with the baseline, projected declines
in employment of 10-20% by 2020 are the most likely scenario based on the IA supporting
the CFP
19
.
In the longer-term the general decline in employment is likely to stabilise. If regionalisation
evolves leading to more effective technical measures then the negative impacts should be
lessened over-time. However, this is reliant on such measures having a level of industry buy-
in.
This will be similarly the case in terms of job quality and satisfaction. Wages will decline in
line with the baseline scenario in the short-term with a gradual improvement as
regionalisation evolves. Provided reductions in unwanted catches and sustainable fishing
mortalities are achieved through regionalisation then, job quality and attractiveness of the
sector will stabilise much more quickly than under the baseline.
Other stakeholders
The social impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses will very much mirror the impacts
in the catching sector.
8.3.3.
Environmental impacts
In the short-term the environmental impacts on fish stocks would be similar to the baseline
scenario. Discard plans would provide the opportunity to introduce measures to improve
exploitation patterns for fisheries and species falling under the landing obligation in the period
up to 2016-2019. Such measures may lead to reductions in unwanted catches for those
species. The impacts on other species caught as bycatch species in those fisheries may also
benefit depending on the nature of the fishery and the gears used. Example 24 from the Celtic
Sea illustrates the reductions in unwanted catches that could be expected in a mixed fishery
44
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for cod, haddock and whiting. Given such measures are likely to result in economic losses,
positive environmental impacts will depend on compliance with these measures.
Example 24: Based on predictions by STECF
80
, increasing the codend mesh size from 100mm
to 120mm in the Celtic Sea mixed demersal fishery targeting cod, haddock and whiting would
result in reductions in discards of 2%, 14% and 15% respectively, with corresponding
reductions in marketable landings of 28%, 47% and 45%.
In the longer-term there are further benefits from including technical measures within multi-
species multiannual plans. Example 25 illustrates these potential long-term benefits
achievable through improvements in exploitation patterns.
Example 25:
The impact of improving the exploitation patterns of certain fish stocks
exploited by French fleets has been evaluated in a study by Henichart et al. (2011)
82
. For each
of the studied stocks, the F
msy
(relative to current levels of fishing mortality in 2010) was
evaluated under three assumptions:
i) SQ -
status quo (no change in current selectivity),
ii)
catches of individuals aged 2 and less not fished and
iii)
catches of individuals aged 3 and less
not fished. The resulting catches and changes in spawning stock biomass (SSB) were also
projected. The results are shown in table 7.3.3.1.
This analysis shows that stocks generally respond well to improvements in selectivity
although the benefits vary according to the stock concerned. For Northern hake and sole in the
Bay of Biscay, a change in the exploitation pattern to target older fish significantly increases
the F
msy
. For overexploited stocks (i.e.
Nephrops
in the Bay of Biscay, Celtic Sea cod and
plaice), fished above F
msy
the difference between current fishing mortality and F
msy
is
narrowed by improving selectivity. For example targeting age 2+
Nephrops
results in the
reduction of 44% required at the current level of fishing mortality to reach F
msy
being reduced
to a 19% reduction. For plaice in the Celtic Sea selectivity improvements have little influence
on target F
msy
, probably because the current exploitation pattern is already close to the
optimum exploitation pattern. Changes in F
msy
also translate into increased catches and higher
SSBs. For most of these stocks the benefits are seen most when fishing is targeted at 3 year
old fish and above.
Fishing mortality at F
msy
(relative to current F)
SQ
Age 2+
Age 3+
Northen
Hake
Sole
Biscay
Nephrops
Biscay
Cod
Celtic Sea
Plaice
Celtic Sea
0%
-19%
-44%
-45%
-64%
11%
-7%
-19%
-41%
-62%
45%
30%
101%
8%
-56%
Catches
SQ
0%
1%
11%
10%
109%
Age 2+
7%
4%
33%
14%
112%
Age 3+
25%
10%
64%
46%
122%
SQ
0%
18%
88%
143%
437%
SSB
Age 2+
2%
22%
64%
135%
436%
Age 3+
6%
35%
28%
106%
462%
Table 7.3.3.1: Quantifiable impacts of exploitation pattern on long-term MSY objective compared to
current exploitation pattern
(Source: Adapted from Henichart et al. (2011))
In the Mediterranean it will be more difficult to reduce negative environmental impacts. A
study carried out for the European Parliament
83
suggested that one possible consequence of
the landing obligation may be an increase in illegal marketing of fish below the mcrs.
Landing, storage and transportation of juveniles will be legal and this could simplify
commercialisation in the black market and incentivise the targeting of juveniles instead of the
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converse as anticipated in the northeast Atlantic. This is a long-standing problem in the
Mediterranean and not necessarily related to technical measures but could create an unwanted
incentive to drive non-compliance. Fishermen may choose to fish unselectively and target
small fish if the revenues from such catches are significant. As there are no fishing
opportunities set in the Mediterranean, Article 17 of the CFP cannot be used to counteract
these potential negative impacts.
For sensitive species and habitats the impacts will be at best neutral or negative. Existing
nature conservation measures will remain in place. Regionalisation of environmental
protection measures would provide Member States with more flexibility to develop effective
measures to achieve environmental objectives. Flexibility will allow the consideration of
trade-offs and complementarities between measures focusing on environmental requirements
under these Directives and measures aimed at the conservation of fish stocks (MSFD
descriptor 3). The identification of environmental measures contributing to MSFD descriptors
at a regional scale would better take into account the effects of certain measures which could
negatively impact other environmental requirements. For example, fishing effort displacement
as a consequence of closures adopted to contribute to descriptors 1, 4 or 6 and which could
negatively impact stock conservation (descriptor 3) can be anticipated and counteracted from
the outset.
Other stakeholders
As with the baseline scenario if perceived negatively in the short-term by NGOs this may
translate into a negative reaction from consumers.
8.3.4.
Simplification, administrative costs and burden
A degree of simplification is achieved through the consolidation of the common rules into one
Regulation. Consolidation would allow specific common provisions of some existing co-
decided regulations to be repealed to avoid duplication. Regulations containing regionally
specific measures and implementing rules would remain in place without change. In the
longer-term regionalisation of technical measures is envisaged by way of derogations to the
technical measures. It is unlikely to lead to any major simplification of the rules and may in
fact add new rules.
In the short-term as with the baseline administrative costs and burden on Member States will
remain high. There will be additional short-term costs for developing temporary discard plans
which may include technical measures. By way of example of the projected costs for
developing a temporary discard plan for pelagic fisheries in North Western waters are shown
below in example 26.
Example 26:
The development of a discard plan for pelagic fisheries in the North Western
Waters, (which contained no technical measures) required 6-8 meetings over an 8 month
period. These meetings involved representatives from 6 MS and two ACs (Pelagic Advisory
Council and North Western Waters AC). The cost of these meetings is estimated at around
€10,000-€15,000 per meeting primarily to cover travel and subsistence costs
83
. Assuming the
same level of engagement in the future this implies additional costs of around €80,000-
€120,000 for the development of a plan. These costs would likely reduce once the plans are in
place as focus would shift to monitoring and evaluation requiring a lot less formal
engagement between Member States.
In the longer-term the gradual move towards multiannual plans will lead to increasing costs
for Member States administrations. The scale of these costs will depend upon the number of
Member States involved, the number and nature of the fisheries, the complexity of the plan
and the role of technical measures within the plans. The costs for individual Member States
associated with regionalisation will also vary depending on the number of sea basins in which
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a Member State has a fisheries interest. France for instance are involved in fisheries in the
Northwestern waters, Southwestern waters, North Sea and Mediterranean so would have a
higher level of costs compared to Ireland who principally have only an interest in
Northwestern waters. The IA supporting the CFP
19
estimated the move to regionalisation is
likely to increase overall costs in the region of 20-50%, although the total direct cost to
stakeholders would depend on the allocation of funding and in particular increased
contributions from Member States as well as how the Advisory Councils structure their work
programme to take account of regionalisation. These costs would be largely front-loaded
during the development phase of multiannual and discard plans.
In the short-term costs for scientific agencies will be similar to the baseline scenario and be at
similar levels illustrated by example 27. In the longer-term to support the development of
regionalised plans that include technical measures would lead to increased costs dependent on
the detail and content of the plan. For instance a plan for pelagic fisheries would have a lot
less need for technical measures to ensure effective implementation compared to a demersal
fisheries plan where the role of technical measures has much more importance.
Example 27:
The level of funding for research that may be incurred, France allocated €2
million between 2008 and 2012 to support 11 selectivity projects (€0.9 million from the EFF
and €1.1 million national contribution
6
). Such funding possibilities will continue under the
EMFF.
Regionalisation will also involve STECF and ICES in the provision to i) the regions with
information to determine the effectiveness and relevance of regionally-specific technical
measures proposed (channelled through the Commission), and ii) the Commission with
scientific advice to determine whether to approve the proposals made at the regional level.
Provision of this advice will not necessarily result in increased costs for the Commission for
contracting STECF or ICES to provide this advice but would require adjustments to the work
programmes of both organisations to accommodate these assessments.
The costs for controlling technical measures will remain high as under the baseline scenario.
Control authorities will have to enforce the existing technical measure regulations. Any small
reductions in costs arising from the simplification of the common technical rules into one
Regulation would be offset by increased costs for monitoring the landing obligation.
In the longer term regionalisation should lead to greater acceptability (as a result of increased
participation from stakeholders in the specification of measures relevant to them in their
regions). This may result in reductions in control costs compared to the baseline if
regionalised measures under this option introduce an incentive for compliance. It can be
expected that regional measures will be more focused and streamlined, leading to improved
controllability.
Other stakeholders
The move to regionalisation should not necessarily impact on third countries fishing in Union
waters to any degree. Fishing opportunities and supporting rules including technical measures
are already subject to negotiation annually between the Union and third countries
84
.
8.3.5.
Impacts on SMEs
Regionalisation of technical measures under this option would have positive and negative
impacts on the catching sector as the main group of SMEs involved. In the short-term
administrative burden and costs would remain high for the catching sector. In the longer-term
regionalisation may lead to benefits in terms of reduced administrative burden and, through,
the Advisory Councils, much greater involvement in the decision-making process (i.e. in the
development and implementation of the multiannual and temporary discard plans). However,
there are costs associated with regionalisation as indicated which indirectly impact on SMEs
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as members of the Advisory Councils. There will also be short - and longer-term direct costs
for adaptation of gears to regionally developed measures established under multiannual or
discard plans. These costs can be offset from funding from the EMFF in the short-term.
8.4.
8.4.1.
Option 2: Framework Approach
Economic impacts
MSY and the landing obligation
The economic impacts will be positive after a short period of adjustment to the new
governance structure introduced by the framework regulation where economic impacts would
be similar to option 1. After this transitional period regionalisation of technical measures
should be accelerated provided Member States pro-actively embrace the process.
Tailor-made technical measures developed as part of multiannual and discard plans should
lead to the optimisation of exploitation patterns and facilitate the move to sustainable levels of
fishing mortality and reduction in unwanted catches as indicated under option 1. Integrating
technical measures (gear/spatial/temporal) as drivers for changes in exploitation patterns as
part of multiannual plans will have a significant bearing on the yield that can be achieved
from a given stock
12
. Using technical measures in this way will incentivise selective fishing.
There will be a strong driver for the catching sector to focus on catch profiles that are
economically optimal
12
.
These increases will not be uniform across fleet segments and are dependent on the scale of
the fisheries, the target species and the relative impact of technical measures. Regionalisation
of technical measures will be more beneficial for towed gear fisheries as improving selectivity
in these fisheries is much more critical than static gear fisheries (i.e. gillnet and longline)
which are more selective. Towed gear fisheries currently comprise around 16% (14,000
vessels) of the total EU fleet.
The IA supporting the CFP
19
estimated improvements in exploitation pattern as a result of
moving to MSY and the introduction of discard reduction strategies could lead to significant
increases (10-40%) in retained and sold catches of some species currently subject to
significant discarding depending on the fishery.
This option will also provide opportunities to move away from prescriptive rules to a more
results-based and adaptive approach using the associated selectivity associated of baseline
standards as the objective to be achieved. Such a results-based approach has shown to deliver
positive benefits in leading to the voluntary use of selective gears. This is best illustrated in
the context of the long-term management plan for cod
85
(example 26).
Example 26:
Articles 11 and 13 of the Long Term Management Plan for Cod
85
are based on
an results based approach and have resulted in largely positive outcomes
6,11&12
. They provide
the possibility for vessels to avoid future restrictions on fishing opportunities in terms of TAC
and effort adjustments (article 13) or to be exempted from effort restrictions provided that
catch rates of cod are demonstrated to be below certain thresholds (article 11). This has had a
number of substantive impacts in terms of the application of technical measures and the
development role of industry as well as on the financial viability of the sectors most impacted.
It has led to innovation in the development and testing of new and novel approaches to
minimising cod catches.
Fishermen operating availing of this option within the regulation have
reacted positively to the reward of additional days at sea in return for reducing cod mortality in
ways other than applying punitive reductions in fishing effort and fishing opportunities that would
have applied. It has managed to focus gear innovation in the right way and has instilled some
sense of ownership on the fishermen involved in the fisheries
12
. According to ICES, fishing
mortality on the cod stock in the North Sea has reduced and the stock (SSB) has increased
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significantly from a historical low levels in 2006
86
. While these outcomes are not solely as a result
of improved selectivity, the use of such gears has undoubtedly contributed significantly.
Given that the number of overfished stocks in the Mediterranean far outweigh others regions,
it is likely that the economic situation will not be as positive. The transition to sustainable
fishing will take longer to achieve and therefore the short-term economic impacts are likely to
significant on these fleets in the Mediterranean targeting highly depleted stocks – fleets
targeting mixed demersal species as identified previously. For these fleets, improving the
effectiveness of technical measures will help to cushion these impacts but will not alleviate
them altogether.
Adaptation costs
In the short term there would be adjustments to the technical measures currently in place
through the creation of baseline standards which would function as default measures while
regionalisation evolves. These baseline standards would be linked to the current rules and take
account of existing exploitation patterns (as described in section 6.4) but some sectors of the
catching sector may face marginal costs associated with adaptation to these baselines. These
could be largely offset by financial support under the EMFF.
In the longer-term with the move to a more results-based approach, where focus is more on
achieving a result, the decision of whether to change gears will be left largely to the fishermen
themselves. It would become a business decision driven by economics rather than by changes
in legislation as under option 1.
Competitiveness
The impact on the competitiveness will be similar to option 1. The advantages provided by
regionalisation in terms of flexibility will create a competitive advantage over those
continuing under the more rigid rules (e.g. common provisions and baselines) contained in the
framework regulation. This should act as a strong driver for regionalisation.
Other stakeholders
The impacts on downstream and ancillary industries will be similar to option 1 but will
depend on regionalisation affecting change in regulating technical measures quickly.
The catching sector of third countries would benefit from increased fishing opportunities as a
result of reaching MSY targets in the northeast Atlantic. Any benefits will depend indirectly
on the actions of the catching sector of the Member States.
8.4.2.
Social impacts
In the immediate short-term the social impacts on employment would be similar to the
baseline scenario as the catching sector adjusts to the challenges of moving to MSY and the
landing obligation. However, assuming that regionalisation is accelerated and the most
concerned fleet segments notably those targeting mixed demersal species, would strive
quickly to improve selectivity, any negative impacts on jobs in would be counteracted more
quickly than under the baseline. Employment levels would stabilise. The framework would
manage the hard transition period much better than option 1, where additional short-term job
losses are to be expected in EU fleets dependent on overfished stocks.
Achieving environmental sustainability as quickly as possible is a precondition for social
sustainability. The simulations in the CFP IA
19
showed that once MSY levels are achieved,
fishing opportunities will increase (by at least 20% by 2020). Such a significant increase has a
potential to create new jobs in the catching sector, as shown by the fact that, according to the
simulations, employment per vessel increases already after 2017. This is also in line with
experience of countries such as New Zealand, where the use of management instruments
allowing for the transition to sustainable fishing, very similar to those proposed by CFP
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reform, ultimately resulted in increases in catches and, consequently, in employing more
capital and manpower in the fleets
87
.
It is also in line with the EU's own experience that stocks already fished sustainably have
benefited from TAC increases. It is these TAC increases that help to maintain employment in
the sector and represent a significant source of additional income for fishermen. As examples,
the increases (based on 2012) represented additional incomes of €10 million for herring
fishermen in the Celtic Sea and €12 million more income for anglerfish fishermen in the West
Atlantic
87
.
Fishing sustainably will lead to increase income and wages and therefore job attractiveness.
Simulations carried out for the IA of the CFP show that the average wages under the new CFP
will nearly double in comparison to what would happen in the absence of reform as a result of
fishing at MSY. In addition reducing unwanted catches will decrease the workloads on board
associated with sorting and storing such catches, improving work conditions for crews.
As with the economic impacts the situation will not be as positive in the Mediterranean,
where a large number of stocks are depleted.
Other stakeholders
The impacts on downstream businesses would mirror the situation in the catching sector. If
regionalisation is effective then the impacts on these sectors will be lessened.
8.4.3.
Environmental impacts
The benefits in terms of stock sustainability would be positive compared to the baseline. In
the short-term the framework approach would manage the transition to regionalisation and,
through the inclusion of baseline standards and retention of existing measures that are still
necessary, environmental sustainability objectives would continue to be met. The benefits are
likely to be marginal but in the longer-term once plans are developed further positive benefits
to stock sustainability should accrue as fishermen strive to optimise exploitation patterns to
maximise economic returns.
In the terms of impacts on sensitive species and habitats, existing nature conservation
measures would be maintained under the framework Regulation so the impacts would be
neutral in the short-term. In the longer-term regionalisation under multiannual plans and under
Article 11 of the CFP would provide the possibility to adapt measures to be more responsive
and anticipatory to threats to marine ecosystems and to take such measures expediently.
Other stakeholders
Assuming this option is perceived positively by NGOs as indicated in the public consultation
then the certification of fisheries (such as under the Marine Stewardship Council) could
follow from sustainable and responsible fishing. Certification may lead to an improved
perception by consumers who are becoming increasingly aware of such schemes.
8.4.4.
Simplification, Administrative Costs and Burden
The current regulatory structure will be simplified significantly and provide a direct route to
regionalisation. The three overarching regulations (or most of them) would be repealed or
rationalised immediately. The current mesh size and catch composition rules contained in the
annexes to the current regulations would be converted into a smaller number of results-
orientated baseline mesh sizes while the number of closed areas would be reduced by the
removal of redundant or ineffective closures. Many of the other implementing and technical
measures contained in other regulations would be incorporated into the framework and these
regulations or provisions would be repealed. Further simplification is likely under multiannual
plans in the longer-term with the move to a results-based approach.
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There will be increased administration costs for Member States in the short-term associated
with regionalisation but this is balanced by the reduction in administrative burden as a result
of the simplification of the regulations and less time spent negotiation of regulations centrally.
These costs will stabilise in the longer term once plans are established and the focus shifts
from development to monitoring and evaluation of the plans and finding solutions to
emerging problems. The costs of regionalisation would be as projected under option 1.
Costs and changes in workloads for research institutes and scientific bodies (i.e. STECF and
ICES) would be the same as under option 1.
In the short-term control costs would reduce as a result of simplification but costs for
enforcing the remaining technical rules at sea will remain and will be significant. In the longer
term there is potential to reduce control costs considerably particularly if regions move
towards a result-based approach and widen the use of Joint Deployment Plans (JDPs). JDPs
will lead to improve coordination of monitoring and control amongst Member States within
regions. If aligned to multiannual plans they would have the potential to ensure the best use of
human and material resources pooled by Member States in a coordinated way
88
for
monitoring and control. This has been the case with a JDP introduced in 2008 which
established specific control and inspection programme for the recovery of cod stocks in the
Northeast Atlantic and the North Sea to support the implementation of the long-term
management plan for cod
85
. The total estimated cost of all six JDP
89
operations during 2013
were €43.4 million of which €34.9 million was spent on at sea inspections. This compares
favourably with the costs for individual Member States historically for at sea control.
Once there is confidence in the documentation of catches in the longer-term resulting from the
full implementation of the landing obligation (i.e. by 2019), the need for prescriptive technical
rules would diminish further and in fact once plans (and JDPs) are in place in all regions it
could be envisaged that the number of technical rules required could further reduce if Member
States chose to move in this direction. The focus of control would be shifted to monitoring
catches rather than controlling and measuring detailed gear construction and operation
resulting in substantial reductions as the need to monitor technical rules at sea would be
diminished. Based on the retrospective evaluation
6
and assuming a 10% reduction in at sea
monitoring with the use of alternative monitoring techniques such as CCTV
90
, savings in the
order of €10.2 million for the Member States in the Northeast Atlantic (based on total costs of
€102 million euros
6
) could be achieved. This shift should also act an incentive for compliance
for the catching sector given the greater flexibility it provides fishermen in how they operate.
Other stakeholders
The move to regionalisation should not impact on third countries.
8.4.5.
Impacts on SMEs
The impact on SMEs in terms of administrative costs and burden would be positive in that
there would be immediate simplification of the current regulations and a greater role for the
catching sector through the ACs in the development of technical measures. In addition the
potential move to a results-based system in the longer-term would lead to further
simplification of the technical rules but implies a shift in the burden of proof onto the catching
sector. This will put the onus on the catching sector to demonstrate and document catches
accurately. Potentially this may increase costs associated with documentation of catches
although the costs incurred would depend on the approach of the Member States to
“regionalised control” and offset against the greater flexibility such an approach would afford.
Member States may attempt to past some of the control costs onto the catching sector as a
trade-off for flexibility although equally they may choose to continue to bear the costs for
control themselves with support from the EMFF.
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8.5.
8.5.1.
Sub-option 2.1: Framework approach without baselines
Economic impacts
MSY and the landing obligation
Based on past experiences the short-term economic impacts are likely to be negative as a
result of partial "de-regulation". Partial de-regulation will introduce uncertainty and create a
legal vacuum. With no baseline standards in place there will be no measures directly
controlling exploitation patterns (i.e. mesh sizes, minimum conservation reference sizes or
closed areas would be deleted). There is a high risk that exploitation patterns will deteriorate
and fishing mortality will increase to unsustainable levels as fishermen attempt to adapt to de-
regulation. To compensate for overfishing will require downward adjustments of fishing
opportunities leading to significant reductions in incomes across the catching sector. In a
worst case scenario widespread overfishing could lead to the total closure of a fishery with
significant economic consequences. Example 27 concerning the fishery for haddock in
Rockall illustrates the potential impacts caused in a fishery with partial de-regulation.
Example 27:
The fishery for haddock around Rockall (ICES Division VIb) was traditionally
exploited by EU vessels from UK and Ireland with catches of around 6,000 tonnes valued at
around €8 million
91
. The fishery was managed under a TAC with technical measures
regulating mesh size and minimum landing size. In the late 1990s part of division VIb was
designated as being in international waters where non-EU vessels were not subject to any
TAC or technical measures. This allowed part of the fishery to be unregulated and resulted in
a fleet of Russian vessels entering the fishery. These were large vessels fishing unselectively
with small mesh codends
92
. Catches by the EU vessels began to decline following the entry of
the Russian vessels into the fishery and soon after the stock collapsed resulting in a reduction
of catches by EU vessels from 5,000 tonnes in 1999 to 430 tonnes in 2004, a reduction of
90%
91
representing a loss of revenue of around €6 million. The Russian vessels left the
fishery and since then the stock situation has steadily improved.
This sub-option may also introduce an incentive to misreport catches or alternatively discard
illegally unwanted catches to minimise economic impacts. Without adequate independent
monitoring at the level of an individual business, it could result in ‘free-rider’ effects. In the
absence of appropriate monitoring, some businesses may choose to adopt measures to
minimise unwanted catches, resulting in short-term losses while other ‘free-riders’ (those who
don’t change behaviour) may then benefit without paying for the cost. If there are sufficient
‘free-riders’, then no benefit is accrued and the individuals who have acted in a responsible
manner are effectively penalised twice
12
. The use of Article 17 to reward responsible fishing
with increased fishing opportunities may counteract these free-rider effects to a certain extent.
These negative economic impacts, however, are likely to be temporary as the risks associated
will act as a driver for Member States to put in place regional measures rapidly, in the short-
term, under discard plans and in the longer-term, under multiannual plans. At this stage the
positive impacts projected under option 2 would be the more likely outcome depending on the
scale of any impacts they may have occurred in the transition period.
Adaptation costs
The costs would be similar to option 2 but very-much dependent on the above-mentioned
"free-rider" effects.
Competitiveness
The impact on the competitiveness of the catching sector would be similar to option 2
although would be even more dependent on the speed and effectiveness of regionalisation.
Other stakeholders
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The impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses are dependent on the reaction of the
catching sector. The reaction of third countries to limited regulation is harder to assess. Some
countries may see the benefits of such an approach (e.g. in the Mediterranean) whereas in the
northeast Atlantic countries such as Norway may not agree with such an approach.
8.5.2.
Social impacts
As with the economic impacts, the short-term social impacts are likely to be negative.
Overfishing in the short-term would lead to job losses, particularly in those sectors targeting
depleted stocks in line with the reductions in employment forecast under the baseline
scenario. In the longer-term stabilisation of employment and improvement in job quality
through reductions in unwanted catches and increases in wages from landing bigger more
valuable fish is likely. Under this scenario job quality would improve in line with option 2.
Other stakeholders
The degree to which downstream and ancillary businesses are impacted will be dependent on
the reaction of the catching sector to partial de-regulation.
8.5.3.
Environmental impacts
As with the economic impacts based on previous experiences of fisheries with limited
technical measures regulations in place, the environmental impacts will be negative in the
short-term with the high risk of overfishing. The scale of impacts is illustrated in example 28
concerning the sea bass stock for which there have only been very limited technical measures
in place in the past but which have seen rapid increases in fishing pressure.
Example 28: Sea bass are a valuable fish species targeted by pelagic pair trawlers on offshore
spawning grounds and as a seasonal target and bycatch by a large fleet of inshore vessels from
many Member States. Sea bass is also an important species for recreational anglers. Despite
its importance up until 2015, apart from some national rules mainly regulating recreational
fisheries only a minimum landing size applied to the commercial fisheries at Union level.
Following a rapid increase in biomass throughout the stock area in the early 1990s there has
been a steady increase in fishing mortality and landings. During the mid-2000s recruitment of
young fish declined and has been very poor since 2008
93
. Despite this, mainly because of the
lack of any meaningful measures either nationally or at Union level to control exploitation
patterns the stock has declined dramatically. ICES advised in 2014 that fishing mortality
needs to be reduced substantially to recover the stock. In response to this the Commission has
come forward with a series of emergency technical measures including increasing the
minimum size, introducing a closed area as well as restricting fishing effort in order to
recover the stock
94
.
The negative environmental impacts are likely to be temporary and in the longer-term
provided effective measures are in place through regionalisation then the impacts should be
reduced. The speed of recovery is dependent on the scale of negative impacts caused from
overfishing.
Regarding sensitive species and habitats, the environmental impacts will be similar to option
2. Existing environmental protection measures would remain in place and in the longer-term
new measures would introduce under regionalisation to alleviate threats to such species.
Other stakeholders
Evidence from the public consultation showed that NGOs would not be in favour of partial
de-regulation. They indicated this to be a risky strategy that could lead to unsustainable
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fishing. This may translate into a negative reaction from consumers on the basis of
information from NGOs.
8.5.4.
Simplification, administrative costs and burden
There would be immediate repeal of many of the existing Regulations as well as the deletion
of specific articles from several others. Only common technical provisions and essential
nature conservation measures would remain in place.
The deletion of multiple regulations and measures would have obvious benefits in reducing
administrative burden for Member State administrations but would infer extra responsibility
for ensuring accurate catch reporting pending technical measures being put in place at
regional level. This additional responsibility would probably create additional costs for
Member States in putting in place accurate catch reporting systems although these are not
related to regulating technical measures. Member State managing authorities would incur
additional costs associated with regionalisation as described under option 2.
Costs and workloads for national/regional scientists, STECF and ICES would be similar to
those projected under option 2.
Costs for controlling technical measures will reduce in the short-term as a result of partial de-
regulation. However, reductions in costs for monitoring technical rules would be offset by the
need for increased monitoring of catches that would be required under the results-based
approach envisaged under this option. As with option 2 once there is confidence in catch
reporting then the level of control at sea could be reduced and costs are likely to reduce.
Conversely a lack of trust in catch reporting by the catching sector may lead to increased costs
for catch monitoring in the short-term. Accurate catch reporting will be harder to achieve for
towed gear demersal fisheries.
Other stakeholders
Third countries would benefit from reduced administrative burden under this option to the same
degree as the EU catching sector. However, similarly the shift in the burden of proof would result
in increased responsibilities for fishermen from third countries operating in Union waters. This
could make negotiation of third country agreements problematic.
8.5.5.
Impacts on SMEs
The catching sector would benefit from the reduction of administrative burden and costs
associated with partial de-regulation. In addition the move to a results-based approach would
be positive for the catching sector as under option 2 in providing greater flexibility in how
they operate. Regionalisation will bring increased costs through the involvement of the
catching sector with the ACs but has the benefit of increased their participation in developing
technical measures. The risks of overfishing are high which would negatively impact on the
catching sector.
8.6.
8.6.1.
Option 3: Elimination of technical measures
Economic impacts
MSY and the landing obligation
The economic impacts are likely to be similarly negative as sub-option 2.1 in the short-term.
The impacts are critically dependent on the degree of compliance and
reaction of the catching
sector to “de-regulation”.
"De-regulation" as envisaged could lead to widespread overfishing
with knock-on economic impacts which would be significant and likely to be longer-term than
under sub-option 2.1 without any direct linkage to regionalisation.
Adaptation costs
54
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1609440_0066.png
The costs would be similar to sub-option 2.1.
Competitiveness
"De-regulation" would introduce a high degree of competitiveness amongst the catching
sector as individual operators would have almost complete freedom to decide on how to
operate in the short-term. This could lead to "Olympic fisheries" as fishermen strive to catch
available fishing opportunities as quickly as possible to maximise economic efficiency
without necessarily having any regard for the environmental impacts on the stocks that could
result (i.e. fishing unselectively and illegally discarding low-vale unwanted catches). In a
worst case scenario this will result in the least efficient operators or fishermen choosing to
fish responsibly being driven out of the industry before Member States have had time to react
with regionally rules or the introduction of rules at Union level. Incentives in the form of
additional fishing opportunities to those who fish responsibly allowed for under Article 17 of
the CFP may help to alleviate these impacts.
Other stakeholders
The reaction of third countries to "de-regulation" is uncertain. Some countries may see the
benefits of such an approach (e.g. in the Mediterranean) whereas in the northeast Atlantic
countries such as Norway may be negative towards such a management strategy.
8.6.2.
Social impacts
The social impacts would be similar to sub-option 2.1.
Other stakeholders
The impacts on downstream and ancillary businesses will be dependent on the reaction of the
catching sector.
8.6.3.
Environmental impacts
The environmental impacts are most likely to be negative as under sub-option 2.1. There is an
even higher risk of overfishing with corresponding negative impacts on stock sustainability,
which may be difficult to reverse in the short-term. If the catching sector reacted positively
and move to sustainable fishing then the impacts would be alleviated reasonably quickly.
However, past experience prior to the CFP would suggest that some level of technical rules is
required otherwise sustainability is threatened. In the Mediterranean there is a risk under this
option of fishermen targeting small fish without no minimum conservation reference sizes in
place in the short-term. This would have significant negative impacts on stocks in the
Mediterranean
13
.
Essential environmental protection measures (e.g. closed areas) would remain in place.
Therefore in the short-term the impacts would be neutral as per the baseline scenario. In the
longer-term environmental impacts may reduce but will depend on Member States on
introducing effective measures regionally.
Other stakeholders
There is likely to be a negative reaction to "de-regulation" from the NGOs. This evidenced by
the public consultation and may translate into a negative reaction from consumers affecting
prices and economic viability.
8.6.4.
Simplification, administrative costs and burden
The removal of virtually all technical rules and also a significant reduction of administrative
costs and burden is the major advantage. Most of the existing regulations would be repealed
55
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1609440_0067.png
as well as specific articles relating to technical measures would be deleted. The deletion of
multiple regulations and measures would have obvious benefits for Member State
administrations in cutting red-tape but the immediate move to a fully-fledged results-based
approach would infer extra responsibility for accurate catch reporting. In the longer-term,
some level of regulation may actually be re-introduced to prevent or reverse the damage
caused by unsustainable fishing.
Administrative burden and costs for national/regional scientists, STECF and ICES would be
similar to those described for sub-option 2.1.
Costs for control would follow a similar evolution as predicted under sub-option 2.1. There
would be significant reductions in control costs for at sea enforcement of technical rules but
this would be offset to some extent by increased catch monitoring.
Other stakeholders
Impacts would be the same as those predicted under option 2 and sub-option 2.1.
8.6.5.
Impacts on SMEs
This option has obvious benefits for the catching sector in terms of reductions in
administrative burden and costs associated with complying with technical rules. However, de-
regulation would introduce uncertainty into the industry and create an uneven playing field at
the level of individual fishermen. Free –rider effects are likely to be significant.
8.7.
Summary of impacts
Table 8.7.1 summarises the economic, social and environmental impacts on the key
stakeholders of the different policy options compared to the baseline scenario.
56
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Impacts
Baseline Scenario
Option 1
Consolidation
Option 2
Framework Regulation
With Baselines Standards
Without Baselines Standards
(Sub-option 2.1)
Option 3
Elimination of Technical
Measures
Economic
(catching
sector)
MSY and the
landing obligation
Neutral –
No change in
number of overfished
stocks. Unwanted
catches remain high.
Impacts most acute in
mixed demersal
fisheries.
Neutral -
No additional
costs.
Neutral –
Same as
baseline in the short-
term. Longer-term
situation may improve.
Adaptation costs
Competitiveness
(catching sector)
Neutral –No
change
Neutral –
Similar to the
baseline. In the longer-
term costs may increase
as fishermen are forced
to adapt gears due to
economic losses.
Neutral –
Same as
baseline.
Neutral or Positive –
After
initial transitional period
framework will accelerate
regionalisation leading to the
optimisation of exploitation
patterns and facilitate
movement to sustainable
fishing
Neutral –
Short-term costs to
adjust to baselines. Longer-
term gear adaptation becomes
a business decision rather than
driven by legislation
Positive –
Regionalisation
may introduce competitiveness
between catching sectors in
different regions
Neutral or Positive –
Similar
to baseline in the short-term
but fishing sustainably will
lead to stabilise employment
and increase income and
wages.
Positive –
Regionalisation
should lead to improve
exploitation patterns reducing
overfishing and effective
measures introduce for
Negative –
Very much dependent on
the reaction of the catching sector to
partial de-regulation but overfishing
in the short-term likely lead to
reductions in fishing opportunities. In
the longer-term regionalisation
should improve the situation.
Neutral –
Short-term costs to adjust
to baselines. Longer-term gear
adaptation becomes a business
decision rather than driven by
legislation
Positive –
regionalisation may give a
competitive advantage but dependent
on reaction to partial de-regulation
and potential
Negative –
Very much dependent on
the reaction of the catching sector to
partial de-regulation dependent on
the reaction of the catching sector to
partial de-regulation
Negative/Positive –
Partial de-
regulation may lead to overfishing.
In the longer-term situation should
improve and overfishing reduced.
Impacts on sensitive species and
Negative –Critically
dependent on the reaction of
the catching sector to de-
regulation
Social (catching
sector)
Employment &
Working
conditions
Neutral –
employment
likely to continue to
decline with a general
deterioration in job
quality likely.
Neutral –
No
improvement in levels
of overfishing or
impacts on sensitive
species or habitats
Neutral –
Same as
baseline. In the longer-
term situation should
stabilise with the move
to regionalisation.
Neutral –
Same as
baseline. In the longer-
term the situation may
improve
Environmental
impacts
Biological &
Physical impacts
Neutral –
Short-term costs
to adjust to baselines.
Longer-term gear adaptation
becomes a business decision
rather than driven by
legislation
Negative or Positive –
De-
regulation will introduce
competitiveness but free-
rider effects and Olympic
fishing may result.
Negative –
Very much
dependent on the reaction of
the catching sector to partial
de-regulation dependent on
the reaction of the catching
sector to de-regulation.
Negative –
De-regulation
may lead to overfishing and
negative impacts on sensitive
species that may hard to
reverse.
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sensitive species and habitats
Simplification
Neutral -
no
simplification
Neutral –
no increase
in workload or costs.
Multiple regulations
will still need to be
administered.
Neutral –
no change
Administrative
Costs & Burden
National
Administrations
Slightly Positive
-
Common rules
incorporated into one
Regulation
Neutral –
Same as
baseline
Positive -
Rules incorporated
into one Framework regulation
Neutral –
Simplification of
rules will reduce
administrative burden but
balanced against increased
workload and costs for
managing regionalisation
Neutral –
Same as option 1
habitats will be unchanged in the
short-term but improve in the longer-
term.
Positive –
Common rules
incorporated into one Framework
regulation without baselines
standards
Neutral –
Simplification of rules will
reduce administrative burden but
balanced against increased workload
and costs for managing
regionalisation.
Neutral –
Same as option 1
Positive -
most regulations
would be deleted
immediately
Neutral -
Simplification of
rules will reduce
administrative costs and
burden but additional
workload and costs arise if
overfishing occurs as a result
of de-regulation
Neutral
– Same as sub-
option 2.1
Scientific
Community
Neutral –
Same as
baseline. In the longer-
term costs may increase
to support the
development of
regionalised plans
Neutral –
Same as
baseline. In the longer-
term regionalisation may
lead to reduced control
costs.
Negative or Positive –
Admin burden & costs
remain high but greater
involvement in decision-
making through
regionalisation
Control Costs
Control and
Enforcement
Agencies
Neutral –
High costs of
control will continue
Neutral or Positive –
Move
towards a focus on catch based
management reduces the need
for control of detailed
technical rules and therefore
reduce costs
Positive –Costs
associated
with regionalisation balanced
against greater participation in
decision-making process &
simplification
Neutral or Positive –
Move towards
a focus on catch based management
reduces the need for control of
detailed technical rules and therefore
reduce costs
Positive –Costs
associated with
regionalisation balanced against
greater participation in decision-
making process & simplification but
de-dependent on reaction of catching
sector to partial de-regulation
SMEs
Catching Sector
Neutral –
Costs
&Admin burden remain
high
Positive or Negative–
Costs
for control will decrease in
the short-term as a result of
de-regulation but may
increase to compensate for
increased costs for
monitoring catches
Positive or Negative –
Costs
associated with
regionalisation balanced
against greater participation
in decision-making process
& simplification but free-
rider effects likely
Table 7.6.1: Summary of impacts for the different policyoptions
(Source: Author)
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9.
9.1.
C
OMPARING THE OPTIONS
Qualitative assessment against the general, specific and operational objectives
Table 8.1.1 provides a comparison of options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the technical measures compared to the baseline
.
Options
Baseline Scenario
Option 1 -
Consolidation
Option 2 Framework
With baselines
standards
+
Introduces
flexibility through
regionalisation
which provides the
potential for
improvements in
exploitation patterns
Without baseline
standards
-/+
Introduces flexibility
through regionalisation
which provides the
potential for
improvements in
exploitation patterns
but dependent on the
reaction of the catching
sector to partial de-
regulation
+/-
Flexibility provided by
regionalisation
combined with
simplification should
improve effectiveness
but there is risk partial
de-regulation leading to
overfishing
Option 3 –Elimination
General Objectives
Bringing all European fish stocks to MSY by 2015 or 2020 at
the latest
Reduction of unwanted catches and elimination of discards in
fisheries subject to catch limits by 2019
Achievement of GES by 2020, as established under the
MSFD
0
No new measures or
change in regulatory
structure envisaged.
0
No new measures
or change in
regulatory
structure envisaged
in the short-term.
-/+
Introduces flexibility
but fully dependent on
the reaction of the
catching sector to full
de-regulation.
Improvement in the effectiveness of technical measures;
0
No change
0
Only minimal
change in structure
in the short-term.
Specific Objectives
+
Flexibility provided
by regionalisation
combined with
simplification
should improve
effectiveness
Defines clear objectives and success criteria
0
Uses the overarching
objectives of the CFP
+
Specific targets
and indicators are
established in the
framework
59
+
Specific targets and
indicators are
established in the
framework
+
Specific targets and
indicators are
established in the
framework regulation to
+/-
De-regulation provides
maximum flexibility
and shifts the burden of
proof to the catching
sector to demonstrate
targets and objectives of
the CFP are being met
but de-regulation runs
the risk of widespread
overfishing
0
Uses the overarching
objectives of the CFP
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1609440_0071.png
Eliminates over-regulation and simplifies
.
0
Existing 'web' of
regulations remain in place
Flexible legal framework for technical measures and acts as a
vehicle for regionalisation
Promotes a transparent and participatory approach to the
definition and specification of technical measures.
Establish incentive structures linked to the added flexibility
offered by regionalisation and rewarding of "responsible
fishing"
0
No added flexibility
provided. Regionalisation
is an option but not the
focus
0
Relies on role for
stakeholders established in
the CFP.
0
No new incentives created
over and above what is
already included in the
CFP
regulation to
complement CFP
+
Level of
simplification
through
consolidation of
common measures
into one regulation
0
As baseline
regulation to
complement CFP
++
Measures
consolidated into
one framework
regulation.
complement CFP
++
Measures consolidated
into one framework
regulation
++
De-regulation most
measures and
regulations deleted
0
As baseline
0
No new incentives
created over and
above what is
already included in
the CFP
Establish clear targets
0
Uses the overarching
targets defined in the CFP
0
No indicators defined
Establish indicators to measure success
Delete redundant rules and simplify other rules to make them
understandable and controllable;
0
Existing 'web' of
regulations remain in place
0
Targets defined in
overarching
regulation
0
Indicators defined
in overarching
regulation
+
Level of
simplification
through
consolidation of
common measures
+
Increased flexibility
and provides direct
linkage to
regionalisation
+
Clear role for
stakeholders defined
in framework
+
Increased flexibility
and opportunities to
move towards a
results-based
approach under
regionalisation
included in
framework
+
Targets defined in
the framework
regulation
+
Indicators defined in
the framework
++
Measures
consolidated into
one framework
regulation
+
Increased flexibility and
provides direct linkage
to regionalisation
+
Clear role for
stakeholders defined in
framework
+/-
Increased flexibility and
opportunities to move
towards a results-based
approach under
regionalisation included
in framework
+/-
As sub-option 2.1
0
As baseline
Operational Objectives
+
Targets defined in the
framework regulation
+
Indicators defined in the
framework
++
Measures consolidated
into one framework
regulation
+/-
Increased flexibility and
opportunities to move
towards a results-based
approach created
through de-regulation
but danger of "free-
rider" effects negating
positive incentives
0
As baseline
0
As baseline
++
De-regulation with most
measures and
regulations deleted
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Manage the transition to regionlisation in the period up to
2020 by defining baseline standards
0
Relies on existing
measures to act as
baselines
into one regulation
0
Relies on existing
measures to act as
baseline standards
+
Establishes
baselines based on
existing measures
-
Relies on measures to
be developed under
regionalisation
Establish the necessary legal architecture to allow deviation
from these baseline standards and provide for the
development of alternative measures
0
Relies on the existing
empowerments included in
the CFP
0
As baseline
++
Establishes legal
architecture in the
framework
regulation
+
Clear role for
stakeholder defined
in framework
Establish linkages with the CFP to allow for stakeholder
involvement in the development of technical measures
0
Relies on role for
stakeholders established in
the CFP.
0
As baseline
+
Establishes legal
architecture in the
framework regulation
but without defined
baselines
+
Clear role for
stakeholder defined in
framework
-
No baseline standards
included. Relies on the
CFP to drive
improvements in
selectivity
0
As baseline
0
As baseline
Table 8.1.1 Comparison of options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the technical measures
(Source: Author)
Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact, - = negative impact, -/+ = both positive and negative impacts,
 kom (2016) 0134 - Ingen titel
9.2.
Effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability
Effectiveness
95
Given this initiative concentrate on changes in governance with only limited to changes to the
substance of the regulations, the analysis of effectiveness centres on the benefits of
introducing flexibility, simplifying the regulatory structure, creating incentives for
behavioural change and compliance and through greater stakeholder participation instilling a
sense of ownership with the measures put in place.
Option 1 is not likely to enhance the contribution of technical measures to the achievement of
the general objectives of the CFP compared to the baseline scenario, at least in the short-
term.
The minimal changes in the regulatory structure through splitting common measures
from regional rules only partially address the specific and operational objectives. Technical
measures are still very much prescriptive and restrictive and there is no direct driver for
regionalisation. Amendments to technical measures would be principally under co-decision
with only the existing empowerments in the regulations providing a degree of flexibility. This
would result in more regulations being added to the regulatory framework (i.e. still very much
a top-down prescriptive approach) or derogations, diluting effectiveness as is currently the
case. There would be little no added incentives over and above what is included in the CFP
and the weaknesses relating to the lack of involvement of stakeholders would continue. The
definition of clear objectives and indicators to measures success would be beneficial and even
if the use of regionalisation under this option may not necessarily translate into simpler rules,
it can be expected that regional measures will be more focused and streamlined, leading to
improved effectiveness and controllability in the longer-term.
Option 2 would be more effective than the baseline and option 1.
The degree to which
effectiveness would be improved is related to the speed of regionalisation (as outlined in
Section 9.3). The quicker regionalisation evolves across the region, the more effective the
framework will become. In this regard by providing clear and direct linkage to regionalisation
it would act driver for regionalisation. It would provide
flexibility
and the opportunity in the
longer-term to move towards a
results-based approach
where the need for detailed rules is
reduced. Under such an approach the stakeholders have a much greater sense of ownership of
the fisheries. This combined with the copper fastening of the
clearly defined role for
stakeholders
provided by the CFP through the Advisory Councils in the development of
technical measures regionally should provide a
greater incentive for compliance
and to fish
selectively.
In addition, even without the swift development of technical measures at regional level this
option provides for a level of
simplification
through the repealing of a number of existing
regulations and the deletion of redundant measures (i.e. addresses the weakness of
prescriptive and complex rules). This will have immediate benefit for the catching sector in
reducing and simplifying the rules that must be complied with but also for control authorities
who will have to monitor compliance. This option provides for the
smooth transition to
regionalisation,
while it also allows for the review and consolidation of existing measures that
may be needed in the short-term to ensure the sustainability objectives of the CFP continue to
be met while regionalisation evolves. As with option 1 the definition of clear and measurable
objectives and indicators in the form of targets to measure success will address one of the five
main weaknesses identified with the current regulatory structure. Option 2 will benefit
fisheries in the NE Atlantic and Baltic the most. In the Mediterranean, without TAC and
quotas based on current experiences, regionalisation is likely to be much slower to develop. It
will be harder for Member States to incentivise the use of more selective gears in the absence
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of fishing opportunities to allocate to reward good practice. The existence of "black" markets
for undersize fish will also provide a dis-incentive in the short-term for improved selectivity.
Sub-option 2.1
provides many of the same benefits as option 2. However, it introduces
uncertainty and creates a partial legal vacuum in the short-term without baseline standards to
act as safeguards in the transitional period up to 2020. There is a risk it will not deliver on the
general objectives of the CFP as partial de-regulation may lead to "free-rider" effects with
fishermen choosing to fish unselectively to gain advantage over their competitors. It relies
heavily on Member States and stakeholders pro-actively embracing regionalisation and
regionalisation being immediately effective. There is a risk of over-fishing particularly in the
short-term with these options although it is likely these negative impacts will be reversed once
regionalisation "kicks-in".
Option 3 has clear benefits in
eliminating over-regulation and simplification
through
immediate de-regulation. As sub-option 2.1 it is an entirely results-based approach where the
burden of proof is shifted to the catching sector to demonstrate compliance which some
sections of the catching sector have argued for. However, the same risk of overfishing exists
and it is doubtful under this option that the Commission or Member States would be able to
react in time to prevent significant negative impacts which may be hard to reverse without
having to resort to significant cuts in fishing opportunities and fishing effort. De-regulation
may create an incentive for fishermen to discard illegally rather than fish selectively, if there
are costs associated with selective fishing in terms of lost catches. In turn the costs for control
could increase significantly if there is no trust that the catching sector is reporting catches
accurately.
Efficiency
96
Option 1 would provide no advantage over the baseline in terms of cost efficiency in the
short-term.
The costs for enforcement of technical measures would continue to be very high,
as Member States would still be required to enforce the existing raft of technical rules in
addition to the increased levels of catch monitoring that would be required to implement the
landing obligation. In the longer –term cost efficiency may improve as regionalisation evolves
but this is dependent on what measures are introduced at the regional level
Options 2 and sub-option 2.1 potentially will lead to cost efficiencies in the short to longer
term as both of these options are based on the development of regionally specific measures.
Through simplification and moving towards a results-based approach would result in the
focus of control switching to the monitoring of control of catches with less emphasis on
regulating technical rules. In addition as confidence builds that fishermen are complying with
the rules in place the need for costly sea based monitoring would diminish, lowering costs.
Member States and stakeholders (i.e. the ACs) would, though incur increased costs in the
short-term as a result of regionalisation. These costs could be minimised if the ACs are
successful at adjusting their work programmes to the requirements of the regionalisation
process. With the move to fishing at MSY and the introduction of the landing obligation the
CFP has moved in this direction so aligning the regulatory structure of technical measures to a
catch based approach will help to achieve the objectives more cost efficiently than the current
regulatory structure. Aligning the technical measures with regionally based JDP programmes
may also help to reduce costs of enforcement.
The cost efficiency of option 3 is dependent on the speed of behavioural change.
If in the
short-term there is no confidence that the catching sector is accurately reporting catches then
the increases costs for controlling and monitoring catches will outweigh any savings from
"de-regulation". If confidence is greater, then cost-efficiency will increase as with option 2
and sub-option 2.1.
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Coherence
97
Option 1 is coherent with the overarching sustainability objectives of the CFP but not fully
coherent with regionalised decision-making.
Regionalisation is likely to be very much piece-
meal rather than targeted. This option provides only limited scope for simplification and so
does not fully correspond to the objectives for Better Regulation under the REFIT
programme
2
. It does not further the linkage with EU environmental policy at least in the
short-term.
Option 2 and sub-option 2.1 are coherent with the objectives of the CFP and provide a
governance structure that is fully in line with regionalisation.
They represent a high level of
simplification through the creation of one single framework Regulation rather than retaining
multiple Regulations as with the baseline so are coherent with the REFIT programme
2
. Both
will establish much better linkage of environmental policy with technical measures. However,
there is a risk with sub-option 2.1 that the sustainability objectives of the CFP could be
compromised if the catching sector does not choose to fish responsibly in the transition
towards regionalisation.
As with sub-option 2.1 the absence of any technical rules in the short-term under option 3
may jeopardise meeting the sustainability objectives of the CFP.
It does not necessarily
promote regionalisation. Simplification is achieved by the immediate deletion of the majority
of technical measures regulations. As with option 1 it does not further the linkage with EU
environmental policy at least in the short-term.
Acceptability
Option 1 would be the least acceptable of the options put forward.
It represents a
consolidation rather than an overhaul of the current regulatory structure. Member States, the
Advisory Councils, NGOs nor the catching sector felt this was a good option. It also limits the
role of the co-legislators because there would be only minor changes to the current regulatory
structure and any future changes would simply add on additional rules. There would be little
or no pressure form stakeholders or added incentive for Member States to develop
regionalised technical measures strategically as part of multiannual plans or any real incentive
for the ACs to engage proactively.
Option 2 was the preferred option for Member States, several of the Advisory Councils, NGOs
and most of the catching sector.
They saw it as the best way to manage the transition to full
implementation of the landing obligation, reaching MSY and implementing the MSFD.
Institutionally this option is more balanced than option 1 in that it provides the co-legislators
with an opportunity to establish a new structure for technical measures. It also allows them to
fix overarching objectives and targets as well the baseline standards that will be the default
option in the absence of measures at regional level. It also promotes a bottom-up approach by
providing stakeholders with a clear role in the development of tailored made measures for
their particular sea basin. The other advantage is that it has the added safeguard in the form of
existing measures that need to remain in place pending regionalisation.
Sub-option 2.1 was favoured by certain sectors of the fishing industry that did not see the
need for baseline measures to be included under the framework.
Member States, the NGOs
and some of Advisory Groups were less in favour seeing this as a riskier option, which would
introduce uncertainty. Institutionally it is weaker than Option 2 as the co-legislators have
much less of a direct role in shaping technical measures. They have input into setting the
objectives and principles and agreeing on common measures but would have no say in the
describing of the major implementing measures such as mesh size, minimum conservation
reference sizes and closures which would be agreed regionally. It is also riskier in that it is
64
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1609440_0076.png
reliant on multiannual plans being developed quickly and on technical measures contained in
temporary discard plans to form a stop-gap in this transitional period.
Option 3 would seem to be unacceptable to the Member States and NGOs
as it does not have
any in built safeguards to deal with conservation problems that emerge. Several of the
Advisory Councils were similarly negative. However, as mentioned above, some of the
catching sector preferred this option mainly as it does away with most technical rules. It relies
on the introduction of technical measures largely through other instruments of the CFP or on a
voluntary basis so instructionally it gives the co-legislators little role in defining technical
measures.
Table 8.2.1 summarises the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and
acceptability by stakeholders in achieving the objectives.
Effectiveness
Option 1
Option 2
Sub-Option
2.1
Option 3
+
++
?
Efficiency
0
-/+
-/+
Coherence
0
++
+
Acceptability
0
+
-/+
?
-/+
-/+
-/+
Table 8.2.1 Comparison of the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability in
achieving the objectives
(Source: Author)
Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - =
negative impact, -/+ = both positive and negative impacts, ? = impact unknown
9.3.
Risk Assessment
The impacts of the different options compared to the baseline, as well as their effectiveness,
efficiency, coherence and acceptability by stakeholders are assessed assuming regionalisation
is effective. This assumption is not free of risks, and in selecting a preferred option the extent
to which they may affect the different options need to be considered.
Four main risk factors exist:
The speed of regionalisation
Option 1
is not impacted directly by the speed of regionalisation. However, it carries a high
risk that if regionalisation is slow to evolve then the current technical measures will remain in
place for much longer. Acceptance of such a regulatory structure would be low. The incentive
for compliance would remain similarly low as in would remain "top-down" rather than
"bottom-up".
Option 2
provides for a smooth transition to regionalisation by acting as a central storage
facility for existing measures that should remain in place while regionalisation evolves. It
allows for the risk of regionalisation being slower and uneven across regions. It clearly
triggers regionalisation where directly involved stakeholders see merits to it.
Sub-option 2.1
relies heavily on regionalisation evolving quickly than envisaged under option
2. In this regard it carries a higher risk than option 2.
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Although
option 3
is a high risk strategy, it is not necessarily impacted by the speed of
regionalisation. It relies on the incentive generated by the landing obligation to affect change
and much is left to Member States and stakeholders to decide whether technical measures will
be needed under plans in the future.
Managing the transition to regionalisation
While regionalisation develops it is important to ensure there is no legal vacuum during the
transition and that conservation objectives continue to be met.
Option 1,
which assumes regionalisation will be slow to develop, carries a low risk. The
governance structure envisaged means the existing rules will be in place, which provides
some guarantee that the current situation will not deteriorate any further.
Option 2
provides for a smooth transition so the risk of a legal vacuum or conservation issues
is relatively low.
Sub-option 2.1
and
option 3
are higher risk strategies as in the short-term there would be
fewer technical rules in place to directly control exploitation patterns
.
The transition from the
current management approach to regionalisation is very much left to Member States and the
catching sector. There is no guarantee that by the time regionalised plans are developed the
situation economically and environmentally would not have deteriorated beyond repair.
Risk of non-compliance and incentive for change
Regionalisation instils a sense of ownership in that the measures put in place will have
originated from the Member States themselves with the direct input of the fishing industry
through the Advisory Councils. There is a far bigger incentive for Member States to enforce
their own rules and much more likelihood of compliance with rules in which the industry has
had a direct say in developing. This is compared to the current top-down system where the
rules emanated from the Commission and agreed on by the Member States with little or no
direct involvement of the stakeholders. Developing this ownership should create more of an
incentive for local management and peer pressure amongst fishermen to actively report on
other fishermen breaking the rules. Currently there is a perception that those who break the
rules are those who benefit most. Regionalisation should minimise this.
Added to this, regionalisation should introduce much more flexibility into the system
providing rules tailored to the specific fisheries and that can be changed relatively quickly to
react to evolving problems. Rules under co-decision lack this flexibility and specificity as
they tend to be "one size fits all" solutions.
The EMFF provides clear financial incentives for fishermen to develop and test new gears or
management approaches developed as part of regionalisation, to adapt existing gears to
improve selectivity or diversify to gears with lower ecosystem impacts. Article 17 of the CFP
also provides Member States with the possibility of rewarding responsible fishing with
increased fishing opportunities.
In this context,
option 1
does not provide any new incentive for compliance compared to the
baseline scenario. There is a high risk that the current low levels of compliance with some
technical measures (e.g. the use of illegal attachments to the codends of trawls and the use of
acoustic deterrent devices to mitigate against cetacean bycatch) and the incentive for
fishermen to minimise the impacts of the rules would continue. This may improve in the
longer term as rules that are better adapted to meet the needs of the regions are developed.
The governance framework under
option 2
is better suited to addressing the shortcomings of
the current technical measures regulations compared to the baseline situation. It should
66
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produce positive impacts on sustainability of exploitation, and contribute to a decrease in
control costs and burden as well simplification of existing rules. Incentives are provided
through increased flexibility, greater ownership and simpler rules in addition to the existing
mechanisms.
The lack of rules under
sub-option 2.1
and
option 3
could act as a strong driver for non-
compliance and has the risk that fishermen, within regions and between regions, would adopt
different strategies or in a worst case scenario, fishermen would exploit the lack of technical
rules to fish unselectively and irresponsibly - "free-rider" effects. This would create tensions
between fishermen and Member States. However, if these options were accepted then they
would drive self-regulation and the use of peer pressure amongst fishermen.
Risk of uneven implementation or creation of uneven playing field
Regionalisation as envisaged in the CFP will lead to a certain degree of uneven
implementation but this a policy choice made by the co-legislators in the CFP. They have
already accepted this risk when agreeing on regionalisation. Uneven implementation may
create tensions between Member States in the short-term as different rules are developed
between different regions. However, this may in fact act as an incentive for Member States in
regions where regionalisation is slower to evolve and it is anticipated that this will help
Member States to "learn" from "doing". For example based on the experiences to date with
regionalisation in respect of temporary discard plans it is clear that Member States in the
Northeast Atlantic and the Baltic have been more effective at working collectively at the
regional level than in the Mediterranean where there has been only minimal contact between
the Member States. However, there are indications that the Member States in the
Mediterranean have recognised this and have begun to explore and establish mechanisms to
facilitate work regionally taking from the examples of the regional groups of Member States
established in other regions (e.g. the Scheveningen group in the North Sea).
The risk of uneven implementation is highest with
sub-option 2.1
and
option 3
which rely
heavily on regionalisation to succeed.
The inclusion of baseline measures on
option 2
lessens this risk, while the framework is
designed to act directly as a vehicle to encourage regionalisation.
Option 1
is less reliant on regionalisation and so less susceptible to any problems generated
through uneven implementation across regions.
Regarding the disturbance of the creation of level playing field for technical measures felt
important by stakeholders, again this is a risk associated with regionalisation which has been
accepted by the co-legislators.
Under
option 2
and
sub-option 2.1,
clear objectives will be set in the framework regulation,
and agreed on by the co-legislators. These will apply across all regions ensuring a level-
playing field at the highest level. Operationally how Member States and stakeholders choose
to achieve these objectives is left open so there is possibility that different measures will apply
in different areas. However, free-rider effects under sub-option 2.1 would negate any concept
of a "level playing field".
Option 1
carries a lower risk of uneven measures as this option envisages less latitude for
Member States to adapt measures regionally but also defines objective at the level of the co-
legislator.
Option 3
runs the highest risk of creating an uneven playing field. Under such a de-regulated
approach there is a danger of widely different approaches emerging across regions. There is a
risk of "Olympic fishing".
67
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1609440_0079.png
10.
R
ANKING THE OPTIONS
Retaining the current technical measures under the baseline scenario is not an option.
Option 2
best meets the objectives set and provides a level of security that conservation
objectives will continue to be met while regionalisation develops. In the longer-term (at the
latest by 2022) option 2 aims to have most technical measures required included under
regional plans. Option 2 is best geared to managing the transition to regionalisation.
Sub-option 2.1
and
option 3
would bring about simplification of technical measures
immediately which would find favour with the catching sector but are riskier. They rely in the
short-term on significant behavioural change of fishermen and on peer-pressure and self-
regulation to ensure unselective fishing practices do not prevail. Member States, some
sections of the catching sector and NGOs seem reluctant to move in this direction. However,
in the longer-term most Member States, the catching sector and the NGOs see this as a
management approach to work towards.
Option 1
is the least favoured and received very little support by stakeholders as an acceptable
option. In the short-term it essentially keeps the current complex regulatory structure in place
and does not provide any clear incentives for stakeholders over and above the baseline
scenario. It is also not fully coherent with the spirit of regionalisation as envisaged under the
CFP. It does not directly manage the transition to regionalisation but is a low risk option in
the sense that it assumes that by maintaining the current rules in place until regionalisation
develops, the current situation will not deteriorate further.
Option 2 is the preferred option.
11.
11.1.
M
ONITORING AND
E
VALUATION
Monitoring
Under the preferred option clear targets that would act as success indicators would be
established for the reduction and as far as possible the elimination of unwanted catches by
2019 and fishing at MSY for all stocks by 2020. Targets for the reduction of the negative
impacts of fishing on marine ecosystems to contribute to the achievement of GES by 2020
would also be established. In order to measure achievement of these targets the following
environmental, economic, social and compliance indicators are proposed:
Environmental
Evolution of catch profiles (from DCF data):
catch profiles in terms of mean
lengths or proportion of fish larger than mcrs will be used to monitor improvements of
the selectivity properties of fishing gears.
Number of stocks at MSY (from ICES advice):
the number of stocks fished at F
msy
will be used to monitor the success of technical measures of increasing selectivity
leading to improved exploitation patterns.
Evolution of incidental catches (from DCF data):
the level of bycatch compared to
overall population levels will be used to monitor the effectiveness of mitigation
measures introduced to reduce incidental catches.
Evolution of protection of sensitive habitats or seabed integrity (from DCF data):
the number of closed areas crated to protect sensitive habitats, as well as the
effectiveness of mitigation measures developed to allow low impact fishing in such
areas.
68
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Economic
Income, GVA, revenue/breakeven revenue and net profit margins (from DCF
data):
the success of technical measures in contributing to revenues remaining stable
following the introduction of the landing obligation and the move to MSY.
Social
Employment (FTE) and crew wages per FTE (from DCF data):
the success of
technical measures in ensuring employment and crew wages do not deteriorate.
Compliance
Number of infringements related to technical rules (from control agencies and
EFCA):
compliance and acceptability of the catching sector with technical measures.
At sea patrol days (from control agencies and EFCA
the amount of time spent at
sea monitoring technical rules.
At the operational level technical measures will be monitored principally through catch
profile data collected under the DCF. This will be collected through observers on board
vessels as well as port sampling of landings. Routine inspections at sea and ashore will also
allow assessment of the effectiveness of technical measures through observation of
compliance with measures in place and also from catch monitoring which will also provide
information on catch profiles. In this regard an initiative taken by EFCA in sampling the "last
haul"
98
during routine monitoring of fishing vessels by fisheries protection vessel is an
important tool to provide information on catch composition and estimated discards). Other
monitoring measures such as the use of reference fleets may also be considered as operational
monitoring tools which will provide supplementary information on catch profiles. A reference
fleet is a pre-defined selection of vessels where the actual sampling is usually carried out by
the fishermen themselves or in some cases by observers. The reference fleet is within the
population of all active vessels within a given fleet. Reference fleets have the ability to
provide documentation on entire catches, especially discards at a fine spatial scale. They also
provide a platform for cross-referencing official catch and data collecting systems and
procedures (e.g., electronic logbooks, reporting- and grading systems, discards).
11.2.
Evaluation
An ex-post evaluation discussing the key evaluation questions (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency,
coherence and relevance) of technical measures should be carried out by 2022 when the
landing obligation should be fully operational for several years, MSY achieved for all stocks
and Good Environmental Status achieved for marine ecosystems under the MSFD. It would
directly also feed into the retrospective evaluation of the CFP scheduled to begin in 2022 in
preparation for the next reform.
The new multiannual plans will be assessed by STECF 5 years after entry into force whether
sustainability objectives are being achieved. These evaluations will provide indications of
whether technical measures included as part of these plans are effective.
Reporting requirements under Articles 49 (functioning of the CFP) and Article 50 of the
CFP
99
(progress on achieving MSY), while not directly related to technical measures will also
provide insight into the effectiveness of technical measures.
Evaluation of measures developed regionally will also have to be carried out on a regular
basis by STECF or ICES to ensure such measures are consistent with objectives of the CFP.
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Annual Reporting of the EFCA in relation to Joint Deployment Programmes (JDPs) which
document the number and reasons for infringements detected compared to the number and
nature of inspections carried out. This will provide an indication of the level of compliance
with the technical measures regulations.
70
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1609440_0082.png
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REGULATION (EU) No 508/2014
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15
May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No
2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011
of the European Parliament and of the Council
76
Catchpole, T., S. Elliott, D. Peach, S. Mangi (2014).
Final Report: The English Discard Ban Trial, Cefas
report, pp65.
77
Condie, H. M., Catchpole, T. L., and Grant, A. (2013).
The short-term impacts of implementing catch quotas
and a discard ban on English North Sea otter trawlers. – ICES Journal of Marine Science,
doi:10.1093/icesjms/fst187
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78
ICES. (2013).
Report of the Workshop to Review and Advise on Seabird Bycatch (WKBYCS), 14–18 October
2013, Copenhagen, Denmark. ICES CM 2013/ACOM:77. 79 pp.
ICES (2014).
EU request to ICES for review of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive: Descriptor 6 –
Seafloor integrity Technical services, October 2014.
79
80
STECF (2014). 47th Plenary Meeting Report (PLEN-14-03). 2014. Publications Office of the European
Union, Luxembourg, EUR 26944 EN, JRC 93037, 138 pp.
81
Henichart, L.M., Massiot Granier, F., Lesueur, M., Gascuel, D. (2011).
Groupe de travail régional (RMD) -
Les enjeux de gestion au rendement maximal durable pour les pêcheries bretonnes. Rapport d’étude. . Les
publications du Pôle halieutique AGROCAMPUS OUEST N° 6, 36 p.
IEO (2014).
The obligation to land all catches – consequences for the Mediterranean. IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-
168. Brussels. 52pp.
82
83
Based on information from Member State Administration involved in the development of discard plans in
2014.
84
85
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/index_en.htm& http://www.gfcm.org/gfcm/en
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1342/2008
of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod
stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2004.
86
ICES (2014).
Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Divisions VIId (Eastern Channel) and IIIa West (Skagerrak).
Advice June 2014.
87
88
89
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/social_dimension_en.pdf
European Fisheries Control Agency (2014). Annual Report 2014
There are currently JDPs covering North Sea and Western waters demersal stocks, Baltic Sea demersal and
pelagic, Western waters pelagic, Mediterranean Bluefin tuna, swordfish and small pelagics, NAFO and NEAFC.
90
Kindt-Larsen, L., Kirkegaard, E. and Dalskov, J., (2011).
Fully documented fishery: a tool to support a
catch quota management system. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsr065.
91
92
ICES (2014).
Celtic Sea and West of Scotland – Haddock in Division VIb (Rockall)
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/222201030_Rockall_and_the_Scottish_haddock_fishery#
93
ICES
(2015).
Sea bass (Dicentrarchus
labrax)
in Divisions IVb and c, VIIa, and VIId–h (Central and South
North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel, Celtic Sea)
94
95
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/sea-bass/index_en.htm
The effectiveness of each option in terms of the general, specific and operational objectives has been assessed
where effectiveness is defined "as
the extent to which options achieve the defined objectives of the proposal".
96
The efficiency of the different options has been compared to the baseline scenario where efficiency is defined
as "the
extent to which the objectives can be achieved for a given level of resources/at least cost".
97
Coherence, defined as "the
extent to which options are coherent with the overarching objectives of EU policy,
and the extent to which they are likely to limit trade-offs across economic, social and environmental domain"
has
also been assessed.
99
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201404/20140408ATT82472/20140408ATT82472EN
.pdf
98
As technical measures fall under exclusive competence the evaluation question of EU added value is not
applicable.
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LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION
ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATION
ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES
ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS
ANNEX V CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL MEASURES
ANNEX VI DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES FOR TECHNICAL
MEASURES BY REGION
ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY
ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES
ANNEX IX DETAILED BEAKDOWN OF CATCHING SECTOR
ANNEX X DETAIL ON THE BASELINES AND THE CRITERIA FOR THEIR
ESTABLISHMENT
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ANNEX I - SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION
Introduction
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) includes as a management instrument the regulation of
technical aspects of fishing operations, through so-called technical measures. These define
and condition where, when and how a fishing enterprise can exploit and interact with marine
resources and the wider marine ecosystem. These rules are laid down in a series of Union
Regulations on technical measures for the different sea basins of the Union waters.
The European Commission, in a supporting consultation document, has indicated that current
technical measures regulations are too complex, and difficult to understand, control and
enforce. Therefore a comprehensive revision is required to look at the technical measures in
light of the new CFP which has just entered into force. This revision will also provide an
opportunity to bring about a general improvement in the technical rules to facilitate the
implementation of the landing obligation and the ecosystem-based approach, which are key
objectives in the new CFP. In this context the Commission has signalled its intention to
review and revise the current technical measures.
Through the public consultation the views of stakeholders and the public in general were
sought on the best way forward to modernise and rationalise technical measures in the context
of the new CFP. This document reports on the outcome of this consultation.
The overview of the contributions presented is based on the written contributions received. It
is neither intended to draw conclusions regarding the options proposed nor does it represent
the position of the Commission. It will support the preparation of the Impact Assessment
report, which in turn will be the basis for developing the Commission's proposal for a new
framework for technical measures.
Contributions received
The public consultation took place between the 24 January and the 16 May 2014, with a total
of 59 written contributions received. Individual contributions are available on the dedicated
website to this consultation
1
.
Table 1
provides a summary of the submissions by stakeholder
grouping.
Table 1 - Breakdown of contributions
Stakeholder Group
Advisory Councils
MS administrations
Civil
organisations
society
Number of contributions
5 (9%)
15 (25%)
11 (19%)
Examples
MED AC, SWW AC, NS AC, NWW AC, BS AC
Ministries, Local government
Environmental NGOs
Fishermen's representative organisations, , consumer
groups, European transport workers federation, anglers
organisations, fisheries consultants
Citizens with differing backgrounds (e.g. retired
fisherman, anglers, member of NGO)
Industry/interest groups
stakeholder organisations
General Public
22 (37%)
6 (10%)
1
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/technical-measures/index_en.htm
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Five of the seven operational Advisory Councils (ACs) - the North Western Waters (NWW
AC), North Sea (NS AC), Baltic (BS AC), South Western Waters (SWW AC) and
Mediterranean (MED AC) - submitted comments. Three ACs (NS, SWW & MED) provided
detailed comments covering the main principles and challenges outlined in the consultation
document. The two other ACs (NWW & BS) indicated they had difficulties in agreeing a
common position amongst the AC membership and therefore their comments were restricted
to endorsing the need for a revision of the technical measures regulations and requesting
further dialogue.
Fifteen submissions were received from national administrations and regional governmental
agencies covering the North Atlantic, North Sea, Baltic and Mediterranean. These
submissions either related to the challenges highlighted in the consultation document or dealt
with regional issues relating to specific measures that created difficulties at a national level.
Two Member States supplied an outline of their vision of the structure and content of a new
technical measures framework. No submissions were received from the Member States or
industry groups from the Black Sea.
Eleven environmental NGOs submitted contributions. These contributions largely dealt with
the main issues included in the consultation document and tended to focus on environmental
issues and the linkage of technical measures with environmental rules. Many of these
submissions were detailed and provided examples to support their point of view.
Twenty two contributions were submitted by a range of industry interest groups and other
stakeholder organisations. The majority of these were from fishermen's representative bodies
(sixteen). Other submissions were received from a range of different stakeholder and business
organisations representing anglers, consumer groups, workers' rights and one from a fisheries
consultancy. The industry groups tended to follow the same line as the ACs although some of
these groups concentrated on specific issue or issues relating to their particular region. Most
of the remaining submissions tended to be more general in nature concentrating on one or
more of the specific challenges highlighted in the consultation document. A fisheries
consultant put forward an alternative strategy for technical measures.
There were six submissions from members of general public. Most of these concentrated on a
particular issue or issues of interest to that respective individual.
General Comments
There is general support across stakeholders and Member States for the broad approach
outlined in the consultation paper (i.e. move away from micromanagement and towards a
regionalised, results-based approach). It is clear that the complexity of the current regulations
and their multiple amendments should serve as an example to the Commission of "what not to
do". Many respondents also point to enforcement issues with the current regulations and the
lack of compliance with the complex rules. The current regulations are highlighted as having
produced a range of unintended consequences that have in fact forced fishermen to discard
and run counter to the principal objective of the measures (i.e. to protect juveniles). There is a
generalised, clear message that this should not be repeated in any new framework for
technical measures, given the change of approach (i.e. principle of management by result)
within the new CFP and the introduction of the landing obligation. There is overwhelming
support for a complete overhaul of technical measures not limited to just a re-casting or
cleaning-up of the current measures.
Main Challenges
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In the consultation document four major principles were identified for the revision of
technical measures:
Simplification and enabling regionalisation
Creation of incentives for the industry to take more responsibility
Reduction and avoidance of unwanted catches
Minimisation of the ecosystem impacts of fishing gears
Under each of these principles, stakeholders were requested to respond to some specific
questions. The comments received are summarised below. For some questions more detailed
comments were received than for others and there was a certain amount of duplication of
points across the different questions.
Simplification and regionalisation
Many respondents advocate that the most simple and clear rules will be those created at the
lowest level possible, which in the case of the new CFP equates to the regional level.
Regionalisation is seen by many as an important opportunity to introduce simplification and
flexibility of the technical measures rules and regulations. Multiannual plans are identified by
the majority of respondents as the appropriate vehicle for the development of specific
technical measures at the regional level. Such measures should be adaptive and open to
periodic review. The majority of stakeholders share the view that this cannot be achieved by
maintaining the majority of technical measures under normal legislative procedure (i.e. co-
decision) as it is too cumbersome a process to be able to react to changes in fisheries.
The ACs and industry groups stress the need for stakeholder involvement in developing
technical measures as part of multiannual plans. They see this as essential to the successful
implementation of the landing obligation. However, they underscore that dialogue between
stakeholders and Member States as envisaged in the CFP must be meaningful. Several
Member States acknowledge the involvement of stakeholders in developing regional rules.
There are diverging opinions on the content of any future legislative framework for technical
measures. Many of the industry groups (including small-scale fisheries) advocate a
minimalistic approach with few (if any) rules under co-decision and any detailed rules that are
required to be developed at regional level. One submission describes this as the Commission
having to take a "leap of faith", and is not convinced by the argument that EU technical
measures should be retained on a transitional basis until multiannual plans are adopted to
activate regionalisation for technical measures. Several submissions do advocate for some
safeguards (e.g. limits on the amount off undersized fish a vessel may catch), which would act
as a safety net against continuing bad practices.
The NGOs consider there remains a strong need for some high-level overarching objectives
and minimum common standards that should apply across the EU to ensure no gaps in
management occur. Simplification should not happen at the expense of the environmental
protection. Many also advocate safeguards. The majority of the NGOs also indicate that
additional measures may be needed for the full integration of the ecosystem-based approach
in the new CFP and the interaction with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD).
These follow from the high level objectives but should be implemented regionally.
The position of Member States is not uniform on the structure of a new framework. Most
highlight the importance of simplifying the rules while insisting on maintaining a level
playing field which will result in some rules remaining under co-decision. Regionalisation is
seen as important although Member States express mixed views as to what shape regional
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measures should take. Most Member States believe that the level of risk that we are prepared
to accept should define the number and definition of rules at both Union and regional level.
This should be strongly linked to the level of confidence in the control and monitoring system
to detect illegal discarding or bad practice in general.
On the inclusion into the framework of reference gears or minimum standards linked to
selectivity, most industry groups and some Member States and NGOs see this as unnecessary
and likely to stifle regionalisation and innovation. Whereas some other NGOs and Member
States indicate that such elements should indeed be included in the framework regulation.
From the NGOs perspective this would provide a fall-back position should alternative
measures not be developed and agreed regionally. One Member State advocates defining
reference gears but at a regional level with provision for alternative highly selective gears that
meet agreed standards for certification and monitoring to be used.
Incentivising industry and stakeholders
The industry groups and ACs emphasise that stakeholder involvement in the decision-making
process, leading to clear and simple rules will act as a strong incentive for compliance with
rules.
The majority of respondents point to the landing obligation as the major incentive to drive
selectivity, obviating the need for the current prescriptive approach to technical measures.
They point to the problems, both economically and biologically, inadvertently created in the
past by the imposition of over-prescriptive rules. Many strongly advocate that to implement
the landing obligation will require that fishermen be given the maximum possible liberty to
decide on selective measures. However, in return, NGOs and other stakeholders stress that
accountability is a critical prerequisite for allowing fishermen flexibility to find innovative
ways to meet environmental standards. This is acknowledged by the ACs and industry groups
as important.
The ACs, NGOs and some Member States highlight that improvements in selectivity have
been achieved in the past when incentives have been aligned with management objectives.
This approach should be broadened, extended and deepened. In this context an industry group
representing small-scale fishermen, several Member States (Mediterranean countries) as well
as the NGOs point to the rewarding of the use of low-impact fishing methods with increased
fishing opportunities or privileged access as another way of incentivising fishermen to act
responsibly.
The removal of measures that are deemed redundant under the landing obligation, including
catch composition rules and effort restrictions, are highlighted by the ACs, industry groups
and Member States. This is considered another important incentive to improve compliance
with technical rules and to improve selectivity. In this context several Member States and
industry groups highlight that a move to fully documented fisheries will allow a much higher
degree of simplification of the technical rules and removal of others. The NGOs while
accepting this stress the need for stringent monitoring requirements to allow for the relaxing
of rules. Fully documented fisheries must amount to what the name implies.
Encouraging innovation will act as an incentive to improve selectivity and responsible fishing
and the ACs, NGOs and the industry highlight that funding and additional quota to undertake
vital research and pilot projects must be granted by fast track. Innovation needs to be given a
very high priority by Member States in developing their national programmes under the
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund.
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Opinions on the use of "soft law" are split. Some industry groups and NGOs very much
advocate soft law as a way of supporting technical measures rules. However, others suggest
that voluntary measures under soft law are not sufficient in themselves to ensure high level
objectives are achieved, and also can lead to the use of unselective gears and fishing
techniques. Some industry groups highlight that even such voluntary measures will be
superfluous because the landing obligation will provide adequate incentive for selective
fishing.
Reduction and avoidance of unwanted catches
The ACs and industry groups stress that measures to reduce and avoid unwanted catches
should be developed regionally under multiannual plans. In no circumstances do they
advocate developing measures at Union level to address specific bycatch issues. Several
industry groups also highlight that what is important is not identifying the worst fisheries in
terms of unwanted bycatch and applying stricter measures, but rather identifying those with
the biggest hurdles and ensuring the management structure provides the flexibility and
freedom for appropriate solutions to be found. In this context regional bodies (i.e. the ACs)
are best placed to identify fisheries that require special assistance.
The majority of NGOs highlight the need to improve selectivity in many fisheries and several
identify specific fisheries (e.g. mixed demersal and
Nephrops
fisheries) and sea basins (e.g.
Irish Sea, Skagerrak and eastern Baltic) where particular problems exist. They include
bycatch of vulnerable or sensitive species in the context of unwanted catches and stress the
need to address such issues as a matter of urgency.
One NGO indicates that "institutionalised" overfishing and tolerated use of non-selective and
destructive gears is a bigger problem than discarding of unwanted catches. Several others
advocate that certain gears and fisheries should be subject to very restrictive measures or
phased out altogether if reductions in unwanted catches cannot be achieved quickly.
The ACs, several NGOs, industry groups and Member States advocate the use of avoidance
measures such as real-time closures and moving-on provisions. There are divergent views on
whether this should be defined at Union or regional level. Some advocate a twin-track
approach with the overarching principles for such measures defined in a framework regulation
with detailed implementing rules at regional level.
There is broad consensus that minimum landing size, catch composition rules and by-catch
provisions generally prevent fishermen from fishing selectively and even induce discards. All
advocate and welcome the moves to neutralise the negative impacts of these rules through the
Commission's omnibus proposal
2
.
Minimising the ecosystem impact of fishing gears
The majority of stakeholders advocate that detailed ecosystem protection measures should be
developed at the regional level. Most agree that only prohibitions of destructive practices or
measures to protect rare or vulnerable species and existing closures to protect sensitive
habitats should be included in an overarching framework under co-decision. Several NGOs
and Member States suggest that performance targets relating to environmental directives
could also be established in the framework. These are commonly used in other states to
manage marine mammal bycatch.
2
COM(2013) 889 FINAL
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The majority of NGOs specifically highlight the need for the new technical measures
framework to signal a shift towards low-impact fishing and to the achievement of Good
Environmental Status under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Several advocate the
inclusion of a requirement for impact assessments of fishing activities, which would help to
identify potential concerns and to propose appropriate mitigation measures. Such measures
highlighted include mapping of vulnerable habitats and species, restrictions of fishing in
vulnerable habitats, compulsory use of proven mitigation measures to reduce unwanted
catches of vulnerable species and more extensive spatial or depth limitations.
An industry group representing small-scale fishermen points to the need for genuine
interaction between all stakeholders in defining ecosystem protection measures. Decisions
should be made on scientific grounds and not be made at the expense of small-scale
fishermen. They point to a number of examples where fishermen and NGOs have developed
Marine Protected Areas that meet the aims and aspirations concerned but without creating
economic hardship on fishermen.
Member States mainly advocate for a regionalised approach to minimise the ecosystem
impacts of fishing gears to ensure that the right fisheries are monitored and required to take
appropriate mitigation measures. This will deliver greater benefits in a more targeted way.
Some Member States perceive ecosystem measures in quite a negative light indicating that
they are disproportionate to the scale of the problem - measures to protect cetaceans in the
Baltic are highlighted. These Member States stress the importance of balancing legitimate
economic expectations with the broader expectations in society of providing protection for the
ecosystem. This view is shared by a stakeholder group representing workers' rights and
several industry groups.
Scope of a framework for technical measures
In addition to the four principles detailed, the consultation paper included a question
regarding the scope of any new framework regulation. Currently technical measures are
contained in separate regulations covering different regions. The question posed was whether
the current situation should be maintained or should there be a common framework.
The majority of NGOs very much favour a common technical measures framework covering
all sea basins. It should include overarching objectives, common baseline measures,
definitions and governance rules that define how technical measures should be designed and
implemented regionally.
The ACs and industry groups strongly argue for a minimalistic approach at Union level
through a framework regulation. Many question the need for any framework at all while
others accept that to ensure a level playing field in terms of direction and goals a common
framework may be needed which sets realistic high-level objectives across the various sea
basins. Many industry groups advocate that it is not logical to start with the development of a
general framework at Union level. Work should focus very much at regional level in the first
instance and from this it can be established whether common rules are needed.
Member States have divergent opinions on whether there should be one common framework
or different frameworks for different sea basins. Several Member States advocate a separate
framework for the Mediterranean because of the particular characteristics of the fisheries in
this sea basin.
Other issues raised
A number of submissions dealt with issues outside the scope of the questions contained in the
consultation document although nonetheless linked to technical measures.
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One fisheries consultation advocates the concept of "balanced harvesting" as a possible "wild-
card" policy option. Balanced harvesting changes the technical measures objective, and would
aim to make fishing unselective for species. Instead, a defined proportion of natural
production per unit area, by size class, of all species, would be removed from the ecosystem.
A consumer group also referred to this concept in a positive light.
Several submissions from industry groups supported by one local administration body dealt
with a specific issue relating to the size of Japanese calms in the Bay of Arcachon They
highlight the need for more flexibility within technical measures regulations to allow the
setting of rules (in this case a minimum size) of sedentary shellfish species at local level,
rather than at Union level.
Several submissions from industry group relate to the Commission's omnibus proposal to
amend certain technical measures regulation and the control regulation (the so-called
"omnibus regulation"). These submissions detailed a number of issues and difficulties with
the Commission's proposal.
Several submissions from Member States and industry groups highlight specific issues. These
include measures in the Mediterranean on the use of purse seines and restrictions on trawling
within 3 nautical miles off the coast that requires immediate amendment or deletion. The
general ban on fisheries using electricity which has hampered the introduction of sustainable
alternatives to the beam trawl was also raised as well as issues relating to the definition of
drift nets and the need for clearer rules and conditional derogations for commercial activities
outside normal fishing operations (e.g. provision of fish for aquariums).
Citizen’s contributions
A limited number of responses were received from members of the general public reflecting
the subject matter of this consultation which is highly technical. Three were from anglers, two
from small-scale fishermen (one retired) and one from an active member of an environmental
NGO.
These cover a range of issues. The submissions from anglers relate to the setting of minimum
landing sizes, specifically for bass. These submissions also put forward other specific
measures relating to bass fishing including the banning of pair trawling for this species. More
extensive use of temporary or permanently closed areas is advocated in the other responses,
either as general comments or in one case specifically in Greek waters. The banning of
trawling in inshore waters (inside 6 miles) along with the use of effort control rather than
TACs and quotas is also advocated by two of the respondents.
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ANNEX II LIST OF MEETINGS, WORKSHOPS & CONSULTATIONS
2011
Details
MS Administrations
1
Experts Meeting
Technical Measures
(Skagerrak)
Experts Meeting
Technical Measures
(Skagerrak)
Experts Meeting
Technical Measures
(Skagerrak)
Experts Meeting
Technical Measures
(Skagerrak)
27-28 April
Gothenburg
Date
Location
2
25-26 August
Copenhagen
3
5-6 October
Copenhagen
4
26-28 October
Bergen
Advisory Councils
5
6
7
Inter AC
NWWAC
NWWAC
Other Events
8
9
ICES Workshop on Seine
Net Selectivity
AGLIA Seminar on
Selectivity and Discards
22-24 February
15 November
Aberdeen
Lorient
6 March
5 July
16 November
Brussels
Dublin
Madrid
2012
Details
MS Administrations
1
Experts Meeting
Technical Measures
(Skagerrak)
Experts Meeting
Technical Measures
(Skagerrak)
Bilateral NL
Bilateral UK
Experts Meeting
Technical Measures
(Baltic Sea)
Bilateral UK
1 February
Copenhagen
Date
Location
2
21-22 March
Stockholm
3
4
5
29 August
13 September
17 October
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
6
4 December
Brussels
Advisory Councils
7
8
Inter AC
NWWAC
21 February
29 February
Brussels
Paris
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9
10
11
NSAC
SWWAC
SWWAC
26 June
11 July
22 November
Brussels
Lisbon
Paris
European Parliament
12
13
PECH Committee
PECH Committee
Other Events
14
15
16
17
18
ICES WGBYC
Capecure Conference on
Discards and Selectivity
Workshop on Baltic Sea
Selectivity
STECF EWG
DAG Meeting
8 February
29-30 March
23-25 May
1-4 October
20 November
Copenhagen
Boulogne-sur-Mer
Karlskrona
Dublin
Brussels
8 October
8 November
Brussels
Brussels
2013
Details
MS Administrations
1
2
3
Bilateral UK
Bilateral BE
EU/Norway
1 February
16 April
11 September
Brussels
Brussels
Edinburgh
Date
Location
Advisory Councils
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
SWWAC
Inter AC
SWWAC
NWWAC
BSAC
NWWAC
NWWAC
NSAC
NWWAC
NSAC
NGOS
14
15
Birdlife
Birdlife
Other Events
16
17
18
ICES WGBYC
STECF EWG
EU/Norway Workshop on
Technical Measures in the
4-7 February
4-8 March
17-19 April
Copenhagen
Dublin
Bergen
19 February
25 November
Brussels
Brussels
7 February
1 March
13 March
18 April
6 May
7 June
17-19 June
9 July
23-24 September
12 November
Brussels
Brussels
Madrid
Bilbao
Copenhagen
Dublin
Dublin
London
Dublin
Edinburgh
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North Sea
19
EU/Norway Workshop on
Technical Measures in the
North Sea
EU Seabirds Workshop
EU BENTHIS Project
Workshop
NSAC Discards
Workshop
Baltic Cod Selectivity
Workshop
EU ECOFISHMANN
Project Workshop
6-8 May
Edinburgh
20
21
22
23
24
16 May
4-5 June
19 June
4 September
15-16 October
Brussels
Haarlem
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
2014
Details
MS Administrations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Bilateral NL
Bilateral SE
Committee for Fisheries
& Aquaculture
Fisheries Council
Bilateral SE
Bilateral IE
Bilateral DK
Informal meeting of
Directors-general for
Fisheries
Committee for Fisheries
& Aquaculture
31 January
21 February
24 February
28 May
24 June
25 June
25 September
29 September
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Naples
Date
Location
9
28 October
Brussels
Advisory Councils
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
BSAC
NSAC
MEDAC
Inter AC
LDAC
NWWAC
SWWAC
BSAC
NSAC
PELAC
SWWAC
NSAC
86
25 February
25 February
4-5 March
19 March
21 March
25-26 March
27-28 March
31 March
9 April
10 April
12 June
8 July
Copenhagen
London
Barcelona
Brussels
Brussels
Dublin
Dublin
Copenhagen
Paris
The Hague
Paris
Amsterdam
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22
23
24
25
SWWAC
NWWAC
Inter AC
NSAC
9 July
17-18 September
30 October
12 November
Vigo
Dublin
Brussels
Brussels
European Parliament
26
27
28
29
30
31
Greens
S&D
PECH Committee
PECH Committee
PECH Committee
PECH Committee
20 February
2 April
7 April
4 September
23 September
6 November
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Industry Groups
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
CRPMEM (FR)
CRPMEM
LIFE/NUFTA
EUROPECHE
SFF
EUROPECHE
EAPO
EUROPECHE
LIFE/NUFTA
NGOS
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Client Earth
NGOs
WWF & Client Earth
EDF
Client Earth
Oceana
Client Earth
EDF
WWF
Oceana
Other Events
51
North Sea Mixed
Fisheries Multiannual
Plan
EESC
North Sea Mixed
Fisheries Workshop
27 February
Brussels
7 March
16 April
24 April
25 April
14 June
25 September
20 November
5 December
16 December
17 December
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
27 January
3 April
4 April
7 April
29 April
26 September
3 October
6 November
13 November
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Brussels
Westport
Brussels
Brussels
52
53
4 April
29-20 September
Brussels
Brussels
87
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54
Workshop on best
practices in selectivity
4 December
Brussels
2015
Details
MS Administrations
1
2
Committee for Fisheries
& Aquaculture
Bilateral NL
EFCA
3
EFCA
9-10 February
Advisory Councils
SWWAC
4
5
NSAC
NSAC
21 January
4 February
11 March
Lisbon
Copenhagen
Copenhagen
Vigo
26 February
18 March
Brussels
Brussels
Date
Location
European Parliament
6
PECH Committee
Industry Groups
7
EAPO
NGOS
8
9
WWF
Oceana
Other Events
10
11
EU SOCIOECO Project
Workshop
STECF EWG
18 February
2-6 March
Brussels
Dublin
27 January
18 March
Brussels
Brussels
19 March
Brussels
22 January
Brussels
88
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ANNEX III LIST OF STUDIES
COFREPECHE, IFREMER and SCAPECHE, 2014.
Reduction of gear impact and discards in
deep sea fisheries (Contract MARE/2011/07 – Studies on the common fisheries policy Lot 1).
Brussels, 202pp.
CIBM, COISPA, CNR-IAMC, HCMR, CONSIMA (2013).
Identification and
characterization of thesmall-scale driftnets fisheries in Mediterranean (DRIFTMED).
Brussels, 287pp.
MRAG et al. (2014).
Study in support of the review of the EU regime on the small-scale
driftnet fisheries. Brussels. 295pp + Annexes
Sala, A. (2015).
Alternative solutions for driftnet fisheries. IP/B/PECH/IC/2014-082.
Brussels. 90pp.
SLU, DTU, Thunen, MIR (2013).
Collaboration between the scientific community and the
fishing sector to minimize discards in the Baltic cod fisheries. Brussels. 76pp+ Annexes.
MRAG Ltd, Poseidon & Lamans s.a. (2011).
Contribution to the preparation of a Plan of
Action for Seabirds. Bruusels. 290pp.
MEDISEH, ARCHIMEDES, BERNTOOL, MYGEAR & MEDPEL projects
Ulecia, R.C., (2013).
Summary of the Implementation of EU Regulation 1967/2006.
IP/B/PECH/NT/2013_06. Brussels. 16pp.
IEO (2014).
The obligation to land all catches – Consequences for the Mediterranean.
IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-168. Brussels. 52pp.
IMARES (2010).
Study for the Revision of the plaice box – Final Report. Brussels. 250pp.
Kaiser, M.J. (2014).
The conflict between static gear and mobile gear in inshore fisheries. IP/
B/PECH/IC/2014-018. Brussels. 68pp.
MRAG, IFM, CEFAS, AZTI Tecnalia & PolEM (2009).
An analysis of existing Rights Based
Management (RBM) instruments in Member States and on setting up best practices in the EU.
Final Report. London: MRAG Ltd. Brussels. 117pp.
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ANNEX IV INVENTORY OF EU TECHNICAL MEASURES REGULATIONS
(Regulations currently in force are in bold)
1980 1
ST
Regulation
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2527/80 of 30 September 1980 laying down technical measures
for the conservation of fishery resources Official Journal L 258, 01.10.1980 P. 0001 - 0015
(Repealed)
1983 New Regulation 171/83
Council Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 of 25 January 1983 laying down certain technical
measures for the conservation of fishery resources. Official Journal L 024, 27.01.1983 p. 0014
– 0029 (Repealed)
Amendments to 171/83
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2931/83 of 4 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No
171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources.
Official Journal L 288, 21.10.1983 p 1 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1637/84 of 7 June 1984amending for the second time
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 156, 13.06.1984 p. 1 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2184/84 of 23 July 1984 amending for the third time
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 199, 28.07.1984 p.1 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2664/84 of 18 September 1984 amending for the fourth time
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 253, 21.09.1984 p.1 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3625/84 of 18 December 1984 amending for the fifth time
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 353, 21.12.1984 p.3 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3625/84 of 18 December 1984 amending for the sixth time
Regulation (EEC) No 171/83 in particular by the addition of technical conservation measures
applicable to maritime waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Spain and
Portugal. Official Journal L 363, 31.12.1985 p.21 (Repealed)
1986 New Regulation 3094/86
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 of 7 October 1986 laying down certain technical
measures for the conservation of fishery resources. Official Journal L 288, 11.10.1986 p. 0001
– 0020 (Repealed)
Amendments to 3094/86
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4026/86 of 18 December 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No
3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources.
Official Journal L 376, 31.12.1986 p. 0001 – 0003(Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2968/87 of 29 September 1987 amending Regulation (EEC)
No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources.
Official Journal L 280, 03.10.1987 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed)
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Council Regulation (EEC) No 3953/87 of 21 December 1987 amending for the third time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conversion of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 371, 30.12.1987 p. 0009 - 0010 56 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1555/88 of 31 May 1988 amending for the fourth time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 140, 07.06.1988 p. 0001 – 0002 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/88 of 23 June 1988 amending for the fifth time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 179, 09.07.1988 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3287/88 of 20 October 1988 amending for the sixth time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 292, 26.10.1988 p. 0005 - 0005 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4193/88 of 21 December 1988 amending for the seventh time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 369, 31.12.1988 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2220/89 of 18 July 1989 amending for the eighth time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 211, 22.07.1989 p. 0006 - 0006 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/89 of 19 December 1989 amending for the ninth time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 389, 30.12.1989 p. 0075 - 0077 (Repealed)
1991. Council Regulation (EEC) No 3500/91 of 28 November 1991 amending for the tenth
time Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the
conservation of fishery resources. Official Journal L 331, 03.12.1991 p. 0002 - 0002
(Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 345/92 of 27 January 1992 amending for the eleventh time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 042, 18.01.1992 p. 0015 - 0023 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1465/92 of 1 June 1992 amending for the twelfth time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conversion of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 155, 06.06.1992 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2120/92 of 20 July 1992 amending, for the 13th time,
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 213, 29.07.1992 p. 0003 - 0004 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3034/92 of 19 October 1992 amending, for the fourteenth time,
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 307, 23.10.1992 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1796/94 of 18 July 1994 amending, for the fifteenth time,
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 187, 22.07.1994 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1173/95 of 22 May 1995 amending, for the sixteenth time,
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 118, 25.05.1995 p. 0015 - 0015 (Repealed)
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1909/95 of 24 July 1995 amending, for the 17th time, Regulation
(EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery
resources. Official Journal L 184, 03.08.1995 p. 0001 - 0002 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 2251/95 of 18 September 1995 amending for the 18th time
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 230, 27.09.1995 p. 0011 - 0011 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 3071/95 of 22 December 1995 amending, for the 19th time,
Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of
fishery resources. Official Journal L 329, 30.12.1995 p. 0014 - 0017 (Repealed)
1997 New Regulation 894/97
Council Regulation (EC) No 894/97 of 29 April 1997 laying down certain technical
measures for the conservation of fishery resources. Official Journal L 132, 23.05.1997 p.
0001 - 0027 (In force)
Amendments to 894/97
Council Regulation (EC) No 1239/98 of 8 June 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No
894/97 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources.
Official Journal L 171, 17.06.1998 p. 0001 – 0004 (In force)
1998 New Regulation 850/98
Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery
resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine
organisms. Official Journal L 125, 27.04.1998 p. 0001 – 0036 (In force)
Amendments to 850/98
Council Regulation (EC) No 308/1999 of 8 February 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No
850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 038, 12.02.1999 p. 0006 -
0009 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1459/1999 of 24 June 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No
850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 168, 03.07.1999 p. 0001 -
0005 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 2723/1999 of 17 December 1999 amending Regulation (EC)
No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 328, 22.12.1999 p. 0009 -
0011 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 812/2000 of 17 April 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No
1626/94 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources
in the Mediterranean and Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery
resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine
organisms. Official Journal L 100, 20.04.2000 p. 0003 - 0004 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1298/2000 of 8 June 2000 amending for the fifth time
Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical
measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 148,
22.06.2000 p. 0001 - 0002 (In force)
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Council Regulation (EC) No 724/2001 of 4 April 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No
850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the
protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 102, 12.04.2001 p. 0016 -
0019 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1298/2000 of 8 June 2000 amending for the fifth time
Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical
measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. Official Journal L 148,
22.6.2000, p. 1–2 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 602/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No
850/98 as regards the protection of deepwater coral reefs from the effects of trawling in
an area north west of Scotland. Official Journal L 097, 01.04.2004 p. 0030 - 0031 (In
force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1568/2005 of 20 September 2005 amending Regulation (EC)
No 850/98 as regards the protection of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of fishing
in certain areas of the Atlantic Ocean. Official Journal L 252, 28.09.2005 p. 0002 - 0003
(In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 734/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the protection of vulnerable
marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse impacts of bottom fishing gears.
Official Journal L 201 30.07.2008 p. 8. (In force)
Regulation (EU) No 227/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
March 2013 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of
fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine
organisms and Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 specifying conditions under which
herring may be landed for industrial purposes other than direct human consumption.
Official Journal L 78 20.03.2013 p. 1. (In force)
Transitional Technical Measures
Council Regulation (EC) No 1288/2009 of 27 November 2009 establishing transitional
technical measures from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2011. Official Journal L 347 24.12.2009,
p.6 (Repealed)
Regulation (EU) No 579/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources
through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms and Council
Regulation (EC) No 1288/2009 establishing transitional technical measures from 1 January
2010 to 30 June 2011. Official Journal L 165 24.06.2011, p.1 (Repealed)
Recovery measures containing technical measures:
Irish Sea cod
Commission Regulation (EC) No 304/2000 of 9 February 2000 establishing measures for the
recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES division VIIa).Official Journal L 035,
10.02.2000 p. 0010 - 0011 (Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 660/2000 of 30 March 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No
304/2000 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES
Division VIIa).Official Journal L 080, 31.03.2000 p. 0014 – 0014 (Repealed)
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Council Regulation (EC) No 2549/2000 of 17 November 2000 establishing additional
technical measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES Division
VIIa). Official Journal L 292, 21.11.2000 p. 0005 - 0006 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 300/2001 of 14 February 2001 establishing measures to be
applied in 2001 for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES division VIIa).
Official Journal L 044, 15.02.2001 p. 0012 - 0014 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1456/2001 of 16 July 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No
2549/2000 establishing additional technical measures for the recovery of the stock of cod
in the Irish Sea (ICES Division VIIa). Official Journal L 194, 18.07.2001 p. 0001 –
0001(In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 254/2002 of 12 February 2002 establishing measures to be
applicable in 2002 for the recovery of the stock of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES division
VIIa). Official Journal L 041, 13.02.2002 p 0001 - 0003 (In force)
North Sea and West of Scotland cod
Commission Regulation (EC) No 259/2001 of 7 February 2001 establishing measures for the
recovery of the stock of cod in the North Sea (ICES subarea IV) and associated conditions for
the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official Journal L 039, 09.02.2001 p. 0007 – 0010
(Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 456/2001 of 6 March 2001 establishing measures for the
recovery of the stock of cod to the west of Scotland (ICES Division VIa) and associated
conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official Journal L 065, 07.03.2001 p.
0013 - 0016 (Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 714/2001 of 10 April 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No
259/2001 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of cod in the North Sea (ICES
subarea IV) and associated conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official
Journal L 100, 11.04.2001 p. 0005 - 0006 (Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 715/2001 of 10 April 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No
456/2001 establishing measures for the recovery of the stock of cod to the west of Scotland
(ICES division VIa) and associated conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels.
Official Journal L 100, 11.04.2001 p. 0007 – 0008 (Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2056/2001 of 19 October 2001 establishing additional
technical measures for the recovery of the stocks of cod in the North Sea and to the west
of Scotland.Official Journal L 277, 20.10.2001 p. 0013 - 0016 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term
plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing Regulation
(EC) No 423/2004. Official Journal L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 20–33 (In force)
Hake
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1162/2001 of 14 June 2001 establishing measures for the
recovery of the stock of hake in ICES sub-areas III, IV, V, VI and VII and ICES divisions
VIII a, b, d, e and associated conditions for the control of activities of fishing vessels. Official
Journal L 159, 15.06.2001 p. 0004 – 0009 (Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2602/2001 of 27 December 2001 establishing additional
technical measures for the recovery of the stock of hake in ICES subareas III, IV, V, VI and
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VII and ICES Divisions VIIIa, b, d, e. Official Journal L 345, 29.12.2001 p. 0049 - 0051
(Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 494/2002 of 19 March 2002 establishing additional
technical measures for the recovery of the stock of hake in ICES sub-areas III, IV, V, VI
and VII and ICES divisions VIII a, b, d, e. Official Journal L 077, 20.03.2002 p. 0008 -
0010 (In force)
Southern Hake and Norway lobster
Council Regulation (EC) No 2166/2005 of 20 December 2005 establishing measures for the
recovery of the Southern hake and Norway lobster stocks in the Cantabrian Sea and Western
Iberian peninsula and amending Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery
resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms.
Official Journal L 345, 28.12.2005, p. 5–10
(In
force)
Baltic Sea Technical Measures
Council Regulation (EC) No 1866/1986 of 12 June 1986 for the conservation of fishery
resources through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound. Official
Journal L 162 18.06.86. p.1. (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 88/98 of 18 December 1997 laying down certain technical
measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the waters of the Baltic Sea, the Belts
and the Sound. Official Journal L 9, 15.1.1998, p. 1–16 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1520/98 of 13 July 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 88/98
laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the waters
of the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound. Official Journal L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 1–3
(Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 677/2003 of 14 April 2003 establishing emergency
measures for the recovery of the cod stock in the Baltic Sea. Official Journal L 097
15.04.2003 p. 31 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 289/2005 of 17 February 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No
88/98 as regards the extension of the trawling ban to Polish waters Official Journal L 49,
22.2.2005, p. 1–1 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 of 21 December 2005 for the conservation of
fishery resources through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound,
amending Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 88/98. Official
Journal L349 31.12.2005.P.1. 60 (In force)
Commission Regulation (EU) No 686/2010 of 28 July 2010 amending Council Regulation
(EC) No 2187/2005 as regards specifications of Bacoma window and T90 trawl in
fisheries carried out in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound. Official Journal L 199,
31.7.2010, p. 4–11 (In force)
Mediterranean Technical Measures
Council Regulation (EC) No 1626/94 of 27 June 1994 laying down certain technical measures
for the conservation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean. Official Journal L. 171
6.07.94. p.1 (Repealed)
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1075/96 of 10 June 1996 amending Regulation (EC) No 1626/94
laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the
Mediterranean. Official Journal L 142, 15.6.1996, p. 1–2 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 782/98 of 7 April 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 1626/94
laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources in the
Mediterranean .Official Journal L 113, 15.4.1998, p. 6–7 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1448/1999 of 24 June 1999 introducing transitional measures for
the management of certain Mediterranean fisheries and amending Regulation (EC) No
1626/94. Official Journal L 167, 2.7.1999, p. 7–8 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 2550/2000 of 17 November 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No
1626/94 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of marine resources in
the Mediterranean. Official Journal L 292, 21.11.2000, p. 7–8 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 813/2004 of 26.4.2004 amending Regulation (EC) No 1626/94
as regards certain conservation measures relating to waters around Malta. Official Journal L
150, 30.4.2004, p. 32–41 (Repealed)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006 of 21 December 2006 concerning management
measures for the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea,
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 and repealing Regulation 9EC) No 1626/94.
Official Journal L409 30.12.2006 p.11 (In force)
Regulation (EU) No 1343/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on certain provisions for fishing in the GFCM (General Fisheries
Commission for the Mediterranean) Agreement area and amending Council Regulation
(EC) No 1967/2006 concerning management measures for the sustainable exploitation of
fishery resources in the Mediterranean Sea. Official Journal L 347, 30.12.2011, p. 44–61
(In force)
Non-EU waters Technical Measures
Council Regulation (EC) No 973/2001 of 14 May 2001 laying down certain technical
measures for the conservation of certain stocks of highly migratory species. Official
Journal L.137 19.05.2001.p.3. (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 600/2004 of 22 March 2004 laying down certain technical
measures applicable to fishing activities in the area covered by the Convention on the
conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. Official Journal L. 97
1.04.2004.p.1.(In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 831/2004 of 26 April 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No
973/2001 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of certain stocks
of highly migratory species. Official Journal L 127 29.04.2004. p.33 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 520/2007 of 7 May 2007 laying down technical measures for
the conservation of certain stocks of highly migratory species and repealing Regulation
(EC) No 973/2001. Official Journal L 123 12.05.2007 p.3 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 302/2009of 6 April 2009 concerning a multiannual recovery
plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, amending Regulation
(EC) No 43/2009 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1559/2007. Official Journal L 96
15.04.2009. p.1. (In force)
Gear Specifications and Operational Measures
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Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3440/84 of 6 December 1984 on the attachment of devices
to trawls, Danish seines and similar nets. Official Journal L 318, 7.12.1984, p. 23(In force)
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 955/87 of 1April 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No
3440/84 on the attachment of devices to trawls, Danish seines and similar nets. Official
Journal L 90, 1.04.1987, p. 29 (In force)
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2122/89 of 14July 1989 amending Regulation (EEC) No
3440/84 on the attachment of devices to trawls, Danish seines and similar nets. Official
Journal L 203, 15.07.1989, p. 21 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 of 29 June 1998 specifying conditions under which
herring may be landed for industrial purposes other than direct human consumption. Official
Journal L 191, 7.7.1998, p. 10–12 (In force)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1922/1999 of 8 September 1999 laying down detailed rules
for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 as regards conditions under which
vessels exceeding eight metres length overall shall be permitted to use beam trawls within
certain waters of the Community (In force)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 129/2003 of 24 January 2003 laying down detailed rules for
determining the mesh size and thickness of twine of fishing nets. Official Journal L 022,
25/01/2003 P. 0005 - 0014 (Repealed)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 146/2007 of 15 February 2007 amending Regulation
(EEC) No 3440/84 as regards conditions for certain trawls for vessels operating pump
aboard systems. Official Journal L46 16.02.2007, p.9 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 809/2007 of 28 June 2007 amending Regulations (EC) No
894/97, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005 as concerns drift nets. Official Journal
L 182, 12.7.2007, p. 1–2 (In force)
Commission Regulation (EC) No 517/2008 of 10 June 2008 laying down detailed rules
for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 as regards the
determination of the mesh size and assessing the thickness of twine of fishing nets (In
force)
Commission Regulation (EU) No 724/2010 of 12 August 2010 laying down detailed rules
for the implementation of real-time closures of certain fisheries in the North Sea and
Skagerrak. Official Journal L 213, 13.8.2010, p. 1–5 (In force)
Nature Conservation Measures
Council Regulation (EC) No 1185/2003 of 26 June 2003 on the removal of fins of sharks
on board vessels. Official Journal L 167, 4.07.2003. p.6 (In force)
Regulation (EU) No 605/2013 of the European Parliament And Of The Council of 12
June 2013 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1185/2003 on the removal of fins of
sharks on board vessels. Official Journal L 181 29.06.2013 p. 1 (In force)
Council Regulation (EC) No 812/2004 of 26 April 2004 laying down measures
concerning incidental catches of cetaceans in fisheries and amending Regulation (EC)
No 88/98. Official Journal L 150, 30.04.2004. p.12 (In force)
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1609440_0109.png
ANNEX V CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF TECHNICAL
MEASURES
Regulation
Purpose of Regulation
*Types of Technical
Measures included
1,2,3,4,5
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
850/98
Establishes technical measures for the North-
eastern Atlantic including the North Sea,
Skagerrak and Kattegat, the outermost regions
and Black Sea (since 2013)
Establishes technical measures for the Baltic
Sea
Establishes technical
Mediterranean
measures
for
the
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
2187/2005
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
1967/2006
COMMISSION
(EEC) No 3440/84
COMMISSION
(EC) No 517/2008
REGULATION
1,2,3,4,5
1,2,3,4,5
Attachments to fishing gears
1,2
REGULATION
Measurement of mesh size and twine
thickness
Implementing rules relating to the closed are
to protect plaice box in the North Sea
Recovery measures to protect hake in the
North-east Atlantic excluding the North Sea
(includes technical measures, control rules
and reporting requirements)
Additional technical measures to protect hake
stocks in the North-east Atlantic excluding
the North Sea
Additional technical measures to protect cod
stocks in the Irish Sea
Additional technical measures to protect cod
in the Irish Sea
Additional technical measures to protect cod
stocks in the North Sea and West of Scotland
Emergency measures to improve selectivity in
demersal fisheries in the Celtic Sea
Conservation measures applying in the
Mediterranean
&
Black
Sea(GFCM
Regulatory Areas) includes control measures,
effort restrictions, reporting requirements as
well technical measures
Multiannual plan for cod stocks in the Baltic
Sea
Implementing rules for the use of selective
1,2
COMMISSION
REGULATION
(EC) No 1922/1999
COMMISSION
(EC) No 494/2002
REGULATION
1,2
1,2,3
COMMISSION
(EC) 2602/2001
REGULATION
1,2,3
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
254/2002
COUNCIL REGULATION(EC) NO
2549/2000
COMMISSION
REGULATION
(EC) No 2056/2001
COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING
REGULATION (EU) No 727/2012
REGULATION (EU) No 1343/2011
OF
THE
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
1098/2007
COMMISSION
REGULATION
1,2,3
1,2
1,2,3
2
1,2,4,5
3
2
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1609440_0110.png
(EU) No 686/2010
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
2347/2002
gears in the Baltic Sea
Access
requirements
and
associated
conditions applicable to fishing for deepsea
stocks by Union waters includes specific
catch composition rule relating to fishing
authorisations
Implementing rules to set up real-time
closures in the North Sea & Skagerrak
Restrictions on the use of driftnets for highly
migratory species
Prohibition on the removal of shark fins on
board Union waters
Measures to reduce the incidental catches of
cetaceans in gillnets and pelagic trawl
fisheries in Union waters (includes reporting
requirements as well technical measures)
Specific catch composition rules for industrial
herring fisheries in the North-east Atlantic &
Baltic
Control regulation includes measures relating
to real-time closures
Effort regime for vessels in the North-east
Atlantic excluding the North Sea includes
closed area (Biologically sensitive area off the
coast of Ireland)
Conservation measures for Union vessels
operating in the Antarctic (CCAMLAR region
) (includes control and reporting measures as
well technical measures)
Conservation measures for Union vessels
fishing for highly migratory species in
ICCAT region (includes control, and
reporting measures as well as technical
measures)
Recovery plan for bluefin tuna in ICCAT
region includes specific technical measures
Technical measures to protect vulnerable
marine ecosystems in the high-seas
Fishing opportunities for Union waters and
Union vessels fishing in non-EU waters
includes technical measure slinked to specific
stocks and also technical measures for
fisheries under RFMO agreements
Fishing opportunities for Black Sea includes
close area for turbot fisheries
2
COMMISSION
(EU) No 724/2010
REGULATION
4
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
894/97
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
1185/2003
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
812/2004
1
1
5
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
1434/98
1
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
1224/2009
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
1954/2003
1,4
4
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
600/2004
1,2,3,4,5
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
520/2007
1,2,3,4
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
302/2009
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No
734/2008
COUNCIL
2015/104
REGULATION
(EU)
1,2,3,4
5
1,3,4,5
COUNCIL
2015/106
REGULATION
(EU)
4
99
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1609440_0111.png
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No
1221/2014
COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No
1367/2014
Fishing opportunities for the Baltic includes
technical measures linked to specific stocks
Fishing opportunities for deep-sea stocks
includes technical measure slinked to specific
stocks
Source: Author
2
2
*Key:
1) measures that regulate the operation of the gear (e.g. prohibitions of certain gear types, maximum
limits on how long or what type of gear can be deployed);
2) measures that regulate the design characteristics of the gears that are deployed (e.g. mesh size
and catch composition rules);
3) minimum landing sizes below which fish must be returned to the sea (e.g. for cod the minimum
landing size is set at 35cm);
4) measures that set spatial and temporal controls (e.g. closed/limited entry areas and seasonal
closures) to protect aggregations of juvenile or spawning fish; and
5) measures that mitigate the impacts of fishing gears on sensitive species (e.g. cetaceans, seabirds or
sea turtles) or closed areas to protect sensitive habitats (e.g. coldwater coral reefs).
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ANNEX VI DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNENCE STRUCTURES FOR
TECHNICAL MEASURES BY REGION
Region
Principal Regulations (Co-
decided Acts)
Regulation (EC) No 850/98
Flexibility
mechanisms/empowerments
- the division of regions into
geographical areas;
– to amend rules concerning the
conditions for the use of certain
mesh size
combinations;
– to adopt detailed rules for
obtaining the percentage of target
species taken by more than one
fishing vessel,;
- to adopt rules concerning the
technical descriptions and method
of use of authorised devices that
might be attached to the fishing net,
and which do not obstruct or
diminish the effective mesh
opening of the net;
– conditions under which vessels
exceeding eight meters length
overall shall be permitted to use
beam trawls within certain waters
of the Union;
– measures designed to address
unexpectedly small or large
recruitments of juveniles, changes
in migration patterns or any other
changes in the conservation status
of fish stocks, with immediate
effect.
to amend rules concerning the
construction of certain gears
.
the granting of derogations where they
are specifically provided for in that
Regulation;
– the setting of criteria to be applied for
the establishment and allocation of fish
aggregating devices (FAD) course lines
for dolphin fish fishery in the 25-mile
management zone around Malta;
– the adoption of detailed rules for
further technical specifications of
square mesh panels to be inserted into
towed nets;
the adoption of technical specifications
limiting the maximum dimension of
float line, ground rope, circumference
or perimeter of trawl nets along with
the maximum number of nets in multi-
rig trawl nets, and
– the amendments to the Annexes to
Regulation (EC) No 1967/2006.
National Management Plans
NE Atlantic
Baltic
Mediterranean
Regulation (EC) 2187/2005
Regulation (EC) 1967/2006
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1609440_0113.png
Multi-annual plans
Black Sea
Regulation (EC) 850/98
Technical measures can be
included in the annual Fishing
opportunities regulation provided
the measures have a functional link
to a particular stock
Additional technical measures
transposing RFMO rules and
recommendations are included
under
the
annual
fishing
opportunities regulations.
Non-Union waters
Specific regulations transposing
RFMO rules: Regulation (EC)
600/2004, (EC) 520/2007, (EC)
302/2009
High Seas:
734/2008
Regulation
(EC)
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ANNEX VII MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY
The new CFP, Regulation (EU) 138/2013 entered into force on 1 January 2014. It is based on
the principle of management by result. The main elements of the new CFP are:
Maximum Sustainable Yield
is the best possible objective for renewable and
profitable fisheries, harvesting the maximum amount of fish on a long term basis. The
objective of the CFP is to ensure that MSY is achieved by 2015 where possible, and
by 2020 at the latest. Not all stocks in the north-east Atlantic are MSY-assessed yet.
Of the assessed stocks 60% of them are fished at MSY (up from 6 % only in 2005). In
the Mediterranean only around 11% of assessed stocks are within MSY and there is
little sign of improvement. For many stocks, particularly in the Mediterranean, we
have no assessment of MSY.
Annual legislation on fixing fishing opportunities
(TACs and quotas, some are set
on a two-yearly basis): to fix, based on scientific advice that is consistent with MSY
and in accordance with multi-annual plans (where they exist), the amount of fishing
for the stocks concerned, and to allocate quotas to the Member States following the
so-called relative stability key. In turn, Member States deal with how to distribute
their national quotas to their fishermen. Annually fishing opportunities are set for the
Baltic, North Sea, Atlantic and deep-sea stock, by Council only, to determine the level
of catches (before the landing obligation: landings), for each stock. The COM outlines
its approach for the TAC in the Spring in a Policy Statement.
The COM proposals are based on existing multi-annual plans (with certain provisions
on TAC setting), or on annual biological advice. TACs are shared out to MS
following fixed allocation keys (so-called relative stability, which differs among
stocks). TACs (in tonnes) are a translation of fishing mortality (F, mortality caused by
fishing as a ratio of the stock). In the context of multi-annual plans the COM will be
seeking advice on MSY expressed in ranges of fishing mortality that correspond to
sustainable fishing and MSY, for the target species.
Under certain multi-annual plans TACs are accompanied by effort reduction schemes
for certain fleets. These effort regimes are currently considered ineffective, causing
red tape, and sometimes creating conflicts with the TACs. They are likely to
disappear from future multi-annual plans, but are currently still part of the TAC
proposals.
The landing obligation:
The new CFP includes a landing obligation for all catches of
species subject to catch limits (TACs) and, in the Mediterranean, also catches of
species which are subject to minimum sizes (only blue-fin tuna is under TAC in this
sea basin).
It applies to all Union vessels fishing in Union and non-Union waters. The landing
obligation is applied in a gradual way and is fishery based. On 1 January 2015 pelagic
fisheries and industrial fisheries everywhere in Union waters will be under the landing
obligation, as will be all other fisheries (salmon and cod) in the Baltic.
The landing obligation comes with a set of potential measures and flexibility
instruments to make the transition and timely implementation possible. These include
quota flexibilities, exemptions for species that have a high survival rate and a
de
minimis
exemption to cater for unwanted catches that are unavoidable. The plans may
also fix conservation reference sizes for fish. These measures should be developed
103
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through multi-annual plans, but in the absence of such plans,
discard plans
can be
adopted.
The new CFP encourages regionalization, which basically allows Member States, in
consultation with the relevant stakeholder Advisory Councils, to come forward with a
proposal for a discard plan (joint recommendation) that the COM, after review, turns
into Union legislation (through a Commission Regulation).
EU multi-annual plans;
national plans in the Mediterranean: they contain the
framework for management of a stock or a combination of stocks (by fishery). Multi-
annual plans are designed to ensure effective management of the fisheries and to bring
conservation and management provisions for groups of stocks under plans. Plans
contribute to stability and a long-term security for the industry. The main elements of
plans are:
– MSY-related targets (per target stock), deadlines for achieving MSY, and
fishing mortality/exploitation ranges that are consistent with MSY (F
msy
as a
range of values);
– Safeguard provisions if science indicates that stocks are in trouble; specific
conservation measures for non-target species, so as to keep them within
sustainable boundaries;
– Mechanisms to allow for regionalization of implementing measures under the
plan.
Fleet capacity rules:
these are provisions to support that the fleet capacity of a
Member State matches with the fishing opportunities that are allocated to it; fleet
overcapacity potentially leads to overfishing. Member States cannot increase the
engine power or storage capacity of their fleets. Each Member State is subject to a
maximum capacity threshold (in engine power (kW) and in vessel volume (gt)).
Nominally, all Member States fleets are under these ceilings however, in many
Member States the effective engine capacity may well outscore the numbers in the
CFP. Despite intensified enforcement, this is a persistent and hard-to-tackle issue.
Annually Member States must report on the balance between capacity and fishing
opportunities. Historically this has not been linked to targeted actions. For the first
time, under the new CFP Member States have to give follow-up to the identification
of overcapacity with an action plan to eliminate it, in order to have access to funding
for decommissioning of excess vessels. The assessment exercise by Member States on
the balance between capacity and fishing opportunities is facilitated by common
guidelines developed by the Commission. It includes technical and economic
parameters. Member States will have to include in their reports an action plan for the
fleet segments with identified imbalance. In the action plan, Member States have to
set out the adjustment targets and tools to achieve the balance. The plan has to include
a clear time frame for the implementation of the action plan as well.
The External Dimension:
The CFP reform enshrines for the first time the external
dimension of the CFP (Part VI of the Basic Regulation: Articles 28-31). It calls for
strong external action that follows externally the same principles and standards as
internally while promoting a level-playing field for EU operators. Under the CFP ne
international agreements should
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– Contribute to long term sustainability worldwide via stronger bilateral
relations and tackling global issues such as IUU fishing and fishing
overcapacity.
– Up-hold and strengthen the global architecture for fisheries governance (UN,
FAO, OECD, etc.).
– Contribute towards a more effective functioning of RFMOs, more sustainable
Fisheries Agreements and better coherence with other EU policies.
Data Collection Framework:
a set of requirements on collection by fishermen and
Member States and management of biological and other data as input for biological,
economic and other knowledge and advice in support of the policy. To align to the
new CFP a Commission proposal for a revised Data Collection Framework
Regulation is under preparation. It will introduce simplifications and more flexibility
and adaptability, based on an evaluation3 of the previous framework.
Advisory Councils:
The Advisory Councils (ACs) were established since 2004 to
advise the Commission on matters related to fisheries management in their respective
areas of competence. Seven ACs were established for the Mediterranean Sea, the
South Western Waters, the North Western Waters, the North Sea, the Baltic Sea,
small pelagic species, and the Long Distance Fleet. The ACs are stakeholders'
organisations that bring together the industry (fishing, processing and marketing
sectors) and other interest groups, such as environmental and consumers'
organisations. They receive an annual grant of up to 250.000 euros from the
Commission to cover part of their operational costs. The new CFP foresees the
creation of four new ACs for Aquaculture, Markets, the Black Sea and Outermost
Regions. ACs are expected to expand their play in the regionalized CFP and are to be
consulted by Member States when preparing joint recommendations on conservations
measures.
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ANNEX VIII TRENDS IN DISCARDING IN EU FISHERIES
(Source:
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/discards/annex_en.pdf)
ICES regions
Target species
High Discards (>40%)
Beam Trawls
Bottom trawls
Flatfish (sole, plaice)
Nephrops
Horse mackerel, monkfish,
megrim, hake
Cod, haddock,
Cephalopods
Mullet
Plaice, sole, cod,
Target species
haddock, whiting, dab
Medium Discards (15-39%)
Bottom trawls
Trammel nets
Hake,
Nephrops,
sardines
Herring, horse mackerel,
mullets, whiting
Low Discards (<15%)
Pelagic trawls
Herring, mackerel, horse
mackerel, blue whiting
Discard species
Discard
characteristics
Mediterranean
Undersize target species
Undersize target species
Over quota target species
Low commercial value
Target species and dab,
gurnards, plaice, lesser-spotted
dogfish, whiting, boar fish,
poor cod, gt silver smelt
horse-mackerel and dragonets
Undersize target species
Over quota target species
Low commercial value
Target species
Target species
Overquota, high-graded
herring,
Whiting below MLS
High-grading of low value
individuals, below MLS
Beam trawls
Target species
Cephalopods and
scallops (Adriatic)
High Discards (>40%)
Longline
Hydraulic dredges
Albacore,
swordfish
Clams (Adriatic)
Bottom trawls
Mullet
Medium Discards (15-39%)
Bottom trawls
Pelagic trawls
Red mullet, red
shrimp, octopus,
horse mackerel
Anchovies,
sardines, red
mullet, jack
mackerel, silver
scabbards
Target species,
sharks
Low Discards (<15%)
Trammel
nets/gillnets/lampara
Anchovies, striped red
mullet, black
scorpionfish
Discard species
Invertebrates,
Nephrops
Swordfish, bluefin
tuna, tope shark,
turtles
Clams and other
benthic
invertebrates
Small commercial
and non
commercial
invertebrates
106
Target species
Target species,
Jack mackerel,
sardines,
macroinvertebrates
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1609440_0118.png
Beam trawls
Discard
characteristics
Undersize target
species
High Discards (>40%)
Longline
Hydraulic dredges
Undersize target
species,
overquota
(bluefin),
endangered species
Undersize target
species, species
with low or no
commercial value
Bottom trawls
Undersize target
species
Low commercial
value
High diversity
(~135 spp. per
trawl)
Medium Discards (15-39%)
Bottom trawls
Pelagic trawls
Under MLS,
damaged or
small
Below MLS, high
grading of low
values species and
small individuals
Low Discards (<15%)
Trammel
nets/gillnets/lampara
High grading
(small/damaged
individuals),
below MLS
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ANNEX IX DETAILED BEAKDOWN OF CATCHING SECTOR BY
MEMBER STATE AND BY GEAR TYPE
Member State
Number of
vessels
89
1010
n/a
1664
2663
10892
934
3365
6004
6467
17168
2162
14715
171
319
1087
738
805
8557
Gross Tonnage
(1000GT)
15.8
5
n/a
64.6
67.5
414.7
14.7
16.7
161.0
207.2
88.3
72.2
185.0
46.0
8.5
12.1
130.5
38.0
102.5
Kilowatts
(1000kw)
51.2
33.7
n/a
151.4
238.8
936.0
39.6
172.8
879.9
825.9
506.4
202.4
1236.5
54.4
22.3
83.4
290.1
88.1
377.4
Total jobs
FTEs
BEL
BGR
CYP
DEU
DNK
ESP
EST
FIN
FRA
GBR
GRC*
IRL
ITA
LTU
LVA
MLT
NLD
POL
PRT
377
3276
n/a
1639
1460
36294
n/a
1722
10713
12405
n/a
4714
28726
768
712
225
2763
2411
17234
342
1668
n/a
1258
1661
32194
n/a
316
7447
7192
n/a
3166
20599
575
378
155
1768
1576
17188
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1609440_0120.png
ROU
SVN
SWE
*GRC data from 2010
488
186
1359
1.0
1.0
32.9
7.0
10.9
178.1
454
114
1679
28
77
974
Table 1 Number of Vessels and Employment by Member State, 2011
(Source: STECF 2013b)
Gear Type
Number
Vessels
of
Gross
Tonnage
(1000 GT)
32.8
629.0
1.0
4.7
236.7
89.6
232.5
45.8
23.6
97.7
11.7
54.3
40.8
1500.3
Kilowatts
(1000Kw)
Total Jobs
FTE
DRB
DTS
MGO
Active gears
MGP
PS
TBB
TM
DFN
FPO
Passive Gears
HOK
PG
PGP
PMP
Total
1650
6735
208
117
1322
757
564
4073
3893
2978
4095
13857
9443
49690
202.4
1794.8
17.3
21.1
563.9
308.1
365.0
329.5
263.6
364.4
148.5
582.4
295.5
5256.6
4298
28000
258
423
12059
2964
4036
11662
8085
9560
3917
21245
20358
126865
2520
26461
135
350
11227
2094
3050
8091
6498
8669
1368
17140
14652
102256
Table 2: Breakdown of EU fleet by gear type, 2011
Source: (STECF 2013b)
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Gear
Type
North-east
Atlantic
Number
of
Vessels
FTE
North Sea
Baltic Sea
Mediterranean
Number
of
Vessels
285
1067
n/a
48
12
611
12
874
1099
136
205
n/a
623
68
5040
FTE
Number
of
Vessels
n/a
322
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
180
555
n/a
27
2973
n/a
818
35
4910
FTE
Number
of
Vessels
719
3410
56
8
554
71
188
610
197
744
41
131
9809
2413
18951
FTE
DRB
DTS
MGO
MGP
PS
TBB
TM
DFN
FPO
HOK
PG
PGO
PGP
PMP
Total
424
1377
50
37
247
73
78
1662
1837
979
n/a
118
1817
1375
10074
917
5453
82
57
2594
348
499
4057
3762
1993
n/a
122
3465
4936
28285
664
3884
n/a
96
157
1572
181
1260
1870
202
31
n/a
391
162
10470
n/a
906
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
687
390
n/a
49
1031
n/a
356
41
3460
392
9968
52
14
2473
174
474
1880
98
1650
2
88
11376
2167
30808
Table 2: Breakdown of EU fleet by gear type and sea basin (excluding international vessels), 2011
Source: (STECF 2013b)
Key - DFN:
Drift and/or fixed netters;
DRB:
Dredgers;
DTS:
Demersal trawlers and/or
demersal seiners;
FPO:
Vessels using pots and/or traps;
HOK:
Vessels using hooks;
MGO:
Vessel using other active gears;
MGP:
Vessels using polyvalent active gears
only;
PG:
Vessels using passive gears only for vessels < 12m;
PGO:
Vessels using other
passive gears;
PGP:
Vessels using polyvalent passive gears only;
PMP:
Vessels using
active and passive gears;
PS;
Purse seiners;
TM:
Pelagic trawlers;
TBB:
Beam trawlers
Passive Gears
Active Gears
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ANNEX X DESCRIPTION OF BASELINES AND THE CRITERIA FOR
THEIR ESTABLISHMENT
Baseline
Mesh size (as a replacement for
the current mesh size and catch
composition rules)
Description
Mesh sizes by region based on
existing mesh sizes contained in
the following regulations:
NE Atlantic: Annexes I to VII of
Regulation (EC) 850/98 and
associated regulations
Baltic: Annexes II and III of
Regulation (EC) 2187/2005 and
Regulation (EC) 686/2010
Mediterranean: Article 9 and
Annex II of Regulation (EC)
1967/2006
Black Sea: Article 15 of
Regulation Regulation (EC)
1343/2011
Criteria/Basis
Exploitation patterns for key
driver species of commonly used
mesh sizes (taking account of
selective devices being used in
fisheries (sorting grids, escape
windows and also any national
measures) based on STECF
evaluation
Spatial considerations of mesh
sizes appropriate to the particular
area of operation and fishery
Whether existing derogations are
still relevant
In the Baltic, Mediterranean
and Black Sea
baseline mesh
sizes are already defined in the
regulations
No change in mcrs except for
changes made in discard plans
(i.e. Baltic cod, anchovy in Area )
or where there is scientific
evidence from STECF to support
a change in the current size
Minimum Conservation
Reference Size (replacing
minimum landing sizes)
Based on current mcrs sizes
contained in the following
regulations:
NE Atlantic: Annex XII of
Regulation (EC) 850/98
Baltic: Annex IV of Regulation
(EC) 2187/2005
Mediterranean: Annex III of
Regulation (EC) 1967/2006
Black Sea: Annex XIIa of
Regulation (EC) 850/98
Closed or restricted areas
Relevant closed areas contained
in the following Regulations:
NE Atlantic: Regulation (EC)
850/98; Regulation 494/2002;
Annual Fishing Opportunities
Baltic: Regulation (EC)
2187/2005; Regulation (EC)
1098/2007
Mediterranean: Regulation (EC)
1967/2006; Regulation (EC)
1343/2011
Black Sea: Annual fishing
opportunities regulation
Whether the objective of the
closure is still relevant, unclear or
no longer relevant as the
objective has been met.
Whether the closure has been
subject to a full or partial
evaluation or evaluated indirectly
as part of stock assessments or
wider reviews of management
measures.
Whether the closure is effective
or not based on available
information based on assessment
by STECF or ICES.
No change in measures unless
there is an STECF evaluation to
amend or delete
Other Measures
Regional rules restricting the use
of specific fishing gears (e.g.
prohibition of the use of beam
trawls in the Kattegat; limit on
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the number of pots for deepwater
crab that can be used in the
Mediterranean) or derogations
from the common rules (e.g.
derogation to allow the use of
electric pulse trawls in the
southern south to catch flatfish)
Table 1 Description of Baseline measures and the criteria for their establishment in the framework
regulation under option 2
(Source Author)
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