Europaudvalget 2016
KOM (2016) 0493
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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 3.8.2016
SWD(2016) 272 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL
establishing a mixed fishery multi-annual plan for demersal stocks and their fisheries in
the North Sea
{COM(2016) 493 final}
{SWD(2016) 267 final}
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This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not
prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 7
PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES .. 8
2.1. Organisation and timing .................................................................................... 8
2.2. Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board ................................................ 8
2.3. Consultation and expertise .............................................................................. 10
2.3.1.
2.3.2.
2.3.3.
2.3.4.
Consultation with Stakeholders ......................................................... 10
Expert advice ..................................................................................... 11
Other relevant studies ........................................................................ 12
Internal consultation .......................................................................... 13
3.
PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................ 13
3.1. Existing legislation and political context ........................................................ 14
3.1.1.
3.1.2.
3.1.3.
3.1.4.
3.1.5.
Annual fishing opportunities regulation ............................................ 15
The "old" CFP Regulation (EC)2371/2002 and management plans
derived from it ................................................................................... 15
The new Basic Regulation ................................................................. 15
Lisbon Treaty, inter-institutional conflict and its resolution ............. 17
Technical measures regulations......................................................... 18
3.2. "Traditional" management of North Sea demersal fisheries: The problem of
discarding ........................................................................................................ 19
3.3. Solutions and problems stemming from current North Sea Management
Plans ................................................................................................................ 20
3.4. CFP-reform: solving problems, creating new challenges ............................... 22
3.4.1.
3.4.2.
3.4.3.
Ending discarding and overfishing .................................................... 22
New challenge: "Choke" species and underfishing ........................... 23
New challenge: the costs of landing all catches ................................ 25
3.5. Mismatch between the current management plans and the Basic Regulation 25
3.6. Solutions foreseen in the CFP Basic Regulation ............................................. 26
3.7. Who is affected? .............................................................................................. 26
3.8. Summary ......................................................................................................... 29
3.9. Legal basis for the EU to act ........................................................................... 29
4.
OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................... 29
4.1. General objectives ........................................................................................... 29
4.2. Specific objectives........................................................................................... 30
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5.
POLICY OPTIONS................................................................................................... 31
5.1. Discarded options ............................................................................................ 31
5.1.1.
5.1.2.
5.2.1.
5.2.2.
No policy change at EU level ............................................................ 31
Amendment of the existing management plans ................................ 32
Use solely the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation) . 33
A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries ....... 34
5.2. Potential policy options ................................................................................... 33
6.
ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS ....................................................................................... 40
6.1. Option 1- Use the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation) ......... 41
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
6.1.4.
6.2.1.
6.2.2.
6.2.3.
6.2.4.
Environmental effects........................................................................ 42
Economic effects ............................................................................... 42
Social effects ..................................................................................... 43
Administrative costs .......................................................................... 44
Sub-option 2.1 - F
MSY
is achieved by the start of 2016 ..................... 45
Sub-option 2.2 - F
MSY
is achieved by 2020 at the latest .................... 47
Sub-option 2.3 - short (5 year) recovery period ................................ 49
Sub-option 2.4 - long (10 year) recovery period ............................... 50
6.2. Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries..... 44
6.3. Summary ......................................................................................................... 50
7.
COMPARING THE OPTIONS ................................................................................ 53
7.1. Assessment against the environmental, economic and social impacts ............ 53
7.2. Qualitative assessment against the general and specific objectives ................ 54
7.3. Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence and Acceptability ................................ 55
7.4. The preferred option ........................................................................................ 57
8.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION .................................................................... 57
8.1. Monitoring ....................................................................................................... 57
8.2. Ex-ante evaluation of delegated acts (regionalised measures) ........................ 58
8.3. Ex-post evaluation of the plan ......................................................................... 59
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Glossary
Biomass
Biomass refers to the size of the stock in units of weight. Often,
biomass refers to only one part of the stock (e.g. spawning
biomass, recruited biomass or vulnerable biomass, the latter two
of which are essentially equivalent).
A biological reference point. The stock size below which there is
a risk of reduced reproduction leading to a reduction in
recruitment.
A biological reference point. B
MSY
is the average biomass
expected if the stock is exploited at F
MSY
. It is a notional value
around which stock size fluctuates when F= F
MSY
. It strongly
depends on the interactions between the fish stock and the
environment it lives in, including biological interactions between
different species.
Allowed maximum time for fishing trips allocated to vessels per
year, depending on their type of fishing gear. For the purpose of
this impact assessment it means the same as 'fishing effort' which
is the product of the capacity and the activity of a fishing vessel.
Descriptive of a fish which lives at or near the bottom of the
water column, e.g. cod or haddock.
A plan laying down specifications for implementation of the
landing obligation in a given geographical area for given fisheries
or species. The proposal for the plan is prepared by the Member
States concerned and after scientific assessment adopted as
Commission delegated act. Discard plans can only contain
elements listed in Article 15(5) of Regulation (EU) 1380/2013
(the "Basic Regulation").
Unwanted catches returned to the sea during fishing operations.
The rate at which fish are removed from the stock due to fishing
operations.
A biological reference point. It is the fishing mortality rate that, if
applied constantly, would result in an average catch
corresponding to the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and an
average biomass corresponding to B
MSY
.
A set of rules which specify what the TAC for a given stock
should be in a given year based on information about the state of
that stock and its fisheries.
Discarding is the practice of returning unwanted catches to the
sea, either dead or alive,
In population ecology and economics, MSY is the largest average
yield (catch) that can theoretically be taken from a species’ stock
over an indefinite period under constant environmental
conditions.
B
lim
B
MSY
Days at sea
Demersal
Discard plan
Discards
Fishing mortality (F)
F
MSY
Harvest control rule
Landing obligation
Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY)
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Mixed fisheries
Overexploitation
Fisheries in which several species are likely to be caught in the
same fishing operation.
A situation where catches of fish observed fishing mortality (or
exploitation) rates exceed targets.
In relation to fish, the term 'pelagic' refers to fish which live in the
upper layers of the water column, e.g. herring, sprat and
mackerel.
An approach to managing fisheries to ensure a high probability of
avoiding undesirable outcomes. Typically this involves specifying
a limit value of spawning stock biomass, then managing fisheries
to make sure the stock stays above this level. A limit reference
point may also be specified for fishing mortality, in which case
management will aim to keep fishing mortality below this level.
The number of new fish added to the exploitable portion of the
stock resulting from growth of juvenile fish into adults, or
migration of smaller fish.
The process by which the Member States with direct interest for
fisheries of a given geographical region organize themselves with
the aim to agree on common management measures. The agreed
measures as joined recommendation are submitted to the
Commission and after scientific assessment adopted as
Commission delegated acts.
The weight (usually in tonnes) of the total number of individual
fish that is old enough to reproduce. This generally corresponds to
the minimum landing size and so defines the 'fishable' population.
The population of a given species that forms a reproductive unit
and spawns little if at all with other units. The “total stock” refers
to both juveniles and adults while “spawning stock” refers to the
adult population (see above).
Total allowable catch; the maximum biomass of fish that can be
caught from a given stock in a given year.
Measure establishing conditions for the use and structure of
fishing gear and restrictions on access to fishing areas.
Pelagic
Precautionary approach to
fisheries management
Recruitment
Regionalisation
Spawning Stock Biomass
Stock
TAC
Technical measures
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List of acronyms
AC
CFP
EWG
FTE
GVA
IA
ICES
MAP
MRAG
MSFD
MSY
NGO
NSAC
SME
STECF
TFEU
Advisory Council
Common Fisheries Policy
Expert Working Group
Full-Time Equivalent
Gross Value Added
Impact Assessment
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
Multi-annual Plan
Marine Resources Assessment Group
Marine Strategy Framework Directive
Maximum Sustainable Yield
Nongovernmental Organization
North Sea Advisory Council
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
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Lead DG:
DG MARE
Other departments involved:
DG ENV, DG GROW, Legal Services and the Secretariat-
General
Agenda planning/WP reference: 2011/MARE/063
1.
I
NTRODUCTION
This impact assessment (IA) concerns the future framework for managing the demersal stocks
and their fisheries in the North Sea in the context of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) – the
"Basic Regulation" - that entered into force in 2014. The new CFP introduced an obligation to
manage fisheries sustainably based on the principle of maximum sustainable yield (MSY). At
the same time it introduced an obligation to land all catches that, for the North Sea, will have
to be implemented incrementally between 2016 and 2019. The new CFP gives particular
emphasis to multi-annual plans as one of the main conservation measure for fish stocks.
The current rules governing the demersal fisheries in the North Sea have been heavily
criticised as overly prescriptive, ineffective and inapplicable. Additionally, they are not being
applied coherently by the Council and the EU Member States. In particular, this is the case for
the scheme that currently limits the number of days fishermen can spend at sea. It has created
significant administrative burden and caused problems for the catching sector of the North
Sea fishing industry by forcing them to apply unsustainable practices like discarding fish for
which they do not have quota.
The IA presents the problems and challenges produced by the different generations of policy
in detail. It defines the objectives with regard to the Basic Regulation, outlines the main
policy alternatives and examines the options available to introduce the improvements required
for an effective and smooth implementation of the new CFP. The consultation with
stakeholders demonstrated almost unanimous preference for a new, flexible multi-annual
management plan that would apply to fish stocks fished in mixed demersal fisheries in the
North Sea.
This plan should be adaptive to the changing realities and conservation needs by facilitating
the development of regionalised measures that are consistent with the objectives contained in
EU law. Finally, it will provide an opportunity to simplify the current rules that have become
overly complex and difficult to enforce. Simplification will contribute to reductions in
administrative burden in terms of lessening the number of regulations fishermen will have to
comply with and Member States will have to enforce. This stems from the commitments
detailed in the Commission's Regulatory Fitness and Performance Program (REFIT)
1
for
"Better Regulation". It also addresses the simplification needs outlined in an earlier
Commission Communication on the implementation of the CFP
2
.
1
COM(2013) 685 final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Social and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Regulatory Fitness and
Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps.
COM(2009) 261 final
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
the implementation of the Action Plan for simplifying and improving the Common Fisheries Policy.
8
2
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2.
2.1.
P
ROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Organisation and timing
New conservation measures need to be considered for the demersal fisheries in the North Sea
that would implement the new CFP and replace the existing management plans for cod
3
and
for plaice and sole
4
. The two existing plans have been evaluated by technical experts between
2011 and 2014, with the main conclusions that both plans need substantial revision.
Consultation on a new approach to fisheries management in the North Sea has been ongoing
since then.
This impact assessment concerns the management framework for the demersal stocks and
their fisheries in the North Sea. The initiative was planned in 2011 (Agenda Planning
2011/MARE/063)
and enshrined in the 2013 Annual Management Plan of the Directorate-
General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The long delay in implementing the initiative is
due to the negotiations on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that lasted from
2011 until the end of 2013. The regulation defining the new CFP entered into force on
January 1, 2014
5
. Additionally, within that time frame, there were inter-institutional
discussions on the respective competences of the Council and the Parliament; their agreement
was published in January 2014
6
.
The impact assessment report (IAR) was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB)
on June 8, 2015. The RSB met to consider the IAR on July 1, 2015. The RSB produced a set
of comments
7
prior to the meeting, on June 26, 2015, and their opinion
8
was published on
July 6, 2015.
2.2.
Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board
The impact assessment report (IAR) was revised considerably following the extensive
comments received from the RSB. A broad description of the changes, requested in the
opinion from the RSB (Ares(2015)2821066 - 06/07/2015) is given below; the detailed
changes required in both the opinion and in the impact assessment quality checklist were
provided to the RSB separately.
The opinion listed four main recommendations for improvement in the following areas: the
policy context; the provisions of the multi-annual plan; the analysis of impacts; compliance
and monitoring.
The policy context:
the revised report merged the previous sections entitled "Policy Context"
and "Problem Definition" into a new section entitled "Problem Definition". This section now
3
Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and
the fisheries exploiting those stocks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2004.
(OJ L 348, 24.12.2008).
Council Regulation (EC) No 676/2007 of 11 June 2007 establishing a multi-annual plan for fisheries
exploiting stocks of plaice and sole in the North Sea (OJ
L 157, 19.6.2007).
Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the
Common Fisheries Policy. (OJ
L 354, 28.12.2013).
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/taskfor/taskforce.pdf
Impact Assessment Quality Checklist for Regulatory Scrutiny Board Opinion.
RSB opinion – Ref.Ares(2015)2821066 - 06/07/2015.
4
5
6
7
8
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explains in much clearer terms the evolution of fisheries management policy over the last 15
years including the introduction of the existing management plans, the rationale of the new
Basic Regulation and the challenges that the various regulations have raised. It explains what
instruments the Basic Regulation offers to solve the problems identified. It also explains how
the results of an Inter-Institutional Task-Force that resolved inter-institutional stalemate on the
new generation of management plans can be used to address the identified problems.
Additionally, the objectives section has been redrafted. All objectives are now clearly linked
to problems identified in the "Problem Definition" section, to the CFP Basic Regulation or to
the multi-annual plan.
Provisions of the multi-annual plan:
the policy options section has been redrafted. Options
that were discarded early in the process are presented separately. This section also explains
why the status quo option has been discarded.
Among the retained options, the option of a single mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan is
presented in more detail, describing in more clarity the relationship with other regional
management plans and how the instrument of Regionalisation will be used within the plan.
More sub-options are discussed. The report identifies one group of sub-options for which the
best option has to be chosen based on qualitative arguments. These qualitative arguments are
discussed in detail. A second group of sub-options is identified for which the choice of the
best option has to be based on a quantitative analysis.
Analysis of impacts:
the report presents the analysis of the quantitative sub-options of the
multi-annual plan in a more evidence-based format, as requested in the opinion. The results
are presented based on the robust, though limited, quantitative support analysis carried out by
STECF
9
.
Compliance and monitoring:
the monitoring and evaluation section now describes potential
compliance issues, how the CFP Control Regulation monitors compliance in general and how
the Data Collection Framework and ICES advice based on these data provide the tools for
constant monitoring. It explains how the new mixed-fisheries plan incentivises compliance. It
also depicts how the different components of the initiative will be monitored and evaluated.
Further clarification was requested by the board (Ares(2015)4245599 – 12/10/2015)
following its scrutiny of the revised IAR. The revised opinion listed four main
recommendations for clarification in the following areas: coherence with other initiatives;
assessment of impacts; comparison of options; compliance issues.
In this third version of the IAR a broad description of the changes is given below:
Coherence with other initiatives:
an explanatory footnote has been added in Section 5.2.2 to
explain the coherence between the new regional multi-annual plans and the new technical
measures framework; a paragraph has been added in Section 5.2.2.1 to further explain the
coherence between the new regional multi-annual plans themselves.
Assessment of impacts:
a more quantitative and detailed breakdown of possible impacts
from an economic and social perspective has been given in Section 6.2 for the sub-options of
9
Report on Evaluation of management plans: Evaluation of the multi-annual plan for the North Sea demersal
stocks (STECF-15-04).
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Option 2 – a potential single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries using one
economic indicator (profitability) and one social indicator (number of vessels) and comparing
the outcomes to the baseline option (use solely the Basic Regulation (including the landing
obligation)). The data have been taken from the robust, though limited, quantitative support
analysis carried out by STECF
9
.
Comparison of options:
an extra paragraph has been inserted into Section 7.1 on the
assessment against the environmental, economic and social impacts. This better explains how
the sub-options of Option 2 compare in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence.
Extra text has been inserted into Section 7.3 on "Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence and
Acceptability" where the impacts of the sub-options of Option 2 can be distinguished.
Compliance issues:
the text in Section 8.2 has been revised to better explain how compliance
will be ensured and why the risk to uneven implementation is believed to be.
Additionally, there was a request to more clearly define technical terms. Some of the
definitions in the glossary have been revised. A figure has been added in Section 3.1 to
explain better the MSY concept and in Section 5.2.2 to explain better the precautionary
reference points B
lim
and B
pa
.
2.3.
Consultation and expertise
In preparing this Impact Assessment, consultation has taken place at different levels,
including stakeholders, scientists, public (including public administrations) and Commission
services. It has followed a full evaluation process, set-up so that the initial tasks and questions
to be addressed have been specified by DG MARE but the key inputs at all steps have come
from scientists and other experts, and from stakeholders who have been fully involved
throughout the process.
2.3.1.
Consultation with Stakeholders
Stakeholders have been consulted in a targeted manner during the scoping exercise and
through consultation with the North Sea Advisory Council
10
(one of several stakeholder-led
organisations established in order to encourage participation by the fisheries sector in the
formulation and management of the CFP – see Section 3.1.3). Two scoping workshops have
been held.
The first workshop was held in Brussels on 27 February 2014
11
. Participants included invited
scientific experts and representatives of North Sea Member States and the North Sea and
pelagic ACs. This workshop enabled discussion to be initiated on the development and
implementation of a mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan for the North Sea. Mixed fisheries are
fisheries in which several species are likely to be caught in the same fishing operation (i.e.,
using the same vessel and gear).
10
11
http://www.nsrac.org
Scoping workshop on mixed fisheries management for the North Sea, Brussels, 27.02.2014. Overview.
Ref.Ares (2015) 2301118-02/06/2015.
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A second scoping workshop subsequently took place in Brussels from 29 to 30 September
2014
12
. Participants included invited scientific experts, representatives of North Sea Member
States and the North Sea AC (NSAC). Its main objectives were to reach a shared
understanding of the new legal and political framework for multi-annual plans, to discuss a
draft outline of how the future MAP for the North Sea could look and, through break-out
groups, to take forward collective thinking on the possible "building blocks" of the future
plan.
Additionally there were discussions with the NSAC, through its Mixed Fisheries Focus
Group, at meetings in October 2015 in Amsterdam and in March 2015 in Copenhagen
10
.
A wide ranging, internet-based, public consultation was carried out from 9 February to 4 May
2015
13
. A total of 25 detailed contributions were received from Member States, the Advisory
Councils (ACs), industry representative organisations, NGOs, and the general public
13
. Annex
I contains a summary of the findings from the public consultation. The main conclusions,
which will also be reflected in the relevant parts of the report, were as follows:
current management plans are too prescriptive and too complex. They need to be
replaced with legislation that is based on strategic objectives and general principles
any new management plans should take into account mixed-fisheries interactions
the landing obligation presents a major challenge, not only to the fishing industry but
also the Member States in the allocation of quotas to the fleets
detailed rules should be managed at a regional level, but there has to be coherence
with management plans for neighbouring areas
many contributors agree on cod, haddock, saithe, whiting, sole, plaice and
Nephrops
as the main target species. There are varying points of view on the inclusion of
additional target species and on the level of protection of other species. In general, the
Member States and the fishing industry favour a focus on the main target species,
whereas the NGOs want specific objectives for each of the harvested species in the
North Sea
Technical Measures introduced on the basis of the management plan should be agreed
on at a regional level
Expert advice
2.3.2.
Most of the work and consultation necessary to cover all of these aspects of the work has been
carried out by scientists working through the auspices of the Scientific, Technical and
Economic Committee on Fisheries (STECF)
14
and The International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
15
as well as by the Marine Resources Assessment Group
(MRAG) under a framework contract with the Commission.
12
2
nd
Scoping workshop: mixed fisheries management for North Sea demersal stocks. Overview of the
discussions. Ref.Ares (2015) 2300556-02/06/2015.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/maritimeaffairs_fisheries/consultations/north-sea-multiannual/index_en.htm
Commission Decision of 26 August 2005 establishing a Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for
Fisheries (2005/629/EC).
http://www.ices.dk/explore-us/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx
13
14
15
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These bodies had conducted a number of evaluations of the current management plan for cod
stocks
3
(hereafter referred to as "the cod plan") and the management plan for North Sea sole
and plaice
4
(hereafter called "the flatfish plan") prior to the reform of the CFP. In the case of
the flatfish plan, an impact assessment of options from the first "recovery stage" to the second
"management stage" of the plan was carried out by the MRAG
16
in 2009, as such a revision is
foreseen in the plan itself once both stocks are observed to be within safe biological limits for
two consecutive years. An STECF expert group that met in Vigo in October 2010
17
also
evaluated the flatfish plan.
Two meetings took place in 2011 to perform a retrospective review of a number of
management plans, including the cod plan
3
: these were a combined STECF/ICES expert
group in Copenhagen in February/March 2011
18
and a follow-up meeting in Hamburg in June
2011
19
. Both meetings were open to participants from NSAC and Member State
administrations. Among the conclusions of these analyses were that the cod plan
3
would
benefit from linking to plans for
Nephrops
and haddock, whiting, saithe, sole and plaice in the
North Sea and that the plan had not controlled fishing mortality as had been envisaged.
The Commission Services took no action to revise either plan at that time due to an inter-
institutional dispute over management competencies. Once an Inter-Institutional Task Force
to resolve the dispute had presented its conclusions
6
, and following the adoption of the new
CFP, work on the evaluations could take into account the new political context (see Sections
3.1.3 and 3.1.4).
In 2014, an STECF expert group met in Varese, Italy, from 10 to 14 March, to prepare a
retrospective evaluation of the flatfish plan
4
. The evaluation was reviewed by STECF at their
plenary meeting in Brussels later in March 2014
20
. The first scoping meeting to discuss and
hone the STECF EWG evaluation of the North Sea multi-annual plan options took place from
6 to 8 December 2014 in Varese, Italy. The work planned by that group was subsequently
carried out by a full panel of experts in the STECF EWG 15-02 in Varese, Italy from 16 to 20
March 2015. The report
9
was reviewed and presented to STECF at their plenary meeting from
13-17 April 2015
21
.
2.3.3.
Other relevant studies
This impact assessment for a North Sea multi-annual plan is taking place in the context of the
new CFP and the redrafting of the technical measures regulations (see Section 3.1). The new
CFP includes, inter alia, a new landing obligation, a timeline to reach maximum sustainable
16
Economic and social impacts of multi-annual management plans for North Sea plaice and sole, Final Report
Fish/2006/09.
Report of the Sub Group on Management Objectives and Strategies (SGMOS 10-06). Part b) Impact
assessment of North Sea plaice and sole multi-annual plan.
Report on Scoping for Impact Assessments for Baltic cod and Evaluation of Cod in Kattegat, North Sea,
West of Scotland and Irish Sea (STECF-11-02).
Evaluation of multi-annual plans for cod in Irish Sea, Kattegat, North Sea, and West of Scotland (STECF-
11-07).
Report on Evaluation/scoping of management plans: Evaluation of the multi-annual management plan for
the North Sea stocks of plaice and sole (STECF-14-03).
Scientific, Technical And Economic Committee For Fisheries – 48th Plenary Meeting Report (PLEN-15-
01).
17
18
19
20
21
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yield (MSY) and Regionalisation. Against this background, a number of reports, studies and
contracts have provided background on these issues. These include:
2.3.4.
the reform of the CFP
22
impacts of the introduction of the landing obligation
23 24
socio-economic dimensions of the CFP
25 26
the development of a new technical measures regulation
27
mixed-fisheries issues in the EU
28
, including dealing with choke effects
29
considerations on management areas for the new multi-annual plans
30
considerations of managing using MSY
31
Internal consultation
An Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG) was established in November 2014, which, in
addition to DG MARE, comprised representatives from four other Directorates-Generals
(DG) and services – Secretariat General (SG); Legal Services (SJ), DG Environment (DG
ENV) and DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). The
IASG met on 3 occasions in 2015 – 23 January, 15 April, 8 May – and worked to finalise a
draft of the IA by written consultation following its last meeting.
3.
P
ROBLEM DEFINITION
The main objectives of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy are the sustainable management of
fisheries resources by maintaining healthy fish stocks and providing the conditions for an
economically viable and competitive fishing industry. Demersal fisheries in the North Sea
have been governed by common rules since the 1970s because the coastal Member States
22
23
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/impact_assessments_en.htm
45th Plenary Meeting Report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (PLEN-14-
01).
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/540360/IPOL_STU(2015)540360_EN.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/socio_economic_dimension/index_en.htm
http://www.socioec.eu/images/SOCIOEC/Media_Centre/Deliverables/SOCIOEC%20Deliverable%206%20
8%20Management%20Measures%20North%20Sea%2026%2003%202012.pdf
24
25
26
27
MRAG et al. (2014). A study in support of the development of a new Technical conservation measures
framework within a reformed CFP. Lot 2: retrospective and prospective evaluation on the Common fisheries
policy, excluding its international Dimension. Brussels. 265pp.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/529053/IPOL-
PECH_ET(2014)529053_EN.pdf
http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/830996/2014-11_STECF+14-19+-+Landing+Obligations+-
+part+4_JRC93045.pdf
http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/364146/2012-07_STECF+12-14+-+Management+plans+II+-
+area+definitions_JRC73150.pdf
http://www.myfishproject.eu/project-myfish/deliverables
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29
30
31
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understood the need for a common regulatory framework. Prior to the introduction of a
common policy
32
, several demersal stocks were overfished
33
.
Overfishing occurs in an unmanaged fishery as every fisherman tries to maximise his catch
without paying attention to the long-term consequences for the state of fish stocks. An
individual fisherman simply does not have an incentive to catch less than he can. In the end,
when stocks decline, the outcome is unsatisfactory for all fishermen. This situation is often
referred to as "the tragedy of the commons". Additionally, without regulation, there is no
incentive for fishermen to avoid the young fish which have not yet had the chance to
reproduce; this further deteriorates the state of the fish stock in question
34
.
This section will show that, while regulation is needed to prevent overfishing and discarding,
the current rules are outdated and too complex and, therefore, need to be updated.
Figure 3.1.1. Driver and problems in an unregulated fishery.
Section 3.1 briefly describes existing relevant legislation and the political context. Section 3.2
describes how traditional fisheries management in the North Sea tried to reduce overfishing
and how this approach caused new problems by increasing discarding. Sections 3.3 to 3.6
describe how additional past (management plans) and recent (CFP reform) regulation has
more or less successfully addressed problems identified in the preceding sections while at the
same time creating new challenges. Section 3.7 describes who is affected by this initiative.
Section 3.8 summarises why this initiative is needed while Section 3.9 discusses the legal
basis for EU action.
3.1.
Existing legislation and political context
The following section describes the most important EU legal frameworks regulating demersal
fisheries of the North Sea in order to show the context for this initiative.
32
Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70 of the Council of 20 October 1970 laying down a common structural policy
for the fishing industry (OJ
L 236, 27.10.1970).
See, for example, Thurstan, R.H., Brockington, S. & C.M. Roberts. 2010. The effects of 118 years of
industrial fishing on UK bottom trawl fisheries. Nature Communication, 1, no. 15.
doi:10.1038/ncomms1013
See, for example, Grafton, R.Q., Kirkley, J., Kompass, T. & D. Squires. 2006. Economics for Fisheries
Management. Ashgate Studies in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 176 pp.
33
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3.1.1.
Annual fishing opportunities regulation
Every year, in its annual fishing opportunities regulation, the EU establishes the amount of
fish that European fishermen are allowed to exploit from each fish stock. This amount is
referred to as the total allowable catch (TAC). This regulation is not adopted under the
ordinary legislative framework but solely by Council, upon proposal by the Commission. This
deviation from the ordinary procedure is fixed in Article 43(3) of the Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
35
. The Commission bases its proposals for the
annual fishing opportunity regulations on annual scientific advice provided by ICES
15
.
3.1.2.
The "old" CFP Regulation (EC)2371/2002 and management plans derived from it
Council Regulation (EC) 2371/2002
36
, the pre-reform Basic Regulation, constituted a
horizontal regulation containing the most important rules on fisheries management in the EU.
The Regulation foresaw the use of management plans of which the basic description of role
and content could be found in its Articles 5 and 6. The ethos of these plans was to address the
problem that, prior to 2002, there were no constraints to Council's decision to setting TACs.
Hence, TACs were often set at too high levels and the size of many fish stocks subsequently
declined. These plans limited the freedom of Council when deciding on annual fishing
opportunities; they gave binding guidance when translating scientific advice into tangible
annual TACs
37
.
In the North Sea there are currently two management plans, introduced in 2007 and 2008
respectively: the flatfish plan
4
, for plaice and sole, and the cod plan
3
were both adopted in the
form of Council Regulations (Council Regulation (EC) No 676/2007 and Council Regulation
(EC) 1342/2008 respectively). It is important to note that although Regulation (EC)
2371/2002
36
is no longer in force, the management plans derived from it still are.
3.1.3.
The new Basic Regulation
In 2013 a new Basic Regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy
5
was adopted as the
cornerstone of a broad reform of the policy, replacing Regulation (EC) 2371/2002
36
. Its main
elements are listed in Annex II. The new Basic Regulation obliges the EU to manage its
fisheries sustainably, based on the principle of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). The
MSY is the catch of a fish stock that optimises the yield from that stock in the long term.
As another important measure, the Basic Regulation bans the discarding of fish (see Section
3.4.1). The Basic Regulation also foresees the use of management plans, now called multi-
annual plans. These multi-annual plans are supposed to implement the Basic Regulation and
to enable its objectives, especially with regards to sustainable MSY-based fisheries
management. In some narrowly defined cases, multi-annual plans are allowed to deviate from
the provisions of the Basic Regulation (see Section 3.6). The current management plans like
the cod
3
and the flatfish
4
plans do not fit into this structure as they were adopted prior to the
35
Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable
exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (OJ
L 358 , 31.12.2002).
Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy (COM/2001/0135 final).
36
37
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latest CFP reform. In many aspects they are contradictory to the new Basic Regulation (see
Section 3.5).
Another important innovation introduced by the new Basic Regulation is the so-called
"Regionalisation". Regionalisation is the reform's reply to the common and long-lasting
accusation of micro-management i.e. that in the CFP too many detailed decisions are taken in
"Brussels", far away from the stakeholders concerned.
The Basic Regulation lays down the concept of Regionalisation in Article 18 as a blueprint to
be used in future CFP legislation. The concept is supposed to be used for detailed, rather
technical, provisions to achieve the objectives of a regulation. It foresees that fisheries
regulations, where appropriate, include an empowerment to the Commission to adopt these
rather technical provisions in a Delegated Act. The difference to the ordinary case of
Delegated Acts is that the Commission invites the Member States that are affected by these
provisions to collaborate to formulate Joint Recommendations on the measures to take. There
is a strong political commitment from the Commission to include measures into these
Delegated Acts that are only agreed unanimously by the concerned Member States
38
.
The aim of Regionalisation is to increase the involvement of the Member States affected by
regulation and thus to increase their identification with the measures. The Commission's role
is to ensure that the adopted measures are suitable to fulfil the objectives of the basic act.
Regionalisation thus constitutes an important shift from instrument-based to results-based
management. Regionalisation also gives a stronger voice to Advisory Councils (ACs) which
have to be consulted when formulating Joint Recommendations (Art. 18(2) of the Basic
Regulation). ACs are stakeholder organisations
39
, established by the previous CFP reform in
2002, that bring together the industry (fishing, processing and marketing sectors) and other
interest groups, such as environmental and consumers' organisations. ACs are separated by
Sea Basins. Annex III of the Basic Regulation foresees an AC for the North Sea area – the
North Sea Advisory Council (NSAC) - and delineates its exact area coverage to ICES Subarea
IV and Division IIIa
40
.
In practice, Regionalisation in the North Sea area will be delivered by the Scheveningen
group which is a group of Member States cooperating on fisheries policy, established in 2013.
Members are Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and France. So
far, the Commission has received two Joint Recommendations from the group: one in 2014
38
If Member States are not able to agree on measures but the Commission deems certain measures as
necessary, the Commission can obviously still propose regulation through the ordinary legislative procedure.
Legally speaking, the empowerment to adopt Delegated Acts also applies when there is no regulation.
However, there is strong political commitment from the Commission not to adopt a Delegated Act in such a
situation, unless the basic act foresees otherwise. This is the case for the Basic Regulation (which not only
describes regionalisation as a blueprint for future fisheries legislation but also applies it for the first time)
with regards to exemptions from the landing obligation (see Section 3.6). Article 15(6) contains an
empowerment to the Commission to adopt a Delegated Act based on a Joint Recommendation from Member
States concerned while as a sort of fall back option, Article 15(7) contains a more limited empowerment to
adopt a Delegated Act in the absence of a Joint Recommendation.
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/cfp_factsheets/racs_en.pdf
The NE Atlantic (amongst other sea areas) is divided into statistical rectangles. Various combinations of
these rectangles are combined by ICES to give different areas, sub-areas, divisions and sub-divisions.
Various combinations of these ICES "zones" are used to define fish stocks in the ICES area.
39
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for the pelagic discard plan and recently another one for the demersal discard plan. The
Commission has submitted the recommendations to STECF in order to assess their
compatibility with the CFP. After a positive assessment is received, Commission proceeds to
adoption of a delegated act that contains the elements proposed by the Joint Recommendation.
The regionalisation procedure in the North Sea and the cooperation between members of the
Scheveningen group and the Commission has already proven effective when adopting the
discard plan for small pelagic and industrial fisheries in the North Sea in 2014.
3.1.4.
Lisbon Treaty, inter-institutional conflict and its resolution
Prior to the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union or TFEU
35
), fisheries legislation was adopted by the Council based on
Commission proposals. Since the Lisbon Treaty, fisheries legislation is now subject to the
ordinary legislative procedure with the derogation with regards to "measures on […] the
allocation of fishing opportunities" (Article 43(3) of the TFEU
35
), i.e. the setting of annual
TACs, remaining under control of the Council (see Section 3.1.1). The entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty led to a dispute between the European Parliament and the Council on the
subject of multi-annual plans, as on the one hand they affect the setting of annual TACs, a
Council competence, and on the other hand they go beyond the annual TAC setting exercise
by taking a multi-annual policy perspective, suggesting that the Parliament should play a role.
An Inter-institutional Task Force comprising the three main EU Institutions (Commission,
Council and Parliament) was therefore convened, in September 2013, to solve the delicate
inter-institutional controversy that emerged on the sharing of competences. In its final report,
issued in April 2014
6
, the Task Force suggested, as a solution to the stalemate, a framework
where multi-annual plans would be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure while a
certain margin for discretion would be kept for Council's annual TAC decisions. The solution
would be to use ranges, rather than point values, of F
MSY
when defining the amount of fish
that is allowed to be caught through fishing every year in a multi-annual plan. Council would
then, for the species covered by a plan, have to fix TACs within the ranges provided for in the
plan. ICES provided ranges that give a long-term yield from the stock that is at least 95
percent of the yield if the F
MSY
point-value was being used (see
41
and Figure 3.1).
Beyond the resolution of the inter-institutional conflict, the Task-Force also agreed to include
biomass safeguards into the plans. These biomass safeguards are thresholds that trigger
remedial action if the biomass of a stock falls below a certain limit. The rationale for this is
that exploiting a stock based on F
MSY
is the sustainable choice in most cases but it can put a
stock at risk if the stock's biomass is very low. In such a situation it is advisable to adopt a
TAC based on a lower exploitation rate or to take other measures that reduce the fishing
mortality for this stock. Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation requires fishing at F
MSY
or below
and adherence to the precautionary principle. Biomass safeguards can be regarded as a
concrete manifestation of the precautionary approach to fisheries.
41
In fisheries science, the rate at which fish are removed from a stock due to fishing operations (including fish
subsequently discarded) is denoted F. It is approximately the stock annual removal expressed as a proportion
of the total stock. F
MSY
is the fishing mortality rate that, if applied constantly, would result in an average
catch corresponding to the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). Upon Commission's request, ICES has
calculated ranges for important North Sea stocks that maximise long-term average yield and thus comply
with the CFP objectives (Version
4 of Report 6.2.3.1 EU request to ICES to provide F
MSY
ranges for
selected North Sea and Baltic Sea stocks).
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Figure 3.1. Example of yield (production) versus fishing mortality (F) for a hypothetical fishery. SSB:
spawning stock biomass. The peak of the production function is MSY and the fishing mortality generating
this peak is F
MSY
.
The Task-Force results have already been followed in adopting a Commission proposal for a
multi-annual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea
42
. Both co-
legislators have received the proposal positively, adopted their respective positions and have
been negotiating on the final text in trilogues since June 2015.
3.1.5.
Technical measures regulations
Another important tool to manage fisheries in the EU has been to prescribe technical
measures, i.e. measures establishing conditions for the use and structure of fishing gear and
restrictions on access to fishing areas. There are a large number of technical measures in place
for fisheries exploiting stocks in the North Sea. At present, these are mainly contained in the
main technical measures regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 850/1998)
43
. The measures
include gear specifications, minimum percentages of target species and by-catch limitations
by mesh size and area as well as a variety of closed areas and seasons. The reasons for the
technical measures vary but very often they are in place to increase avoidance of unwanted
catches and thus reduce discards.
The Commission is working towards a new framework for technical measures to adapt it to
the logic of the reformed CFP where discard avoidance is already strongly incentivised by the
Basic Regulation (see Section 3.4.1). Preparation and consultations on this issue are taking
place in parallel with the North Sea multi-annual plan.
42
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multiannual plan for
the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending
Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007.
Council Regulation (EC) No 850/1998 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through
technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. (OJ
L 125, 27.4.1998).
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3.2.
"Traditional" management of North Sea demersal fisheries: The problem of
discarding
In the North Sea and adjacent areas a wide range of different fish and shellfish species are
exploited, among them many demersal species. Demersal fish are fish that live at or near the
bottom of the water column, e.g. cod and haddock. The North Sea demersal fishery is a mixed
fishery: fishermen unavoidably catch a mixture of demersal species at the same time. They
cannot control (or only to a limited extent) the composition of their catches
44
.
Fisheries in the EU are traditionally managed by defining and prescribing annually the
amount of fish that can be fished in the coming year for each stock. This amount is divided
among Member States following a fixed allocation key and then, in most of the cases, it is
shared out to fishing enterprises at the Member State level. If fishermen run out of quota for a
particular stock ("stock A") and they still have quota available for another in the same mixed
fishery ("stock B") they are allowed to keep on fishing. Fishermen simply throw catches of
stock A back into the sea. They also discard catches of young fish because EU legislation
45
stipulates that they are not allowed to land catches below a certain size in order to avoid the
emergence of a market for such young fish and thus further incentives for fishermen to catch
young fish. Discarded fish does not survive in most cases
29
. The discarded part of the stocks is
thus wasted; the stocks are effectively economically underutilised. While TACs reduce
overfishing, they create new externalities by the fact that over-quota catches are being
discarded and hence wasted.
Another problem stems from the fact that the true amount of discarding is unknown and is
therefore only partially taken into account when setting the annual TAC. The TAC does then
not fully reflect the amount of fish that is really killed due to fishing. This is one among
several reasons why TACs are often set too high and the stocks are overfished
46
.
44
Depending on the specific circumstances, catch composition can sometimes be controlled by employing
fishing gear that allows undesired species to escape ("selective" gear) or by avoiding areas with an
abundance of an unwanted species.
Article 9 Council Regulation (EC) No. 850/1998, see footnote 43.
Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, accompanying the document Commission proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy
(SEC(2001)891).
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Figure 3.2.1. Traditional management and the new problems it creates. Rectangle: policy measure;
diamond: problem; solid line: leads to unwanted result; dashed line: reduces / removes problem.
3.3.
Solutions and problems stemming from current North Sea Management Plans
In the North Sea, the system described in the previous section has led to significant discarding
and could not prevent overfishing
37
. The stock that has been most negatively affected by the
right to discard over-quota fish is the cod stock. Therefore, when introducing the cod
management plan
3
(see Section 3.1.2), the EU decided to protect the cod stock by introducing
another regulatory system in addition to the TAC system. The cod plan
3
introduced
limitations of "days at sea", i.e. to the time that fishermen are allowed to spend at sea. The
system tried to protect the cod stock by generally limiting demersal fishing in the North Sea,
including fishing for other stocks where cod is caught as an unwanted by-catch. The plan
incentivised fishing methods that avoid involuntary catches of cod by allowing Member
States to increase the days at sea of their fishermen if they could prove that the cod by-catch
of these fishermen is very low. A comparable system of days at sea has also been applied in
the flatfish plan
4
.
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Figure 3.3.1. The North Sea management plans – partial solutions and new problems. Rectangle: policy
measure; diamond: problem; solid line: leads to unwanted result; dashed line: reduces / removes problem.
These current management regimes are considered by Member States, the fishing industry,
scientists
22-31
,
47
and environmental organisations as ineffective, overly prescriptive,
unnecessarily burdensome and economically damaging for the EU fishing industry. In
particular, the “days at sea” regime has been at the centre of criticism. In its evaluation of the
cod plan
19
, STECF concluded that the plan had not controlled fishing mortality as envisaged
and that the short-term economic impacts of the management plan were not clear. With
regards to the flatfish plan, STECF concluded that the observed recovery of sole and plaice
was unlikely to stem from limitations on days at sea
20
. The ability of the days at sea regime to
address the problem of discarding has therefore been rather mediocre.
The cod plan
3
has also been heavily criticised for envisaging further restrictions even when
the cod stock in the North Sea started to recover in recent years. Its effect has been not only to
limit fishing for cod in the North Sea, which accounts for approximately 5% of the fish
landed, but also to prevent fishing vessels from leaving port even when they own legitimate
fishing quota for the 95% of other fish. That consequence has been criticised as grossly unfair
and disproportionate throughout the fishing sector.
The days at sea regime has also been criticised for having perverse effects that damage the
environment rather than preserving fish stocks, for instance because vessels with a limited
budget of fishing days have to fish close to shore where juvenile fish concentrates. Similarly,
the North Sea fishing industry has argued in the Public Consultation to this initiative (see
Annex I) that severe restrictions on the time they can spend at sea makes it more difficult for
them to seek fishing areas with lower cod abundance, so the restrictions exacerbate the
problem of unwanted cod catches in the mixed fisheries. Moreover, the days at sea
47
Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Lot 2 Study. Administrative experience with effort management
concerning the NE Atlantic (December 2010).
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management scheme has created significant administrative burden for the Commission and
Member State administrations.
Since 2011, the Council has been calling on the Commission to submit a proposal to replace
the cod plan, which it considers ineffective and discredited.
In 2012, the Commission adopted two proposals
48
,
49
for amendments of the cod plan
3
. The
first was to align it to the Lisbon Treaty; the second to amend it to provide interim solutions to
its most pressing problems, pending the development and implementation of a mixed-fisheries
plan for North Sea fisheries.
In December 2012, Council decided to split the COM proposal COM (2012)0498
49
and
unilaterally adopted a Council Regulation (EU) amending the cod plan
50
. That amendment
removed some of the most burdensome rigidities of the cod plan but without putting in place a
scheme that would allow management of the cod stock effectively as part of a mixed fishery.
The European Parliament and the Commission have each brought an action against the
Council to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the annulment of that regulation
51
. It is
likely that the judgement of the ECJ will lead to its repeal
51
. This would re-establish the
previous version of the cod plan which is considered as unworkable and inapplicable.
To sum up, the system of days at sea restrictions is ineffective, very bureaucratic and has not
gained acceptance among fishermen. In the Public Consultation (Annex I) the fishing industry
gave a clear message that the restrictions on days at sea in the two existing plans are very
unpopular as they are unworkable, not sufficiently adaptive, and/or counterproductive.
Additionally, the current plans have been criticised for not being flexible enough to address
the issues that have evolved during their implementation. For these reasons, the plans can be
regarded as regulatory failure which should be addressed by this initiative. More importantly,
the plans can be regarded as pieces of outdated regulation because the problem of discarding
in mixed fisheries is being addressed in a more thorough way by the new Basic Regulation of
the CFP which will be described in the next section.
3.4.
3.4.1.
CFP-reform: solving problems, creating new challenges
Ending discarding and overfishing
The new Basic Regulation adopted in 2013 includes a new approach to solve the problems of
overfishing and discarding. The new Basic Regulation bans discarding by introducing an
48
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC)
No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting
those stocks (COM(2012)0021).
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC)
No 1342/2008 of 18 December 2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting
those stocks (COM(2012)0498 final).
Council Regulation (EU) No 1243/2012 amending Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 establishing a long-term
plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks. (OJ
L 352, 21.12.2012)
.
Joined Cases C‑124/13 and C‑125/13. (Common fisheries policy — Action for annulment — Council
Regulation (EU) No 1243/2012 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting
those stocks — Legal basis — Scope of Article 43(2) and Article 43(3) TFEU — Technical implementing
measures).
49
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obligation to land all catches; this obligation is being introduced stepwise between 2015 and
2019. The landing obligation implies that fishermen have to stop fishing when they run out of
quota for one of the stocks that they catch – discarding will simply no longer be allowed. This
provision is supposed to trigger behavioural change on many levels. The Commission expects
Member States to attribute fishing rights to their fishermen in a way that reflects, as far as
possible, the expected mixture of species caught. Fishermen are expected to change behaviour
because they now have a much bigger incentive to avoid stocks that they do not want to catch
because they would have to "pay" with valuable quota for these catches. Under the old
management, the discarded catch was not counted against the quota for that species. Under
the landing obligation, however, not only do all fish caught have to be landed but all fish
caught will now be counted against the quota for that stock. The landing obligation should
therefore trigger innovation in fishing gears, techniques and strategies.
At the same time Article 2(2) of the new Basic Regulation makes the concept of Maximum
Sustainable Yield (MSY) legally binding. Where possible by 2015, and at the latest by 2020,
the EU cannot set total allowable catches above levels that comply with the MSY concept.
Therefore, once F
MSY
has been reached for any particular stock, the annual fishing
opportunities need to be set at the level necessary to ensure that exploitation does not exceed
F
MSY
for that stock.
These two central measures of the CFP are expected to solve the problem of overfishing and
resource wastage caused by discarding.
Figure 3.4.1. The CFP reform – a comprehensive solution. Rectangle: policy measure; diamond: problem;
solid line: leads to unwanted result; dashed line: reduces / removes problem.
3.4.2.
New challenge: "Choke" species and underfishing
However, the rule that states that fishermen have to stop fishing when they run out of quota
for just one of the stocks caught in the mixed fishery will create new problems. Some stocks
will probably be underfished in the future, because the entire fishery will have to be closed
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when another stock's quota has been used up. Such a stock which restricts fishing in a mixed
fishery is often referred to as a "choke species". The problem will be aggravated by the
obligation to apply the MSY concept to all stocks simultaneously because it will not be
possible to allow (temporary) overfishing of a stock that "chokes" the fishery. Due to the
fluctuations in the abundance of the different fish stocks, different species might become
choke species in different years. The resulting underfishing could threaten the economic
viability of the fishing industry.
Figure 3.4.2. The CFP reform – creating new challenges. Rectangle: policy measure; diamond: problem;
solid line: leads to unwanted result.
Under the impact of the landing obligation, where no discarding is allowed, cod has the
potential to be a choke species, given the significant degree of historical over-quota catches
(currently discarded) of cod. These over-quota catches appear to be increasing in recent years,
as shown in Table 3.4.2.1 giving the proportions of over-quota catches where 1.0 expresses an
exact match of catches and TAC and >1.0 expresses catch figures that are higher than the
TAC).
Table 3.4.2.1. Over quota catches of cod in the North Sea
Year
Cod
2010
1.2
2011
1.4
2012
1.4
2013
1.4
2014
1.6
Table 3.4.2.2 illustrates the hypothetical effects on the landed value for seven demersal
species caught together in the North Sea if the landing obligation were already fully applied to
cod in 2015. There are clearly significant reductions in the quantities of other demersal
species that could be landed, with highly significant impacts on the reduction in value.
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Table 3.4.2.2. The hypothetical effects on landings, in tonnes, and value, in euros, for seven North Sea
demersal fish species based on the cod scenario in the mixed-fisheries advice for 2015
52
where, once the
North Sea cod quota is caught other fisheries catching cod would have to cease.
% change in landed
value compared to
single species advice
0
-66
-53
-37
-41
-18
-44
Species
Cod
Haddock
Plaice
Saithe
Sole
Turbot
Whiting
Single species landing
advice 2015 (t)
26713
48176
128376
72854
10973
2406
17190
Landings (t) if landing
obligation fully applied
26713
16592
60175
45797
6469
1972
9654
2012 value
per ton (€)
2.72
1.28
1.41
1.30
9.36
8.22
1.27
The problem is not limited to the cod stock. An analysis of these issues for the North Sea
fisheries was undertaken by the STECF
29
, which showed that for all Member States and for a
number of stocks, catches were well in excess of the available quota which indicates that
these stocks would become choke species under a landing obligation. The most important
findings of this STECF report are provided in Annex III.
The landing obligation will be introduced in the North Sea demersal fishery stepwise for
catches from different species between 2016 and 2019
53
. Therefore, the problem of
underfishing is not imminent yet but will evolve from the legislation that is already in place.
3.4.3.
New challenge: the costs of landing all catches
Another problem created by the Basic Regulation is the costs of the landing obligation that
fishermen have to bear. These costs notably stem from having to sort and record additional
catches, and store them on board until landed, while not being allowed to market them for
human consumption
54
. In some cases, especially when the stock which is being discarded is in
a good state, has low economic value or discarded amounts are relatively small, the obligation
to land all catches might be a disproportionate measure. To sum up, the CFP reform solves the
problem of overfishing and discarding but, when applied strictly, may lead to the problems of
disproportionate costs and underfishing.
3.5.
Mismatch between the current management plans and the Basic Regulation
Some provisions of the cod plan
3
do not match with the new Basic Regulation. Most
importantly, the current plans include rules on how to define the annual fishing opportunities
that are not in line with the principle of MSY foreseen by the Basic Regulation.
52
53
http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2014/2014/mix-nsea.pdf
Details will be included in a Delegated Act, adopted on the basis of Article 15(5)(a) of the Basic Regulation
and developed according to the Regionalisation method.
Article 15(11) of the new Basic Regulation bans the marketing of undersized fish for direct human
consumption in order not to incentivise fishing activities that target young fish.
54
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3.6.
Solutions foreseen in the CFP Basic Regulation
The Basic Regulation introduces a binding timetable for implementing the landing obligation,
but it also foresees ways to address the challenges described above. Before the entry into
force of the landing obligation in a specific fishery, Article 15(5) of this regulation allows for
the adoption of exemptions from the landing obligation for species that have a high chance of
survival when thrown back into the sea. Exemptions can also be granted "where scientific
evidence indicates that increases in selectivity are very difficult to achieve" (Article
15(5)(c)(i)) or to avoid "disproportionate costs of handling unwanted catches" (Article
15(5)(c)(ii)). The Basic Regulation contains the right for the Commission to adopt these
exemptions in a Delegated Act for a transitional period of no more than three years. The Basic
Regulation stipulates that these Delegated Acts, commonly referred to as "discard plans", are
developed following the Regionalisation method described in Section 3.1.3. According to
Article 15(5) of the Basic Regulation, any exemptions that are supposed to be valid for a
period longer than three years can only be adopted as part of a multi-annual plan.
Another way towards a solution can be found in the Inter-Institutional Task Force's proposal
to use fishing mortality ranges instead of the point estimate of F
MSY
(see Section 3.1.4). This
would enable management of the mixed fishery by allowing some more room for manoeuvre
to set TACs in a way that avoids underfishing and thus reduces economic and social losses
caused by the "choke species" problem.
An additional solution, not explicitly foreseen in the Basic Regulation but developed by the
Inter-institutional Task-Force (see Section 3.1.4) is the "decoupling" of mixed fisheries by
prescribing specific technical measures that increase selectivity. The Task-Force final report
6
foresees room for such measures especially for by-catch stocks in a mixed fishery and
foresees the use of the regionalisation procedure (see Section 3.1.3) to develop such measures.
3.7.
Who is affected?
The fisheries of the North Sea and adjacent areas involve vessels from Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, as well as Norway,
using a wide variety of different fishing gears to target a wide range of different fish and
shellfish species. According to the 2014 STECF Annual Economic Report
55
, in 2012, the
North Sea fleet comprised some 5800 vessels, varying in size from 6 m to greater than 40 m
in length. Employment within the North Sea fleet (in terms of full time equivalents) was
around 9300 people. The weight and value of landings generated by the EU North Sea fleet in
2012 amounted to approximately 1.1 million tonnes and almost €1.5 billion respectively. The
UK, French and Danish North Sea fleets together accounted for around 73% of the total days
at sea in the region (See Annex IV for more detail on the North Sea demersal fisheries and
stocks).
In the North Sea, demersal trawls and seines and beam trawls were the two most important
gears with respect to both the total weight of species landed (64%) and the total value of
species landed (68%) by the EU North Sea fleet in 2012. The majority of demersal fish landed
are caught in these gears. The numbers of vessels and employment for vessels using these
gear categories (relative to all other gear types), for each Member State, for the top 35 fleet
55
The 2014 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing fleet. STECF 14-16.
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segments
56
, are given in Table 3.7.1. Overall, these data show that, in 2012, these two
demersal gear categories accounted for 20% of the vessels and more than 55% of the
employment of the entire North Sea fleet.
Table 3.7.1. Numbers of vessels and employment in the EU North Sea fleet in 2012 by gear type and by
Member State for the top 35 Member State fleet segments
56
in terms of landed value. Employment is given
as Full Time Equivalents (FTEs).
Demersal trawls / seines
EU Member State
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Netherlands
Sweden
UK
Totals
% of total NS fleet
Fleet size
0
218
57
15
21
66
268
645
11
FTEs
0
665
297
128
84
232
2100
3506
38
Beam trawlers
Fleet size
58
0
0
181
255
0
20
514
9
FTEs
157
0
0
286
906
0
118
1467
16
Other gears
Fleet size
0
62
186
0
13
0
1026
1287
22
FTEs
0
234
505
0
75
0
940
1754
19
However, for individual Member States, the dependence on the demersal fleets can be much
higher than the overall figures. For example, the demersal sector of the Belgian and German
fleets comprises over 75% of their North Sea fleet in each country (Table 3.7.1), with the
Dutch fleet having around 50% of its vessels in the demersal sector. In terms of employment,
only France has significantly less than 50% of the North Sea fleets' employment in the
demersal catching sector.
The catching sector for North Sea demersal fish is, demonstrably, very important to the
Member States surrounding the North Sea. It comprises a high proportion of the fleet size,
employment, landed value, landed weight, fishing time (days at sea) and GVA for the
majority of those Member States (Table 3.7.2). Clearly, any negative impacts on the demersal
catching sector have the potential to impact those Member States.
Within the top 35 North Sea fleet segments
56
, the demersal catching sectors in Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands represent over 80% of the landed value of North Sea landings.
Sweden's demersal sector provides over 93% of its landed weight; the figure is greater than
80% for Belgium and Germany. In terms of gross value added (GVA), GVA from the
demersal catching sectors in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden is in excess of
70% for each of their North Sea fleets; it is around 50% for the UK.
56
The STECF AER (see footnote 55) only provides detailed data for the 35 fleet segments with the highest
value of landings. A fleet segment is a group of vessels from the same Member State using the same gear
type. Although not exhaustive, the data available are still relevant, as in 2012 the top 35 Member State fleet
segments in the catching sector represented 60% of the fishing effort, 84% of the landed weight and 83% of
the landed value generated by the regional fleet. These top 35 fleet segments represented 42% of the fleet in
terms of number of vessels and 72% of the employment. Note that these figures include landings generated
from a variety of gear categories, not only demersal gears. All figures in this section refer to the top 35 fleet
segments, not to the entire fishing fleet.
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Table 3.7.2. Percentages of various categories, by Member State, represented by the demersal sector in
2012 for the top 35 Member State fleet segments
56
in terms of landed value. Employment is given as Full
Time Equivalents (FTEs)
EU
State
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Netherlands
Sweden
UK
Member
Fleet
(%)
77
21
10
79
49
13
10
size
FTEs
(%)
73
56
23
77
78
46
52
Landed
value (%)
81
45
36
84
84
70
50
Landed
weight (t) (%)
81
40
39
86
53
93
37
Days
at
sea (%)
74
43
14
82
87
22
22
GVA
(%)
84
38
21
85
84
70
48
Additionally, there is a shore-based processing sector that deals with the North Sea fish catch.
Figures for the numbers of enterprises and employment within the sector in each of the North
Sea Member States are given in Table 3.7.3. Note that in most cases the enterprises will be
processing catches from other areas as well as the North Sea. In terms of employment, 61% of
these enterprises are micro-businesses and 37% are SMEs
57
.
Table 3.7.3. Numbers of enterprises and employment in the processing sector of North Sea EU Member
States in 2012.
Number of enterprises by size (No. of employees)
No.
of
employees:
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Netherlands
Sweden
UK
Total
≤ 10
206
57
133
171
35
190
166
958
11-49
28
30
108
56
33
25
133
413
50-249
5
19
39
15
16
8
64
166
≥250
1
0
15
8
0
0
12
36
Total
240
106
295
250
84
223
375
1573
Employment
(FTEs)
2492
3409
16184
7010
3567
2135
19070
53867
The other stakeholders most affected by this proposal would be the sector regulators in the
Member States. Any changes to the regulatory structure will require a re-adjustment of the
management regime. Sectors' research agencies will also be affected as changes in
management measures will require experimentation and evaluation of these new measures.
57
Report of the STECF Expert Group on: Economic Performance of the EU Fish Processing Industry
(STECF-14-21).
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3.8.
Summary
The EU has tried, for decades, to solve the main problems in the North Sea demersal fisheries:
overfishing and discarding. Currently, old instruments (the current management plans and
their days at sea schemes) and a new instrument (the new Basic Regulation) are in force at the
same time, all aiming to solve these problems. The current management plans have failed to
solve these problems satisfactorily while creating new problems. They can therefore be
regarded as regulatory failure. At the same time they are outdated because the Basic
Regulation addresses the same problems in a different way.
The Basic Regulation promises to solve the problems of overfishing and discarding more
effectively. However, this regulation is too strict as it leads to underfishing and imposes a
landing obligation even in situations where such an obligation is disproportionate. Hence, if
no alleviating measures (exemptions from the landing obligation beyond the 3 years discard
plans, flexibility with regards to MSY in a mixed fishery, technical measures to "decouple
fisheries") are taken, the Basic Regulation will most likely have negative economic and social
consequences for the fishing industry in the coming years.
3.9.
Legal basis for the EU to act
According to Article 3(1)(d) of the TFEU
35
, the Union shall have exclusive competence in the
conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP. Article 43(2) of the TFEU
35
establishes the Union’s power to adopt the provisions necessary for the pursuit of the
objectives of the CFP. The problems identified in this section clearly relate to the
conservation of marine biological resources; they therefore have to be resolved by the EU.
Hence, there is no need to justify measures with regards to the principle of subsidiarity.
Nevertheless, the reformed CFP gives the EU the possibility to move decision making closer
to the affected stakeholder by making use of Regionalisation (see Section 3.1.3) thus living up
to the spirit of subsidiarity.
4.
4.1.
O
BJECTIVES
General objectives
The current initiative complements the CFP reform and helps to implement it for the North
Sea demersal fisheries. It therefore has to be in line with objectives of the CFP Basic
Regulation which are stated in its Article 2. Of particular importance for this initiative are the
following objectives:
to provide a transparent framework to achieve the maximum sustainable yield
exploitation rate (F
MSY
) by 2015, where possible, and by 2020 at the latest
to apply the precautionary approach
the simplification of EU legislation and of the management of European fisheries
58
58
The objective of simplification is not stated explicitly in the Basic Regulation but it can be found in
Commission Communications
COM(2011)417
(Communication From The Commission To The Council
And The European Parliament on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy) and
COM(2009)261
(Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parliament on the
implementation of the Action Plan for simplifying and improving the Common Fisheries Policy).
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4.2.
Specific objectives
Having identified the main problems that occur in the North Sea demersal fisheries, or that
will occur once the landing obligation is introduced, the following objectives for this initiative
can be derived:
to reduce the extent of underfishing in a mixed fishery under a landing obligation (see
Sections 3.4.2) by introducing F
MSY
ranges (see Sections 3.1.4 and 3.6),
to establish biomass safeguards in order to enable the precautionary approach
established in Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation (see Section 3.1.4)
to facilitate the application of the landing obligation introduced in the reformed CFP
59
(see Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 and 3.6)
to establish the framework necessary for the implementation of Regionalisation within
the North Sea area (see Sections 3.1.3 and 3.6)
to remove the days at sea regime which has proven to be ineffective and which is no
longer necessary given that the new Basic Regulation addresses the same underlying
problems with different means
It should be noted that the specific objectives are partly linked to each other. Facilitating the
application of the landing obligation by granting exemptions from this obligation could help
to reduce the risk of underfishing in a mixed fishery. Establishing a framework for the
implementation of Regionalisation within the North Sea area makes it significantly easier to
adopt technical measures that decouple mixed fisheries. Hence, Regionalisation equally has a
potential to contribute to reducing the risk of underfishing (see Section 3.6).
Another important objective of the CFP is to minimise negative impacts of fishing activities
on the marine ecosystem (Basic Regulation, Article 2(3) and to be coherent with the EU
environmental legislation (Basic Regulation, Article 2(5)(j)). Any initiative taken within the
Common Fisheries Policy shall therefore avoid being detrimental to these objectives and
where possible should help to achieve them.
An additional important objective of the CFP is to achieve "economic, social and employment
benefits" (Article 2(1)) and to "provide conditions for economically viable and competitive
fishing capture and processing industry" (Article 2(5)(c)). This initiative will contribute to
achieving this objective by preventing underfishing and by simplifying legislation.
59
The issue of Regionalisation is closely linked to the new technical measures framework which is currently
under development (see Section 3.1.5). The new technical measures framework might enable
Regionalisation for all EU waters. However, as a new technical measures framework would constitute a
major reform of the way the EU manages its fisheries, substantial delays in the adoption of that initiative
cannot be excluded. For the reasons described in Section 3.6, after the introduction of the landing obligation
regionalised technical measures will become essential in the North Sea to "decouple" mixed fisheries and
thus increase the yield from the fishery. Therefore, one cannot rely on the technical measures framework to
bring about the possibility of regionalised technical measures but the initiative developed in this impact
assessment also has to enable Regionalisation. The Commission will have to ensure coherence between the
different instruments.
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5.
P
OLICY OPTIONS
A screening of different policy options has led to the identification of those policy options that
are most likely to meet the objectives and address the problems identified in Section 3. The
four options considered are the existing management approach, amending the existing plans,
managing solely according to the new CFP (the Basic Regulation), and establishing a single
mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan. The first two options (existing management approach,
amending the existing plans) have been discarded early on. The reasons for this will be
explained in the following sub-sections. Subsequently, the remaining two options will be
discussed in more detail, including sub-options for a potential mixed-fisheries multi-annual
plan.
5.1.
5.1.1.
Discarded options
No policy change at EU level
The first option is the
status quo
option or no policy change at EU level, i.e. to continue to
apply the existing management (i.e. cod
3
and flatfish
4
) plans, in combination with all other
existing rules of the new CFP.
Under this option none of the objectives of this initiative would be reached. It would not
provide a transparent framework on how and when to achieve the maximum sustainable yield
exploitation rate (F
MSY
). Instead it would provide for contradictory management objectives,
i.e. the fishing mortality rates stated in the existing plans and the MSY objective stated in the
Basic Regulation
60
. The unilateral amendment by Council to the cod plan (Council Regulation
1243/2012) see Section 3.3), deemed illegal by Commission and Parliament, does not change
the fishing mortality rate stated in the plan and therefore does not solve the problem. This
option would also not introduce ranges for F
MSY
.
The current plans only include biomass safeguards for the cod stocks, therefore, the objectives
of applying the precautionary approach and establishing biomass safeguards cannot be
reached for all other stocks in the North Sea.
Under this option, it would not be possible to replace the discard plans after they have lapsed.
The landing obligation would thus also be applied in cases where this is disproportionate (see
Section 3.4.3). Moreover, this option does not enable Regionalisation in the North Sea and
would not do away with days at sea management
61
, a policy that has been strongly criticised
at many levels (see Section 3.3).
Due to the contradictory provisions that would be in force, this option clearly does not reach
the objective to simplify legislation.
60
The target fishing mortality provided for in the cod plan is no longer appropriate because it is much higher
than F
MSY
for the North Sea stock. The same applies for both the sole and plaice stocks, for which the plan
has achieved the first-stage objectives and has not been amended to introduce new objectives. It is therefore
outdated vis-à-vis the new CFP.
The unilateral amendment Council made to the cod plan (see Section 3.3) does not abolish the days at sea
scheme, it merely eases its application by limiting the automatic days at sea reductions foreseen in the plan
(Council Regulation 1243/2012, Article 1(2)).
61
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Additionally, stakeholders clearly reject this option
13
. In the public consultations for both the
North Sea multi-annual plan and for the new framework for technical measures the catching
sector gave a clear message that the restrictions on days at sea in the two existing plans are
very unpopular as they are unworkable, not sufficiently adaptive, and/or counterproductive.
Both the catching sector and the Member States consider that these restrictions would be
unnecessary or even counterproductive when the landing obligation enters into force and the
administrative burden of implementing them would therefore no longer be justified.
Additionally, the current plans have been criticised for not being flexible enough to address
the issues that have evolved during their implementation. The Member States directly
concerned have requested to replace these plans as soon as possible. There are high
expectations by all stakeholders that these plans will be replaced. In addition, there are
expectations, e.g. from the European Parliament, to bring more fisheries under multi-annual
plans in the future. In 2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which "calls on the
Commission to provide for the establishment of long-term management plans for all EU
fisheries"
62
.
This "no-change"-option has been discarded very early in the process, not only because none
of the problems identified above would be resolved but also because under this option
contradictory, competing legislation would be in force; it would, therefore, be unclear which
of the legislations would be enforced. The "no-change"-option is therefore not an appropriate
baseline against which the other options can be assessed
63
.
5.1.2.
Amendment of the existing management plans
This option would enable an update and review of the existing management plans, and
subsequently consider the introduction of a series of new single-species plans. Existing (cod
and flatfish) plans would be updated to meet the challenges of the new CFP reform, and in
light of their evaluations – adjusting to F
MSY
, reviewing elements such as days at sea
restrictions, etc. Over time new, additional, plans could be introduced for stocks not currently
under a management plan. This would entail the development of between 7 and 9 plans for the
demersal fish stocks for which ICES currently provides scientific advice on maximum
sustainable yield
41
, and potentially a further 23 plans for other commercially important stocks.
Some of the objectives of this initiative can be achieved by this option in exactly the same
way as under a single mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan: a transparent framework for F
MSY
as
well as F
MSY
ranges and biomass safeguards could be established; days at sea management
could be abolished. These elements will be discussed in more depth in the section dealing
with the option of a single mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan (see Section 5.2.2).
However, keeping and amending the existing plans would make it difficult to achieve the
objectives of implementing regionalisation and facilitating the introduction of the landing
obligation. This is because integrated approaches to the implementation of the landing
obligation (introduced per fishery) or of technical measures to be introduced at a regional
level would be virtually impossible because the same technical measures applying to fishing
62
European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2012 on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy –
Overarching Communication (2011/2290(INI)).
We recognise that it is unorthodox to discard the "no-change" option. However, we have demonstrated that
the current management plans constitute regulatory failure. To discard this option is, therefore, the
pragmatic and honest approach.
63
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different stocks would have to be introduced in separate delegated acts based on different
(multiple) single-stock plans – and would therefore create a proliferation of delegated acts.
This would also be the case for the implementing rules governing the landing obligation and
possible exemptions from this obligation (see Section 3.6). In a mixed fishery it would be
unclear which of the species/stock-based plans would have to include details on the fisheries-
based phasing in of the landing obligation. Additionally, future exemptions from the landing
obligation for the North Sea would need to be distributed over many different plans instead of
being contained within one document as is the case for the current discard plans.
The foreseen outcome would create a very complex legal framework, with complicated
management challenges and most likely increased administrative burden in developing each
plan and implementing and updating them to ensure coherence between them. The risk of
unforeseen loopholes would also need to be considered. The objective of simplifying
legislation would clearly not be met.
The Public Consultation showed that, among stakeholders, there has been strong criticism of
the complexity of the existing legislation, so any further complications arising from a
multiplicity of plans are unlikely to be welcomed. Additionally, Member States consider that
no time should be spent on amendment of the plans in force and focus instead should be on
development of a new multi-annual plan for the North Sea mixed fisheries. There is general
support by stakeholders that the existing plans should be replaced by a new holistic plan (see
Annex I).
This option would address some of the objectives in the same way that a mixed-fisheries plan
can (i.e. provision of a transparent framework; introduction of F
MSY
ranges; application of the
precautionary approach; removal of the days at sea regime). However, there are difficulties to
solve the remaining problems that a single-species plan can address more easily (i.e.
facilitation of the landing obligation; Regionalisation; simplification; see Section 5.2.2);
therefore this option has also been discarded.
5.2.
5.2.1.
Potential policy options
Use solely the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation)
This option would aim at repealing the two existing multi-annual plans (the cod plan
3
and the
flatfish plan
4
) and apply only the Basic Regulation, including the landing obligation. This
option would mean that for every (of the around 40 – see Annex IV) stock in the North Sea
the management obligation is to achieve MSY by 2020 at the latest. This means that the TACs
that are set annually for all stocks must respect MSY objectives, using the point estimate
value of F
MSY
as a target. TACs are set on a single-stock basis, where there may be no
consideration of mixed-fisheries interactions. This has proven in the past to lead to
mismatches in the quota basket for fishermen and Member States, normally having discarding
as a potential consequence. With the landing obligation, a large number of stocks would turn
into choke species under this option (see Section 3.4.2). As a consequence, either the fishery
would need to be stopped completely before the end of the season – to ensure that the
conservation objectives are met and the TAC is respected – or, alternatively, fishermen would
continue to fish for species for which they still have quota, in combination with illegal
discarding. The latter, though hard to estimate quantitatively, would lead to a deterioration of
catch data, distortion of stock assessments and the risk of structural (not identified)
overfishing of the choke-species' stock.
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A quick remedy would need to be found whereby cod could be isolated (decoupled) from the
other demersal species, in particular from haddock, by means of technical measures (see
Section 3.6). Such short-term remedies are not foreseeable under the Basic Regulation,
especially in the absence of adaptable technical measures or alternative conservation measures
– which would have to be adopted through co-decision: the inflexible governance structure
(no regionalisation) would hinder stock conservation. This option would operate within the
existing framework of technical measures under co-decision, implying very limited
adaptability of the technical rules to new situations or requirements.
In addition, the lack of flexibility and adaptability in, notably, the technical measures
legislation, rules out the possibility to introduce more selective and avoidance fishing
strategies and techniques to a significant degree. Individual fishermen will see no driver to
change the behaviour when others don't participate – which is typically the argument for the
tragedy of the commons. In the absence of these adaptations of fishing gears and of fishing
strategies, the choke species phenomenon will continue to hamper the fishing industries.
This option would also imply that the implementation of the landing obligation in North Sea
demersal fisheries would have to proceed without any facilitating practical measures after
2018. Once the discard plan expires, the landing obligation would have to be applied without
any exemptions which could have severe negative economic effects in some fisheries (see
Table 3.4.2).
Additionally, under this option, when stocks fall below a stock size consistent with full
reproductive capacity, there would be no immediate safeguards written into the regulation. In
the absence of such semi-automatic initiatives to recover the stocks to safe biological levels,
stock recovery is normally slow as decision makers avoid drastic measures that lead to large
reductions in fishing mortality.
5.2.2.
A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries
This option would provide one plan, containing one single management framework for the
management of stocks caught together in demersal fisheries in the North Sea. It would aim to
account for mixed-fisheries interactions through the introduction of F
MSY
ranges, allowing
more flexibility in the setting of fishing opportunities. This would enable more coherence in
the definition of fishing opportunities for the different stocks it would cover because different
stock's TACs would be able to be based on values of fishing mortality within their F
MSY
ranges, rather than the point estimate value of F
MSY
(see Section 3.4.2). A mixed-fisheries
plan, using ranges of fishing mortality, instead of point estimates, as MSY targets would
maximise the contribution that a mixed-fisheries approach to setting TACs could make to
reducing the choke species problem.
Figure 5.2.2.1 illustrates for five of the six main North Sea demersal stocks how F
MSY
ranges
help to resolve the choke species problem described in Section 3.4.2. Each of the symbols in
the figure shows where the fishing mortality in 2013 is, in relation to F
MSY
. If the value is less
than 1, then the fishing mortality in 2013 (F
2013
) is higher than the F
MSY
values. If the value is
greater than 1 then the F
2013
is lower than the F
MSY
values. The three different symbols
represent F
2013
relative to: the point estimate of F
MSY
(blue diamonds); the upper bound of the
F
MSY
range (red triangles); the lower bound of the F
MSY
range (green squares). It can be seen
that saithe, plaice and sole, for example, have F
2013
values that are around F
MSY
(they all have
values of around 1) and similar relative ranges of F
MSY
for the three species. Conversely, cod
and haddock are very different to the other three species. Cod in 2013 is well above its F
MSY
values, whereas haddock is well below its F
MSY
values. It would, therefore, be easy to set
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coherent TACs for saithe, plaice and sole to ensure exploitation consistent with F
MSY
.
However, because the relative F
MSY
ranges for cod and haddock have minimal overlap with
each other and with the ranges for the other species it would be difficult to set TACs that
would exploit all five species at levels consistent with F
MSY.
This is where regionally defined
technical measures that would be possible under the framework of a multi-annual plan could
be useful to complement the F
MSY
range approach, for example, by reducing the F for cod
through technical measures and thereby minimising choke effects, rather than setting
incompatible TACs.
An added important dimension, agreed by the Inter-Institutional Task Force
6
, would be the
identification of the species that determine the fishery as opposed to the by-catch species, with
distinct management targets for the two categories of stocks – all befitting the MSY objective.
For the target species (driving the fishery) the plan would introduce ranges of fishing
mortality, while for by-catch species in the fishery it would include specific or alternative
conservation measures to ensure that the conservation objectives are respected.
FMSY range / F
2013
3,00
Fmsy/F2013
2,50
2,00
1,50
1,00
0,50
0,00
Cod
Had
Whg
Saithe
Ple
Sole
FmsyLow/F2013
FmsyUp/F2013
Figure 5.2.2.1. F
MSY
ranges in 2013 relative to the fishing mortality in 2013 (F
2013
), for five of the six main
North Sea stocks. "FmsyUp" and "FmsyLow" are the upper and lower bounds of the F
MSY
ranges
respectively for each species that were provided to STECF by ICES in March 2015 (N.B. Some of these
values have since been updated).
The regionalised governance possibilities under the new CFP (see Section 3.1.3) mean that
the plan would not only allow for adaptation mechanisms in specified technical measures to
allow for the introduction of measures to decouple fisheries (see above) but also to use such
measures to minimise impacts of fishing on the wider marine environment, e.g. on marine
mammals, sea birds and the sea bed. Specific technical measures to protect the marine
environment might be needed for one fleet, but not necessarily for another. Under this option,
it will be possible to adopt such measures rapidly, without having to make use of the lengthy
Ordinary Legislative Procedure
64
.
64
The new technical measures framework which is currently under development will also enable the adoption
of regionalised technical measures. The exact legal setup for the interplay between the new technical
measures regulation and the multi-annual plans is still under development.
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By the same token, the plan would allow for the introduction of implementation elements for
the landing obligation in light of the limited lifespan of discard plans.
Creating a single management framework, with in-built options for Regionalisation and
adaptation would allow the plan to be responsive to changes in the fisheries, in the
management advice and in the status of the stocks while keeping consistency between all of
the elements relevant for the management, and making it easier to ensure coherence across the
stocks caught together in the mixed fisheries.
Within this option there are a number of choices to be made:
the delineation of areas and the consequent fisheries and stocks to be covered
the choice of how to introduce measures that facilitate the introduction of the landing
obligation
the choice of the ranges for F
MSY
the choice of species for which precise MSY-related target ranges would be set. The
Task Force agreement foresees focus on the species that drive the fishery – the main
target species – and by managing those sustainably, the plan is expected to deliver on
the conservation objectives for the by-catch species as well
the latest dates for achieving F
MSY
(between now and 2020 at the latest)
the time period for rebuilding stocks to precautionary levels (whenever they are below
such levels)
The first four choices can be taken based on a qualitative analysis conducted in the following
sub-section. The last two sub-options will be analysed quantitatively.
5.2.2.1. Sub-options for qualitative analysis
Delineation of areas
When deciding on the area scope of the plan, several criteria have to be taken into account:
different multi-annual plans have to be coherent, situations where areas remain
uncovered by a plan in the long term should be avoided
the area coverage should be as coherent as possible with the areas covered by
established Member States' regional cooperation fora (here: the Scheveningen group,
see Section 3.1.3) and Advisory Council areas (here : the NSAC, see Section 3.1.3). In
case of a mismatch between the area covered by the plan and these bodies, Member
States would have to cooperate outside the established regional fora when drafting
Joint Recommendations and two or more Advisory Councils would have to be
consulted on these measures.
fish stocks do not respect the borders drawn by humans; additionally the borders
between fish stocks are different. However, as much as coherence as possible in
biological and fisheries terms should be achieved.
It is obvious that ICES Subarea IV, which is the main part of the North Sea, should be
covered by the plan. The question is whether adjacent waters like Skagerrak and Kattegat
(Division IIIa) and the Eastern Channel (Division VIId) should be covered by the plan as
well.
Skagerrak and Kattegat have to be covered by the plan as they are not covered by the Baltic
Sea plan which has been proposed by the Commission
42
. Not including this area into the
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North Sea plan would lead to a situation where this area would likely remain uncovered in the
long-run as it is too small to justify a plan on its own.
STECF
30
was requested to comment on the areas to include in the new generation of regional
management plans. STECF recommended inclusion of the Eastern Channel within a North
Sea plan, as the fish in the Eastern Channel (VIId) appear to have greater affinity with the
North Sea than areas to the west. At the same time, however, this area is not covered by the
Scheveningen group and the NSAC but by the regional management body called the North-
Western High-Level Group and by the North-Western Waters AC (NWWAC). Therefore, it
has to be decided whether to follow the criteria of coherence with the area coverage of
established management bodies and Advisory Councils or the criteria of biological coherence.
It seems appropriate to opt for coherence with the management areas. The reason is that it is
not so important where to establish management objectives for fish stocks, e.g. F
MSY
ranges.
What is important is that there are no contradictory objectives for the same stock in different
plans. Management objectives should be included in the plan which covers the area of main
abundance of a stock. In order to ensure coherence between different plans, all plans would
have to ensure that management objectives established in other plans remain valid when a
stock straddles the areas of those plans. The Commission can ensure this when establishing
and amending plans. Hence, a lack of biological coherence can be remedied.
Deviating from the area covered by the Scheveningen group and the NSAC would be more
problematic, notably when adopting measures under Regionalisation. As explained, additional
Member States and the NWWAC would have to be consulted when formulating Joint
Recommendations. This would be detrimental to a smooth implementation of Regionalisation
which actually builds on improving cooperation among Member States as well as among
stakeholders, so changing the current configuration should be avoided. The sub-option of
including the Eastern Channel into the plan is therefore discarded. This area will have to be
covered by the North-Western Waters plan which is being developed in parallel.
To ensure coherence with the other plans, the Commission has to ensure that if a range of
F
MSY
is to be set for any straddling stock then this range is included in the plan that covers the
area of main abundance of the stock in question; all other plans containing that straddling
stock will contain a provision that makes the application of the F
MSY
range also binding in the
areas that they cover.
In the Public Consultation (Annex I), some stakeholders supported the inclusion of the
Eastern Channel into the plan, while some contributions from the fishing industry objected to
the inclusion of Skagerrak and Kattegat and the Eastern Channel if this leads to the inclusion
of additional stocks other than straddling stocks that are also present in the main basin of the
North Sea (Subarea IV). The NSAC in its contribution only highlighted the need of
consistency with adjacent areas.
Choice of method for facilitating the introduction of the landing obligation
As described in Section 3.6, the Basic Regulation allows the adoption of so-called "discard
plans" through Regionalisation to adopt exemptions from the landing obligation for not more
than three years. After the expiry of these discard plans, exemptions will still be needed, in
order to allow for the discarding of species that survive discarding and to allow for
exemptions in situations where the landing obligation is a disproportionate measure. The
Basic Regulation itself foresees in Article 15(5) that such exemptions should be adopted as
parts of a multi-annual plan and "where relevant, further specified in accordance with Article
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18", i.e. through Regionalisation. The latter would mean that the multi-annual plan includes
an empowerment to adopt delegated acts for this purpose.
When drafting a multi-annual plan, the Commission will have to decide which elements of the
future exemptions from the Basic Regulation will be included in the multi-annual plan itself
and which elements will be adopted as a part of a delegated act / Joint Recommendation.
However, the option of including exemptions in the plan itself can be discarded, for several
reasons. Firstly, the discard plans that are adopted on the Basic Regulation are constantly
evolving. The Scheveningen group has brought forward a first Joint Recommendation
concerning demersal North Sea fisheries that only covers the first stage of the landing
obligation, i.e. exemptions from the landing obligation for the stocks for which this obligation
applies already in 2016. Further Joint Recommendations will follow for the following steps.
The multi-annual plan will be adopted before the landing obligation will be fully implemented
in the North Sea, thus an empowerment for delegated acts to adopt exemptions for the later
steps of the phasing-in of the landing obligation would be needed in order to avoid a situation
where the plan has to be amended several times through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.
One could imagine consolidation of all the exemptions already adopted in the plan itself;
however, some these exemptions might still evolve as some of them, following STECF
evaluation
65
, will probably only be granted under the condition that the Member States
conduct further scientific studies that justify these exemptions. The adaptive, flexible
approach of Regionalisation is therefore clearly the preferred option for this element of the
plan.
Choice of the F
MSY
ranges
In terms of the ranges of F
MSY
to be used in the plan, in September 2014 Commission
Services requested ICES to provide plausible values around F
MSY
(ranges for F
MSY
) for
various stocks of fish and shellfish in the North Sea
41
, to be based on the stock biology,
fishery characteristics and environmental conditions (see also Section 3.1.4). ICES provided
F
MSY
ranges
41
(F
lower
, F
upper
) that are derived to deliver no more than a 5% difference in long-
term yield compared with F
MSY
. Additionally, in order to be consistent with the ICES
precautionary approach, the value for F
upper
is capped, so that the probability of the spawning
stock biomass (SSB) being below the limit biomass reference point (B
lim
) is no more than 5%
(
66
and Figure 5.2.2.2 below).
Theoretically, wider (or narrower) ranges could be envisaged. However, for consistency and
coherence with the Baltic plan, which has used the ICES definitions for the F
MSY
ranges, the
North Sea plan will also use ICES' definitions.
65
STECF report -Landing Obligation - Part 5 (demersal species for NWW, SWW and North Sea).
SSB is the spawning stock biomass – the size of the adult part of a stock (in tonnes) that is able to contribute
to reproduction in any given year; B
lim
and B
pa
are conservation (or precautionary) reference points for any
stock. The smaller the stock size, the greater the likelihood that reproduction will be impaired and the stock
will fall below safe biological limits. If the stock size is below B
lim
there is a risk that the stock will suffer
from severely reduced productivity. B
pa
is the biomass reference point designed to have a low probability of
being below B
lim
. When the spawning stock size is estimated to be above B
pa
, the probability of impaired
recruitment is expected to be low.
66
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B
pa
Figure 5.2.2.2. Illustration of biomass-based reference points. B
lim
and B
pa
are precautionary reference
points related to the risk of impaired reproductive capacity. Diamonds show the variable recruitment for
different spawning stock sizes (SSB) that has been observed over the years. Recruitment can be seen to be
generally lower when the SSB is below B
lim
.
In the Public Consultation (Annex I), the NGOs replied that they would like to set the upper
bound of the range at the point estimate of F
MSY
. However, this would effectively set F
MSY
as
a limit not as a target. The current practice is to consider F
MSY
as a target, which means that
the actual fishing mortality would fluctuate around F
MSY
, sometimes above, sometimes below.
Setting F
MSY
as a limit would mean that we should never fish above that level. The target
fishing mortality would, therefore, need to be substantially lower than F
MSY
. This would lead
to underfishing of virtually all stocks in the mixed fishery.
Choice of species
All harvested species in the North Sea are covered by the obligations and objectives of the
Basic Regulation and these same harvested species will be covered by this plan. Where F
MSY
ranges are available then those species will be listed accordingly. Currently these are the main
target species. However, the plan is expected to deliver on the conservation objectives for the
by-catch species as well and to evaluate the question of whether management of the species
that drive the fisheries adequately allows for the management of the by-catch species,
STECF
29
carried out an analysis of correlations between the catches of driver species
identified in the plan and a variety of by-catch species. The analysis overall suggested limited
correlation meaning that, at the gross level, management of the species that drive the fisheries
would not be adequate for the management of the by-catch species. However, when the
analysis was performed at the fleet segment level, there were some obvious strong
correlations between some driver and by-catch species in specific segments but not in others.
This suggests the scope to use fleet segment-related management measures for the driver
species as a way of managing some of the by-catch species through, for example, technical
measures. Under the framework of the multi-annual plan, the regionalised governance will
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enable these kinds of measures to be introduced at the appropriate regional level to enable the
appropriate management of the by-catch species.
5.2.2.2. Sub-options for quantitative analysis
Achievement of F
MSY
Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation provides for a binding obligation to reach F
MSY
(see
Section 3.4.1) but leaves some flexibility regarding the timeframe for reaching this target (by
2015 where possible and […] at the latest by 2020). In order to achieve the objective of
providing a transparent framework regarding F
MSY
, the plan should specify this timetable for
the North Sea demersal stocks. The environmental, economic and social impacts of different
timeframes should therefore be assessed.
The time period for rebuilding stocks to precautionary levels
Annex 2 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
67
contains guidelines for applying a precautionary
approach within an MSY framework. In accordance with a precautionary approach,
populations need to be maintained within safe biological limits to make MSY possible.
However, within safe biological limits, an MSY approach is necessary to achieve MSY. A
precautionary approach is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for MSY.
When a stock's biomass falls below safe biological limits then it needs to be rebuilt because
when the spawning stock size is estimated to be below safe biological limits, the probability
of impaired recruitment is expected to be high
66
. The time taken to rebuild any stock is
associated with the level of risk that managers are prepared to take in attempting to achieve
management objectives. It is anticipated that catch opportunities would be set at a fishing
mortality rate that is lower than the lower bound of the F
MSY
range; this is coherent with the
Baltic plan proposal.
A biomass objective in a plan should be linked to a binding timetable; otherwise rebuilding
the stock can be delayed and will not have any binding effect. Theoretically, many different
timeframes can be imagined. However, it seems reasonable not to go beyond a recovery time
of 10 years, firstly because longer timelines would make the objective irrelevant for the
current generation of fishermen and would thus put at risk the support for this policy
objective. Secondly, if a stock is below a biomass safeguard threshold, there is a constant risk
that the stock might collapse and the stock size shrink to even lower levels. Therefore, the
time at which the stock is left in such a risky state has to be limited.
Recovery within 5 years seems to be a reasonable choice as an alternative sub-option. As the
most important stock that is below B
pa
at the moment is cod and as the TAC for this stock has
a limiting effect on fishing for other stocks, a faster recovery time would imply a stronger
reduction of the TAC and thus have more negative economic and social consequences.
6.
A
NALYSIS OF IMPACTS
The main areas of uncertainty in the short-term are around the introduction of both the landing
obligation and Regionalisation, introducing the new concept of results-based management, as
67
UN. 1995. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
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noted in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.4.2. This uncertainty has a knock-on effect for the evaluation of
the impacts of the candidate options, as by nature these impacts will be very difficult to
quantify. It is impossible at this stage to know what Joint Recommendations the Member
States may put forward for technical and other conservation measures etc. and their
subsequent impacts, and the landing obligation will be introduce on a stepwise basis,
introducing more stringent, but currently unknown, exemptions each year.
As a result, the approach used here has been to give the best evaluation of the possible
impacts of each option, taking into account the introduction of the landing obligation in the
new CFP.
The impacts are considered in the light of various indicators which are:
E
NVIRONMENT
: abundance of the main stocks (SSB; risk to B
lim
; risk to B
pa66
)
E
CONOMIC
: landed value; profitability and revenue
S
OCIAL
: employment; number of vessels.
6.1.
Option 1- Use the Basic Regulation (including the landing obligation)
This option can be considered as a realistic baseline scenario in the sense that existing plans
have lost most of their value in light of the MSY objective under the new CFP (see Section
5.1.1).
Description of the option and stakeholder support
Under this option the current management plans are repealed and the new Basic Regulation
(including the landing obligation) is applied (see Sections 3.4 and 5.2.1). This option is the
baseline against which any added value of the mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan can be
ascertained.
The large majority of stakeholders call for repealing the current cod plan, which is seen as
rigid and overly restrictive. Generally, however, stakeholders are expecting a strategic multi-
annual framework that is provided by a new generation of plans, containing ranges of F
MSY
,
rather than a reversion to the unpopular situation (before the plans) whereby TACs are set
purely on an annual basis, without guidance and only steering on MSY. The high expectations
from EU Institutions, Member States' authorities and stakeholders for a multi-annual plan
imply that this option would only be acceptable when a multi-annual plan would have no
clear, demonstrable added value. Additionally, repealing a plan without replacing it is
considered not to be in line with the objectives of the CFP (i.e. to bring more stocks under
multi-annual management plans). Additionally, this approach would mean that the European
Parliament would not be involved in the decision making.
The majority of the important fish species in the North Sea demersal fishery have already
achieved, or are close to achieving F
MSY
. Cod, however, is still being exploited above F
MSY
.
The information available at the time of the consultation and scientific analysis
68
was that cod
was fished in 2014 at a fishing mortality of F=0.4. The impact of achieving F
MSY
will,
68
ICES Advice 2014. Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Divisions VIId (Eastern Channel) and IIIa West
(Skagerrak).
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therefore, mostly be driven by the rate at which the fishing mortality for cod is reduced from
0.4 to F
MSY
.
The following impacts will be described with the assumption that fishing mortality on cod is
reduced from F=0.4 in 2014 to the point estimate of F
MSY
for cod, where F=0.22, at the start
of 2016.
Table 3.4.2 in Section 3.4.2 above, describing the evolution of the problem with full
implementation of the landing obligation, illustrates the effects that cod can have on the under
exploitation of other species in the North Sea demersal fisheries. The single species scientific
advice for cod in 2015 given in Table 3.4.2, and also in Table 6.1 below, shows the landings
that would be obtained if the North Sea cod stock was fished at F
MSY
in 2015
.
Table 3.4.2
illustrates the impact of the choke effect that cod would exert on the landings of other stocks
in the North Sea mixed-fisheries assemblage; it also shows the subsequent impact on the
value of those landings. Table 6.1 illustrates the impact of the reduction in catch on the size of
the stock (SSB) the following year. The tables are highly illustrative of the scale of the impact
of an immediate change to F
MSY
for cod.
Table 6.1. The effects on landings and SSB, in tonnes, for six North Sea demersal fish species based on the
mixed-fisheries advice for 2015
53
where, once the North Sea cod quota is caught, other fisheries catching
cod would have to cease fishing.
Single species
landings advice
2015 (t)
26713
48176
128376
72854
10973
17190
Landings (t) if
landing obligation
fully applied
26713
16592
60175
45797
6469
9654
SSB (t) 2016
following single
species advice
109100
117426
735259
178867
53783
266012
SSB (t) 2016
following full LO
on cod
104855
146776
803339
210160
58524
270986
% difference
in SSB
Species
Cod
Haddock
Plaice
Saithe
Sole
Whiting
-4
25
9
17
9
2
6.1.1.
Environmental effects
The landings of cod would be significantly reduced if F
MSY
is achieved at the start of 2016,
from around 40 000 t to 26 713 t. The choke effect that this would exert on the other stocks in
the North Sea mixed-fisheries assemblage would result in significantly reduced catches of the
other fish species. The knock-on effect of this would be positive for the stock size of all of the
species because less fish would be removed in the fisheries, leaving larger stocks in the sea.
However, the short term impact on SSB is small compared to larger long-term effects where
leaving higher biomasses reduces the risks to any of the stocks falling below B
pa
and B
lim
. The
MSY approach is intended to make the best use of the ecosystem productivity in the long
term. Therefore, in the long term, once MSY is achieved, the SSB for each stock would be
expected to fluctuate around its maximum. All of the stocks have some way to go to achieve
their maxima.
6.1.2.
Economic effects
The converse effect is true for the economic effects on the North Sea industry. Table 3.4.2
shows that the large reduction in catch opportunities resulting from an immediate move to
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F
MSY
would have catastrophic effects on the industry. In 2016 alone, the value (based on 2012
values) of the haddock landings could be reduced by more than 60%; plaice by 53%, saithe,
sole and whiting by about 40%; turbot by around 20%. This equates to a loss of landed value
(based on 2012 values) of around €200 million in one single year, a loss of 55% overall.
Section 3.7 shows that the catching sector for North Sea demersal fish is very important to the
Member States surrounding the North Sea. It comprises a high proportion of the fleet size,
employment, landed value, landed weight, fishing time (days at sea) and GVA for the
majority of those Member States. Fleets carrying both major gear types (demersal trawls and
seines and beam trawls) would be negatively impacted significantly as all of the species above
are caught in those gears. These gear types catch around 90% by value (see Annex IV) of the
top ten demersal species (which include all of those listed above).
Cod is among the most valuable and the most vulnerable stocks in the mixture of demersal
species in the North Sea. Without the mixed-fisheries considerations and the flexibility to
match TACs between stocks within the boundaries of the CFP (as indicated above), the
introduction of the landing obligation will have additional negative economic and social
impacts, until a solution can be found and applied that isolates (decouples) cod from the other
demersal species. Additionally, the economic impact of the effect of other choke species
would also be negative for many of the North Sea fleets, with significant under-quota catches
being landed with the corresponding negative economic effects (Table 3.4.2).
While the discard plan to implement the landing obligation in the North Sea may give some
temporary relief to these problems, in the longer term, the discard plan would be phased out
(after 3 years) – leaving the industry with a stringent set of rules, with no room for flexibility
or exemptions. This will aggravate the phenomenon of choke species into almost every
fishery and even for virtually every fisherman individually; fisheries will have to be stopped
before the whole quota basket is used up, with the corresponding economic losses for
fishermen and the industry as a whole. In addition, handling costs may increase.
6.1.3.
Social effects
Fishermen normally work under the concept of share fishermen
69
, therefore negative
economic impacts (in terms of returns and revenues of vessels) are directly translated into
either reduced income for the crew members, or, where possible in reduction of crew and job
losses.
The social effects of an immediate move to F
MSY
would therefore also have catastrophic
effects. A 55% reduction in landings of the named species would be a highly significant
reduction for the processing sector to absorb in a single year.
Given the large number of SMEs and micro-businesses in the North Sea catching and
processing sectors, significant direct negative impacts on both sectors would occur. In the
demersal catching sector, the top 35 fleet segments with the highest landed value (see Section
3.7), some 1100 vessels, consist exclusively of vessels with an average of 10 (FTE)
employees or less, averaging 4 (FTE) employees (Table 3.7.1). The processing sector has 958
companies with 10 employees or less, 61% of the processing enterprises. 98% of these
enterprises employ less than 250 people (Table 3.7.3).
69
A ‘share fisherman’ is someone who works in the fishing industry that is paid a share of the earnings or
profit of the boat and is not employed under a contract.
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6.1.4.
Administrative costs
There is no doubt that the repeal of the existing management plans would reduce
administrative costs, particularly because the management of days at sea would no longer be
required. However under this option, TACs would be set annually for each stock on the basis
of single species MSY advice, with no account taken of mixed-fisheries interactions (Section
5.2.1). Moreover, there would be no facility to rapidly adjust technical measures at regional
level to reduce the impact of mixed fisheries. There are likely to be indirect administrative
costs arising from this. One example is that choke effects caused by the lack of coherence
between TACs would create an incentive for illegal discarding, which would need to be
controlled through enhanced enforcement.
6.2.
Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries
Description of the option, stakeholder support and consideration of the sub-options
Under Option 2, there would be one plan, containing one single management framework for
management of stocks caught together in demersal fisheries in the North Sea. It would aim to
account for mixed-fisheries interactions (links between stocks and species) and enable
coherence in the definition of fishing opportunities for the stocks it would cover. It would
include any specific or alternative conservation measures for by-catch species caught in the
fisheries for which TACs are established. This corresponds to what the European Parliament
and Member States expect and is the same approach as taken for the Baltic plan.
The large majority of stakeholders agree that multi-annual plans are preferable to setting
TACs purely on an annual basis, and that it would make sense to develop a single mixed-
fisheries plan covering the main demersal species in the North Sea. Additionally, the new
multi-annual plan will provide the framework for more a flexible regional, results-based
management approach that has strong stakeholder support.
The sub-options relating to the latest date for achievement of F
MSY
in European fisheries (sub-
options 2.1. and 2.2) and stock rebuilding timetables, to be implemented when the spawning
stock biomass is outside safe biological limits, (sub-options 2.3 and 2.4) were assessed by the
STECF
9
. They examined the impacts of achieving F
MSY
both immediately and by 2020 and
the impacts of achieving rebuilding within 5 or 10 years. These are compared to Option 1 –
the Basic Regulation under the new CFP. The STECF analyis was performed using a variety
of models to give the best results possible, whilst recognising that the scope of the analysis
was somewhat limited due to the lack of a holistic model that could adequately capture all of
the dynamics. In the Public Consultation, several stakeholders seemed to prefer an
incremental reduction to F
MSY
by 2020.
Under each sub-option it is possible to set fishing opportunities using a range of fishing
mortalities, between a lower and an upper bound of F
MSY
as defined by ICES
41
for each stock.
STECF
9
used this approach - an envelope, or bracketing, approach - where the scenarios
tested considered the likely consequences of moving to the target (i.e. the lower or upper
bound of F
MSY
) in the first or last year of the intended timescale (2016 or 2020) and keeping
fishing mortality constant during the rest of the period. The levels of fishing mortality were
set at both extremes of the F
MSY
range, to give a “best / worst case” scenario evaluation. This
approach informs on the range of potential outcomes of alternative tactical management
decisions and is the most pragmatic approach given that Council decisions on the annual
fishing opportunites cannot be anticipated. Additionally, the variables of F and time to reach
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1655579_0046.png
F
MSY
, and of SSB and time to rebuild, give myriad possible sub-options that are not realistic
to model (Figure 6.2.1). Ultimately, the impacts of any of the sub-options are highly
dependent on the choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the Council
under a single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries.
Figure 6.2.1. Illustration to show, simplistically, how fishing could be reduced from the situation in 2015 to
immediate achievement of the F
MSY
ranges in 2016 or a more prolonged achievement by 2020. Note that
the trajectory could be smooth, as is illustrated, or stepwise and that there are, therefore, many ways to
achieve the same result which are too numerous to model.
6.2.1.
Sub-option 2.1 - F
MSY
is achieved by the start of 2016
6.2.1.1. Environmental effects
The STECF analysis
9
shows that where F
MSY
is achieved by the start of 2016, in the short
term, fishing at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range will generate larger catches for all stocks
with the trade-offs of higher inter-annual variability and larger fishing mortalities - which can
be 50% above those in Option 1. The consequence of this is lower biomasses than under
Option 1. This results in increased risks to the SSB falling below B
lim
for cod and below B
pa
for haddock and sole.
In contrast, however, where fishing is at the lower bound of the F
MSY
range, compared to
Option 1, the catches are lower and show lower inter-annual variability. The consequence of
this is higher biomasses with subsequent reduction to the risks of SSB falling below both B
pa
and B
lim
.
The largest trade-off to fishing at the upper bound of the F
MSY
is keeping biomasses at lower
levels.
In the long term, fishing at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range generates larger catches than
Option 1, while fishing at the lower bound produces smaller catches. The trade-offs are
between biomass levels and the fishing mortality required to get those catches, which can be
seen as a proxy for variable costs. Fishing at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range generates
more catches but keeps biomass at lower levels, which implies an increase in biological risk
and an increase in effort.
Additionally, STECF
9
concluded that to maximise the likelihood of achieving the objectives
of the CFP, setting fishing opportunities at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range should be
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applied only in exceptional circumstances, such as in the case of cod where, in the short term,
fishing opportunities need to be reconciled with the other species in the mixed fishery. Under
the multi-annual plan this flexibility is inherent and gives considerable added value over and
above Option 1.
6.2.1.2. Economic effects
Two models were available to predict socio-economic effects. The first, SIMFISH, is limited
to 2 flatfish and 1 shrimp species, predominantly in the southern North Sea, and to 6 beam
trawl fleet segments. The second, FISHRENT, contains 4 demersal fish species and 10
demersal trawl fleet segments. Neither model deals with mixed-fisheries considerations. The
results are, therefore, limited.
The economic effects vary depending on the level of F.
If F is set at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range more fishing effort is required to catch the
higher short-term catches; the large increase required in fishing mortality, when compared to
Option 1, may not be balanced out by the effort required to catch the higher quantities of fish,
leading to a less profitable fishery.
However, setting F at the lower bound of the F
MSY
range results in reduced costs across most
of the fleet segments with other indicators showing a variable result but generally better than
under Option 1.
For the mixed fishery as a whole, therefore, utilising the upper bound of the F
MSY
range for a
substantial proportion of the stocks may impair the economic performance of the fleet in the
long term whereas fishing at the lower bound of the F
MSY
range will give improved economic
performance.
Profitability is one of the economic indicators that can be predicted in both economic models.
In SIMFISH, where F
MSY
is achieved by the start of 2016, only 2 of the 6 fleet segments show
any likely impact on profitability compared to Option 1. The extent of the impact will very
much depend on choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the Council.
The 2 fleet segments are Dutch beam trawlers between 24 and 40 m vessel length and,
secondly, those with a vessel length greater than 40 m. In FISHRENT, the profitability for all
bar 3 of the the 10 fleet segments is likely to be affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by the
attainment of F
MSY
by the start of 2016. Four fleet segments are most likely to be impacted.
These are German demersal trawlers between 24 and 40 m vessel length; German and French
demersal trawlers with vessel lengths greater than 40 m and UK demersal trawlers with vessel
lengths between 12 and 18 m.
6.2.1.3. Social effects
Two models were available to predict socio-economic effects. The first, SIMFISH, is limited
to 2 flatfish and 1 shrimp species, predominantly in the southern North Sea, and to 6 beam
trawl fleet segments. The second, FISHRENT, contains 4 demersal fish species and 10
demersal trawl fleet segments. Neither model deals with mixed-fisheries considerations. The
results are, therefore, limited.
The number of vessels is one of the social indicators can be modelled in both SIMFISH and
FISHRENT. In SIMFISH, where F
MSY
is achieved by the start of 2016, only 2 of the 6 fleet
segments show any likely impact on the number of vessels compared to Option 1, and to a
more limited extent than the possible change in profitability. Again, the extent of the impact
will very much depend on choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the
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Council. The 2 fleet segments are the same as those mentioned above for the economic
indicator of profitability. In FISHRENT, the pattern is similar to that for profitability. All bar
2 of the the 10 fleet segments are likely to be affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by the
attainment of F
MSY
by the start of 2016, compared to Option 1. The vessel numbers of 2 other
fleet segments are considerably more likely to be impacted than the others. These are German
demersal trawlers between 24 and 40 m vessel length and UK demersal trawlers with vessel
lengths between 12 and 18 m.
Given the large number of SMEs and micro-businesses in the North Sea catching and
processing sectors, direct negative impacts on both sectors are possible with fishing at the
upper bound of the F
MSY
range. Conversely, fishing at the lower bound of the F
MSY
range
gives an improved outcome in comparison to Option 1.
The socio-economic effects mentioned above will mostly affect SMEs and micro-businesses.
Although the fleet segments themselves may each employ a large number of people, each
individual enterprise (in many cases these are skipper owned enterprises) itself will have only
a small crew. For example, in the demersal catching sector, the top 35 fleet segments with the
highest landed value (see Section 3.7), some 1100 vessels, consist exclusively of vessels with
an average of 10 (FTE) employees or less, averaging 4 (FTE) employees (Table 3.7.1). The
processing sector has 958 companies with 10 employees or less, 61% of the processing
enterprises. 98% of these enterprises employ less than 250 people (Table 3.7.3).
6.2.1.4. Administrative costs
One plan, containing one single management framework for the management of stocks caught
together in demersal fisheries in the North Sea will represent considerable simplification in
comparison to Option 1. Creating a single management framework, with in-built options for
Regionalisation and adaptation will allow the plan to be responsive to changes in the fisheries,
in the management advice and in the status of the stocks while keeping consistency between
all of the elements relevant for the management, and making it easier to ensure coherence
across the stocks caught together in the mixed fisheries. The administrative burden under this
option will be considerably lower than under Option 1.
6.2.2.
Sub-option 2.2 - F
MSY
is achieved by 2020 at the latest
6.2.2.1. Environmental effects
The STECF analysis shows that if the achievement of F
MSY
is delayed to 2020, catches are
lower than, but not very different from, the average catches under sub-option 2.1. SSB is, on
average, generally higher than the average SSB under sub-option 2.1. Overall this represents
an improvement on Option 1, which is reflected in lower risks to B
pa
and B
lim
, with the
exception of cod and sole’s risk to B
lim
.
When fishing at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range, the stocks of cod and sole show an
increased risk to B
lim
and a significantly increased risk to B
pa
for cod in 2020 when compared
with sub-option 2.1, which is, in turn, an increased risk on Option 1. Overall, in the longer
term, fishing at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range generates higher catches but keeps
biomasses lower and increases risks to the stocks of falling below both B
lim
and B
pa
.
Similarly to sub-option 2.1, if exploitation is at the lower bound of the F
MSY
range, compared
to Option 1 the catches are lower and show lower inter-annual variability, leaving higher
biomasses and reducing the risks to B
lim
and B
pa
. Moreover, biomasses are even higher and
risks to B
lim
and B
pa
are further reduced compared to sub-option 2.1.
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Again, for the mixed fishery as a whole, the best approach to maximise long-term yield would
be to attempt to reconcile F on mixed fisheries using Fs between the lower bound of the F
MSY
range and F
MSY
. This will lead to larger and healthier stocks
.
6.2.2.2. Economic effects
Under this sub-option, where achievement of F
MSY
is delayed to 2020, compared to Option 1,
there are larger landings for the fleets but these may be associated with higher costs due to
higher effort needed to make these catches. Overall, fishing at the upper bound of the F
MSY
range leads to a negative impact on profitability and net profit because effort has to be
sustained at a higher level.
As with sub-option 2.1, fishing at the lower bound of the F
MSY
range, in contrast, leads to
higher profitability across many of the fleet segments because less effort is required to catch
the fish, and will, therefore, give improved economic performance compared with Option 1.
For the mixed fishery as a whole, therefore, utilising the upper bound of the F
MSY
range for a
substantial proportion of the stocks may impair the economic performance of the fleet in the
long term.
Profitability can be predicted in both economic models. In SIMFISH, where F
MSY
is achieved
by 2020, the effects on the fleet segments are more limited than with immediate attainment of
F
MSY
and with less variable effects. Again, only 2 of the 6 fleet segments show any likely
impact on profitability compared to Option 1. The extent of the impact will very much depend
on choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the Council. The 2 fleet
segments are different to those under immediate attainment of F
MSY
; they are German beam
trawlers between 18 and 24 m vessel length and Dutch beam trawlers with vessel lengths
between 12 and 24 m. In FISHRENT, the same fleet segments are affected as for the
attainment of F
MSY
by the start of 2016 but the potential effects on profitability could be
larger, depending on the choice of fishing mortality, for the most affected segments.
6.2.2.3. Social effects
The number of vessels can be modelled in both SIMFISH and FISHRENT. In SIMFISH,
where F
MSY
is achieved by 2020, the same 2 of the 6 fleet segments show any likely impact on
the number of vessels compared to Option 1, but to a greater extent than those seen with
immediate attainment of F
MSY
. Again, the extent of the impact will very much depend on
choices of fishing mortality that would be made each year by the Council. In FISHRENT, the
pattern is similar to that for the immediate attainment of F
MSY
. All bar 2 of the the 10 fleet
segments are likely to be affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by the attainment of F
MSY
by
the start of 2016. The vessel numbers of 3 other fleet segments are considerably more likely to
be impacted than the others. Two are the same as for the results where F
MSY
is achieved by
2016: German demersal trawlers between 24 and 40 m vessel length and UK demersal
trawlers with vessel lengths between 12 and 18 m; the third fleet segment affected is the
German demersal trawlers with a vessel length greater than 40 m.
6.2.2.4. Administrative costs
The administrative costs, effects on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden
under this sub-option are the same as those related to sub-option 2.1.
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Stock rebuilding timetables
The multi-annual plan introduces biomass safeguards that are not contained in the Basic
Regulation. These will enable stocks to be rebuilt above precautionary levels (above which
there is a low probability that the recruitment will be impaired) whenever the SSB falls below
the levels stipulated. It is anticipated that catch opportunities would be set at a fishing
mortality rate that is lower than the lower bound of the F
MSY
range. The time period for
recovery could be long or short. It will be discussed below in the short and medium term (5
versus 10 years) – see Section 5.2.2.
Currently, the majority of the important fish species in the North Sea demersal fishery are
already within safe biological limits. The impact on most stocks of a short term (5 year) or
medium term (10 year) recovery period when a stock falls below its precautionary biomass is
not very pronounced except for cod where the risks to SSB, to B
lim
and to B
pa
are very much
higher if recovery is protracted. This is because cod is still below safe biological limits
although its biomass has been showing a steady recovery in recent years. Nevertheless,
because it is still below the biomass safeguard and fishing mortality is still above F
MSY
, the
management of this stock will continue to drive the impacts on the mixed fisheries.
The significant added value of this multi-annual plan, over and above Option 1, is the
inclusion of conservation measures that can be adopted to enable the rebuilding of stocks that
fall below precautionary levels.
6.2.3.
Sub-option 2.3 - short (5 year) recovery period
6.2.3.1. Environmental effects
A short recovery time will mean that F has to be reduced considerably to enable the stock to
rebuild quickly. The knock-on effect of this would be positive for the stock size of all of the
species because less fish would be removed in the fisheries, leaving larger stocks in the sea.
The STECF analysis shows that the risk for cod of being below B
pa
by 2020 is reduced
significantly in comparison to the Basic Regulation and is lower than in the slow recovery
scheme.
From a stock perspective, fast recovery for cod seems preferable because it bears a smaller
risk with lower uncertainty for future biomass levels, not least for cod, and it confers
improved environmental sustainability.
6.2.3.2. Economic effects
Similarly to sub-option 2.2, a short recovery time and fishing below the lower bound of the
F
MSY
range leads to higher profitability across many of the fleet segments because less effort
is required to catch the fish, and will, therefore, give improved economic performance
compared with Option 1.
6.2.3.3. Social effects
Fishing below the lower bound of the F
MSY
range gives an improved outcome in comparison
to Option 1. It is, therefore, likely that the impacts on factors like job losses, reduction in crew
numbers etc., would be lower than under Option 1. This would be more beneficial for the
large number of SMEs and micro-businesses in the North Sea catching and processing
sectors.
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6.2.3.4. Administrative costs
The administrative costs, effects on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden
under this sub-option are the same as those related to the other sub-options.
6.2.4.
Sub-option 2.4 - long (10 year) recovery period
6.2.4.1. Environmental effects
Compared to sub-option 2.3, the risk to B
pa
for cod is higher if recovery is protracted, but still
significantly lower than the risk under Option 1.
6.2.4.2. Economic effects
The economic effects on the fleet are improved with a slower recovery time compared to
Option 1 but more negative than with a fast recovery time.
6.2.4.3. Social effects
Any negative economic effects will mostly affect SMEs and micro-businesses. In the
demersal catching sector, the top 35 fleet segments with the highest landed value (see Section
3.7), some 1100 vessels, consist exclusively of vessels with an average of 10 (FTE)
employees or less, averaging 4 (FTE) employees (Table 3.7.1). The processing sector has 958
companies with 10 employees or less, 61% of the processing enterprises. 98% of these
enterprises employ less than 250 people (Table 3.7.3).
6.2.4.4. Administrative costs
The administrative costs, effects on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden
under this sub-option are the same as those related to the other sub-options.
Overall, STECF considered that a fast recovery scenario (5 years) is better than a slow
recovery, because it bears a smaller risk and smaller uncertainty to the future biomass levels,
not least for cod, without making much difference to the fleets in the short term.
6.3.
Summary
The following text table summarises the results of the analysis comparing the two feasible
options and sub-options.
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Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal fisheries
Option 1-Use the CFP
Basic Regulation
(including the landing
obligation)
Sub-option 2.1.
F
MSY
achieved by the start of 2016
Lower bound of
F
MSY
Upper bound of
F
MSY
Sub-option 2.2.
F
MSY
achieved by 2020 at the latest
Lower bound of
F
MSY
Upper bound of
F
MSY
Sub-option 2.3.
5 year rebuilding
period
Sub-option 2.4.
10 year rebuilding
period
Acceptability
Low.
The majority of
stakeholders want the
current plans to be
repealed.
Single species TACs with
no consideration of the
mixed-fisheries
interactions leading to
discarding and /or choke
effects. No biomass
safeguards to recover
stocks
Severe negative economic
effects with choke effects
driving down profits. Short
term negative effects with
a 55% loss of landed value
of major fish species in
North Sea mixed fisheries
Reduced income for crew
members. Likely reduction
of crew numbers and job
losses – mostly affecting
SMEs.
Mixed. Some reduction
and some increase.
High.
There is high expectation from stakeholders for a strategic multi-annual framework enabling a flexible, regional results-based
management. It will aim to account for mixed-fisheries interactions and enable coherence in the definition of fishing opportunities and
include any specific or alternative conservation measures for by-catch species caught in the fisheries for which TACs are established
Environmental
effects
Higher biomasses
c.f. Option 1.
Reduced risk of
falling below safe
biological limits
(B
pa
and B
lim
)
Lower biomasses c.f.
Option 1. Increased
risk of falling below
B
pa
and B
lim
Higher biomasses
and reduced risk of
falling below B
pa
and B
lim
c.f. sub-
option 2.1
Increased risk c.f.
sub-option 2.1.
Significantly
increased risk for
cod and sole falling
below B
lim
and for
cod below B
pa
Higher landings but
higher costs
leading to negative
impact on
profitability and net
profit c.f. sub-
Option 1
More negative
effects for SMEs
and micro-
businesses than in
Option 1
Low risk of cod
being below B
pa
and B
lim
by 2020.
Higher biomass for
all stocks
Low risk of cod
being below B
pa
and B
lim
by 2025
but higher than in
sub-option 2.3
Economic
effects
Lower effort and
reduced costs.
Outcome better
than Option 1
Higher effort
required for short
term increase in
catch gives less
profitable fishery
than Option 1
Higher profitability
across many fleet
segments to give
improved
economic
performance c.f.
Option 1
Improved outcome
in comparison with
Option 1
Higher profitability
across many fleet
segments to give
improved
economic
performance c.f.
Option 1
Improved outcome
in comparison with
Option 1
Improved c.f.
Option 1 but lower
than sub-option 2.3
Social effects
Improved outcome
for SMEs and
micro-businesses
in comparison to
Option 1
Direct negative
effects on SMEs and
microbusinesses
likely worse than
Option 1
Improved c.f.
Option 1 but lower
than sub-option 2.3
Administrative
burden
One plan, containing one single management framework for the management of stocks caught together in demersal fisheries in the
North Sea will represent considerable simplification. The administrative burden under Option 2 will be considerably lower than under
Option 1
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For the management plan sub-options it is very important to remember that, in reality,
Council will set fishing opportunities between the lower and upper bounds of F
MSY
as defined
by ICES
41
; this means that the outcome within each sub-option will be different than fishing
at either the higher or lower bound of the range. However, the outcome would not be that
different when compared for the same rate of F for the different sub-options.
Additionally, it should be noted that fishing at F
MSY
does not guarantee that a stock will
remain above its safeguard biomass. In the case of cod, the current fishing mortality is above
F
MSY
, and the biomass is below the safeguard biomass. Although these are two different
issues to be addressed they both require the same solution, which is a reduction in fishing
mortality. The impacts of a rapid reduction in fishing mortality to F
MSY
and of a rapid
recovery of the biomass levels are therefore essentially the same.
Compared to the Basic Regulation, a single management framework for the management of
stocks caught together in demersal fisheries in the North Sea will confer a number of
advantages:
simplification: the single management framework, with in-built options for
Regionalisation and adaptation will allow the plan to be flexible to deal with
conservation measures and issues such as using fleet-related management measures for
the driver species as a way of managing some of the by-catch species
the F
MSY
range approach appears to confer flexibility that could help reconcile
difficulties arising in the mixed-fisheries context
the use of F
MSY
ranges gives scope to reconcile TACs for different species so that they
become closer to being consistent with F
MSY
however, the use of the F
MSY
range approach should only be employed when informed
by objective mixed-fisheries advice
the biomass safeguards provide an important level of protection against over-fishing
The Basic Regulation stipulates that "the maximum yield sustainable exploitation rate shall be
achieved by 2015 where possible and on a progressive incremental basis at the latest by 2020
for all stocks." The sub-options 2.1 and 2.2 are illustrative of the effects of earlier versus later
attainment of F
MSY
.
Whether fishing mortalities are chosen at the lower or upper bounds of the F
MSY
ranges does
make a difference, with negative effects on risk and profitability at the upper bounds. Fishing
at the upper bounds of the ranges will maintain smaller stock biomasses, require greater
fishing effort (and therefore have negative consequences in terms of carbon dioxide emissions
and profitability) and, as a consequence of higher fishing mortalities, tend to reduce the
average ages in the populations which is not indicative of a healthy stock
70
. Additionally, the
impact of the F
MSY
range approach is highly dependent on the choices of fishing mortality that
would be made each year by the Council under a single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea
demersal fisheries. ICES has specified the ranges of F
MSY
that should be followed
41
for a
number of North Sea demersal stocks. For precautionary management, and to provide
maximum long term benefits for the stocks, it has stipulated that the F targets set should be
70
Descriptor 3
of
Directive 2008/56/EC Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 17 June 2008
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy
Framework Directive).
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between the lower bound of F
MSY
and the point estimate of F
MSY
. STECF similarly
demonstrated
9
that there is an increased risk of over-exploitation if fishing opportunities are
set in line with the upper bounds of the F
MSY
ranges, particularly if several stocks in a mixed
fishery are involved. Similarly there are increased economic and social risks to fishing at the
upper bounds of the F
MSY
ranges. However, setting fishing opportunities at the level of the
upper bound of the F
MSY
range could be applied but only in exceptional circumstances and
only in the short term, such as in the case of cod where fishing opportunities need to be
reconciled with the other species in the mixed fishery. These findings are in accordance with
Recital 7 of the Basic Regulation that states "The exploitation rates should be achieved by
2015. Achieving those exploitation rates by a later date should be allowed only if achieving
them by 2015 would seriously jeopardise the social and economic sustainability of the fishing
fleets involved. After 2015, those rates should be achieved as soon as possible and in any
event no later than 2020".
7.
C
OMPARING THE OPTIONS
The new CFP introduces a number of changes to the way fisheries are managed in the
European Union. The most important of these are the landing obligation and Regionalisation.
These represent a fundamental shift in fisheries management and will change the behaviour of
the fleets in ways that are difficult to predict. This means that any proposals for new
management measures must be evaluated against a baseline that will in any case change.
Any new management measures must be coherent with the requirements of the new CFP. This
means that they must facilitate the landing obligation, establish the framework necessary for
the implementation of Regionalisation and take into account mixed-fisheries interactions.
7.1.
Assessment against the environmental, economic and social impacts
Table 7.1 provides a comparison of the options and sub-options in terms of the environmental,
economic and social impacts of a new mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan compared to
managing according to the Basic Regulation.
Table 7.1 shows that management under sub option 2.2, where F
MSY
is achieved by 2020 at
the latest, is more advantageous than under either sub-option 2.1 (where F
MSY
is achieved by
the start of 2016
)
or Option 1 – use the CFP Basic Regulation. The suite of measures under
sub-option 2.2 has the most advantageous outcome when analysing the trade-offs between
environmental, economic and social impacts, especially when fishing between the lower
bound of F
MSY
and the point estimate of F
MSY
; this ensures precautionary management and
provides the maximum long term benefits for the stocks' status, economic returns and
environmental impact.
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Table 7.1. Comparison of options and sub-options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the
management of demersal fisheries in the North Sea.
Option 2- A single mixed-fisheries plan for North Sea demersal
fisheries
Sub-option
2.1. F
MSY
achieved by
the start of
2016
+
Sub-option 2.2.
F
MSY
achieved
by 2020 at the
latest
Sub-option 2.3.
5 year
rebuilding
period
Sub-option 2.4.
10 year
rebuilding
period
Option 1- Use the
CFP Basic
Regulation
(including the
landing
obligation)
Environmental
effects
Economic
effects
Social effects
0
++
++
+
0
++/-*
++/-*
+
+
0
++/-*
++/-*
+
+
Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative
impact, +/- = both positive and negative impacts
* N.B. Fishing between F
MSY
and F
lower
gives much more positive results than the Basic Regulation.
However, fishing above F
MSY
for more than very short time periods gives more negative results than the
Basic Regulation.
7.2.
Qualitative assessment against the general and specific objectives
A comparison of the Basic Regulation and a new mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan relative to
the objectives of revising the management of demersal fisheries in the North Sea is provided
in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 shows Option 2 as the plan in its entirety, rather than divided into the sub-options
that have been analysed for their respective impacts. Each sub-option scores the same against
each objective. It is only when they are compared against the environmental, economic and
social indicators (Table 7.1 above), that the true differences between the sub-options are
apparent. The two tables together enhance the ability to choose the preferred option (taking
into account the sub-options within Option 2).
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Table 7.2. Comparison of options in terms of achieving the objectives of revising the management of
demersal fisheries in the North Sea.
Options
Option 1 – Basic
Regulation
Option 2 – mixed-
fisheries multi-
annual plan
General Objectives
Provide a transparent framework to achieve
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) by
2020 at the latest
Apply the precautionary approach
Simplification of EU legislation and of the
management of European fisheries
Reduce the extent of underfishing in a
mixed fishery under a landing obligation by
introducing F
MSY
ranges
Establish biomass safeguards in order to
enable the precautionary approach
established in Article 2(2) of the Basic
Regulation
Facilitate the application of the landing
obligation introduced in the reformed CFP
Establish the framework necessary for the
implementation of regionalisation within
the North Sea area
Remove the days at sea regime which
proved ineffective and which is no longer
necessary given that the new Basic
Regulation addresses the same underlying
problems with different means
0
++
0
0
++
++
0
++
0
++
Specific Objectives
0
++
0
++
0
++
Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative
impact, +/- = both positive and negative impacts
7.3.
Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence and Acceptability
Effectiveness
Table 7.2 shows that Option 2 is considerably more effective than Option 1 with respect to
meeting the objectives. The plan would ensure that the main stocks covered by the plan
achieve their MSY targets by specified deadlines whilst minimising any conflicts between the
management requirements for each of the stocks. The plan also introduces biomass safeguards
that require action to recover stocks that fall outside safe biological limits. It is apparent from
Table 7.1 that a faster recovery period (sub-option 2.3) is preferable to a slower one (sub-
option 2.4) because it confers greater environmental benefits to the fish stocks than slower
recovery with minimal differences in the economic and social impacts. The plan would allow
for adaptation mechanisms in specified technical measures to take measures aiming at
decoupling fisheries and helping to achieve the conservation objectives of the plan, as well as
to minimise impacts of fishing on the marine environment. This would be done through the
regionalised governance possibilities under the new CFP. At the same time, the plan would
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allow to introduce implementation elements for the landing obligation in light of the limited
lifespan of discard plans. One plan, containing one single management framework for the
management of stocks caught together in demersal fisheries in the North Sea will represent
considerable simplification compared to Option 1.
These actions represent additional added value of Option 2 over and above Option 1.
The stocks of plaice, saithe and sole are already fished within their MSY ranges, so it will be
relatively simple for the Council to fix TACs for these species that minimise any choke
effects in the mixed fisheries. More problematic are cod and haddock. It can be seen from
Figure 5.1.4.1 that it is impossible to find levels of fishing mortality on these stocks that
would be coherent with one another, or indeed with the fishing mortalities of plaice, saithe
and sole. This does not mean that the TACs are necessarily incompatible; that would depend
on the degree of interaction in the mixed fisheries. It is probable that, for example, the TAC
for sole could be fixed independently to that of haddock with few, if any, problems. The same
is not true for cod and haddock, which are highly associated in the mixed fisheries. The
degree to which the TACs on these species could be made compatible would depend not only
on the relative sizes of the TAC, but also on the degree to which the fisheries on cod and the
fisheries on haddock could be decoupled, perhaps through technical measures or through
changes in the spatial or seasonal behaviour of the fleets. This illustrates further the
effectiveness and added value of Option 2, where both TAC levels and appropriate regional
technical measures can be considered together in the same legal framework.
Efficiency
Option 2 creates more efficient management than Option 1 because it provides a framework
within which flexibility and rapid decision making, tailored to the characteristics of the
specific sea basin, will be possible through a regional decision making process. This is the
case regardless of the sub-options chosen within Option 2. The administrative burden under
Option 2 would be expected to be considerably lower than under Option 1. Under Option 2,
more coherent TACs and regional technical measures will reduce unwanted catches and hence
reduce the burden on control and enforcement. Overall, the single mixed-fisheries multi-
annual plan represents consolidation of the management of the North Sea demersal fish
stocks.
Coherence
Option 1 is coherent with the overarching objectives of the CFP but it is not fully coherent
with regionalised decision-making as envisaged in the CFP. Nor is it coherent with the
objectives of the CFP to take into account mixed-fisheries interactions. This option provides
only limited scope for simplification.
Option 2 is coherent with the objectives of the CFP and provides a governance structure that
is fully in line with Regionalisation.
Acceptability
The majority of stakeholders agree that multi-annual plans are preferable to setting TACs
purely on an annual basis, and that it would make sense to develop a single mixed-fisheries
plan covering the main demersal species in the North Sea
13
. This shows that Option 2 is
preferable to Option 1. The majority of contributors think that the current North Sea
management plans need to be replaced and that a mixed-fisheries multi-annual approach is the
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right way forward. Contributors from Member States' administrations and the fishing industry
would like to see simple, non-prescriptive regulation –an EU framework including strategic
objectives and general principles with detailed rules drawn up through the regionalised model.
A new mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan is seen as an opportunity to improve the
management of North Sea fisheries.
Table 7.3. Comparison of the options in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and acceptability in
achieving the objectives.
Effectiveness
Option 1
Option 2
0
++
Efficiency
0
++
Coherence
0
++
Acceptability
0
++
Key: 0 = neutral impact, + = positive impact, ++ = very positive impact (relative to other options), - = negative
impact, +/- = both positive and negative impacts
7.4.
The preferred option
The preferred option is a mixed-fisheries multi-annual plan with the sub-options of the
achievement of F
MSY
by 2020 at the latest, in line with the objectives of the Basic Regulation,
with faster recovery of a stock when it falls below safe biological limits. Once F
MSY
has been
reached for any particular stock, exploitation should not exceed F
MSY
for that stock.
This suite of measures has the most advantageous outcome when analysing the trade-offs
between environmental, economic and social impacts (Table 7.1), especially when fishing
between the lower bound of F
MSY
and the point estimate of F
MSY
; this ensures precautionary
management and provides the maximum long term benefits for the stocks' status, economic
returns and environmental impact. Additionally, ICES
41
and STECF
9
have both stipulated,
through considerable analysis, that there is an increased risk of over-exploitation if fishing
opportunities are set in line with the upper bounds of the F
MSY
ranges, particularly where
several stocks in a mixed fishery are involved.
The operational objectives that would enable this suite of measures are:
keep fishing mortality within the target fishing mortality ranges defined by ICES for
the main target species
maintain spawning stock biomass above the biomass safeguards (MSY B
trigger
and the
limit biomass B
lim
) defined by ICES for the main target species
ensure that fishing practices are adopted, through Regionalisation, to take into account
the specific characteristics of the fisheries in the North Sea
M
ONITORING AND EVALUATION
8.
Any multi-annual plan must have the means to ensure its correct implementation and
application. As the preferred option is a regulation that is directly applicable, there are no
problems with implementation. Correct application, however, has to be monitored and
evaluated.
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8.1.
Monitoring
The Commission has to monitor whether the MSY related fishing mortality targets prescribed
by the plan are being met. This is relatively easy as these targets have to be translated into
total allowable catches (TACs) to be adopted by Council in its annual fishing opportunies
regulation. Adopting TACs that do not correspond to the provisions of the plan would simply
be illegal.
The same goes for the achievement of the precautionary approach. The Commission proposal
for the annual fishing opportunities regulation is based on annual ICES advice which again is
based on catch data and scientific sampling data provided by Member States fulfilling the
obligations they have under the EU data collection regulation
71
. If a stock is below the
precautionary targets established by the plan, ICES would advise what fishing mortality has to
be adopted to move biomass above the theshold and within the timeframe provided for in the
plan. Council would be legally bound to adopt TACs based on these fishing mortality rates.
It also has to be ensured that the TACs adopted by Council are being respected. The EU
fisheries control regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009)
72
contains provisions
that oblige Member States to control whether fishermen respect the CFP rules. Among other
rules, Member States are obliged to carry out landing inspections and cross check whether
fishermen correctly record their catches to make sure that fishermen do not land more catches
than their quota allows and to ensure that no fish caught illegally enters markets. The Control
Regulation also contains provisions on the deduction of quota applied to Member States in the
form of reduced fishing opportunities if a quota from the previous year had been overfished.
The application of the ranges for F
MSY
and their effects will have to be monitored throughout
the application of the plan. It has to be ensured that Council does not set TACs that are based
in the upper part of the F ranges without having a justification stemming from mixed-fisheries
/ choke species problems. DG MARE deals annually with the preparation of Council
decisions and with ICES stock advice, so no special monitoring arrangements have to be
taken. If TACs are set too often in the upper part of the range, the Commission can react by
proposing an amendment to the plan.
Additionally, to ensure that Regionalisation works effectively, the Commission will ensure
that the Joint Recommendations submitted by Member States are scientifically sound and will
meet their objectives. This will be ensured through the evaluation of each Joint
Recommendation by the STECF.
8.2.
Ex-ante evaluation of delegated acts (regionalised measures)
All Joint Recommendations proposed by Member States will have to be evaluated by STECF
before being adopted as a Delegated Act. A similar evaluation has been made for the discard
plans that are being adopted based on the delegation in the Basic Regulation. Commission has
71
Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 of 25 February 2008 concerning the establishment of a Community
framework for the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific
advice regarding the Common Fisheries Policy. (OJ
L 060, 5.3.2008).
Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for
ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, amending Regulations (EC) No 847/96,
(EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC)
No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No
1342/2008 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006.
(OJ L
343, 22.12.2009).
72
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already successfully asked Member States to modify their Joint Recommendations in cases
where STECF concluded that provisions foreseen in a Joint Recommendations were not based
on correct scientific advice.
When it comes to technical measures that serve to decouple the mixed fishery in order to
increase its economic profitability, there is a strong incentive for Member States to propose
Joint Recommendations that include effective measures. If Member States do not suggest
such technical measures, one potential instrument to solve the choke species problem remains
unused, thus the productivity of the fishery decreases.
There is a similar incentive for Member States to suggest effective technical measures aiming
at achieving the conservation targets of the plan. If Member States do not suggest appropriate
technical measures, the TAC of the species concerned will have to be reduced to be in
compliance with the plan. That again constitutes a strong incentive for Member States to
suggest appropriate technical measures.
Member States will also have a strong incentive to control compliance with these measures, as
these measures only successfully decouple the mixed fisheries or achieve conservation targets
if they are really enforced. In addition, it can be expected that the Regionalisation procedure
increases Member States' support for the agreed measures as Member States will play a much
more active role in developing these measures. This should also increase compliance by
Member States.
The Control Regulation also obliges Member States to verify within their Exclusive
Economic Zones whether CFP provisions are complied with. Previous EU-level technical
measures contain provisions to make control easier (e.g. provisions to have only one gear type
on board at a time, so that fisheries inspectors easily determine which gear has been used
during the fishing trip). Joint Recommendations could include similar provisions, if deemed
sensible by Member States.
Measures adopted through Regionalisation are Union Measures, even though they are
developed by regional groups of Member States. The Control Regulation then obliges
Member States to control the application of these rules. The Commission will be obliged to
monitor the correct implementation of the rules (and of the control systems) by Member
States. In suspected cases of non-compliance by Member States the Commission will follow
the standard procedures, i.e. EU pilots and infringement procedures.
8.3.
Ex-post evaluation of the plan
The plan, and its environmental, economic and social effects, should be evaluated by STECF
5 years after its entry into force. An earlier evaluation is not sensible, due to fact that there is
an important time gap between implementation of the plan and when the data required for
evaluation are available. STECF notes that a period of 48 months after implementation would
be required in order to have 3 years of biological data at its disposal and 60 months for 3 years
of economic data to be available
73
. It also has to be noted that the regulatory environment in
the North Sea demersal fisheries will be under constant change due to the stepwise
introduction of the landing obligation between 2016 and 2019. The use of the F
MSY
ranges
will likely change over time because with every additional stock which comes under the
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landing obligation other choke species challenges might arise. This is another reason to
evaluate the plan only after the landing obligation has been fully in force for some years.
Indicators to be used for the evaluation should be environmental (fishing mortality and SSB
for all relevant stocks), economic (net profit margin, return on fixed capital assets (ROFTA)
and gross value added by full-time equivalent (GVA/FTE) as well as social (total employed,
total FTE, average wage). It would be advisable to analyse economic and social indicators
both on an aggregated as well as on a fleet-segment level, to see whether the management
options taken had specific effects in specific segments.
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ANNEX I
SUMMARY OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION
Introduction
Council Regulation (EU) No
1380/2013
on the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP),
establishes new objectives and means for sustainable fisheries, including the objective of
maintaining populations of harvested species above levels that can produce the maximum
sustainable yield and achieving an exploitation rate consistent with this objective as soon as
possible and at the latest by 2020 for all stocks.
The new CFP also introduces a landing obligation, which means that unwanted catches of
species that are subject to quotas can no longer be discarded, and objectives that contribute to
achieving "good environmental status" (GES) as required by
Directive 2008/56/EC
(the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive, or MSFD).
The introduction of the landing obligation represents a fundamental shift in the way in which
fisheries are managed. In the North Sea demersal fisheries, several species are usually caught
together in the same net. The management plans currently in place were conceived when there
was no landing obligation. This limits their effectiveness, because under the previous CFP,
fishing could continue in these mixed fisheries even if the quota for one or more of the species
concerned was exhausted. The unwanted catches would simply be discarded. Indeed, there
was a legal obligation to discard catches in excess of quota, and also to discard any fish that
were below the minimum landing size. This will no longer be the case. Under the landing
obligation, the fishery should be stopped whenever the quota for any one of the species in the
mixture is exhausted. Moreover, all under-sized fish must be landed and counted against the
quota.
In line with the principles and objectives set out in Articles 9 and 10 of the Basic Regulation
(Council Regulation (EU) No
1380/2013),
and to the extent possible, multi-annual plans
should become the main repository for all of the elements and instruments necessary for the
management of the fisheries and stocks that a plan encompasses. This ambition would need to
take into account the developments regarding the landing obligation and technical
conservation measures which are underway in a parallel process to development of this
proposal. It could be envisaged that recommended measures or approaches resulting from
those developments be incorporated into any multi-annual plan, through regionalisation.
A new multi-annual plan for the North Sea would aim to fulfil the objectives of the new CFP
i.e. to achieve an exploitation rate consistent with maximum sustainable yield (MSY), to
ensure high and stable yields for the industry, while taking into account mixed-fisheries
interactions. It would respond to the challenges under the landing obligation, and would seek
a results-based approach by enabling tailor made management measures to be produced in
close consultation with fishers and Member States. It would also contribute to the objectives
of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, achieving high long-term yields while
maintaining productive and healthy fish stocks within functioning marine ecosystems.
The views of stakeholders and the public in general were sought through a public consultation
on the best way forward to modernise and rationalise multi-annual plans in the context of the
new CFP. This document reports on the outcome of this consultation.
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The overview of the contributions presented is based on the written contributions received. It
is neither intended to draw conclusions regarding the options proposed nor does it represent
the position of the Commission. It will support the preparation of the Impact Assessment
report, which in turn will be the basis for developing the Commission's proposal for a new
multi-annual plan for North Sea fisheries.
Contributions received
The public consultation took place between 9 February and 4 May 2015, with a total of 25
written contributions received. Individual contributions are available on the dedicated website
to this consultation
74
.
Table AI.1 provides a summary of the submissions by stakeholder grouping.
Table AI.1. Breakdown of contributions to the Public Consultation on North Sea multi-annual plans
Stakeholder Group
Advisory Councils
Member States
administrations
Civil society
organisations
Industry/interest groups
stakeholder organisations
Number of contributions
1 (4%)
4 (16%)
Examples
MED AC, SWW AC, NS AC, NWW AC, BS AC
Ministries, Local government
9 (36%)
Environmental NGOs
Fishermen's representative organisations, , consumer
groups, European transport workers federation, anglers
organisations, fisheries consultants
Citizens with differing backgrounds (e.g. retired
fisherman, anglers, member of NGO)
9 (36%)
General Public
2 (8%)
General comments
The majority of contributors think that the current North Sea long term management plans
need to be replaced as they have become outdated due to the introduction of the landing
obligation. Member States' and industry's contributions strongly criticise the current effort-
based regime that does not incentivise fishermen to fish more selectively. The majority of
stakeholders state that a mixed-fisheries multi-annual approach is the right way forward.
Contributors from Member States' administrations and the fishing industry would like to see
simple, non-prescriptive regulation –an EU framework including strategic objectives and
general principles with detailed rules drawn up through the regionalised model. A new mixed-
fisheries multi-annual plan is seen as an opportunity to improve the management of North Sea
fisheries.
Almost all NGO contributors highlight that the precautionary approach and the ecosystem-
based approach should be respected in all new MAPs. With respect to the way that TACs will
be set in the future, almost all NGOs state that F
MSY
must be an upper limit and not a target
value. NGOs strongly argue against F
MSY
ranges where the upper bound of the range is above
F
MSY
. NGOs also want biomass reference points which trigger previously agreed reductions in
F to be included into the plan.
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Implementation of the landing obligation
There is general agreement from all contributors that the implementation of the landing
obligation will present a major challenge for the fishing industry. Some industry contributors
challenge the usefulness of the landing obligation. While sharing the point of view that the
landing obligation will present an important challenge for fishermen, NGO contributors also
emphasise the environmental and economic opportunities that a successful implementation of
the landing obligation might present. One NGO points out that the implementation of the
landing obligation not only poses a challenge to the fishing industry but also to MS as a new
approach to quota allocation within MS is needed.
Area coverage
There is general agreement that the plan must make suitable provision for consistency with
other area plans to ensure consistency of objectives. There are divergent views whether stocks
that are not predominantly fished in the North Sea should be covered by the proposed North
Sea plan or not. All Member States that participated in the consultation recommend that the
plan covers ICES areas IIIa, IV and VIId. However, some contributions from the fishing
industry object to the inclusion of IIIa and VIId if this leads to the inclusion of additional
stocks other than straddling stocks that are also present in the main basin of the North Sea
(area IV).
Major stocks to be included in the plan
The most frequently mentioned additional major stock to be included in the plan was
monkfish. Clarity over approaches for co-management with Norway was also mentioned (by
NSAC and Member States). Many industry contributors agree with the list of stocks presented
in the consultation document. In addition to monkfish, a stock that is mentioned in several
industry contributions is megrim. A couple of other fishing industry contributors individually
suggest adding other stocks, e.g. sea bass or brown shrimp. NGO contributors emphasise that
the MSY objective should be applied to all harvested species. One NGO contribution
mentions lemon sole, brill and turbot as drivers of fishermen's behaviour which therefore
might be considered as major stocks.
By-catch species to be covered by the plan
With respect to by-catch species, where by-catches are significant or where interactions are
important, technical measures through regionalisation are considered appropriate by the
majority of industry contributors, the NSAC and Member States, using an adaptive and
incremental approach and monitoring the situation to determine the most at-risk species.
Many NGOs again emphasise that the CFP's MSY objectives should apply to all species.
Some NGOs give special mention to the protected zero-TAC species porbeagle and spurdog,
which need special protection as they still can be discarded in the future.
Ecosystem considerations
For ecosystem considerations, many industry and Member State contributors feel that existing
legislation already takes the ecosystem into account. There was recognition that some stocks
may need to be exploited more lightly than F
MSY
to achieve MSFD Descriptor 3.
However, NGO contributors agree on the need to include ecosystem considerations when
drafting the multi-annual plan. They see a need in respecting the MFSD objectives when
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adopting fisheries legislation and also refer to article 2(3) of the Basic Regulation of the CFP
which foresees an ecosystem-based approach. Some NGOs want very concrete objectives to
be achieved like the improvement of the state of specific Natura 2000 sites.
One Member State and one NGO state that the multi-annual plan should be developed
incrementally and that ecosystem considerations might be added after evaluation of the new
plan or when scientific advice evolves.
Regionalised technical measures
For technical measures, Member States and fishing industry ask the Commission to
coordinate the elaboration of the multi-annual plan and future framework for technical
measures to avoid duplication. One Member State highlighted that they should be broadly
formulated to avoid excluding possible instruments for future management. All technical
measures should be dealt with through regionalisation alone.
The AC, Member States and industry highlighted a wide range of technical measures
including selectivity improvements, spatial / temporal closures, limitations or prohibitions on
the use of certain fishing gears and activities, MCRS and combinations of measures where
necessary.
One industry interest group suggested new technologies like sorting fish in the water prior to
bringing them on board and leaving behind the unwanted catch.
Additionally, many NGOs underline the need for broad consultation and effective
regionalisation when developing new technical measures. Several NGOs propose temporal,
real-time and permanent closures in order to protect juveniles and/or vulnerable species. Some
NGOs refer to the possibility of creating fish stock recovery areas as defined in Article 8 of
the Basic Regulation. Many NGOs suggest introducing measures for higher selectivity of
fishing gear. Some NGOs want best practices on handling unwanted catches (e.g. of
vulnerable species like sharks and rays) to be promoted, in order to achieve higher survival
rates.
Two NGOs suggest other concrete measures like obligatory by-catch reduction devices,
move-on rules, obligatory CCTV in cod ends, improved monitoring and reporting
requirements and the limitation of fishing licences to certain areas.
Citizen's contributions
Two responses were received from members of the general public. One respondent is a retired
fisheries scientist. His contribution emphasizes the need to set F below F
MSY
and suggests
working on defining a general rule for defining such an F value like 75 or 80 percent of F
MSY
instead of setting F arbitrarily below F
MSY
. He also points out the need to reduce fishing
below the F value foreseen in the plan if scientific data indicate that the size of the spawning
stock has fallen below some threshold value.
The other respondent is the Chief Executive of a regional processors' association who
contributed on his own behalf. He strongly criticises the landing obligation and emphasises
the need to leave more decisions to the individual fishermen. He also asks to add crab, squid
and lobster to the list of main target and bycatch species.
A word cloud indicating the 100 most frequently used words and phrases in the combined
responses to the public consultation from all contributors is illustrated in Figure AI.1.
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Figure AI.1. Word cloud to show the 100 most frequently used words and phrases in the combined responses to the public consultation from all contributors
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ANNEX II
MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY
The new CFP, Regulation (EU) 138/2013 entered into force on 1 January 2014. The main
elements of the new CFP are:
(1)
Maximum Sustainable Yield
is the best possible objective for renewable and
profitable fisheries, harvesting the maximum amount of fish on a long term basis.
The objective of the CFP is to ensure that MSY is achieved by 2015 where
possible, and by 2020 at the latest. Not all stocks in the north-east Atlantic are
MSY-assessed yet. Of the assessed stocks 60% of them are fished at MSY (up
from 6 % only in 2005). In the Mediterranean only around 11% of assessed stocks
are within MSY and there is little sign of improvement. For many stocks,
particularly in the Mediterranean, we have no assessment of MSY.
(2)
Annual legislation on fixing fishing opportunities
(TACs and quotas, some are
set on a two-yearly basis): to fix, based on scientific advice that is consistent with
MSY and in accordance with multi-annual plans (where they exist), the amount of
fishing for the stocks concerned, and to allocate quotas to the Member States
following the so-called relative stability key. In turn, Member States deal with
how to distribute their national quotas to their fishermen. Annually fishing
opportunities are set for the Baltic, North Sea, Atlantic and deep-sea stock, by
Council only, to determine the level of catches (before the landing obligation:
landings), for each stock. The COM outlines its approach for the TAC each spring
in a Policy Statement.
The COM proposals are based on existing multi-annual plans (with certain
provisions on TAC setting), or on annual biological advice. TACs are shared out
to Member States following fixed allocation keys (so-called relative stability,
which differs among stocks). TACs (in tonnes) are a translation of fishing
mortality (F, mortality caused by fishing as a ratio of the stock). In the context of
multi-annual plans the COM will be seeking advice on MSY expressed in ranges
of fishing mortality that correspond to sustainable fishing and MSY, for the target
species.
Under certain multi-annual plans TACs are accompanied by effort reduction
schemes for certain fleets. These effort regimes are currently considered
ineffective, causing red tape, and sometimes creating conflicts with the TACs.
They are likely to disappear from future multi-annual plans, but are currently still
part of the TAC proposals.
(3) The landing obligation:
The new CFP includes a landing obligation for all
catches of species subject to catch limits (TACs) and, in the Mediterranean, also
catches of species which are subject to minimum sizes (only blue-fin tuna is under
TAC in this sea basin).
It applies to all Union vessels fishing in Union and non-Union waters. The landing
obligation is applied in a gradual way and is fishery based. On 1 January 2015
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pelagic fisheries and industrial fisheries everywhere in Union waters will be under
the landing obligation, as will be all other fisheries (salmon and cod) in the Baltic.
The landing obligation comes with a set of potential measures and flexibility
instruments to make the transition and timely implementation possible. These
include quota flexibilities, exemptions for species that have a high survival rate
and a
de minimis
exemption to cater for unwanted catches that are unavoidable.
The plans may also fix conservation reference sizes for fish. These measures
should be developed through multi-annual plans, but in the absence of such plans,
discard plans
can be adopted.
The new CFP encourages regionalisation, which basically allows Member States,
in consultation with the relevant stakeholder Advisory Councils, to come forward
with a proposal for a discard plan (joint recommendation) that the COM, after
review, turns into Union legislation (through a Commission Regulation).
(4)
EU multi-annual plans;
national plans in the Mediterranean: they contain the
framework for management of a stock or a combination of stocks (by fishery).
Multi-annual plans are designed to ensure effective management of the fisheries
and to bring conservation and management provisions for groups of stocks under
plans. Plans contribute to stability and a long-term security for the industry. The
main elements of plans are:
MSY-related targets (per target stock), deadlines for achieving MSY, and
fishing mortality/exploitation ranges that are consistent with MSY (F
MSY
as
a range of values)
safeguard provisions if science indicates that stocks are in trouble; specific
conservation measures for non-target species, so as to keep them within
sustainable boundaries
mechanisms to allow for regionalisation of implementing measures under
the plan
(5)
Fleet capacity rules:
these are provisions to support that the fleet capacity of a
Member State matches with the fishing opportunities that are allocated to it; fleet
overcapacity potentially leads to overfishing. Member States cannot increase the
engine power or storage capacity of their fleets. Each Member State is subject to a
maximum capacity threshold (in engine power (kW) and in vessel volume (gt)).
Nominally, all Member States fleets are under these ceilings; however, in many
Member States the effective engine capacity may well outscore the numbers in the
CFP. Despite intensified enforcement, this is a persistent and hard-to-tackle issue.
Annually Member States must report on the balance between capacity and fishing
opportunities. Historically this has not been linked to targeted actions. For the first
time, under the new CFP Member States have to give follow-up to the
identification of overcapacity with an action plan to eliminate it, in order to have
access to funding for decommissioning of excess vessels. The assessment exercise
by Member States on the balance between capacity and fishing opportunities is
facilitated by common guidelines developed by the Commission. It includes
technical and economic parameters. Member States will have to include in their
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reports an action plan for the fleet segments with identified imbalance. In the
action plan, Member States have to set out the adjustment targets and tools to
achieve the balance. The plan has to include a clear time frame for the
implementation of the action plan as well.
(6)
The External Dimension:
The CFP reform enshrines for the first time the
external dimension of the CFP (Part VI of the Basic Regulation: Articles 28-31). It
calls for strong external action that follows externally the same principles and
standards as internally while promoting a level-playing field for EU operators.
Under the CFP new international agreements should
contribute to long term sustainability worldwide via stronger bilateral
relations and tackling global issues such as IUU fishing and fishing
overcapacity
uphold and strengthen the global architecture for fisheries governance
(UN, FAO, OECD, etc.)
contribute towards a more effective functioning of RFMOs, more
sustainable Fisheries Agreements and better coherence with other EU
policies
(7)
Data Collection Framework:
a set of requirements on collection by fishermen
and Member States and management of biological and other data as input for
biological, economic and other knowledge and advice in support of the policy. To
align to the new CFP a Commission proposal for a revised Data Collection
Framework Regulation is under preparation. It will introduce simplifications and
more flexibility and adaptability, based on an evaluation of the previous
framework.
(8)
Advisory Councils:
The Advisory Councils (ACs) were established since 2004 to
advise the Commission on matters related to fisheries management in their
respective areas of competence. Seven ACs were established for the
Mediterranean Sea, the South Western Waters, the North Western Waters, the
North Sea, the Baltic Sea, small pelagic species, and the Long Distance Fleet.
ACs are stakeholders' organisations that bring together the industry (fishing,
processing and marketing sectors) and other interest groups, such as
environmental and consumers' organisations. They receive an annual grant of up to
250.000 euros from the Commission to cover part of their operational costs. The
new CFP foresees the creation of four new ACs for Aquaculture, Markets, the
Black Sea and Outermost Regions.
ACs are expected to expand their play in the regionalised CFP and are to be
consulted by Member States when preparing joint recommendations on
conservation measures.
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ANNEX III
ANALYSIS ON CHOKE SPECIES EXTRACTED FROM STECF 14-19
The findings of the STECF for selected Member States are summarised in the figures below
75
. Given the uncertainties on how the landing obligation will
be implemented, the information presented can only be used to flag potential choke species issues. All information is presented in relative terms (ratio of
realized catches to quota), regardless of the actual size of the quota and/or of the value of the fishery.
The blue bars - indicate the ratio of actual landings to actual quota (final quota in 2012 after swaps). Where this is close to 1, it indicates a high
uptake of the quota and a good balance between landings and final fishing opportunities at the country level.
The red bars - show the same thing for the initial quotas (before swaps). A comparison between the red and the blue bars therefore indicates the
extent to which the Member State is dependent on receiving quota from other Member States to cover its landings.
The green bars - illustrate the mismatch between catches (landings + estimated discards) and the initial quota allocation in 2012. Any green bar
above 1 indicates that the 2012 initial quota would not have been sufficient to account for the realised catches if they had been subject to the
landing obligation, and is therefore the primary indicator for potential choke effects.
The main conclusions concerning North Sea stocks are summarised after the figures for each of the Member States.
75
Report on Landing Obligations in EU Fisheries -part 4(STECF-14-19).
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For Germany:
Cod catches in IIIa are well in excess of initial and final quota
Nephrops
catches in IV are well in excess of initial quota although the final quota was able to cover all catches although quota/catches are small
Hake catches in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota
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For Denmark:
Cod catches in IV and IIIa are in excess of initial quota and final quota
Megrim catches in IV are above the initial and final quota although catches are low
Hake catches in IV are in excess of initial and final quota and the initial quota is higher than the final quota
Haddock catches in IIIa are in excess of the initial and final quota
Saithe catches in IV are in excess of initial and final quota
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For the United Kingdom:
Catches of cod in IV are in excess of initial and final quota
Catches of haddock in IV are in excess of initial quota but aligned with final quota
Catches of hake in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota
Catches of saithe in IV are in excess of initial and final quota
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For the Netherlands:
Catches of haddock in IV are in excess of initial quota and broadly in line with final quota
Catches of hake in IV are in excess of initial quota
Catches of
Nephrops
in IV are well in excess of initial quota and in excess of final quota
Catches of plaice in in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota
Catches of whiting in IV are well in excess of initial and final quota
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ANNEX IV
N
ORTH
S
EA DEMERSAL STOCKS AND FISHERIES
ICES divides the area under consideration into the following sub-areas,: the North Sea
(ICES Sub-area IV, sub-divided into ICES Divisions IVa, IVb and IVc); the Skagerrak &
Kattegat (ICES Division IIIa); the Eastern Channel (ICES Division VIId). These areas
are shown on the map in the figure below (Figure A.IV.1.)
Figure A.IV.1. The North Sea area showing ICES reporting areas.
D
EMERSAL
S
TOCKS
I
N
T
HE
N
ORTH
S
EA
A
REA
The fish populations within this broad area form a number of stocks, some of which are
distributed across several ICES reporting areas. Some of these stocks are already subject
to management plans (see Table A.IV.1). In addition to these fish stocks, there are
important fisheries for Norway Lobster (Nephrops
norvegicus).
This crustacean occurs in
number of separate populations in different parts of the North Sea. These are called
Functional Units (FU). The Functional Units in the North Sea area are further described
in Table A.IV.2 and Figure A.IV.2. No management plans are currently in place for the
Norway Lobster fisheries although a plan has been proposed by the North Sea Advisory
Council (NSAC)
76
. This was recently reviewed by the STECF
77
. STECF concluded that
the measures and instruments described in the LTMP for North Sea
Nephrops
fisheries
proposed by the NSAC are worded such that the intention is to deliver the objectives of
76
77
http://www.nsrac.org/category/reports/meetings-c/nfg/
http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/991908/2015-04_STECF+PLEN+15-01_JRC95802.pdf
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the CFP (Council Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013). However, there is an absence of
specific detail on how any of the measures listed will be implemented in practice. Hence,
STECF concludes it is not possible to assess whether the plan is likely to deliver the
objectives of the CFP.
Table A.IV.1. Management and advice status in 2014 for North Sea demersal stocks.
Species
Area
EU mgt
plan
EU / NO
strategy
Advice
basis
1
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
PA
F
MSY
ranges
2
Biomass
safeguards
2
Anglerfish,
Lophius
piscatorius
&
L. budegassa
Blonde ray,
Raja brachyura
Blue ling,
Molva dypterygia
Brill,
Scopthalmus rhombus
Cod,
Gadus morhua
Cod,
Gadus morhua
Cuckoo ray,
Leucoraja naevus
Dab,
Limanda limanda
Flounder,
Platichthys flesus
Grey gurnard,
Eutrigla
gurnardus
4
Haddock,
Melanogrammus
aeglefinus
Hake,
Merluccius merluccius
Lemon sole,
Microstomus kitt
Lesser spotted dogfish,
Scyliorhinus canicula
4
Ling,
Molva molva
Megrim,
Lepidorhombus
whiffiagonis
Northern shrimp,
Pandalus
borealis
Northern shrimp,
Pandalus
borealis
Norway lobster,
Nephrops
norvegicus
IIIa, IV & VI
IVc & VIId
I, II, VIII, IX, XII, IIIa &
IVa
IV, IIIa & VIId,e
IIIa East
IV, IIIa West & VIId
IV & IIIa
IV & IIIa
IV & IIIa
IV, IIIa & VIId
IIIaN, IV & VI
IIIa, IV, VI, & VII, &
VIIIa,b,d
IV & IIIa
IV, IIIa & VIId
IIIa, IVa, VI, VII, VIII,
IX, XII, & XIV
IVa & VIa
Fladen ground IVa
IVa East & IIIa West
IIIa
Y
3
Reg.
1342/2008
MP
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
MS
MSY
DLS
DLS
DLS
MSY
DLS
MSY and
PA
MSY
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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Norway lobster,
Nephrops
norvegicus
Norway pout,
Trisopterus
esmarki
Plaice,
Pleuronectes platessa
Plaice,
Pleuronectes platessa
Plaice,
Pleuronectes platessa
Pollack,
Pollachius pollachius
Saithe,
Pollachius virens
Sole,
Solea solea
Sole,
Solea solea
Sole,
Solea solea
Spotted ray,
Raja montagui
Striped red mullet,
Mullus
surmuletus
4
Thornback ray,
Raja clavata
Turbot,
Scophthalmus
maximus
Turbot,
Scophthalmus
maximus
Tusk,
Brosme brosme
Whiting,
Merlangius
merlangus
Whiting,
Merlangius
merlangus
Witch
1
IV
IV & IIIa
IV
IIIa
VIId
IV & IIIa
IIIa, IV & VI
IV
IIIa
VIId
IV, IIIa & VIId
IV, IIIa & VIId
IV, IIIa & VIId
IV
IIIa
IIIa, Vb, VIa, & XIIb, &
IV, VII, VIII, & IX
IV & VIId
IIIa
IV, IIIa & VIId
Y
Reg.
676/2007
Y
Reg.
676/2007
mixed
PC
MP
DLS
Y
DLS
MS
MP
MSY
MSY
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
DLS
Y for
some
FU
Y for some
FU
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
advice basis: MP: EU management plan; MS: EU/Norway management strategy; DLS: data limited approach; FU:
functional unit; MSY: F
MSY
;PA: precautionary approach; PC: precautionary considerations.
2
http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2015/Special_Requests/EU_FMSY_ranges_for_selected
_NS_and_BS_stocks.pdf;
3
under review;
4
ICES advice given but no TAC.
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Amongst the main North Sea demersal stocks, cod is currently the one of greatest
concern. The stock biomass has been below its limit reference point (B
lim
) for over ten
years, and it was forecast to reach that biomass at the start of 2014
78
. Fishing mortality
has also been high, and while it has shown some recent reduction to below the
precautionary level, the stock is still over-exploited with respect to MSY. In contrast, the
spawning biomass of the haddock stock is above the relevant reference points and the
stock is being harvested below the target level associated with MSY. The main stocks of
sole and plaice in the North Sea are subject to a combined management plan, reflecting
the close link between the fisheries for the two species. This has contributed to a plaice
stock which is currently at a historic high level and which is being fished at below the
MSY target level. The spawning biomass of the North Sea sole stock is above the
relevant reference points but the stock is being harvested above the target level associated
with MSY.
N
ORWAY
L
OBSTER
F
UNCTIONAL
U
NITS
I
N
T
HE
N
ORTH
S
EA
A
REA
Norway lobster (Nephrops) stocks have been identified by ICES experts on the basis of
their population distribution and characteristics, and established as separate Functional
Units. The Functional Units (FU) are defined by groupings of ICES statistical rectangles;
they are illustrated in Figure A.IV.2 and detailed in Table A.IV.2. The statistical
rectangles making up each FU encompass the distribution of mud sediment on which
Nephrops
live. There are two FUs in Division IIIa and nine FUs in Subarea IV.
Management of
Nephrops
currently operates at the ICES Subarea/Division level.
Figure A.IV.2. Name of each Norway Lobster Functional Unit in the North Sea area.
78
ICES Advice 2014. Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea) and Divisions VIId (Eastern Channel) and IIIa
West (Skagerrak).
78
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Table A.IV.2. Name and number of Norway Lobster Functional Units in the North Sea area.
FU No.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
32
33
34
FU name
Skagerrak
Kattegat
Botney Gut – Silver Pit
Farn Deeps
Fladen Ground
Firth of Forth
Moray Firth
Noup
Norwegian Deep
Off Horn Reef
Devil's Hole
ICES Division
IIIa
IIIa
IVb,c
IVb
IVa
IVb
IVa
IVa
IVa
IVb
IVb
Scientific advice
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
D
EMERSAL
F
LEETS IN THE
N
ORTH
S
EA
A
REA
Data from the STECF Annual Economic Report (AER) on the EU fishing fleet
79 80
suggest that the EU North Sea fleet spent a total of around 471 thousand days at sea in
2012, in line with 2011. Vessels predominantly using demersal trawls and seines and
beam trawls accounted for 36% of the total number of days at sea in the North Sea.
Demersal trawls and seines and beam trawls were the two most important gears with
respect to both the total weight of species landed (64%) and the total value of species
landed (68%) by the EU North Sea fleet in 2012 (Table A.IV.3).
Table A.IV.3. Percentages of total landed weight and of landed value by the EU North Sea fleet by
gear type, across all fleet segments, in 2012.
% of total landed weight
(t)
64
25
11
% of total landed value
(€)
68
13
19
Demersal trawls and seines and beam
trawls
Pelagic trawls and purse seines
Other gears
Although around 30 species of fish and shellfish are caught in the mixed demersal
fishery, around 23% of the total landed value and 44% of the total landed weight in 2012
was accounted for by the top ten demersal species alone. In terms of value landed these
79
80
The 2014 Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing fleet. STECF 14-16.
The STECF Annual Economic Report (AER) on the EU fishing fleet gives summaries by both
individual Member State and by sea basin area. In the latter category, the North Sea is combined with
the Eastern Arctic area, hence some of the figures summarised here may also include some catches
from the latter area. However, these are likely to be relatively small, and should not change the overall
picture. The data summarised in the 2014 AER report cover the years up to 2013. However, the data
for 2013 are incomplete, so only data up to 2012 are used here.
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were, in order of importance: sole, plaice,
Nephrops,
cod, saithe, haddock, turbot,
anglerfish, whiting and lemon sole. In terms of weight landed, the order was slightly
different and dab replaced turbot in the species list: plaice, saithe, haddock, cod,
Nephrops,
whiting, sole, dab, anglerfish and lemon sole.
Capture in demersal trawls and seines and beam trawls accounted for around 90% of the
top ten demersal species caught across all North Sea fleet segments, both by weight and
by value landed, in 2012 (Table A.IV.4).
Table A.IV.4. Percentages of total weight and of value landed by the EU North Sea fleet by gear type,
across all fleet segments, for the top ten demersal species, in 2012.
% of total landed weight
(t)
92
0
8
% of total landed value
(€)
87
0
13
Demersal trawls and seines and beam
trawls
Pelagic trawls and purse seines
Other gears
The STECF 2014 AER
79
provides detailed fleet and segment information for the top 35
Member State fleet segments with the highest landed values
81
. Table A.IV.5 shows the
vessel size categories as percentages of both the total weight and total value landed by
the different fleet segments in 2012. These data show that around 70% of the landed
weight and 40% of the landed value came from the two important demersal gear
categories. The vessels using these gears tended to be the larger vessels in the fleet, with
the majority greater than 18 m length.
Table A.IV.5. Percentage of the total landed weight and total landed value by the different fleet
segments, for the different vessel size categories, in 2012, for the top 35 Member State fleet segments
by landed value.
% of total landed weight (t)
Vessel
length
category
(m)
< 10
10 - 12
12 - 18
18 - 24
24 - 40
> 40
Total
Demersal
trawls and
seines and
beam trawls
0
0
6
20
25
18
69
Pelagic
trawls and
purse seines
Other gears
% of total landed value (€)
Demersal
trawls and
seines and
beam trawls
0
0
2
9
15
14
41
Pelagic
trawls and
purse seines
Other gears
0
0
0
0
0
20
20
3
3
3
1
1
0
11
0
0
0
0
0
32
32
1
1
1
0
1
0
4
81
A fleet segment is a group of vessels from the same Member State using the same gear type.
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