Europaudvalget 2017
KOM (2017) 0647
Offentligt
1815323_0001.png
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 8.11.2017
SWD(2017) 358 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009 on common rules for access to the
international market for coach and bus services
{COM(2017) 647 final} - {SWD(2017) 359 final}
EN
EN
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
Table of Contents
GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................. III
1.
2.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? ................................. 1
2.1. Policy Context ................................................................................................... 1
2.2. Market Context .................................................................................................. 4
2.3. Evaluation of the Regulation ............................................................................. 7
2.4. Problem definition ............................................................................................. 8
2.5. What are the problem drivers? ........................................................................ 16
2.5.1.
2.5.2.
2.5.3.
Problem driver 1: Restricted access to national inter-urban
markets .............................................................................................. 16
Problem driver 2: Excessive administrative costs of entry ............... 18
Problem driver 3: Restricted access to key infrastructure ................. 20
2.6. Who is affected by the problem, in what ways, and to what extent? .............. 23
2.7. What is the EU dimension of the problem?..................................................... 23
2.8. How would the problem evolve, all things being equal? ................................ 24
3.
WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? .............................................................................. 26
3.1. Legal Basis ...................................................................................................... 26
3.2. Subsidiarity ...................................................................................................... 27
3.2.1.
3.2.2.
4.
Necessity test ..................................................................................... 27
EU added value test ........................................................................... 28
WHAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED? ........................................................................ 28
4.1. General policy objective .................................................................................. 29
4.2. Specific objectives ........................................................................................... 29
5.
WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE
OBJECTIVES? .......................................................................................................... 30
5.1. Retained policy measures ................................................................................ 30
5.2. Identification of possible policy packages ...................................................... 32
5.3. Identification of a list of market access policy options ................................... 32
5.4. Identification of a list of terminal access policy options ................................. 35
EN
EN
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
6.
WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS
AND WHO WILL BE AFFECTED? ........................................................................ 37
6.1. Impacts of policy options to address excessive administration costs of
entry and market access problems ................................................................... 39
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
6.2.1.
6.2.2.
6.2.3.
Economic impacts ............................................................................. 39
Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 55
Social impacts .................................................................................... 56
Economic impacts ............................................................................. 63
Environmental impacts ...................................................................... 66
Social impacts .................................................................................... 66
6.2. Impacts of policy options to address terminal access problems ...................... 63
7.
HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .................................................................. 69
7.1. Effectiveness and efficiency ............................................................................ 69
7.2. Coherence ........................................................................................................ 71
7.3. Proportionality of the preferred option ............................................................ 73
7.4. Conclusion of the comparison of options and combined effects ..................... 76
8.
HOW WOULD ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND
EVALUATED? ......................................................................................................... 78
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PROCESS
TO PREPARE THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT AND THE
RELATED INITIATIVE. ......................................................................................... 80
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION SYNOPSIS REPORT. ...................... 89
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW? ....................... 101
ANNEX 4: ANALYTICAL MODEL USED IN PREPARING THE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................... 102
Scenario design, consultation process and quality assurance
........ 105
Main assumptions of the Baseline scenario
.................................... 106
ANNEX 5: DESCRIPTION OF THE ROAD INITIATIVES
– THE ‘BIG
PICTURE’.
.............................................................................................................. 122
ANNEX 6: DISCARDED POLICY MEASURES ......................................................... 128
ANNEX 7: IMPACTS OF LIBERALISATION ON PSOS ........................................... 135
ANNEX 8: CASE STUDIES .......................................................................................... 137
ii
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
G
LOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS
,
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ARAFER
ART
Cabotage operations
Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires et routières
Autorità di Regolazione dei trasporti
Means either:
- national road passenger services for hire and reward carried out on a
temporary basis by a carrier in a host Member State, or
- the picking up and setting down of passengers within the same
Member State, in the course of a regular international service, in
compliance with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009,
provided that it is not the principal purpose of the service.
European Disability Forum
European Transport Federation
European Union
General objective
Is the main intercity coach provider in Greece "Common Funds of Bus
Proceeds"
Impact Assessment
Global Industry Association of Road Transport
Net present value
Open Public Consultation
Passenger-kilometres
Persons with reduced mobility
Public Service Contract means one or more legally binding acts
confirming the agreement between a competent authority and a public
service operator to entrust to that public service operator the
management and operation of public passenger transport services
subject to public service obligations; depending on the law of the
Member State, the contract may also consist of a decision adopted by
the competent authority:
- taking the form of an individual legislative or regulatory act, or
- containing conditions under which the competent authority itself
provides the services or entrusts the provision of such services to an
internal operator;
Public Service Obligation means a requirement defined or determined
by a competent authority in order to ensure public passenger transport
services in the general interest that an operator, if it were considering
its own commercial interests, would not assume or would not assume
to the same extent or under the same conditions without reward
DIRECTIVE 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the
framework of the provision of services
Regulatory fitness and performance revision
Railway Information Measuring and Monitoring System
Small and medium-sized enterprises
Specific Objective
EDF
ETF
EU
GO
KTEL
IA
IRU
NPV
OPC
pkm
PRMs
PSC
PSO
PWD
REFIT
RIMMS
SME
SO
iii
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0005.png
1.
I
NTRODUCTION
This impact assessment (IA) accompanies a legislative proposal that revises Regulation
(EC) No 1073/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for
access to the international market for coach services, and amending Regulation (EC) No
561/2006
1
(hereinafter “the Regulation”).
The Regulation forms part of a common EU legal framework for efficient, fair and
sustainable road transport. Within the framework the Regulation is closely related to the
legislation on access to the occupation of road transport operator
2
and social rules for
road transport operators (the Driving Time Regulation
3
, Road Transport Working Time
Directive
4
, the Enforcement Directive
5
, and the Tachograph Regulation
6
) which together
set the legal framework for road passenger transport operators to operate in the EU.
This initiative is part of a broader review of the existing legislation applying to road
transport. The objective of the review is to update and improve the existing legislation so
that it continues to achieve its objectives without undue burdens. Together, these
initiatives consider a range of different options, with mutually reinforcing measures,
which ultimately should improve the efficiency, fairness and sustainability of road
transport. For road passenger transport operations the interaction of this initiative and
initiatives on access to the occupation, social rules and the Eurovignette
7
are closely
linked. This package is further described in Annex 5.
This impact assessment concerns a new REFIT initiative (regulatory fitness and
performance revision) of current law
8
that aims to simplify and reduce regulatory costs
while maintaining benefits.
2.
W
HAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM
?
2.1.
Policy Context
This initiative is closely linked with the Communication of the Commission of 31 May,
'Europe on the Move'
9
, which aims to make transport cleaner, more connected and
competitive. Bus and coach services have the possibility of contributing to all these
objectives by providing better services to citizens
The internal market is not yet complete and barriers remain, notably in the area of
services. The integration of the European Union (EU) transport market remains low in
comparison to other parts of the economy and a genuine EU-wide internal market exists
only in air transport, while other transport modes, including road, suffer from different
degrees of fragmentation along national borders.
The White Paper
10
on transport policy adopted on 28 March 2011 (hereinafter “the 2011
White Paper”) sets out the Commission’s vision for a competitive and sustainable
transport system and reiterates the continuing importance of our ultimate aim, to pursue a
1
2
OJL 300, 14.11.2009, p. 88.
Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009, OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 51
3
Regulation (EC) 561/2006, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1
4
Directive 2002/15/EC, OJ L 80, 23.3.2002, p. 35
5
Directive 2006/22/EC, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 35
6
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014, OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 1
7
Directive 1999/62/EC, OJ L 187, 20.7.1999, p. 42
8
Initiative no. 9, annex 2, Commission Work Programme 2017
9
SWD(2017) 177 final
10
See
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0144
1
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0006.png
single European transport area and remove competitive distortions. This will help the EU
transport policy remains the creation of a single European transport area, to help the EU
stay competitive by optimising the performance of the entire transport sector for the
benefit of all while safeguarding safety, security and the environment. It acknowledges
that curbing mobility is not an option and that new transport patterns must emerge,
according to which greater numbers of travellers are carried jointly to their destination by
the most efficient (combination of) modes.
In the 1990s, the internal market for bus and coach services was created by two separate
pieces of legislation, namely Council Regulation (EEC) No 684/92 on common rules for
the international carriage of passengers by coach and bus
11
and Council Regulation (EC)
No 12/98 laying down the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate
national road passenger transport services within a Member State
12
. These Regulations
were consolidated by the Regulation which provides the conditions for the international
carriage of passengers by coach and bus services within the EU by carriers for hire and
reward.
The Regulation was adopted as a part of a legislative package with Regulation (EC) No
1071/2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to
pursue the occupation of road transport operator
13
and Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 on
common rules for access to the international road haulage market
14
. Together, these three
regulations establish the conditions for accessing the profession and for accessing the
markets for transport of goods and people by road and aim to support the completion of
the internal market in road transport, its efficiency and competitiveness.
The scope of the Regulation covers the international carriage of passengers by coach and
bus within the EU by carriers for hire and reward in possession of a Community licence
or by own-account carriers established in a Member State.
The regulation provides for the opening of the markets for the following services:
Table 2-1: International carriage of passengers
Type of service
Regular services
Definition
Regular services means services which provide for
the carriage of passengers at specified intervals
along specified routes, passengers being picked up
and set down at predetermined stopping points.
Typical example: Regular, scheduled service open
to all passengers, such as Eurolines services
between Member States.
Special regular services mean regular services, by
whosoever organised, which provide for the
carriage of specified categories of passengers to the
exclusion of other passengers.
Typical examples: Regular, scheduled service not
open to all passengers, such as:
‐
School services serving only those
attending a school; and
Regime
Subject
to
authorisation
granted by the competent
authorities of the MSs
concerned
Special Regular
Services
Not subject to authorisation
where they are covered by a
contract concluded between
the organiser and the carrier
11
12
OJL 74, 20.3.1992, p. 1.
OJL 4, 8.1.1998, p. 10.
13
OJL 300, 14.11.2009, p. 51
14
OJL 300, 14.11.2009, p. 72
2
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0007.png
Occasional
Services
Staff services serving only those working
at a location.
Occasional services means services which do not
fall within the definition of regular services,
including special regular services, and the main
characteristic of which is the carriage of groups of
passengers constituted on the initiative of the
customer or the carrier himself.
Typical examples: Multi-day visit or tour requested
by a customer or offered by a carrier. Excursion or
day trip requested by a customer or offered by a
carrier. Local excursion or day trip offered to those
already on a multi-day visit.
‐
Exempt from authorisations
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
The Regulation lays down the provisions to be complied with by undertakings that wish
to operate on the international road passenger transport market and on national markets
other than their own (known as
cabotage operations).
Table 2-2: Cabotage Operations
Type of service
Regular services
Permitted cabotage operations
The picking up and setting down of passengers within the same MS, in
the course of a regular international service provided that:
It is not the principal purpose of the service;
It is not a transport service meeting the needs of an urban centre
or conurbation, or transport needs between it and the surrounding
areas; and
It is not performed independently of such international service
Liberalised from any specific authorisation if carried out on a temporary
basis and covered by a contract concluded between the organiser and the
carrier.
Liberalised from any specific authorisation
Special Regular Services
Occasional Services
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
It includes provisions related to the documents to be issued to such carriers by the
Member State of registration (Community licence) and by the authorising authority
(Authorisation for a regular service). It sets down provisions regarding the sanctioning of
infringements and cooperation between Member States in that context.
The Regulation has the following general objectives:
To promote coach transport as a sustainable alternative to individual car transport.
To open the market for international services and for cabotage operations without
undermining public service obligations;
To prevent discrimination on grounds of nationality or place of establishment;
and
To limit the administrative burden to the extent possible
No rules have been adopted so far at EU level as regards access to the national markets
for regular services by coach and bus (except cabotage operations which are part of an
international service) and therefore the operation of national services is otherwise subject
to the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States.
This initiative should be seen as complementary to several parallel initiatives in the
review of road transport legislation as part of the mobility package.
Market and
3
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0008.png
social issues in the road passenger transport sector are likely to become more
interdependent because market opening tends to increase competitive pressure on
operators and their mobile workers. Addressing these issues requires a holistic approach
whereby the social, internal market and posting of workers' rules are considered together
to ensure both fair working conditions for drivers and fair competition between operators.
It is also closely linked with the road charging initiatives which propose to include
coaches in the Eurovignette Directive and contribute to a level playing field in particular
with rail.
Therefore, this initiative on access to the coach market is part of a co-ordinated
response to both the social and market challenges faced.
This initiative is in particular complementary to the on-going revision of the Posting of
Workers Directive 96/71/EC
15
(PWD), which aims to clarify and update the provisions
adopted more than twenty years ago and to ensure that the Directive still strikes the right
balance between the need to promote the freedom to provide services and the need to protect
the rights of posted workers. The PWD revision deals with general issues, such as broader set
of remuneration rules or maximum periods of posting to be applied to all sectors. This
initiative is also complementary to the specific rules proposed by the Commission on 31 May
2017
16
for the application of posting rules to workers in road transport. This proposal
addresses the risks of inadequate working conditions for drivers, including terms and
conditions of employment, and at the same time mitigating the excessive regulatory burdens
on operators and preventing distortions of competition. The overarching goal is to ensure a
balance between adequate working conditions for drivers and freedom to provide cross-
border services for operators.
2.2.
Market Context
The international and national markets for inter-urban regular coach services play an
important role in passenger transport. Coach is an economical, efficient and sustainable
17
mode of transport which can contribute to reducing emissions from transport and to
improving accessibility for citizens on low income or living in isolated and low
population density regions with no rail services.
In 2014, the bus and coach transport activity (expressed in passenger-kilometre)
represented 8.0% of passenger transport and 8.8% of land passenger transport within the
EU
18
.
Table 2-3: Modal split of passenger transport 2014
19
Modal split of passenger transport in 2014
Passenger car
72.3%
Powered 2
wheel
1.9%
Bus and
coach
8.0%
Railway
6.5%
Tram &
Metro
1.5%
Air
9.2%
Sea
0.6%
OJ L 18, 21.1.1997, p. 1
Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending
Directive 2006/22/EC as regards enforcement requirements and laying down specific rules with
respect to Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU for posting drivers in the road transport
sector Brussels, 31.5.2017 COM(2017) 278 final 2017/0121 (COD)
17
Coach has lowest CO2 emissions of all long distance modes (with E-trains) Bus and coach transport for
greening mobility, Delft, October 2011
18
Data from Statistical Pocketbook 2016 EU Transport in figures
19
The modal split indicator is based on passenger transport activity expressed in passenger-kilometres.
16
15
4
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0009.png
Modal split of passenger transport on land in 2014
80.1%
2.1%
8.8%
7.2%
1.7%
Source: Statistical Pocketbook 2016 EU Transport in figures
Although the sector’s share of the land passenger transport market has grown by 0.4%
since 2009, these high level statistics do not accurately describe the different types of
coach and bus services within the scope of the Regulation. The scope, quality and
availability of data vary widely across Member States. There are inconsistencies across
Member States in the definition of services (regular, international regular, special regular
and occasional) and the distinction between bus (usually urban) and coach services
(usually inter-urban). Vehicle-kilometres and passenger-kilometres (pkm) are reported in
different and mutually inconsistent ways by different Member States. The statistics
available at the European and Member State levels frequently refer to all bus and coach
services together. While some statistics are available at an aggregate level (and usually
conflate both bus and coach operations) there are few statistics available for sub-sections
of the market, e.g. medium or long distance coach services.
As shown in table 2-4, 14 Member States have some competition on the market for
regular services accounting for an estimated 278 billion pkm. However, these Member
States often still restrict the scope of inter-urban coach services by reference to a
geographical market definition or a distance threshold; or by withholding permission to
operate following an analysis of the impact of the proposed service on established
operators; or by requiring operators to establish locally; or in some cases they rely on
services provided under public service contracts
20
(PSC) to supplement commerically
operated networks and protect these PSCs from competition. These will be described
further in section 2.5.1. Moreover, as desbribed in section 2.3, restrictions in a broader
sense can be exacerbated by discrimination in access to bus and coach terminals (see
section 2.3).
There are a further 7 Member States with periodic tendering of concessions (competition
for the market) accounting for 71 billion pkm and 7 Member States continue to limit
competition considerably representing 30 billion pkm.
Table 2-4: National market size and market liberalisation in the EU
Continue to limit
competition
considerably
Some
competition for
the
market/
Concessions
Some
competition on
the market/ open
access services
Member State
Market size in 2015
(billion pkm)
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
20
6.9
13.3
7.6
3.0
1.1
15.5
4.9
See page iv for definition
5
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0010.png
Continue to limit
competition
considerably
Some
competition for
the
market/
Concessions
Some
competition on
the market/ open
access services
Member State
Market size in 2015
(billion pkm)
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
1.5
4.4
34.4
45.1
13.5
14.7
5.1
77.0
1.6
2.4
0.4
0.4
7.9
32.2
5.3
10.6
1.8
4.8
36.6
4.9
26.2
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave.
The international market for regular services is small compared to the domestic market
but it appears to be growing. It is estimated that international regular service passenger
numbers grew by 40-60% and international coach pkm
21
grew by between 0-40%,
between 2009 and 2014
22
. The domestic market in 2014 is broadly similar, and possibly
slightly larger, than the market in 2009. The data suggests that the average international
coach trip is getting shorter. It is estimated that there are several tens of millions of
passengers per year travelling, on average several hundred kilometres each. This stronger
growth in international markets relative to the overall market suggests that operators have
responded to opportunities provided by international liberalisation.
In 2013 there were 43,352 enterprises operating bus and coach services in both national
and international markets (not including urban or suburban services) with 497,800
employees
23
.
A passenger-kilometre is the unit of measurement representing the transport of one passenger by a
defined mode of transport over one kilometre
22
Comprehensive Study on Passenger Transport in Europe, Steer Davies Gleave, April 2016
23
Estimated using EUROSTAT structural business statistics "other
passenger land transport n.e.c. (not
elsewhere categorised)".
It is cautioned that this classification of economic activity is indicative as it
includes more forms of land transport than coach.
21
6
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0011.png
Many coach brands are a marketing alliance or partnership, managed by one operator and
operated by several companies or by subcontractors. Many coach companies are domestic
subsidiaries of foreign owning groups, and the ultimate ownership of individual coach
operators may depend on mergers and acquisitions activity among a more limited number
of parent companies including rail companies (e.g. Deutsche Bahn AG and SNCF) and
major transport groups (e.g. Arriva and National Express).
Coach operators can add and remove routes relatively easily, allowing them to enter
markets on a trial basis, or to modify services rapidly as markets change. The provision of
the services, and their relative success, will generally depend on the characteristics of the
competing modes. International coach services and networks are dynamic, with
competition sometimes leading to price wars and subsequent withdrawal of one or more
operators.
2.3.
Evaluation of the Regulation
The ex-post evaluation of the Regulation which was carried out from 2015 to 2017
24
concluded that the Regulation has contributed to the establishment of a more coherent
framework for international services by coach and bus, including cabotage operations.
The opening of the international market for regular services has resulted in improvements
in the level of service with growth in the number of operators, numbers of passengers and
the number of services in the EU. There was substantial growth in certain Member
States, notably Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland, over the period 2009-2014 and the
only Member State with data available that reported a decrease over this period was
Slovenia. However, it has proved difficult to find evidence that directly links increase in
activity to the introduction of the Regulation and some of the evidence is largely
anecdotal and insufficient to demonstrate a causal relationship. There is conclusive
evidence that the liberalisation of national markets by MSs in combination with the
liberalisation of international services by the Regulation created a favourable
environment for the expansion of coach services at national and international level. The
opening of national markets for regular services in countries such as Italy, Germany and
France that followed the liberalisation of international services triggered the expansion of
some transport operators and enhanced the provision of new international services. It
appears that once a national market for regular service is established, operators tend to
exploit their national position through offering services to neighbouring countries.
The available evidence indicates that the Regulation has not had any discernible effect on
the volume of employment. No conclusion could be drawn regarding the evolution of the
working conditions of drivers.
Despite its achievements, the inter-urban coach and bus sector has failed to grow at a rate
comparable to that of other transport modes and its modal share has continued to decline
over an extended period. There are different explanations to this but very importantly, as
described below; it appears that international services, without competitive inter-urban
services, constitute less appealing service offerings to users.
The evaluation has shown that the intended modal shift from passenger car to coach
and bus services didn’t materialise to the anticipated extent.
The anticipated impact
was a more sustainable modal mix in passenger transport. The aim was to promote
24
The Commission published a Staff Working Document with the results of the evaluation: insert link to
SWD
7
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0012.png
passenger transport sustainability by shifting traffic volumes away from car. These
expectations were largely based on an over-optimistic assumption that the promotion of
bus alone would change passengers' modal choices. In fact, the coach sector has failed to
grow at a rate comparable to that of passenger cars and its passenger transport share
continued to decline over an extended period. However, the problems of pollution,
congestion and road safety that should have been addressed by the original objective of
promoting coach and bus services as a sustainable alternative to individual car transport)
still exist and remain valid. Furthermore, the evaluation identified the lack of an
attractive mix of affordable alternative transport modes for citizens as a new and
–
at
least - equally urgent challenge.
The original Regulation did not aim at integrating national markets for regular services.
However, the latter are recognised in the evaluation as a critical factor in the provision of
international services. The evolution of the market, in terms of different and divergent
rules on access to national markets in Member States, is a problem that was not
previously apparent or considered when the intervention was designed. This patchwork
of regulatory systems in the EU makes it difficult for carriers to exploit the full potential
of operating in an Internal Market, impedes integration and undermines the efficiency of
coach and bus services.
The scope of the objectives of the original Regulation did not cover the problem of
discrimination in access to terminals. Yet, without non-discriminatory access to
terminals, bus and coach operators are forced to stop at the road-side, which diminishes
the quality of service provided to users. Moreover, terminals serve a vital role acting as a
hub in a network enabling passengers to change coach or acting as a multimodal hub
enabling passengers to transfer to another collective mode of transport. The evaluation
found evidence of discriminatory access to terminals in Austria, Czech Republic, France,
Croatia and the UK which distorts service patterns and limits the possibility of operators
to adapt services to passenger demand. The accessibility to terminals as well as the extent
to which the terminals are linked to other modes of transport is particularly important for
international regular services.
2.4.
Problem definition
Following the ex-post evaluation, further Commission work and stakeholder
consultations, two main problems were identified. The main problems are:
operators are
facing obstacles in national markets to develop inter-urban
coach services,
and
the
low modal share of sustainable transport modes
25
.
The effects of these problems for citizens are described in figure 2-1. In non-liberalised
markets this
contributes to the transport disadvantage of certain groups of citizens.
Furthermore citizens in general are
faced with a lack of connectivity and non–
integrated services.
In particular, the ability of citizens in disadvantaged regions that are
more sensitive to the price of transport, and to purchase end-to-end tickets from a
competitive pan-European operator could substantially improve their access to
employment, education and leisure opportunities.
25
Of modes that are competing on inter-urban transport, coach and trains are the most energy efficient and
produce the least CO
2
emissions (Bus and coach transport greening mobility, CE Delft 2011).
8
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
The evaluation concluded that operators are faced with a wide range of restrictions on
access to national inter-urban markets even in Member States that have introduced
different forms of market liberalisation. The date of most recent liberalisation relating to
national markets for regular services varies widely, from 1980 in the UK to 2015 in
France. Partly as a consequence, both the type of services which have been liberalised
and the extent of the liberalisation vary widely between Member States. For example:
Some create a number of regional concessions competitively, with exclusive
rights to operate services (e.g. Spain).
Some permit commercial operations, subject
to rules designed to protect PSC’s
(e.g. France)
Some permit commercial operations carrying passengers beyond a minimum
distance (e.g. United Kingdom).
Some delegate responsibility to regional, county or municipal authorities (e.g.
Germany).
9
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0014.png
Figure 2-1: Problem Tree
10
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0015.png
In these liberalised national markets, restrictions therefore include inter alia the
prohibition of services below a certain distance threshold or prohibition of cabotage
services or withholding permission to operate due to negative impacts on established
operators. Operators encounter additional problems due to the excessive time taken to
grant or refuse an authorisation following a procedure with little or no transparency.
Some Member States continue to require that operators establish locally forcing them to
adopt different business models to overcome this restriction.
In the 14 Member States with non-liberalised markets (see table 2-4) there are a wide
range of restrictions on access to markets for inter-urban services. These restrictions
originated from a variety of different sources including Member States protecting rail,
protecting incumbent operators, protecting PSC’s, or putting in place market access
arrangements that are considered to better reflect the local circumstances. This means
that barriers to market entry exist at a number of levels, ranging from tight national
control of services, through regional awards of concessions with exclusive rights
(whether directly awarded or competitively tendered), to local requirements for, or
prohibitions on, stopping in particular locations.
The number and diversity of regulatory frameworks and authorising procedures across
the EU imposes excessive administrative costs on operators seeking to provide regular
services in more than one domestic market. Furthermore the range of authorising
procedures deters coach operators from providing international services as in reality
national and international are interlinked and in turn integrated with other modes of
transport.
Discrimination in access to terminals is a common problem across the EU.
A review
of a number of cases investigated by competition authorities in different Member States
provided information on whether the actions of particular transport and terminal
operators were anti-competitive
26
. These cases demonstrate the variety of different
problems and their impacts on the services provided by competing coach operators
including:
Refusal to grant access to competitive terms can prevent a competitor from
introducing a new service on a given route;
A decision by a terminal owner to also access to a single preferred supplier can
have the effect of displacing even an established competitor;
A decision by incumbent coach operator to vacate a terminal in favour of a new
facility can have the effect of undermining the services of competitors who
remain.
They also demonstrate that reaching a decision in a case involving abuse of a dominant
position and anti-competitive behaviour can take several years.
The UK based operator association Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT) stated during the
consultation that terminal access was a major concern. They suggested that there should be an EU-wide
regulation requiring Member States to adopt appropriate measures to enhance and manage terminal
capacity.
26
See table 3.3 Support Study for the IA for the Revision of Regulation 1073/2009 Steer Davies Gleave
11
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0016.png
Coach services have the potential to provide transport opportunities that match the needs
of these disadvantaged groups of citizens, typically without passenger cars, as it can offer
low fares and a large network of services.
In 2014 passenger cars accounted for 83.4 % of inland passenger transport whilst the
more sustainable collective modes of transport (train, coach, bus, metro and tram)
accounted for only 16.7%. Over the period 2004 to 2014 the relative importance of the
use of passenger cars was quite stable, with its share always within the range of 83% to
83.7%. This indicates that the more sustainable collective transport modes have not been
able to reduce the relative importance of the use of passenger cars.
The decline in the modal share of coach services has to be seen in the context of the
very wide potential for such services.
The potential for the development of the network
of coach services is linked to the density of the road network in the EU. The greater
density of the road network should enable coach operators to develop more extensive and
complex networks, to provide services to more cities, and to provide more services to
rural areas that are not served by, or accessible to rail, air or maritime transport. Figure 2-
2 illustrates that the road density in each MS is much greater than that of the rail network.
Figure 2-2: Density of the total road (km road/km
2
land area) and rail (km rail/km
2
land area)
27
networks
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT LU HU NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Density road network
Density rail network
Source: Adapted from Statistical Pocketbook 2016 EU Transport in figures
Expansion of the network of coach services could improve the connectivity of
disadvantaged regions and supplement existing bus and rail networks.
Figure 2-3
shows the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita (measured by purchasing power
rates) in NUTS-2
28
regions across the EU, with locations served by Flixbus’s network
overlaid. Since commencing the expansion of its network beyond its home Member State
(Germany) in 2015 Flixbus has developed one of Europe’s largest long-distance
coach
and bus networks. The figure shows that the expansion has been heavily concentrated in
recently liberalised markets (France and Italy) that served as the stepping stone for the
uptake of bus and coach services both at national and international level. It also clearly
shows that network expansion has been constrained significantly, in countries such as
Greece and Spain where national markets are still closed despite the presence of well-
established industries in tourism expected to generate significant levels of coach traffic.
27
28
CY and MT are not included as they do not have rail networks
Please see
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview
for an overview of NUTS-2 (Nomenclature of
territorial units for statistics)
12
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0017.png
However it also shows that currently, there are relatively few locations in disadvantaged
NUTS-2
regions with GDP per capita of less than €20,000 (e.g. in Poland, the Slovak
Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) covered by the network of coach services.
This suggests that an expansion of the network to the east could improve the connectivity
of several more disadvantages NUTS-2 regions and supplement existing bus and rail
networks even in Member States with liberalised markets (e.g. in Poland, the Slovak
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria). As described above, better and more integrated service
offerings to users from disadvantaged regions via the possibility to purchase end-to-end
tickets could substantially improve their access to employment, education and leisure
opportunities.
Figure 2-3 GDP per capita by NUTS-2 region and the Flixbus network
Source: Comprehensive study on passenger transport by coach, Steer Davies Gleave, April
2016.
The Special Eurobarometer Report on Coach Services
29
(hereinafter “the Eurobarometer
Report”) survey indicates that the
pricing of coach services is an important factor
in
the mode-choice of both non-users and economically disadvantaged users. More
specifically, the socio-demographic breakdown shows a notable difference between the
average non-user and non-users from disadvantaged groups. For example, on average
26% of respondents would be more likely to use coach services if fares were lower. This
increases to 35% of people with difficulty paying bills most of the time, 31% who have
difficulty paying bills from time to time, 36% of respondents still studying and 34% of
respondents aged 15-24.
Restrictions to the provision of inter-urban coach services in national markets seem to
lead to low service quality and higher fares. Table 2-5 describes the impacts on inter-
urban coach services in Member States that have recently liberalised their markets to
promote travel by coach. The results demonstrate that
fares can be as much as 20%
more expensive on routes where the provision of coach services is restricted
than on
29
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SP
ECIAL/surveyKy/2144
13
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0018.png
routes where there is competition. It also demonstrates that service quality was lower, the
number and frequency of services was lower, the size of the route network was smaller
(with less accessibility), and less on-board services were provided e.g. less provision of
Wi-Fi.
Table 2-5: Impact of liberalisation on fares and service quality
Study
Member
State
Impact of liberalisation
Identified a statistical relationship between level of market
concentration and fare offered indicating that actual competition is an
important determinant of fare levels. Also, the threat of new entry
alone was sufficient to constrain the fares offered by incumbents.
Fro the usto er s perspe ti e, oa h arket li eralisatio has
already improved standards and choice. Increase in number of services
and service frequencies. Coach services are now being promoted more
actively, with services marketed on the size of the route network,
better value for money and the environmental benefits of coach travel.
Open access to routes can have a significant impact on fare
competition. It suggests that fares on routes served by three operators
are 17% lower than on monopoly routes.
Gradual decline in tariffs and greater innovation in the interests of
passengers (e.g. web-based ticketing & provision of Wi-Fi).
New entrants introducing pricing strategies based on airline-style yield
management with substantial discounts available for early booking, in
contrast to the more rigid, distance based fares strategies that are still
pursued by established incumbents.
Augustin
(2013)
30
Germany
France
Deman
31
Germany
Italy
Dürr
and
Hüschelrath
(2015)
32
Gipp
(2016)
33
Grimaldi et
al (2016)
34
Germany
Germany
Italy
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
In principle, the benefits of opening access described above serve to demonstrate the
benefits foregone in Member States in which there is little or no competition between
operators. The evidence on the effects of competition to date, coupled with the
Contestability of the long distance German coach market, Katrin Augustin, KCW GmbH, European
Transport Conference 2013.
31
Liberalisation of passenger transport in Europe and its consequences for the fleet, Jan Deman, Director
of Busworld Academy.
32
Niklas S Dürr and Kai Hüschelrath, Competition in the German Interurban Bus Industry: A Snapshot
Two Years After Liberalisation, Centre for European Economic Research, August 2015.
33
Economic Lessons from the Liberalization of the German Bus Market, Christoph Gipp, IGES Institut
GmbH, March 2016.
34
Intercity coach liberalisation - the cases of Germany and Italy, Raffaele Grimaldi, Katrin Augustin, Paolo
Beria, World Conference on Transport Research, July 2016.
30
14
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0019.png
demonstrable restrictions on market access in many Member States, suggest there is
considerable scope for improving the competitiveness of the sector from the perspective
of passengers. Greater competition within national markets would result in lower and
more innovative fares, more efficient promotion of coach and bus regular services.
The 2011 White Paper calls for greater integration of modal networks to provide
passengers with better modal choice. Passengers are less likely to use coach services if
they do not connect with other coach services or sustainable modes of transport or if the
connections provided are not convenient. The range of facilities (such as well-signed
interchanges, and relevant and accessible passenger information) and onward
connectivity which the majority of coach terminals provide makes them particularly
attractive, and important, for passengers.
R
estrictions on access to terminals are widespread and that they have a material impact on the services
provided to operators and passengers.
For example, during the targeted consultation exercise t
he
operators National Express and Megabus confirmed the importance of serving terminals that enable
interchange with other modes. National Express also highlighted the importance of ensuring connectivity
between international and national coach services.
The evidence indicates that the provision, standards, ownership and regulation of terminals vary widely
between Member States, within Member States, and even within the same city. This variety of conditions
makes access to terminals and integration with other modes complex and difficult.
The IRU stated that there is a general lack of integrated terminal facilities supporting door-to-door
t a spo t a d u de i i g the a ilit of ope ato s to eet usto e ’s eeds. Othe ope ato stakeholde s
stated that roadside stops are not appropriate for encouraging multi-modal travel. Fewer than one in six
respondents (13%) in the Eurobarometer Report gave good connections with other transport services as a
reason for using coach services.
The European Disability Forum (EDF) confirmed that multi-modal terminals are particularly important for
persons with reduced mobility (PRMs) who rely on being able to transfer between modes easily. The
Eurobarometer Report indicates that of the respondents that use coach services one in ten respondents
stated they use coach services to travel to or from airports and a further 7% use the services to travel to or
from rail stations. Of the non-users of coach services 21% reported they would be more likely to use the
services if there was a more extensive network of routes and stations and better connections with other
transport modes.
Consequences of problems
Situations of transport disadvantage, or low levels of accessibility, occur when there is
little or no access to public transport or other transport modes, which restricts mobility
and access to employment, education and leisure opportunities. This, in addition,
disproportionately impacts on certain disadvantaged groups
35
of citizens.
Similarly to inter-urban services, there is evidence that the accessibility to long distance
services is associated with income levels
36
. In other words, citizens with high levels of
income generally have access to much improved mobility services.
35
Disadvantaged groups include those sensitive to the price of transport, low income, those in education
and training, unemployed, young people, old people, people with restricted mobility (PRMs), disabled
people, those living in disadvantage areas, living in isolated regions, and households with no access to
a car and living outside urban areas.
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC96151/jrc96151_final version 2nd
correction.pdf
36
15
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0020.png
The lack of inter-urban mobility for economically disadvantaged groups is a problem
because these citizens may not be able to participate in key activities such as education,
job, visiting family and friends, healthcare and in general suffer social exclusion.
2.5.
What are the problem drivers?
As indicated in the problem tree, figure 2.1, there are three underlying problem drivers
affecting the two main problems of
operators’ facing
obstacles in national markets to
develop inter-urban coach services,
and a
persistent low modal share of sustainable
passenger transport modes.
2.5.1.
Problem driver 1: Restricted access to national inter-urban markets
The regulatory frameworks for national coach services vary widely between the Member
States. In some cases access to markets is directly restricted through the award of
contracts to monopoly service providers. This both eliminates the scope for competition
on individual routes and substantially hinders the development of international
commercial services and networks. For example, in Greece contracts are awarded
directly to operators within KTEL, a jointly funded group of companies and in Spain
contracts are competitively tendered, with operators only periodically being subjected to
competitive discipline. Restrictions may also stem from interactions with rail services,
which Member States in certain cases protect as these are considered to be more
environmental friendly.
As shown in table 2-4 above, there are 14 Member States who limit competition on their
markets accounting for in excess of 100 billion pkm. These Member States can exclude
operators entirely from potential markets or award PSCs which favour incumbent
operators and prevent potential new entrants from competing on equal terms (e.g.
Austria, Belgium, Greece and Spain). By definition, the award of monopoly contracts
effectively eliminates the scope for competition on individual routes. It can also
substantially constrain the development of international networks. Even where contracts
are subject to competitive procurement, the cost and uncertainty of mounting a bid to
operate an entire route network will discourage potential market entrants who would
otherwise have tested commercial opportunities through more limited market entry. The
length of concession contracts also limits the opportunities for new entry.
As mentioned above restrictions also occur on liberalised national markets including: a
prohibition of services below a certain distance threshold (e.g. France and Germany);
withholding permission to operate following an analysis of the impact of the proposed
service on an established operator (e.g. Ireland and Estonia); and prohibitions on certain
types of services, for example cabotage operations, in Latvia. The application of these
different approaches to protect PSCs makes it difficult for operators to plan new services.
Operators have reported during the stakeholder consultation that even in liberalised markets they
encounter problems due to the excessive time taken to grant or refuse an authorisation and that there is
little or no transparency in authorisation procedures especially in the application of mechanisms to protect
PSCs.
Restrictions on market entry can
be exacerbated through the process of awarding PSC’s,
which may favour incumbent operators and prevent potential new entrants from
competing on equal terms.
For example, BusUp, a provider of occasional and discretionary coach services, noted that both existing
and new contracts are often tendered on terms that only established operators can meet. It stated that
16
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0021.png
the large size of concessions in Spain resulted in difficulties for SMEs bidding for them. Similarly, the Coach
Tourism and Transport Council of Ireland has suggested that the pre-qualification criteria for bidding for
e e t PSC’s e e su h as to p e lude the ajo it of p i ate ope ato s.
Limiting the number of bidders in this way may mean that new operators are prevented
from extending their networks even where they are prepared to operate services under
PSC and meet contractual requirements defined by regional and local authorities.
Member States that have liberalised national regular services always continue to require
that operators establish locally and have not taken the opportunity to decide that the
Community licence shall be valid for national transport operations under the provisions
of Regulation 1073/2009. This forces operators to adopt different business models to
overcome this restriction. The business models include contracting services to local
operators and establishing subsidiaries. Operators have confirmed that the costs of
circumventing local establishment requirements can be significant, even for large
operators. The biggest perceived negative impact of the requirement to establish locally
is the associated administrative costs for the carrier. 81% of the 36 carriers that
responded to the open public consultation (OPC) identified these costs as having a
negative impact.
Stakeholders responding to the OPC generally agreed that restrictions on access to national markets for
regular services are a problem. Of the 153 respondents, 33% agreed that it is a major problem and 27%
stated it is a minor problem. 67% of the 45 operators responded that the restrictions have a negative
impact on their ability to expand into new markets and none expressed the view that they had a positive
impact.
Public Service Contracts
Some public passenger transport services that society needs as part of its general interest
cannot be run commercially, so the competent national, regional or local EU authorities
must be able to make certain they are provided. Competent authorities can do this:
by awarding exclusive rights to operators running public services, compensating them
financially. This usually takes the form of bundling profitable and non-profitable
routes together so that the profitable routes cross-subsidise the non-profitable routes,
and also
by defining rules (i.e. public service obligations) for how public transport should be
operated. For instance, public subsidies can be granted for the provision of
transportation services, particularly for low-density routes, usually connecting rural
areas. Such subsidies can be granted both to railway and coach services. As a
reference, the total amount of subsidies granted for the compensation of railways
PSOs in the European Union in 2015 amounted to EUR 20 billion.
Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Protocol
No 26 on services of general interest annexed to the TFEU sets out the general principles
of how Member States define and provide services of general economic interest. The EU
has developed legislation to avoid disparities between Member States in the procedures
and conditions they apply to the execution of public service obligations.
17
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0022.png
Evidence from a previous study
37
indicates that there is little consistency across Member
States in terms of the size of the area of competence of the competent authorities which
organise public transport and PSCs. In smaller or island Member States the authorities
tend to be national, whilst in many Member State there can be a large number of
authorities. Some states have authorities in charge of transport at a regional level,
including Belgium, Germany, Czech Republic, Denmark, Croatia, Italy, Spain, Slovakia
and Sweden. There is nothing to prevent authorities of national competence to manage
many distinct contracts. However, in the case of Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, there are
only a limited number of public service contracts in use.
The opening of access to the national market for regular services would enable operators
to provide new services which, if attractive, will both:
provide welfare benefits to new passengers who would not otherwise
travelled; and
have
take passengers from existing services, reducing the revenues of existing
operators and incentivising them, where possible, to improve quality and lower
fares, reduce costs, or cut services.
Where new services effect existing services provided under a PSC, Member States and
competent authorities are likely to be concerned if the first effect “generation” (of
revenues through newly generated demand for bus and coach services) is small compared
to the second effect “abstraction” (of
revenues from existing operators).
Currently there are a number of different approaches to protecting PSC’s based on
restricting or limiting new entry. These are:
Regulation 1073/2009 requires that international coach services be authorised
except on the
basis of detailed analysis of their effect on one or more PSC’s.
Regulation 1370/2009 permits exclusive rights to protect any PSO provided by in
particular any land transport mode.
Directive 2012/34 as amended Directive 2016/2370 requires that international and
domestic rail services may be limited to protect the economic equilibrium of a
PSC applicable to the same or an alternative route.
Each of the options described in section 5 dealing with PSCs will continue to provide
Member States with the capability to protect PSCs whilst also providing carriers with
transparency together with clear, simple and rapid procedures to address demand.
During stakeholder consultation 9 out of the 13 Member States that replied reported that they were
concerned about the potential adverse impact on services operated under PSCs. To address these concerns
all easu es deali g ith a ket a ess i lude a easu e to p ote t PSC’s.
2.5.2.
Problem driver 2: Excessive administrative costs of entry
We have identified extensive evidence that administrative costs incurred by operators can
be material and that administrative processes can delay entry. It is also clear that the
requirements for the authorisation of national and international regular services can vary
significantly by Member State.
37
Study on economic and financial effects of the implementation of Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by Steer
Davies Gleave 2016
18
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0023.png
Operators face excessive costs of entry in national and international markets due to
national and local authorisation procedures and requirements including in the case of
applications to operate international services under the Regulation.
In Germany the application process can take up to four months with different procedures in different
Länder. The authorisation procedures for international and national regular services involve protracted
paper-based administrative procedures with both large and small operators acknowledging that this
process favours larger established operators who are well placed to understand national requirements
and processes. Operators also highlighted the importance of language barriers and the need for
translators to communicate requirements and complete application forms.
Coach operators who carry out international occasional services, such as group tours to
holiday destinations, require a journey form. The journey form holds information about
the type of transport on the one hand and about destination, route and passengers on the
other hand. The journey form generates an unnecessary administrative burden for
operators.
The REFIT Platform has considered a submission from the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and
Environment on the elimination of the journey form
38
clearly shows mixed views. The Stakeholder group
considers that the journey form has lost its relevance, generates unnecessary administrative burden for
many operators, in particular SME’s and recommends its removal.
Within the Government group, views are divided. While a few Member States consider that the abolition of
the journey form would reduce regulatory burden for both carriers and Member States, the majority of
Member States see the journey form as an effective control tool to complement tachographs which needs to
be maintained.
In the OPC 75% of the 65 companies and 78% of the 27 non-governmental organisations stated that the
journey forms serve no useful purpose. Although 12 Member States indicated that they do not support
abolishing the form the reasons provided are inconsistent with the experience in Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden who abolished the obligation of the journey form for operators that have their
business establishment in their countries in 2003 and there have been no negative consequences for road
inspections.
The estimated administrative burden of market entry for authorisation and journey form
are provided in the table below:
Table 2-6: Estimates of the administrative costs of market entry
Process
Source of costs
Time
Comment
Authorisation Resources used by
Three days Based on stakeholder comments concerning need
operator to complete
for translation and consultancy advice
application
The delay in the reply Two
Stakeholders have indicated that elapsed time for
to the application for
months
approval can be four months but that two months
authorisation
would be more appropriate
Resources used by
Five days
Elapsed time of four months suggests significant
national authority to
number of days’ effort
process application
Journey form Time taken for
Less than
No reason to modify this estimate based on
operator/driver to
one hour
evidence to date
complete journey
form
Resources used by
Five
Inspection time proportionate to time to complete
national authority on
minutes
–
the form. Inspection rate of 10% gives sufficiently
inspection
10% of
high likelihood of inspection to encourage
38
See
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/xv9apassengertransport.pdf
19
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0024.png
forms
inspected
compliance
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
Some Member States have taken action to reduce the administrative burden. For
example, the abolition of the use of journey forms in Nordic Member States. Operators or
national authorities do not record the administrative cost systematically but there is
extensive evidence that the costs incurred can be material and that administrative
processes can delay entry for operators.
2.5.3.
Problem driver 3: Restricted access to key infrastructure
Terminals provide connectivity to the network of coach services and serve as a place of
interchange between coach services. They also act as an interface between the network of
coach services and urban, rail, air or maritime networks. The provision of terminals in the
EU is variable. Some Member States appear to expect or require the competent national,
regional or local authorities to provide terminals whilst others have no systematic
provision of terminals. There are several models of terminal ownership across the EU
including ownership by national, regional and local government, by operators, by the
railway infrastructure manager, by airports, privately and by other parties. In some
Member States the terminal ownership is irrelevant, because the coach market is highly
restricted or regulated and new coach services are not allowed to compete with existing
services or operators are not permitted to operate domestic regular services.
The success of inter-urban services depends largely on the extent to which they connect
with other modes of transport and the convenience of the connections provided. Access
to terminals is a factor that limits competition in the market. There is evidence (collected
during two 2016 studies
39,40
) that carriers face restrictions in access to key infrastructure
are common and widespread with instances identified in 14 Member States
41
. The issue
of equal access to terminals was investigated further during the targeted consultation
exercise as there is a particular risk that access to terminals may be a barrier to entry if
the company that manages the terminal is vertically integrated with one of the coach
operators. Where the terminal operator is independent of the coach operator, it is more
likely that they will treat operators equally, although this is not guaranteed and they may
still face incentives to protect the largest operator. The evidence indicates that restrictions
on terminal access are widespread and that they can materially impact on services.
Due to the decline in the coach market over an extended period the amount of terminal
capacity has increased particularly in central and eastern European States, where rapidly
increasing car ownership has reduced the demand for long distance coach travel.
However, there are still issues with access to terminals in other Member States.
Experience in Germany, following liberalisation of the market for regular services,
suggests that terminal access may become a problem after market opening when a rapid
expansion of services puts pressure on available resources. A key issue is, where there
are capacity restrictions, how is it decided to distribute slots between operators. This is
39
40
Comprehensive Study on Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe,
April 2016
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/road/studies/doc/2016-04-passenger-transport-
by-coach-in-europe.pdf
41
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Slovakia, Sweden and UK
20
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0025.png
not always transparent, and coach operators have been refused access to terminals on the
basis of capacity restrictions which were very unclear. The following table provides a
summary of some of the issues raised by stakeholders including operators, regulators and
ministries:
Table 2-7: Examples of restrictions on terminal access
Stakeholder
ARAFER
Remarks
Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires et routières cited a recent case in which
it was required to resolve a dispute concerning access to Beauvais airport. Initially, the
terminal operator failed to publish access rules, and while they were subsequently made
available, ARAFER considered that they were poorly written and that the objective of
the rules was open to question. At the time of writing there is an ongoing procedure,
whereby ARAFER is investigating whether the terminal operator has breached its legal
obligations.
Autorità di Regolazione dei trasporti highlighted a general lack of terminal capacity in
cities such as Rome and Torino. The terminals that are available are heavily congested
and it is difficult for new operators to gain access. ART also suggested that the lack of a
clear definition of terminals, setting out minimum standards for facilities, made it
difficult to enforce access.
It is bringing forward a Presidential Decree defining mandatory standards for different
categories of terminal to clarify the facilities that should be made available to operators.
It also referred to the construction of a new terminal at Elleonas, consolidating the
existing facilities at Kifisos and Liosia. This will provide capacity for international
services, which are currently not permitted to use the inter-city terminals.
Cited a case recently referred to them in which an operator complained that a regional
authority had refused to grant a licence because the city centre at one end of the
proposed route was congested. The Ministry subsequently confirmed that the licence
should be issued, but the example demonstrates how local restrictions can frustrate or at
least delay market entry.
Observed that while there is no discrimination in terminal access in Germany,
infrastructure designed for local public transport is not necessarily suited to longer
distance transport services. The Supreme Building Authority within the Bavarian
Ministry of the Interior also noted that local authorities must be permitted to determine
how the facilities that they owned were used to further their own transport objectives.
Confirmed that it preferred to use terminals rather than on-street stops, particularly
when passengers require inter-modal transport links. It noted that it had experienced
difficulties in gaining access to terminals owned and managed by railway operators,
citing Trenitalia’s refusal
to provide access to the terminal in Padua by way of example.
They also observed that there is no terminal in Brussels and that the city centre is
reserved for tourist coaches.
Noted difficulties in obtaining access to terminal facilities as well as on-street stops in
some French cities, and indicated that in some cases coaches had effectively been
prohibited from operating to city-centre locations.
Observed that there are generally insufficient public terminals across Europe, and that
several major cities including Amsterdam, Paris and Brussels do not have any public
terminals. In Austria, terminals tend to be owned by the rail operator and requests for
access can be refused, while in France they are increasingly being located outside of city
centres. Competitors are generally unwilling to share their terminals and they are
anyway frequently capacity constrained.
ART
Ministry of
Transport
Greece
Ministry of
Transport
Slovak
Republic
Ministry for
Transport for
Baden-
Würtemberg
Megabus
Ouibus
National
Express
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
21
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0026.png
There is considerable evidence
42
that discrimination is a common problem in the EU and
occurs where terminal facilities are both privately and publicly owned. Discriminatory
behaviour in relation to privately owned terminals is more difficult to challenge from a
policy perspective, since the business case underpinning private sector investment may
depend on a single operator having exclusive use of the available capacity. Regulations
having the effect of providing a right of access to third parties whether set at the
European Union or national level could therefore have the effect of discouraging such
investment. For this reason, concerns about discrimination relating to privately owned
terminals are arguably better addressed through competition policy, whereby the relevant
authorities can assess the
merits of particular actions on the part of terminal owners’
case-by-case.
By contrast, discriminatory behaviour by the operators of publicly owned terminals is
more difficult to justify, since the underlying investment is more usually driven by
recognition of the importance of providing appropriate facilities to support good quality
public transport services within a country, region or city. Moreover, public terminal
facilities are often provided to ensure that passengers can interchange between transport
modes, an important consideration in the planning of many coach services.
The cases above, amongst others, demonstrate a variety of impacts that discriminatory
behaviour can have on carriers including: refusal to grant access on competitive terms
can prevent a competitor from introducing a new service on a given route; a decision by a
terminal owner to allow access to a single preferred supplier can have the effect of
displacing even an established competitor; and a decision by an incumbent bus and coach
operator to vacate a terminal in favour of a new facility can have the effect of
undermining the services of competitors who remain. They also demonstrate that in the
absence of applicable rules the time taken to reach a decision on cases involving abuse of
a dominant position and anti-competitive behaviour can take a number of years,
particularly if challenged in court.
In the OPC, 81% of the 32 operators stated that discrimination against new entrants in providing access to
terminals is a problem resulting in administrative costs for operators but it has not been possible to
quantify the costs.
In addition to the evidence gathered during the targeted consultation indicating that the
restrictions are widespread and that they have a material impact on the services provided
to operators and passengers, operators also reported that the various different structures
of ownership and the regulation of terminals across Member States make it difficult for
them and cause an unnecessary administrative burden. They find it difficult determine
who to contact, how capacity will be allocated, and how they will be charged by the
terminal operators across Member States.
Finally, there are two other root causes to the driver of restricted access to key transport
infrastructure: constrained terminal capacity; and restrictions on access to city centre
locations. At this stage, the Commission is not proposing to address these issues as the
question to what extent it is competent to do so first needs to be clarified. Transport is a
shared competence between the Union and the Member States and subsidiarity
considerations may come to play here. The Commission has launched a study on urban
42
See IA Support Study Table 3.3
22
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0027.png
vehicle access restrictions (which should be available in autumn 2017) and, based on its
results, it will assess whether it is necessary to propose measures in this area or not.
2.6.
Who is affected by the problem, in what ways, and to what extent?
The excessive administrative costs, restricted access to national inter-urban markets and
restricted access to key transport infrastructure have a direct or indirect impact on the
following stakeholders:
Citizens / passengers:
face an inferior offer of services in terms of availability, cost,
quality and reliability. Regular services are not always adapted to meet passenger
demand. They are not fully benefiting from the affordable mobility offered by inter-urban
bus and coach services; in particular those who suffer transport disadvantage suffer
disproportionately and are more likely to experience reduced mobility. They are unable
to purchase end-to-end tickets to improve their access to employment, education and
leisure opportunities across the EU. Where coach and bus services are not available
citizens are also affected by worse air quality due to the on average higher emissions
from other inter-city passenger transport modes (except electric rail) and in particular
from car.
Road passenger transport operators:
new entrants face a patchwork of regulatory
requirements including restrictions or prohibitions on market entry and lose business
opportunities. Incumbent operators remain protected and gain business opportunities with
little or no incentive to innovate.
Terminal operators:
may continue to provide specific carriers with discriminatory
access giving them a competitive advantage on certain services, preventing effective
competition between carriers and constraining the development of an integrated coach
network.
Road passenger transport workers:
have a key interest in working conditions, pay and
employment conditions, health and safety in the workplace, training and professional
careers.
Public authorities
–
the problems affect the manner in which national competent
authorities interact with road passenger transport undertakings and terminal operators.
The problems also affect how public authorities provide for inter-urban passenger
transport e.g. commercially or in the general economic interest through PSCs.
2.7.
What is the EU dimension of the problem?
One of the Europeans Unions main transport policy objectives is to improve travel
possibilities across Europe and ensuring high-quality transport services for its citizens. In
that context one of the primary objectives of Regulation 1073/2009 is to increase the
level of performance of international coach and bus services. There is evidence
43
that the
opening of national markets for regular services by coach and bus has created a critical
mass of operators who also introduce international services, resulting in a greater impact
on the number of international routes and service frequencies than pan-European
legislation alone. This suggests that further opening of national markets would strengthen
the development of the international market for regular services, quite apart from any
benefits for passengers making national journeys.
43
Comprehensive Study on Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe, Steer Davies Gleave, April 2016,
23
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
The problem drivers mentioned in the previous section are mainly due to the possibility
of Member States to adopt their own rules and restrictions with regard to access to their
national market for regular services. The different national approaches and the
restrictions in access to terminals constitute a barrier to the free movement of services in
the field of transport which is one of the goals of the Common Transport Policy. This
affects the effectiveness of the Internal Market in the field of passenger transport by road.
Carriers have been unable to compete fully in national inter-urban transport markets. This
has limited the sectors ability to grow market share relative to other modes. It has
prevented the development of a fully integrated market for inter-urban travel by bus and
coach, resulting in poor connectivity from some citizens, particularly those with limited
access to a private car or rail services. EU citizens have access to a poorer (in terms of
accessibility, frequency, price, comfort) than optimal mobility offer which affects the
free movement of persons in the EU. Indeed, while national restrictions on paper only
affect domestic transport, in reality domestic and cross-border connections are interlinked
and in turn integrated with other modes of transport to collectively constitute the
available passenger mobility offer inside the EU. Hence restrictions on domestic coach
services and access to terminals have far reaching consequences on the functioning of the
passenger transport sector in the whole EU and across all transport modes.
In the absence of harmonised rules at EU level, carriers operating in the EU regular
services are faced with excessive administrative costs of entry, a patchwork of access
rules and in discrimination in access to terminals. Simplifying administrative procedures,
removing restrictions on access to inter-urban markets through a harmonised legal
framework across the EU and preventing discriminatory access to public terminals would
contribute to solving the issues identified and facilitate inter-urban mobility for all
citizens by promoting coach travel.
2.8.
How would the problem evolve, all things being equal?
This section analyses how the problem would evolve, assuming the continuation of
existing policies and the implementation of already planned policy reforms. There is no
indication that Member States will introduce changes to existing provisions. However,
Member States will have witnessed the increase in passengers carried, total passenger
km, employment levels and the density of the network of coach services along with lower
fare prices in recently liberalised markets for national regular services (e.g. France,
Germany, Italy and Poland). In the absence of EU action some Member States may be
prompted to liberalise their markets according to different principles to improve
efficiency.
In the absence of further EU action, Member States may continue to maintain restrictions
on market and route access or excessive requirements e.g. the requirement of local
establishment. All things being equal and in the absence of any further liberalisation
measures at the EU or national level, it is estimated that by 2035, around 26% of the
market (equivalent to 108 billion pkm) will be subject to restricted access due to reliance
on concessions or direct restrictions on market access. There will also be restrictions to
market access for new entrants in the remaining 74% of the market that has to some
extent liberalised but continue to impose various restrictions, for example in order to
protect public services operated under PSCs.
24
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0029.png
The network of coach services will not expand and develop as operators will continue
failing to penetrate into restricted markets. There will continue to be a clear distinction
between international regular services and national regular services for inter-urban travel.
In restricted markets service frequencies are likely to continue to be low and passengers
will continue to have a poor choice of combinations of fares and service quality. Citizens
who are sensitive to the price of transport or who live in areas where restricted markets
have blocked the penetration of the network of coach services will suffer
disproportionately. They are more likely to experience reduced mobility; this is
especially the case for those with little or no access to other modes. The reduction in
mobility hampers their access to employment, education and leisure opportunities.
There are other potential developments described in table 2-8 which could have
significant implications for coach travel. It is difficult to quantify the impacts of these
developments on the bus and coach sector with any confidence, since their effect depends
on a wide range of uncertain factors such as economic conditions across Europe, the
extent of cost changes driven by new technology, changing attitudes to the application of
technology among both the travelling public and transport employees, and policy
responses at the local, regional, national and European level. The table below provides
commentary on possible implications for bus and coach services should the technological
development be implemented.
Table 2-8 - Possible impacts of new technology on the bus and coach sector
Technological
development
Autonomous
vehicles
Possible impacts
‘Platooning’ of vehicles on motorways and other major roads could improve
efficiency, reducing coach service fuel costs and emissions
Could enable increase in operational hours of vehicles
May enhance the attractiveness of travel by private car, for example by
relieving congestion and improving journey quality
Likely to reduce the carbon footprint of coach operations as well as other forms
of road travel
Could change the relative costs of different types of operation, for example
enabling the development of smaller fleets offering on-demand services (based
on further development of the BusUp model)
May strengthen the attractiveness of travel by private car by reducing costs
May enable service users to pay a single subscription fee allowing them to
access a wide range of transport services, reducing the benefits of a private car
relative to public transport
Analysis of data about user choice and local conditions would allow coach
operators to develop more user-focused services, operated to accommodate real
time traffic constraints
Would support improved on-board service offer, including entertainment and
services supporting more effective working on the move
Better real time coordination of coach and other transport services and more
extensive availability of integrated tickets/electronic payment
Alternative fuels
New
operating
models
Integrated
transport
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
The developments under current trends and adopted policies (i.e. baseline scenario) in
inter-urban coach transport activity, energy use and CO2 emissions, as well as revenues
and employment in the sector by 2030 are shown in the table below, assuming the
25
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0030.png
continuation of existing policies. The development of the baseline scenario
44
is described
in detail in Annex 4
"Analytical models used in preparing the impact assessment"
,
together with the underlying assumptions.
Table 2-9: Baseline projections for inter-urban coach transport to 2030
Total average
annual change
Non-
liberalised
39
3
5
51
622
1,763
48
Total
589
30
73
1018
6,882
19,519
985
2015
–
2030
(%)
2.5%
1.9%
2.8%
3.3%
1.3%
1.1%
-1.6%
Projections for
2030
Liberalised
Passenger km
(billions)
Vehicle km
(billions)
Revenue (€
billions)
Employment
(000s)
Energy use (000
toe)
CO2 emissions
(000 t)
Accident costs (€
millions)
99
6
14
181
1,499
4,203
309
Type of national market
Transition
383
16
45
681
3,640
10,349
517
Concessions
68
5
8
105
1,121
3,204
110
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
It is estimated that continued discriminatory behaviour in relation to terminal access
could unduly constrain terminal capacity supporting some 1.5 billion vehicle kilometres
and could result in the suppression of around 400 million vehicle kilometres.
As mention in Section 2.5.2, the administrative costs incurred by operators can be
material and administrative processes can delay entry. It is clear that even the
requirements for authorisation of international services vary significantly by Member
State and nothing indicates this will change. It is estimated that the total administrative
costs on the coach sector is €884 million in 2015 (with 2/3 falling on operators and 1/3
falling on government and/or regulatory
bodies), rising to €1,288 million in 2030
45
.
3.
W
HY SHOULD THE
EU
ACT
?
3.1.
44
Legal Basis
45
The Baseline scenario builds on an update of the EU Reference scenario 2016 but additionally assumes
the implementation of the reform of the national regulatory frameworks for buses and coaches in
Germany, France, Italy and Poland. The updated EU Reference scenario 2016 includes some updates
in the technology costs assumptions (i.e. for light duty vehicles) and few policy measures adopted after
its cut-off date (end of 2014) like the Directive on Weights and Dimensions, the 4th Railways
Package, the NAIADES II Package, the Ports Package, the replacement of the New European Driving
Cycle (NEDC) test cycle by the new Worldwide harmonized Light-vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP).
It has been developed with the PRIMES-TREMOVE model (i.e. the same model used for the EU
Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-E3MLab. A detailed description of this scenario is available in the
Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the
charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180
[Support study for an Impact Assessment for the revision of Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009, Steer
Davies Gleave]
26
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0031.png
The right of the EU to act in the field of transport is set out in the TFEU (Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union). According to Article 4 TFEU, transport is one of the
principal areas where shared competence between the Union and the Member States
applies.
The competence for this initiative derives from Title VI (Transport) of the TFEU, in
particular Article 91 which states,
inter alia
, that the European Parliament and the
Council shall lay down common rules applicable to international transport to or from the
territory of a Member State, or passing across the territory of one or more Member
States, as well as the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport
services within a Member State. The applicability of Title VI to road transport is
stipulated in Article 100 TFEU.
As far as public service contracts are concerned, the measures considered under different
PSC options in this IA are geared towards providing flexibility to Member States. Article
14 and Protocol 26 of the Treaty confirm the place occupied by services of general
economic interest in the shared values of the Union. Under Article 106(2) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), companies that provide services that
are of general economic interest are subject to the rules of the Treaties, in particular to
the rules governing competition. But unlike other economic sectors, this Article does not
apply when compensation is paid for public service obligations in land transport. Instead,
this type of compensation is covered by Article 93 TFEU as a 'lex specialis' and is
applied according to the rules of Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger transport
services by rail and by road
46
. It is not proposed to make any amendment to Regulation
1370/2007 and Member States can continue to act to ensure that services of general
economic interest continue to be provided. In this respect, the initiative presented will not
go further than allowed by the Treaty and will not impinge upon Member States' right to
specify public service obligations underlying to PSCs.
3.2.
Subsidiarity
In accordance with Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) any EU action
should respect the principle of subsidiarity. This involves assessing two aspects.
3.2.1.
Necessity test
The necessity test assesses if the objectives of the proposed action can be sufficiently
achieved by Member States. The legitimate rights of Member States to take actions
which reflect their local, regional or national specificities, must not unduly restrict the
proper functioning of the internal transport market.
EU transport policy has always focused on overcoming obstacles between Member States
and creating a single European transport area with fair competition conditions for and
between the different forms of transport. This means not only dismantling cross-border
barriers but also integrating national markets in order to complete the internal market for
transport.
Across the EU there is a patchwork of rules for access to national markets for coach and
bus services. Carriers are required to comply with different rules in each Member State in
which they operate. These rules include restrictions on access to national inter-urban
46
OJ L 315, 03.12.2007, p. 1.
27
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
markets which constrains carriers’ ability to develop services into pan-European
coach
networks and denies them the possibility to offer integration with other coach services
and transport modes.
The past has shown that Member States action at the national or lower level (Article 25
of the Regulation enables Member States to agree bilaterally or multilaterally to further
liberalise services) has not been sufficient to tackle the identified problems. Furthermore,
Member States acting alone cannot introduce or ensure the coherence and coordination of
uniform market access rules needed for the emergence of a genuine internal market for
road passenger transport. It is therefore necessary to provide rules at the EU level.
3.2.2.
EU added value test
The EU added value test assesses if the objectives of the proposed action can be better
achieved at Union level.
Since the 1980s, the EU has elaborated a framework of common rules and procedures
intended to open the European road transport market to competition. The approach has
been consistent with the objective of developing Europe’s transport sector and the EU is
best-placed to lay down common rules for the road passenger transport market that
guarantees carriers access to operate throughout the EU without discrimination. The
envisaged revision of the regulatory framework will streamline the national differences in
market access rules and provide carriers with predictable business conditions throughout
the EU, therefore removing distortions of competition and barriers to market access as
well as providing the ground to strengthen the internal market.
The envisaged revision should have an immediate and strong positive impact on the level
of accessibility for EU citizens some of whom will have access to an affordable mobility
offer for the first time. Additionally, but over the longer term, it will have a positive
impact on the external costs of transport due to the expected modal shift. The beneficial
effects of the modal shift from car and air together are greater than the negative
environmental impact associated with the generation of new traffic and the substitution
of some rail use in favour of coach travel. The performance of coach and rail combined is
improved leading to an increase in the modal share of sustainable transport modes.
The envisaged revision should lead to an increase in inter-urban travel with the benefit of
not having any adverse impact on the environment. It will facilitate the mobility of
citizens who otherwise could not afford to travel. It will reduce the negative externalities
of inter-urban passenger transport, such as emissions, accidents and fatalities, road
congestion as well as to improve the efficiency of use of transport resources.
Furthermore, the introduction of measures to ensure a level playing field in the allocation
of terminal capacity should lead to an uplift in capacity that is unduly suppressed by
discriminatrory behaviour in access to terminals.
The EU is by far the best placed to act to achieve an accessible and competitive inter-
urban coach passenger sector and a true internal market for road passenger transport as
these cannot be better achieved at national level. The proposal does not aim at total
liberalisation of domestic services and Member States may still limit the right of access
to national markets for regular services if a commercial service would compromise the
economic equilibrium of a public service contract.
4.
W
HAT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED
?
28
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0033.png
4.1.
General policy objective
The proposed revision of Regulation 1073/2009 aims to resolve the problems of
operators facing obstacles in national markets to develop inter-urban coach services and
the low share of sustainable transport modes. The initiative aims at a proportionate
response to national obstacles to market entry whilst avoiding excessive intrusion into the
national markets.
Therefore the 2 general objectives (GOs) of the proposed revision have been defined as
follows:
GO1: Facilitate inter-urban mobility and connectivity for all citizens
GO2: Increase the modal share of sustainable transport modes
The GOs cover both national and international regular services, reflecting the potential
for operators to provide both kinds of services as part of an integrated European route
network.
It is in line with the political priority of the Commission for the period 2014-2019 to
create a fairer and deeper internal market and strengthened industrial base.
It is also in line with the 2011 White Paper which foresees an efficient single transport
area for multimodal intercity travel and transport, and recognises the need for the greater
use of bus and coaches and the requirement to link the modal networks so they provide
better modal choices for passengers.
4.2.
Specific objectives
To achieve the GO the following 3 specific objectives (SO) have been developed. The
SOs align with the three problem drivers defined in section 2.5.
SO1: Simplify administrative procedures
This SO aims to address the problem of excessive administrative costs of entry, defined
in section 2.5.2, by clarifying and simplifying administrative procedures including the
procedure for authorising regular services.
SO2: Remove restrictions on access to inter-urban markets
This SO aims to address the problem of restricted access to national inter-urban markets,
defined in section 2.5.1, by removing legal barriers to market access and stimulating
competition in the national inter-urban markets.
The majority of respondents to the OPC considered that establishing a common framework in the EU for
access to national markets for regular services would contribute to improving the market for coach
services (65%).
SO3: Prevent discriminatory access to public terminal facilities
The SO aims to address the problem of restricted access to key infrastructure, defined in
section 2.5.3, by requiring Member States to grant operators access rights to public
terminal infrastructure on fair and non-discriminatory basis for the purpose of operating
regular services.
T
he majority of respondents to the OPC considered that operators should have a level playing field in
access to terminals (70%) and the majority of Ministries/Regulators that responded to the targeted
stakeholder questionnaire supported establishing common requirements to ensure that access to coach
29
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0034.png
terminals is fair and non-discriminatory. Seven of those responding (35%) supported the proposal.
The SOs should be mutually reinforcing, such that interventions designed to ensure that
they are met can be expected to improve the competitiveness of the sector through a
series of interacting impacts. For example, removing restrictions on access to inter-urban
markets could be expected to reduce the administrative costs of entry by simplifying
procedures as well as removing direct restrictions on market access.
5.
W
HAT ARE THE VARIOUS OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES
?
The stakeholder consultation, the expert meetings, independent research and the
Commission's own analysis have allowed the Commission to identify different policy
measures, which served as a basis for the identification of a wide set of policy options.
These options have been considered in order to address the problem drivers and the three
specific objectives. Although the three problem drivers contribute to the overall problem,
one problem driver will be treated separately from the other two
47
.
The assessment leading to the choice of an overall policy option addressing the main
problems has be broken down into two assessments leading to the choice of two sets of
policy options:
the first set of policy options on market access addressing SO1 and SO2; and
the second set of policy options on terminal access addressing SO3.
Then a separate assessment and comparison of the two different sets of policy options is
performed and a preferred policy option from each set of options is selected. Finally, an
assessment of cumulative effects for the combined two preferred policy options is
performed.
The following process was applied for establishing the policy options:
identify an extensive list of policy measures addressing the problems (considered
policy measures);
as a result of this initial screening, a number of policy measures were discarded
from the initial analysis (see Annex 6 for the list of measures and the underlying
justification).
consider policy measures which are retained after a preliminary assessment; and
identification of possible policy packages.
5.1.
Retained policy measures
Driver 1
–
Excessive administrative costs of entry
No.
1
Policy measure
Standardise the
authorisation
procedure
Description
This measure aims to simplify and standardise the procedure for the
authorisation of regular services. There is a standardised authorisation procedure
for international regular services but the authorisation procedures for national
47
The policy option to address "Restricted access to key transport infrastructure" or SO3 is not interlinked
and the geographical scope of the effect is different to the choice of a policy option to address
“Excessive administrative costs of entry” or SO1 and "Restricted access to national inter-urban
markets" or SO2. Action in the former area need not imply action in the other and considering the two
areas separately was considered optimal.
30
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0035.png
No.
Policy measure
Description
regular services vary widely across Member States.
2
Abolish the
journey forms
for occasional
services
This measure aims to simplify the operation of occasional services by removing
the requirement to complete a journey form for occasional international services.
This measure will reduce regulatory costs by eliminating the administrative costs
for operators and national authorities.
Driver 2
–
Restricted access to national inter-urban markets
No.
3
Policy measure
Clarify the
meaning of
“Cabotage
operations shall
be
authorised…”.
Extend the
scope of the
Regulation to
include national
markets, subject
to authorisation
Description
This measure aims at clarifying how cabotage operations are authorised.
4
This measure aims to open access to national markets for regular services and
simplify the authorisation procedure. Member States would be able to reject an
application for an authorisation if the new service would compromise the
economic equilibrium of an existing public service contract.
During the targeted consultation 6 Member States reported that they did not
support this measure and the reasons given were concerns about unfavourable
impacts on coach sector employees (in Bulgaria and Estonia), the potential
adverse impact on services operated as PSOs (Germany and Ireland), safety
(Italy) and inconvenience (Spain). The difference in views of these stakeholders
does not appear to reflect the differences in the market liberalisation as
described in table 2.4 but rather reflect each Member States unique national
regulatory system.
5
Require access
to national
regular services
markets without
discrimination
Set common
requirements for
the protection of
PSCs
Set common
requirements for
the protection of
PSCs meeting
the needs of an
urban area
This measure aims to ensure that carriers from all Member States be guaranteed
access to national markets for regular services without discrimination on grounds
of nationality or place of establishment. The fact that a carrier is established in
another Member State shall no longer constitute justification for rejecting an
application for authorisation.
This measure aims to ensure that Member States are permitted to take action to
protect all public passenger transport services covered by PSCs from
competition. Member States may limit the right of access on services that are
covered by one or more public service contracts if the service would compromise
the economic equilibrium of a public service contract.
This measure aims to ensure that Member States are permitted to take action to
protect all public passenger transport services covered by PSCs meeting the
needs of an urban centre or conurbation, or transport needs between it and the
surrounding area. An automatic authorisation procedure shall apply to services
carrying passengers 100km or more. Member States may limit the right of access
on services that carry passengers less than 100km if the proposed service would
compromise the economic equilibrium of a public service contract.
Of the 20 Ministries or regulators that replied, five (Bulgaria, Finland, France,
Ireland and Portugal) supported a set of common requirements, as this would
help to create a more level playing field. All the Member States that supported
this measure have already opened national markets. Six (Estonia, Italy, Latvia,
Slovakia, Spain and the UK) maintain that the protection of PSOs is outside the
scope of Regulation 1073/2009 and should be addressed through Regulation
1370/2007. Although these six Member States share the same view on the
6
7
31
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0036.png
No.
Policy measure
Description
pro
tection of PSO’s the regulatory status in each of their national markets is
different.
This measure aims to abolish the need for an authorisation for regular services
carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more. Regular services would be
fully liberalised along the same lines as occasional services. This measure would
also address driver 1 as the time consuming authorisation procedure would no
longer be required and administrative and compliance costs would be reduced.
8
Abolish the
authorisation
procedure
Driver 3
–
Restricted access to key transport infrastructure
No.
9
Policy measure
Define a coach
terminal
Encourage coach
terminal operators
to provide access
Encourage the
publication of
conditions of use
Require the
European
Commission to
report on market
opening
Require Member
States to grant
non-
discriminatory
access
Require the
publication of
conditions of use
Description
This measure aims to provide the meaning of the term terminal. Terminals
are not yet defined in EU legislation and a definition would be a necessary
precursor to any action related to access to them.
This measure aims to encourage coach terminal operators to provide access to
carriers operating regular services on fair and non-discriminatory terms. This
should be done by guidelines/recommendations.
This measure aims to encourage the publication of conditions of use to
provide operators with transparency on how they will be treated by terminal
operators.
This measure aims to provide the European Commission with evidence of the
scale, incidence and duration of terminal access disputes. It may be
advantageous to expand the evidence base before further intervention to
specify proposals for the addition of capacity or the resolution of disputes.
This measure aims to require Member States to grant carriers access rights to
terminal infrastructure on fair and non-discriminatory terms for the purpose
of operating regular services.
10
11
12
13
14
This measure aims to require the publication of conditions of use to provide
operators with transparency on how they will be treated by terminal
operators.
5.2.
Identification of possible policy packages
The policy packages have been defined so as to reflect an increasing level of regulatory
intervention and entailing an increasing level of expected impacts. They are cumulative,
in the sense that all measures in PO1 are also part of PO2, which itself includes further
measures, and so on. This is intended to facilitate and structure the analysis of the
impacts, given the large number of measures which must be assessed. They have been
defined in a way to show the expected outcomes of increasing levels of regulatory
intervention.
5.3.
PO0 - Baseline
The Regulation would continue to apply in its present form. No new measures applied.
PO1
–
Open access to the market for regular services with the possibility to refuse
authorisation if the economic equilibrium of a PSC is compromised
Identification of a list of market access policy options
The retained market access policy options to address SO1 and SO2 are:
32
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0037.png
Policy Measure Numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
This option would provide common market access rules for inter-urban regular services. It would
simplify and standardise the authorisation procedure. The option would reduce costs by
standardising the authorisation procedure throughout the EU; make the procedure more
transparent; as well as reducing the number of grounds for refusal. Member States will be able to
protect all public service contracts by limiting the right of access if the proposed service would
compromise the economic equilibrium of an existing public service contract. As this option does
not aim at total liberalisation of the domestic market it will still be possible for Member States to
intervene in areas where regular services cannot be operated on a commercial basis.
It would abolish legal monopolies, national establishment requirements and eliminate any special
protection of other transport modes granted by Member States on inter-urban routes.
It would reduce the administrative burden by standardising and simplifying the authorisation
procedure for national regular services and abolishing the journey form for occasional services.
In practice this would provide a common procedure for authorising national and international
regular coach and bus services. Under this option Member States would have the option of
limiting the right of access to the market where the new service would compromise the economic
equilibrium of an existing public service contracts providing any public passenger transport
service. To determine if a PSC may be compromised an independent body should make the
decision to grant, refuse or limit the service on the basis of an objective economic analysis,
following a request from the competent authorities that awarded the public service contract or the
public service contract operator. The new independent body is proposed to ensure the
impartiality and objectivity of the economic analysis and should function in a way which avoids
any conflict of interests and any possible involvement in the award of the public service contract
under consideration. The procedure and criteria to be followed when determining whether the
economic equilibrium of the PSC is compromised by a new service should be in line with test
carried out by regulatory bodies in other transport modes, EU Law and the principles of equality
and non-discrimination. . If no request for a test is submitted within the deadline, the authorisation
would be granted. If there is a request for the test the entity making the request would be
required to provide the independent body with the information required to conduct the test. The
independent body would assess whether the economic equilibrium of a public service contract
would be compromised by the proposed new service. Member States will not be obliged to
introduce a new independent body but will be free to use an already established body. The body
will only incur costs if it is requested to conduct a test but as the required information is provided
by other entities the cost of the test for the independent body will be minimal. The independent
bodies would be required to develop a consistent methodology that would be clear, transparent
and non-discriminatory. The analysis would focus on the economic impact of the proposed new
service on the public service contract as a whole, not on individual services operated under it,
over its entire duration. The economic equilibrium of a public service contract would generally be
considered as compromised if the proposed new service has a substantial negative impact on the
profitability of services operated under the public service contract, and/or the net cost for the
competent authority awarding the public service contract. The independent body may grant the
authorisation, refuse the authorisation or indicate possible changes to the proposed service that
would ensure that the conditions for granting the authorisation are met, and give the opportunity
to the applicant to adjust its application for authorisation accordingly.
This method of regulating the interaction between commercial services and PSCs is similar to the
method employed currently in Regulation 1073/2009 for international regular services. It is not
possible to determine how new services would affect PSC’s in all the non-liberalised
Member
States but under this option the relationship between inter-urban (commercial) services and
urban (usually operated under PSC and subsidised) services is clearly defined and the
commercial service will only be permitted if it will not compromise the economic equilibrium of a
PSC. There is no evidence to indicate that this method of regulating the relationship with PSCs
has been problematic. However, there is the risk that operators are not provided with sufficient
flexibility to address demand and provide services where they are needed.
The extension of the scope of the legislation to include national regular services under this option
33
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0038.png
is not supported by 6 Member States for
PO2
–
Open access to the inter-urban market for regular services over distances of 100km
or more. Authorisation can be refused if the economic equilibrium of an urban PSC is
compromised
Policy Measure Numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7.
This option differs from PO1 in the approach taken to protect public service contracts and the
extent of the REFIT intervention. It would simplify and standardise the authorisation procedure for
national and international regular services and change the grounds for refusal. Similar to PO1,
this option does not aim at total liberalisation of the domestic market. In this case Member States
will be able to intervene in areas where commercial services may compromise the economic
equilibrium of certain PSC’s. The opening of a new coach line could no longer be refused if the
service carries passengers more than 100km. The 100km threshold enables Member States to
take action to protect urban transport services covered by PSCs from competition. The extent of
the REFIT intervention is increased as the authorisation regime becomes faster, more
transparent and effectively lowers the barrier for new market entrants. It provides operators with
more certainty when assessing whether a new coach line is acceptable or not. It reduces the
administrative burden on operators through simplification and standardisation of the authorisation
procedure. There is no longer a requirement to get agreement from authorities in all Member
States in whose territories passengers are picked up and set down.
In practice this would provide a common procedure for authorising national and international
regular coach and bus services. New entrants would apply for authorisation to commence a new
service. If the new service is carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more the
authorisation is automatically granted. If the new service is carrying passengers over a distance
of less than 100km competent authorities or the operators of a PSC would have a defined time to
request an economic equilibrium test which would be conducted by an independent body in the
same way as PO1.
This method of regulating the interaction between commercial services and PSCs is employed in
a number of Member States including Germany, France, Italy and in the past in the UK and
Sweden. It is not possible to determine the future relationship between commercial and PSC
services in all non-liberalised Member States. However, the distance threshold will clearly define
the relationship between inter-urban (commercial) services and urban (usually operated under
PSC and subsidised) services. There has been no evidence to indicate a problematic relationship
between commercial services and PSC services in any of the Member States that have opened
market access using a similar framework but there is some anecdotal evidence from Germany
that rail has lost many customers to coach with twice as many coach passengers (30%) coming
from long-distance trains as from local or regional trains (14%) but the German Ministry suggests
that the loss of rail passengers is likely to be effected by other factors such as rail strikes, floods
on lines and decreasing supply.
The model to compensate public service operators for the operating a public passenger transport
service under PSC that involves compensation from public authorities in the form of granting
exclusive rights to provide services on a profitable route, in such a way that profits for the
provision of the service cross-subsidise other non-profitable services imposed on the service
provider appears to be more challenged under this option. This model is used both in railways
(for instance in the United Kingdom) and in coaches (for instance in Spain). Such a model relies
on the existence of a monopoly in the profitable service, and weak competition from other
transport modes, as otherwise it would not be possible to extract the necessary rent from the
profitable services to cross-subsidise the other services
48
. The new services would introduce
competition in the long distance market and a threat to this model of PSO funding. It is likely that
new services would “cherry-pick” the profitable lines and as the PSO operator loses revenue from
the profitable services this model of public intervention becomes challenged and new financing
48
See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/601970/IPOL_STU(2017)60197
0_EN.pdf
34
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0039.png
models may be required.
PO3
–
Open access to the inter-urban market for regular services without an authorisation
process for regular services carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more
Policy Measure Numbers: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8.
This option differs from PO1 & PO2 in that all regular services that carry passengers over
distances of 100km or more would be fully liberalised and there would be no authorisation
procedure for these services. The existing time-consuming national and international
authorisation procedures would no longer be necessary and the principle of free competition
would apply. This removes the complexity, delay and cost associated with an authorisation
regime resulting in a reduction of administrative and compliance costs. As the authorisation
procedure is abolished enforcement would have to focus on rules on access to the profession or
on road safety. In the absence of an authorisation procedure the Member State of establishment
would have a vital supervisory role in this new regime and the investigations during the
application procedure for a Community licence (or the certified true copies) would replace the
investigations carried out in the current authorisation procedures. As such, host Member States
would rely on Member States of establishment to carry out controls and would be deprived of
direct enforcement possibilities. As a result of the inclusion of the measure to abolish the
authorisation procedure for this option would have substantial benefits in terms of reduction of
administrative burden.
In practice new entrants would not have to apply for authorisation to commence a new service
carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more but they would have to notify the
competent authority before commencing, ceasing or altering operation on a route. Similar to PO1
and PO2, this option does not aim at total liberalisation of the domestic market. In this case
Member States will also be able to intervene in areas where commercial services may
compromise the economic equilibrium of certain PSC’s. If the new service is over a distance of
less than 100km authorisation would be required and competent authorities or the operators of a
PSC would have a defined time to request an economic equilibrium test which would be
conducted by an independent body in the same way as PO1.
The method of regulating the relationship with PSC’s under this option is the same as under PO2.
The three ways in which the needs for authorisations are proposed to be reduced further
along with the protection of PSC are set out in the following figure.
Figure 5-1: Approaches to reducing the requirement for authorisations and the protection of PSC's
100km or
more
PO1
Authorisation applies
Authorisation can be
rejected if it
compromises a PSC
Authorisation applies
Authorisation can be
rejected if it
compromises a PSC
PO2
Authorisation applies
PO3
Authorisation cannot
be required
No protection of PSC
No protection of PSC
Less than
100km
Authorisation applies
Authorisation can be
rejected if it
compromises a PSC
Authorisation applies
Authorisation can be
rejected if it
compromises a PSC
5.4.
Identification of a list of terminal access policy options
The retained terminal access policy options to address SO3 are:
PO4
–
Soft Regulation and report
Policy Measure Numbers: 9, 10, 11 and 12.
This would establish guidelines or recommendations on access to terminals. The guidelines or
recommendations would include a definition of a coach terminal as it is not yet defined in EU
legislation. The definition would address barriers to entry in the form of access to terminals.
35
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0040.png
They would encourage operators and managers of terminal infrastructure to provide access to
carriers operating regular services on fair and reasonable grounds and without discriminatory
between operators. In practice it is expected that the operator or manager of a terminal would
grant access to and use of a coach terminal to all carriers on the same terms. It would be
considered fair and reasonable for an operator or manager of a terminal to refuse access to a
terminal if there is no available capacity.
They would encourage the operators and managers of terminals to make available the conditions
of use of the terminal which shall include at least:
•
list of the services provided with prices
•
rules for scheduling the allocation of capacity
•
current capacity allocation, and
•
current timetable.
The conditions of use would be published in two official languages of the EU and made available
free of charge from the operator or manager of the terminal and the competent authority. The
conditions of use would also be displayed in the terminal, where they have websites, on the
websites of the operator or manager of the terminal and the competent authority.
The guidelines or recommendations would also encourage that decisions on applications for
access are taken within a specified time after the date of application.
The European Commission would report on the effects of market opening after a period of time
during which it is expected that overall demand for access to terminal infrastructure would either
have reached a plateau or peaked and begun to decline.
PO5
–
Equal access rules
Policy Measure Numbers: 9, 12, 13 and 14.
This would define a terminal in legislation. It would require that operators and managers of
terminal infrastructure to grant access to carriers operating regular services on fair and
reasonable grounds and without discriminatory between carriers. In practice operators or
managers of a terminal would be required to grant access to and use of a coach terminal to all
carriers on the same terms. It would be considered fair and reasonable for an operator or
manager of a terminal to refuse access to a terminal if there is no available capacity.
Operators and managers of terminals would be required to make available the conditions of use
of the terminal which shall include at least:
•
•
•
•
list of the services provided with prices
rules for scheduling the allocation of capacity
current capacity allocation, and
current timetable.
The conditions of use would be required to be published in two official languages of the EU in line
with existing international practices
49
and made available free of charge from the operator or
manager of the terminal and the competent authority. The conditions of use would also be
displayed in the terminal, where they have websites, on the websites of the operator or manager
of the terminal and the competent authority.
Decisions on applications for access would be required to be taken within a specified time after
the date of application. Member States would be required to ensure that carriers have the
capability to appeal negative decisions.
The European Commission would be required to report on the effects of market opening after a
period of time during which it is expected that overall demand for access to terminal infrastructure
would either have reached a plateau or peaked and begun to decline. It would ensure
undertakings can appeal negative decisions by requiring Member States to ensure that they have
49
For example see Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November
2012 establishing a single European railway area Text with EEA relevance, recital 34.
36
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0041.png
the possibility to appeal decisions refusing access to at least on independent and impartial body.
6.
W
HAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS AND WHO WILL BE
AFFECTED
?
The analysis of impacts covers all policy options. The key impacts are captured
quantitatively at a level of detail consistent with the available data, otherwise they are
treated qualitatively. Based on a set of assumptions, an IA tool was developed by the
external consultant to assess the development of the baseline and the effects of various
policy measures within a 20 year timespan (from 2015 to 2035) to align with related
impact assessments in the mobility package. The development of the baseline scenario is
based primarily on input assumptions from an update of the EU Reference Scenario
2016
50
but additionally covers the implementation of the reform of the national
regulatory frameworks for buses and coaches in Germany, France, Italy and Poland. The
key output variables which result from the overarching modelling framework include: 1)
changes to the level of transport activity; 2) fares for users; 3) connectivity of different
social groups; 4) environmental costs and 5) regulatory costs for different groups. Some
of the other important impacts (e.g. working conditions) are estimated based on the desk
and field research. All costs and benefits are summarised over the 20-year period 2015-
2035 and presented as a 2017 Net Present Values using a discount rate of 4%. Impacts on
transport activity and employment are presented for 2030, relative to the Baseline. The
sensitivity and robustness of the results were tested; the relative impacts of each policy
option were not significantly affected by the low and high cases used in the sensitivity
analysis, as described in Annex 4. Each policy option presented below is compared
against the results of the baseline scenario, unless stated otherwise.
Each policy option has been analysed in terms of its economic, environmental and social
impacts. Where possible, quantitative estimates are given, in other cases however,
because of the non-availability of statistics, this was not possible. In these cases, a
qualitative assessment is provided and where relevant strengthened by the opinion of
stakeholders.
The impacts are likely to vary between Member States depending on the existing market
access rules and the economics of individual routes. However, as noted in table 2-4, 14
Member States have already liberalised including 6 of the largest 7 national markets. In
this IA the quantification of the problem of obstacles in national markets that hinder the
development of inter-urban bus services focuses on the 14 Member States that have not
liberalised their inter-urban regular coach and bus services. The estimated impact of
market opening in these Member States is based on evidence from previous domestic
coach market opening initiatives. The levels of secondary impacts are driven by changes
to the level of transport activity. It is assumed that the non-liberalised Member States will
50
The updated EU Reference scenario 2016 includes some updates in the technology costs assumptions
(i.e. for light duty vehicles) and few policy measures adopted after its cut-off date (end of 2014) like
the Directive on Weights and Dimensions, the 4th Railways Package, the NAIADES II Package, the
Ports Package, the replacement of the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) test cycle by the new
Worldwide harmonized Light-vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP). It has been developed with the
PRIMES-TREMOVE model (i.e. the same model used for the EU Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-
E3MLab. A detailed description of this scenario is available in the Impact Assessment accompanying
the Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles
for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180
37
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0042.png
experience a rate of transport activity growth between that of Germany and the UK in the
first five years following market opening. The assumption is adjusted depending on the
ability of each Member State to restrict market access under each option.
A schematic diagram of the segments of coach and bus markets is shown in figure 6-1
below.
Figure 6-1: Segments of the market for regular coach and bus services
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
The red dotted line divides the services that require subsidy (below the line) or services
that can be operated commercially (above the line).
The horizontal axis of the figure indicates the distance over which a passenger is carried,
ranging from short services on the left to long services on the right, and then international
services which are the focus of Regulation 1073/2009. The vertical axis of the figure
indicates the number of services.
The ellipses on the figure illustrate a number of market segments. First, and bottom left,
are
short-distance regular services,
a large proportion of which, particularly on urban
and suburban routes, are not commercially viable and hence require a public service
contract as provided for under Regulation 1370/2007.
Second, and top left, are
short-distance regular services in Member States in which all
services are liberalised,
and fares are either unregulated or set at levels which can be
commercially viable.
Third, and bottom right, are
longer-distance regular services in Member States where a
mix of profitable and unprofitable services are operated as a package
, as in the regional
concessions in Spain and under the contracts awarded to KTEL companies in Greece.
Fourth, and top right, are
longer-distance services in Member States which have
liberalised regular domestic services,
such as Germany (2013), Italy (2014) and France
(2015) where, subject to the restrictions described above, new entrants have typically
first entered the market on the most profitable routes. However, as indicated with the
ellipse with the question mark (“?”), these services will in principle continue to expand
38
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0043.png
until all profitable opportunities have been exploited, in theory including all services
above the dotted red line.
This shows that opening access to commercial services and protecting public service
contracts are not mutually exclusive.
Opening access with the adequate protection of
PSCs provides opportunities for carriers to respond to demand and provide new services.
However, it also introduces the risk of carriers cherry-picking the most profitable
services. It is therefore necessary for the authorisation procedure and the economic
equilibrium test to strike a balance between the benefits of opening market access with
the potential impact on the economic equilibrium of PSC’s. The retained policy options
provide different combinations of protection for PSCs and market opening to assess the
impact of each combination. The experience from liberalised and transition Member
States (see table 2-4)
has shown that PSC’s can be protected and co-exist
with a thriving
open inter-urban domestic transport market. The approach taken to opening market
access in each of the liberalised Member States was different but in all cases it has been
perceived to have been a success.
6.1.
Impacts of policy options to address excessive administration costs of
entry and market access problems
6.1.1.
Economic impacts
Transport Activity: The impact of the policy options on transport activity is focused on
the 14 non-liberalised Member States (including those awarding concessions through
competitive tendering). Impacts on other Member States, which are already liberalised,
are expected to be positive due to an increasing alignment of national market access
rules, which will reduce the administrative burden on operators seeking to provide
regular services in more than one domestic market. Furthermore the alignment of rules is
expected to encourage some coach operators to provide international services.
Figure 6-2 shows the increase in inter-urban coach traffic under the market opening
options by Member State in 2030 relative to the Baseline. While all options lead to
substantial increases of coach traffic in Member States, Option 2 and Option 3 deliver the
same increase (displayed as one column in figure 6-2) which is considerably larger than
the increase under Option 1. Under Option 1 the economic test can be used to assess if
the new service would compromise the economic equilibrium of the PSC. The test would
examine the balance of the effects of a proposed new service between generation of new
revenue (by creating new demand) and abstraction of revenue from existing rail or coach
services operated under a PSC. The test allows the positive effect of authorising a new
service (e.g. lower fares with more services, better connectivity and rail operators can
enter into coach market or benefit from integrating with coach and picking up its
passengers) to be considered and balanced against the negative effect of abstraction.
This inclusion of the measure setting common requirements for the protection of PSCs
meeting the needs of an urban area, which will simplify the authorisation procedure and
remove discretion to restrict market access unduly. The effect varies considerably
between Member States and the increases in Belgium, Hungary and Greece are
particularly large when compared to Spain, which has a well-developed coach market.
Figure 6-2: Impact of options by MS (increase in inter-urban coach traffic in 2030 relative to the
Baseline, in billion passenger-kilometres)
39
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0044.png
25.0
20.0
Billion pkm
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
HU
BE
EL
AT
HR
ES
PO1
LT
SI
NL
EE
LV
CY
MT
LU
PO2 & PO3
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
The average growth rate by Member State by 2030 are shown in figure 6.3 below. The
growth rates in Spain & the Netherlands, which have well-developed coach markets, are
low even after the adjustment for the effect of liberalisation, and the additional traffic
generated is therefore correspondingly low despite the volume of traffic in the baseline.
By contrast, Hungary experiences a higher rate of growth in the baseline than Spain,
reflecting the economic conditions taken into account in the baseline and the adjusted
growth rate and increment in traffic is correspondingly large.
Figure 6-3: Average annual growth rate by 2030 by MS under each option
7%
Average annual growth rates (2015-2030)
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
HU
HR
AT
BE
SI
EL
MT
LT
EE
LU
CY
LV
NL
ES
-1%
-2%
Baseline
PO1
PO2 & PO3
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
Under options 2 and 3 new services carrying passengers over distances of 100km or more
cannot be prevented solely to protect an existing PSC. This introduces the risk that the
new service may erode some form of PSCs such as a service to a remote area via inter-
urban bus services or alternatively it may result in the requirement for an increase in
subsidies. However, no evidence is available to indicate that the opening of the national
40
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0045.png
market for regular coach and bus services has had either of these effects. In cases where
profitable and non-profitable services are bundled together, passengers on the profitable
routes are “subsidising” through increased fares the passengers on non-profitable
routes.
This inflates the fares on profitable routes, makes these services less attractive for
citizens and promotes private use of cars. As described in table 2-4, 14 Member States
have already opened their markets accounting for 73% of the total passenger kilometres
for the EU.
The impact of market opening in these Member States has been widely
studied and we have not found any evidence that the market opening has eroded
PSCs serving rural areas or that the negative impact of abstraction has been larger
than the positive impact of generation.
There are very few PSCs in place that cover
services beyond 100km so the overall impact on PSCs of opening the market in this
segment is likely to be very small.
The national policies and frameworks towards the
provision of regular services varies across the non-liberalised Member States
however this was also the case for the 14 Member States that have already
liberalised. Furthermore, stakeholders have been widely consulted and no
stakeholder has indicated that market opening has resulted in these issues.
The evidence in the Impact Assessment support study suggests that Member States are
more concerned with their urban PSCs and have chosen regulatory distances broadly
consistent with permitting no journey wholly within their largest suburban system, and
by implication any other suburban system. The current precedents include 100 km in
France and 50km in Germany, and past precedents include 100 km in Sweden and 48km
in the UK.
Table 6-1 below provides further information of incremental traffic under each policy
option in 2030 relative to the Baseline. The Baseline projection of coach traffic is 589
billion pkm in 2030. The change relative to the Baseline under Option 2 and Option 3 is
around 66.5 billion pkm in 2030, representing an increase of 11.3% in coach traffic. The
change relative to the baseline for journeys is roughly 430 million and the number of
services increases by about 510 in 2030.
Table 6-1: Estimated impact of options on coach traffic levels
Metric
National
Billion passenger-km
International
Total
% increase
Million journeys
Number of Services
Average load factor (p.p. change)
Change relative to the baseline in 2030
PO1
25.0
3.4
28.4
4.8%
190
220
-0.7
PO2
58.3
8.2
66.5
11.3%
430
510
-1.1
PO3
58.3
8.2
66.5
11.3%
430
510
-1.1
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
When estimating the impacts it was not possible to differentiate between national and
international regular services from the available data. The estimated volume of
international traffic rises in line with the total traffic which is broadly consistent with the
recent experiences when domestic liberalisation has been seen to stimulate the
introduction of new international services as well as the development of national
networks. It is also assumed that vehicle kilometres operated increase in line with
demand and the average load factor will not change materially between options.
41
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0046.png
Just fewer 60% of the respondents to the OPC consider that establishing a common framework in the EU
for access to national markets for regular services would have a positive impact on growth in the
passenger transport sector. However, the national authorities had mixed views with 2 of the 3 considering
it would have a negative effect. The same percentage of respondents consider that it will have a positive
impact on the administrative burden for public administrations with just more than 60% considering it
would also have a positive impact on the reduction of cost of compliance with legislation.
Revenue: The projected impacts on coach revenue reflect the underlying traffic activity
impacts described above. Option 1 generates in the region of €27 billion in additional
coach sector revenue in net present value (NPV) terms over the timescale of the impact
assessment (2015-2035). Again, Options 2 and 3 perform particularly well, generating
roughly €62 billion in additional coach sector revenue reflecting the inclusion of the
measure setting common requirements for the protection of PSCs meeting the needs of an
urban area, which would simplify the authorisation procedure and remove discretion to
restrict market access unduly.
Just fewer than 60% of respondents to the OPC consider that abolishing restrictions on access to national
markets for regular services would have a positive impact on the economic situation of small road
passenger transport operators. The results are mixed across stakeholder groups with national authorities
and NGOs consider that the impact would be negative. More than 60% of the respondents (and the
majority of all stakeholder groups) consider that it will have a negative effect on incumbent coach
operators.
Fares for users and service quality: Given the lack of data from liberalised Member
States on the effects of coach market liberalisation the impact on fares for users and
service quality has been assessed in qualitative terms. Fares for users and service quality
have been assessed together rather than in isolation to demonstrate the overall impact on
customer service.
The evidence indicates that most coach services are cheaper, on a fare per kilometre
basis, than the equivalent rail service. This may be because rail often offers faster
journeys and can therefore act as a market ‘price-maker’. However, this is not always the
case and coach fares have been found between two and three times greater than the
equivalent rail fare, despite average speeds being similar between modes. In this case it is
likely that there are additional factors such as service frequency and quality which permit
coach operators to charge a much higher fare. Where one mode offers more frequent and
faster services, the other may have the characteristics of an “inferior good
51
” and have to
accept lower fares. At long distances, where air services are available, coach services can
attract passengers by not charging for heavy baggage, and may be viable when rail
services are not.
In cases where rail services are slower and less frequent than coach services, rail may be
an “inferior good” and coach may charge a fare many times the rail fare.
This is
particularly the case on the routes in the EU13 and is not dependent on the state of
market opening.
The Eu o a o ete Repo t p o ides a i di atio of passe ge s’ pe eptio of fa es as ell as diffe e t
aspects of service quality. The results do not suggest any systematic differences in the satisfaction of
passengers in liberalised and non-liberalised Member States. Nevertheless, there is evidence from
individual Member States that have liberalised indicating that market opening can lead to a substantial
51
The term “inferior good” here as defined
strictly within economic terminology. In economics, an inferior
good is one for which demand falls when consumer income rises, and vice versa.
42
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0047.png
reduction in fares as well as improvements in service quality, at least in the short term.
Over the longer term the evidence suggests that after market opening, strong
consolidation takes place. The competent authorities have the role of ensuring that there
is no decline in competition in the supply of bus services after the removal of market
restrictions due to the abuse of a dominant position by one player.
The following figure shows changes in National Express average real fares and service
departures from Victoria Coach Station in London (the latter is an indication of two
different dimensions of service quality, namely the range of routes served and the service
frequency offered). It indicates that in the five years following full market liberalisation
in 1980, average fares fell by more than 20%, while the number of departures increased
by more than 100%, representing a substantial improvement in the service offer. Note,
however, that by 1991 average fares were more than 10% higher than in 1980 while
departures had fallen back to 120% of their pre-liberalisation level, reflecting the
consolidation of the market and the strengthening of National Express’s dominant
position from 1984.
Figure 6-4: Trends following domestic liberalisation in the UK
Source: Peter White, reported by ECMT, Steer Davies Gleave analysis in Annex F of support
study
Whether the resulting price-service quality offer represented an improvement on the
position in 1980 is difficult to determine on this evidence alone, although the increase in
departures was clearly a benefit to passengers. In any event, the figure demonstrates the
difficulties of sustaining any initial, substantial improvement in the value of the service
offer, particularly if competition in the market is not preserved.
More recent evidence from Germany supports the view that that the immediate effect of
liberalisation is to improve the price-service quality ratio and that competition is
recognised an important determinant of fare levels
52
. A previously cited study by Dürr
and Hüschelrath (2015) reported that there are significant reductions in fares on routes
where there is competition between two or more operators. It also suggests, as illustrated
in the figure 6-4 below, that liberalisation resulted in a wide range of price-service
quality combinations within the first year of the new market access arrangements taking
effect.
52
Contestability of long distance German coach market, Katrin Augustin, KCW GmbH, European
Transport Council 2013.
43
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0048.png
Figure 6-5: price-service quality offer of German coach operators in 2014
Source: Dürr and Hüschelrath (2015)
This can be interpreted as a measure of customer perceptions of the overall value for
money offered by the different operators. As shown, operators offering higher value for
money include both FlixBus (with lower fare and lower service quality rating) and
DeinBus.de (with a higher fare and higher service quality rating). Those apparently
offering lower value for money, based on customer perceptions, include operators such
as Berlin Linen Bus and Eurolines Germany, both of which charged relatively high fares
but whose service quality offering was broadly comparable with that of FlixBus. Note
that both these operators were established before liberalisation, and could therefore be
considered to represent the price-service quality offering in the absence of competition.
As part of the 2016 study on passenger transport by coach in Europe a number of fares
for interurban services were sampled across 19 Member States as illustrated in the figure
below. The fares include both peak and off-peak return fares and recorded data for
booking one day, one week and one month ahead for a single point-to-point journey.
From the available data, it appears that the fare per kilometre averages at
€0.06 in
liberalised markets, compared to €0.11 in restricted markets. This significant difference
indicates that liberalisation usually leads to a reduction in prices with positive impacts for
the passengers.
Figure 6-6: Sample of fares for national inter-urban services
Cheapest single, return or advance
PPP_adjusted fare per kilometre
0,16
0,14
0,12
0,10
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0,00
AT EL HU HR ES LT LV BG PT SE RO CZ FR DE IE UK IT
Restricted Market
Liberalised
PL
FI
Most expensive single, return or advance
Source: Adapted from Support Study for the IA for the Revision of Regulation 1073/2009
44
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0049.png
Over the long term it is more difficult to predict because the fares depend on the extent to
which competition on the individual route is sustained. If competition is not preserved,
the efficiency gains resulting from the removal of market restrictions can be outweighed
by the negative consequences through the abuse of a dominant position by one player,
leading to higher fares. However, any abuse of market power is susceptible to
intervention by supervisory authorities; also the specific dynamics of this market will
counter this: as fixed investment required for market entry is typically very low (no
infrastructure investment, availability of leased bus capacity), any excessive price rises
by mono- or oligopolists will immediately provoke new entry. These markets will
therefore clearly remain contestable after the elimination of national regulatory barriers.
Based on this analysis, it can be expected that under Option 1, market opening will
initially lead to a reduction in fares and more innovative pricing strategies in the short
term. The studies mentioned above have identified significant reductions in fares on
routes where there is competition between two or more operators.
However, the impact on fares over the long term is more difficult to predict, because it
depends on the extent to which competition on individual routes is sustained. There is
clear evidence that the market in Germany has become concentrated and emerging
evidence that consolidation among operators is taking place in France and Italy. The UK
market continues to be dominated by National Express despite more than 35 years of
liberalisation.
Against this background, it seems that the impact on fares over the long term will to a
great extent depend on the willingness of competent authorities to take action to preserve
competition.
We have not identified any evidence from the Eurobarometer survey suggesting that
passengers using services in liberalised markets perceive service quality to be materially
higher than in other markets. However, some studies suggest that market liberalisation
leads to a more innovative use of sales channels, the adoption of yield management and
faster introduction of on-board services such as Wi-Fi. In addition, there is clear evidence
from independent studies that the number of services offered increases substantially in
liberalised markets.
Option 2 and Option 3 will have the same impact on fares as Option 1 but as they will
stimulate more rapid market growth more aggressive price competition in the short term
under both these options is expected.
Just fewer than 60% of the respondents to the OPC consider that market opening will have a positive
effect on fares. The stakeholder groups that were the most divided in their assessment of the effect were
governmental authorities (2 of 3 view the effect as negative) and NGOs (14 of 28 view it as negative).
Options 1, 2 and 3 all include measures that will simplify the market access procedures
and open the inter-urban market to competition. As described in the impacts on transport
activity section above, each option has a positive impact on the number of services as a
result of newcomers entering the markets with extensive networks including coach lines
in areas where coach services were previously barely present. There is also evidence (see
table 2-5 above), from recently liberalised markets, that service frequency increases with
the number of competitors on the route and that liberalisation has provided passengers
with a greater choice of combinations of price and service quality.
45
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0050.png
Each of the three options has a positive impact on safety which is driven by the
significant reduction in car traffic. External costs of accidents fall under Option 1 by
about €1.2 billion, expressed as present value over 2015-2035.
They fall more
substantially under option 2 and 3 generating in the order of €2.8 billion in savings over
the same period. This is discussed in more detail in the section 6.1.3. on social impacts.
Market opening has led to the use of more innovative use of sales channels and
platforms, the adoption of yield management and faster introduction of on-board services
such as Wi-Fi. This is particularly important to younger passengers who are the most
interested in coach services. There is no evidence of any difference across the 3 options.
The majority (just under 60%) of respondents to the public consultation reported that in their view
opening the market for national regular services would have a positive effect on service quality provided
to passengers. The views of the stakeholder groups were mixed with the majority of governmental
autho ities of a d NGO’s 6 of 8
considering that the effect on service quality will be negative. The
Eurobarometer Report results indicate that passengers using coach services in liberalised markets do not
perceive the quality of service to be materially higher than in other markets.
Level of performance of other modes of transport: Increases in the level of coach
transport activity are likely to lead to decreases in the level of transport activity on
competing transport modes. Competition from long distance coaches encourages rail
transport to lower its prices and set up low cost services to retain its customers. Also, rail
operators have the capability to enter the coach market to regain some of the passengers
lost to rail such as in France where Ouibus (a 95% subsidiary of SNCF) holds 30% of the
intercity coach market. To calculate the decrease in traffic for each competing transport
mode, the traffic diversion factors derived from experience in Germany have been
applied. These factors are: 4% for air transport, 40% for passenger car transport, 46% for
rail transport and 10% for generated coach transport. The formula used to calculate the
change in share is described in Annex 4, in the section “Assessment of secondary
impacts”.
One factor that provides coach an advantage compared to rail is that operators make no
payment for the use of infrastructure beyond an annual licence, while rail operators
maybe required to pay not only the cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating
the train service but also mark-ups on the basis of efficient, transparent and non-
discriminatory principles which are permitted to obtain full recovery of the costs incurred
by the infrastructure manager. Thus, while the directly variable costs of coach may be
lower than those of rail, the effect of mark-ups, the effect of mark-ups may be the
average costs of rail are higher than those of coach. In practice many of the costs of both
rail and coach operations, including the provision of vehicle and crew, are time-based, so
an important factor may often be the relative average speeds achievable by rail and
coach, determined both by the rail and road infrastructure and the number of stops made
on route. This initiative on access to the coach market should be seen as part of a co-
ordinated response to, amongst other things, market challenges faced. As part of this
package buses and coaches will be included within the scope of the Eurovignette
Directive. The inclusion of buses and coaches will help to diminish distortions of
competition in the internal market for passenger transport caused by according
preferential treatment (i.e. exemption from paying for the use of infrastructure) to these
vehicles, vis-à-vis rail transport, which is already subject to such charging.
A second factor providing coach with an advantage compared to rail is that the unit of
capacity, a coach, is much smaller than a typical train. In practice, an interurban-service
46
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0051.png
with a number of intermediate stops may generate only sufficient demand to justify a
train every hour or every two hours. The demand between the two cities alone, however,
may be sufficient to support a half hourly coach service operating non-stop between them
on a direct motorway, in some cases with a comparable or shorter overall journey time.
The impact of each policy option on traffic carried by mode in 2030 relative to the
Baseline is shown in figure 6-3 below. Under Option 1 there is a limited impact on rail of
about 2% (about 13 billion pkm) and a 4.8% (about 28 billion pkm) increase in coach
total pkm. Under Options 2 and 3 there is a larger but still limited impact on rail of 4.8%
(about 30 billion pkm) with a significant increase in coach transport activity of 11.3%
(about 66 billion pkm). The modal share of rail in under Options 2 and 3 is decreasing by
0.4 percentage points in 2030 relative to the Baseline (from 8.4% to 8%)
Figure 6-7: Estimated impact of market opening options on other modes (% change to the Baseline
in 2030)
11%
9%
% change to the Baseline in 2030
7%
5%
3%
1%
-1%
-3%
-5%
PO1
PO2 & PO3
Coach
Rail
Car
Air
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
Our analysis, based on the experience of Member States that have liberalised their coach
markets, indicates that the
liberalisation of national markets can only be expected to
have a limited impact in terms of passenger shift from rail.
This could be explained
somewhat by the targeting of coach operators of services at different groups of
passengers. In the targeted consultation, coach operators confirm that they target specific
groups such as those without access to a car, younger and older passengers and
passengers who could be considered more finically disadvantaged.
The decrease in passenger car transport activity for the 3 options appears small at under
0.5% (27 billion passenger-kilometres) relative to the Baseline in 2030 but given the
dominance of car travel in the EU passenger transport, even the small percentage
reduction in car traffic achieved under each option has important implications for traffic
congestion and emissions as discussed below.
As a result of the changes in the allocation of traffic across modes under Options 1, 2 and
3, the modal share of coach services increases. Under Option 1 the sector’s modal share
increases by 0.4 percentage points in 2030 relative to the Baseline. Under Options 2 and
47
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0052.png
3, which generate
more substantial additional coach traffic, the sector’s modal share
increases by 0.9 percentage points. Against the background of the long term decline in
modal share described in Section 2.2 this would represent an improvement in the
competitiveness of the sector and facilitate inter-urban mobility for all citizens and in
particular for groups with limited access to other modes.
The increase in coach traffic generated by each of the options results in a diversion away
from other modes. The beneficial effects of the modal shift from car and air together with
the generation of new traffic are greater than the abstraction from rail.
The performance
of coach and rail combined is improved by all three options so increase the modal
share of sustainable transport modes.
The modal shift also reduces the revenues earned by other forms of public transport,
particularly rail transport. However, similar to the net beneficial effect of the modal shift
under each option there is a net increase in revenues due to the expansion of the market
towards new passengers as described in figure 6-8 below.
Figure 6-8: Revenue of coach and other modes relative to the Baseline over 2015-2035 (expressed as
present value)
PO1
80.0
PO2
PO3
illio €
‘e e ues prese t alue i
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
-20.0
-40.0
-60.0
5.0
10.7
10.7
Coach
Rail
Air
Net
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
To assess the impact of the policy options on the performance of other transport modes,
the lost revenue arising from the decrease in the level of transport activity was estimated
based on the demand reduction rates provided in in the first paragraph of this section.
Under Option 1 rail revenues decrease by about 0.6% (€20 billion) relative to the
Baseline and there is a net increase in revenues of around €5 billion (expressed as present
value). Under
Options 2 & 3 the estimated reduction in revenues is about 1.4% (€46
billion) and there is a net increase in revenues of around €10.7 billion relative to the
Baseline (expressed as present value). However, the estimates of revenue loss are based
on diversion factors derived from experience in Germany, which in some respects has
introduced a greater degree of liberalisation than is implied in the policy options which
provided more protection to existing services than is the case in Germany so the
estimates of rail revenue loss shown in the figure below may overstate the impact.
48
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0053.png
Administrative Burden: The reductions in administrative burdens are estimated using the
costs associated with authorisations and journey forms as previously described in table 2-
6
53
.
The saving from the measure abolishing the journey form for occasional services is
estimated at €4 million over the period 2015-2035
(expressed as present value) relative to
the Baseline under all three options and is the only reduction in administrative burden
under option 1.
Under Option 2 the same savings are generated from abolishing the journey form. It is
assumed that revenue is foregone due to delays in the authorisation procedures and
therefore savings are generated by the reduction in time to complete authorisation
process from four months to two months. This saving is estimated at €1,450 million over
the period 2015-2035 (expressed as present value) relative to the Baseline.
Under Option 3 the same reductions from getting rid of the journey form are generated as
Option 2 with a reduction of around €240 million over the period 2015-2035
relative to
the Baseline due to the elimination of the authorisation procedure and €3,230 million cost
savings generated by the reduction in time to complete the authorisation process.
Impact on market structure in the coach and bus sector: Under Option 1, it is expected
that the liberalisation of the market would lead to a more competitive market structure, at
least in Member States where the market is currently dominated by a limited number of
incumbents. Competitors are likely to focus on specific routes rather than trying to
replicate or establish national route networks. Over the longer term the evidence suggests
that after market opening, strong consolidation takes place. The competent competition
authorities have the role of ensuring that the efficiency gains resulting from the removal
of market restrictions are not unduly appropriated through the abuse of a dominant
position by one player, leading to higher fares. The inclusion of the measure abolishing
journey forms will also reduce costs of entry for the providers of occasional services.
Option 2 will have the same impact on the market structure as under Option 1 but it is
likely that there will be more rapid growth which may lead to greater fragmentation of
the market in the early years of liberalisation followed by consolidation. As mentioned
above, the competent competition authorities have the role of ensuring that the efficiency
gains resulting from the removal of market restrictions are not unduly appropriated
through the abuse of a dominant position by one player.
Option 3 will have the same impact on the market structure as under Option 2, but the
inclusion of the measure abolishing of the authorisation procedure is likely to make it
more difficult to track market developments. If the European Commission does not have
at its disposal comparable, reliable, synchronised, regular and comprehensive statistical
data on the market it makes it difficult for the European Commission to carry out the
tasks entrusted to it in the context of the common transport policy.
Potential relocation of businesses: The inclusion of a measure requiring Member States
to grant access to national markets for regular services without discrimination in Options
1, 2 and 3 will enable operators to operate in markets that were otherwise closed to them
without having to establish subsidiaries. However, in practice, operators may continue to
53
Calculated using the EU average wage (https://www.reinsfischer.com/average-salary-european-union-
2016)
and assumptions on time taken as described in table 2-6
49
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0054.png
establish subsidiaries in different Member States for a variety of strategic and operational
reasons regardless of the regulatory environment.
We would not expect any of the options to have a material effect in the distribution of
coach companies across the EU, although there may be some migration over the long
term away from Member States whose markets are currently closed to operators
established elsewhere.
Integration of ticketing and price competition: Under Option 1 the more fragmented
market over the short term may result in less integrated ticketing since, for example,
inter-modal ticketing arrangements will be more difficult to coordinate. Consolidation of
the market could be expected to make such coordination easier. Over the longer term,
competition could lead to the creation of a wide range of multi-modal products
introduced through partnerships between coach companies and airlines as well as rail
operators.
The more effective protection of public service contracts under Options 2 and 3 due to
the inclusion of the measure to set common requirements for the protection of PSCs
meeting the needs of an urban area will help preserve integrated ticketing arrangements
in conurbations.
Level of infringements of rules on access to the market: Under Option 1 the rules
governing access to national markets will be streamlined and it is expected that there will
be fewer opportunities for operators to infringe them and hence fewer recorded
infringements. However, it is possible that a greater level of market activity could result
in some remaining rules, for example those protecting PSCs, to be infringed more
frequently.
Option 2 should also result in fewer infringements due to the streamlining of market
access rules, including those protecting PSCs.
The inclusion of the measure abolishing the authorising procedure in Option 3 would
appear to increase the risk of infringements. The operator opening a new route would no
longer be checked immediately before commencing the route. Enforcement would have
to focus on access to the profession and the Community licence. The Member State of
establishment would have a vital role in encouraging carriers to comply with the
regulations.
Level of congestion: the changes to the level of transport activity, for both coach
transport and competing modes, imply changes to the level of externalities produced by
each transport mode. The net change in the level of congestion is based on changes to
transport activity and the demand extraction rates and is further explained in Annex 4.
The absolute reduction in car traffic as a result of the options is significant, and since car
traffic makes a major contribution to congestion the impact of the options on congestion
costs are correspondingly large. Option 1 delivers a reduction in congestion costs of in
the region of €6 billion over
the timescale of the impact assessment (expressed as present
value). Options 2 and 3 deliver a significantly greater reduction of about €15 billion in
such costs over the same period.
There is no evidence that any of the three options would lead to greater congestion in
urban areas. Urban congestion is more likely to be a result of terminals not being able to
50
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0055.png
adequately accommodate all coaches in stands or if terminals no longer have the scope to
expand to cater for further frequency increases in coach traffic.
Economic effects for SME’s:
Under Option 1 liberalisation would provide new
opportunities for SMEs, notwithstanding the risk of consolidation over the long term. If
some new business models were to become widespread, national operators seeking to
expand their networks would provide opportunities for sub-contracting and offer benefits
that could be of considerable value to the SMEs. However these effects could be offset
by a general trend towards greater market consolidation, especially if dominant operators
emerge that prefer to manage operations in-house rather than out sourcing.
Under Option 2 the greater market stimulation would be expected to generate more
opportunities for SMEs. As the measure abolishing authorisations in Option 3 would
significantly reduce the regulatory costs faced by SMEs it would be expected to generate
even more opportunities and encourage new businesses to enter the market, either as a
sub-contractor or primary operators.
Just fewer than 60% of respondents to the public consultation have the view that
abolishing restrictions on access to national markets for regular services will have a
positive effect on the economic situation of SMEs.
Impact on public service contracts: In rail passenger transport competition takes the form
of
competition for the market
–
via PSC or service concessions, giving an
undertaking exclusive right to operate on a specific route or bundle of routes; or
competition in the market
–
where two or more operators compete on the same
route.
Ensuring the provision of public rail services usually implies the need for compensating
undertakings. Suburban and regional trains are usually run through PSC, whereas long
distance and high speed trains may be more frequently operated under competition in the
market. In most countries providing data via Railway Information Measuring and
Monitoring System (RIMMS), the PSC compensation per train-km is higher than EUR 5
(with the notable exception of the UK). There does not appear to be any difference
between the levels of PSC compensation per train-km between the group of Member
States that have liberalised their coach market and the group of Member States that limit
competition.
The portion of PSC services in total rail passenger traffic varies widely between the
Member States. As shown in the figure below the portion of PSC services as % of total
rail passenger services indicates that liberalisation of coach market appears to have little,
if any impact on the portion of rail services operated under PSC in Member States.
Figure 6-9: PSC Services as % of total rail passenger services
Non-
liberalised
coach
markets
51
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0056.png
Liberalised
coach
markets
Source: RIMMS, 2014 data except for IE and NL (2013) and EL and ES (2012). Domestic PSO
for FR includes also train services TET, TER and Transilien (operated only by SNCF, and not
RATP)
This indicates that the introduction of commercial coach services does not appear to have
any significant impact on rail PSCs. However, in principle, it
may result in a number of
responses either by PSC operators, within any flexibility to do so provided in their
contracts, or by the competent authorities.
Responses might include changes to fares,
vehicle quality, service frequency, length of service day (from first service to last
service), off-peak and weekend provision, stopping pattern and, potentially, withdrawal.
The mechanisms by which liberalisation may result in changes to PSC services are set
out in table 6-2 below.
Table 6-2: Mechanisms by which liberalisation may result in changes to PSO services
Issue
Has the liberalisation of the coach market
resulted in loss of revenue to services?
If there has been a loss of revenue, has the
operator of those services detected this effect?
Details
This appears likely to be the case except where the
coach service is in a wholly new market and does
not abstract any passengers from existing routes.
If revenues are monitored by route, or boarding’s are
monitored by stop or service, the operator may
detect the effect.
However, in a large PSO operation, with no detailed
revenue reporting, the effect of minor competition
may not have been noticed.
If the operator has detected the effect, can it
identify on which services the revenue is being
lost?
If the operator can identify on which services the
revenue is being lost, can it identify a service
reduction plan (including complete closure)
which would mitigate the losses?
If the operator can identify a service reduction,
can it implement it?
As above, this may depend on the level of
monitoring and revenue reporting of the operator.
This may depend on many operational practicalities.
For example, if a liberalised service takes demand
from the centre of a route which remains busy at the
ends, there may be no saving from cutting the route
into two.
To implement a service reduction it may still need to
be consistent with the public service contract and/or
overall transport policies or labour agreements. For
example, a requirement that all services remain at
least hourly, or of no compulsory redundancies, or
vehicle leases which do not expire for a long period,
may mean no change in response to loss of revenue.
Cost-recovery may be so low that any further loss of
revenue is immaterial.
If the operator can implement a service
reduction, will it be material?
52
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0057.png
If all the above are true:
The PSO operator may cut back services to
the extent that is permitted by its contract.
The competent authority may change the
specification of services in the next contract.
If any of the above are true:
In a net cost contract, the PSO operator may
accept revenue losses.
In a gross cost contract, or where there is an
internal operator, the competent authority may
accept revenue losses.
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
In summary, competent authorities specifying PSC services, prima facie:
may not bear revenue risks, in the case of net cost contracts; However, operators
may stop operating under PSC if operations turn out to be financially
unsustainable.
may continue to provide services on social grounds irrespective of losses if
politically acceptable; and/or
may set fares much lower than costs, so that large revenue losses have relatively
little effect on subsidy; and/or
may make no change until the next contract is awarded, which may be up to 15
years away.
Under option 1 all PSCs remain protected so there is no impact. Under options 2 and 3
PSCs would be affected as follows:
liberalised services required to carry passengers 100 kilometres more would only
affect a small proportion of public service contracts, because many routes
operated in accordance with public service obligations are under 100 kilometres
long and passenger journeys on them are implicitly shorter;
where cost-recovery is low, revenue loss has limited impact on overall subsidy;
and
publicly contracted services affected by liberalisation may not change until
contracts are renewed.
Where coach markets have been liberalised, we have found no evidence of
competent authorities awarding public service contracts or public service operators
citing it as a major cause of reductions in the services provided or closing of lines.
Member States such as FR, DE, IT, and SE who have already liberalised their markets
have not reported during the consultation that there has been a requirement to increase
subsidies or that there has been any loss of public service contract revenues. The opening
of market access also provides the opportunity for competent authorities to reorganise
existing PSC after their which may result in significant cost savings and/or also reduce
travel times by taking advantage of the best of coach and rail.
There is specific evidence from France, Spain and Sweden an EU-wide study on PSO
night trains that provides detailed information on the financing of PSCs. A summary of
the findings are in the table below, and more detailed information are in Annex 7.
Table 6-3: Summary of evidence of impacts of liberalisation on PSOs
Source
Public Service
Contract
duration
Evidence
Whatever impacts on demand and revenue, PSO services may not change until
contract renewal, which may be as long as 10-15 years.
53
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0058.png
France
Spain
Sweden
EU-wide
SNCF expects to lose 15-25%
of revenue, or €1-2
billion per year, but it is not
clear what is due to coach and what is due to car-sharing.
Two of the five busiest coach routes are little more than 100 kilometres long.
ARAFER has received multiple applications to carry passengers less than 100
kilometres, although these may be between intermediate stops on longer routes.
Average passenger length on interregional services has risen to 180 kilometres,
but no equivalent information was found on regional services.
Lack of information on regional concessions, and of the mix of services in any
concessions, makes it difficult to identify where new entry might occur.
One County has no PSO services longer than 100 kilometres, and over 60% of
revenue is from routes shorter than 20 kilometres, implicitly for journeys which
are even shorter.
Cost recovery varies from 80% to almost zero, averaging 30% for all route
lengths: a given percentage loss of revenue would require a much smaller
percentage increase in subsidy.
Liberalisation in Germany, France and Italy was not cited by stakeholders as a
direct or even major cause of closures of night train services, but it had driven
their fares down.
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
The intervention of the Member States would only be required under circumstances
where commercial services serving remote areas fall below the limits acceptable to the
competent authorities. Member States will continue to be free to organise PSO’s that are
required in such a way as to ensure bus connectivity of remote urban centres under all
options. The usual model of PSO to ensure coach connectivity with remote urban areas is
the granting of public subsidies for the provision of these transportation services.
Member States have flexibility to better organise the balance between commercial and
non-commercial services and target the mobility needs of citizens. The distance threshold
should not create many distortions for PSO operators serving rural areas as in some of the
Member States that have not yet liberalised. It is estimated that less than 5% of bus and
coach revenue from PSCs relates to routes over 100km. Given that such services seem
likely to include intermediate stops rather than serving only end-to-end flows, it is
estimated that less than 2.5% of revenue relates to passenger journeys over 100
kilometres. As not all such journeys would be replaced by a commercial service, less
than 1.25% of bus and coach PSC revenue would be lost to commercial services. The
introduction of competition on these routes is likely to result in decreased revenues from
PSO passenger fares which may require an increase in public subsidies to maintain the
same level of service under all options but the increase is relatively small. This would
indicate that under all options the sustainability of public service contracts serving
remote urban areas would not be undermined.
Under PO1, a significant part of the long distance coach and bus market would not be
opened for commercial operators to address demand. The impact on PSOs is less than
under other options as all PSOs can be protected but this option also limits the
effectiveness of the market opening considerably as operators do not have the flexibility
to address demand where it is needed.
Under PO2 and PO3 the impact on PSO’s is increased as more of
the national markets
for regular services are liberalised and new services carrying passengers over distances of
54
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0059.png
greater than 100km cannot be refused on the grounds that the service could compromise
a PSO. The distance threshold is set at a level to minimise
distortions to PSO’s whilst
maximising the impact of opening market access. Increasing the level of the distance
threshold will reduce the impact on PSOs but will also reduce the effectiveness of the
market opening.
Notwithstanding the overall abstraction of passengers from the rail sector, we estimate
the associated loss in rail revenues to be around 1.4% relative to the baseline over the
horizon of the impact assessment (expressed as present value). We therefore conclude
that the primary effect of new coach services on the railways is likely to be a requirement
for a relatively small increase in subsidy by the competent authority.
6.1.2.
Environmental impacts
The changes to the level of transport activity, for both coach transport and competing
modes, imply changes to the level of externalities produced by transport modes. The
formula used to calculate the net changes is defined in Annex 4. In this section the
impacts of the options on carbon emissions, air pollution and energy use are described. In
all cases the environmental impacts of Option 2 and Option 3 are equal as the level of
transport activity was the same in each case.
Level of carbon dioxide emissions: The savings in CO
2
emission costs are substantial.
They reflect the absolute reduction in car traffic achieved under each of the options.
Under Option 1 CO
2
emission costs are reduced by around €80 million relative to the
Baseline over the timescale of the impact assessment. Options 2 and 3 deliver
significantly greater savings with CO
2
emission costs
reduced by around €183 million in
NPV terms.
As an illustration, 2 case studies were carried out looking at the connections between
Paris and Lille and between London and Birmingham to assess the CO
2
emissions in two
different markets, respectively a recently opened market and a more mature market. In
both cases, as explained in Annex 8, the CO
2
emission impacts were important.
Passenger cars are by far the largest emitters of CO
2
serving the connection between
Paris - Lille and are responsible for in excess of 65% of all CO
2
emissions. Coaches,
together with electric trains, transporting passengers collectively are the lowest emitters
of CO
2
.
A typical rail fare would be roughly €40 with a transit time of 1 hour compared to a
typical coach fare of roughly
€15 with a transit time of 3 hours. These differences
illustrate the fact that users of rail and coach have very different preferences and that the
coach customer group are more price conscious and place less value of time.
Based on available travel statistics and CO
2
emissions per person by mode of transport, it
can be calculated that the introduction of the coach connection between Paris and Lille
has reduced transport CO
2
emissions by about 10,000 tonnes of CO
2
per annum.
Moreover, it has resulted in around 250,000 less car journeys between the cities, thereby
reducing also congestion as well as air and noise pollution.
It should be noted that this CO
2
reduction was calculated based on one of the busiest
interregional connections in Europe with the presence of a high number of parallel rail
services. Considering that rail lines are relatively limited in the EU (200,000 km)
compared to roads (5 million km), the scope for coach services
–
without any parallel rail
55
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0060.png
services
–
is very important, and such new services would have an even more positive net
CO
2
effect, as travellers in these cases only have cars as an alternative option.
Energy use: The reduction in net energy use is also substantial. Again, it reflects the
absolute reduction in car traffic achieved under each of the options. Under Option 1 net
energy use is reduced by about 3.6 million tonnes of oil equivalent over the timescale of
the impact assessment relative to the baseline. Reflecting the increased transport activity,
Options 2 and 3 deliver significantly greater savings with a reduction of about 8.4 million
tonnes of oil equivalent relative to the baseline.
Level of air pollution: Again, the savings in net air pollution costs are substantial and
reflect the absolute reduction in car traffic achieved under each of the options. Under
Option 1 air pollution costs are reduced by around €250 million relative to the Baseline
over the timescale of the impact assessment (expressed as present value). Options 2 and 3
deliver significantly greater savings
with air pollution costs reduced by about €590
million.
6.1.3.
Social impacts
Working conditions and job quality:
This initiative on rules on access to the coach market
should be seen as part of a co-ordinated response to the social and market challenges faced.
As part of this package market and social issues in the road passenger transport sector
will become more interdependent. A holistic approach has been adopted with the social,
internal market and posting of workers' rules working better together to ensure both fair
working conditions for drivers and fair competition between operators.
The results of then open public consultation show that stakeholders have divided views about the effect of
a common framework in the EU for access to national markets for regular coach and bus services, the
effect of abolishing restrictions on access to national markets and the effect of removing the protection of
PSCs from competition. The operators and others consider that these measures will have a positive effect;
regulators are equally divided whereas National authorities and NGOs consider they will have negative
effects.
The concerns of the stakeholders have been addressed by the different interlinked
initiatives in this package: (i) internal market rules governing access to occupation of
road transport operator and access to passenger and freight markets, (ii) social rules
applicable to road transport sector, (iii) rules implementing the user and polluter pays
principle in the context of road charging and (iv) the rules on interoperable tolling
services through digital technologies. All together these initiatives jointly contribute to
fair, efficient, environmentally and socially sustainable road transport sector. In
particular, the links between the social and the internal market provisions are most
prominent. The abuse of internal market rules by applying illegal business practices, such
as: illegal cabotage, fake establishment in low-cost countries, have adverse effects on
drivers' working conditions and often deprive them from their social protection rights. In
the same vein, the misapplication of the social rules in road transport by non-respecting
the driving, working or resting time requirements or applying the terms and conditions of
employment of the low-wage country to drivers working most of the time in high-wage
countries disrupts fair competition between operators by unfair cost gains. Therefore,
solving the social challenges in the sector must go hand in hand with addressing the
internal market problematic issues. Enforcement is a cross-cutting element affecting the
effectiveness of both: the social and the internal market legislation. By strengthening
enforcement and administrative cooperation between Member States in the social rules
56
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0061.png
and access to the occupation initiatives should contribute to ensuring fair working and
business conditions, which will enable a balance between the freedom to provide road
transport services and adequate working conditions and social protection of road
transport workers.
The on-going revision of the Posting of Workers Directive will ensure the right balance
between the need to promote the freedom to provide services and the need to protect the
rights of posted workers.
Although there is likely to be increased competitive pressure the holistic and co-
ordinated response means that other initiatives will seek to alleviate the pressure on
working conditions from the policy options on market access. These initiatives will
address any potential erosion of labour market standards that is likely to occur over time
and there does not appear to be a requirement for any further labour market policies to
address these problems.
Employment: In the calculation of the estimate of employment it is assumed that
employment grows in line with transport activity throughout the assessment period but
the estimates assume no increases in productivity. There is also strong evidence from
recently liberalised MSs such as France, Italy and Germany of the positive impact market
opening has had on employment. Market opening at the EU level is estimated to result in
an increase in employment in the coach sector. Under Option 1, it will result in about
34,000 additional employees by 2025, rising to about 37,000 by 2030.
Options 2 and 3 deliver significantly more employment with about 82,000 additional
employees by 2025, rising to about 85,000 by 2030.
We would expect that emerging technological developments in section 2.8, including the
introduction of driverless vehicles, will have an impact on the employment sector but it is
not possible to forecast these with confidence at present.
Road Safety: The impact on road safety is positive for all options. The absolute reduction
in car traffic drives savings in accident costs relative to the Baseline. Under Option 1,
savings of around €1.2 billion will be generated by 2035 relative to the Baseline
(expressed as present value). With Options 2 and 3 the savings generated increase to
around €2.8 billion relative to the Baseline over the time scale of the impact assessment
(expressed as present value).
Accessibility for people with reduced mobility, rights of the elderly and integration of
persons with disabilities: The EDF has received complaints from members who are
concerned that market opening will disadvantage people with restricted mobility. In its
view, the needs of people with reduced mobility are generally not taken into
consideration when operators are purchasing new coaches, and terminals are also poorly
equipped. However, no evidence was found indicating that market opening has resulted
in the provision of a poorer service to PRMs, affected the rights of the elderly, or the
integration of persons with disabilities more than regulated ones.
Connectivity of different social groups: To determine whether the impact of liberalisation
can be expected to be adverse or favourable overall, the following was considered:
the extent to which publicly contracted services, and existing commercial
services, are cut back in a way which disadvantages citizens with limited access
to other modes; and
57
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0062.png
the extent to which liberalised services create new opportunities for citizens with
limited access to other modes.
On the first point, the impact is unpredictable, as it depends on many decision-makers
dealing with routes with different levels of exposure to liberalised services, different
levels of materiality to subsidy levels, different policies and different constraints.
On the second point, those introducing new services in liberalised markets are unlikely to
have data on, and hence be able to target, citizens with limited access to other modes.
They may enter the market using at least two business models:
identifying a new connection, in a new market, which can be operated
commercially: this may benefit citizens who did not have private transport; and
identifying an existing connection, in a proven market, from which they can
abstract passengers (given that the typical market positioning of coach relative to
rail and air is that it is slower but cheaper, this may benefit citizens (or non-
citizens) who could not afford access to other modes).
Evidence from the German market provides some insight into this issue, since it enables
analysis of the origins of passengers on liberalised coach services
54
. It suggests that only
around 10% of passengers had no access to other modes, but many of the others might
have had “limited” access, such as a car which was not always available to them. We also
note that more than twice as many coach passengers (30%) had come from long-distance
trains as from local or regional trains (14%).
Data from a FlixBus coach users indicates that around 70% of coach stops could have
been reached via the public transport or rail network, even if the coach journey itself was
not well-served by public transport
55
.
Liberalised services may serve points which did not previously have public transport,
particularly if they impose only a small time penalty or would be necessary in any case
for rest or a crew change. One example of the former is on the frequent Oxford Tube
coach service between Oxford and London in Great Britain, which includes a stop at the
small village of Lewknor (population around 600), 20 kilometres from Oxford and 60
kilometres from London. However, we note that Member States would not be obliged to
authorise such a stop in Options 2 and 3, as no passengers from Lewknor could be carried
more than 100 kilometres.
54
55
Bundesamt
für Güterverkehr “Marktanalyse des Fernbuslinienverkehrs 2014”.
Bundesamt für Güterverkehr “Marktanalyse des Fernbuslinienverkehrs 2015”.
58
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0063.png
Figure 6-10
Error! Reference source not found.
compares coach and rail fares on
journeys over 300 kilometres and plots rail fare on the horizontal axis and coach fare on
the vertical axis.
Figure 6-10: comparison of coach and rail fares
Source: Comprehensive study on passenger transport by coach, Steer Davies Gleave,
February 2016.
Coach fares are lower than rail fares (points low right on the chart) in many liberalised
markets, and most notably in the UK, suggesting that in these markets, coach may be an
inferior mode that tends to charge lower prices. This is also the case with all four of the
transition Member States although coach fares may fall by around 20% in the first four
years after liberalisation before rising to previous levels (see UK case study in Annex F
of IA Support Study).
In practice, the outcome of liberalisation on coach fares depends on at least two factors:
In the first few years after liberalisation, coach fares may fall, as new entrants try
to attract passengers and build market share.
In the longer term after liberalisation, coach fares determined in the market place
may either be lower or higher than rail fares, depending on the relative quality,
and particularly average speeds, of coach and rail services.
Of the Member States shown in figure 6-9, only Spain has a significantly lower average
coach speed than rail speed
56
. This suggests that, all other things being equal, average
coach fares in Spain may fall after liberalisation, but provides little indication of what
may happen in other Member States.
56
See figure 5.10 Study on the prices and quality of rail passenger services, Steer Davies Gleave, April
2016
59
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0064.png
The estimate of the proportion of additional traffic accounted for by passengers living in
remote regions, passengers facing difficulty paying bills and elderly passengers (65 and
over) under each option is derived using the data from the Eurobarometer Report.
The results of the assessment show that these disadvantaged or vulnerable social groups
would benefit significantly from all three market opening options. Passengers living in
remote regions would account for around 162 billion pkm by coach in the Baseline by
2030. Relative to the Baseline, under Option 1 the pkm by this group will increase by
about 10 billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 2 and 3 the increase will be slightly over 2
billion pkm in 2030 relative to the Baseline.
Passengers facing difficulties paying bills would account for around 50 billion pkm by
coach in 2030 in the Baseline. Relative to the baseline, under Option 1 the pkm by this
group will increase by about 4 billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 2 and 3 the increase
will be about 10 billion pkm relative to the Baseline in 2030.
Elderly passengers (65 and over) would account for about 145 billion pkm by coach in
the Baseline in 2030. Relative to the Baseline, under Option 1 the pkm by this group will
increase by around 7 billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 2 and 3 the increase will be
around 15 billion pkm.
In practice, it is expected that passengers facing difficulties paying bills to benefit
disproportionately, since their travel decisions are typically constrained by fares on offer
and lack of access to a car.
Six of the eight Consumers (75%) and six of the seven Companies (86%) participating in the OPC gave a
positive response when asked if coach services were viewed as important for the economic development
of the espo de t’s egio a d jo s. A f e ue t o
e t i the f ee te t se tio
as that ette
connections and coordination between different modes of transport would encourage greater use of
coach services.
Table 6-4: Synthesis of Economic, environmental and social impacts
PO1
Billion pkm
% increase
Transport activity
in 2030
(difference to the
Baseline)
Economic Impacts
Million
journeys
Services
Load factor
(p.p. change)
Change in
revenues relative
to the Baseline
(present value for
2015-2035)
Performance of
other modes
relative to the
Baseline in 2030
(in billion pkm
and % change)
Modal Share in
28
4.8
190
220
-0.7
PO2
66
11.3
430
510
-1.1
PO3
66
11.3
430
510
-1.1
€
Billion
27
62
62
Coach
Rail
Car
Air
Impact on coach
share (p.p.
28 (4.8%)
-13 (-2%)
-11 (-0.2%)
-1 (-0.1%)
+0.4
66 (11.3%)
-30 (-4.8%)
-27 (-0.5%)
-3 (-0.3%)
+0.9
66 (11.3%)
-30 (-4.8%)
-27 (-0.5%)
-3 (-0.3%)
+0.9
60
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0065.png
PO1
2030
change to the
Baseline)
Impact on coach
and rail
combined
(difference to
the Baseline in
billion pkm)
Frequency
Availability
Quality of
services
Safety (savings
relative to the
Baseline)
Ease of
purchasing
tickets
Market structure
More competitive
market structure
Relocation of
business
Fares
PO2
PO3
15.5
36.3
36.3
Increases
Improves
€1.2 billion
Larger Increase due to
more competition
Greater improvement
€2.8 billion
Same as PO2
Same as PO2
€2.8 billion
Improves due to
more innovation
Same as PO1
Same as PO1
As per PO2 but
more difficult to
track market
developments
No material effect
As per PO1 but likely
to result in more rapid
growth
No material effect
No material effect
Reduction in fares
and more
innovative price
strategies. Long
term action may
be required to
preserve
competition
As per PO1 but
greater reduction in
short term due to
more aggressive price
competition
As per PO1 but
greater reduction
in short term due
to more
aggressive price
competition
More effective
protection of
PSCs will help
preserve
integrated
ticketing in urban
areas
€4 million
Integration of
tickets
Difficult in short
term but positive
over longer term
More effective
protection of PSCs
will help preserve
integrated ticketing in
urban areas
Administrative
burden (cost
savings relative to
the Baseline)
Abolish journey
form
Simplify
authorisation
procedure
€4 million
€4 million
0
Fewer recorded
infringements
€1.4 billion
€3.5 billion
Increase potential
of infringements
Level of
infringements
Congestion costs
(change relative to
the Baseline,
present value
2015-2035)
SMEs
As per PO1
€6.4 billion
€14.5 billion
€14.5 billion
New opportunities
Greater market
Reduced
61
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0066.png
PO1
but risk of
consolidation in
long term
Public Service
Contracts (change
relative to the
Baseline, present
value 2015-2035)
CO
2
emissions
Coach
No impact
PO2
stimulation so more
opportunities
Overall increase in
subsidy of less than
1%
Loss of revenue of
1.4%
€183 m
PO3
regulatory costs
so even more
opportunities
Overall increase
in subsidy of less
than 1%
Loss of revenue
of 1.4%
€183 m
Rail
Net cumulative
savings in CO2
emissions costs
relative to the
Baseline
Net cumulative
energy savings
relative to the
Baseline (000
tonnes of oil
equivalent)
Net cumulative
savings in air
pollution costs
relative to the
Baseline
No impact
€80 m
Environmental impacts
Energy Use
3,600
8,400
8,400
Air pollution
€250 million
€590 million
€590 million
Accessibility
No impact
No impact
Negative as
effective
enforcement more
difficult
62
Connectivity
Increase in
billion pkm of
disadvantaged
social groups (in
2030 relative to
the Baseline)
27
62
Social impacts
Working
conditions
Increased
competitive
pressure but no
direct effect
37,000
As per PO1
As per PO1
Employment
(additional
employment in
2030 relative to
the Baseline)
Road Safety
Savings in
external costs of
accidents
relative to the
Baseline
(present value,
2015-2035)
85,000
85,000
€1.2
billion
€2.8 billion
2.8 billion
62
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0067.png
6.2.
Impacts of policy options to address terminal access problems
6.2.1.
Economic impacts
Transport Activity: Section 2.8 described the calculation of the terminal capacity that
might be unduly suppressed because of discriminatory behaviour. It suggested that an
additional 400 million vehicle kilometres might be accommodated if publicly owned
capacity were available on a non-discriminatory basis and managed effectively. This has
been used as a basis for estimating the effects of a one-off and sustained uplift in capacity
as a result of introducing measures to ensure a level playing field in the allocation of
terminal capacity.
The effects of the options for improving terminal access are small in comparison to the
effects from the market access policy options. The effect under Option 4 is due to the
measure encouraging terminal operators to provide non-discriminatory access that
delivers an estimated increase of 0.9% in coach transport activity in 2030 relative to the
Baseline. Under Option 5 the effect is due to the requirement for Member States to grant
non-discriminatory access, leading to 1.7% increase in coach transport activity (around
10 billion pkm) relative to the Baseline in 2030. It is important to note that this increase
is instead of, as opposed to in addition to, the uplift under market access policy options.
Table 6-5: Estimated impact of options on coach traffic levels
Metric
National
International
Total
% increase
Change relative to the
baseline in 2030
PO4
PO5
4.4
8.8
0.7
1.4
5.1
10.2
0.9%
1.7%
24
47
38
76
0.0
0.0
Billion passenger-km
Million journeys
Number of Services
Average load factor (p.p. change)
Source: Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
Revenue: The revenue impacts reflect the underlying traffic impacts. Option 4 generates
roughly €6 billion in additional coach sector revenue over the timescale of the impact
assessment relative to the Baseline (expressed as present value) but the additional
revenue
generated by Option 5 is more significant at an estimated €12.5 billion.
Level of performance of other modes of transport: The impact of each policy option on
traffic carried by mode is shown in the figure below. The effects of Options 4 and 5 on
modal share of coaches are limited. The small reduction in car transport represents an
absolute reduction which is more substantial under Option 5. Option 5 also delivers twice
as much of an increase in coach pkm as Option 4. Under Option 4 about 0.4% (2 billion
63
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0068.png
pkm) is diverted from rail in 2030 relative to the Baseline and under Option 5 it is about
0.7% (5 billion pkm). In both cases this is a very small portion of the traffic diverted
from rail.
Figure 6-11: Impact of terminal options on other modes (% change in transport activity in 2030
relative to the Baseline)
2.0%
1.5%
% change to the Baseline in 2030
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
Coach
-0.5%
Rail
Car
Air
-1.0%
PO4
PO5
Source: Adapted from Support Study for Impact Assessment 2016 Steer Davies Gleave
As the change in allocation of traffic across modes under terminal access options is
small, the increase in the modal share of coach services is also small at an estimated 0.1
percentage points for both options relative to the Baseline in 2030.
The increase in coach traffic generated by the two options reduces the revenues earned
by other forms of public transport. Under Option 4 rail revenues decrease by around
0.1% (€5 billion) during the timescale of the impact assessment relative to the Baseline.
Under Options 5 the estimated reduction in revenues is about 0.3% (€9 billion)
relative to
the Baseline.
Quality of service: There is no evidence that Options 4 or 5 providing greater access to
public terminals will have any effect on the quality of service. However improved access
to terminals could encourage investment in new facilities.
Impact on market structure in the coach and bus sector: It is expected that Option 4
would support new entry and a more competitive market structure but under soft
regulation the effect is likely to be marginal. The inclusion of the report provides the
Commission with the opportunity to identify any remaining barriers but this would not
encourage new entry unless followed up by further action.
The expected effect of Option 5 on market structure is greater than under Option 4 as
where competition authorities have taken action to address discriminatory behaviour
competing operators have been able to establish new services.
Potential relocation of businesses: Providing greater access to public terminals is not
expected to have any material effect in the distribution of coach companies across the
EU.
64
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0069.png
Fares for users: Given the estimated impact on traffic levels, it is not expected that the
release of terminal capacity under Options 4 or 5 would have a material impact on fares
other than on specific routes affected by discriminatory behaviour. Improved access to
terminals could encourage investment in new facilities by new entrants and there is a risk
that terminal facilities might be removed to exclude facilities from the scope of the
Regulation if a prescriptive definition of a terminal is introduced.
Integration of ticketing and price competition: Option 4 could lead to more ticketing
facilities at terminals under the measure encouraging non-discriminatory access, although
the effect is likely to be marginal. A report by the Finnish Competition and Consumer
Authority in 2016 reveals how discriminatory behaviour can impact on integration of
ticketing and price competition. In summary it finds that the major bus companies
formed a cartel with the aim of preventing market entry. In particular, by refusing access
to certain services so competitors were unable to include their routes within published
timetables, or sell their tickets through established service points.
The provision of ticketing facilities under Option 5 could be greater than under Option 4
as the terminal capacity released under a non-discrimination requirement could be
expected to increase further. However, the effect is still likely to be limited.
Administrative Burden: The total level of administrative activity performed by operators
and authorities decreases under both options relative to the baseline. Under Option 4 the
administrative costs have limited or no impact. Under Option 5 there is a saving of about
€110 million as improved
terminal access results in reduced delay to the introduction of
new services, enabling operators to secure incremental revenue more quickly (one year’s
delay under the baseline is eliminated).
Level of infringements of rules on access to the market: The assessment indicates that
Options 4 and 5 would not have any material effect on level of infringements of rules on
access to the market.
Level of congestion: There is an absolute reduction in car traffic as a result of the
options, and since car traffic makes a major contribution to congestion the impact of the
options on congestion costs is of a corresponding magnitude. The estimates indicate that
Options 4 delivers
a reduction of about €1.7 billion in congestion costs relative to the
Baseline and Option 5 delivers an estimated reduction of nearly €3.4 billion over the
timescale of the impact assessment, expressed as present value.
The removal of restriction in access to terminals located in urban areas may reduce urban
congestion in the immediate vicinity of the terminal as coaches would have access to
stands within the terminal and would not require to park at on street stopping points.
Economic effects for SME’s: Under Option 4 new entry of SMEs could be supported.
However, under soft regulation the effect is likely to be marginal.
Under Option 5 increased entry of SMEs is expected as the evidence indicates that where
competition authorities have taken action to address discriminatory behaviour, competing
operators have been able to establish new services. However, the overall effect is still
expected to be limited.
Impact on public service contracts: Providing greater access to public terminals is not
expected to have any material effect on public service contracts.
65
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0070.png
6.2.2.
Environmental impacts
The changes to the level of transport activity, for both coach transport and competing
modes, imply changes to the level of externalities produced by transport modes. The
changes are smaller in the terminal access options compared to the market access
options. In this section the impacts of the terminal access options on carbon emissions,
air pollution and energy use are described.
Level of carbon dioxide emissions: The net cumulative savings in CO
2
emissions costs
relative to the Baseline are relatively small and reflect the absolute reduction in car traffic
achieved under each of the options. Under Option 4 CO
2
emission costs are reduced by
about €20 million over the timescale
of the impact assessment, expressed as present
value. Options 5 delivers double the savings with net cumulative CO
2
costs being
reduced by about €40 million (expressed as present value).
Energy use: The net reduction in cumulative energy use relative to the Baseline is also
relatively small. Under Option 4 energy use is reduced by 850 thousand tonnes of oil
equivalent relative to the Baseline over the timescale of the impact assessment. Option 5
delivers twice as much savings with a reduction of 1.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent
relative to the Baseline.
Level of air pollution: Finally, the net cumulative savings in air pollution costs are also
relatively small. Under Option 4 air pollution costs are reduced by about €70 million
relative to the Baseline over the timescale of the impact assessment, expressed as present
value. Under Options 5 savings in air pollution costs of about €135 million are achieved.
6.2.3.
Social impacts
Working conditions and job quality: The assessment indicates that Options 4 and 5
would not have any material effect on working conditions and job quality.
Employment: In the calculation of the estimate of employment it is assumed that
employment grows in line with transport activity throughout the assessment period. The
two options result in an increase in employment in the coach sector. Under Option 4,
there are just about 9,000 additional employees by 2030. Option 5 delivers more
employment, with almost 18,000 additional employees by 2030.
We would expect that emerging technological developments in section 2.8, including the
introduction of driverless vehicles, will have an impact on employment but it is not
possible to project this with confidence at present.
Road Safety: The impact on road safety is positive for both options. The absolute
reduction in car traffic drives savings in external costs of accidents relative to the
Baseline over the timescale of the impact assessment. Under Option 4, savings of around
€260 million would be generated relative to the Baseline, expressed as present
value over
the timescale of the impact assessment. With Option 5 the savings generated increase to
around €520 million.
Accessibility for people with reduced mobility, rights of the elderly and integration of
persons with disabilities: The assessment indicates that Options 4 and 5 would not have
any material effect on accessibility for people with reduced mobility, the rights of the
elderly or integration of persons with disabilities.
Connectivity of different social groups: The estimate of the proportion of additional
traffic accounted for by passengers living in remote regions, passengers facing difficulty
66
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0071.png
paying bills and elderly passengers (65 and over) under each option is derived using the
data from the Eurobarometer Report.
The results of the assessment show that these disadvantaged or vulnerable social groups
would benefit significantly from all both options. Passengers living in remote regions
account for around 28% of coach pkm. Relative to the Baseline, under Option 4 the pkm
by this group will increase by about one billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 5 the
increase will be about 3 billion pkm in 2030.
Passengers facing difficulties paying bills account for 8.5% of coach pkm. Relative to the
Baseline, under Option 4 the pkm by this group will increase by almost 500 thousand
pkm in 2030. Under Option 5 the increase will be almost one billion pkm in 2030 relative
to the Baseline.
Elderly passengers account for 25% of coach pkm. Relative to the Baseline, under Option
4 the pkm by this group will increase by around one billion pkm in 2030. Under Option 5
the increase will be about 2 billion pkm in 2030 relative to the Baseline. In practice, it is
expected that passengers facing difficulties paying bills will benefit disproportionately,
since their travel decisions are typically constrained by fares on offer and lack of access
to a car.
Table 6-6: Synthesis of Economic, Environmental and Social Impacts
PO4
Billion pkm
Transport activity
in 2030
(difference to the
Baseline)
% increase
Million journeys
Services
Load factor
Change in
revenues relative
to the Baseline
(present value for
2015-2035)
Economic Impacts
Performance of
other modes
relative to the
Baseline in 2030
(in billion pkm
and % change)
Modal Share in
2030
5
0.9%
24
38
0.0
PO5
10
1.7%
27
76
0.0
€ Billion
6.2
12.5
Coach
Rail
Car
Air
Impact on coach share
(p.p. change to the
Baseline)
Frequency
Availability
5 (0.9%)
-2 (-0.4%)
-2 (-0.04%)
0 (0%)
0.1
0
0
€260 million
10 (1.7%)
-5 (-0.7%)
-4 (-0.1%)
0 (0%)
0.1
0
0
€520 million
Purchasing of tickets easier in
terminals
Greater effect as operators
enabled to establish new
Quality of services
Safety (savings
relative to the
Baseline)
Ease of purchasing
tickets
0
Support new entry but
Market structure
67
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0072.png
PO4
effect is marginal
Relocation of
business
Fares
Integration of
tickets
Administrative
burden (cost
savings relative to
the Baseline)
Level of
infringements
Congestion costs
(change relative to
the Baseline,
present value
2015-2035)
SMEs
0
0
More ticketing
facilities at terminals
PO5
services
0
0
More ticketing facilities as
more terminal capacity
released but effect still limited
€110 million
Improved access to
terminals
0
0
0
€1.7 billion
€3.4 billion
New entry supported
but impact is marginal
Coach
Rail
Net cumulative
savings in CO2
emissions costs
relative to the
Baseline
Net cumulative energy
savings relative to the
Baseline (000 tonnes
of oil equivalent)
Net cumulative
savings in air
pollution costs relative
to the Baseline s
0
0
€20 million
Operators able to establish
new services but overall
effect is limited
0
0
€40 million
Public Service
Contracts
CO
2
emissions
Environmental impacts
Energy Use
850
1,700
Air pollution
€70
million
€135 million
Accessibility
Connectivity
Increase in billion
pkm of disadvantaged
social groups (in 2030
relative to the
Baseline)
0
4
0
8
Social impacts
Working
conditions
Employment
(additional
employment in
2030 relative to
the Baseline)
Road Safety
Savings in external
costs of accidents
0
9,000
0
18,000
€260 million
€520 million
68
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0073.png
PO4
relative to the
Baseline (present
value, 2015-2035)
PO5
7.
H
OW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE
?
7.1.
Effectiveness and efficiency
The effectiveness and efficiency of the policy options for market access and terminal
access are assessed separately against the policy objectives described in section 4.
Considering that the regulatory costs are part of the policy objectives, the efficiency of
the policy options is considered at the same time.
The effectiveness of the options depends on their ability to deliver the specific objectives
set for this initiative. The effectiveness of PO1 is positive but limited. It will introduce
more uniform market access rules and remove some restrictions on market access but
Member States will still be able to restrict access to national inter-urban markets. In
terms of cost effectiveness it rates the lowest with only a limited reduction in costs for
operators and national authorities.
PO2 rates very effective in terms of delivering reduced fares and improved quality of
services. It simplifies the authorisation procedure for operators providing them with
greater transparency. It generates significant savings in environmental costs and an
increase in modal share. It rates highly in terms of efficiency with significant reduction in
costs for operators and authorities as a result of the simplification of the authorisation
procedure and the introduction of a 100km threshold. There is a limited effect on PSC’s
and other transport modes.
PO3 brings additional gains in terms of effectiveness due to the abolition of the
authorisation procedure for services carrying passengers over 100 km. There remains a
limited effect on PSC’s and other transport modes.
Strongly
negative
Weakly
negative
No or limited
impact
Weakly
positive
Strongly
positive
Table 7-1: Effectiveness of market access policy options
PO1
GO1: Facilitate inter-
urban mobility and
connectivity for all
citizens by facilitating
the provision of inter-
urban coach services
GO2: Increase the
modal share of
sustainable transport
modes
Improves quality of service
and reduces fares, simplifies
authorisation process, and
generates savings in
environmental costs.
Moderate increase in modal
share. No impact on PSCs
and limited on performance
of other modes.
PO2
More aggressive fare and
quality of service competition,
further simplification of
authorisation process,
increased level of savings in
environmental costs.
More significant increase in
modal share. Limited impact on
PSCs and performance of other
modes
PO3
Same as
PO2
Same as
PO2
Efficiency shows the relation of achieved results and the necessary costs to do so. There
are no major compliance or enforcement costs associated with any of the 3 market access
policy options for either businesses or national authorities, and the administrative costs
are reduced in comparison to the baseline. PO1 is positive in that it delivers the
objectives at very limited cost and a small reduction in administrative burden of €4
69
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0074.png
million over 2015-2035 expressed as present value. However PO2 and PO3 have greater
efficiency gains in that the deliver stronger results with limited costs and a substantial
reduction in administrative burden of €1.4 billion and €3.5 billion 2015-2035
respectively. PO3 will require changes to enforcement and control. The abolishing of the
authorisation procedure means that enforcement and control will now have to focus and
access to the profession rules, the Community licence and road safety rules. Member
States of establishment would have a much increased supervisory role. There would have
to be increased cooperation between Member States to ensure the correct application of
the Regulation. The only investigations that would take place would be in the Member
State of establishment. Host Member States would rely on Member States of
establishment would rely on Member States of establishment to carry out controls.
Table 7-2: Efficiency of market access policy options
PO1
Compliance and administrative costs for businesses
Compliance, enforcements and administrative costs for authorities
+
+
PO2
++
++
PO3
++
+
For the terminal access policy options, the effectiveness of PO4 is very limited. There are
some small positive impacts in terms of environmental costs, modal share and increases
in transport activity and connectivity for disadvantaged social groups. The efficiency is
weakly positive with small savings in compliance and administrative costs from the
abolition of the journey form.
The effectiveness of PO5 is positive but limited with a greater increase in coach transport
activity. There is also a positive impact on connectivity for disadvantaged social groups.
Table 7-3: Effectiveness of terminal access policy options
PO4
Effectiveness
GO1: Facilitate inter-
urban mobility and
connectivity for all
citizens by facilitating
the provision of inter-
urban coach services
Increases transport activity and
connectivity for disadvantaged
social groups somewhat. Generates
small savings in environmental
costs. Small increase in modal
share. No change to quality of
service or fares. No impact on PSCs
and negligible impact on
performance of other modes
Small increase in modal share.
Increases transport activity and
connectivity for disadvantaged social
groups somewhat. Greater increase in
transport activity and connectivity for
disadvantaged social groups increases
substantially. Limited impact on PSCs
and other transport modes.
PO5
GO2: Increase the
modal share of
sustainable transport
modes
Small increase in modal share.
PO4 whilst addressing the problem of restricted access to key infrastructure includes
voluntary measures to encourage coach terminal operators to provide access. This may
not be adopted by all Member States and accordingly may only partly address some of
the problems identified in practice. The efficiency gain of PO4 is therefore limited as
although there is no major costs for businesses or national authorities there are also
70
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0075.png
limited benefits associated with this option. PO5 is expected to deliver positive benefits
in terms of facilitating inter-urban mobility at minor, if any, regulatory costs.
Table 7-4: Efficiency of terminal access policy options
PO4
Compliance and administrative costs for businesses
Compliance, enforcements and administrative costs for authorities
0
0
PO5
+
+
7.2.
•
•
•
Coherence
In terms of the coherence with EU policy, the following aspects have to be examined:
Internal coherence among the policy measures under consideration;
Coherence with key EU policy objectives; and
Coherence with other relevant EU legislation, including access to the profession,
social legislation and the Posting of Workers Directive.
The policy options are coherent with two key overarching EU strategies, the Agenda for
Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change of President Juncker
57
and the 2011
White Paper on transport policy
58
.
All options contribute positively to employment but the impacts of Option 2 and Option
3 are much greater than the other options. The opening of national markets by Options 1,
2 and 3 and the requirement to grant non-discriminatory access to terminals in Option 5
contribute positively to a fairer and deeper internal market. Option 4, which encourages
terminal operators to provide access, is neutral.
The general aim of EU transport policy is to reduce the adverse effects connected with
mobility which above all means the promotion of co-modality i.e. optimally combining
various modes of transport within the same transport chain. The objectives of this
initiative are coherent with the 2011 White Paper as described in section 2.1 in that they
both aim to make greater use of bus and coach as part of the core network for multimodal
intercity travel. Under all 5 options the amount of traffic generated by the combination of
rail and coach increases. The aim of and this initiative is complimentary to the aims of
rail as they both have the objective of increasing the modal share of the more sustainable
transport modes and improving performance vis-à-vis car.
The Commission's Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050
and the White Paper, transport as a whole has to reduce its CO2 emissions by 2050 of
about 60% vs their 1990 level. The average CO2 emissions of bus and coach per
passenger transported are best in class (with e-train) for long distance transport and as
such these services can play a significant role in decarbonisation of transport. The
revision is coherent with this strategy as the aim of sustainability is shared and the aim of
increasing the modal share of sustainable transport modes is complementary to the aims
of emission reduction, low-carbon, and a climate-friendly economy. All 5 options deliver
savings in environmental costs of energy use, carbon and air pollution and contribute
57
Juncker, J.-C. (2014): A new start for Europe. My agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic
Change. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission.
https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en_0.pdf.
58
COM(2011) 144 final of 28.3.2011.
71
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0076.png
positively to the objective of cutting transport emissions in the Energy Union and the
2011 Transport White Paper.
The absolute reduction in car traffic results in a fall in accident costs under all options is
positive for road safety. The market opening options will deliver a higher share of
collective transport (coach and rail combined) increasing the density and frequency of
service, thereby generating a virtuous circle for public transport modes. The aim of the
Eurovignette directive
59
is to improve the functioning of the road transport internal
market by reducing the differences in the levels and systems of tolls and vignettes
applicable in Member States and to take better account of the principles of fair and
efficient pricing by providing for greater differentiation of tolls and vignettes in line with
costs associated with the road use. The inclusion of buses and coaches will help to
diminish distortions of competition in the internal market for passenger transport by
according preferential treatment (i.e. exemption from paying for the use of infrastructure)
to these vehicles vis-à-vis rail transport, which is subject to such charging. Requiring
non-discriminatory access to terminals promotes the greater integration of the modal
networks providing citizens with a better modal choice.
Strongly
negative
Weakly
negative
No or limited
impact
Weakly
positive
Strongly
positive
Table 7-5: Coherence of market access policy options with overarching EU Strategies
PO1
PO2
PO3
Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change of President Juncker
Boost for Jobs, Growth
and Investment
Resilient Energy Union
with a Forward looking
Climate Change Policy
Slight positive impact on
employment levels.
Limited but positive
impact on net energy
usage, net CO2 costs
and net air pollution
costs
Introduction of more
uniform market access
rules but some
restrictions remain on
access to inter-urban
services
Positive impact on
employment levels
Substantial positive
impact on net energy
usage, net CO2 costs
and net air pollution
costs
Introduction of more
uniform market access
rules with authorisation
procedure for inter-
urban services.
Positive impact on
employment levels
Same as PO2
Deeper and fairer
internal market
Introduction of more
uniform market access
rules and abolish
authorisation
procedure.
2011 Transport White Paper
Access to market and
fair competition
Non-discriminatory
access to national
markets but some
markets and routes will
remain restricted
Reduction in transport
emissions
Reduction in net
Non-discriminatory
access to national inter-
urban markets
Same as PO2
Transport emission
reduction
Road Safety
Significant reduction in
transport emissions
Significant reduction in
Same as PO2
Same as PO2
59
COM/2017/0275 final - 2017/0114 (COD)
72
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0077.png
accident costs
An efficient core
network for multimodal
intercity travel and
transport
Positive impact on
number of services and
size of network
net accident costs
Strongly positive impact
on number of services
and size of network
Same as PO2
Table 7-6: Coherence or terminal access policy options with overarching EU Strategies
PO4
Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change of President Juncker
Boost for Jobs, Growth
and Investment
Resilient Energy Union
with a Forward looking
Climate Change Policy
Deeper and fairer
internal market
2011 Transport White Paper
Access to market and
fair competition
Transport emission
reduction
Road Safety
An efficient core
network for multimodal
intercity travel and
transport
Limited as non-discriminatory
access to terminals is not
guaranteed
Reduction in transport emissions
Reduction in net accident costs
Limited as carriers may still be
discriminated in access to inter-
and intra-modal terminals
Positive impact as discriminatory
access to terminals is prevented
Same as PO4
Same as PO4
Positive impact as discriminatory
access to intra- and inter-modal
terminals is prevented
Slight positive impact on
employment levels.
Limited but positive impact on net
energy usage, net CO2 costs and
net air pollution costs
Very limited/insignificant due to
voluntary nature of measures
Same as PO4
Same as PO4
PO5
Positive impact as discriminatory
access to terminals is prevented.
Market opening may increase the competitive pressure on operators and their workers in
non-liberalised markets. In this context there is an interaction with the legislation on
access to the profession, social legislation and the Posting of Workers Directive. The
strengthening of criteria of establishment and better cooperation between Member States
in the legislation on access to the profession together with the clarifications of the posting
rules applicable to road transport provided in the recent legislative proposals have been
considered. While there are interactions due to the impact of these changes, overall the
revisions make little difference to the assessment of impacts of the options and do not
change the preference ordering of the policy options.
No significant coherence issues have been established regarding the interaction between
the different policy packages and the Tachograph Regulation.
7.3.
Proportionality of the preferred option
The preferred option does not exceed what is necessary to solve the problems and meet
the objectives of the initiative. The problems identified can be best addressed at EU-level
in the context of an amendment to the Regulation. The scope of the Regulation includes
the international carriage of passengers by coach and bus within the territory of the EU as
well as the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate national transport
services within a Member State. For a policy intervention in the internal market, and
73
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
more importantly for international transport, it is necessary to have uniform
implementation across all Member States and to ensure the homogeneous application of
the rules and provide for fair competition. Under these conditions regulations are the
most appropriate instrument as they provide clarity and they do not need to be mediated
into national law by means of implementing measures.
74
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0079.png
Figure 7-1: Preferred Option Intervention Logic
75
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0080.png
7.4.
Conclusion of the comparison of options and combined effects
Based on the analysis above,
the preferred policy option to simplifying administrative
procedures and remove restrictions on access to inter-urban markets rules is PO2
‘Open
access to the inter-urban market for regular services with the possibility to
refuse authorisation if the economic equilibrium of an urban PSC is compromised’.
It provides the same positive impacts as PO3 in terms of increasing the mobility of
citizens with little or no access to other modes of transport and increasing the provision
of inter-urban regular services. The competent competition authorities would have a role
of ensuring that the efficiency gains resulting from the removal of market restrictions are
not unduly appropriated through the abuse of a dominant position by one player, leading
to higher fares. The inclusion of the measure abolishing journey forms will also reduce
costs of entry for the providers of occasional services. PO3 has the largest reduction in
administrative burden which is as a result of the abolition of the authorisation procedure
for regular services. PO3 significantly alters the enforcement and control possibilities.
Host Member States would rely on Member States of establishment to carry out controls
and would be deprived of direct enforcement possibilities.
15 of the 20 Ministries/Regulators (75%) that responded to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire
supported keeping the authorisation procedure. In their opinion it was a useful tool to monitor the market
and ensure safety standards were met.
On the other hand, PO2 benefits from a new simplified authorisation procedure that
provides for effective monitoring of market developments and ensuring that services are
operated safely.
The preferred policy option to simplifying administrative procedures and providing
for greater terminal access is PO5 ‘Equal access rules’.
It provides the most positive
impacts in terms of increasing the availability of existing public terminal capacity,
increasing the modal share of interurban coach services and increasing the number of low
income citizens and regions connected by coach services.
As previously described in section 5.2 the sets of market access policy options and
terminal access policy options have been considered separately as they are not interlinked
and the geographical scope of the effect is different in each case. The outstanding
question is in how far the envisaged options would have impacts that are not captured by
simple aggregation of those already reported. It is considered that
PO5 would reinforce
the impact of PO2 and have important synergy effects as follows:
1. Terminal capacity must be used as efficiently as possible to maximise the benefits of
liberalisation. The growth in the number of services following market opening can
quickly absorb available terminal capacity and the ability to investigate the allocation
of capacity within individual terminals independently can results in a significant
uplift and allow new services to be accommodated.
2. The presumption in favour of non-discrimination would help to ensure a more
favourable business environment for new and smaller operators, allowing them to
plan services with greater confidence.
3. The presumption in favour of fair and non-discriminatory access could reduce the
number of allegations of discriminatory behaviour (through a deterrence effect) and
the costs of investigating them (by providing legal clarity). If so, there would be a
reduction in the administrative burden for all affected stakeholders.
76
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0081.png
4. New public terminal facilities would be subject to new legislative provisions
governing access, preventing dominant operators establishing rights to capacity that
might become entrenched.
5. New rules to ensure fair and non-discriminatory access to public terminals would be
in line with broader EU competition law and policy, as well as legislation governing
other sectors. It would help to reinforce the expectations of operators and policy
makers about the direction of travel of the coach industry.
It would limit the ability of stakeholders to frustrate liberalisation through control of
access to terminals.
One of the key objectives of this REFIT initiative is to reduce the administrative burden
for private operators. The following table summarises the expected impacts of the
preferred option on business costs.
Table 7-7:
“REFIT” balance of the preferred option (Figures provided represent Net Present Values
for the period 2015-2035 in million Euros)
Policy measure
Total impact
expected
4
Qualitative assessment/comment
C4: Abolition of journey forms
A small saving due to the abolition of journey
forms for occasional services
A standardised authorisation procedure and the
introduction of 100km threshold simplifies the
authorisation process and reduces delay to
securing incremental revenue for operators
(reduction from current 4 months to 2 months
expected by stakeholders)
Improved terminal access results in reduced
delay to the introduction of new services,
enabling operators to secure incremental
revenue more quickly (one year’s delay under
the baseline is eliminated)
C1 & U4: Standardise
authorisation procedure and set
common requirements for the
protection of PSCs meeting the
needs of urban areas
1,450
T5: Require Member States to
grant non-discriminatory access
to terminals
110
The main impact of the preferred option is the standardisation and simplification of
the authorisation procedure which is expected to save €1,450
million for the period
2015-2035 relative to the Baseline, expressed as present value.
This saving results
primarily from speeding up the authorisation procedure. The opening of a new coach line
can only be refused for a number of defined grounds. The opening of a new coach line
that carries passengers more than 100km cannot be refused to protect PSCs or because
the principal purpose of the service is not to carry passengers between stops located in
different Member States. This makes the authorisation regime simpler, more transparent
and effectively lowers the barrier for new entrants. Operators benefit because fewer
refusal grounds provides them with more certainty when they are assessing the viability
of a new line.
Competent authorities also benefit from a reduction in administrative costs associated
with national authorisation procedures and possibly because fewer disputes about
negative decisions. There will no longer be a requirement for authorising authorities to
seek the agreement of the competent authority of all Member States in whose territories
77
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0082.png
passengers are picked up or set down for services carrying passengers over 100km. The
time taken for an authorising authority to take a decision on the applications for these
services can be reduced from 4 months to 2 months.
Savings of €110 million NPV over the period 2015-2035
relative to the Baseline are
expected as a result of improved terminal access.
This will reduce the delay for
undertakings gaining access to terminals and enable them to commence the new coach
line earlier securing incremental revenue more quickly.
The final saving on administrative burden is expected from the abolition of the
journey form for occasional services. This is expected to save €4 million over the
period 2015-2035 relative to the Baseline, expressed as present value.
These savings
result from undertakings having less administrative work to complete the forms and
national authorities having less administrative costs from producing, distributing,
collecting and monitoring the books of journey forms.
8.
H
OW WOULD ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED
?
The Regulation does not contain satisfactory monitoring and reporting arrangements so
the quality and availability of data and statistics pertaining to aspects of the Regulation is
often limited. Although the information required to be reported under Article 28(1) & (2)
of the Regulation is clear, the start and finish dates of the reporting period are not
provided and no deadline for the submission of the report is mentioned. This has resulted
in inconsistent reporting periods being used and reported by Member States. Even if
good and reliable data were available on the number of passengers and the amount of
pkms concerning cabotage operations, there are few statistics available for sub-sections
of the market (e.g. medium or long distance coach services) to put the cabotage data into
context.
The European Commission will monitor and evaluate the implementation and
effectiveness of the legislation. The functioning of the Regulation should be observed to
determine to what extent its provisions have contributed to a better functioning road
passenger transport market. Thus the reporting obligation in the Regulation needs to be
strengthened in order to allow a systematic analysis of the market. The Regulation needs
to make clear what data (definition) needs to be gathered and reported as well as what
kind of analysis/report is produced by the European Commission. The relevant data
should be available from Member States.
The Regulation should have a provision which foresees a review and the evaluation of
the new rules some five years after they apply. The evaluation could amongst others
assess to what extent the revision of the Regulation has contributed to reaching its
objective of simplifying administrative procedures, remove restrictions on access to inter-
urban markets and preventing discriminatory access to public terminal facilities.
Operational Objectives
Reduce the elapsed time for the
authorisation process
Open inter-urban market for
regular services for competition
Indicator
Average reported elapsed time by
Member State
The following metrics on regular
services disaggregated by national and
international traffic
Passenger km
Number of journeys
Number of services
Sources
MS Reports
MS Reports
EU Transport in figures
Note: Total passenger km
78
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0083.png
Operational Objectives
Indicator
Number of operators
Modal share of inter-urban coach
services
Number of complaints relating to
regular services
Number of authorisations for regular
services refused on the grounds they
would affect PSC
Number of complaints relating to PSCs
Number of carriers operating domestic
regular services in a host Member
State
Number of carriers refused
authorisation to operate regular
services in a host Member State
Number of complaints relating to
terminal access
Number of operators using terminals
Establish a common approach
to protection of PSC’s
Sources
already available for all
Member States but reliability
needs to be improved. The
aim is to ensure consistent
treatment of international
traffic.
MS Reports
Facilitate cross border entry
MS Reports
Facilitate the level playing field
in access to terminals
MS Reports
79
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0084.png
A
NNEX
1: P
ROCEDURAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PROCESS TO PREPARE THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
REPORT AND THE RELATED INITIATIVE
.
Lead DG
The lead DG for this initiative is DG MOVE. This impact assessment report concerns the
initiative with Agenda planning reference 2016/MOVE/002 - "Better functioning of the
market for bus and coach transport - Reg 1073/2009".
Foreseen adoption date: 4
th
Quarter 2017.
Organisation and timing
The initiative was validated in December 2016 and the impact assessment work started
immediately afterwards. It lasted until August 2017.
The Inter-service Steering Group was chaired by the Secretariat-General with the close
involvement of DG MOVE. All consultations of the associated DGs were closely
coordinated between the two services.
The following DGs participated in the Inter-service Steering Group: DG COMP, DG
RTD, and DG EMPL.
Inter-service Steering Group meetings were held on 25 October 2016 and 13 June 2017.
Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board
The Regulatory Scrutiny Board received the draft version of the present impact
assessment report on 28 June 2017 and following the Board meeting on 19 July 2017
issued a negative opinion on 24 July 2017. The Board made several recommendations.
Those were addressed in the revised IA report as follows:
RSB recommendations
Main considerations
1. The report does not make a convincing, evidence-
based argument why national markets for buses and
coaches and access to public terminal facilities
should be regulated at the EU level.
The argumentation of the report has been
strengthened to clarify the need for action at the
EU level. This includes the insertion of further
evidence from the Evaluation Report and the
support study. An additional problem with the lack
of an attractive mix of alternative sustainable
transport modes has been inserted. Also problems
with objectives not aiming at integrating national
markets and the problem of discrimination in
access to terminals are added (see section 2.3).
The problem definition is restructured and revised
to take into account the problems identified in the
Evaluation section including in particular the low
modal share of sustainable transport modes (see
Modification of the IA report
80
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0085.png
section 2.4).
The description of problem drivers is revised and
provides further information about how national
restrictions prevent carriers from extending their
networks (see in section 2.5.1).
The EU dimension of the problem has been
developed to explain further the integration
between national and international markets (see
section 2.7).
The reasoning concerning the legal basis is revised
to account for the interaction between the
commercial services and PSCs (see section 3.1 and
3.2.1).
2. The objectives of the initiative are not presented
in a consistent way throughout the text. It is not clear
to what extent the initiative aims to increase
accessibility and connectivity for disadvantaged
consumers compared to lowering environmental
impacts. The report does not explore potential
conflicts with obligations to serve remote areas via
inter-urban bus services. If liberalisation erodes
Public Service Contracts, bus service providers may
drop unprofitable connections to low-density regions
and urban centres, going against the objective of
greater connectivity for all citizens. If, on the
contrary, Member States maintain these routes using
Public Service Contracts, subsidy requirements will
increase or the effectiveness of the initiative is likely
to be small.
The general objectives are revised. There are two
general objectives; Facilitating inter-urban mobility
and connectivity for all citizens and increasing the
modal share of sustainable transport modes. The
objectives are complementary and not mutually
exclusive and the proposed measures serve both
objectives (see section 4.1)
An overview of public service contracts is provided
(see section 5.1).
The expected impacts on public service contracts
are described (see section 6.1.1). The section
describes the likely responses to the introduction of
commercial services. The impact is further
explored whilst discussing the impact of the
options on the connectivity of different social
groups (see section 6.1.3).
A description of the impact of national differences
between road and rail have been included (see
section 6.1.1 subsections on fares, level of
performance of transport modes and impact on
public service contracts and section 6.1.3.
subsection on the connectivity of different social
groups).
Stakeholders’
reservations have been included (see
section 5.2) and addressed (see section 5.4 and
5.6).
3.
The report ignores national differences in road
and rail transport sectors. It does not differentiate the
impacts across Member States according to the
availability of public inter-urban services and
national differences in bus and coach regulations.
4. The report does not address stakeholders’
reservations on the proposed policy option.
Further considerations and adjustment requirements
1.
Need to act at EU level and stakeholders’ views
The problem definition including the EU
dimension of the problem, objectives and impact
sections has been restructured and revised to clarify
the added value of EU level intervention. More
detail has been provided on the impacts on users in
the subsection on fares and service quality (see
• The report should clarify the added value of EU
level intervention; given that the impacts concern
mainly national markets and that the effect on global
social costs of transport (CO2 emissions) is small.
81
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0086.png
section 6.1.1) and the connectivity of different
social groups (see section 6.1.3)
• The conclusions of the evaluation regarding shifts
between modes of transport should be discussed in
the problem definition and be taken into account
when assessing the need for action and the
objectives of the initiative.
The presentation of the evaluation results has been
revised (see section 2.3). The finding in the
evaluation report that reveals a lack of accessibility
of affordable transport as a problem (which was not
a problem addressed by the original Regulation and
was therefore not explicitly evaluated) has been
added. The evaluation results are more explicitly
taken into consideration in the revised problem
definition (see section 2.4) and objectives (see
section 4) including the separate introduction of a
new general objective to increase the modal share
of sustainable transport modes.
The critical views of stakeholders are included and
better put into context (see sections 5.2 and 5.4).
The report has been reviewed to respond to the
concerns of stakeholders regarding possible
negative effects of further liberalisation (see
section 6.1.3).
The views of Member States on further
liberalisation, where known, are included together
with further information on non-liberalised
Member States (see section 2.4).
The interlinkages between the initiatives and the
way in which they jointly contribute to a fair,
efficient, environmentally and socially sustainable
road transport sector are explained (see section
6.1.3).
• Critical views of stakeholders should be mentioned
and put into context.
• Explain Member States’ views on further
liberalisation and why some of them have decided
not to open their national markets.
• Explain to what extent
the initiatives under the
package respond to stakeholders concerns regarding
social aspects and safety.
2.
Objectives and Intervention logic
Section 4.1 is revised and restructured with the
inclusion of a second general objective aimed at
increasing the modal share of sustainable transport
modes. The report is now focused on both
facilitating inter-urban mobility and connectivity
for all and increasing the modal share of
sustainable transport modes. The initiative is
expected to have an immediate positive impact on
the level of accessibility and a more long term
positive impact on external costs due to modal
shift.
The problem definition and objectives are
restructured and reviewed. The social objective has
been removed, as the transport disadvantage of
certain groups of citizens is now considered as a
consequence to the problems identified. However,
the mobility of EU citizens, especially access to
low-price international travel options is considered
a valid higher level objective that is served by the
general objective of the initiative (see sections 2
•
Clarify which relative weight accessibility
and the reduction of external costs have and what
dominates in case of conflict.
•
Explain the need to act at EU level with
regard to the social objectives.
82
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0087.png
and 4 and Figures 2-1 and 7-1).
•
Clearly link the identified problem (i.e.
"operators are facing obstacles in national markets to
develop inter-urban coach services") to the
objectives and the options proposed and how it
affects international coach services.
•
Explain the role and the prevalence of the
Public Service Obligations for national and local bus
services.
•
Reconsider the need to act and strengthen
the subsidiarity element in light of the importance of
Public Service Contracts (PSC).
The restructuring of the problem definition and the
objectives provide further clarity on the link
between the problems and objectives. The link is
also described in the intervention logic in figure 7-
1.
An introduction to PSC’s and a discussion of the
role of PSC’s is included in the report (see section
2.5.1). The impact on PSCs is restructured and
reviewed in section 6.1.1.
The reasoning concerning the legal basis has been
revised to include the issue of PSCs (see section
3.1). The authorisation procedure now an
independent body in each MS. A competent
authority or operator of a PSC can request that the
independent body assess whether the economic
equilibrium of a PSC would be compromised by
the proposed new service under certain
circumstances.
The reasoning behind the formulation of the
options is better explained in section 5.6.
Each individual option is further clarified in section
5.6.
The terminology is changed to ‘conditions of use’
and defined in Section 5.1 under objective SO3
policy measure T3.
•
Better explain the choice of options and
packages.
•
Further clarify how the options would be
implemented in practice.
•
Define what exactly is a ‘terminal
statement’ and what ‘essential information’ it would
provide.
3.
Assessment of impacts
•
The baseline should refer to likely
technological changes in the road sector and other
transport modes, and how these impact on social
costs.
•
The report should provide more detail on
likely impacts on users and better explain to what
extent the proposed options would make a difference
for disadvantaged groups of persons.
•
It should indicate whether the price
reductions observed for early liberalisation episodes
can be expected to last or whether market
concentration (like in the case of urban deregulation)
will increase prices at a later stage.
Likely technological changes are described in
section 2.8
More details on impacts are provided in section 6.
See in particular section 6.1.3 subsection
Connectivity of different social groups
Additional information has been added on fares
(see section 6.1.1). The price reductions that are
the likely result of early liberalisation can be
expected to persist to a considerable extent due to
the combined effect of market supervision by
regulatory authorities (in case of abuse of market
power by oligopolists) and by the dynamics typical
for this type of market. As fixed investment
required for market entry is typically very low (no
infrastructure investment, availability of leased bus
capacity) new entry will be provoked by excessive
price rises. These markets will therefore remain
83
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0088.png
contestable after the elimination of national
regulatory barriers.
•
The report should more transparently
present the methods used, the limitations and
uncertainties faced, as well as the assumptions made.
•
The analysis should provide more
information on the expected effects in individual
countries.
•
The report should incorporate existing
differences in the organisation of inter-urban public
transport when assessing the effects of liberalisation.
Further information on the methods used, the
limitations and uncertainties faced, as well as on
the assumptions made have been inserted
throughout Section 6.
Section 6 explains that the expected effect is more
likely to be determined by the response of the PSO
operator or by the competent authority.
Differences between MS’s are incorporated into the
subsection on fares for users (see section 6.1.1) and
the subsection on connectivity of different social
groups (see section 6.1.3). However, country
specific projections could not be obtained from the
modelling.
Modal shift potential is discussed in section 6.1.1.
and further evidence is presented in subsections on
Fares for users and service quality and Level of
performance of other modes. The connectivity of
different social groups is discussed in section 6.1.3.
and further evidence is presented on the expected
positive impact of liberalisation.
Section 6 explains that the expected effect is more
likely to be determined by the response of PSO
operator or by the competent authority. It provides
the mechanisms by which liberalisation may result
in change, as well as further available evidence
from different markets.
Absolute figures have been inserted into the
subsection on the level of performance of other
modes (see section 6.1.1 and 6.2.1).
•
The report should assess modal shift
potential and social impacts taking into account
different national patterns of potential substitution or
complementarity between rail and road transport.
•
The report should indicate the likely
developments of PSC in a liberalised context.
•
The expected modal shift should be
indicated in absolute numbers to make them
comparable and their overall importance should be
assessed.
•
The report should make clear whether or
not liberalisation is expected to lead to greater
congestion in urban areas.
•
The discussion of access to terminals
should further assess the need for and the ways how
to regulate fair access.
It is clarified that there is no evidence that
liberalisation would lead to greater congestion in
urban areas (see section 6.1.1
–
level of congestion)
The problem driver of restricted access to key
infrastructure is developed further to better
demonstrate the need for regulated fair access (see
section 2.5.3).
Measures T1 to T6 on access terminals (see section
5.2) and policy options PO4 and PO5 have been
further developed to demonstrate how to regulate
fair access (see section 5.6)
•
It should take into account that a lack of
restrictions in terminal access can substantially
increase urban congestion.
It is clarified that there is no evidence that
eliminating restrictions to terminal access would
lead to greater congestion in urban areas (see
84
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0089.png
section 6.1.1
–
level of congestion)
4. Coherence with other transport policies
The evaluation of coherence should further
analyse relevant links and synergies (or risks of
redundancies) with other transport policies.
•
The options should be evaluated in the
context of synergies with other interventions to de-
incentivise road transport (e.g. Eurovignette) and
support for the rail sector.
•
The links with other road initiatives in the package
has been further analysed (see section 6.1.3); the
same has been done for other transport policies (see
section 7.2).
The synergies with other interventions of the
options are discussed (see section 7.2).
The Regulatory Scrutiny Board received the revised version of the impact assessment
report on 29 August 2017 and issued in written procedure a positive opinion with
recommendations on 13 September 2017. The Board made further recommendations
which were addressed in the revised IA report as follows:
RSB recommendations
Modification of the IA report
Principal recommendations
(1) The revised report does not provide
clear evidence that EU regulation improves
national inter-urban bus services.
The EU dimension of the problem is further
developed to explain the need to liberalise
national coach services. This includes further
clarification on the link between national and
international
services
and
that
the
liberalisation of national markets can be a
critical factor in the provision of new
international services (Section 2.7).
The models of PSC typically used to connect
rural areas are presented (Section 2.5.1). The
expected impact on rural bus services is
presented and
it is larified that MS s ill
o ti ue to e free to orga ise PSO s i su h a
way as to ensure bus connectivity of remote
urban centres under all options (Section 6.1.
su se tio
I pa t o
pu li
ser i e
o tra ts .
(2) It does not sufficiently substantiate that
public service arrangements to ensure bus
connectivity of remote urban centres are
not undermined by the regulation.
Additional information on terminals is
(3) The report does not provide detailed
presented. It is clarified that this IA focuses on
information on local bus terminal
equal access to terminals and not on
capacities. It does not show that there are
no risks to the economic viability of current
constrained terminal capacity which is an issue
for local, regional and national authorities
terminal operations or of increasing urban
(Section 2.5.3).
congestion levels.
Further considerations and adjustment requirements
1a. The report should further substantiate the
It is clarified that an increase in performance
need to liberalise domestic bus transport at
of international market is one of the primary
85
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0090.png
EU level. It should demonstrate that cross-
border supply will increase national service
levels without creating bottlenecks in
terminal capacity.
objectives of the Regulation. There is evidence
that this increase is driven by domestic
demand (Section 2.7.). Our aim is to ensure
that the existing excess in terminal capacity is
used. It is clarified that the supply of
additional terminal capacity is outside the
scope of this revision and that this proposal
will help to allocate and use existing terminal
capacity efficiently (Section 2.5.3).
The current regulatory status is presented in
Table 2.4. The differences i
stakeholders
views of the market access options are
presented in section 5.1.
The current authorisation procedure includes
an economic equilibrium test for international
regular services. This test has been changed
and will now also be used for national and
international regular services. The test has
been developed to be coherent with test
carried out by other transport regulatory
bodies assessing the economic equilibrium of
a PSC. The independent body has been
proposed to ensure the impartiality and
objectivity of the economic analysis and is
further explained (Section 5.3).
It is clarified that all measures are consistent
with the provisions of Art. 14 (TFEU) and
Protocol 26 (Section 3.1).
1b. The report should take into account the
current regulatory status of national markets.
It should be made clear to what extent
differences in stakeholders' views reflect
these differences in national markets.
2a. The report is now more transparent
concerning the new limitations introduced by
the preferred option to the protection by
Member States of PSCs, both in terms of
geographic scope and modalities for the
rejection of the required authorization.
However, at places (e.g. on p. 18, 25 and 32)
the report continues to suggest that, in all
cases, commercial services will only be
permitted if they do not compromise PSCs.
The report makes clear that the preferred
option limits the PSC protection to urban (less
than 100 km) services. But it should justify
the need for a new "economic equilibrium
test", carried out by an independent body
rather than competent authorities, to protect
PSCs in urban services. The report should also
clarify the consistency of these new
envisaged measures with the provisions of
Art. 14 (TFEU) and Protocol 26.
2b. The report presents service arrangements
for low-density regions as of minor
importance. It should be more transparent on
the subsidy requirements to maintain such
inter-urban public service arrangements as a
consequence of the liberalisation. It should
explore to what extent the ability to protect
public service contracts could limit the
effectiveness of the liberalisation.
2c. The report should discuss whether
competition- or labor market policies are
needed to avoid a decline in competition in
the supply of bus services or the erosion of
labour market standards over time. It should
The impact on PSC serving low density regions
is presented with the impacts on urban PSCs
including a description of the balance between
protection of rural PSCs and market opening
Se tio
. . su se tio i pa t o pu li
ser i e o tra ts .
It is clarified that the competent authorities
have the role of ensuring that there is no
decline in competition in the supply of bus
services after the removal of market
restrictions due to the abuse of a dominant
86
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0091.png
provide information on the costs of such
measures.
position by one player (Section 6.1). As for the
labour market policies the posting of workers'
rules will ensure both fair working conditions
for drivers and fair competition between
operators. This has been developed in Section
6.1.3.
Information on capacity constraints at the
level of regions and cities is limited but we
know that the provision of terminals varies in
the EU and at the level of MS. We have no
evidence to indicate that additional traffic can
be accommodated everywhere. We are aware
that many terminals appear to have adequate
capacity for current services, particularly in
Central and Eastern European States, if they
were built at times when car ownership was
lower. However, this is not always the case
(Section 2.5.3).
Further information about the management of
terminals is presented in section 2.5.3. It is
clarified that there is excess capacity in some
Member States but this is due to the decline in
the coach market as a result of increasing car
ownership reducing the demand for long
distance coach travel.
Duplications have been removed and
inconsistencies are addressed. Figures quoted
now better reflect the assumptions and
limitations.
3a. Additional information on differences in
terminal capacity across regions and cities
would avoid the risk to have overlooked
capacity constraints in some places. This
would qualify the expectation that additional
traffic can be accommodated everywhere.
This could also explain why there is
stakeholder demand for additional terminals.
3b. The report should give more information
on why and how bus terminals are managed.
It should explore to what extent the reported
excess capacity is due to management
regimes to avoid urban congestion and/or
access pricing regimes to cover their full
costs.
4. Removing some of the duplications
contained in the report would help reduce its
excessive length (e.g. similar evaluation
findings are mentioned on p.8 and again on
p.11, p.42). Inconsistencies need to be
addressed (e.g. Sweden is indicated a fully
liberalised Member State according to fig 6.1
p.35 but only for distances above 100km
according to p.38; a new objective has been
added but is not taken into account when
assessing the effectiveness of the different
options). Overall, the level of precision of
estimated impacts (e.g. number of services
estimated under each option) should not
exceed the level of confidence allowed by the
model. Excessive precision in the figures
quoted may give a false sense of scientific
rigour to rough estimates subject to
numerous assumptions and limitations.
Data used in impact assessment and external expertise
87
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0092.png
The Commission sought external expertise in the economic field through a contract for a
support study with Steer Davies Gleave. In the course of the support study, a wide range
of stakeholders were consulted to confirm the scope and the magnitude of the problems
and to provide their views on the potential solutions to these problems
60
. This IA support
study itself followed on from the ex-post evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009
61
and a fact-finding study
62
. In parallel to these studies, the Commission services sought
further expertise and input from stakeholders by means of dedicated meetings throughout
the impact assessment, an open public consultation
63
.
Other sources of data used included:
–
Study on Passenger Transport by Coach in Europe
Final Report, July 2009;
–
Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on common rules for access to the market in coach and
bus services (recast),
SEC(2007) 635 of May 2007;
–
Member State reports
on the activities of the competent authorities delivered to the
Commission under Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009;
–
Member State reports on the activities of the competent authorities delivered to the
Commission under Article 28 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/2009 (unpublished).
60
See
Annex 2 Stakeholder consultation synopsis report for further details.
Insert link
This study was the main basis for the Commission's ex post evaluation of the Regulations:
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/road/studies/doc/2016-04-passenger-
transport-by-coach-in-europe.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/node/4841
61
62
63
88
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0093.png
A
NNEX
2: S
TAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION SYNOPSIS REPORT
.
Introduction
This stakeholder consultation synopsis report provides a summary of the outcomes of the
stakeholder consultation activities which were carried out as part of the review of the
legislation on access to the international market for coach and bus services. It provides a
basic analysis of the responses of stakeholder groups involved in the consultation process
and a summary of the main issues which they raised. Five separate consultation activities
were undertaken, namely:
an open public consultation organised by the Commission services which was
launched on 14/12/2016 and lasted until 15/03/2017 (13 weeks);
a targeted stakeholder consultation organised by Steer Davies Gleave which was
launched on 27 January 2017 and remained open until 24 March 2017 (9 weeks);
18 interviews with a number of stakeholders, including industry representatives,
trade unions, national authorities and operators, which took place during the
period 9 March 2017 to 19 April 2017;
a Special Eurobarometer organised by the Commission, based on interviews with
27,901 respondents at their homes across 28 Member States between 18 March
2017 and 27 March 2017; and
stakeholder seminars and discussions at several different events.
The objectives of the consultation activities were to:
provide the public and stakeholders with an opportunity to express their views on
all elements relevant for the functioning of the internal market in road passenger
transport, as well as to express their positions on the possible/desirable changes to
the regulatory framework; and
gather specialised input (data and factual information, expert views) on specific
aspects of the legislation (e.g. national markets for regular services, terminals,
etc.) from the enforcement community and from the industry, in order to prepare
the impact assessment and the legislative proposal.
Consultation activities
Open public consultation (OPC)
The objectives of the OPC were to help verify the problems faced by the sector, as
identified in the ex-post evaluation, validate the objectives of the possible policy
interventions and obtain the opinion of stakeholders on the appropriateness and expected
impacts of the interventions. It was comprised of two questionnaires, one for the general
89
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0094.png
public and a more specialised one for key stakeholders, which were made available
online through the Commission’s EU Survey facility, ‘Your Voice in Europe’. The
survey was open to all categories of respondents (individual citizens, representatives of
business including individual firms or associations, public authorities and civil society
organisations).
The general questionnaire was concerned with establishing how frequently respondents
used coach services, their view on the importance of such services and their motivation
for using them. A total of 18 responses were received: eight from consumers/citizens,
seven from companies, two from non-governmental authorities and one other as shown in
the table below.
Table A.2-1: Classification of stakeholders responding to the general questionnaire
Stakeholder category
A citizen/consumer
A non-governmental authority (e.g.
NGO)
A company
Other
Total
Notes: “Other” is based on the respondents’ choice.
Number of
responses
8
2
7
1
18
% of responses
44%
11%
39%
6%
100%
Respondents resided, or were based, in nine different Member States (Austria, Finland,
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The
most responses were from Austria, Germany and Hungary, each accounting for three
responses (17% of the total).
Six (33%) of the responses were from EU-13 Member States and 12 (67%) were from
EU-15 Member States.
The specialised questionnaire was concerned with determining stakeholders’ views on
the performance of the market and the possible impacts of potential changes to
Regulation 1073/2009. There was a total of 153 complete or partial responses, including
68 companies involved in the transport chain, 28 non-governmental authorities and 17
road passenger transport workers, as shown in the table below.
Table A.2-2: Classification of stakeholders responding to the specialised questionnaire
Stakeholder category
A citizen/consumer
A road passenger transport worker
(e.g. driver)
Company engaged in transport chain
EU Governmental authority
Number of
responses
1
17
68
3
% of responses
1%
11%
44%
2%
90
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0095.png
Stakeholder category
Enforcement authority
Regulatory authority (e.g.
transport
regulator,
competition authority)
national
national
Number of
responses
3
7
% of responses
2%
5%
A non-governmental authority (e.g.
NGO)
An academic
Other
Total
Notes: “Other” is based on the respondents’ choice.
28
1
25
153
18%
1%
16%
100%
Respondents resided in, or were based in, 16 different Member States (Austria, Belgium,
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Four
respondents were from other European non-EU countries. 90 responses (59%) were from
Germany.
Five (3%) of the responses were from EU-13 Member States and 144 (94%) were from
EU-15 Member States.
Targeted stakeholder consultation
The targeted stakeholder consultation involved sending a detailed questionnaire to key
stakeholders identified during the inception stage of the study. Four different
questionnaires were produced, each tailored to the type of stakeholder.
A total of 31 responses were received, and a breakdown by stakeholder group is shown in
the table below.
Table A.2-3: Targeted questionnaire responses
Type
Questionnaires
sent
53
14
91
27
Responses
received
20
2
3
6
Percentage
of
questionnaires
sent
38%
14%
3%
22%
Ministry / Regulator
Pan-European
organisation
Operator
Operator association
Table A.2-4: Responses to questionnaire
Member State
EU13
EU15
Number of responses
10
19
Percentage
32%
61%
91
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0096.png
Pan-European
2
6%
Interviews were conducted with the aim of gathering more detailed insights into
stakeholder’s experiences as well as their views on the different measures under
consideration. They also provided an opportunity to request quantitative data required for
the impact assessment. In each case, we submitted specific questions in advance and/or
sought clarification on information provided through the questionnaires. Interviews were
held either face-to-face or by phone.
Table A.2-5: Summary of interview programme
Type of stakeholder
Ministry / Regulator
Pan-European
organisation
Operator
Operator association
Number of
completed
6
4
4
4
UK, FR, ES
DE, UK, IE, SE
interviews
Member States covered
UK, EL, IT, IE, NL, FR
Eurobarometer
A Eurobarometer public opinion survey is to be conducted amongst European citizens in
the 28 Member States of the EU. The objective of this survey was to gather the opinion
of the European citizens on a series of issues related to satisfaction with current coach
services in their country and reasons for using/ not using such services.
Targeted stakeholder consultation
The consultant responsible for the support study consulted stakeholders through
questionnaires. The questionnaires were targeted at each relevant stakeholder group and
were adjusted to the needs of each particular group.
The survey investigated:
how many Europeans use coach services and how regularly they do so;
the extent of both domestic and international coach travel;
the purposes for which coach services are used;
how users rate coach services in general, and how they rate specific aspects of the
service including feelings of safety, punctuality and reliability, fares, comfort and
integrated ticketing;
perceptions of service quality among non-users;
the reasons why citizens choose to travel by coach; and
what improvements in existing services, if any, would make them more likely to
use coach services.
Conclusions and limitations
The objectives of the consultation activities have been largely achieved. All relevant
stakeholder groups within all EU Member States have been consulted, and most provided
their views to the policy measures under consideration.
92
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0097.png
It was difficult to engage stakeholders due to the level of consultation activity in 2017 in
support of the study and that undertaken in 2016 as part of the evaluation. The feedback
from most stakeholders we contacted was that they had already responded to the OPC
and/or targeted stakeholder questionnaire and were too busy to engage further.
Consulting via various methods on the same subject in a short period meant that there
was only a limited response in some areas.
Although we requested that stakeholders send us any available data on the coach market,
relatively little was received. This reflected the following:
many Member States do not collect statistics for the coach market and are only
concerned with the authorisations granted; and
the operators we spoke to would not share data for reasons of confidentiality or
because of their company policy.
Results of consultation activities
Stakeholder input on problems with current legislation
Stakeholders provided significant input that helped to validate and elaborate the
definition of the problem and identify potential changes to the current legislation. Input
relating to the problem definition came primarily from the OPC and the targeted
stakeholder questionnaires, and to a lesser extent from the interviews and Eurobarometer.
The sections below summarise the inputs provided and their implications for the
following aspects of the problem:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
restricted access to the market for domestic regular services;
the requirement for establishment in Member State;
different national approaches to liberalisation; discrimination in access to bus and
coach terminals;
and the role of coach services in improving connectivity and economic
development.
Access to the market for domestic regular services is restricted
The Open Public Consultation Specialised (OPCS) stakeholders agreed that restrictions
on access to the national market for regular coach and bus services constitutes a problem.
50 of the 153 (33%) respondents agreed that it is a major problem and 42 (27%) agreed
that it is a minor problem. 30 of the 45 (67%) of companies engaged in the transport
chain (“Companies”) indicated that the restrictions have a negative impact on the ability
of undertakings to expand into new markets, and none expressed the view that they had a
positive impact. A majority of stakeholders stated that establishing a common EU
framework for access to national markets for regular services would reduce the cost of
compliance with legislation relative to the costs under the present rules. However, such a
framework was also considered to have a possible negative effect on incumbent coach
93
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0098.png
operators by 22 of the 68 (32%) Companies, two of the three (67%) EU Governmental
Authorities, 19 of the 28 (68%) NGOs and seven of the 17 (41%) Workers.
In an interview, National Express stated there was no discrimination in providing access
to the UK market. They cited an example of a new entrant from the US gaining access
and operating a service within six months of announcing its intention. However, two
operators responding to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire noted that they had been
refused access to the domestic market, given partial permission to operate or asked to
modify their schedule because it was in competition with an existing public service.
The requirement for establishment in Member State
A majority of stakeholders responding to the OPCS stated that the specific requirement
for local establishment is a concern, with 83 of 153 (54%) identifying it as either a minor
or major problem. 39 of the 68 (57%) Companies who responded stated that it was a
major or minor problem. However, two of three responses from EU Governmental
Authorities, 14 of 28 (50%) from NGOs and four of seven (57%) from Regulatory
Authorities indicated that the requirement was not a problem. The biggest perceived
negative impact of this requirement among Companies was the associated administrative
costs for carriers
–
29 of the 36 (81%) identified these costs as a negative impact.
Moreover, a majority of stakeholders considered that assisting entry into national markets
by carriers resident in other Member States would be beneficial. 38 of the 68 (56%)
Companies and 11 of the 17 (65%) road passenger transport workers (“Workers”) stated
that this would make a positive contribution to the market. At the same time, a majority
of NGOs, 15 of the 28 (54%), and Regulatory Authorities, three of the seven (43%),
stated that there would be no impact on the market.
Different national approaches to liberalisation
43 of the 68 Companies (63%) and 14 of the 17 Workers (59%) responded that the
‘patchwork’ approach to liberalisation
across the EU was a problem. However, two of the
three EU Governmental Authorities (67%), 16 of the 28 NGOs (57%), four of the seven
Regulatory Authorities (57%) and two of the three Enforcement Authorities (67%) did
not consider the differences between the levels of liberalisation in different Member
States to be a concern. Again, the effect on the administrative costs for carriers was
considered to be the greatest negative impact, with 32 of the 38 (84%) Companies, seven
of the nine (78%) NGOs, two of the three (67%) Regulatory Authorities, six of the eight
(75%) Workers and an Enforcement Authority respondent indicating that there would be
a significant negative impact or negative impact.
This view was reinforced during interviews with operators. For example, National
Express highlighted that consistency on market access rule is needed as some countries’
national rules have precedent over European rules, making it difficult to enter new
markets. However, the European Trade Worker’s Federation (ETF)
said that they
disagreed with liberalisation as there are no consistent rules governing driver working
conditions across the EU. They cited the freight industry as an example of how problems
can arise in a mature liberalised market. This opinion was supported by other Pan-
94
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0099.png
European organisations, including the EDF, which stated in interview that it would prefer
a more regulated market, as in the rail sector.
Discrimination in access to bus and coach terminals
A majority of stakeholder groups responding to the OPCS stated that discrimination
against new entrants in providing access to terminals was a problem. 39 of the 68
Companies (57%), two of the three EU Governmental Authorities (67%), 15 of the 28
NGOs (54%), four of the seven Regulatory Authorities (57%) and 10 of the 17 Workers
(59%) indicated that discrimination was either a major or a minor problem. 26 of the 32
(81%) Companies stated that the resulting administrative costs for carriers constituted a
negative impact. No stakeholder group considered that discriminatory access to terminals
had a positive impact. Two of the three (67%) Enforcement Authorities that responded
did not consider discrimination to be a problem however.
When asked about complaints from operators in regards to terminal access, the French
Regulator gave an example of an ongoing dispute by a coach operator. The operator
could not gain access to the coach terminal at Beauvais airport due to the non-publication
of the terminal access rules. The case was dismissed after the rules were subsequently
published, but it was decided at the end of December 2016 to open an infringement
procedure to investigate possible breaches by the operator of its legal obligations. In the
Regulator’s opinion, the rules were not objective, transparent and
non-discriminatory in
nature. The investigation is on-going.
The view that terminal access is discriminatory was supported by Megabus who told us
that they had been denied access to the terminal in Birmingham which is privately owned
by National Express, a rival operator, and have had difficulty obtaining departure slots at
the public terminal in Leeds which is managed by National Express.
The role of coach services in improving connectivity and economic development
Six of the eight Consumers (75%) and six of the seven Companies (86%) participating in
the Open Public Consultation General (OPCG) gave a positive response when asked if
coach services were viewed as important for the economic development of the
respondent’s region and jobs. A frequent comment
in the free text section was that better
connections and coordination between different modes of transport would encourage
greater use of coach services. In general, respondents did not consider that the use of
coach services was discouraged by excessive fares, with four of the seven (57%)
Companies, 100% of NGOs and five of the eight (63%) consumers viewing fares
positively.
However, these results must be qualified to some degree by the results of the
Eurobarometer survey. Across the EU, some 35% of those surveyed made some use of
coach services to travel within their own country, with 25% using them to travel to
destinations in other countries. The majority of journeys are made for leisure purposes,
although some passengers use coach services to connect with airports and rail stations as
well as to make work-related trips. The primary reasons for travelling by coach are the
availability of low fares, even among countries with more liberal market access rules,
95
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0100.png
although lack of access to a car was also frequently cited a reason for choosing coach
services.
Nevertheless, the Eurobarometer results also provide some evidence that fares continue
to be a barrier to coach travel. Among non-users, the most frequent responses to the
question ‘what would make you more likely to travel by coach?’ were lack of access to a
car (37% of non-user responses) and lower prices (26% of non-user responses). The
corresponding responses among economically disadvantaged non-users (facing
difficulties paying bills most of the time) were similar (35% and 32% respectively).
Moreover, among users of coach services in the same disadvantaged group, low prices
accounted for 32% of responses to the question ‘why did you decide to travel by coach
on the most recent trips?’ This suggests that
lower income passengers are aware of the
price competitiveness of coach travel but would make more trips if fares were even
lower.
Stakeholder input on policy measures considered
Stakeholders provided input on the level of support and expected impacts of the policy
measures under consideration. An analysis of the views expressed is presented below.
Extend the scope of the legislation to include all regular services (both international and
national services)
The majority of respondents to the OPCS supported establishing a common framework in
the EU for access to the national for markets for regular services. 44 of the 68 (65%)
Companies, four of the seven (57%) Regulatory Authorities, all three (100%)
Enforcement Authorities and 11 of the 17 (65%) Workers gave the opinion that the
measure would improve the performance of the coach market. Two of the three (67%)
EU Governmental Authorities and 15 of the 28 (54%) NGOs responding stated that this
proposed measure would not contribute to the performance of the coach market.
The respondents to the targeted questionnaire expressed mixed opinions on the proposed
extension of scope. Most Ministries/Regulators that offered an opinion (six out of eight)
did not support the extension or considered that it should be limited and only applicable
in certain circumstances. The reasons given ranged from concerns about unfavourable
impacts on coach sector employees to the potential adverse impact on services operated
as public service obligations. However, two of three operators, the two Pan-European
organisations, and two of three operator associations offering an opinion were supportive.
A number of these respondents cited the success of liberalisation in Germany and France,
a reduction in bureaucracy caused by national regulations and prevention of unfair
competition as reasons to extend the scope.
Abolish the authorisation procedure so that any undertaking established in a Member
State would be free to operate new regular international and national services on any
route whether it is already operated by one or more transport undertaking
15 of the 20 Ministries/Regulators (75%) that responded to the targeted stakeholder
questionnaire supported keeping the authorisation procedure. In their opinion it was a
useful tool to monitor the market and ensure safety standards were met. Only one
96
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0101.png
Ministry/Regulator supported abolition of the authorisation procedure, stating that the
current process was an unnecessary administrative burden. Four of the six operators who
responded (67%) also supported keeping the authorisation procedure but highlighted that
they would like to see the timescale reduced. There was mixed support among operator
associations, with two arguing for abolition to increase transparency and two stating that
it should be kept but standardised.
When interviewed, the Italian Regulator was in favour of keeping the authorisation
procedure and establishing a framework that could be used to evaluate the economic and
financial capabilities of applicants. The main reason authorisations are refused in Italy is
because the applicant does not meet the minimal financial requirements to guarantee the
service. This view was supported by National Express, who noted that the authorisation
procedure was robust albeit time consuming. They suggested that the length of the
process could be reduced from three to two months.
Set common requirements for the protection of PSCs so as to ensure that Member States
are permitted to take action to protect public services contracts from competition
36 of the 68 Companies (53%) and eight of the 17 Workers (47%) responding to the
OPCS stated that removing the protection of PSCs from competition would contribute to
improving the performance of the market. The biggest negative impact was perceived to
be the effect on incumbent coach operators.
The Italian Regulator suggested in an interview that removing the national limitation for
PSOs would be beneficial. If a service in Italy crosses two regions it is regulated at the
national level, and otherwise subject to regional regulation. Introducing a kilometre-
based definition for the purposes of determining regional jurisdiction would simply the
process.
The response to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire was more divided. Six out of 20
Ministries/Regulators (30%) supported a set of common requirements on the grounds
that this would help to create a more level playing field, while five (25%) did not support
the proposed measure.
Require that carriers from all Member States be guaranteed access to national regular
services markets without discrimination on grounds of nationality or place of
establishment
The responses to an OPCS question concerning abolition of restrictions on access to
national markets for regular services were mixed. 42 of the 68 Companies (62%), four of
the seven Regulatory Authorities (57%) and 10 of the 17 Workers (59%) stated that
abolition would contribute to improving performance of the market. However, two of the
three EU Governmental Authorities (67%), 17 of the 28 NGOs (61%) and two of the
three Enforcement Authorities (67%) did not consider that the proposal would be
beneficial.
9 of the 20 Ministries/Regulators (45%) that responded to the targeted stakeholder
questionnaire did not support this proposal. They considered that the measure could lead
to discriminatory conditions or have a negative impact on employment. The other
97
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0102.png
respondents within this category either did not express an opinion or did not recognise
the underlying concern. The only support for the measure came from the operator
associations - 3 of the 6 respondents in this category (50%) considered that it would
benefit customers and lead to a better quality of service.
Devise a definition of a coach terminal so that it can be differentiated from stopping
points and on-street bus stops
The respondents to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire broadly supported this
proposal. Two of the three operator associations (67%) that responded to the question
believed it would be useful to have one transparent definition. Of the
Ministries/Regulators that responded, 8 (40%) supported having a common definition
while 5 (25%) did not see any merit in a definition and considered that it should be left to
Member States.
When interviewed, the EDF highlighted their preference for terminals in defined
locations to guarantee better access for disabled people. EDF added that this was
particularly important for people with autism as it allowed them to plan their trips in
advance.
Establishing minimum common requirements to ensure that coach terminals provide
access to operators of regular services on fair and non-discriminatory terms
A majority of respondents to the OPCS considered that facilitating a level playing field in
access to terminals would help to improve the performance of the market. 46 of the 68
Companies (68%), 15 of the 28 NGOs (54%), five of the seven Regulatory Authorities
(71%) and 11 of the 17 Workers (65%) responded positively to this proposal, although
two of the three (67%) Enforcement Authorities that responded considered that it would
have a negative impact. 41 of the 68 Companies (60%) and 10 of the 17 Workers (59%)
stated that the effect on service quality would be beneficial.
Moreover, the majority of Ministries/Regulators that responded to the targeted
stakeholder questionnaire supported establishing common requirements to ensure that
access to coach terminals is fair and non-discriminatory. Seven of those responding
(35%) supported the proposal, although two considered that it should be left to best
practice and four stated that there are sufficient measures already. All three Pan-
European organisations and all three operator organisations that responded supported the
proposed measure. Two operators indicated that establishing requirements was an
essential measure.
In an interview, the operator association Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT)
stated that terminal access was a major concern. They suggested that there should be an
EU-wide regulation requiring Member States to adopt appropriate measures to enhance
and manage terminal capacity. CPT also indicated that the coach terminal at Heathrow in
the UK was an example of good practice in the definition and transparency of schedules
and tariffs.
Abolish the requirement for occasional services to require a journey form
98
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0103.png
There was a positive response to the OPCS on whether journey forms are useful. Three
EU Governmental Authorities (100%), six of the seven Regulatory Authorities (86%)
and two Enforcement Authorities (67%) supported this view. However, 49 of the 65
Companies (75%), 21 of the 27 NGOs (78%) and 15 of the 17 Workers (88%) considered
that journey forms served no useful purpose.
Only one Ministry/Regulator responding to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire
supported abolition of the requirement for a journey form. 13 of the 14
Ministries/Regulators (93%) that responded to the question wanted to keep the
requirement as they regard it is a useful means of monitoring and regulating coach
services. one operator, one Pan-European organisation and one operator association
stated that journey forms should be retained. However, three of the operator associations
that responded (75%) and one Pan-European organisation stated that journey forms
should be abolished in the interests of reducing bureaucracy.
Clarify
the definition of ‘international carriage’ to ensure that closed-door
tours that visit
other Member States are not excluded from the scope of the Regulations
The respondents to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire did not offer specific support
on the
clarification of the definition of ‘international carriage’, although only one
Ministry and one operator explicitly stated that the meaning is currently clear and well-
understood.
Similarly a majority of stakeholders responding to the OPCS considered that the
definition was sufficiently clear. 40 of the 66 Companies (61%), two of the three EU
Governmental Authorities (67%), 20 of the 26 NGOs (77%), six of the seven Regulatory
Authorities (88%), 13 of the 16 Workers (81%) and all three Enforcement Authorities
participating stated that further clarity was not needed.
Clarify the definition of “regular services” to ensure that there is no requirement to have
stopping points along the route but if there is stopping points they must be known in
advance
The respondents to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire did not offer any specific
support for clarifying the definition of ‘regular services’, although only one Ministry and
one operator explicitly stated that the meaning is currently clear and well-understood.
One Ministry mentioned that it would support a clear definition of ‘special regular
services’.
A majority of all stakeholder groups responding to the OPCS also stated the definition
was sufficiently clear. 35 of the 65 Companies (54%), two of the three EU Governmental
Authorities (67%), 20 of the 27 NGOs (74%), four of the seven Regulatory Authorities
(57%), nine of the 16 Workers (56%) and all three Enforcement Authorities participating
stated that clarity was not required.
Clarify that there is no requirement for an own-account operator to possess a community
licence to be issued a certificate for own-account operations
99
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0104.png
Similarly, respondents to the targeted stakeholder questionnaire did not offer specific
support for clarifying that there is no requirement for an own-account operator to possess
a community licence if it is to be issued a certificate for own-account operations. Among
the stakeholder groups responding to the OPCS, only two of the three EU Governmental
Authorities (67%) indicated that the current provision is not sufficiently clear.
Clarify the meaning of “Cabotage operations shall be authorised…” in Article 15 to mean
that cabotage operations are authorised rather than need to be authorised
10 of the 20 Ministries/Regulators (50%) that responded to the targeted stakeholder
questionnaire specifically mentioned that they would support clarification of the meaning
of this provision. This view was supported by the two Pan-European organisations that
responded, and an operator noted that it was particularly important as interpretations vary
by country. Moreover, only four Ministries/Regulators (20%) considered the meaning to
be sufficient already.
The need for greater clarity was generally supported by the results of the OPCS. Two of
the three EU Governmental Authorities (67%), four of the seven Regulatory Authorities
(57%) and two of the three Enforcement Authorities (67%) indicated that the current
cabotage rules are sufficiently clear. However, 26 of the 67 Companies (39%), 20 of the
27 NGOs (74%) and seven of the 15 Workers (47%) saw no value in further clarification.
The biggest negative impact of not having clarification was perceived to be the
enforcement costs for Member States.
Use of consultation results
The open public consultation was mostly used as a test of the validity of the
Commission's understanding of the problems at stake and of the most adequate policy
measures considered. The results confirmed the Commission's initial views and approach
to the ex-post analysis and to the Impact Assessment.
The OPC and the targeted stakeholder questionnaires, and to a lesser extent from the
interviews and Eurobarometer provided the information for the problem definition. It was
not possible to get much more quantitative (data, statistics) information from the
stakeholders during the consultation process. However, it was a rich source of qualitative
(opinions, views and suggestions) information which helped close the Commission’s
knowledge gap.
100
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0105.png
A
NNEX
3: W
HO IS AFFECTED BY THE INITIATIVE AND HOW
?
Citizens & passengers
–
are provided with an improved offer of passenger transport
services in terms of availability, cost, quality and reliability across the EU. The
promotion of coach travel facilitates mobility for all and
in
particular those who suffer
from transport disadvantage. Where new coach and bus services operate citizens will
benefit from less congestion, better air quality due to the on average lower emissions that
all other inter-city passenger transport modes and in particular from car.
Road Passenger Transport Operators
–
benefit from the removal of legal barriers to
market access and the introduction of uniform market rules. There is a reduction in the
administrative burden and new entrants will have fair and non-discriminatory access to
terminal infrastructure gain business opportunities. Incumbent operators lose protection
but also benefit from new business opportunities and the incentive to innovate.
Terminal Operators
–
must provide all carriers with non-discriminatory access to
terminals, promoting competition between carriers and the development of an integrated
coach network. They will benefit from new business opportunities.
Road Passenger Transport workers
–
there will be an improvement in employment
opportunities without any apparent adverse impact on working conditions, pay and
employment conditions or health and safety in the workplace.
Public Authorities
–
Will benefit from a reduction in administrative burden from the
introduction of a simplified authorisation procedure for regular services and the abolition
of the journey form for occasional services. May affect how public authorities provide
for inter-urban passenger transport e.g commercially or in the general economic interest
through PSCs.
101
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0106.png
A
NNEX
4: A
NALYTICAL MODEL USED IN PREPARING THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
STRUCTURE OF THE IA TOOL
An Excel-based IA tool was developed to evaluate impacts in each Member State across
a 20-year assessment period from 2015 to 2035. An illustration of the structure of the IA
tool is set out in the figure below.
Figure A.4-1: IA tool structure
The main elements within the tool are as follows:
Estimating the impact of liberalisation:
changes to the baseline scenario level
of transport activity arising from the implementation of defined policy measures
are estimated based on evidence from previous domestic coach market
liberalisation initiatives. Impacts on regulatory costs are calculated separately.
64
Estimating the baseline scenario:
it provides projections under current trends
and adopted policies, drawing on input and growth assumptions an updated EU
Reference scenario 2016
64
.
This scenario has been developed with the PRIMES-TREMOVE model (i.e. the same model used for
the EU Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-E3MLab. A detailed description of this scenario is available
in the Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC
on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180
102
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0107.png
Assessing
secondary impacts:
deviations from the baseline scenario level of
secondary impacts are driven by changes to the level of transport activity.
Each of these elements is explained in more detail in the following paragraphs.
BASELINE SCENARIO
The Baseline scenario builds on the EU Reference scenario 2016 but additionally
includes some updates in the technology costs assumptions (i.e. for light duty vehicles)
and few policy measures adopted after its cut-off date (end of 2014) like the Directive on
Weights and Dimensions, the 4th Railways Package, the NAIADES II Package, the Ports
Package, the replacement of the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) test cycle by the
new Worldwide harmonized Light-vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP)
65
, and the market
liberalisation of buses and coaches market in France, Germany, Italy and Poland.
The Baseline scenario has been developed with the PRIMES-TREMOVE model (i.e. the
same model used for the EU Reference scenario 2016) by ICCS-E3MLab. The impact of
the market liberalisation of buses and coaches market in France, Germany, Italy and
Poland has been evaluated directly with the Excel-based IA tool.
The Baseline scenario of the Excel-based IA tool, used as benchmark for comparing the
Policy Options, is defined in terms of few metrics estimated for the whole of the
assessment period (2015-2035):
the level of coach transport activity (in terms of passenger kilometres, vehicle
kilometres and journeys);
the level of transport activity on competing modes (rail, car and air);
the modal share for coach;
fare levels;
revenue (for coach and competing transport modes);
levels of employment;
congestion costs;
accident costs;
energy use (in tonnes of oil equivalent);
CO
2
emissions (in tonnes and monetised using the value of CO2);
air pollution (in terms of the external costs of pollution); and
regulatory costs
.
The sources and assumptions used to estimate each of these metrics in the Excel-based
IA tool, in each Member State, are shown in the table below.
65
A detailed description of the Baseline scenario is available in the Impact Assessment accompanying the
Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for
the use of certain infrastructures, SWD (2017) 180.
103
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0108.png
Table A4-1: Baseline Scenario sources and assumptions
Metric
The level of coach activity
The level of transport activity
on competing modes
Coach mode share
Fare levels
Source for 2015 value
PRIMES-TREMOVE model*,**
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
(provided as unit costs)
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
(using unit costs and transport
activity)
EU Statistical Pocketbook
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
Estimated based on bottom up
calculations
Growth assumption
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
Revenue
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
Grows in line with the level of
transport activity
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
Grows in line with the level of
transport activity
Employment
Congestion costs
Accident costs
Energy use
CO2 emissions
Air pollution
Regulatory costs
* Does not include number of services, international coach activity or cabotage. Source: Steer Davies Gleave
** The PRIMES-TREMOVE is a private model that has been developed and is maintained by E3MLab/ICCS of National
Technical University of Athens, based on, but extending features of the open source TREMOVE model developed by
the TREMOVE modelling community.
As shown in the table above, in most cases, the metrics have been sourced from the
Baseline scenario developed with the PRIMES-TREMOVE model in the context of the
Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Directive amending Directive
1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain
infrastructures.
The PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model does not contain projections of employment
levels and some measures of transport activity (the number of services and international
coach activity) for the coach market. Therefore, the baseline level of these metrics has
been estimated using alternative sources and assumptions.
PRIMES-TREMOVE model
The PRIMES-TREMOVE transport model projects the evolution of demand for passengers and freight
transport by transport mode and transport mean. It is essentially a dynamic system of multi-agent choices
under several constraints, which are not necessarily binding simultaneously. The model consists of two
main modules, the transport demand allocation module and the technology choice and equipment
operation module. The two modules interact with each other and are solved simultaneously.
The projections include details for a large number of transport means, technologies and fuels, including
conventional and alternative types, and their penetration in various transport market segments for each
EU Member State. They also include details about greenhouse gas and air pollution emissions (e.g. NOx,
104
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0109.png
PM, SOx, CO), as well as impacts on external costs of congestion, noise and accidents.
In the transport field, PRIMES-TREMOVE is suitable for modelling soft measures (e.g. eco-driving,
deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems, labelling), economic measures (e.g. subsidies and taxes on
fuels, vehicles, emissions; ETS for transport when linked with PRIMES; pricing of congestion and other
externalities such as air pollution, accidents and noise; measures supporting R&D), regulatory measures
(e.g. CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles;
EURO standards on road transport vehicles; technology standards for non-road transport technologies),
infrastructure policies for alternative fuels (e.g. deployment of refuelling/recharging infrastructure for
electricity, hydrogen, LNG, CNG). Used as a module which contributes to a broader PRIMES scenario, it
can show how policies and trends in the field of transport contribute to economy wide trends in energy
use and emissions. Using data disaggregated per Member State, it can show differentiated trends across
Member States.
PRIMES-TREMOVE has been used for the 2011 White Paper on Transport, Low Carbon Economy and
Energy 2050 Roadmaps, the 2030 policy framework for climate and energy and more recently for the
Effort Sharing Regulation, the review of the Energy Efficiency Directive, the recast of the Renewables
Energy Directive, the European strategy on low-emission mobility and the revision of the Eurovignette
Directive.
The PRIMES-TREMOVE is a private model that has been developed and is maintained by E3MLab/ICCS of
National Technical University of Athens, based on, but extending features of the open source TREMOVE
model developed by the TREMOVE modelling community. Part of the model (e.g. the utility nested tree)
was built following the TREMOVE model. Other parts, like the component on fuel consumption and
emissions, follow the COPERT model.
As module of the PRIMES energy system model
66
, PRIMES-TREMOVE has been successfully peer
reviewed
67
, most recently in 2011
68
.
The EU Reference scenario 2016
Scenario design, consultation process and quality assurance
The Baseline scenario used in this impact assessment builds on the EU Reference scenario 2016 but
additionally includes few policy measures adopted after its cut-off date (end of 2014) and some updates
in the technology costs assumptions.
Building an EU Reference scenario is a regular exercise by the Commission. It is coordinated by DGs ENER,
CLIMA and MOVE in association with the JRC, and the involvement of other services via a specific inter-
service group.
For the EU Reference scenario 2016, Member States were consulted throughout the development
process through a specific Reference scenario expert group which met three times during its
development. Member States provided information about adopted national policies via a specific
questionnaire, key assumptions have been discussed and in each modelling step, draft Member State
specific results were sent for consultation. Comments of Member States were addressed to the extent
possible, keeping in mind the need for overall comparability and consistency of the results.
Quality of modelling results was assured by using state of the art modelling tools, detailed checks of
assumptions and results by the coordinating Commission services as well as by the country specific
66
67
68
http://www.e3mlab.National Technical University of Athens.gr/e3mlab/
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/analysis/models/docs/primes_model_2013-2014_en.pdf.
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/sec_2011_1569_2.pdf
105
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0110.png
comments by Member States.
The EU Reference scenario 2016 projects EU and Member States energy, transport and GHG emission-
related developments up to 2050, given current global and EU market trends and adopted EU and
Member States' energy, transport, climate and related relevant policies. "Adopted policies" refer to those
that have been cast in legislation in the EU or in MS (with a cut-off date end of 2014
69
). Therefore, the
binding 2020 targets are assumed to be reached in the projection. This concerns greenhouse gas emission
reduction targets as well as renewables targets, including renewables energy in transport. The EU
Reference scenario 2016 provides projections, not forecasts. Unlike forecasts, projections do not make
predictions about what the future will be. They rather indicate what would happen if the assumptions
which underpin the projection actually occur. Still, the scenario allows for a consistent approach in the
assessment of energy and climate trends across the EU and its Member States.
The report " EU Reference Scenario 2016: Energy, transport and GHG emissions - Trends to 2050"
70
describes the inputs and results in detail. In addition, its main messages are summarised in the impact
assessments accompanying the Effort Sharing Regulation
71
and the revision of the Energy Efficiency
Directive
72
, and the analytical work accompanying the European strategy on low-emission mobility
73
.
PRIMES-TREMOVE is one of the core models of the modelling framework used for developing the EU
Reference scenario 2016 and has also been used for developing the Baseline scenario of this impact
assessment. The model was calibrated on transport and energy data up to year 2013 from Eurostat and
other sources.
Main assumptions of the Baseline scenario
The projections are based on a set of assumptions, including on population growth, macroeconomic and
oil price developments, technology improvements, and policies.
Macroeconomic assumptions
The Baseline scenario uses the same macroeconomic assumptions as the EU Reference scenario 2016.
The population projections draw on the European Population Projections (EUROPOP 2013) by Eurostat.
The key drivers for demographic change are: higher life expectancy, convergence in the fertility rates
across Member States in the long term, and inward migration. The EU28 population is expected to grow
by 0.2% per year during 2010-2030 (0.1% for 2010-2050), to 516 million in 2030 (522 million by 2050).
Elderly people, aged 65 or more, would account for 24% of the total population by 2030 (28% by 2050) as
opposed to 18% today.
GDP projections mirror the joint work of DG ECFIN and the Economic Policy Committee, presented in the
2015 Ageing Report
74
. The average EU GDP growth rate is projected to remain relatively low at 1.2% per
year for 2010-2020, down from 1.9% per year during 1995-2010. In the medium to long term, higher
expected growth rates (1.4% per year for 2020-2030 and 1.5% per year for 2030-2050) are taking account
of the catching up potential of countries with relatively low GDP per capita, assuming convergence to a
In addition, amendments to two Directives only adopted in the beginning of 2015 were also considered.
This concerns notably the ILUC amendment to the Renewables Directive and the Market Stability
Reserve Decision amending the ETS Directive.
70
ICCS-E3MLab et al. (2016), EU Reference Scenario 2016: Energy, transport and GHG emissions -
Trends to 2050
71
SWD(2016) 247
72
SWD(2016) 405
73
SWD(2016) 244
74
European Commission/DG ECFIN (2014), The 2015 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and
Projection Methodologies, European Economy 8/2014.
69
106
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0111.png
total factor productivity growth rate of 1% in the long run.
Fossil fuel price assumptions
Oil prices used in the Baseline scenario are the same with those of the EU Reference scenario 2016.
Following a gradual adjustment process with reduced investments in upstream productive capacities by
non-OPEC
75
countries, the quota discipline is assumed to gradually improve among OPEC members and
thus the oil price is projected to reach 87 $/barrel in 2020 (in year 2013-prices). Beyond 2020, as a result
of persistent demand growth in non-OECD countries driven by economic growth and the increasing
number of passenger cars, oil price would rise to 113 $/barrel by 2030 and 130 $/barrel by 2050.
No specific sensitivities were prepared with respect to oil price developments. Still, it can be recalled that
lower oil price assumptions tend to increase energy consumption and CO
2
emissions not covered by the
ETS. The magnitude of the change would depend on the price elasticities and on the share of taxation,
like excise duties, in consumer prices. For transport, the high share of excise duties in the consumer prices
act as a limiting factor for the increase in energy consumption and CO
2
emissions.
Techno-economic assumptions
For all transport means, except for light duty vehicles (i.e. passenger cars and light commercial vehicles),
the Baseline scenario uses the same technology costs assumptions as the EU Reference scenario 2016.
For light duty vehicles, the data for technology costs and emissions savings has been updated based on a
recent study commissioned by DG CLIMA
76
. Battery costs for electric vehicles are assumed to go down to
205 euro/kWh by 2030 and 160 euro/kWh by 2050; further reductions in the cost of both spark ignition
gasoline and compression ignition diesel are assumed to take place. Technology cost assumptions are
based on extensive literature review, modelling and simulation, consultation with relevant stakeholders,
and further assessment by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission.
Specific policy assumptions
The key policies included in the Baseline scenario, similarly to the EU Reference scenario 2016, are
77
:
CO2 standards for cars and vans regulations (Regulation (EC) No 443/2009, amended by Regulation
(EU) No 333/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 510/2011, amended by Regulation (EU) No 253/2014); CO2
standards for cars are assumed to be 95gCO2/km as of 2021 and for vans 147gCO2/km as of 2020,
based on the NEDC test cycle, in line with current legislation. No policy action to strengthen the
stringency of the target is assumed after 2020/2021.
Directive on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures (Directive
Directive on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure (Directive 2014/94/EU).
The Renewable Energy Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC) and Fuel Quality Directive (Directive
2009/30/EC) including ILUC amendment (Directive 2015/1513/EU): achievement of the legally binding
RES target for 2020 (10% RES in transport target) for each Member State, taking into account the use
of flexibility mechanisms when relevant as well as of the cap on the amount of food or feed based
biofuels (7%). Member States' specific renewable energy policies for the heating and cooling sector
are also reflected where relevant.
75
76
77
OPEC stands for Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Source:
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/transport/vehicles/docs/technology_results_web.xlsx
For a comprehensive discussion see the Reference scenario report: “EU Reference Scenario 2016:
Energy, transport and GHG emissions -
Trends to 2050”
107
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0112.png
Relevant national policies, for instance on the promotion of renewable energy, on fuel and vehicle
taxation, are taken into account.
In addition, a few policy measures adopted after the cut-off date of the EU Reference scenario 2016 at
both EU and Member State level, have been included in the Baseline scenario:
Directive on weights & dimensions (Directive 2015/719/EU);
Directive as regards the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and
the governance of the railway infrastructure (Directive 2016/2370/EU);
2011/76/EU amending Directive 1999/62/EC).
Regulation establishing a framework on market access to port services and financial transparency of
ports
78
;
Directive on technical requirements for inland waterway vessels (Directive 2016/1629/EU), part of the
Naiades II package;
For Germany, an extension of the toll network by roughly 40,000 kilometres of federal trunk road
from 2018 onwards for all heavy goods vehicles over 7.5t.
80
For Austria, the incorporation of exhaust emissions and noise pollution in the distance based charges.
All federal highways and motorways, totalling around 2,200 km, are subject to distance based charges.
The replacement of the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) test cycle by the new Worldwide
harmonized Light-vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP) has been implemented in the Baseline scenario,
drawing on work by JRC. Estimates by JRC show a WLTP to NEDC CO
2
emissions ratio of approximately
1.21 when comparing the sales-weighted fleet-wide average CO
2
emissions. WLTP to NEDC conversion
factors are considered by individual vehicle segments, representing different vehicle and technology
categories
79
.
For Belgium, a distance based system replaced the former Eurovignette for heavy goods vehicles over
3.5t from April 2016. The system applies to all inter-urban motorways, main (national) roads
81
and all
urban roads in Brussels.
For Latvia, the introduction of a vignette system applied for goods vehicles below 3.5t on the
motorways, starting with 1 January 2017. In addition, for all heavy goods vehicles over 3.5t the
vignette rates applied on motorways for the EURO 0, EURO I, EURO II are increased by 10% starting
with 1 January 2017.
The reform of the national regulatory frameworks of the buses and coaches market in Germany, France,
Italy and Poland has been additionally reflected through the IA excel-based tool.
Transport activity
78
79
80
81
Awaiting signature of act (Source :
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2013/0157(COD)&l=en)
Simulation at individual vehicle level is combined with fleet composition data, retrieved from the
official European CO
2
emissions monitoring database, and publicly available data regarding individual
vehicle characteristics, in order to calculate vehicle CO
2
emissions and fuel consumption over different
conditions. Vehicle CO
2
emissions are initially simulated over the present test protocol (NEDC) for the
2015 passenger car fleet; the accuracy of the method is validated against officially monitored CO
2
values and experimental data.
Currently, 15,000 kilometres of federal trunk road and motorways are subject to tolls.
E.g.
http://www.viapass.be/fileadmin/viapass/documents/download/VlaanderenE.JPG
108
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0113.png
In estimating the baseline number of coach services and the level of international coach
activity, national statistics and stakeholder consultation responses have been drawn upon
to fill some data gaps. However, not every Member State records or publishes this data
and it was not possible to prepare a comprehensive data set. Therefore the remaining data
gaps have been filled as follows:
To estimate the level of international coach activity, the data
–
from Member
States where it was available
–
has been used to generate a ratio of international
coach activity (as a proportion of total coach activity) relative to the number of
international borders. We then applied this ratio to the remaining Member States.
Similarly, to estimate the number of coach services, the available data has been
used to generate a ratio of coach services to coach transport activity. We then
applied this ratio to the remaining Member States.
No data on the level of cabotage activity has been found and no useful information on the
level of cabotage has been received from stakeholders. Accordingly, it was not possible
to provide estimates of cabotage within the IA tool.
Employment
The EU Statistical Pocketbook contains combined total employment levels across local
bus and interurban coach industries in each Member State, and the PRIMES-TREMOVE
model provide projections of the total number of bus and coach vehicles in each Member
State. To estimate total coach industry employment, the proportion of coaches in the total
bus and coach fleet has been applied to the total employment level provided in the
Statistical pocketbook. It has been assumed that employment grows in line with transport
activity throughout the assessment period.
Administrative costs
To estimate regulatory costs in the baseline scenario, the costs associated with
authorisations, licences and journey forms separately for both coach operators and
national authorities have been estimated. To estimate each of these costs, we have used
the following formula:
=
×
ℎ
Where:
And:
=
= ℎ
×
ℎ
109
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0114.png
The price of each regulatory activity has been calculated using the EU average wage
(calculated by Reinies Fischer
82
) and the assumptions on the time taken to carry out each
activity are shown in the table below.
Table A4-2: Baseline Scenario sources and assumptions for administrative costs
Process
Type of effect
Operator
–
resources used
in application
Estimate
previous
study
Not made
in
Revised
estimate
20 days
Comment
Licence
Government/regulator
–
resources used in approval
Authorisation
Operator
–
resources used
in application
Operator
–
time taken to
complete
Government/regulator
–
resources used in inspection
Not made
Ten days
One day for
administrative
staff
Less than one
hour
Not made
Three
days
Journey form
Less than
one hour
Five
minutes
–
10%
of
forms
inspected
Based on Steer Davies
Gleave
experience
of
supporting
operators
in
completing
the
licence
process
Assumed to require twice the
effort of approving an
authorisation
Based
on
stakeholder
comments concerning need
for
translation
and
consultancy advice
No reason to modify this
estimate based on evidence to
date
Inspection time proportionate
to time to complete the form.
Inspection rate of 10% gives
sufficiently high likelihood
of inspection to encourage
compliance
To estimate the total number of authorisations and licences (for both national and
international services), the number of international authorisations and international
Community licences have been scaled up based on the ratio of international to national
coach transport activity. To estimate the number of journey forms, a ratio of forms to
transport activity has been generated, in Member States where data is available, and
applied this across all Member States.
It has been assumed that all administrative costs grow throughout the assessment period
in line with the level of transport activity.
IMPACT OF POLICY OPTIONS
Approach to assessment of impacts
Table A.4-3 summarises how the impacts of the Policy Options have been assessed.
Monetised impacts have been calculated as 2015 Net Present Values (NPVs) using a
discount rate of 4%. For all policy options, the measures are assumed to be implemented
starting with 2019.
82
https://www.reinisfischer.com/average-salary-european-union-2016
110
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0115.png
Table A4-3: Assessment methodology by impact
Qualitative
commentary
Monetised
Impact
Economic impacts
Increases (or decreases) in the volume of transport
activity (in terms of passenger-kilometres and
passenger journeys), segmented by type of
transport: national, cabotage, and international.
Changes in the transport activity should to the
extent possible, be explained by changes in inter alia
(i) the average load factor (passengers per coach),
(ii) number of services, (iii) average journey length.
Increases (or decreases) in the quality of service.
Impact on the market structure in the coach and bus
sector.
Potential relocation of businesses from some
Member States to others and economic effects on
particular Member States and/or regions.
Fares for users and effect on consumer prices.
Integration of ticketing and price competition.
Regulatory costs for road passenger transport
operators and terminal operators. These are the
costs incurred by the relevant parties to comply with
possible new legislative requirements, including
their sub-components (administrative costs, direct
compliance costs, hassle costs, etc.).
Economic effects for SMEs, notably in terms of
regulatory costs and their competitive position.
Regulatory costs (administrative, compliance and
enforcement costs) incurred by the responsible
national authorities.
Level of infringements of rules on access to the
market.
Level of congestion.
Performance of other modes of transport and
integration between modes.
Working conditions and job quality
Overall level of employment and distribution across
Member States.
Level of infringements of social rules, including
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
111
Quantified
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0116.png
Impact
labour law applicable to the employment contracts,
maximum working time, minimum rest periods, etc.
16
17
18
19
20
21
Impact on remote regions.
Access to mobility for low-income consumers.
Accessibility of the bus and coach services for people
with reduced mobility.
The rights of the elderly (EC Charter of Fundamental
Rights
–
Article 25).
Integration of persons with disabilities (EC Charter of
Fundamental Rights
–
Article 26).
Accident costs
Environmental impacts
22
23
24
25
Level of carbon dioxide emissions.
Air pollution
Energy use and efficiency.
Share of road passenger transport in modal split.
Source: Steer Davies Gleave
Analysis of options
The policy options selected for further analysis cover three broad kinds of measure for
supporting the further development of interurban bus and coach markets, namely:
measures for clarifying existing legislation and simplifying current regulatory
procedures (included in Options PO1, PO2 and PO3);
measures for removing restrictions on access to inter-urban markets (included in
Options PO1, PO2 and PO3); and
measures to facilitate the level playing field for access to terminals (included in
Options PO4 and PO5).
A high-level description of the methodology for assessing each group of measures is
provided below, followed by the assumptions used to estimate the impacts of each
option.
Clarification measures
In principle, measures to clarify existing provisions in Regulation 1073/2009 could result
in a change in operator behaviour, for example by encouraging them to introduce more
scheduled services without intermediate stops (following a clarification of the term
‘regular services’). However, for the most part stakeholders considered that most
112
Qualitative
commentary
Monetised
Quantified
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0117.png
provisions identified as potentially requiring clarification for the purposes of the
consultation were already clear. This suggests that current market activity is not
influenced to any material extent by a lack of clarity, and it has been therefore assumed
that these measures would not have any impact on the number of services provided or the
level of traffic carried.
However, it should be noted that the streamlining of regulatory processes, for example
the abolition of journey forms or authorisations, could have a significant impact on the
regulatory burden. Therefore estimates of these have been made, based on the
quantification of the regulatory burden in table A.4-2 and based on these values, it has
been estimated that the total regulatory burden on the coach sector is €884 million in
2015 (with 66.4% falling on operators and 33.6% falling on government and/or
regulatory bodies), rising to €1,228 in 2030.
Measures for removing restrictions on access to inter-urban markets
The assumptions used in estimating the impact of each of the options covering
clarification and uniform business conditions are set out in the table below.
Table A.4-4: Assumptions used in estimating impacts of PO1, PO2 and PO3
Option
Measure
C : larify defi itio of i ter atio al
arriage
C : larify defi itio of regular ser i es
C3: clarify provisions relating to own-
account operations
C4: abolish journey forms
Key assumptions
No quantifiable impact
No quantifiable impact
No quantifiable impact
A reduction in the administrative costs
associated with journey forms
Not modelled due to lack of data on
cabotage services
An increase in the level transport activity
based on the average growth rate of
Germany and the UK in the years following
liberalisation, adjusted downwards by a
factor of a half.
PO1
C5: clarify provisions relating to cabotage
U1: extend scope of Regulation 1073/2009
to include national services
U2: require that carriers from all Member
States have access to national markets
U3: set common requirements for
protection of public service contracts
As for PO2 (except U3)
U4: action to protect public service
contracts limited to contracts for services in
urban centres, conurbations and the
surrounding areas
As for PO2
PO2
An increase in the level transport activity
based on the average growth rate of
Germany and the UK in the years following
liberalisation. Note this uplift is instead, as
opposed to in addition to, the increase
described in PO1.
PO3
113
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0118.png
Option
Measure
U5: abolish authorisation procedure
Key assumptions
A reduction in all regulatory costs
associated with authorisations, based on
the regulatory cost calculation.
Source: Steer Davies Gleave
Measures to facilitate the level playing field for access to terminals
An illustrative calculation of the terminal capacity that might be unduly suppressed
because of discriminatory behaviour is provided in Chapter 3 of the support study. This
suggested that an additional 400 million vehicle kilometres might be accommodated if
publicly owned capacity were available on a non-discriminatory basis and managed
efficiently. This is used as a basis for estimating the effects of a one-off and sustained
uplift in capacity as a result of introducing measures to ensure a level playing field in the
allocation of terminal capacity.
It should be noted that the impact of this group of measures might be expected to
increase over the long term, enabling more effective use of a growing volume of terminal
capacity across Europe (i.e. resulting in a proportionate increase in available capacity
rather than an absolute uplift). However, it is also possible that investment in terminal
capacity over the time horizon up to 2035 relieves the problem of discrimination as well
as more general capacity constraints, and that the impact of measures designed to address
discrimination becomes less over time. The assumption of a one-off, absolute and
sustained uplift in available capacity can be regarded as conservative. Sensitivity analysis
has been undertaken to estimate the effects of alternative assumptions.
In the table below, a description of all the assumptions used in calculating the impact of
measures related to terminal access are provided.
Table A.4-5: Assumptions used in estimating impacts of PO4 and PO5
Option
PO4
Measure
T1: define a ‘coach terminal’ so that it can
be differentiated from stopping points/on-
street stops
T2: establish guidelines/recommendations to
encourage terminal operators to provide
access on fair and non-discriminatory terms
T3: Recommend publication of rules for
allocating capacity and current
timetable/capacity allocation
Key assumptions
No quantifiable impact in itself but essential
to enable other measures
An increase in transport activity adjusted
downwards by a factor of a half.
An increase in the administrative costs
associated with undertaking five terminal
capacity studies (Based on the EU average
wage and the assumption that one study
takes 100 hours).
No quantifiable impact
No quantifiable impact in itself but essential
to enable other measures
PO5
T4: require the European Commission to
submit a report on market opening
T1: define a ‘coach terminal’ so that it can
be differentiated from stopping points/on-
street stops
114
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0119.png
T5: Require Member states to grant access
to terminals on fair and non-discriminatory
terms
An increase in transport activity. Note this
increase is instead of, as opposed to in
addition to, the uplift described in PO1.
In addition, an increase in the administrative
costs associated with undertaking one
additional terminal capacity study. (Based
on the EU average wage and the assumption
that one study takes 100 hours).
Source: Steer Davies Gleave
115
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0120.png
Assessment of primary impacts
Changes to the level of transport activity
A summary of the impact of each policy option on transport activity is shown in table
A.4-6. For policy options relating to market liberalisation, the annual growth rates of
passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres have been multiplied by a value derived
using the methodology described in the section 3 of the support study. For policy options
relating to terminal access, the level of transport activity has been uplifted based on the
methodology described below:
The illustrative calculation of the potential size of the discrimination problem is based on the National
Express data. The calculation is based on the following assumptions:
•
60% of terminals used by coach operators across Europe are publicly owned (equivalent to 18 out of
30 in the National Express example);
•
of these, some 11% (approximately equivalent to 2 of 18) are managed by incumbent operators;
•
publicly owned terminals that are managed by incumbent operators are more likely to be subject to
discrimination than those managed by the local authority itself (although no suggestion is made that
the two privately managed terminals included in the National Express data are subject to such
discrimination); and
•
the proportion of vehicle kilometres operated into such terminals is equivalent to the proportion of
such terminals in the total (at both the Member State and European level).
Table A.4-6: Impact of policy options on transport activity
Option
Applies to
Impact of policy option
Growth
multiplier/
Activity uplift
10.1
Growth uplift
assumption
PO1
Non-
liberalised
Member States
Growth rate multiplied by
ratio in the 6 years following
implementation. *
Based on method
described in section 3 of
the support study, dived by
two.
Average of DE-UK growth
ratio described section 3 of
the support study
PO2
Non-
liberalised
Member States
Non-
liberalised
Member States
All Member
States
Level of activity uplifted in
all years following
implementation.
20.1
PO3
20.1
PO4
0.9%
Based on method
described from section 3
of the support study dived
by two.
Based on method
described from section 3
of the support study.
PO5
All Member
States
1.7%
116
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0121.png
* In Member States where the baseline growth rate in the six years following liberalisation is negative, we have
applied the growth multiplier to the EU average growth rate in those years. Source: Steer Davies Gleave
The method used to estimate the baseline level of each remaining measure of transport
activity, and the assumed impact of the policy options on each remaining measure, are
shown in table A.4-4
.
Table A.4-7: Transport activity impact methodology
Estimation method
Baseline level
Passenger kilometres
Vehicle kilometres
Passenger journeys
International activity
Cabotage
Average load factor
Number of services
Average journey length
Discussed above in the section
titled Transport Activity
Based on sample of routes
Discussed above in the section
titled Transport Activity
PRIMES-TREMOVE Model
PRIMES-TREMOVE Model
Impact of policy options
See table A.4-4
See table A.4-4
ℎ
Measure of transport activity
Grows with passenger
kilometres
∗
Unable to estimate due to lack of evidence
Grows with passenger
kilometres
Assumed to remain constant
*Assuming 50 seats to coach, based on evidence from Germany. Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions
Regulatory costs for operators and national authorities
The regulatory activates assumed to be undertaken by both operators and authorities
under each policy option are shown in table A.4-8. The method used to calculate the total
cost of each of these activates is consistent with the method used in the baseline
described above. The cost of a terminal capacity study is estimated using the EU average
wage and the assumption that one study takes 100 hours based
on Steer Davies Gleave’s
experience of undertaking such studies.
Table A.4-8: Impact of policy options on regulatory activity
Type of Regulatory cost
Journey Forms
Authorisations
Licences
Number of Terminal Capacity Studies
Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions
Baseline
√
√
√
-
PO1
√
√
-
PO2
√
√
-
PO3
PO4
√
√
√
5
√
-
PO5
√
√
√
6
117
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0122.png
As with the baseline, regulatory costs grow throughout the assessment period in line with
the level of transport activity.
Assessment of secondary impacts
Overall level of employment
Increases to the level of employment in the coach industry, arising from the
implementation of the policy options, are in proportion to increases in the level of
transport activity. The employment in the coach industry in year n will be calculated
using the following formula:
ℎ��
ℎ��
��
Share of road passenger transport in modal split
Increases in the level of coach transport activity will lead to decreases in the level of
transport activity on competing transport modes. The proportion of new passenger
demand extracted from each competing transport mode is based on the experience of the
German market, and is shown in table A.4-9.
Table A.4-9: Demand extraction rates used in impact assessment
Source of new coach demand
Generated
Car
Rail
Air
Source: BAG (Marktanalyse des Fernbuslinienverkehrs, 2014)
× 1 + ∆%
��
=
��
Demand extraction rate
10.0%
40.0%
46.0%
4.0%
On each competing transport mode, the decrease in transport activity, arising from an
increase in coach transport activity, has been calculated using the following formula:
��
− ∆
ℎ
��
=
��
×
Therefore, the share of each transport mode in year n is calculated using the following
formula:
ℎ
=
��
��
Externalities
Changes to the level of transport activity, for both coach transport and competing modes,
imply changes to the level of externalities produced by each transport mode. The
externalities considered include:
��
118
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0123.png
Congestion;
Accidents;
Carbon emissions;
Air pollution; and
Energy use.
The formula used to calculate the net change to the level of each externality, based on
changes to transport activity and the demand extraction rates in table A.4-9, is as follows:
ℎ
×
��
−
∆
−
∆
×
×
− ∆
= ∆
ℎ
ℎ
��
��
×
��
����
����
��
����
����
The sources and assumptions used to calculate the net change in each externality are
shown in table A.4-10
.
Table A.4-10: Externality assumptions used in impact assessment
Externality
Congestion
Accidents
Source
PRIMES-TREMOVE
model
PRIMES-TREMOVE
model
PRIMES-TREMOVE
model
Unit of measurement
€ Million
€ Million
Other assumptions
CO2 emissions
€ Million
Cost of air and rail
accidents are not
considered.
Carbon emissions have
been monetised using
the projected ETS
carbon price
Air pollution
Energy consumption
PRIMES-TREMOVE
model
PRIMES-TREMOVE
model
€ Million
Tonnes of oil equivalent
(‘000s)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions
Performance of other modes of transport
To assess the impact of the policy options on the performance of other transport modes,
the lost revenue (separately for rail and air) arising from the decrease in the level of
transport activity have been estimated based on the demand extraction rates in table A.4-
119
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0124.png
9 to calculate the fall in revenue, for both air and rail, the following formula has been
used:
×
����
=∆
����
The unit cost per passenger kilometre for passengers, for each transport mode, has been
taken from the PRIMES-TREMOVE model.
Access for low-income, rural and the elderly consumers
To assess the impact of the policy options on the low-income, rural and the elderly
consumers, the results from the Eurobarometer survey have been used that estimate the
proportion of passenger demand that falls into each of these social groups.
The level of transport activity, for each of these social groups in year n, has been
calculated using the following formula:
×%
��
=
ℎ
��
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As explained above, a number of assumptions have been used for evaluating the impacts
of the policy options. To test the sensitivity and robustness of the results, the growth rate
multipliers and transport activity uplifts described in table A.4-6 for each policy option
have been adjusted. The sensitivity adjustments applied to each set of options is shown in
table A.4-11; for each set of options both a low and high scenario has been tested.
Table A.4-11: Sensitivity analysis adjustments
Low case
Options
Growth
multiplier/
Activity
uplift
Assumption
Growth
multiplier/
Activity
uplift
High case
Assumption
PO1
PO2
PO3
PO4
5%
PO5
6.7
UK growth multiplier
described in section 3
of support study
Estimate of lower
bound of terminal
capacity increase
33.6
DE growth multiplier
described in section 3 of
support study
Upper bound of terminal
capacity increase described
in section 3 of support study
48%
Source: Steer Davies Gleave assumptions
120
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
The results and relative impact of each policy option were not materially affected by the
low and high cases used in the sensitivity analysis.
121
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0126.png
A
NNEX
5: D
ESCRIPTION OF THE ROAD INITIATIVES
–
T
HE
B
IG
P
ICTURE
.
INTRODUCTION
The Road Initiatives, which are all REFIT Initiatives, are fully inscribed in the overall
priorities of the Juncker Commission notably under the 'A deeper and fairer Internal
Market' and the 'Climate and Energy Union'.
The Communications from the Commission on 'Upgrading the Single Market: more
opportunities for people and business' (COM(2015) 550 final) and on 'A Framework
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy'
(COM(2015) 80 final) explicitly refer to the Road Initiatives.
The table below presents the link between the Juncker priorities, the Impact Assessments
prepared for the Road Initiatives and the related legislative acts.
Priorities
IAs
A deeper a d Hired ehi les
fairer I ter al A ess to the haulage arket
Market
a d to the Professio
So ial aspe ts: Dri i g/rest
ti e,
orki g
ti e
a d
e for e e t
easures
ta hograph , Posti g of orkers
a d e for e e t easures
A ess to the arket of uses
a d oa hes
Cli ate
a d
E ergy U io
Euro ig ette
Europea Ele tro i Toll Ser i e
EETS
Dire ti e
‘egulatio
Legislation
/
/
9&
/
9
‘egulatio
/
a d ‘egulatio
/
Dire ti e 9 / , Dire ti e
/ ,
Dire ti e
/
a d Dire ti e
/
‘egulatio
/
9
Dire ti e 999/
Dire ti e
/
Co
issio de isio
9/
Moreover, the transport strategy of the Commission as laid down in the White Paper
"Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and resource
efficient transport system" adopted on 28 March 2011, included references to the road
initiatives
83
.
THE EU ROAD TRANSPORT MARKET
Road transport is the most prominent mode of transport. In 2014, almost three quarters
(72%) of all inland freight transport activities in the EU were by road. On the passenger
83
More specifically in the Annex under points 6, 11 and 39
122
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0127.png
side, the relative importance of road as mode of transport is even greater: on land, road
accounts for more than 90% of all passenger-kilometres: 83% for passenger cars and
almost 9% for buses and coaches.
Almost half of the 10.6 million people employed in the transport and storage sector in the
EU are active in carrying goods or passengers by road. Road freight transport services for
hire and reward employs around 3 million people, while the road passenger transport
sector (buses, coaches and taxis) adds another 2 million employed persons (a third of
which are taxi drivers). This corresponds to more than 2.2% of total employment in the
economy and does not include own account transport which in road freight transport
alone provides employment for 500,000 to 1 million additional people.
There are about 600,000 companies in the EU whose main business is the provision of
road freight transport services for hire and reward. Every year, they generate a total
turnover of roughly €300 billion,
around a third of which is value added by the sector
(the rest being spent on goods and services from other sectors of the economy). The
provision of road freight transport services for hire and reward is hence an important
economic sector in its own right, generating almost 1% of GDP.
In road passenger transport, there are about 50,000 (mostly) bus and coach operators (of
which 12,000 provide urban and suburban services, (some including tram and
underground)) and around 290,000 taxi companies in the EU. Together, they generate a
turnover of €110 billion. Without taxis, total turnover of the sector is around €90 billion
per year, of which some €50 billion is value added.
WHY IS THERE A NEED FOR ACTION?
Road transport is for a large part international (around 34%
84
) and this share is
increasing, which explains the need for a common EU legal framework to ensure
efficient, fair and sustainable road transport. The framework covers the following
aspects:
Internal market rules governing access for operators to the markets of freight and
passengers
Social rules on driving/rest time and working time to ensure road safety and
respect of working conditions and fair competition
Rules implementing the user and polluter pays principles in the context of road
charging
Digital technologies to enable interoperable tolling services in the EU and to
enforcement EU rules (e.g. the tachograph)
It is clear that current rules are no longer fit for purpose. Member States are increasingly
adopting own national rules to fight "social dumping" while acknowledging that their
actions have adverse effects on the internal market. Moreover, public consultations have
shown a strong support for EU action to solve current issues in road transport. For
example:
84
Statistical Pocketbook 2016, EU Transport in figures
123
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
•
Severe competition in the road transport sector has led many operators to establish in
low-wage countries without necessarily having any business activity in these countries.
There is a lack a clear criteria and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that such
establishment practises are genuine, and that there is a level playing for operators.
•
Measures on Posting of Workers implemented in 4 Member States (DE, FR, AT and
IT) are all different and obviously from other Member States which have not
implemented any measure to implement the minimum wage to road transport on their
territory. Stakeholders ask for a common set of (simplified) enforcement rules.
•
CO2 emissions from road transport represent a large share of total emission and the
share is set to rise in the absence of common action (at EU 28 level), which is needed to
contribute substantially to the commitment under the Paris Agreement and to the 2030
goals.
•
Due to the increasingly more and more hyper-mobile nature of the sector, there is a
need for common and enforceable rules for workers. All workers should benefit from the
same level of protection in all Member States to avoid social dumping and unfair
competition between hauliers. This is currently not the case.
WHAT ARE THE MAIN PROBLEMS?
The Internal market for road transport is not complete. It is our assessment that the
current situation does not allow to exploit the full potential of transport services
e.g. current rules on bus/coach services or the rules on hired vehicles are still very
restrictive. Some Member States have decided to unilaterally open their market,
which has led to a fragmentation of the EU internal market.
Many rules are unclear, therefore leading to different levels of implementation by
Member States and problems of enforcement:
e.g. on cabotage where all stakeholders agree that current rules are unenforceable.
There are allegations of 'social dumping' and unfair competition in the road transport
sector. This has led to a division between East and West in Europe. As a consequence,
several Member States have decided to take national measures, which might jeopardize
the unity of the EU market for road transport:
e.g. minimum wage rules in DE, FR, IT and AT coupled with disproportionate
administrative requirements ; prohibition of drivers taking the weekly rest in the
cabin of vehicles in FR and BE.
Environmentally, we have made good progress in reducing pollutants from heavy goods
vehicles but our legal framework currently does not address the issue of climate change
(CO2). At the same time, the infrastructure quality is degrading in the EU although user
charges and tolls are levied on most motorways and other TEN-T roads.
Electronic tolling systems in the EU are still far from being interoperable, despite the
primary objective of EU legislation of establishing "one contract/one on-board unit/one
invoice" for the users. More generally, the benefits of digitalisation are still under-
124
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
exploited in road transport, in particular to improve control of EU legislation (e.g. many
Member States do not currently allow the use of electronic waybills).
OPTIONS AND MAIN IMPACTS
To achieve these objectives, all IAs will consider a range of different options, which
ultimately should improve the efficiency, fairness and sustainability of road transport.
The IA on Hired Vehicles will assess options aiming at removing outdated restrictions on
the use of hired goods vehicles and thus at opening up new possibilities for operators and
leasing/hiring companies alike. More flexibility for the hiring of vehicles should lead to
more efficient operations, higher productivity and less negative environmental impacts as
fleet renewal will be promoted.
The IA on Access to the haulage market and to the Profession will study various options
to ensure effective and consistent monitoring and enforcement of the existing rules in
Member States and to ensure coherent interpretation and application of the rules. Three
broad groups of potential measures will be assessed, namely measures liable to improve
enforcement, measures ensuring simplification and clarification of current rules and
measures reinforcing the cooperation between Member States.
The IA on Access to the market of buses and coaches will assess options aiming at
improving the performance of coach and bus services vis-a-vis other transport modes,
especially private car and further developing the internal market for coach and bus
services. This should lead to a reduction of the adverse environmental and climate effects
connected with mobility. Various policy options will be considered for creating more
uniform business conditions and also a level playing field for access to terminals.
The IA on Social aspects of road transport will study options aiming at ensuring the
effectiveness of the original system put in place and therefore contributing to the original
policy objectives, i.e.: (1) to ensure a level playing field for drivers and operators, (2) to
improve and harmonise working conditions and (3) to improve road safety. An additional
objective, in the context of the implementation and enforcement of the provisions on
posting of workers, is to ensure the right balance between the freedom to provide cross-
border transport services and the protection of the rights of highly mobile road transport
workers. In this perspective, three broad groups of measures will be analysed: 1.
Simplification, update and clarification of existing rules, 2. More efficient enforcement
and cooperation between Member States and 3. Improved working conditions of drivers
and fair competition between operators.
The IA on the Eurovignette Directive will assess options to promote financially and
environmentally sustainable and socially equitable (road) transport through a wider
application of the 'user pays' and 'polluter pays' principles. A number of different
measures and their variants aiming at correcting price signals in freight and passenger
transport will be considered in order to address the issues identified. The policy options
range from minimum adjustments to the Directive required for improving its coherence
and addressing all policy objectives, through the promotion of low carbon (fuel efficient)
vehicles and the phasing out of time-based charging schemes (vignettes) for trucks to the
optimisation of tolls for all vehicles.
125
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
The IA on EETS (European Electronic Tolling Service) will study options aiming at
reducing the cost and the burden linked to the collection of electronic tolls in the EU
–
for users and for society at large. It will equally seek to improve the framework
conditions for the faster and more widely provision of an interoperable European
Electronic Toll Service. Different policy options will be considered, including a non-
legislative approach (facilitating exchange of best practice, co-financing EETS-related
projects) and a legislative review.
These policy options and their impacts will be presented and assessed in detail in the
respective IAs.
EXPECTED SYNERGIES OF THE PACKAGE
The different initiatives constitute a coherent set of measures which will jointly
contribute to an efficient, environmentally and socially sustainable road transport sector.
It is expected that the combined impacts will be more than the addition of the impacts of
each initiative, meaning that the initiatives are complementary. Some examples of such
synergies are provided below.
Current restrictions on cabotage are unclear and therefore lead to illegal cabotage.
These illegal activities are closely linked with the fact that transport operators
established in low-wage countries exert unfair competition via 'social dumping'
and not respecting the rights of workers, who often are staying in their trucks
abroad for longer periods. This illustrates the clear link between compliance of
internal market rules and social/fair competition aspects of road transport, which
are all addressed by the road initiatives and which cannot be dealt with separately.
When assessing the laws applying a national minimum wage to road transport,
Member States explained the Commission that one of the reasons for adopting
these national measures is to fight the phenomenon of fake establishments and
“letterbox” companies in low-wage
countries. Tackling the issue of posting of
workers in road transport goes therefore hand in hand with the issue of
establishment of road transport operators, which again illustrates the link between
internal market and social aspects of road transport.
Promoting interoperability of electronic tolls systems will lead to lower
implementation costs of such systems by Member States. We can expect that this
will incentivise Member States to put in place distance-based tolls, which better
reflect the user and polluter pays principles. This shows the close link between
the Eurovignette and EETS initiatives.
Seeking to improve the performance of coach and bus services vis-a-vis other
transport modes will inevitably lead discussion on a level playing between road
and rail services. Current EU legislation provides that rail users shall pay for the
126
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
use of infrastructure, while it is not currently the case for buses and coaches
which are outside the scope of the Eurovignette directive. The inclusion of buses
and coaches in the Eurovignette initiative to ensure that they pay a fair price for
using the road infrastructure is therefore essential and will ensure overall
coherence.
The initiative on hired vehicles is in particular related to the initiatives on the
access to the market and to the profession, all having the aim of establishing clear
and common rules for a well-functioning and efficient Internal Market for road
haulage: some of them by ensuring a good functioning of the market of transport
services, others by ensuring the best use of the fleet of vehicles.
127
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0132.png
A
NNEX
6: D
ISCARDED POLICY MEASURES
The policy measures were screened to identify the most viable options prior to
conducting an in-depth analysis of the impacts of the retained policies. The criteria used
for screening the viability of the measures were legal feasibility, technical feasibility,
previous policy choices, coherence with other EU policy objectives, effectiveness and
efficiency, proportionality, political feasibility and relevance.
The following policy measure was discarded.
Objective
SO3
Policy
measure
T7
Description
Require separation of operation of transport operators and
control of terminals.
This measure would require that, if a road
passenger transport operator is a public entity, a distinct public
authority must exercise control over terminal infrastructure.
Policy measure T7 provided for the separation of terminal infrastructure managers and
road passenger transport operators to ensure their mutual independence. It required that if
a road passenger transport operator is a public entity, a distinct public authority must
exercise control over terminal infrastructure. This measure was discarded for the
following reasons:
it appears relatively inefficient and ineffective, in that it would require significant
changes to ownership and management arrangements at terminal locations across the
EU. The likely results are at best unclear and there would be substantial effort
required to ensure compliance;
imposing such a separation, in advance of identifying the scale or materiality of
discrimination by public entities controlled both transport operations and terminals,
would not be proportionate; and
it may not be politically feasible, because the requirement for enforced separation or
road passenger transport operations and terminal control would apply even at
terminals which may never be served by regular coach services, particularly on small
islands.
Policy measures U3 to U5 on market access also had to be screened as there were many
different types of approaches that could be taken under each measure. These three
measures were divided into three approaches to investigate simpler, faster and cheaper
approaches which could be used as common requirements for the protection of public
service contracts as detailed in table A6-1 below.
128
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0133.png
Table A6-0-1: Measures U3 to U5 and protecting PSCs
Method
Detailed analysis of
impact, as required
to refuse
authorisations
Details
“on the basis of a detailed
analysis
that
the
service
concerned would seriously affect
the viability of a comparable
service covering one or more
public
service
contracts
conforming to a Community law
on the direct sections concerned”
Rail journey must exceed a
certain time.
Rail journey must be circuitous,
exceeding distance by straight
line by a certain factor.
Public service contract journey
must exceed a certain time.
Public service contract journey
must be circuitous, exceeding
distance by straight line by a
certain factor.
Area is a County
Area is a Region
Area is a metropolitan or
municipal area
Area is chosen by Member State,
but may not exceed a certain
size, such as no two points in the
area more than 50 kilometres
apart.
Tickets must be for travel
between locations separated by a
certain distance by road or in a
straight line.
Example
Article 8(4)(d)
of Regulation
1073/2009
Issues
Might be complex,
slow and expensive
Approach 1:
Based on proposed and existing services
Services may not
compete with a rail
public service
contracts
Services may not
compete with any
public service
contract
Germany 2013
Sensitive to rail
timetable change
Sensitive to public
service
contract
timetable change
Service may not
carry passengers
between two points
in the same
administrative area
Approach 2:
Based on proposed service
Sweden
to
2012
France 2011-
2015
France 2016
Different Member
States have different
internal subdivisions
Areas might often
be new and wholly
artificial
Service may not
carry passengers less
than a certain
distance
Sweden
to
2012,
UK
1980,
Germany
2013, France
2015
Might be difficult to
enforce
Services must have
a minimum distance
between stops
Service must not
compete with a
public service
contract on price
Service must not
compete with a
public service
contract on
frequency
Service must not
compete with a
public service
contract on booking
conditions
Successive stops must be
separated by a certain distance by
road or in a straight line.
Minimum coach fare.
Approach 3:
Based on other factors
Maximum frequency.
Might prevent outer
urban pick-up and
set-down
Comprehensive
study found coach
costs of €2.20 per
coach-kilometre
Limits benefits, can
be
evaded
by
operator collusion
Minimum pre-booking time.
Taxis
Taxis
segmented
into “on demand”
and “pre-booked”
129
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0134.png
Based on proposed and existing services
Under the approach to protecting PSCs based on proposed and existing services three
different methods to protect PSCs were considered.
Detailed analysis of impact.
This method is similar to the method used in the
Regulation to protect PSCs. It is considered slow and expensive by stakeholders
and there is no transparency on comparable PSCs.
Services may not compete with a rail PSC.
Examples include rail journeys must
exceed a certain time or must be circuitous, exceeding a straight line by a certain
distance. This method of protecting is particularly sensitive to rail timetable
changes.
Services may not compete with any public service contract.
Similar to the rail
method above but includes any PSC. This method is particularly sensitive to PSC
timetable change
These three methods create the problem that an applicant proposing a new service
must wait to find out with what existing or future PSC a competent authority says it is
“comparable”. Also it does not make the authorisation procedure faster or simpler for
operators and competent authorities still have to conduct a detailed analysis for each
new application if they think that it may compromise the economic viability of a
PSC.
Based on proposed service
Under the approach to protecting PSCs based on proposed service three different
methods to protect PSCs were considered.
Services may not carry passengers between two points in the same administrative
area
. This method has been employed in Sweden, France and the UK. However,
the internal subdivisions of the Member States may be of different types (Länder,
Provinces, Regions, Counties, Departments, Cities, Communes) or sizes. This
could mean, for example, market entry in Member States with large internal
subdivisions was much more restricted that entry in Member States with small
internal subdivisions
85
.
Service may not carry passengers less than a certain distance.
Using this method
tickets must be for travel between locations separated by a certain distance by
road or in a straight line. It has been employed in the UK and Sweden and is
employed in Germany and France but may be difficult to enforce. If fares are
85
In principle, a solution to this problem would be to specify the maximum size of areas within which
passengers could not be carried, for example with a requirement that no two points in such an area
could be more than 100, 50 or 25 kilometres apart in a straight line. A potential disadvantage of this
approach is that, to comply with the regulation, some Member States would need to introduce new and
artificial subdivisions, which might bear no relation to existing administrative boundaries or transport
demand.
130
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0135.png
sufficiently low, passengers may “underride” on tickets which are printed as
being valid for longer journeys
86,87
.
Services must have a minimum distance between stops.
Under this method
successive stops would have to be separated by a certain distance by road or in a
straight line. This could be easier to monitor than the method on carriage over a
certain distance, as it would only require checks on where the bus or coach
stopped, rather than where individual passengers boarded and alighted. However,
we are not aware of any examples of this approach being adopted. It might also
make it difficult to serve two locations in the same urban area to provide
passengers with a choice of pick-up and set-down points.
Based on other factors
Three other methods to protecting PSCs which do not rely on the locations of the points
served were considered.
Service must not compete with a public service contract on price
. Under this
method a minimum fare would be introduced to ensure that coach services did not
undercut local PSCs. However, we have identified fares for long-distance coach
travel as low as €0.60 (actually £0.50, in the UK) if booked far enough in
advance: this appears to be a commercially legitimate means of filling capacity
which would not otherwise be used. A minimum fare, unless set very low, might
deprive operators of a significant part of their revenue. More widely, it would
limit their ability to offer very low prices to passengers if they wished to do so.
Service must not compete with a public service contract on frequency.
Under this
method a maximum frequency would be introduced, such as limiting services to a
certain number per day, or specifying a minimum interval between successive
services. However, there is a concern that it could merely result in two or more
operators, whether in collusion or not, operating on the same route in a way
which offered a frequent overall service.
Service must not compete with a public service contract on booking conditions.
Under this method a minimum pre-booking time would build on the common
practice of allowing discounts for advance tickets for travel by air or rail
88
. With
86
“Under-riding” is controversial in Great Britain where, to protect rail revenue from short journeys,
promotional tickets for long journeys may not be used for shorter journeys. There are frequent
complaints that rail passengers who do not understand these restrictions have been made to pay a
penalty for travelling a shorter distance than that specified on their ticket.
Assume a distance threshold of 100 kilometres, and an operator wishing to link two cities A and B, 95
kilometres apart. It could introduce
second stops A’ and B’ in each city, so that the overall route was
A’ (5 kilometres) A (95 kilometres) B (5 kilometres) B’, and then sell only tickets from “anywhere in
A to anywhere in B’” and “anywhere in B to anywhere in A’”. All the tickets would
be valid for
journeys of at least 100 kilometres, but it would be difficult to ensure that they were not used for the
95-kilometre journey from A to B.
Early booking discounts are also often available for events such as conferences. In additional,
promotional air and rail fares may be offered in advance, such as travel for Christmas booked by
September.
87
88
131
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
many of the new entrant coach operators selling tickets primarily or exclusively
over the internet, a requirement that tickets were booked at least (say) 24 hours in
advance might prevent their service being used as an alternative to “turn up and
go” PSC services, while not unduly affect their business model.
All the approaches and methods impose the risk that changes to services operated under
public service contracts, which might be have the deliberate intention of preventing
entry, may mean that a proposed new service is no longer permitted.
The approaches and methods to protect existing public service contracts, whether from
international, cabotage or national regular services, should therefore be based either on
the characteristics of the proposed service or on some other feature. Analysis of
approaches and methods adopted to date by Member States indicates that the most
workable approaches and methods appear to require that each passenger is carried a
minimum distance in a straight line, for which there are past and current precedents of:
100 kilometres in France and Sweden;
50 kilometres in Germany, and
48 and 24 kilometres (30 and 15 miles) in the UK.
An added benefit of this approach is that the minimum distance carried can be reduced in
stages, and either competent authorities or individual Member States or the EU can
liberalise further by setting a lower minimum distance carried.
A number of stakeholders were concerned that application of a common distance might
not reflect the different requirements of the Member States and the urban and suburban
networks within them, which vary widely in size. Figure A6-1 below, for example,
compares the radii of the systems of fare zones in a number of European cities.
Figure A6-0-1: Measures U3 to U5 - comparison of zonal systems in urban areas
132
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0137.png
Source: Figure 3.6 of “Study on the prices and quality of rail passenger services”, Final
Report, April 2016
Some European cities have fares zones extending between an urban centre or conurbation
into the surrounding area. In the case of Tallinn, for example, the built-up area extends
only around 15 kilometres from the city centre, but the zonal fares system, at least for rail
travel, extends over 70 kilometres.
Figure A6-0-2 compares the regulatory limits on the shortest distance a passenger may be
carried with an estimate, from Figure A6-0-1, of the effective radius and hence diameter
of the largest urban area identified in each Member State.
Figure A6-0-2: Measures U3 to U5 - regulatory limits and diameters of urban areas
133
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0138.png
Source: Support Study for the IA for the Revision of Regulation 1073/2009
The evidence suggests that each Member State has chosen a regulatory distance broadly
consistent with permitting no journey wholly within their largest suburban system, and
by implication any other suburban system.
On the basis of the evidence the approach retained for protecting PSCs is based on the
proposed service with the method that the service may not carry passengers less than
100km by road. This enables Member States to liberalise further, or to set smaller
distance thresholds if they wish. All other approaches and methods are discarded.
134
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0139.png
A
NNEX
7: I
MPACTS OF LIBERALISATION ON
PSO
S
The IA support study provides evidence from France suggesting that there is demand to
operate liberalised services carrying passengers both over and under 100km although
permission to operate the latter requires a demonstration that the new service will not
negatively impact the economic balance of the PSC for regional rail services. ARAFER
have indicated that for services below 100km the link that faces competition is often only
a small part of a public service. Also, if the link is a very important part of the service,
then there is often a high level of frequency and the impact of the declared service would
not be substantial.
The case study on Spain (see Annex F of IA Support Study) noted that:
some regions are islands with no scope for long-distance or international services;
all regular services are operated as regional or interregional concessions (F.80);
ALSA, owned by National Express, has large shares in the concession market on
any measure (Figure F.45); and
average passenger journey length on interregional concessions has risen from 117
kilometres in 2000 to 180 kilometres in 2014 (Table F.2). However, we found no
equivalent information on regional concessions or on individual routes and their
lengths.
In the event of market opening, a plausible outcome is that there would be new entry on
many interregional routes and on some intraregional routes. However, with the market
currently controlled through the concession system, there is no basis on which to
estimate:
what routes new entrants would choose to operate commercially, how many of
them would be identical, or similar, to existing concessions, and hence whether
existing concessions would need to be renewed, and at what subsidy levels;
what fares new entrants would charge, and whether these would be higher or
lower than those currently set, or would be extensively yield-managed with a
range of fares for each journey; or
what levels of service, including frequency and on-board services, they would
include.
One county in Sweden produces detailed annual analysis of publically contracted
passenger transport services indicates that only 12.5% of revenue from PSCs relates to
routes over 50 kilometres, and none relates to routes more than 100 kilometres (the
longest route within the county is less than 90 kilometres). It is possible to make journeys
of over 130 kilometres in the county, but there is no publicly contracted service of this
length. The limited sample of Sweden and France suggests that the actual proportion of
contracted services over 100 kilometres in some Member States, may be small, because
such services are dominated by local bus services. Over 60% of all revenue from publicly
contracted services in the county relates to routes shorter than 20 kilometres.
135
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0140.png
A further study
89
drew attention to the recent liberalisation of coach markets in Germany,
Italy and France and to subsequent reductions in night train services in all three Member
States, including publicly contracted services in France and Italy. However, rail industry
stakeholders interviewed for that study did not suggest that coach liberalisation had been
a direct cause of reductions in night train services. In total, coach liberalisation was cited
as:
a factor in rail closures, but not a dominant or sole cause, by the Bundesamt für
Güterverkehr in Germany;
a factor in falling rail demand, but not a dominant or sole cause, by DB and
Trenitalia; and
a cause of rail fare reductions, by DB alone.
While the study related to night trains, which mainly carry passengers long distances,
rather than to bus and coach services operated under public service contracts, we note
that there were only limited suggestions by stakeholders that coach liberalisation had
caused contractions in public services.
89
“Passenger night trains in Europe: the end of the line?”, European Parliament
136
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0141.png
A
NNEX
8: CASE STUDIES
Revision of Regulation 1073/2009
DG MOVE analysis of possible CO2 impacts
To illustrate CO2 impacts of a revision of Regulation 1073/2009, DG MOVE has carried
out a case study looking at the connection between Paris
–
Lille, which was opened to
competition as part of the general market opening for coaches in France.
Facts:
Passenger cars are by far the largest emitters of CO2 serving the connection between
Paris - Lille and are responsible for in excess of 65% of all CO2 emissions. Coaches,
together with electric trains, transporting passengers collectively are the lowest emitters
of CO2. As illustrated in the diagram below, coach transport has the lowest CO2
(gram/pass-km) compared to all other modes:
Source: Bus and coach transport for greening mobility, CE Delft 2011
Until August 2015, the intercity market in France was strictly regulated and long distance
coach services were restricted to cabotage as part of an international service. Since
liberalisation of domestic coach services the coach market has experienced rapid growth.
The Paris - Lille connection is 225km and is serviced by 4 coach operators (FLEXBUS,
IDIBUS, MEGABUS, and OUIBUS) with 97 departures and arrivals daily. In addition,
SNCF operates 44 train daily departures and arrivals. SNCF, through its subsidiary
OUIBUS, operates 38 of the 97 bus services serving this connection.
137
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0142.png
A typical rail fare would be €40 with a transit time of 1 hour compared to a typical coach
fare of €15 with a transit time of 3 hours. These differences illustrate the fact that users of
rail and coach have very different preferences and that the coach customer group are
more price conscious and place less value of time. This also explains why SNCF is not
cannibalising its own rail services when offering parallel coach services.
The figure below shows that coach has a very low modal share (1.39%) of long distance
passenger transport. Looking at the sources of coach passengers, i.e. which mode
passengers previously used prior to the market opening in France, the main share came
from cars (50%), followed by rail (20%) and existing coach services (18%).
Source: Own calculations
Analysis of impacts:
Based on the CO2 emissions per person by mode of transport it can be calculated that the
introduction of the coach connection between Paris and Lille has reduced transport CO2
emissions by just over 10,000 tonnes of CO2 per annum. Moreover, it has resulted in
250,000 less car journeys between the cities, thereby reducing also congestion as well as
air and noise pollution.
Extrapolating this CO2 saving to the EU would require a more comprehensive study. An
estimation, however, assuming a similar shift of passengers from long distance car travel
to coaches for the whole of EU would result in a CO2 saving of 1,618,126 tonnes/year.
The CO2 saving for the Paris
–
Lille connection has had little impact on modal shares.
Looking at rail in particular, the shift of passengers to coach represents 20% of the coach
modal share of 1.39%, i.e. 0.28% of the total long-distance rail market share. SNCF,
operating around 40% of the coach service between Paris
–
Lille, can be assumed to have
regained the same amount of passengers.
Conclusions:
138
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0143.png
The net CO2 effect of the opening of the coach market in France, illustrated by the case
study Paris
–
Lille, has been very positive in the sense that this particular connection has
lowered total CO2 emissions from transport by 10,000 tonnes/year and reduced noise
pollution and congestion. The potential CO2 saving for the EU has been tentatively
estimated to 1,618,216 tonnes.
Very importantly, this overall CO2 reduction has been achieved on one of the busiest
interregional connections with the presence of a high number of parallel rail services.
Considering that rail lines are relatively limited in the EU (200.000 km) compared to
roads (5 million km), the scope for coach services
–
without any parallel rail services
–
is very important, and such new services would have an even more positive net CO2
effect, as travellers currently only have cars as an option.
The introduction of new coach services have had little impact on the rail services in
France (0.28%), which is supporting learnings from other countries where inter-city rail
services and a liberalised long-distance bus sector are complementary, and one should
not be considered an alternative to the other. The major share is coming from passenger
cars, which explains the CO2 savings documented via this case study.
More generally, in a recent fact-finding study prepared for the EU Commission it is
reported that the liberalisation of the international coach market has reduced interurban
congestion, air and noise pollution and CO2 emissions as a consequence of modal shift
from cars. Experience across Europe has shown that liberalisation of the domestic coach
market results in significant growth in passengers and rapid changes in service quality
and cost.
A revision of 1073/2009 would
–
in addition to reducing CO2 emissions - contribute to a
broader and more uniform provision of coach services, which today mainly are present at
certain high-volumes links, such as Paris
–
Lille. By ensuring more harmonised rules, as
well as non-discriminatory access to terminals, it would enable also SMEs to enter the
markets in different countries, which today largely is restricted to main operators and rail
incumbents having the necessary capacity and resources to deal with the high
administrative burdens.
Revision of Regulation 1073/2009
DG MOVE analysis of possible CO2 impacts
To illustrate CO2 impacts of a revision of Regulation 1073/2009, DG MOVE has carried
out a case study looking at the connection between London
–
Birmingham. The route was
selected as it is part of a network in a more mature market.
Facts:
Coach services in the UK were liberalised in 1980 since when coach companies have
been able to operate regular services simply by applying for an operating licence.
139
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0144.png
The London - Birmingham connection is 200km. On this route passenger cars are by far
the largest emitters of CO2 and are responsible for in excess of 80% of all CO2
emissions.
The route is serviced by 2 coach operators (National Express and MEGABUS) and on an
average weekday there are 54 coaches travelling from London to Birmingham. A typical
coach fare would be €17 with a transit time of 2 hours and 30 mins. The coach operators
serving this route are part of larger groups that also run rail services in the UK.
The route is serviced by 3 rail operators (Virgin, Chiltern and Londonmidland) and on an
average weekday there are 168 trains travelling from London to Birmingham. A typical
train fare would be €30 with a transit time of 1 hour 43 minutes.
These differences illustrate that users or rail and coach have very different preferences
and that the coach customer group are more price conscious and place less value of time.
The figure below shows that coach serves a relatively low share (6%) of the journeys
between the two cities. However, together with rail, collective transport accounts for 25%
of the journeys.
Mode Share 2016
London to Birmingham
Car
Rail
Coach
Other
Source: Own calculations
Analysis of impacts:
The total volume of passenger traffic on the route has increased by 6.3% between 2008
and 2016. Based on the CO2 emissions per person by mode of transport it can be
calculated that transport CO2 emissions have increased on this route by 5.75% during the
same period. Car is responsible for 75% of the increase in emissions with rail and coach
being responsible for 20% and 5% respectively.
The case study suggests that the opportunity to use collective transport instead of private
car is helping to avoid CO2 emissions. For coach, in 2016, there were 1.15 million coach
journeys between the cities. Assuming that 45% of the coach users have access to a car
then 517,500 more car journeys would have been made which would have contributed to
140
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
1815323_0145.png
103.5 million passenger km and 10.6 thousand tonnes of CO2 compared with 3.8
thousand tonnes of CO2 for the same journeys made on bus.
Actual -v- Potential CO
2
emissions by
coach London - Birmingham
16
14
Tonnes (thousands) of CO
2
12
10
10,6
8
6
4
2
0
3,8
Coach
Potential emissions: had a car been used for the same journey
Actual emissions: by choosing coach
Conclusions:
In this more mature coach market CO2 impacts are less significant as in emerging
markets as most customers have already shifted to long established services. However,
coach continues to make a positive contribution to the decarbonisation of transport by
providing an alternative to travelling by private car which emits the greatest level of
CO2. The case study shows that every coach user with access to a car who chooses to
travel by coach is helping to avoid CO2 emissions.
The avoidance of higher CO2 emissions on the London
–
Birmingham route has been
achieved on one of the busiest inter-city connections with the presence of a huge number
of parallel rail services. The growth in the coach services on this route has not resulted in
any negative impact on the rail services which have grown (>10%) over the past decade.
Rail and coach continue to grow faster than car and this case study supports learnings
from other countries indicating that inter-city rail services and a liberalised long-distance
coach sector operate complementary, and one should not be considered an alternative to
the other.
141
 kom (2017) 0647 - Ingen titel
142