Europaudvalget 2018
KOM (2018) 0252
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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 14.3.2018
SWD(2018) 77 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL
amending Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas
(Visa Code)
{COM(2018) 252 final} - {SWD(2018) 78 final}
EN
EN
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Table of contents
1.
INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
6
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
2.
EU common visa policy .................................................................................. 6
Legislative package 2014 ................................................................................ 7
Broader policy context .................................................................................... 8
Consequences for the common visa policy ..................................................... 9
Scope of the initiative .................................................................................... 10
PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................................ 12
2.1. What are the problems? ................................................................................. 12
2.1.1.
2.1.2.
2.1.3.
origin
2.2.1.
2.2.2.
2.2.3.
2.3.1.
2.3.2.
2.3.3.
3.
Insufficient financial resources to support visa processing .................................. 12
Repeated visa procedures for regular travellers ................................................... 13
Insufficient levels of return of irregular migrants to some countries of
.............................................................................................................................. 16
Insufficient financial resources ............................................................................ 17
Repeated visa procedures ..................................................................................... 18
Return of irregular migrants ................................................................................. 19
Insufficient financial resources ............................................................................ 20
Repeated visa procedures ..................................................................................... 20
Return of irregular migrants ................................................................................. 21
2.2. What are the problem drivers? ...................................................................... 17
2.3. How will the problem evolve? ...................................................................... 20
WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT? ...................................................................................................... 21
3.1. Legal basis ..................................................................................................... 21
3.2. Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action ............................................................. 21
3.3. Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action ........................................................ 22
4.
OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED? ............................................................................. 22
4.1. General objectives ......................................................................................... 22
4.2. Specific objectives ......................................................................................... 23
5.
WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS? .................................................................. 23
5.1. What is the baseline from which options are assessed? ................................ 23
5.1.1.
5.1.2.
5.1.3.
5.2.1.
5.2.2.
Insufficient financial resources ............................................................................ 23
Repeated visa procedures ..................................................................................... 23
Return of irregular migrants ................................................................................. 23
Insufficient financial resources ............................................................................ 24
Repeated visa procedures ..................................................................................... 25
5.2. Description of the policy options .................................................................. 24
2
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5.2.3.
Return of irregular migrants ................................................................................. 26
5.3. Options discarded at an early stage ............................................................... 27
6.
WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS? ......................................................... 28
6.1. Methodology.................................................................................................. 28
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
6.2.1.
6.2.2.
6.2.3.
Possible impacts ................................................................................................... 28
Available data ....................................................................................................... 30
Qualitative assessment method ............................................................................ 31
Insufficient financial resources ............................................................................ 32
Repeated visa procedures ..................................................................................... 35
Return of irregular migrants ................................................................................. 37
6.2. Assessment of policy options ........................................................................ 32
6.3. Sensitivity analysis ........................................................................................ 40
7.
HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE? .......................................................................................... 40
7.1. Insufficient financial resources...................................................................... 40
7.2. Repeated visa procedures .............................................................................. 42
7.3. Return of irregular migrants .......................................................................... 43
8.
PREFERRED OPTIONS .................................................................................................................. 44
8.1.
8.2.
8.3.
8.4.
9.
Insufficient financial resources...................................................................... 44
Repeated visa procedures .............................................................................. 44
Return of irregular migrants .......................................................................... 44
REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency) .......................................... 45
HOW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?................................ 45
ANNEX 1: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION .......................................................................................... 47
ANNEX 2: STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION..................................................................................... 49
ANNEX 3: WHO IS AFFECTED AND HOW? ........................................................................................ 62
ANNEX 4: UPDATE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VISA CODE ......................................... 65
ANNEX 5: VISA FEE ................................................................................................................................ 76
ANNEX 6: INBOUND TOURISM TO THE EU/SCHENGEN COUNTRIES ......................................... 85
ANNEX 7: ELEMENTS CARRIED OVER FROM THE 2014 PROPOSAL ........................................... 87
ANNEX 8: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF MCA .................................................................................... 89
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Glossary
Term or acronym
EES
ESP
Entry-Exit System
Meaning or definition
external service provider (contracted by Member States to assist
consulates with certain tasks in the visa application procedure,
notably the collection of applications, of the visa fee and of
biometric identifiers as well as the return of travel documents to visa
applicants)
European Travel Information and Authorisation System
European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice
Local Schengen Cooperation (regular meetings of Member States'
consuls in a certain location, chaired by EU Delegation)
multiple-entry visa (short-stay visa allowing for an unlimited
number of entries to the Schengen area during its period of validity
and respecting the overall maximum period of stay, i.e. 90 days in
any 180-day period)
agreed approach of how many previous visas/trips the applicant has
to prove to qualify for a long-validity MEV and how the length of
validity for each subsequent visa would increase
periodical evaluations of Member States on the application of the
Schengen acquis in the field of the common visa policy, in
accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013
EU Member States applying the common visa policy in full (all EU
Member States with the exception of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom) as well as the Schengen
associated countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and
Switzerland
single-entry visa
fee paid to the ESP for collecting the application and biometric
identifiers
Schengen Information System
third-country national
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
visa application centre (operated by an ESP)
Visa Facilitation Agreement
Visa Information System (database of all visa applications and
decisions on those applications, including photograph and
fingerprints of applicants)
ETIAS
eu-LISA
LSC
MEV
MEV cascade
Schengen evaluation
Schengen States
SEV
service fee
SIS
TCN
TFEU
VAC
VFA
VIS
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visa
short-stay visa as defined in Article 2 (2)(a) of the Visa Code
(authorising its holder to stay in the Schengen area for up to 90 days
within any 180-day period)
fee paid to the consulate for processing the visa application
Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and the
Council of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information System
(VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-
stay visas (VIS Regulation)
Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and the
Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas
(Visa Code)
2014 proposal to recast the Visa Code (COM(2014) 164 final)
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the
third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt
from that requirement
Visa Waiver Agreement
Impact Assessment accompanying the Visa Code recast proposal
(SWD(2014) 68 final)
visa fee
VIS Regulation
Visa Code
Visa Code recast proposal
Visa Regulation
VWA
2014 Impact Assessment
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1.
1.1.
I
NTRODUCTION
: P
OLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
EU common visa policy
The abolition of checks at internal borders of the states forming part of the
Schengen
area
is one of the most valued achievements of EU integration. The common visa policy
for short-stay visas is one of the Schengen area's
"flanking measures"
(together with
the harmonisation of the external border controls, enhanced cross-border police
cooperation, and the creation of the Schengen Information System (SIS)) accompanying
the establishment of a common area without checks at internal borders.
The visa policy serves various objectives, in particular
preventing irregular
immigration
as well as
safeguarding public order and security.
In general a
visa
requirement
is accepted worldwide as a tool for countries (or groups of countries such
as the EU) to tackle different kinds of migration and security risks. That is the reason
why the EU will maintain visa requirements for citizens of a number of third countries.
At the same time the visa policy also aims at
facilitating travel to the EU for legitimate
and bona fide travellers,
notably by exempting nationals of countries with lower
migratory or security risks from the visa requirement and by easing visa procedures
wherever possible. In that respect the visa policy also plays a role in supporting tourism
and trade, and thus boosting growth in the EU.
The common visa policy is a set of
harmonised rules
governing different aspects
1
:
the Visa Regulation (539/2001) laying down the common
"visa lists"
of
countries whose nationals require a visa to travel to the EU and those who are
exempt from that requirement;
the Visa Code (Regulation 810/2009) establishing the
procedures and
conditions
for issuing short-stay visas;
Regulation 1683/95 laying down a uniform format for the
visa sticker;
and
the VIS Regulation (767/2008) setting up the
Visa Information System
(VIS), in
which all visa applications and Member States' decisions are recorded, including
applicants personal data, photographs and fingerprints.
Moreover the EU has concluded a number of Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFA) and
Visa Waiver Agreements (VWA) with third countries which implement or derogate from
those common rules.
This set of rules allows the Schengen States to
mutually recognise
visas issued by each
of them. The decision to issue a visa is a decision taken by national authorities, which
should take into account not only their own interest but that of all Schengen States.
1
Not all of these regulations are applied equally by all EU Member States. The visa policy is part of
the Schengen acquis and therefore does not apply to the United Kingdom and Ireland; it does apply
to Schengen associated countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). While the Visa
Regulation applies to all Member States, the Visa Code and the VIS Regulation only apply to the
Member States fully applying the Schengen acquis
6
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Therefore, the holder of a visa issued by Schengen States' individual consulates, as a
general rule, is entitled to
circulate in the entire Schengen area.
Visas are in principle not issued at the external borders or within the Schengen area but
visa applications have to be lodged before travelling to the EU at one of the Member
States'
consulates in third countries.
Rules of competence define which Member State
is entitled to examine and decide those applications, namely the Member State which is
the applicant's only or main destination.
1.2.
Legislative package 2014
The Visa Code is a core element of the common visa policy: it establishes harmonised
procedures and conditions for processing visa applications and issuing visas. It
entered
into force
on 5 April 2010, with the overarching objectives of facilitating legitimate
travel and tackling irregular immigration, enhancing transparency and legal certainty,
strengthening procedural guarantees and reinforcing equal treatment of visa applicants.
The Visa Code required the Commission to submit the European Parliament and the
Council an
evaluation
of its application two years after all the provisions of the
Regulation have become applicable
2
. On the basis of that evaluation, an in-depth
impact
assessment
was carried out, focussing on three broad problem areas:
1. the lengthy, costly and cumbersome nature of visa procedures for applicants;
2. the insufficient geographical coverage in visa processing;
3. the lack of a visa allowing travellers to stay more than 90 days in the Schengen
area.
On 1 April 2014 the Commission adopted two
legislative proposals:
the
Visa Code
recast
proposal
3
addressing the first two problem areas and the
touring visa
proposal
4
addressing the third one. The overall aims of this package were to foster travel to the EU
through facilitations in the visa policy – and thereby to contribute to tourism, trade,
growth and employment in the EU – and to harmonise implementation of the common
rules.
As regards the
visa procedures,
the Visa Code recast proposal included a number of
substantial facilitations for applicants: longer timeframe to lodge an application, abolition
of the requirement to present a travel medical insurance, shorter decision deadlines as
well as less documentation and easier access to multiple-entry visas (MEV) for frequent
travellers. Some of those facilitations were largely accepted by the co-legislators while
others were watered down or rejected in the course of negotiations by the co-legislators.
As regards the
geographical coverage
the Commission proposed that the Member
State(s) present in one location would mandatorily represent all Member States not
present, if no representation agreements were entered into. This proposal, while
2
3
4
The provisions on notification of a visa refusal and its grounds and on providing an appeal
procedure against a visa refusal became applicable on 5 April 2011.
COM(2014) 164 final.
COM(2014) 163 final.
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supported by the European Parliament, was widely rejected by Member States, arguing
that it would put disproportionate burden on Member States with a large consular
network while other Member States would be tempted to close smaller consular sections
relying on others. In the meantime the number of representation agreements (voluntarily)
concluded between Member States has further increased and Member States have opened
visa application centres (VAC) in locations where they were not present.
5
Therefore this
problem is less pressing today than it was in 2014, and will not be dealt with in this
impact assessment.
Negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council on the Visa Code recast
proposal ended in a deadlock by end 2016. On the one hand, the Council generally
maintained a very restrictive approach during the negotiations by rejecting essential parts
intended to modernise and facilitate the visa application procedure whereas the European
Parliament was overall quite supportive of the Commission's proposal with regard to the
procedural facilitations. On the other hand and more importantly, both institutions
presented amendments that went far beyond the Commission's proposal: the Council
introduced a link between third countries' cooperation on readmission and visa
facilitation, while the EP proposed to create a "humanitarian visa" in the Visa Code. This
latter suggestion was opposed by both the Council and the Commission as the Visa Code
covers visas for short stays only, a position which was confirmed by the ECJ ruling of 7
March 2017.
6
This stalemate blocked all further attempts to make progress, prompting
the Commission to announce withdrawal of the proposal in the Commission Work
programme for 2018
7
.
As regards the
lack of a visa for longer stays,
the Commission's touring visa proposal
was meant to fill the legal gap between short-stay visas and long-stay residence and
encountered support in the European Parliament and some Member States, but did not
gather a qualified majority in Council. Some Member States rejected the proposal,
expressing doubts about its necessity and legal basis and fearing possible abuse. The
Commission has therefore also announced the withdrawal of the proposal in the
Commission Work Programme for 2018, as there currently does not seem to be sufficient
political willingness to address the problem.
1.3.
Broader policy context
In the past four years (since the Commission proposed the Visa Code recast), the EU has
experienced unprecedented levels of
refugees and irregular migration
into the EU and
increased
threats to its internal security,
including a number of terror attacks. This led
the EU to launch a fundamental overhaul of its migration and security policies. Many of
5
6
7
the number of "blank spots" (the number of instances where a Member State is neither present nor
represented in a visa-required country and where an applicant therefore has to travel abroad to
lodge a visa application) has decreased from approximately 900 in 2014 to around 750 in early
2018, so that about 150 "blank spots" were "filled" in the meantime. (Those numbers include the 12
visa-required countries worldwide where no Member State is present or represented, amounting to
312 blank spots alone.).
Case C-638/16 PPU.
COM(2017) 650 final, 24.10.2017, annex IV.
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these new initiatives have been successfully adopted or implemented and others are
currently in the legislative procedure.
As a result the EU information systems for
border management and security
have been
considerably strengthened and new ones are being developed. In particular the co-
legislators have decided to introduce an
Entry-Exit System (EES)
8
to better manage and
facilitate third-country nationals' crossing the Schengen area's external borders. Among
other objectives, it will allow Member States to monitor irregular stays in the EU and
identify overstayers. This will contribute to strengthening the common visa policy, as it
will enable consulates to better assess applicants' lawful use of previous visas.
The Commission also proposed a
European Travel Information and Authorisation
System (ETIAS)
9
which will screen visa-exempt third-country nationals against security
and migration risks before they start their travel to the EU. This initiative is expected to
be adopted in the coming months. Contrary to the current visa application procedure, this
check will entirely rely on digital solutions, notably allowing applicants to apply online
at an EU portal.
Finally the Commission has recently adopted the so-called
interoperability
proposal
10
to
better link the various EU information systems for security, border and migration
management and improve their use by border guards, migration and asylum officials and
police officers to ensure they have the right information at the right time.
In the past years the EU also stepped up its activities to support Member States in
returning irregular migrants
to their countries of origin, including by overcoming third
countries' reluctance to cooperate with Member States in readmitting their own citizens.
The 2015 Action Plan on Return
11
called for all relevant policies to be used as incentives
for the partner country's willingness to cooperate on readmission, and for further
exploration of visa policy as an important leverage in that context. In June 2016 the
Commission adopted the Partnership Framework Communication
12
in which it stated that
the visa policy can be a very powerful element in the discussions with third countries
about cooperation on migration. The European Council conclusions of 22 and 23 June
2017 called for further efforts to achieve real progress in return and readmission policy,
using all possible levers, including by reassessing visa policy towards third countries.
1.4.
Consequences for the common visa policy
In the last years, apart from the strengthening of the visa waiver suspension mechanism
(allowing the EU to react quickly to substantial increases of migratory or security risks
resulting from visa-free travel by temporarily suspending the visa exemption for one or
several nationalities) and the exemption from the visa requirement to the citizens of
certain third countries, the common visa policy
has not been subject to a fundamental
review or overhaul.
8
9
10
11
12
Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017,
OJ L 327, 9.12.2017, p. 20.
COM(2016) 731 final, 16.11.2016.
COM(2017) 793 final, 12.12.2017.
COM(2015) 453 final, 9.9.2015.
COM(2016) 385 final, 7.6.2016.
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The overall
integrity of the visa processing
by Member States has not been
fundamentally called in question in the past few years. Yet there is a growing need to
ensure that visa policy matches the present and future challenges and can make a more
important contribution to the objectives of the EU's migration and security policies. The
Commission, in its Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on
Migration
13
, announced that it would come forward with its ideas on how to
modernise
the EU's common visa policy
for both the short and longer term. The main objectives of
this review are to bring the visa policy up to speed with the development of new border
management systems, to better use visa policy in its cooperation with third countries, and
to ensure a better balance between migration and security concerns, economic
considerations and general external relations.
The Commission Work Programme 2018
14
confirmed the Commission's intention to
withdraw the current Visa Code recast and touring visa proposals and to propose a
targeted revision of the Visa Code.
The further development of the Visa Information
System (VIS) and the alignment of the visa policy's legal framework with developments
on border management instruments and interoperability objectives will be the subject of a
separate proposal and impact assessment.
15
1.5.
Scope of the initiative
While migration and security related objectives have become more important than in the
past, one should not lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of visa applicants are not
posing any security and/or migratory threat to the EU. Some of the elements of the first
problem area (linked to the visa procedure) tackled by the recast proposal and the 2014
Impact Assessment remain valid in the current migratory and security context. The
stakeholder and open public consultations carried out for this Impact Assessment have
confirmed the importance of those issues for stakeholders and visa applicants.
16
The targeted revision of the Visa Code will have a twofold purpose:
1. Firstly it should
preserve some of the elements
of the 2014 recast proposal
which remain relevant in the current context and on which compromise seems
possible.
17
These elements are either linked to the
facilitation
of visa procedures
or to
clarification and streamlining
of existing provisions. Most of them
concern rather procedural matters which do not leave much room for considering
different policy options and do therefore not need to be examined in detail in this
impact assessment. The items that will be carried over are listed in annex 7,
together with a short description of their expected impacts as well as their
potential for simplification and cost reduction. The most important element of
facilitation in the 2014 proposal was the proposed rules on the increased
issuing
13
14
15
16
17
COM(2017) 558 final, 27.9.2017.
COM(2017) 650 final, 24.10.2017.
This initiative will require a revision of the VIS Regulation and some aspects of the Visa Code
which relate to the use of the VIS by consulates.
See summary of the consultations in annex 2.
Some of the provisions from the original proposal will be amended to take account of positions
expressed in the negotiations between the co-legislators.
10
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of multiple-entry visas with long validity to regular travellers.
As different
approaches are possible and were discussed during the legislative procedure and
the stakeholder consultations, it is useful to examine the problem and different
policy options in a more detailed analysis in this report.
2. Secondly it should address
new elements
that have come up in the negotiations
between the co-legislators on the Visa Code recast proposal and have been
highlighted in the Commission's Communication on the Delivery of the European
Agenda on Migration as well as in the consultations carried out by the
Commission. This concerns the
amount of the visa fee and the financing of
Member States' visa processing activities,
as well as the question of
establishing a
legal link between visa policy and third countries' cooperation
on readmission of irregular migrants.
This Impact Assessment report will therefore focus on the following problem areas:
the need for sufficient financial resources to support Member States' visa
processing;
the divergent practices among Member States in issuing multiple-entry visas and
the resulting repeated visa procedures for regular travellers;
the role that visa policy can play as leverage in the EU's readmission policy.
The third area differs from the two others in that the source of the problem originates in
the area of return, and not in visa policy, and the affected groups and stakeholders as well
as the consequences of the problem are very different. Nevertheless the two policy areas
both have a strong external relations dimension and can be considered as foreign policy
tools. A link can be established to obtain better leverage vis-à-vis third countries, as
shown below in the baseline scenario (section 5.1.3) and the policy options (section
5.2.3).
A number of issues raised in the stakeholder consultation (or the 2014 evaluation) are not
addressed in this report, such as the use and monitoring of external service providers
(ESP), new IT solutions for a full digitalisation of the visa application process, and the
current differentiation between visa-free and visa-required countries. The scope of
stakeholder consultation was deliberately broader, as it was also supposed to feed into the
policy communication that will accompany this initiative. Some issues, such as lodging
and decision-making deadlines as well as monitoring of ESP, are covered by the carry-
overs from the 2014 proposal (see annex 7). Issues regarding visa requirements concern
the Visa Regulation (539/2001) and will be addressed in the communication. On full
digitalisation of visa procedures the communication will announce the launch of
feasibility studies that could feed in future legislative initiatives.
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2.
2.1.
P
ROBLEM DEFINITION
What are the problems?
2.1.1. Insufficient financial resources to support visa processing
The number of visa applications processed by Member States has increased considerably
over the last eight years since the Visa Code entered into force. While Member States
processed 10.2 million visa applications worldwide in 2009, this figure rose by almost
70% to a peak of 17.3 million in 2013, and then dropped to 15.2 in 2016
18
, which still
represents an increase by more than 50% over 2009. According to preliminary figures it
is estimated that in 2017 the number of visa applications will have increased again to
around 16 million.
At the same time the financial resources available to Member States' visa authorities and
consulates for visa processing (per application) have remained static or even diminished
due to budget cuts following the economic crisis. The visa fee of EUR 60 defined by the
Visa Code should be the main financial source to cover the costs of visa processing.
However, in a 2016 questionnaire survey as well as in the stakeholder consultation many
Member States have affirmed (and some have presented calculations showing) that the
current fee does not cover their administrative expenses, notably in terms of staffing
(both expatriate and locally hired staff), premises, equipment, development and
maintenance of IT systems, printing and secure management of visa stickers. This means
that Member States have to cover the funding gap from their general administrative
budget.
Scarce resources for visa processing have prompted Member States to use outsourcing of
certain tasks to ESPs to alleviate the workload for their consulates. However, due to
increasing volumes of applications outsourcing did not lead to sufficient cost savings.
Member States were forced to take more drastic measures, such as cutting staff in
consulates, reducing training and shifting more tasks from expatriate to local staff.
As shown by several recent Schengen evaluation reports and LSC reports, understaffing
(especially as regards expatriate staff which is by far more costly) and lack of appropriate
training are recurrent problems. Consulates often lack well-trained experts with specific
knowledge (e.g. document security experts). Staff shortages in consulates' visa sections
directly affect the quality and integrity of the examination of visa applications and thus
put at risk the screening function of visa procedures, with possible negative consequences
for migratory and security threats.
Some Member States have, as a result of short financial resources, started closing
consular/visa sections or refusing representation of other Member States in certain
18
The drop in numbers was mostly due to a very strong decrease of applications in Russia (from 7
million in 2013 to 3.2 million in 2016) and was not fully compensated by increases in other
countries such as China and India.
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locations.
19
Those measures create problems for visa applicants, as it means that they
have to travel to other countries (than those they live in) to apply for a visa.
Insufficient financial and human resources also lead to long waiting times and deadlines
in processing the visa applications, especially in peak seasons when Member States do
not always have the necessary resources to dispatch temporary staff reinforcements. This
is confirmed by many complaints received by the Commission as well as the open
stakeholder consultation. The fact the length of the procedure was rated by respondents
in the open consultation as the most difficult aspect of the visa procedure (32.6% selected
it as the most difficult, 27.5% as the second most difficult element). The 2013 European
Commission's study on the economic impact of short stay visa facilitation highlights that
the most important source markets are late-booking markets. The lengthy visa procedures
therefore deter tourist from travelling to Europe in the first place, leading to considerable
revenue losses for the European tourism industry.
20
According to a European Tour
Operators Association (ETOA) report, it is estimated that 21% of potential tourists from
emerging markets abandon their plans to travel to Europe due to slow processing of
visas.
21
The lack of sufficient revenues supporting visa processing thus undermines the integrity
of the visa processing as well as the objective of providing fast and client-friendly
procedures to visa applicants.
2.1.2. Repeated visa procedures for regular travellers
One of the main problems already identified in great detail in the 2014 Impact
Assessment is the lengthy and cumbersome visa procedure. This is particularly true for
regular travellers who visit the EU at least once a year for business trips, to attend
conferences, to meet family or friends, or as tourists. In the stakeholder consultation,
associations representing business travellers, maritime transport, performing arts and
tourism were particularly in favour of reducing administrative burdens for frequent
visitors. In the open public consultation 84% of individual respondents who travel to the
Schengen area at least twice per year stated that they had not received any facilitations
during the visa application process despite repeated visa applications.
The Visa Code allows the issuing of multiple-entry visas (MEV) with a validity of up to
five years. However, experience gathered in Schengen evaluations and in LSC since the
start of application of the Visa Code shows that this possibility is rarely used. Member
States (at central or consulate level) have a restrictive policy for issuing visas with a long
19
20
21
For instance since 2014 France, citing budgetary reasons, closed its visa sections in Nepal, Papua
New Guinea, Fiji, Botswana, South Sudan, Brunei, Paraguay, Moldova and Montenegro. Similarly
Denmark closed visa sections in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nepal. Several Member States started
refusing representation of other Member States quoting lack of resources.
Study on the economic impact of short stay visa facilitation on the tourism industry,
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/study-economic-impact-short-stay-visa-facilitation-tourism-
industry-0_en
ETOA, Europe: Open for Business?,
http://www.etoa.org/docs/default-source/Reports/ETOA-
reports/2010-etoa-origin-markets-report.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
13
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validity; as a maximum many consulates are willing to issue a visa with a validity of one
year, with a few rare exceptions. There are several reasons for the reluctance to Member
States to issue MEV with a long validity: long-established practices to issue visas mainly
for the planned trip; consulates' apprehension that visas with long validity increase
migratory risk; national requirements for consulates to consult central authorities before
issuing visas with long validity; and the unclear legal basis (see below, section 2.2.2).
Moreover, there are also wide variations between Member States' practices when it
comes to the length of validity of these MEV.
The table below shows the MEV-issuing practice of three Schengen consulates in China
visited as part of Schengen evaluations in 2016 and 2017. It shows, in two of the three
cases, the very low share of MEV with a validity of one year or more among the total of
visas issued (between 1 and 1.5%). At the same time it shows the wide variety of
practices among Member States. These figures should be read against the background of
the rapidly improving socio-economic situation of Chinese applicants and the rather low
migratory risk from China, compared with other third countries.
Share of total visas issued
MEV 1 year
MEV 2 years
MEV 3 years
MEV 4 years
MEV 5 years
Total MEV 1 year or more
Member State 1
0.99%
0.24%
0.19%
-
0.04%
1.45%
Member State 2
15.4%
0.57%
0.64%
0.68%
2.13%
19.4%
Member State 3
0.87%
0.09%
0.00%
-
-
0.97%
By way of comparison, the standard validity of visitor visas issued by the United States
and Canada in China is 10 years (unless the passport validity is shorter than that, in
which case the visa validity is adapted to that of the passport). These countries argue that
the risk of irregular migration and overstay does not increase by issuing visas with longer
validity, while security checks in databases can continuously be performed by the
systems during the validity of the visa (leading to its revocation where appropriate).
The low share of long-validity MEV – combined with cumbersome and costly visa
procedures – affect the EU's economy negatively. It prevents spontaneous business or
leisure travel by affluent travellers notably from countries such as China, India, or the
Gulf region, who tend to increasingly take last-minute decisions on travel. Such persons
who have not yet been granted a MEV with long validity after one or two trips to the EU
with single-entry visas might turn their attention towards countries which are more ready
to grant them visitor visas with long validity (e.g. United States, Canada, New Zealand).
Business people, tourists as well as people travelling for medical treatment will thus
direct their investment and spending to countries outside of the EU. That will carry
negative consequences for the EU's tourism industry, retail trade, the health sector and
the economy as a whole.
While it is very difficult to estimate the overall scale of the economic loss to the EU as a
result from heavy and repetitive visa procedures, the fact as such was confirmed by
14
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stakeholders during the targeted and the open public consultations.
22
The tourism
industry associations highlighted the role of outbound travel agencies, who have
considerable influence in steering business towards markets where visa procedures are
perceived to be less cumbersome. In the open consultation 22% of individual respondents
who offered an answer stated they would be deterred from visiting the Schengen area
again due to their experience with the visa procedure.
The EU Member States are among the world's leading tourist destinations and the
tourism and travel industry plays a key role in the European economy.
23
Currently it
contributes approximately 10% to the EU's GDP and it contributed to the labour market
by 11.6% in 2016.
24
Visa-required countries include those with the highest increase in
international tourism expenditure in the first half of 2017 (China: +19%, Russia: + 27%
after some years of declines, Thailand: +8%).
25
However, the low share of MEV among
the total number of visas issued unnecessarily restrains further growth of the industry and
limits its global competitiveness
26
.
Another consequence of the low volume of MEV with long validity is that frequent
travellers have to apply over and over again which represents an administrative burden
not only for the applicants, but also for the consulates in particular in locations with very
high volumes of applications. This constitutes a strain for the consulates' human
resources which are already stretched as a result of the limited financial resources (see
above, section 2.1.1).
Finally, the varying practices of Member States with regard to issuing MEV with long
validity encourage applicants to disregard the rules of Member States' competence for
issuing visas and apply with those Member States where they expect the most favourable
outcome (so called "visa shopping"). This means that applicants are more likely to
provide fraudulent information or documents with regard to their travel destination
and/or purpose. Visa shopping is a form of fraud, and even though it is difficult to
determine the extent of the phenomenon, Member States confirm that visa shopping is a
serious issue and occurs frequently. Online fora in third countries show a vivid exchange
among applicants on which consulates issue visas with a long validity. Divergence in
issuing long-validity MEV is one of the strongest factor for visa shopping and also leads
to accusations against some Member States of "unfair competition" to attract tourists and
businesspeople and of not respecting the common rules.
22
23
24
25
26
According to the tourist industry, regular travellers to Europe tend to avoid the main tourist
'hotspots' and visit less known towns and regions instead, boosting the economy in less developed
areas.
See also annex 6.
World Travel & Tourism Council, Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2017,
https://www.wttc.org/research/economic-research/economic-impact-analysis/.
UNWTO, European Union Short-Term Tourism Trends, Volume 1, 2017-5.
For instance, the number of Chinese outbound travellers rose by 6% to 135 million in 2016 and
their expenditure to US$ 261 billion (UNWTO press release, 12 April 2017). However, Europe
only received about 10.2 Chinese visitors, a growth of just 2% (according to the European Travel
Commission).
15
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2.1.3. Insufficient levels of return of irregular migrants to some countries of origin
In the wake of the migration crisis of 2015 the numbers of irregular migrants in the EU
expected to return to their home country has grown considerably
27
. These numbers
comprise people found to be staying illegally in the EU, persons having received
negative asylum decisions as well as those for whom return decisions were issued.
According to Eurostat data
28
, between 2011 and 2016 over 5 million third country
nationals were found to be illegally present in the territory of the EU Member States, out
of which just over 3 million in 2015 and 2016 alone. As regards asylum seekers, in 2015
and 2016 a total of 718 665 third country nationals received first-instance negative
asylum decisions, with an additional 412 330 having received negative decisions in the
first three quarters of 2017. In the six-year period of 2011-2016, 2 891 260 persons were
ordered to leave, out of which 1 118 385 were returned to third countries. This means
that 1 772 875 persons were not returned, out of which 600 925 in 2015-2016 alone. It
can be assumed that the majority of these persons continue to remain in the territory of
the EU Member States.
Irregular migrants staying in the territory of the Member States and waiting for return to
their home country – whether refused asylum seekers, overstayers or other third-country
nationals who do not (or no longer) fulfil the conditions of entry and stay – remain in
legal limbo: not having an authorisation to stay, they do not have the right to work
legally, and thus do not benefit from the rights and legal protection available to legal
migrants having access to employment. They cause high costs for Member States in
terms of housing, food, medical expenses and related expenses, as well as administrative
costs. When return is not immediately possible, certain basic rights are provided under
the Return Directive, such as emergency healthcare and access to education for children.
Many Member States go beyond the basic requirements and continue to provide housing,
healthcare, as well as adult education even after a return decision has been taken, to
reduce the likelihood of absconding. Irregular migrants can easily become prey of human
traffickers, as well as be subject to exploitation.
Irregular migrants who pose a risk of absconding can be detained by the EU Member
States pending preparation of return for up to 18 months. Detention of irregular migrants
27
28
While there is no data set collected in the EU to show in a consolidated manner the total (stock)
number of irregular migrants in the European Union, this number can be extrapolated based on the
available official Eurostat statistics, i.e. data on persons ordered to leave and effectively returned to
third countries, persons found to be illegally present and the numbers of negative asylum decisions,
as well as based on the numbers of arrivals of irregular migrants to the EU. There are however
precision limitations to the use of individual datasets, as they are not always complementary or
directly comparable. To give an example, France estimates the number of irregular migrants staying
in the country based on the number of beneficiaries of state-funded health care (aide médicale
d’État) at well above 311 310 (Avis n° 114 (2017-2018) de M. François-Noël BUFFET, fait au nom
de la commission des lois, déposé le 23 novembre 2017).
Eurostat database, Third-country nationals found to be illegally present – annual data (rounded);
Asylum and first-time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex – annual aggregated data
(rounded), Third-country nationals ordered to leave – annual data (rounded); Third-country
nationals returned following an order to leave – annual data (rounded).
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is not only a serious restriction of freedom for the migrants themselves, but also very
costly for the Member States. Due to high judicial requirements and the limited detention
capacity in the Member States, the threshold for detention of irregular migrants is set
very high. Alternatives to detention, such as reporting obligations, seizing travel
documents and/or valuables, requirement to reside at a specified location, are known to
be inefficient in preventing absconding.
This increases the risk of secondary movements of irregular migrants and abuse of
Member States' immigration systems. Secondary movements increase the administrative
burden of Member States in terms of identification of apprehended irregular migrants,
administrative and/or judicial proceedings necessary to reach a decision on the right to
stay in a given Member State, appeal procedures, possible detention, preparation of
return etc.
Finally the failure to efficiently return migrants to their home country is also an incentive
for further irregular migration. The dangers along the road to Europe are often
disregarded by irregular migrants because they know that the risk of being returned once
in Europe is rather low. Migrants would reconsider whether it is worthwhile to invest
their own and/or family savings to enter Europe if the likelihood of being returned was
significant.
2.2.
What are the problem drivers?
2.2.1. Insufficient financial resources
One of the main drivers for the insufficient financial resources for the purpose of visa
processing is that the
standard visa fee
29
of EUR 60 has not changed since 2006,
i.e.
even before the entry into force of the Visa Code in 2009. While the Visa Code provides
that it "shall be revised regularly in order to reflect the administrative costs", it does not
define a specific procedure for revising the fee. Currently the only possibility to change it
is to amend the Visa Code.
During the negotiations on the Visa Code recast proposal several Member States were in
favour of reviewing urgently the visa fee. This issue was brought up to Coreper in
September 2015, which invited the Commission to carry out an assessment of
administrative costs of the processing of visa applications. Following up this request, the
Commission carried out a survey among Member States to assess the cost of processing a
visa application and what methodology should be followed to make such a calculation.
30
In the stakeholder consultation, almost all Member States were of the view that the cost
of processing a visa application exceeds the amount of the fee and that the visa fee
29
30
A number of fee reductions and waivers apply. For instance, the visa fee is EUR 35 for children
between age 6 and 12, and waived for children under 6. Moreover, most Visa Facilitation
Agreements (VFA) concluded by the EU with third countries in force – including the one for
Russia (3.2 million applications in 2016) – provide for a standard visa fee of EUR 35. VFAs cover
about 30% of all visa applications.
See annex 5, parts 1-2.
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should be increased. However, they differed on the precise amount and whether it should
be differentiated by location or validity of the issued visa. Some argued that rather than
linking the visa fee to the administrative costs, a political decision should be taken to set
it at a certain level. A few Member States, however, recalled that travellers' spending
during their stay compensates for low revenues from the visa fee. This point of view is
shared by stakeholders in the tourism and travel business, who argue that the visa fee
should be seen as a marketing cost that is overcompensated not only indirectly by the
economic benefit of travel and tourism to the Schengen area, but directly by the
additional tax revenue that Member States derive from visitors' spending in the Schengen
area.
In comparison with many other countries' fees for comparable visitor visas, the EU visa
fee is rather low.
31
2.2.2. Repeated visa procedures
The main driver for and underlying cause of the repetitive visa procedures for frequent
travellers and the low share of long-validity MEV is the
unclear legal basis for issuing
such MEVs
and Member States' diverging interpretation of it. Some Member States
require their consulates to consult central authorities before granting long-validity MEVs,
which represents an additional burden and thus a disincentive for consulates to do so.
While the Visa Code provides for the – in principle mandatory – issuing of MEV with
long validity between six months and five years to
bona fide
regular travellers who have
proven their integrity and reliability by lawfully using previous visas, this formulation of
the provision allows for different interpretations. The legal basis is not very clear with
regard to the conditions for issuing of long-validity MEV, the personal scope of the
provision and the precise length of validity MEVs to be issued.
32
For instance there are
diverging views on how applicants are to prove the need to travel frequently or regularly
(which in theory implies concrete planning and evidence of future trips), to what extent
previous trips to other comparable countries (e.g. UK, US, Canada, Australia, New
31
32
2.
(a)
(b)
United States: USD 160 (EUR 133); UK: up to six months validity: GBP 89 (EUR 100), up to two
years: GBP 337 (EUR 383), up to five years: GBP 612(EUR 696); Australia: AUD 140 (EUR 90);
New Zealand: NZD 170 (EUR 100). Among those countries, only Canada has a comparable visa
fee: CAD 100 (EUR 67). See more details in annex 5, part 3.
Article 24(2) Visa Code:
Without prejudice to Article 12(a), multiple-entry visas shall be issued with a period of validity
between six months and five years, where the following conditions are met:
The applicant proves the need or justifies the intention to travel frequently and/or regularly, in
particular due to his occupational or family status, such as business persons, civil servants engaged
in regular official contacts with Member States and EU institutions, representatives of civil society
organisations travelling for the purpose of educational training, seminars and conferences, family
members of citizens of the Union, family members of third-country nationals legally residing in
Member States and seafarers; and
The applicant proves his integrity and reliability, in particular the lawful use of previous uniform
visas or visas with limited territorial validity, his economic situation in the country of origin and his
genuine intention to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa applied
for.
18
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Zealand, Japan) can be taken into account and whether certain categories of travellers
such as tourists can benefit from the provision, as they are not explicitly mentioned.
Moreover there are no rules on the number of previous visas/trips that would entitle the
applicant to a long-validity MEV and how fast the length of validity for each subsequent
visa would increase (so called "MEV cascade"). Some Member States at central level or
in individual consulates have developed such cascades (e.g. the so-called "decision
protocols" of one Member State's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) leading to individual
practices which only aggravate the lack of harmonisation. Additionally, it has been
observed in Schengen evaluations that Member States do not always take account of
visas issued by other Member States for the purpose of considering applicants as frequent
travellers. The guidance provided by legislation to consulates on the issuing of MEV
with long validity is therefore insufficient in several aspects.
2.2.3. Return of irregular migrants
Readmission of own nationals is an obligation under international customary law, hence
cooperation on return is not something that is at the will of a government. Nevertheless
many
third country governments are reluctant to readmit their own nationals.
In the
case of 80 third countries the return rates (i.e. the share of persons return to their country
out of those ordered to leave EU territory) fall below the EU average return rate (46.4%
in 2016). Around 700 000 persons of those found to be illegally present in the territory of
EU Member States in 2016 and nearly 300 000 persons of those ordered to leave
originated from countries that lie below that average return rate. The return rate as such
does not fully reflect the level of cooperation with third countries, as the discrepancy
between the number of persons ordered to leave and those effectively returned can also
be attributed to Member States' own legal or administrative obstacles to return.
Nevertheless, a comparison between the return rates to various third countries is a solid
indicator of the differences in the level of cooperation on return and readmission.
Return of an irregular migrant can only be enforced on condition of possession of a valid
travel document. If such a document is available, no formalities or procedures with
authorities of the third country of origin are necessary. A third country's cooperation is
necessary, however, when no valid travel document is available to Member State's
authorities and consequently the nationality of the irregular migrant has to be confirmed
and a travel document issued by third country authorities. This is a widespread situation
as many irregular migrants conceal or destroy their passport to prevent their return.
In general, based on Member States' reports, cooperation in the return process is difficult
with most third countries of origin. The authorities in the third countries concerned are
not willing to cooperate efficiently in this process, hence procedures are delayed,
obstacles are created, and eventually removal is postponed or avoided. The most
recurrent obstacles reported were:
requiring additional information, such as criminal records or identification
documents;
19
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requests to identify the person, as opposed to establishing his/her nationality;
failure to accept the return decision as the outcome of national procedures, and
the request to reconsider the grounds for stay of the third-country nationals
concerned;
lack of competence of the embassies to establish nationality and identity;
lack of capacity/willingness at the consular sections of embassies to conduct
interviews with alleged nationals;
refusal to issue travel documents;
refusal to accept return flights, in particular charter flights.
As regards the reasons for the lack of third countries' cooperation on return, most third
countries do not provide formal/public justification, given the sensitivity of the topic.
However the experience in negotiations with third countries on readmission, at EU and
Member States level identified these main reasons:
public opinion in third countries remaining very hostile to cooperation on
readmission with the EU;
protecting the interests of own nationals who have migrated to Member States,
whether they had done so regularly or irregularly;
pressure from the diaspora – in some cases embassies/consulates have been
reported to become subject to pressures, bribes or even threats by the migrants'
families urging them to prevent return;
fear of the loss of remittances from migrants, which in many third countries
constitute a substantial share of the GDP (even though irregular migrants
represent only a fraction of the diaspora and are unlikely to be able to send
significant amounts given their precarious status).
2.3.
How will the problem evolve?
2.3.1. Insufficient financial resources
Without any change to the current visa fee, it is very likely that the lack of financial
resources will lead to further cuts to Member States' budgets for visa processing,
resulting in staff shortages and the closing of visa sections. The consequences of these
tendencies have been described in section 2.1.1.
2.3.2. Repeated visa procedures
While some Member States have recognised the problem and have started taking action
(mostly at central level) to encourage consulates to issue more long-validity visas, the
awareness and the perceived need for action is not shared equally among Member States.
In the absence of clear harmonised rules on the issuing of visas to regular travellers,
Member States and their consulates are likely to continue to determining their own
approach.
Many are likely to continue to be reluctant to issue MEV with long validity, while others
might continue to adopt a more open approach, depending either on economic interests
20
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and general relations with the host country or on consuls' individual assessments.
Especially consulates of smaller Member States with no capacity problems because of
limited numbers of applications or those who do not attract tourists do not feel the same
level of pressure from central authorities, host countries, applicants, the tourism industry
and business in general to issue more long-validity MEV, first because the volume of
visa applications in their consulates is lower and secondly because they are less likely to
be the main destination of repeated trips of the same applicant. It is therefore likely that
the gap between the practices of more forthcoming and more restrictive Member States
will further increase.
2.3.3. Return of irregular migrants
Given the peak in asylum applications in 2015 and 2016 and the length of asylum and
appeal procedures, it can be assumed with certainty that the number of migrants expected
to return to their countries (and thus the scope of the problem) will grow in the coming
years. On the basis of Eurostat figures it can be extrapolated that about 1.2 million
refused asylum seekers will be progressively receiving enforceable return decisions in
2018-2019
33
. Out of the 2 583 735 asylum applications made in 2015-2016, 884 655
were still pending in 2017 and could result in a high number of return decisions. The
political pressure to enforce return decisions in practice will grow accordingly.
3.
3.1.
W
HY SHOULD THE
EU
ACT
?
Legal basis
The legal basis for the common visa policy is Article 77(2)(a) TFEU. This Article
empowers the Union to adopt measures concerning "the common policy on visas and
other short stay residence permits". The existing Visa Code and other legislation in the
field of the common visa policy have been adopted on that legal basis.
3.2.
Subsidiarity: Necessity of EU action
The abolition of checks at internal borders in the Schengen area requires, among other
measures, a common policy on visas. The common visa lists (of countries whose
nationals require visas and of those whose nationals are exempted from the visa
requirement), and uniform conditions and harmonised procedures for issuing visas are
pre-conditions for enabling mutual recognition of visas which allows third-country
nationals legally present in one Schengen State to travel to the other Schengen State
without requiring checks at internal borders. No stakeholders have so far called in
question this principle.
The conditions and procedures for issuing short-stay visas are established by a regulation
that is directly applicable in all Member States, namely the Visa Code. The problems
33
Not all Member States issue return decisions together with negative asylum decisions, and out of
those which do, some report only enforceable return decisions to Eurostat, i.e. decisions which have
entered into force once all appeal deadlines had expired or appeal procedures had been completed.
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elaborated in the previous sections are unlikely to disappear in the near future and they
are directly related to the current provisions of the Visa Code. Amendments of the Visa
Code are only possible at EU level.
The initiative will further develop and improve the rules in the Visa Code. The short-stay
visa in principle allows its holder to circulate freely in the Schengen area, which implies
the highest degree of harmonised rules that cannot be solved by Member States acting
alone and can only be addressed at EU level.
3.3.
Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action
As described in the baseline scenario below, the continued application of the current
legal framework is not going to lead to resolving these problems.
As regards the financing of visa processing, it is possible for Member States to increase
their national budget for consulates and central visa authorities; however that possibility
is considerably limited by national budget constraints which exist in most Member
States. Moreover, the Visa Code stipulates that the visa fee should reflect the
administrative costs of visa issuing. Furthermore, it is legally not possible for Member
States to charge additional or higher fees from visa applicants for visa processing; such
action can only be taken at EU level.
As regards the issuing of long-validity MEVs for regular travellers, the Visa Code
currently leaves rather broad discretion to Member States. However, as argued above,
national action in this field is likely to be very uneven and therefore to aggravate the
problem, as it can lead to visa shopping as well as complaints by some Member States
and mutual accusations. EU action is therefore warranted to achieve a more harmonised
development and implementation of current rules.
National action is possible and desirable to try to obtain better cooperation of third
countries on matters of return of irregular migrants. Many Member States have
developed activities in that field, with varying success. However, it is unlikely that any of
such activities will achieve the same leverage towards reluctant third countries to
cooperate as concerted action by all Member States, e.g. in the framework of the
common visa policy.
4.
O
BJECTIVES
: W
HAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED
?
This section lists the general and specific objectives any initiative should have to address
the above-mentioned problems faced by Member States and visa applicants.
4.1.
General objectives
The general objective of the initiative is to strengthen the common visa policy while
addressing migration and security concerns on one hand and taking into account
economic considerations and general external relations on the other hand.
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4.2.
Specific objectives
In order to achieve the general objective, the following specific objectives should be
addressed:
1. ensure sufficient financial resources to Member States in order to safeguard the
quality and integrity of visa processing;
2. ensure more systematic and harmonised issuing of multiple-entry visas with long
validity to
bona fide
regular travellers;
3. advance the EU's interests in the area of return and readmission by increasing
leverage
vis-à-vis
non-cooperative third countries in the area of visa policy.
5.
5.1.
W
HAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS
?
What is the baseline from which options are assessed?
5.1.1. Insufficient financial resources
The standard visa fee will remain unchanged at EUR 60 (and EUR 35 for children
between 6 and 12 years of age) despite the Visa Code provision requiring its regular
revision. Member States' visa authorities will continue to experience the same difficulties
in obtaining sufficient financial resources to fund visa processing in consulates, leading
possibly to further closings of visa sections and staff shortages, which affect the level of
service provided to visa applicants and may put at risk the integrity of the visa
examination procedure.
5.1.2. Repeated visa procedures
The existing provision on issuing MEV with long validity (Article 24(2) Visa Code) will
continue to apply and will be interpreted and implemented very differently. Many
consulates will continue to be rather restrictive in issuing such MEV, thereby requiring
frequent travellers to go through repeated visa procedures resulting in increased costs and
administrative burden for applicants and a high workload for applicants. The potential for
additional unplanned trips to the Member States by holders of MEV will not be
exploited.
5.1.3. Return of irregular migrants
Currently there is no legal basis for making visa procedures conditional on a third
country's willingness to cooperate with Member States on return and readmission of
irregular migrants. However, in parallel to Council's proposed amendments to the Visa
Code recast proposal to provide for a legal framework for using visa policy as leverage
for enhancing cooperation on readmission, Council decided in June 2017 to develop a
Coreper-led coordination mechanism ("visa policy toolbox").
34
This mechanism would
be applied on an
ad-hoc
basis within the existing legal framework, using the limited
34
Council document 9880/17 EU RESTRICTED. As this document is restricted, the approach
followed can only be sketched vaguely.
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margin of manoeuvre given to Member States in the Visa Code. On the basis of a set of
agreed indicators measuring the level of cooperation of a given third country, Coreper
would give guidance, on a case-by-case basis and using an incremental approach, and
recommend the coordinated application by Member States of a series of measures related
to the visa procedure. The measures are to be coordinated by Local Schengen
Coordination and regularly monitored by Coreper.
The Commission supported this "toolbox" approach as "pragmatic and efficiency-
oriented" and not affecting the Commission's institutional role and responsibilities, as the
measures covered fell within Member States' margins of manoeuvre with regard to the
implementation of the Visa Code.
To date a decision leading to a set of measures being agreed on has been made with
regard to only one third country in September 2017. The mere launch of the process
proved successful in negotiations on a return arrangement and it was decided not to
implement the agreed measures pending signals of improvement of cooperation on
readmission.
Therefore the baseline therefore has to be considered as a dynamic one, as no experiences
in the effective implementation of the "toolbox approach" and its impact have been
gathered yet.
5.2.
Description of the policy options
5.2.1. Insufficient financial resources
There is wide consensus that the visa fee paid by applicants should cover the costs of
Member States in processing visa applications, as far as possible. The principle that the
visa fee should reflect the administrative costs is set in the Visa Code itself (Article
16(3)). It is fully in line with Member States' administrative rules providing that their
own citizens have to cover the costs of certain administrative activities, such as the
issuing of passports, ID cards and driving licences.
In 2016 the Commission conducted a questionnaire survey among Member States on
administrative costs and the calculation of the visa fee.
35
It emerged in the survey and the
subsequent discussions in the Visa Committee that it is virtually impossible to calculate
the level of a common visa fee on the basis of national administrative costs. On the one
hand, costs levels (in particular for staff) are very different among Member States. On the
other hand, there were different views on factors that should be taken into account. There
was also no agreement on whether the fee should remain a "flat rate" or whether there
should be differentiated fees, depending on the length of validity of the visa or on the
place of application.
In the survey some Member States presented their own calculations of costs and/or came
up with suggestions what the visa fee should be, as shown in this table:
35
See summary of Member States' replies in annex 5, parts 1 and 2.
24
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Member State
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Latvia
Luxembourg
Malta
The Netherlands
Slovenia
Sweden
Calculation of administrative costs per
visa application (in €)
80-90
143 (at consulates)
69.92 (at consulates)
99.06
Suggested visa fee (in €)
120
65
120 (not counting VFAs)
100
90-100
In the stakeholder consultation, the tourism industry associations favoured decoupling
the visa fee from administrative costs and proposed setting it with regard to the practice
of 'competing' countries. While stakeholders cautioned against raising the visa fee,
several conceded that the indirect costs of a visa application (travelling to the
consulate/ESP, obtaining the travel medical insurance and all supporting documents,
legalisations, etc.) can be equally or more important than the visa fee.
On this basis the following options will be examined:
Policy option 1A: Status quo
Unchanged common visa fee (EUR 60, children aged 6-11: EUR 35).
Policy option 1B: National visa fees based on administrative costs
Abolish the EU visa fee and allow Member States to set their visa fee nationally, based
on real administrative costs (and a common calculation model defining the administrative
costs that should be taken into account and the calculation method).
Policy option 1C: Increase of common visa fee
Increase the common visa fee and establish a mechanism to adjust it periodically (e.g.
every two years, most probably through delegated acts, on the basis of criteria defined in
the regulation).
Sub-option 1C1: EUR 80 (children aged 6-11: EUR 40).
Sub-option 1C2: EUR 100 (children aged 6-11: EUR 50).
Sub-option 1C3: EUR 120 (children aged 6-11: EUR 60).
Sub-option 1C4: SEV/MEV up to 6 months: EUR 80, MEV 1-5 years: EUR 120.
5.2.2. Repeated visa procedures
Policy options to address this problem area should ensure more systematic and
harmonised issuing of MEV with long validity to
bona fide
regular travellers, to avoid
repeated and unnecessary visa procedures both for applicants and consulates. The
following options will be examined:
25
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Policy option 2A: Status quo
Leave Member States / individual consulates to determine their general approach to
issuing MEV with long validity (based on the current provision in the Visa Code).
Policy option 2B: Recommended best practice
Suggest a non-binding approach to issuing MEV with long validity in the Visa Code
Handbook, including a general MEV cascade.
Policy option 2C: Common MEV cascades
Define (legally binding) MEV cascade(s) in the Visa Code and/or Commission
implementing decisions.
Sub-option 2C1 (general MEV cascade): Visa Code defines a "one-size-fits-all"
MEV cascade: after 2 visas in last 12 months, applicant obtains 3-year MEV, then
5-year MEV (based on Visa Code recast proposal).
Sub-option 2C2 (general and country MEV cascades): Visa Code defines a less
generous "one-size-fits-all" MEV cascade: after 3 visas in last 2 years, applicant
obtains 1-year MEV, then 2-year MEV, then 5-year MEV; and provides for the
possibility of more favourable cascades for specific countries (based on
assessment in LSC and limited to countries cooperating on readmission).
Sub-option 2C3 (country MEV cascades): Visa Code provides for possibility to
adopt MEV cascades for specific countries, based on assessment in LSC.
Policy option 2D: Standard MEV with 2- or 5-year validity
Define MEV with long validity (e.g. 2 or 5 years) as the new standard visa in the Visa
Code, while allowing Member States to derogate from the rule and issue visas with
shorter validity in individual cases.
5.2.3. Return of irregular migrants
Visa policy can play an important role to obtain better leverage vis-à-vis third countries
on readmission of irregular migrants. However, it is also clear that better cooperation on
readmission with reluctant third countries cannot be obtained through visa policy
measures alone. Instead a policy mix of positive and negative incentives in various areas
(in particular development cooperation, trade, investments, education) would be
necessary to sway a country's attitude. Measures in the visa policy area would therefore
be one tool among others in the EU's hands to achieve better cooperation. All other tools
(as coordinated notably in the Partnership Framework) will remain equally important.
For the purpose of this report, however,
only policy options in the area of visa policy
will be considered:
26
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Policy option 3A: Status quo
Continue the Coreper-led "toolbox approach" (using the existing flexibility of Visa Code)
to put pressure on third countries not cooperating on readmission of irregular migrants
36
.
No legislative amendments.
Policy option 3B: Positive incentives
Amend the Visa Code to create a legal basis for positive incentives for cooperation on
readmission, such as lower visa fees and a favourable MEV cascade, to be applied in
countries that cooperate or improve their cooperation with Member States.
Policy option 3C: Negative incentives
Amend the Visa Code to create a legal basis for negative incentives for cooperation on
readmission.
Sub-option 3C1 (maximum approach): negative incentives on various aspects of
the visa procedure, to be defined in the regulation (e.g. higher visa fee, more
supporting documents, maximum processing time, limited length of MEVs),
applicable to all holders of passports.
Sub-option 3C2 (targeted approach): negative incentives as above, applicable in
two separate phases: 1) holders of diplomatic and service passports, 2) holders of
ordinary passports.
It would also be possible to conceive of a combination of both positive and negative
incentives. While this possibility should not be discarded outright and should be
considered seriously on the basis of the options proposed, its impacts will not need to be
assessed separately.
5.3.
Options discarded at an early stage
For the first problem area (financial resources), the lowering or even abolition of
common visa fee could be a possible option, but will be discarded at this stage as it
would not contribute to reaching the objective. Some stakeholders in the tourism industry
argue that a reduction in the visa fee should be seen as a marketing cost and would be
recovered indirectly through additional income in the national economy and the resulting
tax revenue. However, it is not clear where the necessary financial resources would come
from: Member States are not ready to subsidise visa issuing even further, and a tax on the
tourism industry to fund visa issuing would encounter strong opposition and seem
disproportionate. Moreover, reducing or abolishing the visa fee would also carry certain
risks, as it could encourage potential irregular migrants to just "try their luck" lodging a
visa application without any or at low cost.
36
For all policy options 'cooperation on readmission' only refers to readmission of third countries'
own nationals, except where third countries have committed to, e.g. in a readmission agreement
with the EU, readmitting nationals of other third countries that have transited through their territory.
27
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6.
6.1.
W
HAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS
?
Methodology
6.1.1. Possible impacts
The EU's visa procedures concern most directly two types of actors: visa applicants and
Member States' authorities. Any options modifying the common visa policy will have the
most immediate impact on those two groups. Other groups of (mostly economic) actors
will be affected indirectly by changes of behaviour of the directly affected groups. These
impacts in turn can have broader consequences for the societies of EU Member States
and the EU's external relations.
The first group which is directly affected are
visa applicants,
i.e. third-country nationals
who are under the visa requirement and who apply for a short-stay visa at one of the
Schengen consulates. Applicants will directly experience any change in the visa fees, as
it will affect the costs involved in the visa procedure and might influence their
travel
plans,
particularly for tourism purposes. Any change in the issuing of MEV with long
validity will also affect visa applicants, as it might reduce the number of times they have
to apply for a visa and thus their financial and "hassle" costs, and increase their flexibility
to travel spontaneously. Finally, if any (positive and negative) change of the visa
procedure is applied in order to obtain a third country's cooperation on readmission, this
change will also positively or negatively affect visa applicants and their travel behaviour.
The second group directly affected are
Member States' authorities,
first and foremost
consulates
in third countries as the visa-issuing authorities. They will be directly
concerned by any change in the visa fee which will influence the financial resources
available for visa processing. Changes in the approach to issuing MEV will affect the
number of visa applications to be processed. Any increased leverage on third countries'
cooperation on readmission will impact on the public authorities dealing with refused
asylum applicants and irregular migrants, namely
migration, asylum and police
authorities.
Groups indirectly affected by the visa policy are
economic actors in the EU having visa
holders as clients or employees,
such as the tourism industry (travel agencies, hotels,
restaurants etc.), airlines and other transport companies, the retail sector, enterprises
engaged in international trade (export/import, trade fairs), the health industry (clinics)
and the shipping industry (employing seafarers). Any changes in travel behaviour by visa
applicants/holders (caused by modifications to visa fees or MEV issuing rules) will
indirectly affect these actors' revenues and competitiveness.
The EU Member States'
economies and societies
will feel the impact of changes in visa
policy. Economic activity in the above-mentioned sectors influences
growth and
employment rates.
Visa policy is one of the tools for controlling irregular migration and
preserving the Schengen area's integrity and security. Financial resources available to
visa-issuing authorities will impact the quality of their work, the integrity of the visa
processing and consequently the
security of the Schengen area.
Similarly, increased
28
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leverage for the EU readmission policy and better return rates will improve migration
management, as well as people's
acceptance of the EU's migration policy.
Increased or
reduced travel as a result of the changes in the EU's visa policy will influence
people-to-
people contacts and cultural exchange
between populations in Europe and other
continents and it will have an effect on emission of greenhouse gases and thus
climate
change.
As many people travel to the EU to visit their family members, the
protection
of family life
37
will also be indirectly affected by increased or reduced possibilities for
travel.
Finally changes in the visa policy, through their effect on third country nationals'
opportunities, will have direct positive or negative impact on the EU's
relations with
third countries
and the EU's
image in the world.
This is particularly relevant regarding
the link between visa policy and readmission policy.
The following table summarises the possible impacts of the policy options:
Economic impacts
costs for public authorities (visa authorities/consulates):
direct (staff, premises, equipment etc.)
indirect (enforcement costs)
benefits for public authorities (visa/asylum/police
authorities):
income
cost savings
costs for third country citizens (applicants):
direct (fees)
indirect (non-monetisable, such as "hassle costs")
benefits for third country citizens (applicants):
direct (cost savings)
indirect (non-monetisable, such as more flexible travel)
competitiveness of EU tourism industry and trade sector
employment in EU (tourism/trade sectors)
integrity and security of Schengen area
people-to-people contacts
external relations/image of EU
emission of greenhouse gases (as result of increased/reduced
travel)
protection of the family
Social impacts
Environmental
impacts
Fundamental
rights impacts
The different possible interventions in the three problem areas are not likely to all have
noteworthy impacts in all of the above-mentioned areas. Therefore the assessment for
each problem area is focused on the fields where the different policy options are likely to
have
significant impacts.
A selection of the most relevant impacts will be established for
each problem area.
37
Articles 7, 9 and 33 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
29
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6.1.2. Available data
The Commission collects yearly
visa statistics
from Member States which include the
number of visa applications by Member State and by location (i.e. consulate), the number
of visas issued and the number of visas refused (with which the refusal rate can be
calculated). These statistics also include the share of MEV issued, but not their length of
validity. The Visa Code recast proposal included a more detailed collection of visa
statistics, including the length of validity of visas issued, nationality of applicant, visas
issued in representation and number of appeals. The current EU legislation does not
provide the possibility for the statistics on visas to be produced centrally from
information available in the VIS; however the upcoming revision of the VIS legal base
will entrust eu-LISA with the task of producing such statistics. In the current absence of
an entry/exit system, no data on the use of visas are available
38
, such as the number of
trips to the EU by holders of MEV. In general there are only limited data on travellers to
the EU (compared with other destinations), especially on details such as their nationality,
the frequency of travel, costs and expenditure.
There are no statistics on the
costs of visa processing
or on budgetary resources
available to Member States' foreign ministries / visa authorities for that purpose. The
Commission services conducted a questionnaire survey among Member States in 2016 to
collect information on the costs of visa processing and the methodology to calculate
them. These costs cover a variety of items (human resources, premises, equipment, IT
development and maintenance, printing and secure dispatch of visa stickers) of which
many are not exclusively used for visas, but also other consular tasks (e.g. issuing of
national passports). On the basis of the replies to the survey, it became clear that these
costs are difficult to estimate. A few Member States shared their estimates of the costs of
visa processing, but they were calculated differently and resulted in wide variations. This
fragmentary evidence will be used where possible.
Little evidence is available as regards the costs and benefits of policy options for
visa
applicants/holders.
There is no stakeholder organisation, such as an NGO or association
directly representing visa applicants that could provide reliable data. In the public
consultation evidence was gathered on third-country nationals' experience with the
Schengen visa procedure, allowing for certain conclusions to be drawn on the costs and
benefits in these individual cases. As respondents to the consultation are self-selected,
however, these responses are not necessarily representative of all visa applicants.
In the absence of a survey of a statistically relevant number of visa applicants in a
representative number of third countries, it is very difficult to assess the impact which
changes in the visa fee or the issuing of MEV will have on third-country nationals'
travel
behaviour.
This can only be estimated on the basis of anecdotal evidence or general
assumptions. Consequently the same is true for the knock-on effects of changes in travel
38
Such data will be available with the entry of operations of the EES.
30
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behaviour on
economic or social outcomes.
Therefore the existing data on
inbound
tourism
in the EU is of limited value for assessing impact of specific policy options.
Available data regarding
readmission of irregular migrants
are limited to available
Eurostat statistics (including by nationality) on the number of return decisions taken by
Member States and the number of effective returns. With those two indicators, the return
rate can be calculated. However, even those figures have to be taken with some caution
as they do not reflect exclusively the willingness of third countries to cooperate on
returns. Those statistical data need therefore to be complemented by more qualitative
information, resulting from Member States' experience in cooperation with those third
countries. Furthermore, implementation of the Return Directive
39
varies between the
Member States, which results in different interpretation of statistical indicators.
40
Member States either do not have or are reluctant to share data on the costs of lodging
and detention of irregular migrants before they can be returned, nor on the costs of
returns. Finally – apart from anecdotal experience in the EU with regard to one third
country – there is no hard evidence on how visa leverage can translate into better
cooperation of third countries on readmission.
The ample experience gathered by the Commission services in monitoring Member
States' implementation of the visa policy, notably through the
Schengen evaluations
41
,
was exploited wherever possible.
42
In this context the Commission services have visited,
since the beginning of 2015, 32 consulates of 16 Schengen States all over the world, thus
generating hands-on and in-depth knowledge of Member States' visa-issuing practices.
6.1.3. Qualitative assessment method
The
scarcity of data
does not allow for a quantitative assessment of the different policy
options, such as could be done in a cost-benefit analysis. Instead a
qualitative method
will have to be used. Given the widely spread impacts that the policy options are likely to
have, it seems most judicious to conduct a
multi-criteria analysis (MCA)
43
. It is a
technique to reach a judgment based on an explicit set of objectives and associated
criteria and is particularly useful in case of complex interventions with diverse quantified
and/or qualitative impacts (in particular factors which cannot be expressed in monetary
terms). An MCA is used to assess and rank alternative options in an impact assessment.
39
40
41
42
43
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals.
For example, it cannot be excluded that in some Member States the real number of persons ordered
to leave is undervalued, as it is lower than the number of rejected asylum decisions, while failed
asylum seekers constitute only a subset of all persons issued return decisions.
In accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 establishing an evaluation and
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis.
This information is rather of qualitative than quantitative nature and has been used cautiously, given
the confidential character of the evaluation reports ("EU restricted" documents, established by
means of Commission implementing decisions). For instance, Member States have not been named.
See tool #63 of the Better Regulation toolbox. However, a slightly simplified model will be applied.
31
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This method will be applied as follows:
1. For each problem area a number of
impact criteria
are established, based on the
selection of most relevant impacts (see above).
2. The
weight
of each criterion (e.g. 20%) will have to be defined as a measure of
its overall importance compared with other impacts.
3. The
performance
of each policy option for each criterion will be ranked on a
scale from 0 to 3, based on a qualitative assessment of the impacts (compared
with the status quo option which by definition will be 0).
44
4. This ranking will include the
direction,
i.e. whether it is positive or better than
the status quo (+) or negative or worse than the status quo (-).
5. The performance score, including the direction (+ or -), will be multiplied by the
weight factor and added to the performance scores of all other criteria, resulting
in an
aggregate impact score
for each policy option. These scores will already
make it possible to compare and rank the policy options.
6. However, as in the absence of hard data those scores will largely be based on
estimations and assumptions, it is useful to assess and compare them on a number
of
general principles
(ranging from - - - for the most negative to + + + for the
most positive):
effectiveness
(with regard to policy objectives),
proportionality,
feasibility
(legal and practical) and
coherence
with other policies.
7. The
preferred option
will be determined through a comparison on the basis of
the aggregate impact score and the other criteria.
6.2.
Assessment of policy options
6.2.1. Insufficient financial resources
Relevant impacts, criteria and relative weight
For Member States a change of the visa fee has direct impact on the
financial resources
available for visa processing. Even in Member States where the visa fee income ends up
in the general state budget, higher revenues give the visa authorities a stronger stand in
their budget negotiations with the finance ministry. Sufficient financial resources are
essential for the staffing of consulates, training and the quality of visa processing.
As argued above, these factors have a bearing on the
integrity and security of the
Schengen area,
which is influenced not only by the amount of the financial resources
available, but also possibly by the fee model (common EU or national). Therefore this
will have to be assessed separately.
44
0 = no change, 1 = weak change, 2 = moderate change, 3 = strong change.
32
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The reverse side of additional income for Member States through increased visa fees are
additional direct costs for visa applicants. It will have to be assessed whether the different
policy options are likely to influence their decisions to travel to the EU and how.
Changes in travel behaviour
will – as argued above – have influence on certain
economic sectors and therefore on employment and growth in the EU. It will also impact
people-to-people contacts, the protection of the family and the EU's image worldwide,
and it will have an effect on carbon emissions. As all these indirect impacts are a
consequence of the travel behaviour, they will not be assessed separately. Overall
reduced travel will be assessed as negative (despite the positive effects on climate gas
emissions, which will however be outweighed by the other negative effects).
The following
weighting
will be attached to the three impact criteria. Changes in travel
behaviour can affect the EU's economy and will therefore be weighted equally to
increases in financial resources. As the integrity and security of the Schengen area is
already influenced by the amount of financial resources available, the second criterion
just rates the additional impact of the fee model chosen (national / common visa fee) and
will therefore be weighted less.
Financial resources
Integrity / security of Schengen area
Changes in travel behaviour
Qualitative assessment of impacts
Policy option 1A (status quo)
would not produce any change. The performance is
therefore ranked +/-0 on all three criteria.
Impacts of
policy option 1B (national visa fees based on administrative costs)
will
depend on how Member States would adapt their visa fees. While evidence gathered in
the survey suggests that most Member States have higher costs than the current EUR 60
per visa application, it is far from certain that all of them would raise the fees. Some with
a strong interest to attract tourists might even be tempted to lower their fees in order to be
more 'competitive' (similarly as has been witnessed with reduced processing time and
other unilateral 'facilitations' in some locations). Others might be reluctant to raise the fee
before other Member States do it. It can therefore be assumed that the increase in
financial resources will be weak, if at all (+1). What can be expected is that the resulting
divergence in visa fees would strongly encourage visa shopping and presentation of
fraudulent documents to obtain a visa at low cost; combined with the risk of one or
several Member States engaging in 'disloyal competition'. This would raise threats to the
integrity and security of the Schengen area (-1). Overall travel behaviour is uncertain to
predict, but would probably remain neutral (+/-0).
40%
20%
40%
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Policy options 1C1, 1C2, 1C3 and 1C4 (increase of the common visa fee)
will have a
direct positive impact on financial resources, depending on the scale of the increase
under the various sub-options
45
:
Current visa fee revenue all Member States worldwide
Additional revenue for option 1C1 (EUR 80)
Additional revenue for option 1C2 (EUR 100)
Additional revenue for option 1C3 (EUR 120)
Additional revenue for option 1C4 (EUR 80/120)
46
Visa fee revenue in €
792 million
205 million
412 million
619 million
267 million
Increase by
26%
52%
78%
34%
Rating
+1
+2
+3
+1
Parallel positive effects can be expected as a result for the security of the Schengen area,
provided the additional revenues are fully invested into additional staff for visa
processing as well as IT tools and training and would therefore contribute to a more
thorough examination of applications (same rating for options). As regards impact on
travel behaviour, it can be assumed that an increase of the visa fee by EUR 20 will not
yet cause noticeable changes, given the overall costs involved in visa procedures
47
and in
travelling to Europe from visa-required countries in Africa, Asia or Latin America
48
(+/-
0); the same is true if MEV of one year or more would be charged EUR 120, as this
would be regarded as 'fair' by most visa applicants. Similarly an increase by EUR 40
would only cause a weak change in travel behaviour (-1). Given comparable countries'
visa fees
49
and the lack of alternatives, even a visa fee of EUR 120 would very likely
only lead to a moderate reduction of travel to the EU (-2).
45
46
47
48
49
See detailed calculations in annex 5, part 4.
Even though the additional revenue would be higher for option 1C4 than for option 1C1, it is rated
the same (+1), as a considerable part of additional income would be lost in a more inefficient
procedure. Differentiated fees for SEV/MEV for up to 6 months and MEV valid for one year or
more would mean that the final fee level cannot be determined at the time of lodging the
application, but only when the decision on the application (and thus on the length of validity) has
been taken by the consulate. An additional procedural step for reimbursing part of the fee or
payment of the additional fee after the decision would have to be introduced, leading to additional
administrative burden and costs.
This includes costs for travelling to the consulate/ESP (to give fingerprints), the service fee for the
ESP, the travel medical insurance, costs for obtaining supporting documents, such as notarisation or
legalisation of official documents, and courier fees for the return of the travel document. In the
public consultation, applicants report spending on average EUR 45 for the travel medical insurance
and around EUR 60 for travelling to the consulate or visa application centre. In some cases these
costs are several hundred EUR and have a far greater impact on the applicant's budget than the visa
fee.
Intercontinental flight tickets cost several hundred euros. Accommodation and other costs
associated with travelling have to be added. A survey of Chinese tourists found that the average
amount spent on an overseas trip in 2016 was about RMB 20 000, around EUR 2500 (Oliver
Wyman consultancy, 2017). The only countries for which even a moderate increase could have
slightly more negative impacts are Belarus, Kosovo and Turkey, notably for cross-border day trips
for shopping or other purposes. All other countries with direct land borders are either visa-free or
covered by VFA with a reduced visa fee which will not be affected by an increase of the general
visa fee.
See details in annex 5, part 3.
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Overview
Impact criteria
Financial resources
Integrity / security of
Schengen area
Changes in travel
behaviour
Aggregate impact score
Weight
40%
20%
40%
100%
1A
0
0
0
0
1B
+1
-1
0
+0.2
Options
1C1
1C2
+1
+2
+1
+2
0
+0.6
-1
+0.8
1C3
+3
+3
-2
+1.0
1C4
+1
+1
0
+0.6
6.2.2. Repeated visa procedures
Relevant impacts, criteria and relative weight
Changing the approach to issuing MEV with long validity will have impacts on Member
States' costs for issuing visas. A more generous issuing of visas with a validity of one
year and above will mean that frequent travellers will have to apply less frequently for
visas. This in turn means less work for consulates, but also less revenue from visa fees.
As the administrative costs for most Member States lie above the current visa fee (and
are likely to continue to do so), issuing more long-validity MEV will lead to net
cost
savings for Member States,
though of limited scale.
50
A higher share of MEV also means
cost savings for frequent travellers,
both on direct
costs (for visa fees, ESP service fees, costs for obtaining supporting documents, travel to
the ESP/consulate, courier fees etc.) as well as indirect "hassle costs" (mainly the time
loss involved in visa procedures).
More long-validity MEV also have a direct positive impact on
travel behaviour.
Holders of MEV of one year or more are more flexible in planning their trips to the EU
and will be able to travel more spontaneously. In the public consultation, respondents
who had received MEV reported taking on average 4.25 additional trips to the EU during
the validity period of their visa, which had not been initially planned at the time of
application. It is therefore likely that a higher share of MEV will also increase travel to
the EU with the positive knock-on effects (described above) on EU economic actors,
employment and growth, people-to-people contacts and cultural exchange, family life
and the EU's external image (as well as negative effects for climate gas emissions). As
explained above, increased travel will be assessed positively.
50
Cost savings for Member States will only be achieved if the visa fee does not fully meet or even
exceed the administrative costs of Member States for processing one visa application. The extent of
costs savings for Member States therefore depends on the policy option that will be chosen for the
first problem area. It is assumed here for the purpose of simplicity that the preferred policy option
will not fully cover the administrative costs for the majority of Member States.
35
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It is assumed that more MEV with long validity will have no impact on the
integrity and
security of the Schengen area.
51
The migratory risk of visa applicants is checked before
the visa is issued, and generally frequent travel is an indicator of low migratory risks. As
regards security risks, the regular SIS check will be performed at each entry in the
Schengen area.
The following
weighting
will be attached to the three impact criteria. The cost savings
for Member States and applicants respectively are rated lower than the change in travel
behaviour as the related monetary and non-monetisable benefits of increased issuing of
MEV are likely to be greater for the wider economy and society than for the applicants
and consulates themselves.
Cost savings for Member States
Cost savings for frequent travellers
Changes in travel behaviour
Qualitative assessment of impacts
52
Policy option 2A (status quo)
would not produce any change. The performance is
therefore ranked +/-0 on all three criteria.
Policy option 2B (recommended best practice in the Visa Code Handbook)
might
prompt a few Member States to improve their practice on issuing MEV with long
validity. However, falling short of a concerted action, it is unlikely to have tangible
effects as regards cost savings for Member States (+/-0) and only limited positive impact
for frequent travellers' cost savings and increased travel (both +1).
Policy options 2C1, 2C2 and 2C3 (MEV cascades at central and/or country level),
are likely to have greater impact due to their legally binding nature, but it will vary for
individual travellers. The 'once-size-fits-all' MEV cascade in option 2C1 is more
generous than the 'fall-back' MEV cascade in option 2C2. A business person who travels
to the EU three times a year would have to apply – over a period of five years – for four
visas in option 2C1, but six times in option 2C2. The cost savings both for Member
States and for applicants could therefore be greater in option 2C1 than in option 2C2. In
the latter option however, there is a good chance that a more favourable MEV cascade
would be established for countries with low migratory risk which are important for
Member States economically, be it as business partners or countries of importance for
inbound tourism, such as China, India or the Gulf countries. This possibility would
compensate for the less favourable 'fall-back cascade'. Cost savings for both options are
therefore assumed to be largely equally positive (+2 for Member States and +3 for
51
20%
20%
60%
52
This is also confirmed by the practice of US and Canadian consulates to issue MEV with a validity
of 10 years as a standard visitor visa.
As only positive impacts will be recorded for this problem area and in order to allow for a more
differentiated assessment of policy options, impacts will be rated as follows: 0 = no change, 1= very
weak change, 2 = weak change, 3 = moderate change, 4 = strong change, 5 = very strong change.
36
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frequent travellers). In both options, the traveller would hold a MEV with a long validity
(one year or more) from the second or third year onwards, so the potential for
spontaneous additional trips would be similarly positive (+3). In option 2C3 the country
MEV cascades would take some time to be agreed locally and established by
Commission implementing decision and the approach would be more patchy while no
'fall-back' cascade would apply, leading to a slower and weaker positive impact on all
three criteria (+1, +2 and +2 respectively).
For parents who visit their son or daughter in the EU only once a year, none of those
options would bring any advantages. This would change in
policy option 2D (standard
MEV with 2- or 5-year validity).
As all travellers, including first-time applicants,
would be issued an MEV with a long-validity, the number of visa applications worldwide
would drop considerably and lead to the greatest cost savings for Member States (+4) and
applicants (+5). Equally the potentially for additional travel and business opportunities
for the EU would increase most (+4).
This option would correspond to the current US and Canadian standard practice of
issuing visas with a validity of ten years, even to first time applicants. According to those
countries' reasoning the length of validity of a visa does not affect the migratory risk
presented by the applicant, while the security risk can be controlled by regularly
checking visa holders against security databases.
Overview
Impact criteria
Cost savings for Member
States
Cost savings for frequent
travellers
Changes in travel
behaviour
Aggregate impact score
Weight
20%
20%
60%
100%
2A
0
0
0
0
2B
0
+1
+1
+0.8
Options
2C1
2C2
+2
+2
+3
+3
+2.8
+3
+3
+2.8
2C3
+1
+2
+2
+1.8
2D
+4
+5
+4
+4.2
6.2.3. Return of irregular migrants
Relevant impacts, criteria and relative weight
The policy options in this problem area could have impacts on two different levels,
namely both in the
readmission
area and in the
visa
area.
Firstly, if the (positive or negative) incentive measures work, third countries' cooperation
on readmission will improve and greater number of irregular migrants or refused asylum
applicants can be returned to their countries of origin. These
improved return rates
would have positive impacts in terms of cost savings for Member States' public
authorities (for housing, food, administration and related expenses), higher security,
better acceptance of the EU migration policy and a deterrent effect on potential future
37
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irregular migrants. These impacts (which are all a consequence of change in return rates)
will be assessed jointly.
Secondly, the positive or negative incentives – if ever applied – might have effects in the
visa area. Changes in visa fees, visa procedures or issuing of MEV with long validity will
have an influence on
costs for visa applicants
and ultimately their
travel behaviour
(with related consequences for employment and growth in the EU, as argued in more
detail above).
Finally, a relaxing or tightening of visa policy as a result of linking it with third countries'
cooperation on readmission will have positive or negative impacts on the EU's and
Member States'
relations with third countries
and the
EU's image in the world.
The following
weighting
will be attached to the three impact criteria. The greatest weight
is given to improved return rates, as these are most directly linked to the policy objective.
Changes in travel behaviour will not be given a strong weight, as only few third countries
are likely to be affected. Any possible impact on external relations will also be duly taken
into consideration, but will be given less weight than the main objective.
Improved return rates
Changes in travel behaviour
External relations / image of EU
Qualitative assessment of impacts
The
"toolbox" approach (policy option 3A: status quo)
is an internal Council
instrument developed for the purpose of reinforcing the link between readmission and
visa, in particular in the context of ongoing negotiations with third countries. The
measures in the toolbox were developed within the limits of the current rules (Visa
Code). A specific set of visa measures that would be applied, on a case-by-case basis,
with regard to a given third country after a political commitment to implement them has
been taken. As the status quo option the performance is ranked +/-0 on all three criteria.
The effect of
policy option 3B (positive incentives)
on return rates is likely to be weak
and could be counterproductive. The scope of visa facilitations that can be offered to
countries with high migratory risk without putting at risk the integrity of visa procedures
and the security of the Schengen area is by definition limited and therefore rather
unlikely to overcome governments' reluctance in cooperating with Member States with
readmission procedures in many cases. This is corroborated by the EU's recent
experience in combining the negotiations on readmission agreements with visa
facilitation agreements
53
. Moreover, offering such facilitations to previously non-
cooperative third countries might even have a counterproductive effect on already
53
60%
10%
30%
Progress in most ongoing parallel negotiations with countries in the southern neighbourhood (e.g.
Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan) is limited, as third countries consider that the visa facilitations offered by
the EU are not substantial enough to justify concessions in the readmission area.
38
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cooperative countries which could consider unfair that they are not being offered any
facilitations and might be encouraged to cease their cooperation with a view to being
offered similar advantages. Therefore the limited positive impact such positive incentives
will have on return rates is likely to be neutralised (+/-0). As visa facilitations are not
likely to materialise for many third countries, any positive impact on travel behaviour
will be negligible (+/-0). This option is therefore not likely to have any positive (or
negative) effects for external relations and the EU's image in the world either (+/-0).
Policy options 3C1 ('maximum' negative incentives)
and
3C2 ('targeted' negative
incentives)
are likely to have a stronger impact on return rates. The negative incentives,
in particular the increase of the visa fee and the decision not to issue MEV anymore,
would have a deterrent effect on third countries' governments, even before those
'sanctions' would be applied. The possibility of imposing negative incentives in the visa
area as a credible measure would already provide substantial leverage in discussions with
a third country government on readmission. While it is unlikely that measures in the visa
area alone will have sufficient influence, it can be assumed that – in conjunction with
other incentives in the area of development cooperation and/or external trade – they can
contribute to encouraging governments to better cooperate with Member States and lead
to higher rates of return of irregular migrants (+2).
As it can be expected that the negative incentives will have a deterrent effect and will
thus be applied in a limited number of cases, it is not likely that there will be strong
consequences for the amount of overall travel to the EU from visa-required countries.
Therefore it can be considered that the overall impact on travel behaviour and the knock-
on effects on employment and growth will be weak (-1).
The linking of readmission policy with negative incentives as regards the issuing of visas
could have negative consequences for the EU's and/or Member States' relations with
those countries and the EU's image in the world. In that context it can be assumed that
option 3C1 which would target the entire population from the beginning with a wide
range of measures would be seen more negatively (-2) than the targeted and gradual
approach in option 3C2 which would have a limited scope of measures and would first
target the government employees (-1).
Overview
Impact criteria
Improved return rates
Changes in travel behaviour
External relations / image of EU
Aggregate impact score
Weight
60%
10%
30%
100%
3A
0
0
0
0
Options
3B
3C1
0
+2
0
-1
0
-2
0
+0.5
3C2
+2
-1
-1
+0.8
39
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6.3.
Sensitivity analysis
Given the scarcity of quantitative data to assess the economic, social and other impacts of
the various policy options, both the weighting of impact criteria and the performance
score of policy options are in most cases the result of a qualitative assessment based on
the best assumptions and estimations available. Even though the multi-criteria analysis
(MCA) has been substantiated by facts and arguments, it cannot be guaranteed that the
results are devoid of possible errors of judgment, and they should be taken with the
necessary caution.
A sensitivity analysis has been conducted to verify to what extent a change of the
weighting would influence the results of the MCA.
54
Instead of giving different weights
to the most important impact criteria identified, the same weight would be attached to all
criteria. For the first and second problem areas (insufficient financial resources, repeated
visa procedures), the comparative ranking of policy options would not change. For the
third problem area (return of irregular migrants), the ranking would be affected by a
different weighting of the impact criteria. The best-ranking option (3C2, targeted
negative incentives) in the assessment above would get the same score as the status quo
option (3A) and the positive incentives (3B); only the maximum negative incentives
(option 3C1) would score worse. This change of ranking is due to higher weight given to
negative effects on travel behaviour – which is, however, unjustified, given the small
number of countries and persons that are likely to be affected.
7.
7.1.
H
OW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE
?
Insufficient financial resources
The best-rated policy option in the aggregate impact score is
option 1C3 (common visa
fee of EUR 120),
followed by options 1C2 (EUR 100) and then 1C1 (EUR 80) and 1C4
(EUR 80 for SEV and MEV up to 6 months, EUR 120 for MEV of 1-5 years).
Effectiveness
As argued above, an increase of the EU's common visa fee would clearly be more
effective in reaching the policy objective of ensuring that the level of the visa provides
sufficient financial resources to Member States in order to safeguard the quality and
integrity of visa processing, than a re-nationalisation of the visa fee (option 1B), which
might even be counter-productive (-). Options 1C1 to 1C4 are all effective in making
positive contributions to the objective of ensuring sufficient financial resources for visa
processing. The effectiveness increases proportionally to the rise in the visa fee: nine
Member States have provided calculations of administrative costs or otherwise suggested
a visa fee (see section 5.2.1). The level calculated or suggested by three Member States
would be met by a visa fee of EUR 80 (option 1C1 and 1C4) (+), for six of them a visa
54
See full results in Annex 8.
40
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fee of EUR 100 (option 1C2) would sufficient (++), and a visa fee of EUR 120 (option
1C3) would meet (or exceed) the costs of eight of those Member States (+++).
Proportionality
Even though the visa fee has not been raised since 2006, the most proportionate option
seems to be an increase by 33% to EUR 80 (++). Had the visa fee been increased each
year since 2006 on the basis of the general EU-wide inflation rate
55
, it would stand today
at around EUR 73.85. Also the lowest estimate of actual visa-processing costs provided
by a Member State is EUR 69. Higher increases (by 67% or 100%) seem increasingly
difficult to justify towards third countries and applicants are therefore deemed
disproportionate (- and
-
- respectively). Intermediary solutions would be a general visa
fee of EUR 80 with higher fees for long-validity MEV (++) or national fees based on
actual administrative costs (++).
Feasibility and coherence
Re-nationalising the visa fee has neither been supported by any stakeholder nor is it
coherent with the goal of a harmonised visa policy flanking the common area without
internal borders. In practice it would be difficult to get all Member States to apply the
same calculation of real administrative costs, and there is a serious risk of visa shopping
with all negative consequences involved (- - -).
A moderate increase of the visa fee would seem the most coherent and feasible option
(+++), with feasibility declining with higher increases (++ and + respectively).
The option of a moderate increase of the general visa fee, combined with a higher
increase for long-validity MEV seems to be 'fair' at first sight and has been supported by
three Member States in the targeted consultation. However, it would create problems in
practice, as neither the applicant nor the ESP / consulate collecting the visa fee would
know at the outset the final amount of the visa fee – which would depend on the outcome
of the examination and decision by the visa officer. In some cases part of the fee would
have to be reimbursed (or paid in addition) after the decision has been taken, creating an
additional procedural step and considerable administrative burden, taking into account
more than 15 million visa applications yearly. Therefore most Member States have
rejected this option, and the practical feasibility is assessed negatively (-).
55
Eurostat, HICP – inflation rate,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00118&plugi
n=1.
41
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1867413_0042.png
Overview
Impact criteria
1A
Aggregate impact score
Effectiveness
Proportionality
Feasibility / coherence
0
0
0
0
1B
+0.2
-
++
---
Options
1C1
1C2
+0.6
+0.8
+
++
++
-
+++
++
1C3
+1.0
+++
--
+
1C4
+0.6
+
++
-
7.2.
Repeated visa procedures
The best-rated policy option in the aggregate impact score is
option 2D (standard MEV
with 2 or 5-year validity),
followed by options 2C1 (general MEV cascade) and 2C2
(general and country MEV cascades).
Effectiveness
Option 2D (standard MEV with long validity) clearly would be the most effective in
meeting the policy objective of ensuring more systematic and harmonised issuing of
multiple-entry visas with long validity to
bona fide
regular travellers (+++). It would be
followed by the two options (2C1 and 2C2) providing for a "one-size-fits-all" MEV
cascade at EU level or a "fall-back" MEV cascade combined with country cascades (both
++) and then option 2C3 providing for MEV cascades country-by country only (+). The
non-regulatory option (2B) would not be very effective in meeting the objective (0).
Proportionality
None of the options seem disproportionate. Option 2D (standard MEV with long
validity), though presenting a simple and straightforward solution, would constitute the
most radical departure from Member States' current practices and could therefore be seen
as going to some extent beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective (-). The
options with MEV cascades (2C1, 2C2 and 2C3) correspond to what some Member
States already practice and therefore seem to be more proportionate. The possibility to
adapt the MEV cascade to a third country's local circumstances (options 2C2 and 2C3)
increases flexibility and therefore ensures a higher degree of proportionality (+++) than a
MEV cascade that would apply in the same manner worldwide (option 2C1) (+). The
non-regulatory option (2B) will have produce little change and are therefore are
considered neutral as regards proportionality (0).
Feasibility and coherence
Option 2D (standard MEV with long validity), though being the most effective, is not
coherent with either the current rationale of the Visa Code, the Visa Facilitation
Agreements signed with third countries or Member States' practices that all point to a
"progressive" increase in the length of validity of visas. While some travel and tourism
stakeholders would certainly favour a complete change of practice, mirroring the 10-year
visas routinely issued by the United States or Canada, no Member State has advocated it.
42
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Its coherence and practical feasibility is therefore judged rather weak (-). Similarly
options 2C1, 2C2 and 2C3, which are all variations of the MEV cascade are in line with
the approach already used in some VFA and can therefore be assessed as both coherent
and feasible in practice (++). The non-regulatory option is of course even more feasible
(+++).
Overview
Impact criteria
2A
Aggregate impact score
Effectiveness
Proportionality
Feasibility / coherence
7.3.
0
0
0
0
2B
+0.8
0
0
+++
Options
2C1
2C2
+2.8
+2.8
++
++
+
+++
++
++
2C3
+1.8
+
+++
++
2D
+4.2
+++
-
-
Return of irregular migrants
The best-rated policy option in the aggregate impact score is
option 3C2 (negative
incentives, targeted approach),
followed by options 3C1 (negative incentives,
maximum approach).
Effectiveness
While the current 'toolbox approach' (status quo) has had some merit in bringing the first
targeted third country to cooperate better with Member States on readmission, it might
quickly show its limitations when Member States will be required to apply the measures.
The Visa Code currently imposes strict limits regarding the margin of manoeuvre of
Member States, thus limiting the effectiveness of the mechanism (0). As argued above,
the positive incentives might not only have little effect, but might even be
counterproductive in reaching the policy objective (-). The negative incentives are likely
to be the most effective approach, albeit only in combination with other measures in
development cooperation or trade (++).
Proportionality
While the positive incentives would not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objective and therefore respect the principle of proportionality (+), the policy option 3C2
with its gradual and targeted approach (targeting government officials first, as they are
responsible for the country's policy on readmission, while keeping negative sanctions for
the country's general population as the
ultima ratio)
is best adapted to the objective and
therefore ranks best in terms of proportionality (++). The maximum negative incentives
that would immediately hit the entire population of the third country would seem to go
beyond what is necessary (--).
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Feasibility and coherence
While both the positive and negative incentives appear feasible and coherent (+), the
'targeted' negative incentives – due to the gradual approach – are most likely to be
implemented and thus work in practice (++).
Overview
Impact criteria
Aggregate impact score
Effectiveness
Proportionality
Feasibility / coherence
3A
0
0
0
0
3B
0
-
+
+
Options
3C1
+0.5
++
--
+
3C2
+0.8
++
++
++
8.
8.1.
P
REFERRED OPTIONS
Insufficient financial resources
The preferred option is
option 1C1
(common visa fee at EUR 80). It is not the most
effective option, as higher fee increases would obviously generate higher financial
resources. However, it will lead to a sound increase of revenues (+26%), while not being
a deterrent for the overwhelming majority of visa applicants, for whom an increase of the
fee by EUR 20 will not be a decisive factor, compared with the price of airline tickets to
Europe and other costs involved in travel. In international comparison the fee would
remain relatively low and therefore competitive. Moreover, combined with a mechanism
to increase the fee on a two-yearly basis (for instance by the inflation rate), this option
presents a solution that will not need to be revisited in the near to medium future.
8.2.
Repeated visa procedures
The preferred option is
option 2C2
(less generous "one-size-fits-all" MEV cascade at EU
level and the possibility of more favourable cascades for specific countries, limited to
countries cooperating on readmission). Though not the most effective option (as any
option that would prescribe long-validity MEV as the standard visa to be issued), it will
achieve to a great extent the objective of increasing the number of long-validity MEV
issued. It further combines a minimum standard applicable to all third countries with the
possibility of more favourable solutions for specific third countries, adapted to local
circumstances and migratory risk. The more favourable MEV cascades for specific
countries would take time to be defined and agreed. This option therefore combines the
advantages of options 2C1 and 2C3.
8.3.
Return of irregular migrants
The preferred option is
option 3C2
(targeted negative incentives). Negative measures in
the visa area are likely to be the most effective in bringing change in third country
governments towards cooperation with Member States on readmission of irregular
44
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migrants, even though they might need to be combined with measures in other policy
areas (e.g. development cooperation, trade) to be fully successful. At the same time the
gradual approach – targeting at first the government officials of the country concerned
before aiming, as the
ultima ratio,
at the general population – is the most appropriate and
proportionate approach and will entail the least negative consequences for travelling,
economic sectors and the EU's standing and reputation.
As outlined in the description of policy options (section 5.2.3), it is possible to combine
the negative incentives with some elements of positive incentives. However, they should
be designed in a way that would not lead counterproductive effects by discouraging
cooperative third countries from pursing their cooperation on readmission. A possible
method would be – in preferred option 2C2 – to reserve more favourable MEV cascades
for specific countries to those which cooperate well with Member States on readmission.
8.4.
REFIT (simplification and improved efficiency)
Initiatives to amend existing legislation are by definition subject to Regulatory Fitness
and Performance (REFIT)
56
requirements. The scope for simplification and improving
the efficiency of the Visa Code by reducing regulatory costs should be explored.
Simplification and cost reduction are achieved in two ways by the envisaged initiative.
First, the main simplification measure both for applicants and consulates is the increased
issuing of MEV with long validity, as envisaged in the preferred option 2C2. It will
considerably reduce the number of visa procedures that frequent travellers to the EU have
to go through. The cost reduction potential both for applicants and consulates is
thoroughly assessed in this report (in particular in section 6.2.2).
Secondly, a significant number of measures likely to be carried over from the 2014 Visa
Code recast proposal aim at simplifying visa procedures, clarifying provisions and in
many cases also reducing costs for visa applicants and Member States. Their expected
impact will be briefly assessed in annex 7.
9.
H
OW WILL ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED
?
Three years after start of application of the revised Visa Code (i.e. three and a half years
after its entry into force), the Commission will present an evaluation report. It should
assess the progress with respect to the three main problem areas and policy objectives
addressed in this report.
The monitoring will be facilitated by three developments: Firstly, the Entry-Exit System
(EES) is scheduled to be operational by 2020, making it possible to obtain precise
statistics on travel to the EU by visa-required third-country nationals. Secondly it is
planned in the framework of the revision of the VIS legal framework to authorise eu-
LISA to provide the Commission with more comprehensive statistics extracted from the
56
For more information on the REFIT programme, see:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-costly_en
45
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VIS, including on the length of validity of visas issued. This would provide precise data
on the share of MEV with long validity issued by Member States. Finally, once the
Regulation on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally
staying third-country nationals
57
is adopted and implemented, return decisions and
effective returns will be recorded in the Schengen Information System, thus substantially
improving the availability of precise data.
The table below provides more detailed suggestions for potential indicators and methods
for data collection.
Problem area
Insufficient financial resources
Potential indicators
- income from visa fee
- real administrative costs of issuing
visas
- changes in travel behaviour as a
result of the increased visa fee
- length of validity of visas issued
(less than 1 year, 1-year, 2-year, 3-
year, 4-year, 5-year)
- changes in travel behaviour as a
result of increased issuing of MEVs
with long validity (per nationality)
- number of cases where visa policy
is raised in negotiations with non-
cooperative third countries
- number of cases where negative
incentives are being applied to non-
cooperative third countries
- change in return rate for those
non-cooperative third countries
- change in the number of
return/readmission agreements and
or informal arrangements
- Member States' feedback on level
of cooperation with third countries
Method of data collection /
source
Survey among Member States
Repeated visa procedures
EES statistics on entry and exit of
visa-required third-country
nationals (eu-LISA)
VIS statistics (eu-LISA)
Return of irregular migrants
EES statistics on entry and exit of
visa-required third-country
nationals (eu-LISA)
DG HOME's own information
Eurostat statistics, SIS statistics
on return (eu-LISA)
DG HOME's own information
These indicators will be used to monitor developments in the three problem areas
addressed by this report and to evaluate the revised regulation, three years after the start
of application. In the best-case scenario, the revised Visa Code will be adopted in 2019
and become applicable by the end of that year. The evaluation would be due by end
2022. As the EES is scheduled to be operational by 2020, the first annual figures should
be available at the end of 2021. Annual data for the purpose of the evaluation would be
available for 2021 and 2022. As regards the VIS legislative initiative, entry into force is
not likely before 2020, leading to a similar time period of relevant data.
57
COM(2016) 881 final.
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Annex 1: Procedural information
1.
L
EAD
DG, De
CIDE
P
LANNING
/CWP
REFERENCES
The lead DG is the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME).
The Decide Planning reference is PLAN/2017/2083. The initiative is mentioned in the
Commission Work Programme for 2018 (COM(2017) 650 final), annex I, item n° 20.
10. O
RGANISATION AND TIMING
Work to prepare the draft proposal and the impact assessment began in early November
2017. The inter-service steering group for the impact assessment was composed of the
Secretariat General (SG), the Legal Service (SJ), the European External Action Service
(EEAS), DG JUST, DG GROW, DG TRADE, DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, DG MARE and
DG EAC. Two meetings were held, on 17 November 2017 and 25 January 2018.
11. C
ONSULTATION OF THE
RSB
The draft impact assessment was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 31
January 2018; an updated version including the full results of the open stakeholder
consultation, which ended on 2 February 2018, was submitted on 7 February 2018. The
Board examined the draft Impact Assessment on 21 February 2018 and delivered a
positive opinion on 23 February 2018. The RSB's comments and suggestions were taken
into account in the final version.
12. E
VIDENCE
,
SOURCES AND QUALITY
Serious efforts have been made to collect data, facts and figures to support the problem
definition, the baseline scenario, and the assessment of impacts of the various policy
options. The 2014 evaluation of the Visa Code was updated with available data (see
annex 4). Data from a 2016 questionnaire survey on visa fees were used. Targeted
stakeholder consultations and an open public consultation were organised to collect
evidence (see annex 2). The ample experience gathered by the Commission services in
monitoring Member States' implementation of the visa policy, notably through the in-
depth Schengen evaluations has been exploited wherever possible.
It must be acknowledged, however, that much of this information is rather of qualitative
than quantitative nature and that even basic data are missing in relation to the three
problem areas covered in the impact assessment, e.g. on the length of validity of visas
issued by Member States. In the short time available to carry out this impact assessment,
it was not possible to conduct an external study to gather more data than those already
available.
There are several reasons behind the lack of reliable data. The focus of the visa policy is
the fight against irregular immigration and security risks by harmonising the conditions
and procedures of processing visas. Economic issues of costs, benefits and administrative
47
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burden were traditionally considered secondary by the co-legislators in this area. The
legislation in force does not foresee appropriate indicators to be collected from the
Schengen States or from other sources. It is generally acknowledged that it is very
difficult to determine quantifiable indicators in this area.
As regards the administrative costs of Member States, it must be noted that there are 26
Schengen States having more than 2000 Schengen visa issuing consulates in approx. 170
countries. Operating costs differ from Schengen State to Schengen State, third country to
third country and consulate to consulate. The most important cost components relate to
the premises, personnel, operating and security-related equipment. It is very difficult to
separate the visa processing from other tasks carried out by embassies/consulates. The
visa section is usually located in the building of the embassy/consulate; even if it is
physically separate, the personnel carries out many other tasks not related to Schengen
visa processing, such as consular assistance, classical administrative services for own
nationals, passports and residence permits. At smaller missions, consular staff also carry
out diplomatic duties. Similarly, the equipment is not only used for issuing visas but also
for managing other tasks, reception of own nationals, issuing of passports. The data
gathered are not representative and vary considerably between Schengen States which
means that the method of cost calculation (if any) also varies between Schengen States.
Most Schengen States do not even have specific statistics, only estimations regarding the
revenues from the visa fee. That is why it was impossible to set "Schengen averages"
regarding the cost of processing a visa for the Schengen States.
A similar explanation applies to the costs and benefits on the applicants' side, which also
depends on many factors such as the place of residence (i.e. distance to the competent
consulate), the purpose and length of the intended trip and the visa history of the
applicant. Although it is recognised that the visa requirement and procedures can indeed
influence travel flows, providing quantifiable evidence to what extent there is such an
impact is even more challenging. There are many other factors influencing the
destination choice, such as travelling costs, security and safety issues, available services
in the country to be visited, exchange rates. Without conducting a worldwide study with
a representative number of visa applicants in a representative number of third countries,
it is not possible to determine to what extent changes in the visa procedure (such as on
the visa fee and the issuing of MEV) will lead to changes in applicants' and visa holders'
travel hehaviour. Recent studies and research only revealed little empirical evidence on
this issue. Therefore it has been impossible to reliably estimate and quantify the scale of
effects of policy options (particularly the economic and financial impacts).
Therefore this impact assessment is to a great extent based on a qualitative assessment of
impacts, based on Member States' experience and the Commission's Schengen evaluation
reports, as explained in detail in secion 6.1 of this report.
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Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation
In preparation of the targeted revision of the Visa Code, the accompanying Impact
Assessment and the Commission Communication, the Commission services conducted a
stakeholder consultation between November 2017 and February 2018. The main
objective was to gather the views and experiences of the 'main users' of the Visa Code in
order to improve procedures for obtaining visas while keeping in mind the current
migratory and security challenges. As a similar consultation was last conducted in 2014
in connection with the evaluation of the Visa Code and the accompanying legislative
proposals, the present stakeholder consultation was intended to update and complement
the views collected at the time.
58
The consultation was organised in two separate phases targeting selected stakeholders
and the public. First, Member States, Members of the European Parliament and the
representatives of the main interest groups and professional organisations participated in
three separate meetings, where they were given the opportunity to present their views to
the Commission services on the basis of a discussion paper raising the following issues:
Minimising administrative burdens for consulates and applicants alike
Harmonising rules on issuing multiple-entry visas
Linking visa issuing rules to the cooperation of third countries on readmission
Revising the level of the visa fee
Assessing the use of outsourcing
Digitalising the visa issuing procedure
Reconsidering the nationality-based visa requirements in the long term
Participants also had the opportunity to submit written position papers after the meetings.
Second, an open public consultation was conducted through an internet-based survey
between 24 November 2017 and 2 February 2018, targeting visa applicants and citizens
who wished to give their input on the modernisation of the EU's visa policy.
Organisations also had the opportunity to submit position papers through the open public
consultation.
I. Consultation meetings
1. Member States
The first meeting took place on 13 November 2017, with representatives of all the
Member States present. 20 Member States also submitted written comments after the
meeting.
Regarding
minimising administrative burdens,
six Member States noted that it is
important not to mix up procedural burdens with requirements necessary for assessing
migratory and security risk. Procedural facilitations should not put security and migratory
concerns at stake. All relevant supporting documents should be submitted and deadlines
for decision making should not be shortened. Many Member States made suggestions on
current practices that could be eliminated in a revision of the Visa Code, such as the
58
See Annexes 4 and 5 of the 2014 Impact Assessment for a summary of the stakeholder consultation
activities at the time: SWD(2014) 68 final
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mandatory lodging in person of the visa application or the right of applicants to lodge
directly at consulates rather than external service providers.
A clear majority of Member States that took the floor on the
harmonisation of practices
regarding the issuing of multiple-entry visas (MEVs)
were in favour of creating
clearer rules, possibly using a 'cascade' approach whereby applicants who have lawfully
used their previous visas in a certain time span receive MEVs with a progressively longer
validity period. Three Member States suggested that the Local Schengen Cooperation
among Member States in third countries could play a role in adapting the MEV issuing
practices to local circumstances, which would be formally adopted as a Commission
implementing act following consultation of the Visa Committee.
Concerning a
link between visa issuing rules and the cooperation of third countries
on readmission,
the vast majority of Member States are in favour of using visa policy as
a leverage to improve cooperation on readmission. While one Member State was in
favour of the legal provisions agreed by Council during the negotiations on the Visa
Code recast, many others were more reserved about incorporating very detailed legal
provisions into the Visa Code, emphasising that the mechanism for triggering
derogations should be as simple as possible and the derogations should be easily
applicable so as not to create additional burden for consulates. Five Member States
favoured a case-by-case political decision within the existing legal framework, arguing
that such an approach would be more efficient and flexible.
Regarding the
level of the visa fee,
almost all Member States favoured an increase, but
they recognised that it is impossible to calculate the unique 'cost' of processing a visa
application. Several Member States therefore suggested no longer linking the visa fee to
the administrative costs, but rather taking a political decision to set it at a certain level.
Some Member States argued that any increase should be modest so not to prevent travel
for tourism purpose. A handful of Member States suggested that the level of the visa fee
could be country specific, with a role for Local Schengen Cooperation in helping
determine the appropriate fee, whereas others recalled the need for a straightforward and
simple system. One Member State suggested that higher fees (+50%) be charged when
visas are issued at the external borders. A number of Member States noted that the
reduced visa fee applied under the Visa Facilitation Agreements certainly does not cover
the administrative costs. Two Member States were explicitly in favour of applying a
progressive fee linked to the length of validity of the visa applied for; however, another
Member State recalled that such a system could create additional administrative burden
in terms of appeals and reimbursements in case the visa issued does not correspond to the
fee paid.
All Member States declared their satisfaction with the
cooperation with external
service providers,
which they consider indispensable for visa processing. Most Member
States would be in favour of strengthening the legal framework so that it reflects this
reality, including more stringent rules on monitoring. Some Member States argued for an
increase in the service fee (now fixed at maximum 50% of the visa fee, i.e. 30 EUR)
charged by external service providers in specific third countries.
Regarding the
digitalisation of visa processing,
all Member States that took the floor
argued that priority should be given to the development of a digital visa, whereas fully
on-line applications are a rather long term perspective. Studies should be launched on
both issues, although some Member States preferred to wait until EES and ETIAS are in
place before proceeding further on digital visas.
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Regarding the differentiation of
visa requirements based on nationality
or on
individual travellers' profile, a handful of Member States would be in favour of further
discussions on differentiating between travellers, while some others noted that such an
individual approach could raise problems regarding visa reciprocity. A number of
Member States suggested a critical revision of Annex II (visa-free countries) to
Regulation 539/2001. The clear majority of Member States, though, preferred to maintain
to the current nationality-based system; only once ETIAS and EES are firmly in place
could another approach be considered. A majority of Member States considered that
there is no need to revise Regulation 539/2001 at this point in time.
2. Members of the European Parliament
The Commission services participated in a meeting on 12 December 2017 in Strasbourg,
where the coordinators of the political groups in the LIBE committee and the rapporteurs
and shadow rapporteurs on the legislative proposals of the 2014 visa package gave their
views on the modernisation of the EU's visa policy.
The MEPs from the
EPP group
considered that time had been lost since the 2014
proposals, in part because of Parliament's position on humanitarian visas. They asked not
to lose sight of the economic dimension of visa policy (tourism, business travel) and
considered external service providers to be essential for facilitating visa applications. In
general the MEPs expressed general support for the Commission's approach on the
targeted revision of the Visa Code. There was general scepticism about disconnecting
visa policy from nationality. There was also concern about how the discussion on visa
policy would influence other files on the table in the legal migration and security fields.
The
S&D group
expressed scepticism, but was looking forward to see Commission
proposals. Instead of working towards partnerships with third countries, the Commission
seemed to focus on the EU's narrow self-interest by promoting only the tourism of rich
people. "Facilitations" would in reality just mean that more personal data was entered
into more and more databases. A link between visa policy and readmission was not
enough and real partnerships with the countries concerned were needed instead.
The
ECR group
recalled that the original aim of visa policy was always the prevention
of migratory and security risks. However, they agreed that now the situation had changed
dramatically with the terror attacks in the past few months and years. There was full
support for the intention to lower administrative burdens; IT solutions could be of great
help in this respect. It was necessary to link visa policy to readmission and applicants
should pay the full cost of the visa procedure. The group was opposed to full
harmonisation of visa issuing practices; while there could be coordination, it should
remain up to MS to take the final decision. Nationality should remain the primary
criterion for visa policy.
The
ALDE group
supported the enlargement of discussions to security and migration
concerns, in addition to the economic dimension. They could back a revision of the visa
fee and suggested varying fees depending on third countries' cooperation on readmission.
This, however, would exclude any move away from nationality as the criterion for
defining visa requirements, an idea which was met with scepticism. The group was
radically in favour of harmonising practices between Member States, especially as
regards the issuing of multiple-entry visas.
The
GUE-NGL group
wondered if there were no security and migration concerns in
2014. Simplification and modernisation were already the objectives of the 2014 proposal,
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so they were not convinced by a change of strategy. While it might be necessary to
harmonise practices on multiple-entry visas, the group considered that Commission
lacked coherence by not proposing to harmonise asylum policies upwards, too. The
group was against raising the visa fee, since this would further limit the right to mobility.
Suggestions to move away from nationality as the defining criterion would contradict any
link of visa policy with readmission.
The
Greens-EFA group
was not satisfied with the link with readmission and warned of
unintended consequences in the cooperation with partner countries. They favoured
harmonisation as long as it was upwards and recalled their support for the touring visa.
IT solutions needed to be carefully assessed for their data protection impact; the same
must be done if there is a move away from nationality towards more individualised
approaches, which they look upon favourably.
3. Stakeholders
The Commission services organised a targeted consultation meeting with stakeholders on
20 November 2017. 16 persons representing 12 organisations from the fields of travel,
tourism, shipping and air transport were present.
59
Many also provided written
contributions after the meeting.
Concerning the
reduction of administrative burdens,
the association representing
business travellers noted that facilitations should be available for business travellers that
often need to depart on short notice and that cannot be without their passport for several
weeks.
The tourism industry associations noted that native language support, a single point of
complete information to the public and a user-friendly and culturally-sensitive approach
to applicants was essential. The application form should be simplified and the advance
deadline for lodging applications extended. Applications from persons who had already
been granted visas should be handled more flexibly and visas on arrival should be
considered. The question of which Member State is competent for an application causes
problems, especially if this country is not represented locally. Applicants should be able
to lodge their application at any consulate that is located close to their residence. Travel
medical insurance should not be required at the time of lodging application. Generally,
requirements for supporting documents should be harmonised and their number reduced;
the requirement for confirmed hotel reservations should be replaced by an agency
guarantee that accommodation will be booked after the final group size is known, or by
sufficient own means.
The association representing performing arts highlighted that other administrative
burdens, such as work permits, also play a large role. The credibility of the inviting
agency/sponsor in the EU should be part of the assessment for providing facilitations.
The association also regretted that following the withdrawal of the touring visa proposal,
the legal gap regarding stays over 90 days without staying for 90 days in any single
Member State will remain.
59
Association of Corporate Travel Executives, Cruise Lines International Association, ECTAA
(National travel agents’ and tour operators’ associations), European Community Shipowners’
Associations, European Tourism Association, European Travel Commission, HOTREC (Hotels,
Restaurants, Pubs and Cafes in Europe), International Air Transport Association, International
Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions, International Chamber of Shipping, Pearle* -
Live Performance Europe, World Travel & Tourism Council,
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The maritime transport associations, speaking also on behalf of the European Sectoral
Social Dialogue Committee, noted that the new proposal should take into account
seafarers' working conditions. Processing time should be reduced (10 days) and
applications should be allowed longer in advance (9 months). In exceptional
circumstances, applications at the border should be facilitated. The previous visa history,
also regarding other countries (US, Australia), should be considered.
The airlines noted that the visa process should not be a barrier to travel and information
to the public should be as clear as possible.
Regarding the
issuing of multiple-entry visas,
all associations were in favour of
expanding the issuing of MEVs with a longer validity to bona fide applicants, including
tourists. From a business traveller perspective, MEVs facilitate travel at short notice.
From a tourism perspective, MEVs should be considered as a marketing tool: On the first
visit, tourists go to the most-visited sites; by incentivising repeat visits, lesser-known
regions in the EU would benefit from more sustainable tourism. For maritime transport,
MEVs would reduce the complexity of crew changes and decrease the need for visas at
the border. The airlines suggested using PNR data on applicants' travel history for
identifying frequent travellers and issuing MEVs.
All associations noted that
visa fees
around the world are not cost-based and the EU
should set it with regard to the practice of "competitors". Most considered the fee of 60
EUR reasonable and did not support an increase. The cost of the visa process should be
seen as a marketing cost and shouldn't be covered entirely by the fee: the money spent
(and taxes paid) by travellers in the EU needs to be taken into account. Measures should
also be taken to reduce the indirect costs of the application process, such as travel to the
consulate.
All associations appreciated the services provided by
external service providers,
but
considered that more competition between them was necessary to keep standards up. The
performing arts association insisted on maintaining the possibility of lodging applications
directly at consulates.
All associations urged speedy progress in moving towards an
electronic visa and online
applications.
Any studies that might still be necessary should be targeted on technical
questions.
Regarding the
differentiation of visa requirement based on nationality
or on
individual travellers' profile, most associations warned of the complexity of introducing
further criteria besides nationality. The airlines highlighted that requirements need to be
understood by carriers. The hotels associations suggested waiting for the implementation
of EES and ETIAS before further options are considered. Some other associations were
open to introducing additional criteria besides nationality, such as the country of
(permanent) residence. In particular, the performing arts association noted that the
purpose of travel could be considered. In the same line, the maritime transport
associations underscored that seafarers are low-risk travellers. The association
representing business travellers was most supportive of moving away from nationality as
the sole criterion, as companies now have staff of all nationalities based all over the
world.
The associations representing maritime transport expressed strong concern about the
possible link between
visa policy and cooperation on readmission.
The associations
warned that only 15% of their crews come from countries that have concluded
readmission agreements with the EU; excluding Russia, this figure drops to 5%. If
restrictive measures were imposed on certain nationalities based on the existence or
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absence of readmission agreements, this would unfairly penalise seafarers and jeopardise
the entire industry.
II. Open public consultation
The public consultation was open for 10 weeks (24 November 2017 – 2 February 2018)
and attracted a total of 1929 responses, of which 1849 were from individual respondents
and 80 represented organisations. Respondents answering on behalf of an organisation
could also upload a document in order to provide additional information or raise specific
points which were not covered by the questionnaire.
60
As the contributions by
organisations corresponded to the opinions expressed during the stakeholder consultation
(see above), this summary focuses on the responses by individuals.
61
A large share of the responses received from respondents with Omani or Moroccan
nationality or residence (1385 responses, 72%) are suspected to be part of
campaigns,
due to the frequency of submissions during a specific period of time and similar patterns
in responses. These responses are not included in the general assessment, but are instead
considered separately below.
The survey attracted responses from a
broad range of nationalities,
but with a
weighting towards Belarus (20%) and Russia (18%).
62
Nationals of Colombia (5%) and
Ukraine (2%) submitted responses despite these nationalities being visa-free.
Respondents had generally applied for Schengen visas in the last five years (89%), with
more than 95% reporting that their visa was issued. 63% of respondents
travel
frequently
to the Schengen area (more than twice per year).
As
purpose of travel,
43% of respondents named tourism, 21% business or professional
purposes, 16% participation in political, scientific, cultural, sports or religious events,
and 11% participation in short-term internship or exchange programmes. Family visits as
travel purpose accounted for 5% of the replies, with 4% of respondents citing unspecified
other reasons.
60
61
62
The list of organisations that submitted additional information can be found at the end of this
summary.
When interpreting the results of the consultation, it is important to note that respondents to the
open internet-based survey were self-selected. It is therefore not possible to assume that they are
representative of the wider population of visa applicants worldwide.
This figure, as all others within this section, excludes respondents who offered no or incomplete
answers. For example, figures relating to respondent nationality exclude nine responses that gave
blank or ambiguous information.
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1867413_0055.png
What is your most frequent purpose of travel to the EU? (n=422)
5%
11%
4%
Tourism
Business/professional
43%
Political, scientific, cultural,
sports, religious event
Short-term internship/exchange
programme
Family visit
Other
21%
16%
In order to
apply for a visa,
most respondents (90%) did not have to travel abroad. Of
respondents who did have to travel, including internal travel, many had to travel
substantial distances. 13% of respondents travelled at least 500km, and 17% travelled for
five hours or more. Most respondents (78%) considered that the three-month limit for
lodging short-stay visa applications before the trip could be more flexible, helping
applicants to avoid peak periods/long waiting times at consulates and/or better plan their
visits. A majority of respondents knew of the opportunity to lodge applications directly at
consulates (75%), but 15% decided to apply via an external service provider.
It is a general practice for consulates to require applicants to make an
appointment to
lodge their visa application.
The appointments are supposed to take place within two
weeks of the dates on which they are requested. However, 28% of respondents who
required appointments signalled that they did not get appointments within two weeks. In
addition, 30% of respondents believed the two-week timeframe to be unacceptable, as
consulates do not allow urgent applications to be made directly without appointments.
On the other hand, 29% of respondents considered a two-week timeframe for
appointments to be acceptable, given that in urgent cases, the requirement to make
appointments is waived.
With regard to
facilitations for repeat applicants,
only 16% of frequent travellers had
been offered any such benefits. Of this group, the most common benefit was receipt of
multiple-entry visas for longer periods than applied for (60%). Other less-frequent
benefits cited on multiple occasions included not having to apply in person (11%) and
not having to present certain document(s) regarding journey purpose (6%),
accommodation (6%), or situation in home country (5%).
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If you are a frequent traveller and have previously had several
visas, have you been offered any benefits because of this? (n=330)
16%
Yes
No
84%
While respondents paid visa fees of either 60 or 35 EUR, the average
indirect cost of the
visa application
can be even higher: applicants reported spending on average EUR 45
for travel medical insurance and around EUR 60 for travelling to the consulate or visa
application centre (with a wide distribution: some respondents reported costs of EUR 20
or less, while others had to spend more than EUR 100 to reach the consulate or external
service provider). The time required to collect supporting documents and lodge a visa
application was repeatedly mentioned as a significant cause of additional costs. The
length of the procedure was also identified as the most difficult aspect of the visa
procedure by 26% or respondents.
What did you find most difficult about the visa procedure?
- Length of the procedure (n=408)
11%
26%
18%
1 (most difficult)
2
3
4
5 (least difficult)
23%
23%
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The entire visa procedure took between 10 and 30 days for around half of respondents
(47%), while 40% were able to receive their visas in under 10 days. 13% of respondents
reported that it took more than one month before they could collect their passports.
81% of respondents had applied for
multiple-entry visas,
either because of their regular
travel needs (64%) or because they had been told that this was the best way to obtain at
least a single-entry visa (17%). While 82% of respondents who were issued visas had
received multiple-entry visas, the largest share of respondents (66%) reported receiving
visas with validity of less than one year. Only 5% of respondents reported receiving visas
with validity of between four and five years. Of respondents who received multiple-entry
visas, around half (53%) reported having taken or intending to take between one and
three spontaneous trips to the EU during their visas' validity periods.
If your last visa was for multiple entries,
what was the period of validity? (n=318)
3%
6%
28%
Less than 6 months
6 months - 1 year
21%
1 - 2 years
2 - 3 years
3 - 4 years
4 - 5 years
5%
38%
Selected responses to the open questions on obtaining MEVs:
After having obtained several multiple entry Schengen visas, I was issued a single entry
visa by the German Embassy despite my request of a multiple entry one and submitting
insurance for 180 days. I had another trip to Austria literally 10 days after my return
from Germany so I applied for another Schengen visa at the Austrian Embassy which
took longer than usual so I had to retrieve my passport one day before departure to
Germany and send it back after my return. That was undue hassle.
A respondent from Jordan
Last year I received a one-year Greek multiple entry visa and travelled to Schengen
countries 3 times. Since I used it correctly, this year I received a three-year Greek visa.
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It's very nice and right, but the most countries don't give such long visas even to active
travellers.
A respondent from Russia
I have found that some countries give multiple entry visa for longer duration (8 months
and 3 years in my case) considering your past travels to Schengen countries but other
countries […] did not consider my multiple entry request despite of showing my years of
travel through Schengen countries. In fact, I lived in Spain for over 4 years in the past,
and even that was not considered. I found this dissimilarity between Schengen states for
difficult.
A respondent from Ireland
Use of multiple entry visas makes travel to EU countries so much easier that the border
doesn't feel like an Iron Curtain anymore. It facilitates the short occasional trips, for
business or personal purposes. I think getting multi visas should be encouraged,
especially for young people.
A respondent from Russia
I found that some consulates are more reluctant to give a multiple entry long term visa.
A respondent from Israel
There are certain documents that one Member State might require whereas others might
not. That said, the bulk of the required documents are identical. Moreover, Member
States' willingness to issue visas for multiple entries with longer validity period varies
extensively […].
A respondent from Turkey
When respondents were asked to
rate different aspects of the visa procedure
according
to their difficulty, the length of the procedure was rated as "most difficult" by the greatest
proportion of respondents (26%), followed by the total cost of the procedure including
the visa fee (24%) and the requirement to apply in person (24%). Conversely, obtaining
travel medical insurance was rated "least difficult" by the greatest proportion of
respondents (46%), followed by the behaviour of the officials/persons involved in the
processing (29%) and getting access to information about the visa procedure process
(29%).
79% of respondents' experiences would not deter them from travelling to the Schengen
area again. Around half of frequent travellers noticed no changes to the visa procedure in
recent years (55%), while 23% thought the procedure had improved and a further 22%
thought the procedure had become worse.
Among respondents who had experience of applying at different consulates, 37% stated
that there were
notable differences between Member States.
Where issues existed,
these included differing documentation requirements, differing policies on the validity of
the issued visas, and varying consideration of previous travel and visa history. However,
among respondents who also had experience of applying for visas to the UK, Ireland,
Canada, the US, Japan, Australia or New Zealand, 65% considered the Schengen visa
procedure to be easier and more straightforward.
Respondents' comments in the free-text fields generally supported the answers given
elsewhere in the questionnaire. Most frequently, respondents criticised the requirement to
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buy plane tickets in advance, the level of the visa fee in comparison to average salaries
(especially for young people, families and retired persons), the insufficient consideration
of prior visa and travel history, and the difficulty in obtaining long-validity MEVs. Some
respondents also complained that refusals could appear illogical and did not fully
consider individual circumstances, while others took issue with the behaviour of staff
members at consulates or external service providers, leading them to conclude that the
process was humiliating.
Suspected campaigns
The public consultation received responses from two suspected campaigns. Beginning in
the morning of 14 January 2018, 1094 responses were submitted by respondents with
Omani nationality or residence. These responses demonstrate patterns suggesting
automatic or semi-automatic submission, for example the submission of 659 responses
(60%) almost every minute between 8.43am and 15.00 on 14 January 2018. However, the
responses also bear signs of authentic content, for example a range of relevant free-text
comments. The responses broadly match the public consultation's wider results.
Beginning in the evening of 22 January 2018, the public consultation also received 291
responses from respondents with Moroccan nationality or residence. 222 of these
responses (76%) were received in a 48-hour period following midnight on 23 January
2018. The responses again bear signs of authenticity, for example a range of relevant
free-text comments, and broadly match the public consultation's wider results.
III. Overall messages from the consultation
The consultation provided a good evidence base for improving the visa procedure and
showed that on a variety of topics, there was a large consensus between stakeholders,
including visa applicants. This is most notable regarding the different practices between
Member States when issuing
long-validity multiple-entry visas,
where the lack of
harmonisation and predictability was criticised by applicants in the public consultation
and by stakeholders, just as Member States and Members of the European Parliament
acknowledged the need for further harmonisation. Contrary to Member States, applicants
are not favourable to increasing the
visa fee.
However, their responses showed that this is
not the decisive factor in the overall cost of travel or the visa application, and stakeholder
groups were not overwhelmingly hostile to a modest increase.
Views diverged more strongly on other issues raised in the consultation, notably the
digitalisation of the visa procedure
and the possible further
individualisation of visa
requirements.
These matters therefore appear to need further discussion and reflection.
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List of organisations that submitted position papers or additional information
Alibaba Group, People's Republic of China.
Allied for Startups, Belgium.
Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation (ACGRC),
Armenia.
Armenian Progressive Youth NGO, Armenia.
Association of Corporate Travel Executives, United States of America.
BV Kustvaartbedrijf Moerman, The Netherlands.
Chamber of Shipping of America, United States of America
Cirque du Soleil,
Canada.
Confcommercio – Confturismo, Italy.
Confederación Española de Hoteles y Alojamientos Turísticos, Spain.
Coordinating Committee for International Voluntary Service (CCIVS), France.
Council for Global Immigration, United States of America.
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) Europe, Belgium.
Deutsche Sportjugend im DOSB e.V., Germany.
ECTAA - National travel agents' and tour operators' association, Belgium.
European Olympic Committees, Italy.
European Students' Union, Belgium.
European Tourism Association, Belgium.
European Tourism Manifesto for Growth and Jobs, Belgium.
European Travel Commission, Belgium.
Feld Entertainment, Inc., United States of America
Global Business Travel Association, United States of America.
Hong Kong Shipowners Association, Hong Kong
HOTREC – The Umbrella Association of Hotels, Restaurants, Pubs and Cafés in
Europe, Belgium.
International Air Transport Association, Canada.
International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions, Belgium.
International Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) - UN Migration Agency,
Switzerland.
ITAMA MOBILITY, France.
Justice and Peace, The Netherlands.
Network for the European Private Sector in Tourism, Belgium.
Newland Chase, United Kingdom.
Pearle*- Live Performance Europe, Belgium.
Public Union of Belarusian Pensioners "Nasha Pakalenne", Belarus.
Royal Association of Netherlands Shipowners (KVNR), The Netherlands.
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., United States of America.
Service Civil International - Catalonia Branch, Spain.
Service Civil International - Deutscher Zweig e.V., Germany.
The Offshore Partners B.V., The Netherlands.
UEFA - Union of European Football Associations, Switzerland.
UK Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom.
UNIMED - Unione delle Università del Mediterraneo, Italy.
Union of Greek Shipowners (UGS), Greece.
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VisaWie? Gegen Diskriminierende Visaverfahren, Germany.
Voluntary Workcamps Association of Nigeria, Nigeria.
World Travel & Tourism Council, United Kingdom.
Joined contribution of Educational and Cultural Bridges, APY – Armenian
Progressive Youth, Youth Alliance Via Networking, United Youth, and Yeghvard
youth ecological NGO.
Joined contribution of European Community Shipowners' Associations, European
Transport Workers' Federation, International Chamber of Shipping, and
International Transport Workers' Federation.
The responses to the open public consultation that respondents agreed could be published
will be available on the dedicated consultation webpage.
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Annex 3: Who is affected and how?
1.
P
RACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INITIATIVE
1.1.
Who?
Citizens/Consumers
Insufficient financial resources
How?
Increasing the current common visa fee from EUR 60 to EUR 80 will lead to additional costs
for visa applicants.
Member States (consulates in third countries acting as the visa-issuing authorities) will benefit
from more financial resources due to increased visa fees. This will allow for better staffing,
better training of the consulate staff and faster procedures.
No direct implications.
Change in travel behaviour, and hence impact on businesses in the travel and tourism industry,
is expected to be negligible.
Administrations
Businesses
1.2.
Who?
Citizens/Consumers
Repeated visa procedures
How?
Frequent travellers, especially business people, family members and affluent tourists, will
benefit from more MEV with longer validity, reducing the number of times they have to apply
for a visa and thus the expenses they have to bear. This will increase their ability to travel
spontaneously to the Schengen area.
Member States' visa-issuing authorities will benefit from lower number of visa applications.
They will therefore be able to make savings and focus on the first-time applicants.
No direct implications.
Holders of MEV with long validity will be more flexible in planning and are more likely to
make spontaneous trips and tour less-visited regions in the Schengen area, bringing additional
revenue to businesses in the travel and tourism industry, strengthening their competitiveness
and employment.
Administrations
Businesses
1.3.
Who?
Citizens/Consumers
Return of irregular migrants
How?
If and where the negative incentives are applied, visa applicants who are nationals of the
concerned third country may experience more difficult procedures when applying for
Schengen visa. The concerned groups, i.e. in the first phase holders of diplomatic and service
passports and in the second phase holders of ordinary passports, will incur additional costs or
will not be granted MEV as a result of these measures.
The European citizens and society at large will benefit from higher rates of return of irregular
migrants, resulting in higher security and a deterrent effect on potential future irregular
migrants.
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Administrations
The improved return rates will have positive impacts in terms of cost savings for Member
States' authorities and better acceptance of the EU migration policy.
No direct implications.
The proposed measures would be taken against countries with high levels of irregular
migration, which generally do not carry great importance for the EU in terms of tourism. The
overall impact on businesses in the travel and tourism industry will therefore be non-existent
or very weak.
Businesses
2.
S
UMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
The tables below summarise the costs and benefits for the preferred option. Given the lack of
available data, the tables have been filled to the extent possible. Many benefits cannot be
monetised. For instance, Member States do not provide data on the costs of housing irregular
migrants or other administrative costs. Similarly there are no precise data available on Member
States' costs of issuing visas. Higher security cannot be monetised either.
I. Overview of Benefits – Preferred options
Description
Amount
Direct benefits
Additional revenue from visa fee
Savings in administrative costs (due
to more issuing of MEV with long
validity and higher return rates)
Savings in visa application costs
EUR 205 million
Not quantifiable due to
lack of data
Not quantifiable due to
lack of data
Not quantifiable due to
lack of data
Not quantifiable in
principle
Member States' visa-issuing authorities are the
beneficiaries.
Member States' visa, asylum and police
authorities are the main beneficiaries.
Frequent travellers will benefit from more MEV
with long validity.
The travel and tourism industry across the
Schengen area will be the main beneficiary.
Main beneficiary are Member States' societies at
large.
Comments
Indirect benefits
Revenue from increased tourism and
travel (due to more MEV with long
validity)
Higher security (due to more
financial resources for visa
processing and higher return rates)
As regards the costs, the increase of the visa fee will only create costs for applicants in third
countries. No costs are expected as a result of issuing more MEV with long validity. The costs
incurred by negative incentives in the visa area linked to readmission will depend on whether
negative incentives in visa policy will be applied to third countries and in how many instances.
Direct costs might arise for visa applicants in third countries, and indirect costs might arise for
tourism businesses in the EU. Those costs cannot be quantified, but are expected to be low.
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II. Overview of costs – Preferred option (million EUR)
Citizens/Consumers
Preferred options
Direct costs
1C1
Indirect costs
Direct costs
2C2
Indirect costs
Direct costs
3C2
Indirect costs
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
-
-
-
n/a
-
n/a
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
One-off
-
Recurrent
205
63
Businesses
One-off
-
Recurrent
-
Administrations
One-off
-
Recurrent
-
63
Per year, for visa applicants in third countries.
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Annex 4: Update on the implementation of the Visa Code
1. Introduction
The Visa Code
64
sets out the procedures and conditions for issuing visas for short stays in
the Schengen area. It replaced and consolidated all previous legal acts governing visa-
issuing conditions and procedures. One of its overarching aims was therefore the
simplification and harmonisation of the way Member States issue Schengen visas. Its
main objective is to prevent migratory and security risks while at the same time
facilitating legitimate travel.
Two years after all provisions of the Visa Code became applicable, the Commission was
required to report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of
the regulation, with an examination of the results achieved. The Commission presented
its evaluation in a report
65
and accompanying staff working document
66
on 1 April 2014.
As there have been no substantive changes to the Visa Code since these reports were
published, their findings remain generally valid today. Nonetheless, as the political
context has significantly changed in the past four years and the Commission services
have gathered more experience on the practical implementation of the Visa Code, the
present annex provides an updated set of data and evidence compared to the 2014
evaluation.
2. Context
Anticipating the 2014 evaluation, in November 2012 the Commission published a first
Communication on the "Implementation and development of the common visa policy to
spur growth"
67
. Both this Communication and the title of the 2014 evaluation ("A smarter
visa policy for economic growth") reflect one of the main concerns at the time: the weak
economic outlook following the economic crisis since 2008 provided the background for
efforts to leverage all possible EU policies to spur growth. The focus was therefore
placed on the facilitation of legitimate travel in order to harness its potential for growth
and jobs creation. As the 2014 evaluation noted, the direct, indirect and induced lost
contribution to GDP resulting from visa requirements amounts to anywhere between
EUR4.2 to 12.6 billion, translating to between 80 000 and 250 000 lost jobs.
Although the Visa Code does not explicitly mention the objective of economic growth
and jobs creation, it is clear that legitimate travel, be it for business, touristic, cultural,
family or other reasons, brings economic benefits to the EU. The Visa Code's objective
64
65
66
67
Regulation (EC) No 819/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
establishing a Community Code on Visas, OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p.1.
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A smarter visa policy for
economic growth; COM(2014)165 final of 1 April 2014.
Evaluation of the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and
Council establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code); SWD(2014 101) final of 1 April
2014.
COM(2012)649.
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of facilitating the entry into the Schengen area of
bona fide
applicants therefore continues
to be highly relevant, as it is in the EU's own interest to be 'open' to travellers that boost
trade and growth. Furthermore, contacts between peoples and cultures promote mutual
understanding and dialogue, contributing to the objectives of the EU in its external
relations with third countries. As the 2014 evaluation noted, the provisions in the Visa
Code that allow consulates to distinguish between unknown applicants and those who
have a positive visa record are not applied sufficiently harmonised manner, leading to
lengthy and cumbersome visa procedures even for frequent travellers. This continues to
be the case.
The migration crisis that reached its peak in 2015 and the terror attacks in recent years,
however, have shifted the political debate on the Schengen area in general and visa
policy in particular towards a reassessment of the balance between migration and security
concerns, economic considerations and general external relations. Since the 2014
evaluation was published, the Visa Code's objectives of preventing irregular migration
and security risks have therefore come into much sharper focus. All available evidence
shows that the application of the Visa Code by the Member States effectively minimises
migratory and security risks; holders of short-stay visas were not implicated in either the
migratory crisis or the terror attacks. Neither the Member States nor the results of studies
and of the stakeholder consultation identify security risks or problems arising from the
Visa Code. The full world-wide roll-out of the Visa Information System (VIS), which
was completed in February 2016 and which contains electronic records of all short-stay
visa applications, further contributed to reducing migratory and security risks and
reinforcing the integrity of the Schengen visa procedure.
68
Even so, the changed political context meant that visa policy came into focus as a tool for
achieving progress in relations with third countries, as the experience with visa
liberalisation had already shown. In this manner, visa policy was called upon to be used
more effectively in the EU's cooperation with third countries, specifically in the field of
migration management. Accordingly, the European Council of June 2017 called for
"reassessing visa policy towards third countries, as needed" as a means of achieving real
progress in return and readmission policy. As the Visa Code was not designed with a
view towards being used as leverage towards individual third countries, but rather as a
means to standardise visa issuing procedures and conditions, it is not entirely adapted to
the new political context. The Commission recognised this changed reality in its
Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration of September
2017
69
, where it stated that "some visa-issuing rules (for instance those related to visas
with long validity and visa fees) should be reviewed to ensure that they can play a part in
our readmission policy." The detailed options for how this could be implemented in the
legislation are examined in this Impact Assessment.
68
69
The VIS legal framework was subject to a separate evaluation (COM(2016) 655 final) which will
be followed up by a separate initiative, according to the Commission Work Programme for 2018.
COM(2017)558.
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3. Recent evidence on the implementation of the Visa Code
3.1. General considerations
The comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of the Visa Code concluded that
the legislation had achieved its overarching objective by modernising and standardising
visa procedures and by contributing to the protection of the external borders. While it is
impossible to prove the direct impact of the Visa Code on the number of visas applied
for, the clarification of the legal framework has contributed to a significant increase in
the volume of visa applications processed by the consulates of Member States. As shown
in table 1 below, the worldwide applications for Schengen visas increased by more than
50% between 2009 (before the entry into force of the Visa Code) and 2016, from 10.2 to
15.2 million. While there has been a decline since the peak reached in 2013, this can be
attributed to economic difficulties in Russia, the number one source country for visa
applications. Preliminary figures for 2017 suggest that the number of applications could
have been around 16 million again.
Table 1: Schengen visa applications worldwide, 2009-2016
Schengen
State
Austria
Belgium
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Total
Schengen
2009
300.210
194.029
456.503
82.064
95.837
795.554
1.592.527
1.615.792
616.051
273.325
493
1.087.521
120.379
208.029
5.493
31.730
333.965
103.251
586.115
117.189
64.953
101.435
854.496
195.943
383.207
2010
280.328
215.978
546.410
85.646
120.135
1.020.825
1.965.777
1.730.875
620.270
253.321
562
1.327.086
137.432
266.048
7.822
41.754
386.759
130.837
695.990
125.832
58.607
52.508
1.143.753
206.077
391.720
2011
283.540
242.857
581.931
94.310
144.567
1.259.643
2.130.471
1.707.197
768.246
288.415
636
1.516.237
163.309
345.765
9.051
33.858
428.206
151.071
912.988
142.754
71.313
39.735
1.518.641
220.567
428.189
2012
304.798
233.490
603.484
100.402
175.360
1.392.048
2.321.534
1.844.704
1.001.341
322.646
1.088
1.706.536
182.496
416.851
10.555
53.777
440.056
130.933
1.091.395
148.489
75.720
42.127
1.836.868
215.763
464.512
2013
313.579
233.273
646.719
105.119
201.056
1.569.961
2.551.196
2.062.979
1.531.383
356.869
2.821
2.036.829
205.230
471.838
11.222
79.559
458.824
197.826
1.126.150
159.421
131.194
38.885
2.080.175
200.543
512.797
2014
266.356
219.758
519.819
109.694
170.731
1.205.034
2.894.996
2.061.137
1.375.287
309.894
3.923
2.164.545
207.185
463.709
11.567
56.886
485.267
179.550
1.125.520
183.216
104.988
26.492
1.923.016
191.009
466.329
2015
259.167
239.500
421.355
123.951
130.197
784.286
3.356.165
2.022.870
876.786
290.798
3.987
2.023.343
164.000
423.189
10.267
39.445
520.809
185.557
970.907
192.220
76.491
26.895
1.629.753
192.852
481.886
2016
268.388
219.687
489.920
145.143
122.872
550.046
3.265.919
2.004.235
986.032
295.226
5.771
1.806.938
165.814
421.143
9.902
27.767
558.101
188.737
1.096.465
204.596
62.472
25.876
1.583.848
227.005
460.653
Change
09-16
-10,6%
13,2%
7,3%
76,9%
28,2%
-30,9%
105,1%
24,0%
60,1%
8,0%
1070,6%
66,2%
37,7%
102,4%
80,3%
-12,5%
67,1%
82,8%
87,1%
74,6%
-3,8%
-74,5%
85,4%
15,9%
20,2%
51,2%
10.216.091 11.812.352 13.483.497 15.116.973 17.285.448 16.725.908 15.446.676 15.192.556
The official visa statistics, which are compiled by the Commission in accordance with
Article 46 of the Visa Code based on submissions by the Member States, do not contain
data on the length of validity of the issued visas, nor on the nationality of the applicants
(although the location of the consulate where the application was submitted can be used
as a proxy for nationality, with the exception of countries where the nationals themselves
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are not subject to the visa requirement, such as the UK, US or UAE). The lack of
statistical data was already identified as a weakness in the 2014 evaluation and the issue
persists to date. However, since all short-stay visa applications are now recorded in the
Visa Information System, there is potential for producing more detailed visa statistics in
the near future.
70
Despite the scarcity of statistical data – which was already noted in the 2014 evaluation –
the Commission has accumulated extensive experience in the implementation of the Visa
Code from its regular monitoring activities, complaints and petitions by citizens,
exchanges on practical issues with Member States, questions raised by Members of the
European Parliament and Schengen evaluations. The latter are periodical evaluations of
Member States on the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of the common visa
policy, in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, and since 2015 have
been carried out for 15 Member States
71
that fully apply the Visa Code. The evaluations
consisted of a week-long visit to two consulates
72
by a mixed team of Commission and
Member State experts, examining the correct application of the Visa Code and related
legal provisions in practice. The findings are described in an evaluation report, which is
classified as EU restricted, and lead to Council recommendations to the evaluated
Member State to remedy any shortcomings identified during the evaluation.
During the evaluations, the experts observed overall compliance with the essential
provisions of the legal framework in most cases, including in general a careful
assessment of applicants' migratory risk. However, they also noted cross-cutting
shortcomings in the application of the Visa Code, which corroborate certain findings
already contained in the 2014 evaluation. Despite a common regulatory framework,
Member States' visa-issuing practices still diverge on a number of aspects and both
consular staff and applicants still view Schengen visas very much as "national" visas.
This contributes to competition between Member States in "attractive markets" as well as
visa shopping and weakens the perception of Schengen as a common travel area.
3.2. Multiple-entry visas
Long-validity multiple-entry visas are one of the most effective facilitations that can be
given to
bona fide
frequent travellers, as they reduce administrative burdens for
applicants and consulates alike. Due to the lack of detailed data on the validity period of
issued visas, it is not possible to draw definite overall conclusions on patterns for certain
locations or certain Member States regarding the number of long-validity multiple-entry
visas.
The available visa statistics do show, however, the rate of multiple-entry visas issued by
the Member States' consulates, even if there is no information on their length of validity
70
71
72
See point 3.2 of the report from the Commission on the implementation of the VIS Regulation,
COM(2016)655.
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Malta, France, Denmark,
Iceland, Sweden, Portugal, Spain and Norway.
A consulate and the central visa authority in the case of Luxembourg and Iceland.
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(Chart 1). In general, the share of MEVs among all issued visas has been slowly
increasing in the past few years. The data confirms, however, the persistent large
variation in Member States' practices regarding the issuing of multiple-entry visas: While
the MEVs issued by some Member States are barely more than 10% of all visas issued,
almost all of the visas issued by other Member States are MEVs. While some of this
variance can be explained by the different consular network of Member States and the
resulting difference in the applicants' profiles, it is clear that the divergent practices of
Member States regarding MEVs remain a problem. The results of the Schengen
evaluations confirm vastly differing approaches between Member States in the same
location on issuing single-entry or multiple-entry visas, especially to first-time travellers,
and on the length of validity of the visas issued.
Chart 1: MEVs as a percentage of total visas issued by Member State
The chart shows the range of MEV issuance rates across Member States as well as the median, first and
third quartile values.
100,0
MEVs issued as a percentage of total visas issuesd
90,0
80,0
70,0
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
2013
2014
2015
2016
3.3. Visa refusals
Chart 2 shows the percentage of visa applications that are refused by the consulates of the
Member States. The average refusal rate has increased slightly in the past few years,
which is mainly due to changes in the pool of applicants: with several nationalities being
granted visa-free status over the same time period, the share of applicants from countries
with a higher migratory risk has slowly increased. In the same manner, the variation in
refusal rates between Member States is explained by the different consular networks,
with some Member States receiving the vast majority of visa applications in countries
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with low migratory or security risk and a consequently low refusal rate (e.g., Russia).
Other Member States have a larger consular network and receive more applications in
certain African or Asian countries where refusal rates can be 30% or higher, leading to a
higher overall refusal rate. The Commission's regular monitoring and Schengen
evaluations confirm that there is no systematic problem with divergent standards and
practices regarding the assessment of individual visa applications and the appreciation of
migratory and security risk between Member States. In general, consulates conduct a
careful and individual assessment of applicants' migratory risk and any cases where this
might have been different are extremely rare and isolated.
Chart 2: Refusal rates as a percentage of total visas applied for by Member States
The chart shows the range of refusal rates across Member States as well as the median, first and third
quartile values.
2016
2015
2014
2013
0
5
10
15
20
Refusals as a percentage of total visas applied for (%)
25
30
3.4. Visas issued at external border crossing points
While visa-required travellers must normally be in possession of a valid visa before
arriving at the external border, in exceptional cases visas may also be issued at border
crossing points according to Article 35 of the Visa Code. Many of the applicants at the
borders are seafarers. Chart 3 shows that in the past four years, the number of such visas
has continuously declined, with less than 100 000 visas being issued at the border in
2016. One reason for this are the improvements made in the consular coverage (see 3.5.
below), which made it easier for applicants to apply for visas ahead of their trip, even on
short notice in emergency situations.
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Chart 3: Short-stay visas issued at the external borders
160.000
140.000
120.000
100.000
80.000
60.000
40.000
20.000
0
2013
2014
2015
2016
3.5. Consular coverage and cooperation
The 2014 evaluation expressed concerns about the progress achieved regarding full
consular coverage for the benefit of applicants. It noted that in many countries, applicants
still had to travel large distances to the nearest consulate or visa application centre of the
competent Member State, which was costly and time-consuming and a barrier to
facilitating legitimate travel.
The situation has evolved quite favourably since 2014, however. As table 2 below shows,
there has been an overall increase of almost 30% in 'visa access points', i.e. locations
where applications for short-stay visas can be lodged. Most of this progress is due to
outsourcing to external service providers, which has grown from 134 locations in 2014 to
1263 locations in early 2018, i.e. by more than 800%. Progress has also been made with
respect to representation agreements between Member States, with such forms of
consular cooperation increasing by more than 3% over the past four years. Conversely,
the Member States' own consular networks have generally shrunk, with almost a quarter
fewer locations in early 2018 than in 2014. Much of this reduction is a direct effect of
national budget cuts that forced Member States to rationalise and reorient their
diplomatic and consular representations abroad. Insufficient revenues from the visa fee to
cover administrative costs also played a role in this development.
Visas issued at external BCPs
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Table 2: Consular coverage and cooperation – visa access points by type, 2014-2018
2014
Consulates
External service providers (ESPs)
Consulate and ESP in same location
Representation agreements
Honorary consulates accepting visa applications
TOTAL visa access points
1341
134
314
1864
134
3787
2018
1012
1263
583
1922
127
4907
Change 2014-2018
(%)
-24.5
842.5
85.7
3.1
-5.2
29.6
3.6. Local Schengen Cooperation
In the Staff Working Document accompanying the 2014, the Commission noted that
progress was slow on establishing harmonised lists of supporting documents, which is a
key role of Local Schengen Cooperation according to Article 48(1)(a) of the Visa Code.
The evaluation therefore concluded that a wide variety of divergent practices continued
to exist between Member States in the same location, which harmed the objective of the
Visa Code to harmonise the way Member States issue visas. If there is clarity about the
supporting documents that need to be submitted with a visa application, this reduces the
burden on applicants and consulates alike, and further reduces incentives for visa
shopping.
Chart 4: Commission Implementing Decisions establishing the lists of supporting
documents to be presented by Schengen visa applicants in specific countries
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Commission Implementing
Decisions (cumulative)
Countries (LSCs) covered
On this matter, too, significant progress has been made since 2014. As Chart 4 shows,
Commission Implementing Decisions giving legal effect to the harmonised lists drawn
up in Local Schengen Cooperation now cover 54 third countries, following a steady
increase year over year. This trend is expected to increase in the coming years, reducing
the problems that applicants report having with supporting documents. While the
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Schengen evaluations revealed some deficiencies in the implementation of the
harmonised lists in practice, with certain consulates still deviating from them, the
situation is expected to improve: Member States are increasingly aware of the added
value of Local Schengen Cooperation and in the stakeholder consultation generally
supported an expansion of its role, beyond drawing up lists of supporting documents.
3.7. Changes in the visa lists
Apart from requirements for airport transit visas, the rules specifying the countries whose
nationals require visas to enter the Schengen area are not laid down in the Visa Code, but
in Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001. Two annexes to that Regulation specify the
visa-required and visa-free countries, respectively. While not part of the Visa Code,
changes to these annexes obviously have an impact on the number and distribution of
visa applications that must be processed by the consulates of the Member States, as well
as on the resources that are necessary and the revenue gained from visa fees.
As table 3 shows, the top ten source countries for visa applications have remained largely
stable since 2013
73
, but with vastly different growth rates. While the applications from
Eastern European countries (Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus) have declined,
there has been a remarkable increase in applications from China, India, Algeria and
Morocco of more than 35% each. While applications from Russia and Belarus are
expected to recover somewhat, the general trend is likely to continue pointing towards
disproportionate growth in applications lodged in Africa and Asia. As Ukrainian citizens
have been visa-free since 11 June 2017, the realignment in visa application patterns will
be even more pronounced.
Table 3: Number of visas applied for in top 10 countries by visa application total
2013
Russian Federation
China
Ukraine
Turkey
India
Algeria
Belarus
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
TOTAL
6,995,141
1,497,178
1,589,963
779,464
522,106
445,517
777,813
401,092
276,984
233,211
13,518,469
2014
5,768,182
1,800,369
1,387,086
813,339
568,216
593,624
881,404
434,652
308,879
219,015
12,774,766
2015
3,467,317
2,381,818
1,233,530
900,789
708,386
735,040
752,782
493,642
367,028
255,319
11,295,651
2016
3,177,621
2,185,927
1,411,950
937,487
792,271
744,213
695,615
555,142
345,006
278,832
11,124,064
Change
2013-2016
(%)
-54.57
46.00
-11.20
20.27
51.75
67.04
-10.57
38.41
24.56
19.56
-17.71
The impact of moving a country from the visa-required to the visa-free list can be seen
most recently in the cases of Moldova, Colombia and Peru. Nationals from these
73
With the sole exception of 2014, in which the United Arab Emirates replaced Thailand in position
10.
73
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countries became visa-free in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively. Table 4 summarises the
decline in visa applications lodged in these countries following the visa waiver, which
exceed 95% in the cases of Moldova and Colombia and reached 75% for Peru
74
. Similar
effects can be expected from Georgia and Ukraine, the two most recent countries that
became visa free. However, a comparable outcome did not take place in the United Arab
Emirates, which also became visa-free in 2015: The high proportion of third-country
nationals in the UAE – often from South Asia – who continued to remain subject to the
visa requirement resulted in only a modest decline in the number of applications by 4%.
Table 4: Visa applications lodged in third countries that were moved to the visa-free
list since 2014
The years in brackets indicate when the respective visa waiver became effective
Change
2013-2016
(%)
-96.1
-3.9
-98.3
-74.9
29.1
-11.2
-18.0
2013
Moldova (2014)
United Arab Emirates (2015)
Colombia (2015)
Peru (2016)
Georgia (2017)
Ukraine (2017)
TOTAL
53,319
210,270
128,443
54,163
82,156
1,589,963
2,118,314
2014
13,932
253,765
133,200
59,309
93,126
1,387,086
1,940,418
2015
2,314
224,202
133,095
66,950
100,549
1,233,530
1,760,640
2016
2,069
201,995
2,223
13,590
106,024
1,411,950
1,737,851
4. Conclusion
Several findings of the comprehensive evaluation of the Visa Code conducted in 2014
remain valid today. First among these is the continuing lack of harmonisation between
Member States regarding the issuing of multiple-entry visas with long validity to
facilitate legitimate (frequent) travel by
bona fide
applicants. The impact assessment
examines in detail the different options for remedying this problem. The complications
caused by the lack of detailed visa statistics also persist, as do a series of minor technical
issues identified in the 2014 report. This includes the application form, which could be
simplified, the deadlines for lodging applications, which could be extended, and the legal
framework for cooperation with external service providers, which could be strengthened.
Conversely, some of the problem areas identified in the 2014 evaluation have seen
significant progress. After a slow start, Local Schengen Cooperation in an increasing
number of locations is fulfilling its role in drawing up harmonised lists of supporting
documents, reducing a key source for divergent practices between Member States. As
shown in the stakeholder consultation, Local Schengen Cooperation seems to be an
instrument that is appreciated by Member States, so its legal framework could be
strengthened.
74
Since the visa waiver for Peru was not yet in effect for the whole year 2016.
74
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Progress has notably been made also with regard to the expansion of consular coverage,
making it easier for travellers to lodge their applications at an external service provider or
a consulate representing the competent Member State. This problem is therefore much
less pressing than it was in 2014. At the same time, the closure of consulates over the
past four years reflects at least in part the fact that the current level of the visa fee is
insufficient to cover the administrative costs of Member States, an issue which is
examined in the impact assessment.
The most important developments since 2014 do not concern the implementation of the
Visa Code
per se,
but the migratory and security environment that affects the Schengen
area as a whole. Whereas the jobs and growth potential of the common visa policy was
very much at the centre of attention four years ago, leveraging visa policy in managing
migration challenges has now also moved to the forefront of policy objectives. The
impact assessment therefore examines different options for designing the link between
visa policy and the EU's readmission policy.
75
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Annex 5: Visa fee
Part 1: Summary of the questionnaire survey on the visa fee (2016)
The Commission carried out a
questionnaire survey among Member States
on
various aspects linked to establishing the level of the visa fee
o
cost of processing a visa application;
o
methodology to be followed to make a (common) calculation;
o
suggestions for the basic visa fee;
o
should the flat rate visa fee be maintained or a progressive fee be charged
depending on the length of validity of the issued visa;
o
should a higher visa fee be charged to nationals of third countries that
charge 'exorbitant' visa fees to EU citizens ('reciprocity').
21 out of 30 Schengen Member States responded.
3 Member States are in favour of
maintaining
the fee at current level. All others
favour
increasing
the fee. No Member State is in favour of lowering the visa fee.
Member States generally favour the visa fee to correspond to the
administrative
costs.
2 Member States suggested a harmonised methodology for calculating the
administrative costs.
3 Member States stressed the importance of a
regular review
of the visa fee level
to reflect the actual situation.
8 Member States suggested
specific amounts,
ranging from 65 to 143 EUR
(basic fee).
11 Member States suggested a
"flat rate" visa fee,
while 5 favour a
differentiated visa fee, suggesting different models:
o
for reasons of simplicity: only 2 different fees: SEV and MEV;
o
airport transit visa: 40 EUR; others 100 EUR; application at border
crossing point: 200 EUR;
o
airport transit visa: 40 EUR; 6 month visa (SEV or MEV): 60 EUR; 1 year
visa: 90 EUR; 2 year visa: 90 EUR; 3 year visa: 120 EUR; 4 year visa:
120 EUR; 5 year visa: 150 EUR;
o
starting with 60 EUR, every additional year progressively increases the
costs (60-120-180-240-300).
On
visa fee reciprocity
only 9 Member States replied. Most of them want to
increase the fees in case of very high fees charged by a third country, except 3
(which foresee practical problems in implementing reciprocity).
10 Member States responded to the question of
methodology for calculating
administrative costs
but only 2 provided concrete calculations; others suggested
some factors to be included into the calculation of administrative costs. There is
consensus that the following factors should be included:
o
overall costs of infrastructure like property;
o
IT-systems;
o
staff and staff related costs;
o
logistics;
o
visa sticker production.
Some Member States also suggested the following factors to be included:
o
administrative costs of issuing visas at the embassies/consulates and at the
borders;
76
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o
migration court of justice (average expenditures of appeals) / costs related
to legal disputes, legal activities like court fees;
o
costs of headquarters (MFA, MOI);
o
whole process from website information on visa applications to internal
appeal procedures handled by the consulates/MFAs;
o
costs of ongoing operation and travelling;
o
costs of operating systems concerning biometry like BIONET, BIODEV,
VISABIO;
o
costs of delivering visas to the borders;
o
costs of training.
Two different
calculation methods
were proposed (see part 2 for details):
Method Member State 1:
�������������������������������������������������������� �������������������� (������������ ���������������� ��������������������������������������������)
=
total costs of visa − costs of national visa − revenues of visa facilitation
number of full paying applicants
Method Member State 2:
�������������������������������������������������������� �������������������� (������������ ���������������� ��������������������������������������������)
= ���������������������������� ���������������������������������������� ���������������� �������� ������������ ���������������� �������������������������������������������� ∗
ℎ�������������������� ����������������
75
60 ������������
75
Including direct, indirect cost like rent of locations, salaries, IT, central overhead costs etc.
77
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Part 2: Calculation of administrative costs (provided by two Member States)
Member State 1:
The costs are calculated as follows
76
:
Total costs C-visa
Personnel
77
:
Overhead
78
ICT-costs
79
Other costs
80
subtotal
Costs national visa
Total costs
(43.351.000-2.910.000)
Revenues per year
Number
255
381,50
Price
45.000
31.000
Total
24.502.500
11.826.500
5.692.000
1.330.000
43.351.000
2.910.000
40.441.000
24.200.000
Number of visa per year
No. of full paying visa applicants
Total costs
Revenues visa facilitation
To finance
Costs per full paying applicant
(37.230.508/309.030)
466.933
309.030
40.441.000
3.210.492
37.230.508
120
Member State 2 (Denmark):
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Denmark has calculated the average cost price per
visa case. The calculation of the cost price for handling one visa application at a Danish
Embassy/Mission handling visa cases are as follows:
The average case processing time per visa case is approximately 80 minutes including all
steps in the case handling process.
On average these 80 minutes consist of 20 % posted staff and 80 % local staff.
76
77
78
79
80
Numbers are an average of 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Personnel working on visa (abroad and in the capital)
Overhead (including personnel not directly working on visa, information, organisation, finances,
administration, communication, accommodation)
Specific ICT-costs (software and hardware)
Other costs related to visa (visa stickers, visa meetings, special assessments etc.)
78
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The average cost price per hour for posted staff at a Danish Embassy/Mission is
calculated to approximately 1,645.00 Danish Kroner = EUR 221.00. 1 minute = EUR
3.68 x 80 minutes = EUR 295.00 for 80 minutes. 20 % of 80 minutes = 16 minutes =
EUR 3.68 x 16 = EUR 58.90 as part of the handling of a visa case. .
The average cost price per hour for local staff at a Danish Embassy/Mission is calculated
to approx imately 585.00 Danish Kroner = EUR 78.60. 1 minute = EUR 1.31 x 80
minutes = EUR 104.85 for 80 minutes. 80 % of 80 minutes = 64 minutes = EUR 1.31 x
64 = EUR 83.85 as part of the handling of a visa case.
The total cost price per visa case is EUR approx. 58.90 + EUR 83.85 = EUR 143.00
(rounded up).
79
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Part 3: Other countries' visa fees
The main objective of the visa fee is to cover the administrative and operational costs of
the visa-issuing procedure; however, it also has a regulatory effect of the visa fees as it
helps to moderate the number of applications which would be refused. Yet, its amount
should not prevent legitimate applicants from travelling and cause unnecessary obstacles
to tourism and business.
The visa fees imposed by different countries vary depending on many aspects. While
respective countries apply various criteria, the most common variables determining visa
fees are:
Visa category (e.g., tourism, business, family visit),
Number of entries (single, multiple)
Length of validity,
Applicant's nationality and/or legal status in the country where the
application is submitted,
Country or location where the application is submitted,
Channel used for submitting the application (e.g. paper, online).
Additionally, it is increasingly becoming a common practice to outsource the collection
of visa applications to external service providers. The service fee charged by some
service providers can actually double the real cost of visa.
81
The first three factors are directly related to the visa and its nature. Business visas can be
more expensive than tourist visas. The differentiation between multiple- and single-entry
visa and transit visa, and the length of validity of the visa are often also determining
factors. For instance, China applies a visa fee of EUR 30 for a single-entry visa, EUR 50
for double entries, EUR 70 for multiple entries up to 6 months and EUR 100 for up to 12
months to most non-Schengen countries' nationals.
The applicant's citizenship or legal status in the country where the application is
submitted have a significant weight when determining the visa fee for many countries.
This criterion reflects the international relations between the concerned countries as well
as migratory risk, economic and business relations and reciprocity. China, for instance,
applies a fee of EUR 140 to visa to Argentinian citizens while fees for other South
American nationals vary from EUR 30 – 100; Romanian citizens have to pay EUR 90 –
190 compared to the flat fee of EUR 60 for the Schengen area countries and EUR 30 –
100 for other third countries.
The country where the application is submitted and processed and the channel used for
submitting the application directly determine the real operational costs related to granting
visa borne by the issuing state. Certain countries have implemented electronic visa
81
Chinese Visa Application Service Centre applies an application service fee of EUR 65.45 to normal
applications of Schengen countries' citizens which results in a total fee of EUR 125.45.
80
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application systems which are more cost-efficient. The fee for applicants using e-visa
procedures is therefore usually lower compared to the traditional (paper) visa procedures.
Additionally, the visa granted on the arrival is usually also cheaper. For instance, Turkey
applies an electronic visa fee of USD 20 (EUR 17) to Austrian citizens, while the fee for
visa on arrival is EUR 25. However, although there are various channels which finally
help to reduce the costs and lower the final visa fee, states tend to limit its use only for
citizens of selected countries due to security concerns and/or other reasons.
The following table shows the wide variation in visa fees charged by the top 10 tourist
destinations according the total number of international tourist arrivals in 2017.
82
The
Schengen area countries are exempted.
Country
Australia
China
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
New Zealand
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
GBP 89
USD 160
Visa fee
AUD 140
Fee in EUR
83
EUR 90
EUR 30-190
JPY 3.000-6.000 EUR 22-47
MYR 6-50
USD 36
NZD 170
THB 1.000
EUR 1,24-10
EUR 30
EUR 100
EUR 25
EUR 20-50
EUR 100
EUR 133
Comment
MEV valid 12 months
MEV up to 12 months
MEV
MEV up to 12 months
MEV up to 180 days
MEV up to 9 months
Per entry, MEV up to 6 months
Visa on arrival
MEV up to 6 months
MEV up to 10 years
The actual operational costs of processing visa applications are a determining factor for
setting the visa fee. The economic strength and purchasing power of the issuing country,
and hence the costs for human resources, have a strong correlation with the visa fee.
The correlation between a country's visa fee and its economic development can be
observed comparing the table above with the graph below showing the nominal GDP per
capita and the GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita of the selected
countries.
84
82
83
84
UNWTO Tourism Highlights: 2017 Edition,
https://www.e-
unwto.org/doi/book/10.18111/9789284419029.
When the visa fee is not officially stated in EUR, the presented value is indicative.
The World Bank Group, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD.
81
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GDP per capita (USD) in 2016 - top tourist destinations
United States
Australia
United Kingdom
Japan
New Zealand
Malaysia
Turkey
Mexico
Thailand
China
0
10.000
20.000
GDP PPP
30.000
nominal GDP
40.000
50.000
60.000
The top tourist destinations can be divided into two groups of countries, whereby the visa
fee roughly corresponds with the economic development, with the exception of Japan.
One group, comprising Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
States, applies visa fees in the range of EUR 90 to 133. The second group, Malaysia,
Turkey, Mexico, Thailand and China, requires on average a lower visa fee compared to
the first group. Furthermore, countries in the second group have usually more complex
visa fee system, whereas the first group applies a simpler system. Japan would fall under
the category of higher GDP per capita; however the considerably lower visa fee makes it
an exception.
Average GDP (PPP) per capita in the European Union reached EUR 33,060 (USD
39,838) in 2016.
85
The Schengen area therefore clearly belongs to the first group of states
with regard to their economic performance. The current
Schengen visa fee
of EUR 60 is
therefore
rather low compared to other countries in the same group.
EU citizens are exempted from the visa requirement by many third countries. Those third
countries that still do require visas do not always apply the same visa fees to all EU
citizens.
By way of example, the following table shows visa fees applied to Belgian citizens by
selected third countries
Country
Angola
85
Visa fee
Fee in EUR
86
EUR 75
EUR 120
Comment
SEV up to 30 days – ordinary
SEV - urgent (10 days)
86
The World Bank Group, idem. Iceland: USD 51.399, Norway: USD 59.385, Switzerland: USD
63.741.
When the visa fee is not officially stated in EUR, the presented value is indicative.
82
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EUR 190
Algeria
India
Iran
Ghana
Jordan
EUR 60
EUR 90
EUR 95
EUR 190
EUR 60
EUR 70
EUR 80
EUR 70
EUR 160-260
EUR 67.50
EUR 97.50
EUR 187.50
EUR 40
EUR 50
EUR 190
EUR 380
EUR 420
EUR 74
EUR 92
EUR 60
EUR 180
EUR 35
87
EUR 123.50 or
more
EUR 29
EUR 50
EUR 79
EUR 113
EUR 130
SEV - express (5 days)
SEV
MEV more than 90 days
SEV/MEV up to 1 year - tourist
MEV up to 5 years - tourist
SEV
TEV (two-entry visa)
MEV
SEV
MEV 3 months – 1 year
SEV 2 months
TEV 3 months
MEV 6 months
Tourist visa
Business SEV
Business MEV 3 months
Business MEV 6 months
Business MEV 1 year
SEV
MEV
SEV
MEV
SEV/TEV
MEV Business visit visa
SEV 3 months
MEV 3 months
MEV 6 months
MEV 1 year
MEV 5 years
Myanmar
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
Saudi Arabia
USD 88
USD 110
Vietnam
USD 10+25
USD 10+50
USD 95
USD 135
USD 155
Also in that comparison the
Schengen visa fee,
which is a "flat-rate" fee both for SEV
and MEV of up to 5 years, is
rather at the lower end.
87
Based on EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement.
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Part 4: Calculation of additional revenues from policy options 1C1, 1C2, 1C3 and 1C4
Estimation of visa fees
Visa fee (in €) Total revenue (in €)
Total number of visa applications 2017
of which VFA countries (30%)
Total number non VFA countries
of which children aged 6-11 (4.4%)
of which children aged 0-5 (3.3%)
other fee exemptions (2%)
of which full fees
of which MEV 1 year + (15%) - adults
of which MEV 1 year + (15%) - children 6-11
Total
increase in %
16000000
4800000
11200000
492800
369600
224000
10113600
1517040
73920
792064000
204736000
25,8484163
411936000
52,00791855
619136000
78,16742081
35
168000000
Option 1C1
Additional fee
Option 1C2
Additional fee
Option 1C3
Additional fee
Option 1C4
Additional fee
35
0
0
60
17248000
0
0
606816000
5
2464000
15
7392000
25
12320000
5
2464000
20 202272000
40
404544000
60
606816000
20 202272000
40 60681600
20 1478400
266896000
33,696267
84
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Annex 6: Inbound tourism to the EU/Schengen countries
Key facts and figures:
The EU/Schengen Member States rank among the world's leading tourist
destinations. In 2016, there were approximately 875 million arrivals at tourist
accommodations in Schengen countries, up from 635 million in 2009.
88
In 2016 the tourism industry contributed to the EU's GDP by 10.2% and to the
EU's labour market by 11.6%.
89
Visa-required travellers represent a growing share of all tourists in the EU and
have the strongest growth rates, both in absolute numbers and in terms of
expenditure. The numbers of arrivals of visa-required travellers
90
at tourist
accommodations in Schengen countries increased by 175% from 2009 to 2016 (to
37.8 million), while the overall number of arrivals increased by only 38%.
91
In absolute numbers, there were approximately 11 million arrivals from China,
6.5 million from Russia, 3.1 million from African countries, and 2.4 million
arrivals from Turkey at tourist accommodations in the Schengen area in 2016.
92
Some of the visa-required nationals rank among the highest spenders in
international tourism worldwide with Chinese leading the global expenditure
ranking. Expenditure by Chinese outbound tourists grew by 12% to USD 261
billion, consolidating China's position as the number one source market in the
world since 2012.
93
The growth in the first half of 2017 was 19%, compared to
the same period in 2016.
94
Additionally, other visa required travellers showed double-digit growth in
outbound tourism expenditure in 2016, for instance India (+16%), Qatar (+11%),
Thailand (+11%), Vietnam (+28%) and Egypt (+19%).
95
In the first half of 2017,
tourism spending by Russian travellers grew by 27% after some years of declines,
showing the recovery of this important market for the EU.
96
Eurostat database, Arrivals at tourist accommodation establishments by country/world region of
residence of the tourist, data updated on 07/11/2017. Those figures do not correspond to the overall
numbers of travellers or trips, as tourists often stay at different accommodations during one trip.
World Travel & Tourism Council,
https://www.wttc.org/research/economic-research/economic-
impact-analysis/.
As figures are not available for all third-country nationals and sometimes only by region, only an
approximation is possible. The following countries/regions were counted as visa-required for this
purpose: Africa, China (including Hong Kong), other Asian countries (excluding Japan and South
Korea), Russia, Turkey.
Eurostat database, idem.
Eurostat database, idem.
UNWTO press release PR 17046, 12 April 2017,
http://media.unwto.org/press-release/2017-04-
12/chinese-tourists-spent-12-more-travelling-abroad-2016.
UNWTO, European Union Short-Term Tourism Trends, Volume 1, 2017-5.
UNWTO, Tourism Highlights, 2017 Edition,
http://mkt.unwto.org/publication/unwto-tourism-
highlights.
UNWTO, European Union Short-Term Tourism Trends, Volume 1, 2017-5.
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
85
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Europe's market share of Asian outbound tourism remains relatively low. Out of
the total of 86.3 million outbound trips made by Chinese in 2016, about 46.7%
were long-haul, but only 12.2% were made to Europe (including non-EU
countries). The numbers are similar for India, despite an even bigger share of
long-haul trips (16.7 million trips, 96.2% long-haul, 14.0% to Europe).
97
The following table presents data on global outbound tourism expenditure of Schengen
visa required travellers from selected countries in million USD.
98
Country of
origin
China
India
Indonesia
Kuwait
Nigeria
Philippines
Qatar
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
2011
72,585
13,699
8,653
8,879
9,533
6,055
7,813
37,343
18,202
7,534
2012
101,977
14,107
9,055
10,073
9,240
7,140
10,702
48,096
17,986
8,095
2013
128,576
13,884
10,280
10,567
9,150
8,400
11,729
59,504
18,648
8,238
2014
234,662
17,492
10,263
12,280
9,068
11,130
12,871
55,383
25,137
8,824
2015
292,200
17,686
9,800
13,148
9,200
11,868
11,641
38,434
20,366
9,539
Increase
2011-2015
303%
29%
13%
48%
-3%
96%
49%
3%
12%
27%
The following graph shows the steady tourism growth in the Schengen area, with the year
2009 taken as a baseline. The blue line represents a growing share of visa-required
travellers' arrivals at tourist accommodations, and hence their growing importance for the
tourism industry in the Schengen area, while the red line illustrates the development of
total arrivals to tourist accommodations.
99
Increase of visa-required/all travellers' arrivals at tourist accommodations
200%
175%
150%
125%
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
All travellers
2015
2016
Visa required travellers
97
98
99
ETC, European Tourism in 2017: trends and Prospects (Q3/2017),
http://www.etc-
corporate.org/reports/european-tourism-2017-trends-and-prospects-(q3-2017).
World Tourism Organization (2017), Compendium of Tourism Statistics dataset [Electronic],
UNWTO, Madrid, data updated on 25/09/2017. Available data are not fully comprehensive.
Eurostat database, Arrivals at tourist accommodation establishments by country/world region of
residence of the tourist, data updated on 07/11/2017.
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Annex 7: Elements carried over from the 2014 proposal
The following elements of the 2014 Visa Code recast proposal are expected to be carried
over to the new proposal
100
, with the aim of introducing procedural facilitations for visa
applications and in view of simplifying, clarifying and streamlining existing provisions.
Procedural facilitations
Provision
Deadline for lodging
applications before the
start of the intended trip
Change
Deadline extended from 3 to
6 months for all applicants
and to 9 months for seafarers
Expected impacts
This will allow applicants to better plan
ahead and avoid waiting times during peak
season. Flight tickets will also be cheaper as
a result, leading to reduced costs for visa
holders. For consulates the work load will
be more evenly spread over the year.
Sea crews typically have contracts of 8-9
months during which they work in the high
seas and can therefore not apply for a visa
in view of their signing off the ship (in the
EU, to return to their home country).
Legal clarification, as many Member States
already apply such deadlines. This will
leave consulates sufficient time to assess
applications, given also the proposed
maximum processing time (10 days). This
will not prevent late submission in
individual cases.
The shortening of decision-making
deadlines will reduce the overall time for
applying for a visa, which is one of the main
difficulties raised by respondents in the
open public consultation.
Where Member States make use of this
possibility, this will promote short-term
tourism at short notice, most likely in the
summer period. This will reduce costs and
hassle for such tourists.
Persons whose biometric data are already
stored in the VIS will not have to go to the
consulate or the external service provider to
lodge their application, which will save
them time and money.
This measure, where used by Member
States, will avoid that the applicant has to
come in person to the consulate (after
having lodged the application). This will
save applicants time and money.
This will make the form more user-friendly.
This will give the person concerned precise
information on the deadline and procedures
to respect when appealing a negative
decision
Applicants should apply as a
minimum 2 weeks before
their intended travel.
Processing time
Visas applied for at the
border
Practical arrangements for
lodging an application
Maximum standard
processing time reduced from
15 to 10 days
Maximum processing time for
exceptional cases reduced
from 60 to 45 days
Member States will have the
possibility of allowing
applications at land and sea
borders during a limited
periods and under specific
conditions
Rules on who may lodge an
application on behalf of the
applicant have been clarified
Interviews of applicants
Application form
Refusal from
Clarification to allow for the
use of modern means of
communication (phone,
Skype) to conduct interviews
during the examination,
where necessary.
Form will be simplified and
reorganised
Entries have been added to
ensure that the refused person
is given detailed information
on the appeal procedures
100
Some of the provisions will be amended from the original proposal to take account of positions
expressed in the negotiations between the co-legislators.
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Clarification and streamlining
Provision
Definition of 'seafarers'
Change
Clarification to ensure that all
staff working on ships benefit
from the various procedural
facilitations.
Clarification of the rules
regarding the exemption from
the ATV requirement to persons
holding certain residence and
entry permits
In case of one trip visiting
several Member States or of
several separate trips within a
short time frame, the length of
the intended stay will determine
the main destination and thus
which Member State is
competent.
Member States are required to
reply as soon as possible to
consultation requests
Deadlines for timely
notification to the Commission
on introduction/withdrawal of
prior consultation
Clarification that earlier stays
on the basis of a national long
stay visa or a residence permit
are not to be counted when
verifying compliance with the
90/180-days rule.
Strengthening of rules
regarding Member States'
monitoring of ESP to ensure
systematic and regular
inspections and reporting.
The represented Member State
will not be able to require to be
consulted during the
examination procedure.
Deadlines for timely
information by Member States
on representation arrangements
More flexible rules to allow
Member States to increase their
consular coverage and develop
cooperation with other MS.
Strengthening of provisions to
ensure that Member States carry
out the mandatory tasks
regarding harmonisation of
practices and that EU
Delegations ensure the
coordination of LSC.
Deletion of annexes on filling
in and affixing the visa sticker
Expected impacts
This clarification will ensure equal
treatment of all categories of staff working
on ships and allow for the smooth rotation
of staff in the the shipping industry.
This clarification will facilitate travel and
airline boarding and controls at borders, for
the persons concerned, airline ground staff
and border guards.
Clarification. Applicants will know better
where to lodge the application. Member
States will know who is competent.
Currently the criterion of 'main' purpose of
a trip is less precise and interpreted
differently by Member States.
Airport transit visa
(ATV) requirements
Member States'
competence for
examining and deciding
on applications
Prior consultation
Verification of
compliance with the
90/180-days rule
This will contribute to shortening
processing time and is in the interest of
both applicants and the case-handling
Member State.
The Commission will be able to ensure
timely information to other Member States
and allow Member States to prepare at
technical level and to inform the public.
Clarification for both Member States and
applicants.
Cooperation with
external service
providers (ESP)
Improved monitoring of ESP activities,
especially as regards data protection.
Representation
arrangements
This will simplify the conclusion of
representation arrangements and contribute
to shortening the processing time
More transparency about representation.
Cooperation between
Member States
Enhanced consular coverage/presence and
optimised use of Member States' resources.
Local Schengen
cooperation
(LSC)
More efficient cooperation between
Member States at local level.
Operational annexes
Simplification. Deletion of obsolete rules.
Clarification in new operational
instructions.
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Annex 8: Sensitivity analysis of MCA
This annex contains a sensitivity analysis of the qualitative assessment of policy options
using the multi-criteria analysis (MCA) approach. It compares the aggregate impact score
of the various options under the original weighting of impact criteria (as elaborated in
section 6.2) with the impact score that options would obtain if equal weighting were
given to all specific impact criteria. The purpose is to assess the sensitivity of the MCA
to such changes. The assessment of options against general principles (i.e. effectiveness,
proportionality, feasibility and coherence) is not affected by different weighting of
impact criteria and is therefore not taken into account in this annex.
1.
I
NSUFFICIENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES
The following tables show the original weighting used for the assessment in section 6.2.1
and the alternative equal weighting. After assigning the same weighting to all impact
criteria for the visa fee policy options, the overall impact score does not change
significantly and the
ranking order remains the same.
The option 1C3 (fee of 120
EUR) records the highest score, followed by the option 1C2 (100 EUR). Options 1C1 (80
EUR) and 1C4 (80 EUR for MEV/SEV up to 6 months, 120 EUR for 1-5 years MEV)
still largely record the same impact score.
Impact criteria
Financial resources
Integrity / security of
Schengen area
Changes in travel
behaviour
Aggregate impact score
Weight
40%
20%
40%
100%
1A
0
0
0
0
1B
+1
-1
0
+0.2
Options
1C1
1C2
+1
+2
+1
+2
0
+0.6
-1
+0.8
1C3
+3
+3
-2
+1.0
1C4
+1
+1
0
+0.6
Impact criteria
Financial resources
Integrity / security of
Schengen area
Changes in travel
behaviour
Aggregate impact score
Weight
33%
33%
33%
100%
1A
0
0
0
0
1B
+1
-1
0
0
Options
1C1
1C2
+1
+2
+1
+2
0
+0.7
-1
+1.0
1C3
+3
+3
-2
+1.3
1C4
+1
+1
0
+0.7
2.
R
EPEATED VISA PROCEDURES
The following tables show the original weighting used for the assessment in section 6.2.2
and the alternative equal weighting. The overall impact score of the policy options for
repeated visa procedures does not change significantly and the
ranking order remains
the same
after assigning the same weighting to all impact criteria. The option 2D
(standard MEV of 2-5 years) still records the highest score, followed by options 2C1
(general MEV cascade) and preferred 2C2 (general and country MEV cascades).
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Impact criteria
Cost savings for Member
States
Cost savings for frequent
travellers
Changes in travel
behaviour
Aggregate impact score
Weight
20%
20%
60%
100%
2A
0
0
0
0
2B
0
+1
+1
+0.8
Options
2C1
2C2
+2
+2
+3
+3
+2.8
+3
+3
+2.8
2C3
+1
+2
+2
+1.8
2D
+4
+5
+4
+4.2
Impact criteria
Cost savings for Member
States
Cost savings for frequent
travellers
Changes in travel
behaviour
Aggregate impact score
Weight
33%
33%
33%
100%
2A
0
0
0
0
2B
0
+1
+1
+0.7
Options
2C1
2C2
+2
+2
+3
+3
+2.7
+3
+3
+2.7
2C3
+1
+2
+2
+1.7
2D
+4
+5
+4
+4.3
3.
R
ETURN OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS
The following tables show the original weighting used for the assessment in section 6.2.3
and the alternative equal weighting. The policy option 3C1 (negative incentives –
maximum approach) obtains the negative score of -0.3 after equalling weighting of the
impact criteria, which makes it the least favourable option. The score of the preferred
option 3C2 (negative incentives – targeted approach) ranks equally with the remaining
options 3A (status quo) and 3B (positive incentives).
Impact criteria
Improved return rates
Changes in travel behaviour
External relations / image of EU
Aggregate impact score
Weight
60%
10%
30%
100%
3A
0
0
0
0
Options
3B
3C1
0
+2
0
-1
0
-2
0
+0.5
3C2
+2
-1
-1
+0.8
Impact criteria
Improved return rates
Changes in travel behaviour
External relations / image of EU
Aggregate impact score
Weight
33%
33%
33%
100%
3A
0
0
0
0
Options
3B
3C1
0
+2
0
-1
0
-2
0
-0.3
3C2
+2
-1
-1
0
90