Europaudvalget 2018
KOM (2018) 0277
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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 17.5.2018
SWD(2018) 178 final
PART 1/2
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on streamlining measures for advancing the realisation of the trans-European transport
network
{COM(2018) 277 final} - {SEC(2018) 228 final} - {SWD(2018) 179 final}
EN
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Glossary
Term or acronym
AA
ACER
CBA
Appropriate Assessment
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
Cost Benefit Analysis
Former European Commission Vice-President H. Christophersen, Professor
K. Bodewig, European Coordinator, Professor C. Secchi, European
Coordinator in the "Action Plan
Making the best use of new financial
schemes for European transport infrastructure projects", June 2015,
Connecting Europe Facility
Core Network Corridor
European Court of Justice
European Fund for Strategic Investments
Environmental Impact Assessment
European Investment Advisory Hub
European Structural Investment Funds
European Union
Gross Domestic Product
Joint Assistance to Support Projects In European Regions
Member State
Non-governmental organisation
Net Present Value
Open Public Consultation
One-Stop-Shop
Policy Option
Public-Private Partnership
Strategic Environmental Assessment
Small and medium sized enterprises
Trans-European Network for Energy
Trans-European Network for Transport
Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the development of
the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No
661/2010/EU OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 1–128
Meaning or definition
CBS Report
CEF
CNC
ECJ
EFSI
EIA
EIAH
ESIF
EU
GDP
JASPERS
MS
NGO
NPV
OPC
OSS
PO
PPP
SEA
SME
TEN-E
TEN-T
TEN-T Regulation
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1 INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT
1.1
Political context
The European Commission holds stimulating economic growth and boosting investment in
the real economy at the heart of its priorities. The Investment Plan for Europe, which
translates this overarching goal into operational terms, has three objectives: to make smarter
use of financial resources, to provide visibility and technical assistance to investment projects,
and to remove obstacles to investment, the so-called third pillar of the Plan. The present
initiative aims at contributing to this third pillar by helping removing obstacles to investments
in the infrastructure projects in the transport sector. Currently, some of the most complex
projects require up to 10 years
1
to clear all necessary administrative procedures to start works,
and for the more routine ones up to five years. It is therefore not possible to fully reap the
expected benefits of infrastructure projects in terms of growth and jobs but also wider socio-
economic benefits. The time between the political decision and the delivery of the
infrastructure asset is in fact too long to bear fruit in the short term
2
. Therefore, it is necessary
to unlock the potential of key transport infrastructure investments with high EU added value,
namely the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).
The EU TEN-T policy
3
recognises the importance of a strategic approach to developing a
Europe-wide smart, efficient and sustainable network of transport infrastructure. The TEN-T
has a dual layer structure
the comprehensive network shall ensure connectivity of all regions
of the EU whereas the core network consists of those elements of the network which are of
the highest strategic importance for the EU and are shown on the maps contained in Annex I
of the TEN-T regulation
4
. The TEN-T Regulation defines binding targets for implementation,
as the core network needs to be implemented by 2030 and the comprehensive network by
2050. The TEN-T policy
5
also establishes Core Network Corridors which are operational
tools to facilitate the coordinated and timely implementation of the core network.
The recent Commission Communication on boosting the potential of cross-border regions in
the EU
6
highlights that transport is a key enabler of exchanges between regions across
national borders. This also underlines the crucial role TEN-T is playing for the integration of
the Single Market. Infrastructure projects on cross-border connections are nevertheless the
most difficult to be developed. Especially public transport services not only help integration
processes but also enhance the sustainability of cross-border connectivity. Yet, insufficient or
low-quality public transport services are still a reality for many citizens in border regions.
Supporting the Investment Plan for Europe
The analysis carried out by the Commission on the Core Network Corridors allows for the
identification of bottlenecks and missing links as well as other relevant infrastructure projects
to ensure compliance with EU standards and the efficiency of the EU transport
7
. It is
estimated that the investments needed from 2021 until 2030 to complete the TEN-T core
Milieu Ltd.,
Study on permitting and facilitating the preparation of TEN-T core network projects,
study for DG MOVE
2017, (Henceforth: Milieu et al.), section 3.1.2, p. 36
2
Report
on
Public
Finances
in
EMU,
2016,
DG
ECFIN,
ISSN
2443-8014
(online),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ip045_en_0.pdf
3
Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines
for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU, (Henceforth the TEN-
T Regulation)
4
Art. 38(1) of the TEN-T Regulation.
5
TEN-T Regulation
6
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Boosting growth and cohesion in EU
border regions, 20.9.2017, COM(2017) 534 final
7
The CNC work plans along with their supporting studies are available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/downloads_en
1
2
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network amount to about €500 billion for the EU, based on inputs from Member States. The
total needs, including TEN-T comprehensive network, as well as investments in
decarbonisation, digitalisation, urban transport and maintenance are estimated to amount to
about € 1,500bn between 2021 and 2030. The achievement of the TEN-T
core network and its
corridors is expected to generate additional € 4,500bn or 1.8% of GDP
and 13 million
additional job-years by 2030
8
.
The effective and timely delivery of the TEN-T is essential for the efficient functioning of the
Single Market and also an enabler for the decarbonisation and digitalisation of transport and
the transition to low carbon mobility
9
.The recent Commission communications emphasise the
need to mobilise private investments in sectors critical to Europe’s future
10
and where market
failures remain
11
as well as reiterate that cross-border and sustainable transport and TEN-T
infrastructure is critical for the EU to shift to a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy
12
.
Political impetus to streamlining permitting for TEN-T
The Council of Ministers adopted conclusions
13
on 3 December 2014 where they considered
“that permitting
procedures are an essential part of the planning of (transport) projects, that an
early consultation and coordination of parties is crucial to streamline these procedures,
accelerate projects and avoid additional costs, thereby increasing investors’ confidence”. The
Council then invited the Commission to take stock of good practices and identify ways to
simplify procedures for projects of the core network.
The simplification of permitting rules and administrative arrangements as a means of
accelerating the implementation of the TEN-T has been identified as one of the
recommendations in the so-called CBS Report Action Plan
14
,
presented by European
Coordinators Bodewig and Secchi as well as former Vice President H. Christophersen. In
January 2018, a progress report of the implementation of their recommendations reiterated the
call to consider setting up of special (single) procurement rules for cross-border projects and
setting time limits for the permitting procedure
15
.
The complex permitting processes delaying the implementation of transport infrastructure
projects are not a typically European problem. The complexity of regulation affecting the
Delivering TEN-T, Facts & Figures,
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/delivering_ten_t.pdf,
September
2017.
9
In the conclusions adopted on 5 December 2017, the Council reiterated its strong commitment to the implementation of the
TEN-T and the necessity to continue this policy to boost investment in transport and contribute to global objectives in
particular in terms of climate action. 15425/17 TRANS 541, available at:
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
15425-2017-INIT/en/pdf
10
European Commission (2016), Europe Investing Again: Taking stock of the Investment Plan for Europe and next steps,
COM(2016) 359
11
"Rail
infrastructure funding from governments budgets is the prevailing source of funds which hardly can be extended
because of increasing budget constraints. New instruments to foster private-type funding such as LGTT or Project Bonds
have not been successful for railway projects as they require sufficient cash flows stemming from the projects. Recently a
better blending of instruments has been suggested by the use of concession-like funding which allows for constructing
availability-based PPPs with modest revenue streams or mixed funds combining different financial sources including road
user or externality charges." - The Results and Efficiency of Railway Infrastructure Financing within the European Union,
Study for the European Parliament, October 2015
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/552308/IPOL_STU%282015%29552308_EN.pdf
12
European Commission (2016|), A European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility, COM(2016)501
13
Informal meeting of EU Transport Ministers, Building Infrastructure
to Strengthen Europe’s Economy, September 2014.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/146017.pdf
14
Former European Commission Vice-President H. Christophersen, Professor K. Bodewig, European Coordinator, Professor
C. Secchi, European Coordinator in the "Action Plan
Making the best use of new financial schemes for European transport
infrastructure
projects",
June
2015,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t-
guidelines/doc/2015_06_03_cbs_action_plan_final.pdf,
(Henceforth: CBS Report)
15
Progress Report of the Action Plan Making the best use of new financial schemes for European transport infrastructure
projects, January 2018,
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/cbs2_report_final.pdf,
(Henceforth: CBS Progress
Report)
8
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efficient permitting procedure has been debated in the G7 format and in the Declaration of the
Ministers adopted at the G7 Transport Ministers Meeting in Cagliari in June 2017, where the
Ministers stressed the importance of building public acceptance of infrastructure projects, of
efficient administrative procedures and of streamlining the regulatory environment
16
.
Efforts
to streamline the procedures are also made at national level, for example in Germany with the
Strategy for speeding up the planning process
which has similar objectives to this initiative
17
.
Long term investments need long term strategy
The TEN-T policy was completely revamped in 2013 with the adoption of a new regulation
defining a holistic strategy based on the establishment of the core network by 2030 and the
comprehensive network by 2050.
The TEN-T policy has nevertheless existed for 25 years and at the time of the preparation of
the current TEN-T framework, evidence already existed on the existence and impacts of
delays in permitting and other regulatory procedures. Initially it was planned to integrate the
simplification measures
also for TEN-T framework, but it was in the end considered
premature due to several factors. Namely, the reshaped TEN-T framework included already
an ambitious set of innovations, in particular in connection with the new funding instrument.
Moreover, the respective horizontal pieces of legislation such as directives on public
procurement and on environmental assessments were planned to be reviewed and adapted also
to the needs of the transport infrastructure developments. For these reasons, the current TEN-
T Regulation does not provide for specific solutions as regards the permit granting
procedures, unlike the TEN-E Regulation. As a result, the present initiative could also not be
developed as part of the REFIT programme.
Finally, it should be highlighted that no evaluation of the TEN-T Regulation is planned in the
near future. The TEN-T regulation was conceived as long term plan for at least two multi-
annual financial frameworks to provide stability, as most of the projects need ca. 10 years to
be implemented. The co-legislators have foreseen that the evaluation of the TEN-T
Regulation would only take place in 2023 to feed into a possible revision of the regulation for
the multi-annual framework post 2027.
1.2
Legal context
The investments on the core network consist of the construction of new parts of the network
as well as the rehabilitation and upgrading of existing infrastructure parts which already exist
but, either are not of sufficient quality and capacity to meet the current needs, or do not meet
the required TEN-T standards. In this context, all key EU pieces of legislation that relate to
infrastructure investments apply to TEN-T projects: in particular environment
18
, public
procurement
19
and State aid
20
.
National legislation transposing EU Directives directly govern the procedures at Member
State level, but these must be in conformity with EU legislation. The main areas for which
16
http://www.g7italy.it/sites/default/files/documents/Final%20Declaration_0.pdf.
This is also in line with the efforts in the
past
years
and
still
on-going
in
the
United
States:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/INFRASTRUCTURE-211.pdf
17
https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Publikationen/G/innovationsforum-planungsbeschleunigung-abschlussbericht.pdf?_
_blob=publicationFile
18
In particular: Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 2001/42/EC, Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC,
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 2011/92/EU amended by 2014/52/EU, Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, Birds
Directive 2009/147/EC, Seveso Directive 2012/18/EU
19
Concessions Directive 2014/23/EU Public Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU, Services Procurement Directive
2014/25/EU, Remedies Directive for the utilities sector 92/12/EEC amended by 2007/66/EC, Remedies Directive for the
public sector 89/665/EEC amended by 2007/66/EC
20
Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, p.9-29
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Member State authorities have sole competence are spatial planning
21
and land use and
linked sectoral planning (e.g. transport plans); and other areas such as archaeological
considerations, forestry etc. All this creates a quite complex set of rules which the project
promoters have to comply with when designing and implementing the projects of EU
importance.
The authorisation framework stems from different obligations, and sets forth the process that
projects must go through to apply for and receive development consent and procure the works
and services necessary for implementation. This occurs at two levels: the strategic level
planning the development of the transport network at national and/or regional level; and the
project level
including the planning phase and the permitting procedure, as shown in
Figure 1
below. Three inter-linked and often overlapping phases can be distinguished:
Strategic planning:
The ministry or authority responsible for transport devises a
national transport plan which provides for the long-term development and modernisation of
the transport network. It defines strategic priorities for different transport modes. A Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA)
22
is generally carried out, along with Appropriate
Assessment (AA) if required according to the relevant EU Directive
23
.
Project planning:
This phase assesses the timeliness and feasibility of a proposed
project, including alternatives to achieving the objectives of the project. Feasibility studies set
out the infrastructure needs and defined solutions and can include traffic analyses, cost-
benefit analyses (CBA) and environmental assessments. These may or may not be regulated
by national standards, or by the requirements of EU funding programmes such as the
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) or the European Structural Investment Funds (ESIF).
Various alternative options are assessed on the basis of economic, social and environmental
criteria. The preferred option is then integrated into the spatial plan(s). In certain countries,
the approval of the project will automatically result in amendments of the spatial plans, while
in others, a specific land-use permit will be required in addition to the construction permit. In
some cases, a major modification to a spatial or other plan to take into account a new project
may require revision to the SEA.
Permitting procedure:
The permitting procedure generally covers the activities
required to prepare an application for development consent, and follows on closely from
project planning. This phase includes the Environmental Impact Assessment procedure (EIA),
the spatial planning decision(s), and all the other permits to be granted. This phase concludes
with the acquisition and/or expropriation of the necessary land.
Public procurement procedures, State aid control, potentially other regulated procedures and
the applications for funding also form part of the preparation of an infrastructure project as
presented in the authorisation framework in Figure 1:
Generic authorisation framework
21
22
Although the EU enacted the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive 2014/89/EU
Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of
certain plans and programmes on the environment
23
Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora
5
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Figure 1: Generic authorisation framework
Building upon the existing possibilities
Various developments in the regulatory framework applicable to the implementation of the
TEN-T projects took place in the recent years, notably a revised EIA Directive was adopted in
2014
24
, a new set of directives in the field of the public procurement
25
. In the field of State
aid, the Notice on the Notion of Aid
26
, the revised General Block Exemption Regulation
27
and
the infrastructure grids have been adopted, providing further clarifications on the rules
applicable to transport infrastructure.
However, these measures have a horizontal scope. The analysis of their application so far
allows the Commission services to assess the level of additional measures necessary for
addressing the specific needs of TEN-T projects and to define the different level of
intervention in different areas targeted on those needs
going from a broader perspective in
the permitting procedures where the impact of the revised measures is the least visible so far,
to public procurement where limited adjustments would only be needed in the cross-border
context. As regards State aid control, the recent clarifications address the needs of project
promoters to understand the rules applicable to transport infrastructure leaving only the issue
of the procedure.
Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on
the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L124, p. 1-18
25
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and
repealing Directive 2004/18/EC OJ L 94, pp. 65-242 and Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors
and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, OJ L94, p. 243-347.
26
Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, OJ C262 p. 1-50
27
Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 as regards aid for port
and airport infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and for aid for sport and
multifunctional recreational infrastructures, and regional operating aid schemes for outermost regions and amending
Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs, OJ L 156, p. 1–18
24
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2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1
What are the problems?
The problems identified in the analytical work leading to this initiative are the
delays
and
legal uncertainties
which impact the effective delivery of the TEN-T core network projects.
Experience with the implementation of the TEN-T projects located on the core network
corridors, as well as those in the previous legislative setting
28
, has shown that the completion
of the projects is very often
delayed
due to the complex regulatory and administrative
arrangements. If a given project is delayed, the positive economic and social effects meant to
be generated by this project will happen later than planned. At the same time, the problems
that the project is expected to address (e.g. congestion, bottlenecks or pollution) are going to
persist over a longer period. Moreover, the overall implementation of the core network risks
to be delayed and completion by 2030 as foreseen by the TEN-T Regulation is unlikely.
Given the transnational nature of the TEN-T, any delay impacting one project has an adverse
effect on the whole stretch of a corridor. The TEN-T framework adopted in 2013 moves from
a project driven approach (patchwork of individual projects) to a network approach based on a
dual layer TEN-T to be realised. This requires a synchronised approach for the development
of projects across the borders, both in terms of project preparation and permitting. This is
even more relevant as regards cross-border public procurement. In the case of cross-border
projects developed together by the neighbouring Member States, the joint tendering
procedures are necessary to better grasp synergies and benefits of scale.
TEN-T infrastructure projects are not often attractive to private investors. There may be
different reasons, which are also addressed in the context of the third pillar of the Investment
Plan for Europe as well as in the Progress Report of January 2018 to the CBS Report. The
complexity of some regulatory procedures in the area of project financing is one of them.
This, next to the other inefficiencies of the permit granting process, concerns in particular
perceived uncertainties with regard to State aid control but also the way permitting procedures
may affect public-private partnerships.
The Netherlands
a dynamic market of PPP in transport
The Netherlands is a prominent example of the development of the PPP market. According to the EPEC Market
Update 2017
29
it is currently the 4th largest PPP market in the EU, also beyond Germany which is the biggest
economy overall. The clarity of rules topped up with constant development of expertise in this field bore fruit
with materialisation of a high number of projects
also in the transport sector financed with an EFSI guarantee.
The TEN-T network as a whole cannot properly function and offer all of its benefits at EU
level before all the elements are completed. The delayed implementation of the TEN-T
network will put off the benefits the EU expects from a smart, efficient, sustainable and well-
functioning transport network, especially in light of its objectives to foster low emission
mobility in Europe. It is very well illustrated by a sequence of sections to be upgraded in one
of the busiest transport corridors across the continent
the Rhine Alpine CNC:
28
Under the former legislative framework, the TEN-T policy identified 30 Priority Projects. Several of them have been
completed but some are still on-going, the experience with Priority Projects also shows that there issues related to permitting
procedures impacted the delivery of several projects (e.g. PP17, PP18/30, PP24), Implementation of the Priority Projects,
November
2012;
DG
MOVE
based
on
data
from
Member
States,
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/infrastructure/ten-t-policy/priority-
projects/doc/pp_report_nov2012.pdf
29
Market Update Review of the European PPP Market in 2017, EIB, March 2018
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Zevenaar
Emmerich
Oberhausen
This cross-border section located on the RhineAlpine CNC is in fact composed of two different projects
one
implemented by the Dutch RIM (ProRail) and the second by the German RIM DB Netz. This section is crucial to
provide capacity for growing traffic on one of the EU's busiest rail freight routes and fully use the potential of
the newly built Betuwe Line in NL. The Dutch part has already been completed; however the works on the DE
part are yet to start and currently are not foreseen to be finished before 2022, while originally planned for 2013,
i.e.
9 years of delay.
This delay, even if the project from the procedural point of view is a purely German national project, affects the
development of the Corridor and TEN-T network as a whole.
In addition, unnecessary costs can also arise when regulations or procedures are not clear
enough and the time needed for their application cannot be foreseen with an acceptable level
of certainty. The lack of predictability in the procedures leaves a
high level of uncertainty
for projects promoters and potential private investors leading ultimately to sub-optimal
investment choices. Finally, such legal uncertainty can also deter private investment from
participating in TEN-T infrastructure projects and results in increased costs in terms of access
to capital.
Several Member States have already started to develop measures at national level to address
the issue. The approach under the present initiative should not lead to unnecessary burden on
Member States that face fewer difficulties because they already have established a one stop
shop and meet the deadlines. However, a synchronised approach would trigger innovation and
improvements for the Member States that are lagging behind.
It should be borne in mind that the annual administrative costs currently incurred by the
authorities and project promoters are estimated at €21 million.
Figure 2: Problem tree
Several
root causes
leading to these problem drivers have been identified.
First, investment projects in transport infrastructure are highly complex and multidimensional
ventures which combine different elements which can create potential problems
these are
technical complexities related to engineering challenges, several impacts on different areas
(environmental, economic, social, political) as well as complexities related to their size and
capital required. Finding resources for their delivery can generate problems related to funding
and financial procedures.
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Another root of the problem is the fact that many of the transport infrastructure projects are
linear, i.e. located in a long stretch of land having impacts along its way on all the
neighbouring pieces of land and their occupiers resulting in a high number of stakeholders
affected and multiple administrative proceeding (e.g. spatial planning in different regions and
localities).
The projects are highly susceptible to generate conflicts, as the procedures and requirements
to properly address their expected impacts may stem from different legislations and acts
adopted at different levels (from local to the EU and international level). Some project
promoters are confronted with multiple use of the infrastructure next to water supply, power
generation, agriculture etc
30
.
On top of this comes the additional complexity of the cross-border projects where all the
procedures are handled differently across the borders, also due to diverging national
transposition of relevant EU directives.
These root causes are inherent to transport infrastructure projects. However, there are other
problem drivers that impact delays and uncertainties in the TEN-T project implementation,
which range from technical (project preparation capacity, feasibility, engineering complexity
and other technical issues), to political and funding issues. They remain outside the scope of
this impact assessment and the present initiative.
In particular, the problems related to the availability of funding (beyond the EU contribution),
technical challenges as well as administrative capacity of either project promoters or
supervising authorities, cannot be effectively address by the present initiative. Either it is
beyond the mandate of the EU action or it is addressed already elsewhere, for example via
dedicated instruments such as technical assistance in funding programmes (e.g. CEF
programme support actions) or horizontal mechanisms (e.g. voluntary ex ante assessment in
the public procurement area). However, the problems referred to above
delays due to
procedures and high level of uncertainty due to procedures
can be effectively addressed by
tackling the above problem drivers as presented in this impact assessment.
2.2
Lessons learnt from the TEN-E experience
Since 2013, the TEN-E Regulation
31
contains provisions aiming at reducing the timeframes
for authorising the projects of common interest in the TEN-E. It also introduced the concept
of the single authorising authority for all the permit granting processes. The TEN-E
experience has therefore been duly taken into account.
This was done in the context of the two supporting studies for the present impact assessment
by also interviewing the relevant services in the Directorate General for Energy of the
European Commission and reviewing any available useful analysis.
According to the Commission's recent assessment; it has proven successful with bringing the
average duration of the permit granting process in energy transmission projects from 10 years
to an expected 3.5 years and is a useful guidance for the solutions presented in this initiative
32
.
30
This is particularly the case with waterborne projects where the transport function of the infrastructure is only one of its
objectives.
31
Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009,
(EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009, p.39
32
According to the analysis of ACER, the average duration of permitting expected by PCI promoters in the pool of 96
electricity PCIs is 3.5 years. For gas, the average permit granting duration for the pool of assessed 54 PCIs was 3.2 years.
Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document Commission Delegated Regulation amending
Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the Union list of projects of common
interest, Annex II, SWD (2017) 425 final
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2.3
Who is affected by the problem?
The problem mainly affects three categories of actors: project promoters, public
administrations at local, regional or national level and civil society often represented by
NGOs. A detailed analysis on the categories of actors which are affected by the problem is
presented in Annex 3 to the present impact assessment report.
2.4
Getting evidence to evaluate the current situation
To best evaluate the situation, the Commission carried out an extensive analysis of the
situation and possible solutions. It completed an exploratory study, which made
recommendation to improve and better coordinate authorisations procedures for infrastructure
projects
33
. This exploratory study conducted an extensive analysis of the problem and 17 pre-
selected cases were screened. Further in-depth studies examined the regulatory and
administrative frameworks for transport projects in ten selected Member States to identify the
sources of delay, cost and uncertainty, as well as good practices. The selection of countries, in
combination with the countries represented in the ten project case studies, has ensured that the
research reflected the general picture across the EU
34
.
The study findings regarding the organisation of the permitting procedure were that delays in
permitting often occur due to overly complex procedures, involving multiple steps and
multiple authorities. A single permitting authority was proposed for TEN-T projects, together
with overall time limits for the permitting procedures. It also found that projects face
considerable delays when challenged by the public or stakeholders due to the quality of the
procedures used to engage the public and due to timing, i.e. the point at which those
procedures take place during the process of project preparation. It suggested measures such as
requirement for public involvement before a permitting application is submitted, establishing
principles for the conduct of public consultation procedures for TEN-T projects, carrying out
public information campaigns and improvements to the process for appeals of decisions on
development consent.
For delays due to environmental assessment, it proposed mandatory joint procedure for all
environmental assessment procedures stemming from EU legislation, various technical
clarifications and providing more dedicated external technical assistance services for the
preparation of TEN-T projects, focused on environmental assessments. In public procurement,
the delays would be partly addressed once the recent revisions of relevant EU directives are
fully implemented in the coming years. A special procurement regime aiming at speeding up
cross-border procurement and review procedures was proposed. As regards State aid
notifications, the study identified two key issues at the Member State level driving delays and
uncertainty, namely late notification by the Member State and the poor quality of notifications
(including information gaps). In addition, the study suggested reducing State aid decision
timeframes for selected TEN-T projects.
2.5
What are the problem drivers?
Five underlying causes to the problems have been identified and are described below as
problem drivers.
2.1.1
Multiple stages and authorities involved in permitting procedures
Permitting procedures in the Member States differ greatly in the number of necessary permits
and decisions to be obtained, as illustrated in Table 1. The number of authorities and levels of
33
34
Milieu et al
The TEN project case studies concern the following Member States: Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom, Austria and Spain.
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governance that may be involved in permitting procedures, as well as their competence and
power in the procedure also vary significantly across Member States. Among the ten Member
States analysed in detail in the exploratory study
35
, four have a single-stage permitting
procedure
36
, where all permitting decisions (environment, spatial planning etc.) are handled
through a single development consent procedure. While only one permitting authority grants
the final decision, consultation of other authorities generally remains a prerequisite, as the
different assessments may relate to policy areas that are within the domain of other
authorities. The other six countries have multi-stage permitting procedures
37
.
In addition to the statutory permits and decisions, binding opinions or decisions of a number
of authorities can be necessary before the permitting authority can issue a permit. The large
number of permitting authorities involved is in part due to the wide scope of impacts
considered in environmental assessments. The internal organisation of Member States and the
level of decentralisation are others relevant factors potentially increasing the number of
authorities involved in the procedure.
Five of the Member States analysed in the exploratory study have integrated various steps
environmental permit, spatial planning and construction permit
into a single permitting
procedure (Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). In Austria,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, environmental and spatial planning decisions
are integrated into a single development consent procedure. In Germany, all decisions on
environmental assessments and other permits are integrated in the plan approval procedure;
however spatial planning remains separate (Regional planning procedure), and precedes the
plan approval procedure. In the Netherlands, land use plans are automatically updated when
the development consent is granted, avoiding the completion of a separate spatial planning
decision
38
.
These efforts, even if in many cases effective, are not sufficient to form an EU-wide approach
and provide for a synchronised implementation of the TEN-T. First, they are not
systematically coupled with time limits (see specifically Section 00) and secondly these
measures are not undertaken by the other Member States (even if some of their streamlined
approaches are very successful
e.g. integrated permitting in Poland for national roads and
railways). But since even the purely national projects affect the developments on the other
parts of the Corridors and TEN-T network, as explained also in the Problem section, a
harmonising effort across the EU is needed.
Furthermore, the 2018 CBS Progress Report highlights that delays in permitting are often due
to multiple steps and authorities and recommends the introduction of a simplified process or
at least a mandatory joint procedure for all environmental assessments at project level.
The situation of multiple stages and authorities involved in permitting procedures is described
in further details in Annex 5, section 1. The results of the Open Public Consultation carried
out for this initiative show that all the categories of stakeholders (98 respondents) with one
exception fully or rather agree that permitting procedures are complex and lengthy when it
comes to the TEN-T projects (Figure 2 in Annex 2). Moreover, permitting procedures in
relation to the TEN-T projects are perceived as suboptimal by most respondents (59 out of 95)
to the Open Public Consultation (Figure 5 in annex 3).
It is worth noting that all categories of respondents including governments disagree with the
statement that permitting procedures are organised in an optimal way (Figure 3 in Annex 3).
35
36
Annex 3 to the Milieu et al., Country executive summaries.
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
37
Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Spain. For details see Table 2 in the Annex 1 to Milieu et al.
38
Milieu et al. Annex 6 Guide of good practices, p. 11
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Why does it drive the problem?
As evidenced in the exploratory study
39
, factors of delay, costs and uncertainty in permitting
procedures are often rooted in procedural aspects. TEN-T projects have multiple impacts on
land-use and the environment, often require conducting multiple environmental assessments,
and, given their size, can fall under several jurisdictions if the procedure is handled at regional
or local level. Consequently, in some Member States, permitting procedures are complex,
involving many steps and permitting authorities, leading to duplication of permits and
applications to be submitted by project promoters, duplication of or overlaps in assessment
procedures, and significant administrative burden and costs for both the project promoters and
permitting authorities. The higher the number of different authorities involved in the
permitting procedure (either as permitting authority or consulted authority), the more complex
it becomes to gather all of the intermediate decisions required to grant the final permit.
Cross-border projects are particularly vulnerable to the problems described above. The
number of permits, the sequence of approvals, time limits, and requirements for public
consultation can vary greatly between countries and can result in permitting procedures
happening at different speeds on either side of the border
40
.
2.1.2
Absent or unenforced time limits
In some Member States, time limits are set out in the legislation for the main permits (EIA,
spatial planning) and public consultations, as illustrated in Table 1. However, global time
limits for the entire permitting procedure have not been fixed in any Member State, even
where an integrated permitting procedure exits (e.g. Germany). Time limits for environmental
assessments generally exist, at least for certain procedures, in particular for screening and
scoping, and public consultation. The 2014 amendment to the EIA Directive introduced time
limits for screening decisions. However, the competent authority has the possibility, in
exceptional cases related to the nature, complexity, location or size of the project, to extend
this deadline
41
.
Stakeholders often mentioned that missing documentation or documentation of poor quality
was the reason why the permit cannot be issued within the time limit, as additional data had to
be requested to the applicant, which often stops the procedure
42
.
In most of the Member States analysed in the exploratory study
43
, sanctions are not applied in
case of missed deadlines. Only in Romania, authorities responsible for issuing different
certificates or notifications can be fined if they do not respect the timelines for issuing
documents, as required by the law.
Why does it drive the problem?
Case studies conducted for this impact assessment showed that large cross-border
infrastructure projects generally exceed ten years from early planning to construction. In the
ten Member States studied, the duration of the permitting procedure (from the submission of
the application to the last permit granted) was, according to interviewed stakeholders,
between two and five years
44
. Regardless of the source of the problem, one way of addressing
39
40
Milieu et al., section 3.1.1, p. 31
A prime example is the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project, where the approval process went quite smoothly in Denmark,
while the approval in Germany is still dependent on the completion of several rounds of public hearings.
41
In that event the competent authority shall inform the developer in writing of the reasons justifying the extension and of the
date when its determination is expected (Article 4(6)).
42
For details see consultations done in the context of the exploratory study
Annex 5 to the Milieu et al.
43
Annex 1 to Milieu et al., Problem Definition, Section 1.1.3
44
Only countries were stakeholders provided information on the duration of the permitting procedure (excluding preparation
of the application) were considered in this average.
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lengthy procedures is to establish time limits, to incentivise permitting authorities to adopt
measures and/or administrative practices accelerating the granting of permits. However,
global time limits for the entire permitting procedure have not been fixed in any Member
State, even where an integrated permitting procedure exits
45
.
Table 1: Permit granting procedures in selected Member States
Number of
Number of
Member
permitting
procedures
Time Limits
State
authorities
required
Austria
Czech
Republic
Germany
Hungary
1-3
4 (+ 10-15
opinions)
1
7-9
1-2 (+)
9-12 months for
EIA
45-90 days per
procedure
Final approval: no
time limit
No legal time
limits
30-42 days per
procedure
150 days for EIA
Average
duration
according to
stakeholders
15 years
Fast-track procedures
n/a
2
3-4 years
n/a
1
4-6
2 years
1-4 years
n/a
Possibility to conduct several
procedures in parallel
Legge Obbietivo (2001),
Development consent granted on
preliminary project Tighter time
limits for decision-taking
Limitations of legal standing of
municipalities, time limits for
judgements in appeals
Number of permits needed reduced
to 2 or 3, land covered by permit
becomes automatically property of
State Treasury
Development consent granted with
preliminary approvals regarding
forest land and utilities
Automatic change of agricultural
land into constructible land once
the ownership title is transferred to
the state Extension of validity of
permits until the end of the
construction works
n/a
n/a
Italy
1
2
Up to 10 years
The
Netherlands
1
1
2 years
1-2 months
(standard rules of
the code of
administrative
procedures)
6 years
Poland
2-4
2-3
1.5-4 years
Romania
6-7
6-7
6-12 months EIA,
5-165 days per
other procedures
2-5 years
Spain
United
Kingdom
3
1
2
1
24 months for
SEA
9 months for EIA
12 months (9 in
Scotland)
Not available
Two years
Source: European Commission based on Milieu et al., 2016.
2.1.3
Differing public procurement procedures for cross-border TEN-T projects
Challenges related to public procurement
Public procurement can bring major challenges to TEN-T projects. The research carried out
for the exploratory study
46
showed that problems in the procurement phase can result in
delays and increased costs for projects. Delays in the completion of the procurement phase
45
In most of the Member States selected for analysis in the exploratory study, time limits have been set out in the legislation
for the main permits (EIA, spatial planning) and public consultations (Milieu et al. Annex 3, Country Executive Summaries).
46
Milieu et al., Section 3.4, p. 56
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appear to be the consequence of a complex legal framework, the absence of time limits for the
award procedure and, in particular, the long review procedures to challenge the award
decision. Increased costs are directly related to delays but also to the selection of poor quality
projects, which appears to be mainly driven by the lack of capacity of contracting authorities
to conduct procurement procedures. These challenges are even more prominent for cross-
border projects and still remain to be addressed as explained below.
The legal framework for public procurement within the EU is set out in Directive
2014/23/EU, on the award of concession contracts; Directive 2014/24/EU, on public
procurement; and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water,
energy, transport and postal services sectors. The ‘new’ EU Public Procurement Directives
had to be transposed into the Member States’ national legal orders by 18 April 2016. The
main objective of the new Directives is to simplify procedures and at the same time make
these procedures more flexible
47
; this is likely to contribute to tackling some of the problems
identified above.
The problems linked to cross-border cooperation and differences in the ways in which
Member States have transposed the legislation may not be fully tackled by the new
legislation. This clearly comes out as a result of the targeted workshop organised specifically
on public procurement
48
. Moreover, the full extent of potential problems linked to partial or
incorrect transposition, gold-plating, and differences across Member States will only be
known once a conformity-checking exercise of transposition of these new Directives has been
completed
49
. It may therefore be the case that the new measures will improve the situation
regarding complexities and delays related to public procurement procedures for TEN-T
projects, and this needs to be taken into account when assessing policy options in this area.
One of the main purposes of EU public procurement is ‘to achieve smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds’
50
. However, public
procurement procedures can be a challenge for the smooth implementation of large
infrastructure transport projects. This has been recognised in the 2015 CBS Report ‘Action
Plan
Making the best use of new financial schemes for European transport infrastructure
projects’
which included a series of recommendations to ‘streamline and simplify
procurement procedures’
51
.
Remaining complexity of the legal framework
The exploratory study
52
found that, within the transport sector, and more specifically within
the context of TEN-T projects, in six out of the ten Member States covered by the study the
perception is the same
the complexity of the applicable rules (mainly resulting from the
transposition and application of the old EU Public Procurement Directives) is considered an
obstacle to a quicker public procurement procedure.
47
The simplification of procurement procedures is envisaged to take place through the establishment of shorter procedural
deadlines or the resort to e-procurement and other measures to reduce paperwork. Flexibility is improved through the
possibility of using innovation partnerships, broader possibilities for negotiation with tenderers (competitive procedure with
negotiation) and the use of best quality-price award criteria (including the total lifecycle cost). See for instance DG MARKT
leaflet “New Rules on Public Contracts and Concessions – Simpler and More Flexible”, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publications/docs/public-procurement-and-concessions_en.pdf
.
48
Conclusions of the Stakeholders Workshop Smart and effective public procurement for TEN-T cross-border projects,
Brussels, 15 June 2017,
49
A conformity checking of the three Directives will be conducted by DG GROW in 2017. The contract notice for
consultancy services for completeness and compliance checks of national transposition measures and other legal assessment
services in the field of EU public procurement law, no. 2016/S 125-222903, was published on 21 June 2016. The notice is
available on TED.
50
See e.g. Recital 4 of Directive 2014/25/EU
51
CBS Report
52
Annex 1 to Milieu et al., Problem Definition, Section 2.1.2
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It appears therefore that the complexity of the legal framework and the application of
differing public procurement rules to projects developed in a cross-border context can also
lead to delays and increase legal uncertainty.
Recent developments in the area of public procurement
Since 2017, the Commission has taken some initiatives to accompany the implementation of
public procurement legislation. In particular, a voluntary ex-ante mechanism has been set up
53
to enable the project promoters and other relevant actors to get targeted assistance and
assessment from the Commission when developing the procurement strategies for their
projects as well as the stage of launching the procurement procedures. This mechanism
consists of three elements: a helpdesk
54
, a notification mechanism
55
and an information
exchange mechanism.
Notwithstanding, the usefulness of all these elements for contracting authorities and project
promoters, the mechanism is however not binding, only provides a compliance assessment
and is not automatically open to all TEN-T projects. Certain thresholds apply
as a principle
only project beyond 500 million EUR can ask for advice. TEN-T projects of common interest
may use the mechanism but only if a decision on the admissibility which will be taken on a
case by case basis. This may limit the attractiveness of the instrument to promoters of
medium-sized projects.
Why do complexities specific to cross-border procurement drive the problem?
Cross-border projects face specific difficulties in conducting public procurement. This has
been highlighted by the project promoters for a long time was confirmed in the public
consultation carried out for the exploratory study. They include legal barriers, language
barriers and lack of experience in doing business in other countries
56
.
Brenner Base Tunnel
This cross-border project is one of the emblematic TEN-T projects aiming at linking together different parts of
the EU. Since the very beginning it was conceived as a long-term asset worth in total 8bn EUR.
In the case of project of this size, a delay of the EIA procedure of 1.5 years in 2006-2007 generated significant
losses as a result of inflation and cost of financing.
Moreover, as a result of procurement issues, delays in the start of phase III/works (2011) of about 19 months
caused a shift of the finalisation of the project from 2025 to 2026 and led to additional costs of about 20mn EUR
(including additional time till finalisation).
Some of these deficiencies were addressed with the adoption of the new procurement
directives in 2014. Nevertheless, there are other issues that are still not regulated at EU level,
as noted in the 2015 CBS Action Plan, namely ‘the use of a single language in tender
and
contracting documents’. These problems were reiterated in the Progress Report presented in
January 2018.
According to the new rules, the participating contracting entities can agree to apply the
53
Communication from the Commission to the Institutions: Helping investment through a voluntary ex-ante assessment of
the procurement aspects for large infrastructure projects, COM(2017) 573
54
National authorities can contact the helpdesk on specific issues they face when developing the procurement plan for a
project. These questions could, for example, concern the applicable EU legal framework governing the project (procurement
or utilities directives; concessions directive, etc.), conditions for exclusions from the directives, procurement procedures to be
used, selection and award criteria, etc.
55
The notification mechanism is designed to enable the project promoters to receive the Commission's views on the
compliance with EU procurement legislation.
56
For example, the case studies also showed that differences in national legislation can lead to significant delay. The
complex legal framework for procurement applied in France and Italy in the Lyon-Turin case gave rise to prolonged
discussions between both countries on the implementation of the applicable EU rules. The implementation of specific
measures to prevent criminal infiltrations in public procurement was one of the specific points of discussion, since French
and Italian law did not implement European law in a similar way at national level.
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national procurement rules of the Member State where the joint entity has its registered office
or the national provisions of the Member State where the joint entity is carrying out its
activities. In addition, they can choose to apply this agreement for an undetermined period,
when fixed in the constitutive act of the joint entity, or limit its application to a certain period
of time, certain types of contracts or to one or more individual contract awards.
The new public procurement directives allow for a margin of discretion in the choice of the
applicable law, the participating contracting entities struggle to decide on which law to apply
and that the scope of application of the agreement ends up being significantly reduced (e.g.
applying only during a certain period of time). In addition, these new rules do not seem fully
satisfactory for infrastructure projects promoters who still mention the application of different
national legal frameworks as the most difficult area for public procurement in the context of
cross-border projects
57
.
2.1.4
Coordination challenges for the delivery of cross-border projects
Cross-border projects face particular challenges that impact the timing and efficiency of
delivery. The involvement of more than one Member State, and often of multiple regional
and/or local authorities, can particularly impact the timely completion of permitting
procedures. Any delay or obstacle on one side of a border will necessarily impact project
delivery on the other side, as project promoters will not proceed with a project until the
delivery on both sides of the border can be assured. Given the priority that TEN-T policy
gives to cross-border projects
58
, TEN-T core network projects are likely to be particularly
impacted by these challenges.
Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link
According to the latest information the German plan approval process for the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project
could only be finalised by summer 2018. Initially, the plan approval process was expected to be completed by
autumn 2015, which means
so far more than 3 years of delay.
Only after this approval, the construction of the
tunnel and access routes on Danish and German side could start. However, it is expected that the plan approval
will be brought to the federal administrative court which could result in additional two years of delay. This
planning process concerns the German part of the Fixed Link itself, as well as the German access routes and is a
prerequisite for the construction phase.
Why does it drive the problem?
Cross-border projects encounter specific problems arising out of inconsistencies between
legal permitting frameworks and procedures across Member States. As demonstrated in
previous section of this report, the number of permits, the sequence of approvals, time limits,
requirements for public consultation can vary greatly between countries and can result in
permitting procedures happening at different speeds on either side of the border. Increased
coordination of procedures is key in cross-border projects to ensure that the project can
develop at roughly the same pace. Different procedures and sequence of permitting
procedures generally impact the whole approval process and create time gaps between
authorisations in both countries. Detailed description on how the cross-border contexts (such
as transboundary EIAs and strategic planning) affect the permitting of the TEN-T projects is
contained in Annex 5.
57
Results of the open public consultation being part of the IA process. The Complex procurement in the Rail Baltica cross-
border project is illustrated in the Progress Report of the Action Plan Making the best use of new financial schemes for
European transport infrastructure projects. It highlights the difficulties regarding public procurement for the Joint Venture RB
RAIL AS which has the sole responsibility for defining the procurement contracts. However, contracts are governed by the
law of the state where the works are performed.
58
See, for example, recital 13 of the TEN-T Regulation.
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2.1.5
Perceived uncertainties related to State aid procedures
State aid control makes sure that State resources mobilised for investments do not lead to
unjustified distortion of completion. Some transport authorities may however find State aid
notifications challenging, given that in the past investments in transport infrastructure was
considered to fall outside State aid rules
59
.
Given the objective to attract more investors to the sector (blending of private and public
financing), there will be more and more situations where the State aid control clearance will
be of importance in the implementation of the TEN-T projects. Some streamlining measures
in this respect have already been applied in the context of the implementation of the European
Fund for Strategic Investments which provided for the possibility of priority treatment of the
projects benefitting from the support of the European Fund for Strategic Investments
60
.
Why does it drive the problem?
The exploratory study
61
determined that the two main problems at the Member State level
driving delays and uncertainty in State aid notifications are late notification and the poor
quality of notifications (including information gaps). Cases of late notification generally come
from a lack of awareness from authorities or project promoters of the need to notify potential
State aid cases to the Commission. In addition, the lack of experience with State notifications
in some authorities may lead to notifications that are of a lower quality. This can result in the
Commission having to request further information to clarify the facts, lengthening the time
needed to have a complete notification necessary for adopting a decision. Some project
promoters may also be uncertain about the applicability of State aid rules to their project may
also need to seek expert opinions, contributing to additional project costs. There has been
important progress in clarifying the State aid rules applicable to the transport infrastructure
projects in recent years. In May 2016 the Commission adopted the Notice on the Notion of
aid
62
where the Commission clarified in particular when public funding for infrastructure
projects falls within the scope of EU State aid control. In 2014 new Aviation Guidelines
63
were adopted and in May 2017 the revised General Block Exemption Regulation as regards
aid for port and airport infrastructure
64
was adopted in 2017. In addition, the Commission
services published so-called "analytical grids" on the application of State aid rules to the
public financing of infrastructure (e.g. for ports, airports, road and rail infrastructure)
65
.
However, the CBS Progress Report proposes to make further steps, also in light of the request
of some stakeholders (for example in the light of what already exists as regards the priority
treatment of certain cases on mobilising investments
66
). As acknowledged by stakeholders
during the workshop devoted to governance and State aid issues, ex-ante appraisal of State aid
compliance is crucial for the financial sector to engage in a project. Therefore, the Progress
59
Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v Commission of the European Communities, European Court of Justice, 2000; Joined
Cases T-443/08 and T-455/08 Freistaat Sachsen, Flughafen Leipzig/Halle et al v Commission of the European Communities,
European Court of Justice, 2011, ECR II-1311
60
European Commission, MEMO/15/5419
61
Milieu et al., Section 3.5, p. 66
62
Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, OJ C 262 of 19.7.2016, p.1-50
63
Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, p. 3.
64
Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 as regards aid for port
and airport infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and for aid for sport and
multifunctional recreational infrastructures, and regional operating aid schemes for outermost regions and amending
Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs, OJ of 20.06.2017, L 156, p.1-18
65
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/notice_aid_en.html
66
Under the Investment Plan for Europe, projects benefiting from the EFSI may combine in their financial schemes also
sources of financing which are considered as State aid, also e.g. ESI Funds. In order to simplify and accelerate their
implementation, the Commission has committed to assess the compliance of ESI Funds with State aid rules as a matter of
priority and to give it fast-track treatment. The Commission aims to complete its assessment within six weeks of receiving the
complete notification from the Member State. European Commission, MEMO/16/313
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Report recommends a swift appraisal procedure by the European Commission if a project is in
conformity with State aid rules to be generalised in order to clear the project upfront and thus
provide legal certainty and predictability about the overall investment.
The Commission carries out its assessment of State aid compliance only once the notification
is complete. Therefore, it encourages Member States to make use of the pre-notification
procedure which can help the Member States to submit complete notifications. In addition, the
Commission gives the possibility to Member States for important and complex projects to
establish a mutually agreed planning clearly setting out the timeline and milestones, and the
information that needs to be delivered, ensuring a swift adoption of the decision once the
notification takes place. This provides Member States with the possibility to agree with the
Commission to a priority treatment of the case.
2.6
How will the problem evolve?
Without EU intervention, the implementation of the current legislative framework will
continue to result in
delays
and
legal uncertainties
which impact the effective delivery of the
TEN-T projects. As explained in section 2.2, given the transnational nature of the TEN-T, any
delay impacting one project has an adverse effect on the whole stretch of a corridor. Overall,
the implementation of the core TEN-T network, as foreseen by the TEN-T Regulation, is
unlikely to be achieved by 2030.
This situation is not expected to be significantly changed by the transposition of the
amendments to the EIA Directive which is meant to be effective as of May 2017. While these
amendments are expected to facilitate EIAs for cross-border projects, they do not foresee the
complete integration and coordination of permitting procedures, do not introduce an overall
time limits for all authorisations and provide for a possibility of optional schemes for
conducting cross-border consultations through a joint body. The provisions in the revised EIA
directive do not suffice for the needs of the TEN-T projects also as they only allow for
integrating assessments required under the EIA, Habitats and Birds directives where
appropriate and as the integration of assessments based on other pieces of EU legislation (e.g.
water framework directive) remains optional.
In a similar way, this situation would not be significantly changed for the needs of TEN-T
projects by the latest revisions of the EU Public Procurement Directives which were meant to
be effective in national law since nearly two years. In case of the cross-border procurement,
the Directives leave to the Member States to choose the applicable legal framework. The
application of the rules to cross-border TEN-T projects would not improve the current
situation as the decision will still be taken
ad hoc,
subject to changing political priorities,
without providing the necessary stability to the project promoters.
Furthernore, the mentioned EU law on environmental assesment and public procurement has
general nature and broader scope while for TEN-T infrastructure projects, more targeted
measures appear necessary .
The risk of inadequate transposition or in diverging ways of this transporsition across the
borders of these recent pieces of legislation cannot be excluded on the basis of the current
experience. Further explanations are made in chapter 5.1 regarding the baseline scenario.
The administrative costs incurred by the authorities is estimated at €185 million
for 2018-
2030 (expressed as present value) in the baseline scenario and for project promoters at €937
million over the same time period. Overall, the administrative burden is projected at €1,122
million for 2018-2030, expressed as present value.
67
67
Source: Panteia, PwC, M-FIVE Impact Assessment support study (2018) (henceforth: Panteia et al). More details on the
assumptions used for the administrative burden are provided in Annex 4.
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Finally, the suboptimal framework for the involvement of private investors remains on top of
the other problem drivers and has a direct consequence: the investors' base will not expand
and transport infrastructure projects will remain unattractive for private investors in many
areas of the EU. This will limit the number of projects going ahead as the biggest financial
burden will remain on the public expenditures.
3 WHY SHOULD THE EU ACT?
3.1
The EU's right to act
The EU’s competence to act in relation to transport
networks is set out in Article 170 of the
TFEU, which requires the EU to ‘contribute to the establishment and development of trans-
European networks’ in the area of transport. In detailing what EU action in this area could
include, Article 171(2) states
that ‘Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission,
coordinate among themselves the polices pursued at national level which may have a
significant impact’ on the objective of the establishment of trans-European
networks, and the
‘Commission may,
in close cooperation with the Member States, take any useful initiative to
promote such coordination’.
Hence, EU action to set out a framework to streamline the permitting and preparation of
projects integral to the establishment of the TEN-T network is
within the scope of the EU’s
right to act. The EU shares competence in this area with the Member States.
3.2
Subsidiarity: necessity of EU action
The transnational nature of the TEN-T network is clear. This is particularly evident in relation
to cross-border projects; however, the corridor approach adopted in the TEN-T Regulation is
inherently transnational
– this approach is intended to ‘coordinate different projects on a
transnational basis and synchronise the development of the corridor’
68
. This coordinated,
transnational approach is unlikely to be adequately addressed by Member State action alone.
Permitting procedures in Member States differ greatly in the number of necessary permits and
decisions to be obtained. The number of authorities and levels of governance that may be
involved in permitting procedures, as well as their competence and power in the procedure
also vary significantly across Member States. The delays stemming from these procedures
have however significant impact on the TEN-T core network completion.
In terms of public procurement, problems appear to be more related to the way applicable
public procurement framework is organised at national level, in particular the long review
procedures which appear to be main cause of delays. In case of cross border projects, the
problems also stem from the differences in transposition of relevant EU law at national level.
For cross-border projects, Member States face similar difficulties when it comes to
coordination of public procurement and interpretation of the applicable EU rules, as well as
coordination of transboundary environmental assessments.
While according to the results of the Open Public Consultation, national and regional
authorities appear less confident that the EU should act, still the majority of stakeholders who
participated in this consultation express themselves in favour of the EU taking action in this
field (75 out of 99 respondents). The vast majority of individual respondents believe in the
effectiveness of the EU action in this field (16 out of 21 answers). In this sense, the results of
the Open Public Consultation confirmed the conclusions of the three dedicated workshops
carried out in 2017 and as well as of the interviews and consultations run in the Exploratory
Study as shown in Figure 4 Annex 2.
68
Recital 43, TEN-T Regulation
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3.3
Subsidiarity: Added value of EU action
The completion of the TEN-T core network by 2030 aims at delivering an efficient, smart and
sustainable transport network that underpins the single European transport area. This overall
strategy is expected to promote low emission mobility, to enable the decarbonisation and
digitalisation of transport, to benefit all users of the EU transport systems
businesses and
citizens but also to generate investments, economic growth and jobs.
The implementation of the TEN-T requires significant coordination efforts of the various
projects in order to fully exploit the overall network benefits at EU level. In this respect, the
delivery of the TEN-T network relies on the efficient synchronisation not only of the
investments but also of the implementation pace of individual projects to avoid time gaps and
reap all benefits from a network approach. This is the approach that has been developed with
the TEN-T regulation adopted in 2013. Several tools have been established to generate the
European added value expected from the TEN-T network. These include the definition of
harmonised standards for greater interoperability, sustainability and efficiency, the
development of core network corridors to bridge missing links and remove main bottlenecks,
the appointment of European coordinators to facilitate the coordination of relevant actors and
the creation of the Connecting Europe Facility and other funding instruments to provide EU
support for investments. However, no coordination tools or mechanisms are yet in place in
the transport sector
and contrary to others such as energy
to address the needs for
synchronisation, coherence and efficiency in the delicate phase of the planning and the
implementation of infrastructure projects.
Indeed, infrastructure projects on the TEN-T core network face a number of challenges in
regulatory and administrative processes that impact effective and efficient planning and
implementation of TEN-T network. Such challenges in permitting procedures, environmental
assessment procedures and public procurement practices contribute to increased delays, cost
and uncertainty during the planning and preparation of core network projects. This is
particularly the case of TEN-T cross-border projects which may be implemented across one or
more Member States by a single entity (joint venture) like for Rail Baltica, Brenner Base
Tunnel, Fehmarn Belt etc. Unnecessary complexity and duplication of efforts can be avoided
by applying the same or coordinating the procedures across the border with a view to
maximise synergies and reap the benefits of a European approach. Otherwise, these
infrastructure projects are confronted with a multitude of national procedures, differing
requirements and regulatory fragmentation.
The policy options presented aim to help the EU achieve the overall objectives of TEN-T
policy. They specifically address some of the problems faced by TEN- T core network
projects by seeking to streamline permitting, environmental assessment, procurement and
State aid processes without prejudice of the content of the legislation underpinning these
procedures. The objective of reducing delays and uncertainties can be more efficiently met by
providing a stable and clear framework at the EU level
3.4
Why act now?
Several reasons plead for introducing now streamlining measures for the implementation of
the TEN-T projects.
The TEN-T Regulation requires the completion of the core network by 2030. This means that
there are less than 13 years left to complete all the necessary projects. Based on the fact that in
extreme cases the process of project preparation in terms of obtaining permits and designing
the technical and financial structure of project lasts around 10 years, no delays can be
afforded to meet the deadline. Of course, not all projects are at that level of complexity and it
may take less time to prepare them.. A conservative calculation as explained in Section 5.1
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shows that in average projects are delayed by approximately 2 years.
The EU economy is still recovering from the economic and financial crisis which resulted in a
clear drop in public and private investment in infrastructure. The European Commission has
placed the relaunch of investment in the real economy at the very centre of its priorities for
2014-2019. This is the main raison d'être of the Investment Plan for Europe, which third pillar
concentrates on the removal of administrative barriers hampering investments and the related
benefits.
As a result, many of the TEN-T projects are planned only now to start being implemented in
the coming years. These projects will benefit from the streamlined measures and be less prone
to delays. This is particularly relevant to foster an effective implementation of TEN-T
infrastructure projects in the current and next multi-annual financial frameworks.
The present initiative results from a long reflection process launched at the beginning of the
current Commission to contribute to implementing its priorities. As already presented before,
the CBS Progress Report clearly summarises the evolution of the reforms of the permitting
processes and other authorisations procedures of which are subject TEN-T infrastructure
projects are still not sufficient and more ambitious solutions are needed. After a long period of
consultation and analysis
started already in 2014 with the Council conclusions under the
Italian Presidency
the material and evidence gathered is solid enough to identify the main
problems and propose solutions with initiating the legislative proposal. Recently, the TTE
Council adopted in December 2017 conclusions on the progress of the Trans-European
Transport Network (TEN-T) implementation and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for
transport which very much support the continuation of this infrastructure policy and
encourage the Commission to give follow up to the reflections on the regulatory environment
of the implementations of TEN-T projects
69
.
4 OBJECTIVES: WHAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED?
4.1
General objectives
The general objective of initiative on streamlining TEN-T implementation is addressing the
delays and the high level of uncertainty which impact the effective delivery of the TEN-T
core network projects. It will contribute to the objective set in Article 170 TFUE to establish
and develop the trans-European transport network as well as to promote the interconnection
and interoperability of national networks.
In particular, this initiative aims at accelerating the benefits of the implementation of a fully
interoperable and interconnected transport network linking the main economic centres and all
the Member States. It will help maximise the impact of the existing national networks
requiring upgrades to meet the TEN-T interoperable parameters as well as bridge missing
links in Europe. Since the development of the TEN-T focuses on the sustainable modes of
transport, this initiative directly contributes to the transition to low emission mobility
70
.
4.2
Specific objectives
SO1: minimising the risk of delays faced by individual TEN-T projects;
To achieve this general objective the following specific objectives (SO) have been defined:
15053/17 TRANS 525,
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15053-2017-INIT/en/pdf
The initiative is listed in the action plan attached to Communication A European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility,
COM(2016) 501 final
70
69
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SO2: increasing legal certainty for project promoters thus attracting more private
investors to transport infrastructure
The
specific objective 1
(SO1) aims at addressing the important delays encountered in the
implementation of TEN-T infrastructure projects which are confronted to a series of
difficulties as explained above.
SO1 will tackle the Problem Driver 2 (absent or unenforced time limits), Problem Driver 3
(differing public procurement procedures for cross border TEN-T core projects) and Problem
Driver 4 (coordination of delivery of for cross border TEN-T core projects).
The
specific objective 2
(SO2) aims at bringing greater clarity in the processes which project
promoters need to follow in order to implement the projects, in particular through permitting
and other administrative authorisations, public procurements and State aid control.
SO2 will tackle the Problem Driver 1 (multiple stages and authorities involved in permitting
procedures), Problem Driver 2 absent or unenforced time limits), Problem Driver 3 (differing
public procurement procedures for cross border TEN-T core projects) and Problem Driver 5
(reluctance of private investors to TEN-T core network infrastructure projects)
The initiative will in addition also provide more coherence in implementation of different EU
policies. The perceived regulatory obstacles and legal uncertainties for TEN-T projects
promoters are very often result of the diverging implementation of EU policies and diverging
national implementation of EU rules and complementing them with additional requirements.
The achievement of the specific objectives is planned without derogating to any objectives
and standards required by the EU policies but by integrating them better together for the
benefit of the TEN-T implementation. No trade-offs are expected between the various EU
policies.
The objectives are also in line with the policy of attracting private capital to the areas
traditionally reserved for public intervention as well as re-launching investment in the real
economy. The increased investment in TEN-T infrastructure is necessary to at least partly
address the backlog in the transport infrastructure investment being the result of the financial
crisis
71
.
The initiative will contribute to closing the infrastructure gap, in particular time gaps in
procedures, between different Member States and it will specifically address the cross-border
projects which are the priority in the TEN-T core network corridors.
Finally, the initiative is planned to reduce the administrative cost due to over complex
procedures and delays in permitting procedures borne by the project promoters. Since the
material rules are not planned to be changed, the compliance cost of the initiative is not
expected to be high.
"In 2008, annual investment in transport infrastructure in the EU28 was approximately € 130 billion, which was broadly
consistent with historical levels of about 1% of GDP. However, investment fell during the financial crisis and the following
period. It is therefore estimated that investment now needs to rise to €160 billion a year until 2020, as a minimum, to address
the backlog and restore investment to pre-crisis levels. " Commission non-paper with a view to the Ministerial lunch debate
taking place at the Transport Council on 1 December 2016
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14826-2016-INIT/en/pdf
71
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5 WHAT ARE THE AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS?
5.1
What is the baseline from which options are assessed (baseline scenario)?
Building on previous priority project reports (2012)
72
, the impact assessment support study
assumes that in the baseline scenario only 50% of investments would occur on schedule while
25% of the investments would be delayed due to permitting procedures by one year, 15% by
two years, and 10% by three years under a conservative approach.
An analysis of the likely pattern of delays has been made, based on the findings from previous
priority project reports (2012). A selection of 34 projects was made. Amongst these projects,
16 projects finished later than planned, delayed on average by 4.25 years. The cross-border
projects were on average delayed more than the others. Amongst the 34 projects, delays were
caused by a range of factors; technical, political, funding, and procedural. It was not possible
to isolate empirically the level or probability of delay linked to specific permitting procedures.
However, it is possible to conclude that delays are not occurring on all projects, and that the
delays attributed to permitting procedures should be lower than the total length of the delays,
as other delay factors are present. Therefore, a “conservative approach” has been chosen for
the Baseline scenario that considers an average delay of 2 years due to the permitting
procedures.
The baseline scenario builds on the updated EU Reference scenario 2016 but assumes the
delays in the implementation of the core TEN-T network investments due to the permitting
procedures.
73
The scheduled cumulative investment profile and the investment profile
including delays are provided in Figure 3.
Figure 3 : Cumulative investment profile
scheduled and with delays (baseline scenario)
In the baseline scenario, EU transport activity is expected to continue growing beyond 2015.
Freight transport activity for inland modes is projected to increase by 28% between 2015 and
2030 (51% for 2015-2050). Passenger traffic growth would be lower than for freight at 17%
72
Implementation of the Priority Projects, November 2012; DG MOVE based on data from Member States,
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/infrastructure/ten-t-policy/priority-
projects/doc/pp_report_nov2012.pdf
73
The updated EU Reference scenario 2016 assumes the completion of the core TEN-T network by 2030 and of the
comprehensive TEN-T network by 2050. A full description of the updated EU Reference scenario 2016 is provided in the
Impact Assessment accompanying the revision of the Eurovignette Directive:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0180.
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by 2030 (36% for 2015-2050). Road transport would maintain its dominant role within the EU
for both passenger and freight transport. Rail transport activity is projected to grow faster than
for road: passenger rail activity would go up by 33% between 2015 and 2030 (70% for 2015-
2050); rail freight activity by 39% by 2030 (75% for 2015-2050). Inland navigation (i.e.
inland waterways and national maritime) activity is projected to go up by 23% by 2030 and
43% for 2015-2050. However, delays in investments due to permitting procedures would lead
to lower activity than in the updated EU Reference scenario for both rail and inland
navigation already over 2015-2020. A description of the baseline scenario assumptions and
more detailed results are provided in Annex 4 on Analytical methods.
The administrative costs incurred by the authorities is estimated at €185 million for 2018-
2030 (expressed as present value) in the baseline scenario and for project promoters at €937
million over the same time period.
Overall, the administrative burden is projected at €1,122
million for 2018-2030, expressed as present value.
74
Considering the uncertainty, an alternative baseline has been used for the assessment of the
policy options where 60% of investments would occur on schedule while 20% of the
investments would be delayed due to permitting procedures by one year, 10% by two years,
and 10% by three years. The alternative baseline scenario shows higher investments taking
place in the beginning of the period. A description of the alternative baseline scenario and
more detailed results are provided in Annex 4 on Analytical methods.
The lack of predictability in the procedures is expected to continue, leaving high level of
uncertainty for projects promoters and ultimately leading to sub-optimal investment choices.
In addition, such uncertainty would not help attract more investments from private capital to
transport infrastructure projects which is an objective of the Investment Plan for Europe. This
would also limit the impact of financial schemes such as the European Fund for Strategic
Investments as well as other innovative financial instruments in the infrastructure field.
5.2
Description of the policy options
The stakeholder consultation, the expert meetings, independent research and their own
analysis have allowed the Commission services to identify different policy measures, which
served as a basis for the identification of the main policy options (in the form of policy option
packages). The following process was applied for establishing the policy options:
Step 1: Identify an extensive list of policy measures addressing the problems (considered
policy measures);
Step 2: Consider policy measures which are retained after a preliminary assessment;
Step 3: Combine the considered policy measures into policy options and identify options
which can be discarded.
The analysis led to a clear conclusions that not the same level of ambition is necessary in
every area and a stepwise approach would be appropriate.
In the case of the permit granting procedures, the situation is diverging in many Member
States and no harmonised approach has been taken at EU level yet. A higher level of
intervention is necessary to cater for a synchronisation of the procedures across the border
and allow for a concerted implementation of projects.
In the case of public procurement, a modernised framework started to apply in the last years.
However, a gap remains in the area of cross-border procurement and commonly developed
projects by two or more Member States. Here, the intervention may only target this specific
situation.
74
Source: Panteia, PwC, M-FIVE Impact Assessment support study (2018) (henceforth: Panteia et al). More details on the
assumptions used for the administrative burden are provided in Annex 4.
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In the case of State aid control, the newly adopted clarifications already removed a majority
of the uncertainty which hampered the development of projects in the last years. In the case of
complex project with sophisticated financial structures, it seems nevertheless necessary that
the European Commission is contacted early in the process by the competent national
authorities, making use of pre-notifications, which in turn allows complete notifications and
facilitates the State aid assessment. The prioritisation of the case, following a mutually agreed
timetable between the Member States and the Commission, may allow the swifter adoption of
the decision.
Table 2: Available policy measures
Policy measures
Description
Preliminary assessment
The option is feasible from a legal point of view, as the acts to be
changed are already in place and there is no doubt that the EU has the
competence to act in this field. From a technical point of view the option
is also feasible; however, additional analysis would be necessary to
determine which minimum requirements would need to remain
compulsory. The option would also likely foster project implementation
with more flexible approach to certain requirements causing particular
problems to project promoters.
However, the option does not seem to be possible or opportune from a
political point of view. Firstly, the EU acts most likely to be changed
have been very recently revised (for example, new or recently revised
public procurement directives) or amended (the EIA directive).
Reopening of this legislation would not be rational from the effectiveness
and efficiency point of view as well as from the political point of view
vis-à-vis the co-legislators. For these reasons, the measure has been
discarded.
The option would be very effective from the point of view of transport
stakeholders and project promoters. However, the option is not
considered legally and politically feasible as there are no sufficient legal
grounds for such an intervention into other policy objectives. Moreover,
depriving other actors (notably citizens) of the rights acquired by virtue
of other pieces of EU legislation for the benefit of project promoters does
not seem legitimate and proportionate. The measure is therefore
discarded from further analysis.
Policy Measure
1: Changing the
existing
legal
framework
This measure would envisage changing
the legal framework which is applicable
to the TEN-T projects. It would require in
particular adaptation of the EU directives
which are applicable for environmental
assessments at project level, EU public
procurement rules as well as specific
rules on State aid. The foreseen changes
would introduce simpler solutions and
less stringent requirements for TEN-T
projects. This special treatment would
derive from the fact that the TEN-T core
network projects are
per se
of specific EU
importance and relevance.
This measure would provide for a general
exemption from the application of certain
EU requirements for TEN-T core network
projects
modelled e.g. on the similar
rules applied for defence purposes. This
would be justified by the EU importance
of the TEN-T infrastructure overriding
other policy objectives.
This measure would leave the
responsibility and authority for delivering
the relevel permits at Member State level
with the introduction of requirements
about the organisation of the proceedings.
The procedure would be handled by a
single competent authority or ‘one-stop-
shop’, designated by each Member State,
along with integration of administrative
procedures from the point of view of the
project promoter.
This measure would define the EU
framework for authorisation as well as a
separate public procurement framework
to be applicable for TEN-T cross-border
projects by replacing the national rules.
The responsibility and the authority for
delivering authorisation for TEN-T core
network projects would be shifted to the
EU level. The procedure would be
handled by an EU authority. A possible
variant of this measure is to define the
framework at EU level but to keep its
application at national level.
This measure would define the maximum
duration for permitting procedures. This
Policy Measure
2:
Exempting
TEN-T
core
network projects
from
the
requirements of
the EU legal
framework
Policy measure 3:
Optimisation of
the
permitting
procedures
at
national level
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal points of
view as the competence related to the territory remains at national level
and the EU has right to act based on the clauses in the Treaty on the
trans-European networks. The measure is considered to be effective by
addressing directly the key problem drivers. The measure has been
already applied in the TEN-E setting. The measure will be further
analysed.
Policy measure 4:
Introduction of
an
EU
authorisation
procedure
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal points of
view, but as the competence is split between EU and Member States, a
detailed analysis is required to examine all possible implications. From
the technical point of view, the measure requires greater analysis, in
particular to determine the key European standards to be applied. The
proportionality of the measure is preliminarily considered to entail risks
such as the misperception by civil society, NGOs or citizens that their
rights to be heard in the context of authorisation procedures would be
limited or compromised. The measure is nevertheless considered to be
effective by addressing directly the key problem drivers. This policy
measure will therefore be further analysed.
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal points of
view with a precedent being in place in the TEN-E framework. The
Policy measure 5:
Introduction of
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time limits for
permitting
and
other procedures
requirement would apply at national
level.
Policy measure 6:
Limiting time for
appeals in the
procedures
related to TEN-T
This measure would further develop
policy measure 5 by adding time limits to
appeal
against
the
administrative
authorisations. This may encompass also
remedies in public procurement.
Policy measure 7:
Targeted
technical
assistance
This measure would introduce technical
assistance for project promoters and
authorities involved in authorisation of
TEN-T projects.
This measure would consist of
developing a set of soft law instruments
meant to clarify and provide more
certainty on the application of existing
EU legislation. This would in particular
concern the rules related to the
environmental assessments at project
level (including purely indicative time
frames), as well as rules on public
procurement. It would also build upon the
existing support mechanisms
e.g.
EIAH, voluntary ex ante mechanism in
the public procurement, support/helpdesk
on the environmental assessment, etc.
This measure would consist of
introducing simplified rules for cross-
border procurement, in particular as
regards the definition of the applicable
EU public procurement rules. It may
consist of developing an EU framework
for cross-border procurement of TEN-T
projects or better targeting the rules of the
existing legal acts at EU level.
The measure would foresee the
prioritisation of the related cases,
following a mutually agreed timetable
between the Member State and the
Commission, setting out clearly the
milestones and information to be
delivered by the Member State. It would
build on existing best practices and allow
a swifter adoption of the decision after
notification.
The use of pre-notification would be
encouraged.
This measure would aim at mitigating the
inherent resistance that some stakeholders
may have to the idea of ‘European’
measure does not target the objectives of the EU policies in place but
limits itself to the organisation and efforts made and engaged resources in
case of certain limited number of projects. The measure is considered to
be effective by addressing directly the key problem drivers and will be
further analysed.
The measure is preliminarily considered feasible from the political point
of view; however, it requires further analysis from legal point of view as
the EU may not be competent to interfere in this part of the national
administrative and judicial legal frameworks. This also true in case of
remedies in the public procurement where remedies are treated by courts,
due to the national procedural autonomy. However, some proceedings
and requirements are derived from EU pieces of law, clarifying their
application as regards e.g. the statute of repose may be also assessed by
this option. The proportionality of the measure is considered appropriate
as it limits the time for appeals while safeguarding the rights of the
interested parties. It also addresses the problem drivers leading to the
legal uncertainty. Hence, it will be further analysed.
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal point of
view as this kind of support is already widely used in different policies.
From the financial point of view the measure would require analysis and
defining the resources to be used to support the mechanism. The
proportionality of the measure is considered appropriate since it
contributes to addressing problem drivers. As a consequence, it will be
further analysed.
Policy measure 8:
Guidelines and
clarification
of
the
existing
legislation,
targeted use of
existing
mechanisms
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal point of
view as developing the soft law as well as guiding principles is the
competence of the Commission. The effectiveness of the option is not
considered optimal as the implementation of the guidelines remains
voluntary. The measure has the potential to address part of the problem
drivers and should be further analysed.
Policy measure 9:
Simplified rules
on cross-border
procurement
Policy measure
10:
Priority
treatment of State
aid notifications
for TEN-T core
network projects
Policy measure
11: Promotional
Campaign on the
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal point of
view as the rules on the public procurement are regulated at EU level.
Difficulties may arise from the fact that level this solution would
eliminate the current flexibility given to the different Member States
through the public procurement directives. The specific problems faced
by cross-border projects would be effectively and proportionally
addressed by this measure. Further analysis is needed on the specific
content of the measure as well as the appropriate instrument in relation to
the previous policy measures. The measure will be further analysed.
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal point of
view as certain arrangements already exist. In addition, State aid control
being the exclusive prerogative of the European Commission, the
measure would not raise particular legal or institutional difficulties.
The measure would imply that the Commission commits to make its best
endeavours efforts to handle State aid cases related to TEN-T core
network projects in a speedy way while respecting all requirements of
State aid control. The Commission would foresee the priority treatment
of TEN-T core network projects, notably as regards mutually agreed
planning. This could be addressed in the context of the current
identification of best practices for the conduct of State aid control
procedures.
The measure addresses problem drivers rooted in the EU role in the
context of projects' implementation. The measure will be further
analysed.
The measure is considered feasible from the political and legal points of
view. Sources of funding would need to be defined. However, the
measure does not seem to be effective and would not adequately address
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importance
of
TEN-T networks
at EU level
Policy measure
12: Increased use
of strengthened
coordination
mechanisms
foreseen in TEN-
T policy
projects. It would consist of conducting
public information and awareness raising
activities dedicated to the aim of
explaining the relevance of EU transport
networks. The campaign would target
both civil society and authorities involved
in the permitting procedures.
This measure would reinforce the
mandate of the European Coordinators
appointed by the Commission to facilitate
the implementation of the TEN-T core
network corridors. The reinforced
mandate would enable the European
Coordinator to facilitate or ensure
adequate coordination of the work of the
national authorities involved in the permit
granting or (if PM 3 is applied) the
national one-stop-shops.
the problem drivers. The measure will not be further analysed.
This option is considered feasible from the legal and political point of
view as the role of the European Coordinators is positively assessed by
the Member States and stakeholders. The option would require
reinforcing the Coordinators' secretariats placed in the European
Commission. As the measure targets seem to be addressing effectively
the problem driver related to the cross-border nature of certain projects, it
will be further analysed.
Table 3: Retained policy measures
Driver 1 Multiple stages and authorities involved in the permitting procedures
Measures
3
Optimisation of the permitting
procedures at national level
Description
Establishment of a one-stop-shop (OSS) at national level. The OSS would continue to
apply national permitting rules (transposed from EU directives).
Integration of various administrative procedures at national level (notably all
environmental assessments EIA, Habitat, Water, Seveso, Waste, Birds etc.. currently
optional)
legal requirement needed / similar to TEN-E
4
Introduction of an
authorisation procedure
EU
Definition of a specific framework for the authorisation of TEN-T core network
projects to be applied at EU level. This would include integrated procedures, time
limits, cases for overriding public interest and make requirement under existing
Directives directly applicable legal requirement needed
Guidelines for TEN-T project promoters and better orientation of existing
instruments (such as the voluntary ex-ante assessment mechanism in the public
procurement)
Targeted technical assistance measures for TEN-T core network projects(including
high quality and efficient packaging of routine projects). The technical assistance
may be modelled on the current JASPERS or EIAH initiatives or use these initiatives
if decision is made on their extending to the new MFF.
Description
Guidelines for TEN-T project promoters with purely indicative time frames
8
Guidelines and clarification of
the
existing
legislation,
targeted use of existing
mechanisms
Targeted technical assistance
7
Driver 2 - Absent or unenforced time limits
Measures
8
Guidelines and clarification of
the existing legislation, targeted
use of existing mechanisms
Introduction of time limits for
permitting and other procedures
Limiting time for appeals in the
procedures related to TEN-T
Measures
9
Simplified rules for
border procurement
cross-
5
6
Introduction of time limits for overall permitting procedures by the way of
recommendation or by legal requirement / similar to TEN-E
Introduction of time limits for legal appeals while preserving access to justice
Driver 3: Differing public procurement procedures for cross-border TEN-T projects
Description
Requirement to opt for a single legal framework for public procurement of cross-
border TEN-T core network projects (currently optional)
legal requirement
needed
Introduction of binding time limits for remedies while preserving access to justice
6
Limiting time for appeals in the
27
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procedures related to TEN-T
8
Guidelines and clarification of
the existing legislation, targeted
use of existing mechanisms
Measures
12
Increased use of strengthened
coordination
mechanisms
foreseen in TEN-T policy
Measures
7
Targeted technical assistance
for unsuccessful tenderers
Guidelines for TEN-T project promoters and better orientation of existing
instruments in the public procurement area (such as the voluntary ex-ante
assessment mechanism)
Description
Reinforced mandate of the TEN-T European Coordinators to facilitate the
cooperation of national permit granting bodied
Driver 4 Coordination challenges for the delivery of cross-border projects
Driver 5: Perceived uncertainties related to State aid control procedures
Description
Technical assistance measures for TEN-T core network projects (including high
quality and efficient packaging of routine projects)
targeted for project
promoters, national authorities and contracting authorities
Priority treatment of TEN-T core network projects, following a mutually agreed
timetable between the Member State and the Commission, setting out clearly the
milestones and information to be delivered by the Member State.
10
Priority treatment of State aid
notifications for TEN-T core
network projects
5.3
Combining the policy measures into policy options
Table 4 below provides a description of the three policy options which are envisaged. They
have been defined so as to reflect an increasing level of regulatory intervention, in particular
the intervention into the national and regional legal systems and the possible adverse effects
on the other affected stakeholders than the project promoters, in particular citizens.
The policy options address all the problem drives however they entail an increasing level of
expected impacts.
The policy packages are cumulative, in the sense that some measures in policy option 1 are
also part of policy option 2, which itself includes further measures. This is valid also for
policy option 3 that adds the definition of the rules to be applied in authorisations and public
procurement. The only exception is for policy option 3b where the authorisations at EU level
would not require the OSS and national level.
It is also worth noting that some policy measures, notably those in policy option 1, involve
both non-regulatory instruments (non-binding measures) and/or regulatory instruments.
Detailed description of the policy options by the affected policy areas
Policy option 1 (PO1)
Minimal change to the existing instruments and development of
soft law as well as accompanying measures.
This option would consist in particular of developing a series of guidelines for TEN-T project
promoters and better orientation of existing instruments (such as planned public procurement
helpdesk, JASPERS or EIAH support) as well as of developing targeted technical assistance
measures for TEN-T projects of common interest. It would recommend indicative time frames
for overall permitting procedures.
Authorisations and permits:
Guidelines for the permit granting procedures and application of the EU acquis in
this field, including indicative time frames.
28
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Systematic encouragement in soft law instruments (e.g. guidelines) to apply joint
and/or coordinated procedures under Article 2(3) of the revised EIA Directive
75
.
Guidelines for TEN-T project promoters and better orientation of existing
instruments (such as planned public procurement helpdesk, JASPERS or EIAH
support)
Public procurement
State aid: No change
Other
Targeted technical assistance measures for TEN-T core network projects (including
high quality and efficient packaging of routine projects).
Effective technical assistance (e.g. modelled on the JASPERS or the European
Investment Advisory Hub, or directly using these initiatives if decision is made on
their extending to the next MFF) to support project preparation and horizontal issues
affecting the implementation of TEN-T projects, both at the Member State and EU
level (systematically involving cooperation Member States
JASPERS (or other
initiatives of this type)
–European
Commission to develop tailor-made solutions for
individual Member States);
Reinforced mandate of the TEN-T European Coordinators to facilitate the
coordination of national permit granting bodies
Policy option 2 (PO2)
Limited binding action to be decentralised and implemented at
national level.
This option would foresee the legal requirement for Member States to introduce one-stop-
shop for TEN-T core network projects and ensure that the most rapid treatment legally
possible.is given to them. The key elements of this option would consist of a set of the
following measures:
Authorisations and permits:
Establishment of a mandatory one-stop-shop (OSS) at national level. The OSS would
continue to apply national permitting rules (transposed from EU directives)
Mandatory integration of various administrative procedures at national level (notably
all environmental assessments EIA, Habitat, Water, Seveso, Waste, Birds etc..
currently optional)
Introduction of time limits for overall permitting procedures
Introduction of time limits for legal appeals while preserving access to justice.
Requirement to mandatory opt for a single legal framework for public procurement
of cross-border projects (currently optional)
Guidelines for TEN-T project promoters and better orientation of existing
instruments (such as planned public procurement helpdesk, initiatives modelled on
the JASPERS or EIAH support, or directly using these initiatives if decision is made
on their extending to the next MFF)
Public procurement
75
State aid
Commission guidance document on streamlining environmental assessments conducted under Article 2(3) of the
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, as
amended by Directive 2014/52/EU), (2016/C 273/01)
29
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No modification of legislative nature
Priority treatment of State aid notifications for TEN-T core network projects,
following a mutually agreed timetable between the Member State and the
Commission
Targeted technical assistance measures for projects of common interest (including
high quality and efficient packaging of routine projects)
Reinforced mandate of the TEN-T European Coordinators to facilitate the
coordination of national permit granting bodies
Other
Policy option 3 (PO3)
–An
EU framework for authorisation of the TEN-T core network
projects.
This option includes elements of the Policy option 2 however instead of the mandatory one-
stop-shop and integration of administrative procedures at the national level it introduces a
specific EU framework for the authorisation of TEN-T core network projects (including
integrated procedures, time limits, cases for overriding public interest and directly applicable
requirements)and the definition of a specific (supranational) set of rules to be applied in
public procurement of cross-border projects. Policy option 3 contains two sub-options which
differ in the level of application and therefore include further measure:
PO3a: the measures regarding EU authorisation procedure with time limits are defined
at EU level but remain applied at national level, with national institutions
implementing them in practice and following the national administrative procedural
rules with possibility for appeal and access to justice based on the national
administrative procedural law;
PO3b: the measures regarding EU authorisation procedure with time limits are applied
at EU level by the Commission (or its agencies). Usual EU rules on procedures and
possibility for appeal apply with EU judicial remedies to the Court of Justice of the
European Union.
Scope of the measures:
The analysis of policy options is made on a three different categories of projects which are the
following:
All TEN-T core network projects, as identified through the TEN-T framework;
Projects identified on the Core network corridors
with a particular role for the European
Coordinators to identify these projects;
Projects which are pre-identified as those eligible to benefit from Union financial support
through CEF (as well as from other sources such as EFSI etc.) and which would be
reflected in Annex I to the CEF regulation.
Table 4: Definition of policy options
Policy option 1 - Minimal change to the existing instruments and development of soft law as well as
accompanying measures
Measures aimed at providing guidelines and clarification of the existing legislation (including indicative
time frames), targeted use of existing mechanisms in all of the fields identified as problem drivers
(environmental assessments, public procurement, State aid and development of alternative financing for
30
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the TEN-T core network projects);
Measures aimed at introduction of time limits for permitting and other procedures
Measures aimed at targeted technical assistance;
Measures aimed at increased use of strengthened coordination mechanisms foreseen in TEN-T policy.
Policy option 2 - Limited binding action to be decentralised and implemented
at national level t
national level.
Measures aimed at optimisation of the permitting procedures at national level (one stop shop, most rapid
treatment legally possible);
Measures aimed at targeted technical assistance;
Measures aimed at introduction of time limits for permitting and other procedures;
Measures aimed at limiting time for appeals in the procedures related to TEN-T core network;
Measures aimed at requiring the national authorities to opt for a single legal framework for public
procurement of cross-border projects (law of the seat of the contracting authority);
Measures aimed at increased use of strengthened coordination mechanisms foreseen in TEN-T policy;
Measures aimed at giving priority treatment of State aid notifications for TEN-T core network projects.
Policy option 3a An EU framework for authorisation of the projects of common interest to be
applied at national level
In addition to the measures in policy option 2, this policy option intends to establish a common set of EU rules for
authorising TEN-T core network projects at national level and includes the following policy measures:
Measures aimed at introduction of an EU authorisation procedure with time limits to be applied at national
level;
Measures aimed at targeted technical assistance;
Measures aimed at limiting time for appeals in the procedures related to TEN-T core network;
Measures aimed at simplifying rules for cross-border procurement;
Measures aimed at increased use of strengthened coordination mechanisms foreseen in TEN-T policy;
Measures aimed at giving priority treatment of State aid notifications for TEN-T core network projects.
Policy package 3b An EU framework for authorisation of the projects of common interest to be
applied at EU level
In addition to the measures in policy option 2, this policy option intends to establish a common set of EU rules for
authorising TEN-T core network projects and apply them at EU level. It includes the following policy measures::
Measures aimed at introduction of an EU authorisation procedure with time limits to be applied at EU
level;
Measures aimed at targeted technical assistance;
Measures aimed at limiting time for appeals in the procedures related to TEN-T core network;
Measures aimed at simplifying rules for cross-border procurement;
Measures aimed at increased use of strengthened coordination mechanisms foreseen in TEN-T policy;
Measures aimed at giving priority treatment of State aid notifications for TEN-T core network projects.
Table 5 below links the individual policy measures with the problem drivers identified in the
problem definition and the respective policy options.
Table 5: Presentation of policy options related to mapping of measures and drivers (V: voluntary; M: mandatory)
Policy measure
Driver 1: Multiple stages and authorities involved in permitting procedures
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
P1
x
x
x
M
M
V
V
P2
M
x
x
V
V
M
M
P3a
x
M
x
V
M
M
M
P3b
x
x
M
V
M
M
M
Optimisation of the permitting procedures at national level
Introduction of an EU authorisation procedure applied at national level
Introduction of an EU authorisation procedure applied at EU level
Guidelines and clarification of the existing legislation, targeted use of
existing mechanisms
Targeted technical assistance
Introduction of time limits for permitting and other procedures
Limiting time for appeals in the procedures related to TEN-T
Driver 2: Absent or unenforced time limits
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Driver 3: Differing public procurement procedures for cross-border TEN-T projects
8.
9.
Simplified rules for cross-border procurement
Limiting time for appeals in the procedures related to TEN-T
existing mechanisms
x
x
M
M
M
V
M
M
V
M
M
V
10.
Guidelines and clarification of the existing legislation, targeted use of
Driver 4: Coordination challenges for the delivery of cross-border projects
11.
Increased use of strengthened coordination mechanisms foreseen in TEN-T
policy
Driver 5 Perceived uncertainties related to State aid control procedures
12.
Targeted technical assistance
13.
Priority treatment of State aid notifications for TEN-T core network projects
M
M
M
M
M
x
V
M
M
M
M
M
6 WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS?
This section presents the economic, social and environmental impacts for the different policy
options. Impacts are assessed for infrastructure projects in the road, rail, maritime and inland
waterways projects and then compared to the baseline scenario. Each policy option has a
different level of effectiveness in terms of reducing the delays in the implementation of
investment projects (i.e. soft measures in PO1 versus limited binding action in PO2 and EU
framework for authorisation of TEN-T core network projects in PO3); this has been taken into
account in evaluating the impacts. The options have been tested for three different scopes of
application (TEN-T core network, core network corridors and CEF Annex 1 projects). More
details on the methodology used are presented in
Annex 4 on analytical methods.
76
The assessment of economic as well as social and environmental impacts can be considered as
a conservative one: it takes into account only the currently planned TEN-T core network
projects and not the future projects, in particular after 2030, which are not in the TEN-T plans
yet. The benefits would be larger when also considering the TEN-T comprehensive network
projects beyond 2030.
6.1
Economic impact
All three policy options generate benefits in terms of reduced delays in project
implementation relative to the baseline. They have direct impacts on investments profile over
time, users' transport costs and macro-economic impacts in terms of generated growth. The
impacts on the administrative costs for the project promoters and the permitting authorities are
also discussed in this section, followed by the impacts on the transport as a business and a
qualitative analysis of impacts on SMEs.
6.1.1
Impacts on investments
The reduced delays in project implementation have a direct impact on the cumulative
investment profile in each policy option (see Table 6). PO1 results in higher investments
already in 2020 (39% of total investments over the lifetime of the projects) as it implies
minimal change to the existing instruments and development of soft law that take less time to
implement. However, PO1 is less effective by 2025 compared to PO2 and PO3. PO2,
reflecting limited binding action to be decentralised and implemented, results in 84.2% of
total investments taking place by 2025, compared to 81.4% in the Baseline. PO3 that reflects
an EU framework for authorisation of core TEN-T projects to be applied at national level
76
A discount rate of 4% has been used for presenting the costs/benefits as present values.
32
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results in higher impact, with 85.1% of total investments taking place by 2025. The ranking of
the options in terms of impacts is similar for rail and waterborne transport (see Table 6).
Table 6: Share of total core TEN-T investments in the policy options for 2020-2025 over the lifetime of the
projects
Cumulative investments (share of total core
TEN-T network investments over the lifetime of
2020
2021
2022
2023
the projects)
Total investments
Baseline
38.7%
50.1%
60.0%
68.5%
Option 1
39.0%
50.6%
60.7%
69.3%
Option 2
38.7%
50.1%
61.6%
71.2%
Option 3
38.7%
50.1%
60.0%
73.9%
Rail transport
Baseline
36.1%
46.9%
56.1%
64.3%
Option 1
36.4%
47.4%
56.8%
65.1%
Option 2
36.1%
46.9%
57.6%
66.9%
Option 3
36.1%
46.9%
56.1%
69.5%
Waterborne transport
Baseline
40.6%
53.8%
65.8%
75.2%
Option 1
41.0%
54.5%
66.7%
76.1%
Option 2
40.6%
53.8%
67.7%
78.2%
Option 3
40.6%
53.8%
65.8%
81.1%
Source: Impact Assessment support study; waterborne transport covers inland waterways and maritime.
2024
2025
75.5%
76.4%
78.9%
80.0%
71.2%
72.0%
74.5%
75.6%
82.9%
83.8%
86.5%
87.7%
81.4%
82.1%
84.2%
85.1%
77.2%
77.9%
80.1%
81.0%
89.0%
89.7%
91.8%
92.7%
6.1.2
Impacts on tranport users' costs
All policy options for all scopes of applications show benefits in terms of reduced user costs
compared to the baseline scenario. They bring benefits to the users in terms of time savings,
increased reliability of transport and lower transport costs, and thus contribute to the increased
productivity of the sector. The TEN-T core network scope of application shows the highest
benefits, as the scope is also the largest. PO1 would generate €1.8 bn of benefits (0.1%
decrease in total user costs compared to the baseline over 2018-2030, expressed as present
value), while PO2 would result in €5.1 bn reduced user costs (0.2% decrease relative to the
baseline). PO3 shows the largest benefit (€6.6 bn) due to the higher effectiveness of a specific
EU framework for the authorisation of TEN-T core network projects in reducing the delays.
The application of the three options to the core network corridors and CEF Annex 1 projects
would bring smaller benefits as the scope of the projects is narrower than the TEN-T core
network (i.e. the core network corridors cover about 75% of the core network investments).
Even when considering the narrower scope of application (CEF Annex 1 projects), the policy
options would still result in more than €1 bn reduction of user costs relative
to the baseline
(expressed as present value over 2018-2030). The ranking of policy options in terms of
reduced user costs would be similar for all scopes of application.
Table 7: Impacts on user costs relative to the baseline over the lifetime of the projects (2018-2030)
Baseline*
PO1
-1,838
-0.1%
2,460,763
-1,379
-0.1%
-1,020
0.0%
PO2
-5,069
-0.2%
-3,802
-0.2%
-2,813
-0.1%
PO3a/PO3b
-6,648
-0.3%
-4,986
-0.2%
-3,690
-0.1%
Total user costs (present value in million € and % change to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network, of which:
Core network corridors
CEF Annex 1 projects
Source: Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018); Notes: * The baseline figures relate to the traffic on the core TEN-T network
33
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6.1.3
Impact on economic growth
All policy options are expected to have a positive impact in terms of economic growth.
Compared to the baseline, PO3 shows the highest economic benefits generated at EU level, in
the range of €1.2 bn to €2.1 bn (1.2-2.1%)
over 2018-2030,
followed by PO2 (€0.9 bn to €1.6
bn benefits, 0.9-1.6%
increase relative to the baseline) and PO1 (€0.3 bn to €0.6 bn benefits).
The impacts are assessed through multiplier effects; they account for wider effects than only
the construction of projects, namely the indirect effects on other economic sectors and the
effects induced by increased productivity, improved conditions for international trade and
technological spill-overs. More explanations regarding the quantification of these impacts are
provided in Annex 4.
Table 8: Annual average economic benefits relative to the baseline for 2018-2030
Baseline
PO1
0.6
0.6%
95
0.4
0.4%
0.3
0.3%
PO2
1.6
1.6%
1.2
1.2%
0.9
0.9%
PO3a/PO3b
2.1
2.2%
1.6
1.6%
1.2
1.2%
Economic benefits (in billion € and % change to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network projects, of which:
Core network corridors projects
CEF Annex 1 projects
Source: M-FIVE and Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018)
6.1.4
Impact on administrative burden
The initiative is expected to have a direct impact on the administrative costs for the permitting
authorities and for the project promoters. The administrative burden for authorities considers
both costs for the EU institutions and the Member States authorities. The inputs used for
calculating the impacts on administrative burden are provided in Annex 4. They draw on
results of the stakeholders' consultation, literature review, TEN-E impact assessment
77
, etc.
78
In PO1, the introduction of guidelines for permit granting and effective technical assistance
for project promoters is estimated to lead to savings in administrative burden for the TEN-T
project promoters in the order of €27 million over 2018-2030
relative to the baseline
(expressed as present value). However the authorities’ administrative burden is expected to
slightly increase (€9 million, 5% increase relative to the baseline) because guidelines would
need to be defined and implemented (albeit on a voluntary basis).
In PO2, the establishment of a one-stop-shop at national level
79
is estimated to lead to slightly
higher costs for the permitting authorities (€13 million over 2018-2030
horizon) but also for
larger benefits in terms of reduced costs for project
promoters (€166 million) over 2018-2030
horizon relative to the baseline. PO2 is in fact the option which achieves the highest reduction
in the total administrative burden (€153 million).
PO3, which includes elements of PO2 like the mandatory one-stop-shop and the integration of
administrative procedures at the national level but also a specific EU framework for the
authorisation of TEN-T core network projects, results in higher additional costs for permitting
authorities than PO1 and PO2
(€20 million
over 2018-2030 horizon) but also lower benefits
77
78
SEC (2011) 1233
Panteia et al.
79
This option was previously considered for the TEN-E impact assessment (SEC (2011) 1233). During that study, a large
majority of stakeholders (over 75%) stated that the one-stop-shop could bring substantial decreases in administrative burden.
The one-stop-shop solution proposed in the TEN-E was expected to generate a 25% reduction of cost for the project
promoters.
34
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for project promoters than PO2 (€120 million over 2018-2030
horizon relative to the
baseline).
Table 9: Impacts on administrative burden relative to the baseline scenario, over the period 2018
2030,
expressed as present value
Baseline (€
million)
Policy options
PO1
PO2
PO3
PO1
PO2
PO3
PO1
PO2
PO3
Difference in costs
relative to the baseline
(€ million)
-27
-166
-120
9
13
20
-18
-153
-100
% change in costs
relative to the baseline
-3%
-18%
-13%
5%
7%
11%
-2%
-14%
-9%
Promoter
937
Authority
185
Total
1,122
Source: Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018)
These calculations have also been confirmed by the results of the opinion of the stakeholders
on the planned measures. Regarding the integration of procedures under a national single
entity (OSS), the measure was supported in particular by project promoters, individuals and
industrial interest groups, i.e. those who would largely benefit from the planned measures.
However, more reserved opinions were expressed by national but mainly regional
governments, i.e. those stakeholders where administrative costs would be generated, at least
in the induction period.
Figure 4: Should a single
permitting authority (a ‘one-stop-shop’) be entrusted to apply standardised procedures to
TEN-T projects?
Source: results of the Open Public Consultation.
6.1.5
Impacts on transport as a business
The overall aim of TEN-T policy is the promotion of sustainable modes of transport and
modal shift to railways, inland waterways and short sea shipping. For passenger rail, the
reduction in delays in the implementation of the core TEN-T investment projects is estimated
to lead to 551 to 2,940 additional million passenger-kilometres (1.3% to 6.7%) in 2025 and
320 to 1,704 million passenger-kilometres (0.6% to 3.4%) in 2030 relative to the baseline.
35
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Similarly, rail freight activity would go up by 273 to 1,458 tonne-kilometres (0.3% to 1.4%)
in 2025 and 160 to 856 tonne-kilometres (0.1% to 0.7%) in 2030 relative to the baseline.
Waterborne transport activity would also increase, by 359 to 1,916 tonne-kilometres in 2025
and 68 to 360 tonne-kilometres in 2030 relative to the baseline. PO3 shows the highest
impacts in terms of traffic shifted from road towards rail and waterborne transport.
Table 10: Traffic shifted to rail and waterborne transport in 2030 relative to the baseline (in million pkm/tkm)
Traffic shifted to rail and waterborne transport
in 2025 and 2030 (in millions pkm/tkm and %
change to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network projects - results for 2025
Passenger transport
Road
Rail
Freight transport
Road freight
Rail
Waterborne transport**
Core TEN-T network projects - results for 2030
Passenger transport
Road
Rail
Freight transport
Road freight
Rail
Waterborne transport**
273,775
224,195
49,580
680,578
182,889
118,483
379,206
204
-116
320
92
-136
160
68
0.1%
-0.1%
0.6%
0.0%
-0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
815
-463
1,278
366
-545
642
270
0.3%
-0.2%
2.6%
0.1%
-0.3%
0.5%
0.1%
1,087
-617
1,704
489
-727
856
360
0.4%
-0.3%
3.4%
0.1%
-0.4%
0.7%
0.1%
259,998
216,310
43,688
626,552
171,596
105,579
349,377
-14
-565
551
-15
-648
273
359
0.0%
-0.3%
1.3%
0.0%
-0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
-56
-2,261
2,205
-62
-2,593
1,093
1,437
0.0%
-1.0%
5.0%
0.0%
-1.5%
1.0%
0.4%
-75
-3,015
2,940
-83
-3,457
1,458
1,916
0.0%
-1.4%
6.7%
0.0%
-2.0%
1.4%
0.5%
Baseline*
PO1
PO2
PO3a/P3b
Source: Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018); Notes: * The baseline figures relate to the traffic on the core TEN-T network;
** Waterborne transport covers inland waterways and national maritime.
6.1.6
Impact on small and medium size entreprises
The TEN-T core network projects are usually implemented by large civil contractors,
specialised in delivering pieces of large infrastructure and associated engineering structures.
This requires specific experience and competence and not many SMEs have the necessary
capacity. Cross-border procurement based on merged tendering procedures across the border
may also strengthen the position of larger companies which have more experience in working
in different Member States. The participation of SMEs is in any case very often limited by
contracting authorities, given the requirement of substantial experience and capacity.
Therefore, no direct impacts on the SME sector are expected.
However, at large construction sites SMEs are usually sub-contractors implementing simpler
works and parts of the infrastructure which do not require specific equipment or experience.
The overall impact on the civil engineering market is expected to have positive spill-over
effects on SMEs in the construction market. This impact is believed to be captured in the
analysis of the wider economic impacts on jobs and growth.
6.2
Environmental impacts
Environmental impacts are assessed in terms of impacts on CO
2
emissions and air quality as
well as impacts on noise emissions.
36
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6.1.7
CO
2
emissions and air quality
The faster shift of traffic from road to more sustainable transport modes in the policy options
relative to the baseline is projected to result in lower emissions of CO
2
. The reductions are
presented in cumulative terms over the lifetime of the projects (2018-2030).
Table 11: Impacts on CO
2
emissions and costs relative to the baseline over the lifetime of the projects (2018-
2030)
Baseline*
PO1
-917
-0.1%
1,602,292
-688
0.0%
-509
0.0%
-68
-0.1%
85,939
-51
-0.1%
-38
0.0%
PO2
-2,686
-0.2%
-2,015
-0.1%
-1,491
-0.1%
-193
-0.2%
-144
-0.2%
-107
-0.1%
PO3a/PO3b
-3,543
-0.2%
-2,657
-0.2%
-1,966
-0.1%
-253
-0.3%
-189
-0.2%
-140
-0.2%
CO
2
emissions (thousand tonnes CO
2
difference and % change relative to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network, of which:
Core network corridors
CEF Annex 1 projects
Costs (present value in million € and % change relative to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network, of which:
Core network corridors
CEF Annex 1 projects
Source: Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018); Note: * The baseline figures relate to the traffic on the core TEN-T network.
The most effective option from this perspective is PO3, where the CO
2
emissions reductions
for the largest scope of application (core TEN-T network) amount to 3.5 million tonnes
relative to the baseline scenario,
representing around €253 million external costs savings over
2018-2030 relative to the baseline (expressed as present value). PO2 shows somewhat lower
impacts, with 2.7 million tonnes of CO
2
saved relative to the baseline (equivalent to €193
million external costs savings), followed by PO1 with significantly lower impacts (0.9 million
tonnes of CO
2
saved, equivalent to €68 million external costs savings).
The environmental impacts of the initiative are also foreseen to result in the reduction of
emissions of air pollutants from road transport such as NOx and particulate matter (PM2.5).
The overall impacts of the policy options on the air pollution, despite being positive, are
however limited in size (€2.9 to 7.6 million external costs savings for the core
TEN-T
network scope of application).
Table 12: Impacts on external costs of air pollution relative to the baseline over the lifetime of the projects
(2018-2030)
Baseline*
PO1
-2.9
0.0%
49,344
-2.2
0.0%
-1.6
0.0%
PO2
-5.6
0.0%
-4.2
0.0%
-3.1
0.0%
PO3a/P3b
-7.6
0.0%
-5.7
0.0%
-4.2
0.0%
External costs of air pollution
(present value in million € and % change relative to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network, of which:
Core network corridors
CEF Annex 1 projects
Source: Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018); Note: * The baseline figures relate to the traffic on the core TEN-T network.
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6.1.8
Impact on noise emissions
All policy options are projected to lead to benefits in terms of savings in external costs of
noise relative to the baseline linked to the reduction in road traffic. PO1, in its largest scope
(core TEN-T
network), would result in about €10 million external costs savings over 2018-
2030, expressed as present value. PO2 and PO3 show somewhat higher impacts
(€27 to 35
million) relative to the baseline, equivalent to around 0.1-0.2% decrease. This outcome is
linked to the higher amount of traffic shifted away from road in PO2 and PO3 relative to PO1.
Table 13: Impacts on external costs of noise relative to the baseline over the lifetime of the projects (2018-2030)
Baseline*
PO1
-10.2
-0.1%
19,319
-7.6
0.0%
-5.6
0.0%
PO2
-26.9
-0.1%
-20.1
-0.1%
-14.9
-0.1%
PO3a/PO3b
-35.1
-0.2%
-26.3
-0.1%
-19.5
-0.1%
External costs of noise (present value in million € and % change relative to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network, of which:
Core network corridors
CEF Annex 1 projects
Source: Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018); Note: * The baseline figures relate to the traffic on the core TEN-T network.
6.3
Social impacts
Apart from the economic and environmental impacts, the initiative is expected to generate a
number of social impacts and to affect civil society players such as local communities and
their authorities,
conservation NGOs and the individual citizens’ rights vis-à-vis
the processes
of TEN-T infrastructure planning, which are usually managed at national level.
This section presents the impacts on public participation in strategic planning, on public
participation in the planning and approval of individual projects and on public acceptance but
also on employment, health and EU cohesion, local benefits, life quality and social inclusion.
6.1.9
Impacts on public participation in strategic planning
The long term planning of transport infrastructure is usually done at highest national (or
federal) level and usually also linked to the allocation of public funds to individual projects.
This process is usually subject to public consultation based on national rules related to the
long-term strategies. Transport infrastructure development strategies are "plans
and
programmes”
in the sense of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (SEA
Directive)
80
. The SEA Directive requires the consultation of the public with sufficient time
foreseen to allow the expression of opinions. None of the policy options would derogate the
rules set by SEA Directive.
PO1
has no impact on the involvement of the civil society. If a set of guidelines are prepared
to address the inefficiencies of the implementation and preparation of the projects, these will
be targeting the procedures at project level, not affecting the involvement of civil society at
strategic level.
PO2
would also have no impact on the implication of civil society in strategic planning as this
policy option integrates permitting procedures at the level of a single project (and not at the
level of plans and programmes).
The application of
PO3
would result in granting certain permits or authorisation according to
EU rules or even at EU level in the case of sub-option PO3b with reference to the TEN-T core
network. In such circumstances, the TEN-T framework would become the main strategic
80
Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of
certain plans and programmes on the environment
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infrastructure "plan
or programme"
in the sense of the SEA directive. A strategic
environmental assessment would then need to be conducted at EU level with the appropriate
consultation at EU level. This may lead to a greater distance with EU citizens and could entail
a negative impact on civil society and public participation. It can be assumed that
consultations run at EU level may be less accessible and less comprehensible for local
communities, despite all the efforts made by the European Commission to publicise them.
Thus the civil society could have less impact on strategic planning of transport infrastructure
that is directly affecting their everyday life.
Different approaches to communication on strategic decisions lead to blockages at project stage
case of
the Lyon
Torino link
A key challenge in many TEN-T projects is that the main project benefits are often realised at EU level, rather
than at national, regional or local levels. This needs to be communicated early in the process of preparing a
project. In case of the Lyon
Torino Railway, on the French side public participation took place early in the
project planning phase, leading to greater transparency and acceptance of the project by the local municipalities.
On the contrary, Italian efforts to involve the local citizens in the planning process came only in 2006, after
significant opposition from the local population in the Italian Susa Valley organised in the "‘No Tav" movement.
Participation is an ongoing process, which should start before the project decision is made for instance in the
context of a SEA and continue after the formal approval (permitting phase) of the project.
6.1.10 Impacts on public participation in the planning and approval of individual projects
and on public acceptance
The development of infrastructure projects requires detailed project designs to identify
notably the actual alignment and technical solutions. This process is usually subject to public
consultation based on national rules transposing the requirements of the Environmental
Impact Assessment Directive. On top of these requirements come consultations based on
various national rules (spatial planning, other administrative and material rules on affected
parties e.g. owners of the neighbouring pieces of land). These consultations are most
important for civil society to be heard in the process leading to the development of transport
infrastructure. All the considered policy options would have implications on these rights of
the civil society.
EU directives requiring public consultations have been transposed in a differing manner
across Member States. As explained above in section 2, national rules go sometimes beyond
what is required by EU law. Clarifying those rules as foreseen under PO1 would be neutral on
civil society's participation, as Member States can continue to apply existing rules. A positive
effect may even be seen in the cross-border context resulting from a greater alignment of
consultation procedures which ultimately increase the involvement of civil society from
across the border.
An undersea tunnel blocked at one of the ends
The Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link aims to create a direct fixed 18km long undersea link between Denmark and
Germany. In Denmark, the approval process was reasonably smooth. The EIA of the Fehmarn Belt link, after
extensive and effective consultation, was approved by the Danish parliament in the form of a Construction Act in
April 2015. Approval on the German side has been delayed. Under German law, only a German authority can
apply for project approval for motorways on German territory. Moreover, compared to Denmark, the procedure
in Germany is longer, with numerous public consultations and hearings. Public participation is equally important
in Denmark and Germany and, while both comply with the EIA Directive and the Aarhus Convention, their
processes differ. As a result, the project, ready at the Danish side, is blocked at German shore and cannot go
forward until all the procedures are completed.
PO2 is not meant to change the rules governing public involvement in the planning of
individual projects. However, the integration of procedures as well as the coordination of the
overall authorisation procedures would have an impact on public consultations. The existing
complex process of project approval involving several bodies at different stages of the
procedure would be replaced by one procedure with a single authority leading the process
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(one stop shop authority). While there is a risk that this could affect their rights due to
changed procedures and potentially reduced time for public consultations, civil society as well
as local communities could also benefit from a clearer framework allowing their comments to
be well channelled and better addressed to the decision maker. As a trade-off for the
potentially reduced possibilities of various consultations where they can express their views,
the greater synchronisation of process and introduction of time limits could also be an
opportunity for local communities and conservation NGOs to have their voice heard due to
innovations in the procedures. For instance, the use of new technologies or the digitalisation
of public consultation can simplify and increase the outreach to the population concerned and
increase civil society impact
81
. As in the PO1, positive effects are expected also in the cross-
border context with better comprehension of the consultation systems in the neighbouring
Member State.
Under PO3, any attempts to simplify existing requirements notably by reducing certain steps
or possibilities of public consultation could be well accepted by national authorities and
project promoters while they would be negatively perceived by civil society, in particular by
NGOs active in the environmental area. The positive effects of a clarification of the
procedures as foreseen under PO2 would be offset by the suspicion of lowering environmental
or other standards. The risk of negative social impacts appears even greater if authorisations
are brought up to the EU level (PO3b). The decision making authority in the latter case would
be much more distant from the affected communities. Even if the fundamental rights would be
safeguarded by the careful definition of the rules, their effective enforcement would be
difficult due to technical and organisational issues.
In the public consultation it was particularly highlighted by local and regional authorities as
well as NGOs and civil society that currently the general public is not sufficiently involved in
the project planning. According to this group of stakeholders, the general public is
insufficiently involved in the whole project planning; it may be due to the scattered
procedures which are not perfectly timed or coordinated.
81
See in this context the Strategy for speeding up the planning process of the German Federal Ministry of Transport and
Digital Infrastructure
https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Publikationen/G/innovationsforum-planungsbeschleunigung-
abschlussbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
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Figure 5: According to your knowledge and experience, what may be the reason for a lack of public acceptance of
certain transport infrastructure projects?
Source: results of the Open Public Consultation.
6.1.11 Impact on employment
All policy options are expected to have positive impacts on employment. PO3 in its largest
scope of application (core TEN-T network projects) would result in around 7,500 additional
jobs per year or 2.2% increase relative to the baseline. PO2 also shows significant impacts in
terms of additional job creation relative to the baseline (5,600 additional jobs per year or 1.6%
increase relative to the baseline). PO1 and the reduced scope of application (core corridor
networks and CEF Annex 1 projects only) generate lower but still positive impacts relative to
the baseline. The impacts are assessed through multiplier effects. More explanations regarding
the quantification of these impacts are provided in Annex 4.
Table 14: Annual average impacts on employment relative to the baseline for 2018-2030
Baseline
PO1
PO2
Employment impacts (in thousand job-years and % change to the baseline)
1.7
5.6
Core TEN-T network projects, of which:
0.5%
1.6%
1.3
4.2
Core network corridors projects
344
0.4%
1.2%
1.0
3.1
CEF Annex 1 projects
0.3%
0.9%
Source: M-FIVE and Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018)
PO3a/PO3b
7.5
2.2%
5.6
1.6%
4.2
1.2%
6.1.12 Impact on public health
reduction of accidents
The initiative does not specifically target public health. However, it is expected to result in a
decrease of road traffic relative to the baseline and modal shift to safer modes (in particular
rail). The improvement of safety of the transport operations is also linked to the provision of
better quality infrastructure and filling the gaps in the missing infrastructure. Hence, it would
result in a reduction of the number of fatalities, serious and slight injuries relative to the
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baseline. If infrastructure projects are implemented as planned without delays, those benefits
will be generated earlier.
The highest savings in terms of external costs of accidents are achieved in PO3 (€389
million
relative to the baseline or 0.4% decrease) when applied to the largest scope of projects, i.e. to
all the TEN-T core network projects. However, PO2 also achieves significant savings in the
external costs of accidents, in the order of
€297 million relative to the baseline over 2018-
2030 (expressed as present value). All options and all scopes of application show positive
impacts relative to the baseline.
Table 15: Impacts on external costs of accidents relative to the baseline over the lifetime of the projects (2018-2030)
Baseline*
PO1
-105.3
-0.1%
91,581
-79.0
-0.1%
-58.4
-0.1%
PO2
-297.0
-0.3%
-222.8
-0.2%
-164.9
-0.2%
PO3a/PO3b
-389.0
-0.4%
-291.8
-0.3%
-215.9
-0.2%
External costs of accidents (present value in million € and % change to the baseline)
Core TEN-T network, of which:
Core network corridors
CEF Annex 1 projects
Source: Panteia, Impact Assessment support study (2018); Note: * The baseline figures relate to the traffic on the core TEN-T network.
6.1.13 Impact on EU cohesion, local benefits, life quality and social inclusion
The implementation of the TEN-T network aims at strengthening EU cohesion, in particular
by enhancing accessibility and connectivity of all regions and by reducing infrastructure
quality gaps between Member States. These objectives enshrined in the TEN-T Regulation are
not questioned by stakeholders and were recently confirmed in Council conclusions
82
. As
explained in the baseline scenario, the timely completion of the TEN-T network is at risk
given the significant delays currently encountered by individual TEN-T projects, in particular
because of lengthy permitting procedures.
In addition, the changing patterns of mobility
mobility as a service, transport as public
service
need to be taken into consideration to assess social impacts. The effective
involvement of the local communities influences this aspect of the implementation of the
TEN-T network which is not only about long-distance flows. The network is also vital to
ensure access of the local communities to economic centres and to shape mobility in urban
areas.
Finally, transport infrastructure is an increasingly key factor of life quality for EU citizens and
for social inclusion. The timely completion of the TEN-T core network is expected to enhance
the transition to low emission mobility to reduce negative externalities of transport (as
explained in section 6.2 on environmental impacts). Good transport infrastructure is
fundamental to ensure good connections, to reduce congestion and enhance new solutions
such as digital ones to improve mobility. Mobility has a great impact on access to public
goods like health, employment, culture or social inclusion.
The social impact on EU cohesion of PO1 is rather modest in light of its limited efficiency.
No substantial changes to the currently applicable rules are expected, but best practices and
positive experiences in terms of local benefits, life quality and social inclusion could be
promoted with expected benefits in the long run.
82
In the conclusions adopted on 5 December 2017, the Council reiterated its strong commitment to the implementation of
the TEN-T and the necessity to continue this policy to boost investment in transport and contribute to global objectives in
particular in terms of climate action. 15425/17 TRANS 541, available at:
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
15425-2017-INIT/en/pdf
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On the other hand, the impact on EU cohesion under PO2 is assessed positively, as the
measures would contribute to improving the implementation rate of the TEN-T core network.
The impact on local benefits depends on the detailed designs of individual projects and is
specifically linked of the quality of consultation procedures. A clear ownership of the
authorisation by a single entity at national level is considered a better approach to integrate
the interests of various stakeholders.
Local influence to a EUR 10billion project
In Italy, the Brenner Base Tunnel project was subject to two parallel and coordinated authorisation procedures: a
central procedure coordinated with the local one, due to the fact that Bolzano is an Autonomous Province with
its own EIA Committee. This allowed for a careful insertion of the project in the region, both from the point of
view of the required authorisations and the necessary agreements, e.g. an in-depth preventive analysis, especially
as concerns logistics, sharing of the project with the local population, consideration of local requests and
agreement on the location of construction and disposal sites
83
PO2 is also likely to provide greater synchronisation of procedures and cross-fertilisation of
measures at the scale of the entire infrastructure project. In the case of cross-border projects,
social benefits could be brought more coherently across the border through green or social
procurement. If a project is developed separately at every step of the permitting procedure or
separately on two sides of the border, the social aspects have less opportunity to be taken into
account in a coherent manner.
Social inclusion in a project of pan-European importance
Based on the new public procurement directives, the project promoter of the inland waterway canal linking the
Seine with the Scheldt is using social clauses in every contract for works. These clauses require a certain number
of local citizens to be employed during the execution of contracts. Procurement is an opportunity for territorial
economic development as well as to increase the public acceptance of a project. However, based on the
experience of the project promoter, it necessitates strong project management structure and strong partnership
with local stakeholders
84
PO3 is also expected to generate positive impact on EU cohesion by fostering TEN-T
implementation. However, the impact on local benefits appears more negative than PO2 as the
one-size-fits-all approach inherent to the definition of a single and uniformed set of rules
could be detrimental to the delivery of local benefits.
Finally, the respondents in the open public consultation in particular emphasised the fact that
focus on local benefits is one of the factors contributing to the raising public acceptance for
individual projects. This element was second only to the greater involvement of the general
public in the project preparation
85
.
6.4
Legal implications
The initiative and the possible solutions are expected to have important legal implications.
One of the elements contributing to this is the fact that the initiative relates to various existing
legal provisions stemming from different legal frameworks (local/regional, national and EU).
The three policy options will have different legal implications at different levels and in some
cases would require the introduction of new procedural rules in the national administrative
law. Therefore, careful analysis of the effectiveness, the implications for stakeholders and
civil society as well as the cost of enforcement has been carried out as part of the present
impact assessment. The reduction of legal uncertainty and the increase in private investment
is taken into account in the assumptions on reduction in delays.
Conclusions of the Workshop: Efficient permitting for TEN-T projects
Brussels, 17 October 2017.
Conclusions of the Workshop: Smart and effective public procurement for TEN-T cross-border projects, Brussels 15 June
2017
85
According to the views of stakeholders in the open public consultation, tout of 91 respondents 66 mentioned involvement
of general public at different level of project planning as a best practice. Focus on local benefits was chosen by 61 out of 91.
Extensive use of ICT was named by 43 respondents while promotion of local employment and SME's by 35.
83
84
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6.1.14 Legal feasability and effectiveness of the options
The legal implications of PO1 would be limited as it would be voluntarily applicable to the
Member States and would not require changing the existing rules. However it is important to
distinguish soft law’s lack of legally binding effect from its potential
impact in practice. Soft
law may affect policy development and practice precisely because it exercises an informal
‘soft’ influence, and can therefore sometimes be presented as a more flexible instrument in
achieving policy objectives. A possible choice of soft law measure under this option could be
recommendations, which while have no binding force might have certain legal effects and
would allow the Commission to have a coordinating role.
The requirement to establish a one-stop-shop at national level for the purpose of coordinating
and issuing development consent for TEN-T projects, foreseen under PO2, would need to be
set forth in an EU legislative instrument. This option would apply to all projects on the TEN-
T core network. This option also includes the adoption of certain limited provisions of public
procurement legislation as well as targeted technical assistance and streamlined procedures at
the EU level when applicable. A similar solution is already in force within the TEN-E
Regulation for energy infrastructure projects. As PO2 would to a large extent follow the TEN-
E precedent with the application of additional measures in the public procurement field, it is
considered feasible from the legal point of view.
From a legal perspective, the effectiveness of such a system would depend on degree of
integration of the one-stop shop (OSS) designated by a Member State. The integrative
approach to the OSS is perceived to be more effective than the coordinated approach
86
. This
policy option does not entail any changes to the EU legal acts that are currently in force.
As regards time limits, the PO2 would also to a large extent replicate the TEN-E precedent.
Their introduction by means of an EU regulation would not require adapting national
legislation, but the right of the Member States to set more ambitious deadlines than the ones
foreseen by the EU legislative act will be safeguarded.
The European framework envisaged under PO3 would be created for the authorisation of
TEN-T core network projects, along with the development of a framework of single rules to
be applied in public procurement of cross-border projects and for environmental assessments.
For these projects, the new framework would replace all national rules and regulations
including those deriving from EU legislation. This would entail making the requirements
currently stemming from EU directives directly applicable. This would require an EU
legislative instrument adopted to streamline regulatory and administrative procedures for
TEN-T core network projects but would also raise the issue of the appropriate legal basis if it
affects the requirements under other EU legislation.
In the case of PO 3a, the national rules on administrative proceedings would remain in place
and would not be affected. However, under PO 3b the EU would be directly in charge of
issuing permits. In such a case, this would imply the usual decision-making procedures of the
Commission to adopt individual -decisions or more likely to establish an ad hoc decision-
making system for implementing this possibly complex scheme.
In addition, it would require supplementing this piece of EU legislation with implementing
measures to govern the permitting procedures which are currently not regulated in a
sufficiently detailed manner by directives, e.g. technical standards for buildings and
structures, technical standards for environmental assessments at project level, administrative
86
According to the views of stakeholders in the open public consultation, the OSS should have extended decision making
power (44 in favour of this approach instead of coordination powers only what was selected by 22 respondents, 12 opted for
another solution and 11 did not express their opinion). This view was shared in particular be project promoters, industrial
groups, regional authorities and individuals. Groups which were most sceptical to this solution were national governments
and regional/local authorities.
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rules on the neighbouring pieces of land, rules on compensations related to compulsory
purchase of land, rules on communication of interested parties.
Finally, PO3 raises significant concerns in particular as regards the competence of the EU to
act in the fields of spatial planning and land use which are the sole competence of the Member
States.
As a result, from the legal perspective, PO3 in general is likely to raise serious subsidiarity
questions and, in the case of PO3b more particularly, setting up an implementing system and
an administrative capacity at EU level with the associated administrative burden would have
important implications.
6.1.15 Impact on judicial review
As it does not entail immediate legal effects, PO1 would not have any impact on the judicial
review.
PO2 would not have important effects on the judicial review either. The current national rules
would continue to apply as far as the definition of the competent court and procedural rules
are concerned. Member States would only able to introduce time limits for challenging
administrative decisions such as a statute of repose, in accordance with their own procedural
rules. Any intrusive rules cannot be proposed due to the lack of competence of the EU to
regulate the judiciary systems of Member States.
In the case of PO3a, the same considerations as for PO2 apply. However, as for the PO3b
there are several options to ensure access to justice. Transport projects involve very large
numbers of stakeholders, and decisions issued by competent authorities granting development
consent for projects face legal challenges by stakeholders. Such legal appeals are likely to
cause delays in the preparation and implementation of some TEN-T projects. Under the
current system, these legal challenges are most likely to be heard at national level. As a new
EU framework regulation would fall under EU law, the competent court would be the EU
general court.
7 HOW DO THE OPTIONS COMPARE?
7.1
Overall assessment of direct impacts
The combined measures under the three policy options have economic, social and
environmental impacts related to users' costs and external costs. The net benefits stemming
from the user costs savings and external costs savings for all three options are positive, with
the highest net benefits presented by PO3, amounting to €7.7 bn for the core TEN-T
network
projects (see Table 16). Again, the application of the three options to the narrower scope,
such as core network corridors and CEF Annex 1 projects only is expected to bring smaller
benefits, €5.8 bn in case of corridors projects for PO3 and €4.3 bn in case of CEF Annex 1
projects for PO3.
Table 16: Costs and benefits of the policy options relative to the baseline over the lifetime of the projects (2018-2030)
Net benefits (in million €, constant prices 2015)
Core TEN-T network projects
Social benefits
User costs savings
External costs savings
Air pollution
Noise
Congestion
PO1
PO2
PO3a/PO3b
1,838
273
3
10
86
5,069
724
6
27
202
6,648
947
8
35
263
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Net benefits (in million €, constant prices 2015)
Accidents
Climate change
Total social benefits
Administrative costs reduction
Net benefits (present value)
Core network corridors projects
Social benefits
User costs savings
External costs savings
Air pollution
Noise
Congestion
Accidents
Climate change
Total social benefits
Administrative costs reduction
Net benefits (present value)
CEF projects
Social benefits
User costs savings
External costs savings
Air pollution
Noise
Congestion
Accidents
Climate change
Total social benefits
Administrative costs reduction
Net benefits (present value)
Source: Impact Assessment support study
PO1
105
68
2,111
18
2,129
PO2
297
193
5,793
153
5,946
PO3a/PO3b
389
253
7,595
100
7,696
1,379
205
2
8
65
79
51
1,583
14
1,597
3,802
543
4
20
151
223
144
4,345
115
4,460
4,986
710
6
26
197
292
189
5,696
75
5,771
1,020
151
2
6
48
58
38
1,171
10
1,182
2,813
402
3
15
112
165
107
3,215
86
3,301
3,690
526
4
19
146
216
140
4,215
56
4,271
In quantitative terms and considering the direct impacts and wider economic impacts (as
shown in previous chapter in Table 7 and Table 8), PO3 clearly generates the highest positive
results.
In addition to quantitative analysis of the impacts it is particularly important for this initiative
also to assess the impacts of the proposed measures which go beyond the quantified social
benefits and include social impacts on civil society, fundamental rights of citizens affected by
the options as well as on the legal certainty. Therefore, the assessment also requires a
thorough examination of the distributive effects on various categories of affected stakeholders
and the qualitative review of the different impacts. This analysis needs to take into account
the advantages and negative effects of the policy options in light of the criteria of their
efficiency, effectiveness and coherence. This is also important as the overall aggregated
positive figures may include also negative effects on citizens and local communities directly
affected by the investments.
Eastern motorway bypass of
Łódź
This greenfield construction of a new motorway along the Baltic-Adriatic Core Network Corridor links the
existing A1 heading north towards
Gdańsk
on the Baltic Sea and A1 leading to the industrial region of Upper
Silesia. The construction of the new road did not use EU funding. It replaced the existing national road crossing
the TEN-T urban node of
Łódź
and directly affecting hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the agglomeration
with increased noise, pollution, low road safety and congestion. It affected also the seamless flows on this
strategic N-S connections going through the centre of Poland. The new road negatively affected the quality of
lives of the residents of the relatively sparsely populated suburbs; however the overall impact on the whole
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region is positive. Moreover, a lot of effort was invested into mitigation measures such as protection from
increased noise, new trees plantations as well as engineering structures in order to reduce the impacts on the
local transport.
7.2
Effectiveness
The effectiveness of the policy options must consider the extent to which these objectives are
achieved. Table 17 presents the objectives and the indicators that have been developed to
monitor the level of achievement of the objectives. The effectiveness of each policy option in
achieving the objectives is presented in Table 18, using the indicators described above.
Table 17: Linking of objectives to key indicators
General objectives
Specific objectives
Indicators
Value of user benefits linked to quicker
implementation of TEN-T
Value of non-user benefits linked to
quicker implementation of TEN-T
establishment and
development of trans-
European networks in the
area of transport as well as
promoting the
interconnection and
interoperability of national
networks
minimising the risk of delays faced by
individual TEN-T projects
increasing legal certainty for project
promoters thus attracting more private
investors to transport infrastructure
Legal effectiveness for TEN-T projects
promoters (qualitative assessment)
All options show positive results in terms of users' costs savings and external costs savings
linked to the quicker delivery of the TEN-T core network projects and its narrower scopes
(core network corridors, CEF Annex 1 projects). PO1 has a more limited impact relative to
PO2 and PO3. PO2 strongly contributes to the achievement of objectives, however not to a
lesser extent in comparison with sub-options of the PO3. PO3 reduces the risks for project
promoters to the minimum and results in the highest direct benefits, these benefits are
however not very much higher than the ones brought by the PO2. In all cases, the benefits are
the highest also when the scope of application is the broadest
i.e. when all projects located
at TEN-T core network would benefit from the new rules.
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Table 18: Effectiveness of policy options
Key: Impacts expected
✗✗
Strongly
negative
Weakly negative
PO1
PO2
PO3a
Specific objective 1: Minimising the risk of delays faced by individual TEN-T projects
User benefits
linked to
quicker
implementatio
n of TEN-T
core network
(present
value)
External costs
savings linked
to quicker
implementatio
n of TEN-T
(present
value)
PO3b
O
No or negligible
impact
Weakly positive
✓✓
Strongly positive
PO3
Unclear
€1,838
million
5,069 million
✓✓
6,648 million
✓✓
€273
million
€724
million
✓✓
947 million
✓✓
Specific objective 2: increasing legal certainty for project promoters thus attracting more private investors to
transport infrastructure
Legal
effectiveness
for TEN-T
core network
projects
promoters
(qualitative
assessment)
The positive impact on
legal certainty would be
high as the procedures
would be integrated.
However, the contents of
the requirements
established directly at EU
level would be new to
project promoters and the
administrative procedures
as well as judicial
proceedings handled at EU
level would create new
level of uncertainty.
The positive impact on
The legal certainty legal certainty would
be high as the
will increase,
however due to the procedures would be
integrated with clear
nature of the soft
ownership in the OSS
law, its
effectiveness will and the rules applied at
national (well-known)
be limited.
level
0
✓✓
The positive impact on
legal certainty would be
high as the procedures
would be integrated and
the rules applied by the
OSS at national level.
However, the contents
of the requirements
established directly at
EU level would be new
to project promoters.
In terms of effectiveness to ensure legal certainty for TEN-T project promoters, the PO2 and
PO3a seem to be most effective as they contribute to the streamlining of procedures at
national level while keeping the common administrative procedures at national level which
are well-known for project promoters. PO3a will result in project promoters having to learn
and adjust to the new framework which could differ from what they are used to. PO1 seems to
have negligible effect as the guidelines to existing procedures would not have decisive effect
and bear the risk to be differently interpreted at different levels. Finally, PO3b may have
weakly negative effects for the certainty of the project promoters. Indeed, the rules will be
streamlined and made simpler for TEN-T projects. However the shift of responsibilities for
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handling the procedures to the EU level will create a certain level of uncertainty in terms of
procedures as well as potential appeals which would need to be lodged to the EU courts.
Finally, experience from the application of the TEN-E rules proves that the scheme proposed
under PO2 has proven successful in the other area of TEN.
TEN-E experience
The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) confirms in the report of 2016 its previous
year’s
finding that those TEN-E Projects of Common Interest which applied for permit granting after 16 November
2013 (i.e. according to the new rules of TEN-E Regulation requiring establishment of a OSS at national level)
are in general more optimistic about the expected duration of the permit granting than those which applied
before. The average duration of the permit granting is 3.5 years and 5.5 years respectively.
Source: Consolidated Report on the progress of electricity and gas projects of Common Interest for the year 2016, ACER
2017
87
7.3
Efficiency
The efficiency of the options is assessed on the basis of the resources or at least cost involved
in light of the objectives of reducing the risk of delays and the increased certainty for project
promoters. All options are expected to have positive impact in terms of administrative costs
on the project promoters with PO2 having the biggest impact. Even if PO3 in both of its
configurations will have also high positive impact on promoter's administrative it is expected
to be lower than for PO2 as in the case of PO3, additional training and learning is required.
PO1 is expected to have modest positive impact.
For permitting authorities, in all options the impact will be negative due to the need of
additional training and learning. It is expected that the impact will be the highest in case of
PO3 where a significant amount of training will be needed. The lowest negative impact is
expected in case of PO1 and rather medium in case of PO2.
In all cases, the overall net impact is positive for all options, which is the highest in case of
PO2.
The objective of the implementation of the TEN-T is the transition towards low emission
mobility. The efficiency of the options was also assessed in terms of acceleration of the
benefits brought by individual projects. Regarding the external costs savings also here the
PO3 is the most efficient option, while PO1 is the least. Expected results for PO2 are
relatively high; however somewhat lower then PO3 and considerably higher than PO1.
Increasing the rights of the TEN-T projects promoters cannot be assessed only against their
interests and the overall highly aggregated benefits. Social impacts and impacts on civil
society have to be duly taken into accounts. Moreover, civil society shows greater interest to
have their say and participate in the decision making process on projects that can affect the
everyday life and the quality of life. Their participation may be hampered by lack of clarity of
rules and procedures. Recent cases show that the effective and early involvement of the civil
society as well as greater focus on local benefits is helpful and prevents conflicts and appeals
at later stage of the project implementation
88
.
The clarified rules and increased technical assistance leading to more efficient public
consultation (PO1) will have weakly positive result. PO2 is expected to contribute in general
positively to the involvement of civil society in the permitting processes by clarifying the
rules and better structuring the paths. However, the integration of consultation may potentially
have adverse effect on the length of consultations which so far may be sequenced and
87
88
http://www.acer.europa.eu/official_documents/acts_of_the_agency/publication/consolidated%20report%20on%20the%20p
rogress%20of%20electricity%20and%20gas%20projects%20of%20common%20interest%20for%20the%20year%202016.pdf
The Brenner Corridor Platform (BCP) gathering infrastructure ministries of Austria, Germany and Italy, the five regions
Bavaria, Tirol, Alto Adige, Trento, Verona, railway and highway companies and the European Commission is an example of
involvement of regions and focus on local benefits in infrastructure projects.
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concentrate subsequently on different topics. This could particularly be the case if the present
initiative would derogate to the consultation requirements stemming from the applicable
directive by replacing them with a simplified consultation. On the other hand, the introduction
of a certain parallelism or greater synchronisation of the consultations will not have such
negative effect. It will safeguard all the existing assessments and consultations while cutting
the overall needed time and ensuring greater transparency for the benefit of the citizens and
NGOs that can better understand when to have their say in the project planning.
Finally, both sub-options of the PO3 are expected to have negative results. In the case of
PO3a bringing unfamiliar new requirements will not be offset by the clearer structure and the
overall impact will be weakly negative. Whereas in the case of PO3b, the overall impact is
expected to be strongly negative due to new unfamiliar rules and the shift of handling of the
procedures to the EU level.
Finally, the legal stability is necessary for long-term TEN-T projects. Significant changes to
the way the procedures are handled and frequent changes to their contents are believed to be
counterproductive. On the other hand, the problem is clearly driven by the organisation of the
procedures and the stability in this respect will not offset the results of the suboptimal
situation. Evolutionary changes in the PO2 are believed to be best balanced in this area,
bringing greater coordination of existing processes which become clearer and more
understandable for both project promoters and the civil society.
Table 19: Efficiency of policy options
Key: Impacts expected
✗✗
Strongly
negative
Weakly negative
O
No or negligible
impact
PO2
PO3a
Impact on
cost borne by
project
promoters
(savings)
Impact on
cost borne by
permitting
authorities
Impact on
CO
2
emissions for
the TEN-T
core network
(cumulative
over 2018-
2030)
27 million
€166
million
✓✓
€120
million
✓✓
PO3b
Weakly positive
✓✓
Strongly positive
PO3
PO1
Unclear
€9
million
€13
million
€20
million
✗✗
-917 thousand
tonnes CO
2
compared to the
baseline
-2,686 thousand tonnes
CO
2
compared to the
baseline
✓✓
-3,543 thousand tonnes CO
2
compared to the baseline
✓✓
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Impact on
civil society
Structuring and
Unfamiliar rules and
integration of
Unfamiliar rules and
distant handling of
Clarification of
permitting procedures requirements are not be
procedures risk having
rules will increase
are believed to have
fully offset by the
strongly negative impact
the efficiency of
positive effects on the
positive effects of
on the civil society
public consultation
civil society to have
structuring and
involvement and will
but is subject to
their voices heard in
integration of permitting reduce the concentration
the efficiency of
the public
procedures. The
on local benefits in TEN-T
voluntary
consultations thus
perception by the civil
project planning.
application of soft
leading to cross-
society risks being
Perception by the civil
law measures.
fertilisation and greater
negative.
society will be crealy
focus on local benefits.
negative.
✓✓
✗✗
Evolutionary changes
without significant
Changes in the contents
modifications to the
will result in necessary
rules and their contents
adaptation of project
provide balance
promoters and may be
between the necessity
suboptimal for long-
for stability and
term planning of TEN-T
optimisation of
projects.
applicable
frameworks.
✓✓
Impact on
legal
framework
stability
Stability is
ensured, however
the main problem
drivers remain not
efficiently
addresses.
Drastic change in
comparison with current
situation, discutable
competence of the EU to
handle procedures having
impacts on local
communities
✗✗
7.4
Coherence
The objectives of this initiative are in line with the relevant EU policies in the field of
transport policy, the Single Market and priorities in other EU policies. All the options
contribute to the
stimulating investment and creating jobs
with the streamlining of investment
in the real economy.
A deeper and fairer internal market
will be achieved by the enhanced implementation of the
TEN-T network whose aim is to physically connect the markets of the Member States with
the clear EU added value with a focus on cross-border connection. All the Policy Options
contribute to these objectives.
In terms of coherence with the other EU policies, PO1 and PO2 align best as they follow the
existing requirements and try to best organise the implementation of the priorities of various
policies, in particular the environmental protection and the functioning of the internal market
with smart public procurement rules, with the goals of the TEN-T. Through better alignment
of these policies' objectives with the TEN-T implementation, synergies are expected to be
achieved.
In terms of coherence with the other policies, the sub-options of the PO3 are not perfectly
coherent with the objectives of public participation and access to justice stemming from the
application of the EU
acquis
in the field of environment, public procurement etc. This policy
option would entail the risk of creating derogatory rules which would then provoke a
suspicion to be more lenient on certain requirements or contribute to fragmenting the legal
framework. This could put at stake the coherence of these policy fields. In addition, the PO3b
by bringing the permitting procedures, affecting to the large extent local communities and
individual citizens, would not be fully in line with the objective of
Enhancing cooperation
between different EU justice systems and preserving the rule of law
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7.5
Proportionality and subsidiarity
None of the options go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives. However, one
needs to note that PO3 in its both sub-options could cause proportionality and subsidiarity
concerns as it replaces the national permitting systems and, in case of PO3b, shifts the
responsibility of handling the permitting procedures entirely to the EU level.
PO2 leaves Member States the responsibility to determine their administrative set-ups while
safeguarding the necessity of the priority, timelines and efficient treatment of the projects of
EU importance, i.e. those implementing the transport networks whose impacts go beyond the
national context (similarly to networks managed at local, regional and national levels where
decisions are made at different levels). Here, while preserving the national competence and
the principle of territorial sovereignty, the EU importance of the projects is incorporated to the
permitting systems by given the most rapid treatment legally possible under the national
permitting systems to TEN-T projects.
7.6
Opinion of the stakeholders on the key policy measures discussed
Regarding the integration of procedures under a national single entity, a
“one-stop-shop”
(OSS), this solution is supported in particular by project promoters, individuals and industrial
interest groups, while more reserved opinions are expressed by national and in particular
regional authorities.
In response to the possibility of introducing time limits to the permit granting process, project
promoters, individuals, industrial interest groups and one responding NGO agree that this
process should not last longer than 2 years, and that the establishment of such time limit can
help reduce excessive delays. Local and regional authorities as well as some national
governments are however more reserved. They are also of a critical view on time limits for
the total duration of approval procedures for TEN-T projects, stating that since procedures for
large-scale and complex projects are usually very time-consuming, such limits may have the
risk of creating relative delays for small uncomplicated projects.
In terms of public procurement issues, a common set of rules at EU level applied to cross-
border projects is considered in particular by project promoters and industrial groups, as the
most effective solution to improve public procurement issues. National authorities argue that
such a set of rules would be more effective when applied to cross-border projects benefiting
from EU funding. As identified above, cross-border procurement based on a single legal
framework may also strengthen the position of larger companies which have more experience
in working in different Member States. The potentially decreased participation of SMEs in
such large procedures is believed to be offset by greater possibilities of working as
subcontractors in the increased overall construction market. This measure is not expected to
have any negative impacts on citizens directly.
As regards definition and handling of procedures at EU level, there is reluctance expressed by
some national governments, who in big numbers take strong positions against this approach.
They argue that it would not speed up the permitting process and might result in the
duplication of efforts, since only national authorities are able to verify the individual approval
requirements of each country, and therefore, some procedure would be duplicated. However,
the workshops devoted to public procurement and permit granting procedures showed some
support from project promoters to rules and procedures that would be developed at EU level
specifically for TEN-T infrastructure projects. On the other hand, the representatives of civil
52
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society expressed concerns that such rules and procedures would result in reducing their
possibility to be consulted on the projects.
89
7.7
Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis has been performed for the baseline scenario and for the effectiveness
rates used in quantifying the policy options.
An alternative baseline scenario has been considered where 60% of investments would occur
on schedule while 20% of the investments would be delayed due to permitting procedures by
one year, 10% by two years, and 10% by three years. Consequently, the impacts of the policy
options have been assessed drawing on the alternative baseline scenario while at the same
time keeping the effectiveness rates unchanged.
In addition, a sensitivity analysis has been performed on the effectiveness rates. More
conservative levels for the effectiveness of the policy options have been assumed: 10% for
PO1, 50% for PO2 and 70% for PO3. In this case, the policy options have been quantified
drawing on the central baseline scenario.
The results of the sensitivity analysis with respect to the baseline and the effectiveness rates
are presented in terms of net benefits Figure 6. The detailed results are presented in Annex 4
on Analytical methods.
Figure 6:
Net benefits (in million €, constant prices 2015)
Source: Impact Assessment support study
Overall, the sensitivity analysis shows that the alternative baseline scenario and lower
effectiveness rates result in somewhat lower net benefits. However, the ranking of the options
in terms of net benefits does not change.
7.8
Preferred Policy Option
Based on the assessment above PO3 is the most effective in terms of wider economic impacts
and also direct user and non-user benefits. However, PO3 shows clearly negative impacts in
terms of legal stability and social impacts in terms of the involvement of civil society in the
infrastructure planning. Moreover, this options does not seem to be fully coherent with the
objectives of the other policy areas, overall objectives and general principles of the Union as
well as it does not seem proportional for the objectives it is meant to achieve.
89
More details on the outcomes of the open public consultations can be found in the Annex 2 as well as in to the Panteia et
al. 2018 (Report on the results of the public consultation).
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The impacts of PO1 are much more balanced and it is proportional to the objectives it is
meant to achieve. However the overall the effectiveness and efficiency of this option is not
high.
Taking into consideration the experience of the projects in the field of the TEN-E, the
evolutionary model of PO2 which is respecting the national permitting processes but at the
same time a requires to better coordinating them, seems to be effective and the most efficient
option
90
.
PO2 therefore qualifies as the preferred option, it performs much better in terms of
effectiveness and efficiency in comparison with PO1 and is does not have the drawbacks
present in the case of application of PO3, in particular of the sub-option PO3b. It is also
proportional to the objectives it is to achieve and coherent with the other policies of the EU
and its fundamental principles. PO2 seems to achieve a balanced and efficient framework
based on an increased effectiveness of administrative procedures to foster the implementation
of TEN-T projects and, at the same time, on clearer and more inclusive processes to
strengthen public acceptance of infrastructure projects.
8 HOW WOULD ACTUAL IMPACTS BE MONITORED AND EVALUATED?
Monitoring and evaluating the legal act which will streamline the implementation of the TEN-
T should build on existing measures to monitor the implementation of the TEN-T as such. It
should therefore use to the largest possible extent the existing framework and in a simple and
transparent way to make it easily accessible for interested stakeholders. It is not the intention
to create a complex system of new performance indicators.
The monitoring of specific policy objective 1 will be measured by the general advancement of
the implementation of the TEN-T and number of TEN-T core network projects which do not
experience delays. This monitoring will be done using the existing method of monitoring the
implementation of the TEN-T provided for in article 49 (3) of the TEN-T Regulation.
Projects receiving CEF support are subject to a more detailed and regular reporting carried out
by the executive agency INEA.
In addition, the European Coordinators will be able to highlight any achievements or
difficulties occurring for infrastructure projects in their core network corridor work plans
provided for in article 47 of the TEN-T regulation and which are regularly updated.
The monitoring of specific policy objective 2 will be measured by the number of TEN-T
projects using innovative EU financial instruments as well as private capital.
Given that there are several drivers of the problems and that all cannot necessarily be
addressed by the present initiative (as explained in section 2.1
e.g. political and funding
issues), any positive results will not be easily attributable to the exclusive implementation of
the measures adopted. Therefore, the overall evaluation should take into consideration the
general pace of the implementation of TEN-T.
8.1
Indicators
For the main specific policy objectives, the following monitoring indicators have been identified:
90
There is evidence that the promoters of PCIs expect acceleration of the procedures in their individual cases. According to
the analysis of ACER, the average duration of permitting expected by PCI promoters in the pool of 96 electricity PCIs is 3.5
years. For gas, the average permit granting duration for the pool of assessed 54 PCIs was 3.2 years. Commission Staff
Working Document Accompanying the document Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No
347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the Union list of projects of common interest,
SWD(2017) 425 final
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/swd_accompanying_pci_list_final_2017_en.pdf
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Minimising the risk of delays faced by individual TEN-T projects:
-
The advancement of the TEN-T implementation in terms of compliance with the
standards and requirements.
-
Progress in investment supported by EU in the TEN-T transport infrastructure measured
by the number of CEF projects (or the projects supported by its successor) implemented
on time and/or not delayed due to permitting/procurement issues.
Increasing legal certainty for project promoters thus attracting more private investors to
transport infrastructure
-
The increase of number of the TEN-T infrastructure projects financed with the use of
the EU-supported financial instruments (e.g. EFSI and its successors).
8.2
Operational objectives
Based on the preferred options, the following operational objectives have been identified.
Table 20: Operational objectives
Operational objectives
Accelerate the pace of the implementation of the TEN-
T
Increase the effectiveness of EU funding for the
delivery of the TEN-T core network
Increased use of private and alternative financing in
the TEN-T infrastructure projects
Indicators
% of the TEN-T compliant infrastructure in railways
and inland navigation
Number of EU-funded projects encountering delays
related to permitting or procurement procedures.
Number of TEN-T infrastructure projects using EFSI
and its successor or related schemes
55