Europaudvalget 2025
KOM (2025) 0221
Offentligt
3035452_0001.png
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 4.6.2025
SWD(2025) 221 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
2025 Country Report - Poland
Accompanying the document
Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Poland
{COM(2025) 221 final}
EN
EN
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0002.png
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0003.png
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY POLICY
CHALLENGES
Economic growth is accelerating
but competitiveness challenges
remain
Poland’s
economy is one of the fastest
growing in the EU.
Polish GDP grew by 2.9%
in 2024 and is set to surpass this figure in
2025, driven by strong private consumption
and investment, including funded by the EU.
The negative contribution to economic growth
from net exports is expected to lessen as
exports gradually increase. Risks to the
economic outlook mainly stem from delays to
public investments.
Graph 1.1:
Poland - real GDP growth and
contributions
10
pps.
Overall, macro-financial challenges and
risks remain limited.
The housing market
has seen strong house price growth (15%
compared to an EU average of 3.3% in 2024),
further boosted by demand-side measures
adopted in 2023 and a slow supply-side
response (see Section
“Skills, quality jobs and
social fairness”).
Nevertheless, financial
stability risks from the residential real estate
market
remain
contained.
External
sustainability improved in 2023 and 2024,
with Poland’s
current account moving into
surplus. Financial sector risks remain limited,
and bank profitability has increased (see
Annex 5).
Labour market tightness eased somewhat
in 2024, but unemployment remains at a
historic low.
Total employment decreased in
2024 following weak economic growth during
the previous year and rapid rise in labour
costs. The decrease in total employment was
mainly observed in the agricultural sector,
while job counts rose in manufacturing and in
some service sectors. In 2024, the
employment
rate
of
15–74-year-olds
increased. The unemployment rate remained
broadly unchanged, reaching 2.9% in 2024 in
a context of a shrinking working-age
population.
Challenges to competitiveness persist, in
particular in relation to the business
environment, research and innovation,
skills and education, and the clean
transition.
These challenges are especially
pronounced in regions outside the capital (see
Annex 17). At 67% of the EU aggregate, labour
productivity (GDP per hour worked) is low in
Poland. To increase productivity, it is
particularly important for Poland to ensure its
business sector has a stable and clear legal
framework and for barriers to the marketing
of research and innovation to be addressed
(see Section
“Innovation, business environment
forecast
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Net exports
Investment
Priv. consumption
Gov. consumption
Inventories
Real GDP (y-o-y%)
Source:
AMECO
Price pressures are continuing to ease
while concerns remain regarding cost
competitiveness.
Inflation decreased to 3.7%
in 2024. In 2025, inflation is set to edge down
including due to lower energy commodity
prices. Large increases in unit labour costs,
elevated inflation, and
złoty
exchange rate
appreciation against the euro could pose a risk
to cost competitiveness over the medium
term.
2
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0004.png
and productivity”).
Moreover, for the Polish
economy to remain sustainable and
competitive in the long term, it would help to
ensure broader access to affordable
renewable energy, decarbonise the heating
sector, reduce energy prices and ensure proper
management of water resources (see
Section
“Decarbonisation, energy affordability
and sustainability”).
Finally, it would be
beneficial to address persistent labour and
skills shortages, including in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics, and
inadequacies in the education system (see
Section
“Skills, quality jobs and social
fairness”).
Fiscal adjustment takes shape to
tackle growing fiscal challenges
Poland faces fiscal challenges amid a
rising budget deficit and public debt.
As
the general government deficit reached 5.3%
of GDP in 2023, exceeding the Treaty
reference value of 3%, in January 2025 the
Council initiated the excessive deficit
procedure (
1
) for Poland. At the same time, the
Council endorsed Poland’s medium-term
fiscal-structural plan, which sets a binding
government expenditure path aimed at
reducing the deficit to below 3% of GDP over
the 2025-2028 period. According to the
Commission’s Spring 2025
Economic Forecast,
Poland’s
budget deficit is projected to fall
from 6.6% of GDP in 2024 to 6.4% of GDP in
2025. The consolidation of public finances will
be challenging in the context of geopolitical
situation and high and rising defence
spending. Public debt is forecast to rise from
49.5% of GDP in 2023 to 58.0% of GDP in
2025.
The annual progress report sent on 30
April 2025 presents the state of
implementation of the fiscal plan.
In 2024,
net expenditure (
2
) in Poland grew by 12.7%
(see Annex 1). This increase was mainly driven
by higher public consumption, including growth
of salaries of the public sector employees, as
well as higher than estimated defence
investments. The increase of government
expenditure
was
partially
offset
by
government decisions on fiscal measures
increasing revenues. The annual impact of
those measures, estimated at 0.4% of GDP, is
deducted from net expenditure. In 2025, net
expenditure is forecast by the Commission to
grow by 6.2%, which is below the maximum
growth rate recommended by the Council (
3
).
The cumulative growth rate of net expenditure
in 2024 and 2025 taken together is projected
at 19.7%, which is above the maximum rate
recommended by the Council. This is due to
higher growth rate of net expenditure in 2024
compared to the growth rate of 12.5%
assumed in the medium-term fiscal-structural
plan The projected deviation is allowed under
the conditions of the national escape clause
on current projections for defence spending.
(
2
) Net expenditure is defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation
(EU) 2024/1263 as government expenditure net of (i)
interest expenditure, (ii) discretionary revenue
measures, (iii) expenditure on programmes of the Union
fully matched by revenue from Union funds, (iv)
national expenditure on co-financing of programmes
funded by the Union, (v) cyclical elements of
unemployment benefit expenditure, and (vi) one-off
and other temporary measures.
(
3
) Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end
to the situation of an excessive deficit in Poland
(C/2025/5037) and Council Recommendation of 21
January 2025 endorsing the national medium-term
fiscal-structural plan of Poland (OJ C, C/2025/642,
10.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/642/oj).
(
1
) The excessive deficit procedure aims to ensure that all
member states maintain low government debt or
reduce high debt to sustainable levels.
3
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0005.png
Box 1:
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Poland has improved on the SDGs related to macroeconomic stability (SGDs 8, 16, 17),
productivity (SDGs 4, 8, 9) and fairness (SDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10) and exceeds the EU
average on SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 4 (quality education), SDG 10 (reduced
inequalities), SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals).
Nevertheless, while Poland has been improving on some of the SDGs related to
environmental sustainability (SDGs 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14), it is moving away from some
of the targets for SDG 2 (zero hunger, which includes indicators on malnutrition,
sustainable agricultural production and the environmental impacts of agriculture), and
SDG 15 (life on land).
Source of data: Eurostat
Substantial reforms have been made to
the national fiscal framework.
In
December 2024, the Polish parliament
enacted legislation establishing a Fiscal
Council which is set to become fully
operational in January 2026. Initially, the
Council will play a mostly advisory role, with
its activities slated for review by 2029.
Furthermore,
in
July
2024,
several
amendments were made to the stabilising
expenditure rule,
Poland’s
primary national
fiscal rule, following a comprehensive review.
The aim of these amendments is to make the
rule more effective and align it with the new
EU fiscal framework.
Public spending efficiency could be
further improved, particularly in the area
of social expenditure.
Public spending as a
share of GDP has been increasing, reaching
49% in 2024. Social programmes could better
target lower-income and vulnerable groups,
thereby reducing expenditure flows to higher-
income groups. Moreover, Poland could
strengthen its currently limited use of
spending reviews in the budgetary process to
support the government’s consolidation efforts
in the years to come.
Similarly, the efficiency of public
investments could be further enhanced
throughout the investment cycle.
Public
investments, including those by state-owned
enterprises, would benefit from a more
integrated and comprehensive planning
approach. The public investment system would
also benefit from improvements to the
monitoring of large infrastructure projects,
more systematic
ex post
evaluations and
enhanced IT systems. More broadly, adopting a
longer-term perspective and ensuring stability
in the governance of state-owned enterprises
would enable more strategic allocation of
funds, and promote effective public
investment (see Box 2).
The Polish tax framework is complex,
which
hampers
innovation
and
sustainable growth.
Despite recent efforts
to reform the investment landscape, Polish
companies continue to cite over-regulation as
a significant obstacle to investment. Moreover,
the tax system appears to be very complex (
4
),
indicating a need for substantial improvement.
There is considerable scope for simplifying tax
regulations and tax administration processes.
To enhance the business environment, efforts
to achieve a simpler and more predictable tax
system would need to continue. Potential
measures
include
consolidating
and
eliminating numerous tax reliefs and
preferences, as well as simplifying the system
for calculating and collecting taxes and social
security contributions.
(
4
) Poland ranks last among the 27 EU Member States in
the Tax Complexity Index 2022
(https://www.taxcomplexity.org).
4
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0006.png
Addressing challenges linked to an
ageing society
Poland’s ageing society is
putting
pressure on its pension system and on
health and long-term care.
The statutory
retirement age in Poland is 60 years for
women and 65 years for men. Data from the
Polish Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) for
2023 (
5
) shows that the average age at which
men were awarded their pension equalled the
statutory age, while for women, it was slightly
above the statutory age (60.7 vs 60) having
remained stable for several years. A recent
evaluation report on tax relief (PIT-0) for
senior citizens
–
which entered into force in
2022 and aims at increasing the effective
retirement age
–
revealed small but growing
uptake. The interest of PIT-0 could be higher,
but the option often chosen by the insured is
to receive a pension and a salary at the same
time which lower total net income over the
entire period after retirement (
6
). According to
the 2024 Ageing Report (
7
), the pension
system’s annuity factor will lead to a
substantial decline in pension benefits due to
rising life expectancy and will leave effective
retirement ages broadly unchanged. If the
current pension benefit ratio (average pension
benefit as percentage of average wage) is
maintained, pension spending is expected to
increase by 2.5 percentage points of GDP by
2045. Retaining a very low retirement age for
women amidst a rapidly aging population has
the potential to increase pensioner poverty or
cause government spending on pensions to
rise sharply in the future, which could present
a risk to the sustainability of government
finances. Moreover, there are several special
pension schemes in Poland, e.g. for judges,
(
5
) https://psz.zus.pl/kategorie/emerytury/nowoprzyznane.
( )
SGH Report: ‘Ocena wpływu działań na rzecz
podniesienia efektywnego wieku emerytalnego na
skutek zmian wprowadzonych reformą podatkową
Polski
Ład (tzw. PIT-0 dla seniora)’
https://www.gov.pl/attachment/2e62d93d-5c04-4bb6-
872a-1c74affb69eb.
6
prosecutors, the police force and farmers,
which have more generous conditions that are
primarily financed by the general government
budget. These schemes are considered to be
highly complex when compared to other EU
countries (
8
). Different schemes with specific
rules reduce transparency and can have lock-
in effects. For instance, the method of
calculating social insurance contributions to be
paid by farmers if they shift to the general
pension scheme discourages them from taking
up this option. The necessity of such special
schemes could therefore be reviewed as those
not clearly linked to occupational risks could
be a source of inequality (
9
).
Greater uptake of private pension
schemes could help to improve financial
security and future pension adequacy.
The
current pension system in Poland is largely
made up of public pensions and will face
significant challenges in the future due to
demographic changes. Individuals who
increase their retirement savings via private
schemes can bolster their financial security
and at the same time support economic
growth by directing savings into investments,
including in the Polish economy. Various
private pension investment options exist in
Poland, e.g. Employee Pension Plans (PPE) or
Individual Pension Protection Accounts (IKZE).
However, their use and assets under
management remain limited, with only about
30% of the eligible population actively
participating (
10
). The low level of private
pensions in Poland with total assets valued at
around 10% of GDP points to potential for
growth over the long term (
11
). By expanding
the use of default enrolment options,
redesigning incentives for investment and
(
8
)
https://economy-
finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-
04/dp125_en.pdf
(
9
) OECD Poland Economic Survey February 2025.
(
10
)
Raport o stanie rynku emerytalnego w Polsce na koniec
2023 r.
(
11
) For example, in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark
the value of private pension assets is 200%, 100% and
70% of GDP respectively
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Pensions_in_national_account
s_-_statistics.
(
7
) European Commission, 2024 Ageing Report. Economic
and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States
(2022-2070).
5
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0007.png
enhancing financial literacy, Poland could
increase private pension participation and ease
the pressure on the public system.
Improving
relatively
poor
health
outcomes and working conditions is
becoming increasingly challenging as the
population ages.
In Poland, mortality among
working-age adults as a proportion of total
mortality is significantly higher than the EU
average, exacerbating the effects of
population ageing on the labour force.
According to Eurostat data, spending on
preventive healthcare in Poland was among
the lowest in the EU in 2022, amounting to
only 1.9% of total healthcare spending. In fact,
the rate of treatable mortality in Poland has
barely improved since 2012. Cardiovascular
diseases and cancer remain the leading
causes of death, with mortality rates higher
than the EU average. Under its recovery and
resilience plan, Poland is carrying out major
reforms in this area that should improve
health outcomes in future years. The results of
the SHARE international survey (
12
) show that
job satisfaction in Poland among the 50+ age
group is lower than in other countries. At the
same time, the percentage of workers
discouraged from working or tired of
strenuous or routine work is higher than the
EU average. Investing in better working
conditions could help to convince older people
to continue working beyond retirement age.
Health expenditure per inhabitant in Poland
(adjusted for differences in purchasing power)
was EUR 1 960 in 2022, compared to an EU
average of EUR 3 685. A large proportion of
health expenditure (approximately 37%) is
allocated to inpatient and day care (
13
). To
improve health outcomes, a concerted effort is
needed to shift resources away from hospital-
centric models towards primary and
outpatient/ambulatory care and to address
persistent shortages in health professionals, in
particular general practitioners and nurses
(see Annex 14).
(
12
)
SGH, Ministry of Family and Social Policy ‘Raport
podsumowujący wyniki badań 8. Rundy badania SHARE:
50+ w Europie’, Warszawa 2023, page 53-60.
(
13
)
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?oldid=624730
Increasing the availability of affordable
long-term care services could support the
labour market.
Due to a lack of formal long-
term care
capacity, Poland’s informal carers
face a heavy care burden without adequate
support. The Minister for Senior Policy is
planning to offer care vouchers for dependent
older persons which could relieve family
members from their care responsibilities.
However, without legal recognition for
informal carers, the planned support (training,
information, psychological counselling) will not
reach all those who need it. The number of
long-term care workers per 100 individuals
aged 65 and over is very low (0.3 in Poland
compared to an EU average of 3.2 in 2023).
The World Bank carried out a strategic review
of long-term care in Poland (
14
). The results
show a need to increase access to high-
quality, affordable and accessible community-
based long-term care services, while improving
working conditions and work-life balance for
carers going beyond the measures included in
Poland’s recovery and resilience plan.
(
14
)
https://www.gov.pl/web/zdrowie/przeglad-strategiczny-
opieki-dlugoterminowej-w-polsce-opracowany-przez-
bank-swiatowy
6
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0008.png
Box 2:
Barriers to private and public investment
The share of Polish firms investing has been consistently fairly high (80%, slightly below
the EU average of 87% (
15
)). Overall, firms in Poland report higher investment obstacles
than their EU counterparts. The main barriers to private investment were:
•
Uncertainty about the future (92%).
A high share of Polish businesses
expressed uncertainty about the future, above the EU average of 79%. This may
be linked to frequent changes in the legal framework.
High energy costs (88%).
High energy costs are a major investment obstacle. To
overcome this, Polish firms are directing a high share of investment towards
improving energy efficiency (17% in Poland vs an EU average of 12%).
Shortage of skilled staff (87%).
Labour market shortages pose a challenge for
many businesses, notably in the construction, manufacturing and service sectors.
•
•
Regarding public investment, while Poland has effective procurement practices and
ensures capital availability over the lifetime of an investment project, some challenges
remain to achieving the most efficient public investment decisions:
•
Poland lacks a
unified state investment plan
aligned with the country’s long-
term strategy and medium-term fiscal-structural plan in order to gain a
comprehensive overview of investment spending and sources.
There is potential for enhanced
transparency and predictability
in public
investment plans in order to foster a more favourable business environment for
the private sector.
There are no
standardised procedures for project selection
or prioritisation at
central level involving external quality assurance to minimise underrepresentation
of risks and costs.
Standardised methodologies for project assessments
are currently mainly
used for EU co-financed projects but could be applied more widely especially for
major projects.
Ex post
assessments
are not systematically required or frequently conducted,
limiting the opportunity to correct earlier planning and implementation mistakes.
•
•
•
•
The implementation of
Poland’s RRP
faces challenges. At present, Poland has fulfilled
25% of the milestones and targets in its RRP. It remains important to accelerate the
implementation of
cohesion policy programmes.
The mid-term review offers
opportunities to speed up progress and better address EU strategic priorities related to
competitiveness, defence, housing, water resilience and the energy transition. While Poland
has leveraged
STEP
to reallocate some cohesion policy resources towards
competitiveness, it can further support the development or manufacturing of critical
technologies in the areas of digital and deep tech, clean and resource efficient
technologies, and biotechnologies.
(
15
) EIB Investment Survey 2024 Poland overview.
7
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0009.png
INNOVATION, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND
PRODUCTIVITY
Simplification and reduced
administrative burden for
businesses
Poland’s institutional framework is
crucial for its competitiveness.
The country
has improved regulatory governance and
digitalisation which is an important step in
building trust among citizens and businesses.
Action is being taken to ensure judicial
independence and to address concerns over
corruption, with the roll-out of a new electronic
case management and case allocation system
(Annex 6). A stable judicial system which
offers certainty is crucial for Poland’s future
prosperity. To further increase trust among
citizens, the government could prioritise
limiting
bureaucracy
and
increasing
transparency around decision-making and the
use of public money (
16
). Moreover, reducing
transposition and conformity deficits, which
are above the EU average, would enable the
single market to function smoothly in Poland.
(Annex 4)
The business environment in Poland is
subject to a complex and fast-changing
regulatory framework, which can deter
investment and hinder economic growth.
Frequent changes to laws and regulations
which provide companies, on average, only
31 days to prepare, can be challenging, in
particular for small to medium-sized
enterprises. Measures have been taken to
improve the law-making process, such as more
frequent use of impact assessments and
public consultations. However, persistent
challenges
remain
with
regard
to
administrative
burden
and
ensuring
(
16
)
Understanding Europeans’ views on reform needs
regulations are proportionate and effective.
More could also be done to strengthen legal
certainty and make more frequent use of
periodic in-depth reviews, codification, and
regulatory consolidation, in conjunction with
efforts to increase the average time between
adoption and the entry into force of new laws.
By streamlining the regulatory framework and
reducing unnecessary bureaucracy, Poland
could create a more favourable business
environment that encourages entrepreneurship
and investment.
Graph 2.1:
Four most frequently cited
problems when doing business in Poland (%)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Fast-changing
legislation
Tax rates
Complex admin
procedures
Restrictive
labour
regulations
PL
EU-27
Source:
Flash Eurobarometer 543. Businesses’ attitudes
towards corruption in the EU. Fieldwork 02/04-
23/04/2024
Government-led initiatives can improve
productivity.
Labour productivity in Poland is
lower than the EU aggregate but is rapidly
closing in on it (
17
). Recently, the government
embarked on a simplification exercise to
improve conditions for businesses and
eliminate unnecessary administrative burdens
(
17
) European Commission (Autumn 2024 Economic
Forecast).
8
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0010.png
for citizens (
18
). Moreover, it has set up a
governmental task force that will work with
business representatives (
19
). These initiatives
are promising, but there remains scope for
further action, for example, by setting up a
dedicated institution (i.e. a National
Productivity Board) to promote productivity-
enhancing policies on a more permanent basis.
Digital transformation in fostering
innovation and productivity
Digital transformation plays a crucial
role in fostering innovation and
enhancing productivity in Poland, but
progress has not been uniform.
As shown
by Poland’s achievements in the key
performance indicators on digitalisation
identified in the Digital Decade Country
Report (
20
), Poland made notable progress in
terms of its connectivity and digital
infrastructure, in particular gigabit connectivity
and fibre-to-the-premises coverage. However,
it is lagging behind in the roll-out of 5G
technology, with coverage in Poland well below
the EU average, primarily due to delays in
authorisation of 5G pioneer bands (see
Annex 4). This limits businesses’ ability to
adopt advanced digital solutions, such as
Internet of Things (IoT), AI-driven automation
and cloud computing. Accelerating the
allocation of 5G spectrum will thus be critical
to closing this gap, enhancing business
productivity and improving the share of ICT in
Poland’s gross value added.
Challenges persist in the adoption of
digital technologies by businesses,
particularly small to medium-sized
enterprises,
negatively
impacting
productivity
growth.
Poland
is
(
18
)
https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/uchwala-w-sprawie-
koordynacji-procesu-legislacyjnego-wdrazajacego-
deregulacje.
(
19
)
Ruszyły prace zespołu ds. deregulacji
- Kancelaria
Prezesa Rady Ministrów - Portal Gov.pl
(
20
) Poland Country report. European Commission:
Digital
Decade 2024: Country reports
| Shaping Europe’s digital
future.
underperforming in digitisation metrics which
have a high potential impact on productivity
and innovation, such as take-up of AI. Only
4.9% of small to medium-sized enterprises in
Poland have adopted AI compared to an EU
average of 12.6%. Furthermore, they are less
likely to use data analytics, with usage at just
17.6%, compared to an EU average of 32.1%.
A major barrier to progress is a shortage of
ICT specialists, which is making it more
difficult for businesses to implement digital
solutions effectively. Strengthening the ICT
workforce and fostering a robust start-up
ecosystem will be essential to driving
innovation and increasing productivity (see
Annex 12).
Poland is achieving mixed results in
digital public services.
Poland scored below
the EU average in terms of the availability,
accessibility and use of digital public services
by citizens and businesses. However, it excels
in online access to e-health records, scoring
well in excess of the EU average. In terms of
the use of eID in public services, Poland scored
slightly above the EU average. Work is ongoing
to improve digital services, with the annual
growth rate in such services for citizens
exceeding the EU average (6.4% in Poland
compared to an EU average of 3.1%). This
trend is being reinforced by the development
of an electronic documentation management
system and the addition of new key public
services (see Annex 6).
Poland’s recovery and resilience plan and
cohesion policy funding are driving
forward the digital transition.
Poland has
already implemented three reforms under its
recovery and resilience plan to improve the
development of and access to wired and
wireless communication. The Polish recovery
and resilience plan and cohesion policy funding
have supported investment in ultra-fast
broadband coverage for households and
schools in white spots. Moreover, companies
will receive support to: (i) invest in advanced
technologies and artificial intelligence in
manufacturing and business processes; (ii)
implement smart production lines and
construct smart factories; and (iii) deploy
digital
technologies
to
reduce
the
environmental impact of manufacturing.
9
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0011.png
Absorption of funds under the Recovery and
Resilience Facility and cohesion policy will also
help to increase the efficiency of public
administration. This will be achieved by
investing in interoperable and secure e-
services for individuals and businesses (see
Annex 6).
activities and collaboration with academic
researchers and institutions is particularly
underused. This is further exacerbated by
insufficient
targeting
of
programmes
promoting applied research and academic-
private collaboration and a lack of systemic
incentives for researchers to cooperate with
industry.
Poland
has
established
various
instruments to bridge the gap between its
research community and business.
The
Łukasiewicz Research
Network and the Polish
Association of Centres for Technology Transfer
(PACCT) are important initiatives which will, if
effectively implemented, help to translate
knowledge into business solutions. The
‘implementation
doctorate’
programme
allowing PhD students to work in the business
sector while studying, aims at linking academic
knowledge with practical business applications.
Additionally, a set of R&D tax incentives has
been introduced. Assessing, monitoring and
possibly improving those initiatives will be key
to their success.
A strong public research career system
with systemic incentives for researchers
to cooperate with industry would also
reinforce science-business collaboration.
To this end, criteria and rewards encouraging
science-business collaboration could be
considered as part of an ongoing review of
Poland’s
research
evaluation
system.
Moreover, better salaries and career prospects,
mobility programmes and a support
framework for academics could help to make
research careers more attractive and address
the shortage of public sector researchers (see
Annex 3 and Annex 10).
Funding under cohesion policy and the
Recovery and Resilience Facility is
instrumental
in
supporting
the
development
of
science-business
collaboration in Poland.
Crucial to this will
be the timely roll-out of the European Funds
for a Modern Economy (FENG) under which
Poland and the EU have jointly earmarked
Enhancing innovation through
stronger science-business
collaboration and an attractive
research career system
Poland
has
improved
its
R&D
performance but continues to face
structural challenges.
As an emerging
innovator, Poland has made visible progress in
its R&D performance, narrowing the gap with
the EU average (65.9% in 2024, up
3.3 percentage points on 2023) (
21
). As past
improvements were largely driven by gradual
increases in R&D spending, further increases
would therefore be beneficial. Improvements
to Poland’s R&D performance will also depend
on whether structural challenges are
addressed in relation to weak collaboration
between science and business and Poland’s
underperforming research career system.
These efforts should be tailored to differences
across regional innovation ecosystems and
local competitiveness potential (see Annex 17).
Cooperation
between
science
and
business is limited, reducing Poland’s
ability to bring innovation to the market.
While the general regulatory and legal
environment in Poland is conducive to
innovation, Poland faces difficulties in joining
up scientific research with business needs.
Despite some improvement, Poland remains
well below the EU average in terms of
business participation in research and
innovation activities run by public institutions
and the number of joint scientific publications
(Annex 3). The potential for small to medium-
sized enterprises to engage in innovation
(
21
)
European innovation scoreboard - European
Commission
10
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0012.png
EUR 10 billion over a seven-year period (
22
)
and the swift implementation of investments
in modern laboratories financed under the
Recovery and Resilience Facility.
(
22
)
Open Data Portal for the European Structural
Investment Funds - European Commission | Cohesion
Open Data
11
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0013.png
DECARBONISATION, ENERGY AFFORDABILITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY
Decarbonising industry and
supporting the development of
clean technologies
Poland
is
making
progress
on
decarbonising the economy but remains
heavily reliant on fossil fuels.
Poland’s
share of renewables in the electricity
generation mix increased to 30% in 2024, up
from 27.2% in 2023, although this remains far
below the EU average (47%). Fossil fuels,
including coal, lignite and natural gas, account
for 70% of electricity generation, which
exacerbates price surges (see Annex 8).
Relatively high electricity prices are leading
consumers to choose different energy sources,
such as gas, slowing down the electrification
of the economy, which stands at 16.6%,
compared to an EU average of 22.9%.
Poland has emerged as a clean tech hub in the
EU and is playing a growing role in clean
technology manufacturing, while conventional
industries are facing a complex challenge in
shifting to clean modes of production to
remain competitive. 60% of all European-
made lithium batteries are manufactured in
Poland. Meanwhile, other clean tech industries,
such as heat pump manufacturing, are
growing in Poland (see Annex 7). Clean
technology manufacturing would benefit from
a clear strategic outlook, better regulatory
certainty and forward-looking investments in
skills in order to scale up further. Action could
also be taken through public procurement and
other policies which stimulate steady domestic
demand and promote clean tech growth while
assisting the transition of other sectors such
as heating and transport. At the same time,
Poland would strongly benefit from a policy
framework to advance the transformation of
conventional energy-intensive industries to
bolster their competitiveness. Its primary focus
should be on lowering energy prices through
faster decarbonisation of the power system
(see Annex 8) and facilitating public and
private investment in cleaner modes of
production that help industries reduce their
carbon footprint while cutting pollution and
strengthening the circular economy. Poland
would also benefit from drawing on existing
instruments to increase demand for EU-made
products, e.g. by incorporating sustainability,
resilience, and made-in-Europe criteria into
public and private procurement.
Poland could also take action to accelerate the
clean transition of the district heating sector.
In Poland, 69% of district heating still runs on
coal.
Poland’s anticipated Heating Strategy is
an opportunity to prioritise investments in
energy efficiency and electrification to
advance the decarbonisation of the district
heating sector while contributing to sector
coupling. Investment plans for the sector
should therefore promote the diversification of
sector business models, including through the
development of power system services such
as demand side response or energy storage
and energy efficiency improvements for end
customers. This has significant potential for
stimulating the development of ancillary
sectors such as bio-methane production,
facilitating renewables integration, while
ensuring the long-term economic viability of
the district heating sector. The district heating
sector in Poland could play a part in lowering
energy prices due to its size and potential for
diversification. However, tapping into this
invaluable potential will require a coherent set
of policies and coordinated, strategically-
oriented investment plans. At the same time, it
would be beneficial for public investments in
the energy efficiency of buildings to continue,
with a better programme design where
necessary, in order to reduce energy
consumption and shield households from
volatile and rising energy prices (see Annex 7).
In this context, Poland has benefited
12
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0014.png
significantly from EU-funded programmes for
improving energy efficiency, receiving some
EUR 6 billion in cohesion policy funding for the
period 2021-27 and EUR 9.4 billion under the
recovery and resilience plan.
Poland would also benefit from reversing
the upward trend in transport emissions.
To this end, additional investment in railway
infrastructure could promote a modal shift
away from road transport, while making the
economy more competitive. Poland has
received EU funding to invest in its railways,
including
EUR 2.4 billion
for
railway
modernisation under the recovery and
resilience plan. Nevertheless, road transport
emissions are continuing to rise (registering an
increase of 95% between 2005 and 2023),
reducing the likelihood of Poland meeting the
2030 emission reduction targets under the
Effort Sharing Regulation. With electric cars
accounting for a low share (5%) of new car
registrations, high road transport emissions
look set to continue in the coming years (see
Annex 7). It would be useful to accelerate the
modal shift towards more sustainable
transport modes, in particular rail transport.
Wider use of rail freight transport, which
reduces the carbon footprint of end products,
is crucial to maintaining the competitiveness
of Polish industry. As regards passenger rail
transport, better suburban and regional
connections could address labour market
shortages by facilitating commuter travel.
of renewable energy to end users as quickly as
possible, including through the implementation
of relevant EU legislation (
23
). Specific policies
that could contribute to those objectives
include encouraging faster take-up of
corporate power purchase agreements and
implementing renewables acceleration areas.
Taxation could be used to reduce Poland’s
relatively high electricity prices by
shifting the tax burden from electricity to
fossil fuels.
In Poland, wholesale electricity
prices in 2024 were among the highest in the
EU, at EUR 96 per MWh, which had a major
impact on industry competitiveness and on
households. The tax burden on electricity is a
contributing factor to high electricity prices. In
Poland, taxes and levies on electricity account
for nearly 50% of the total price paid by
households and 32% of the price paid by
energy intensive industries, compared to the
EU averages of 24% and 7-12% respectively.
By contrast, taxes and levies on gas account
for only 19% of the total price paid by
households and around 1% of the price paid
by energy intensive industries (see Annex 7).
By rebalancing its energy taxation, Poland
could lower electricity prices for consumers
and increase the competitiveness of industry
while creating a stimulus for faster fossil fuel
phase-out and electrification. It would also
curb the need for the household electricity
price cap, introduced in 2022 and extended
until September 2025, which is not targeted
and distorts the price signal for saving energy.
Increased grid flexibility and cross-border
interconnections could also contribute to
a reduction in electricity prices.
Significant
investments in non-fossil grid flexibility,
including storage and demand-side response,
would be beneficial, in addition to addressing
market access barriers. This would help
stabilise electricity prices while increasing the
penetration of renewable energy sources
through storage of excess energy during peak
generation periods. Poland’s electricity grid
connections are underdeveloped, with only 5%
(
23
) Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources
(recast).
Reducing energy prices and
phasing-out fossil fuel subsidies
Affordable renewable energy is essential
to ensuring that Polish industry,
especially
energy
intensive
users,
remains competitive.
Major reforms and
investments have already been and continue
to be made by Poland that contribute to this
objective, including through the recovery and
resilience plan. However, more could be done
to bring larger volumes of clean and
affordable energy to the market quickly (see
Annex 7). In this context it is crucial to
accelerate the roll-out of renewables and grid
permitting processes and to bring the benefits
13
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0015.png
cross-border interconnections (EU target: 15%
by 2030). Moreover, there are no significant
projects in the pipeline to increase transfer
capacity on the western border. Increased
interconnections would help to improve
electricity prices, system flexibility, renewable
energy penetration and supply security.
National allocation constraints still limit the
cross-border availability of electricity capacity.
Finally, broader uptake of dynamic pricing for
electricity would encourage consumers to
adapt their energy usage, reducing strain on
the grid and allowing utilities to offer lower
prices during off-peak hours.
Poland records sizeable relevant fossil
fuel subsidies without a planned phase-
out before 2030, representing 0.92% of
Poland’s GDP.
Scaling down and phasing out
these subsidies is in line with EU commitments
and would give the government greater
flexibility for its spending choices. Priority
could be given to phasing out fossil fuel
subsidies which do not address energy poverty
in a targeted way, do not respond to genuine
energy security concerns, are not crucial to
industrial
competitiveness
and
hinder
electrification. Examples include ongoing
subsidies to the coal mining industry, tax
exemptions for coal and fuel oil, and excise
duty refunds on diesel used in agriculture (see
also Annex 8).
industries, the energy sector and tourism all
face the prospect of new challenges to their
competitiveness due to a growing risk of water
scarcity.
Poland has made progress in building up
its water resilience through investments
in water retention in rural areas under
the recovery and resilience plan and the
allocation of over EUR 2 billion to water
resilience under the European Regional
Development Fund and cohesion funds,
however there is scope for further
progress.
River valleys, forests, peatlands and
farmland currently have untapped potential
for retaining water in the landscape and
mitigating floods and drought through nature-
based solutions. This potential should be
acknowledged, exploited and preserved under
river basin management and forest
management policies and in the way
agricultural subsidies and farm advisory
services are designed (see Annex 9). Poland
should rebuild the knowledge and evidence
base necessary for policies to deliver resilient
water management. Investments in the
coming years should exploit the full potential
of nature-based solutions and shift the focus
from present-day uses to long-term water
resilience. At the same time Poland could
develop a policy framework for flood and
drought
preparedness
that
integrates
investment in early warning systems and
rescue services on the one hand, with nature-
based disaster prevention on the other.
Addressing the high costs of pollution and
boosting the circular economy
Poland still faces major environmental
challenges, including air and water
pollution, while its circular economy is
less developed than the EU average.
Simultaneously, these are also areas in which
the clean industrial transition presents
opportunities
for
reducing
industry’s
environmental impact while bolstering its
competitiveness.
In 2023, Poland’s circular material use
rate was 7.5%, up slightly on the
previous year having steadily declined
since 2014.
This puts Poland’s rate below the
Strengthening climate
preparedness and water resilience
Climate change poses a growing threat to
Poland’s economic security and, in
particular, its water resilience.
Extreme
weather events are putting infrastructure at
risk, heatwaves are posing an ever-greater
threat to public health and there is a growing
risk of water scarcity undermining the
sustainability of sectors which rely on water.
Poland is increasingly falling victim to an
alternating cycle of drought and floods, which
is threatening household water supply security
and exposing key economic sectors to losses
(see Annex 9). Agriculture and food production,
the
biomass
industry,
manufacturing
14
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0016.png
EU average of 11.8%. Poland is also lagging
behind the EU average in terms of its resource
productivity, although it has been steadily
improving in this area for the past decade.
Air pollution remains a serious problem in
Poland despite positive trends.
Poland has
the second-worst industrial air pollution in the
EU, with the energy sector being the primary
emitter, followed by the chemical industry.
Polish industry still releases large amounts of
water pollutants. Over the past decade, Poland
has seen the largest decrease of any EU
Member State in the number of water bodies
considered to be in good ecological status,
driven by pollutants from the mining and
quarrying industries, agriculture and municipal
and industrial waste and wastewater
treatment (see Annex 9).
At the same time, the costs of pollution
continue to exceed the amount invested
in pollution prevention and control.
As a
result of coal reliance in the heating sector
and energy production, Poland has one of the
highest exposures to fine particulate matters
in the EU. The latest available annual
estimates (for 2022) from the European
Environment Agency attribute 34 700 annual
deaths (or 391 000 years of life lost) to fine
particulate matter (PM2.5) alone. Poland’s
investment needs for pollution prevention and
control are estimated at EUR6.3 billion per
year in 2021–2027. Current investments, e.g.
supporting the replacement of coal-based
heating systems and investments into clean
technologies,
reach
an
estimated
EUR 4.8 billion per year, leaving a gap of
approximately EUR 1.5 billion per year(
24
) .
Poland needs to rapidly advance the green
transition in this sector. Investments to bolster
its competitiveness should work hand-in-hand
with boosting the circular economy and
reducing emissions.
(
24
) European Commission, 2025 Environmental
Implementation Review
–
Poland
15
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0017.png
SKILLS, QUALITY JOBS AND SOCIAL FAIRNESS
To improve the quality of school
education, Poland would benefit from
efficiently implementing its curriculum
reform,
while
ensuring
sufficient
preparation and support for teachers.
The
share of students who are top performers in
basic skills has fallen, indicating quality
challenges in general education, including in
teaching. To address its currently ineffective
knowledge-based curriculum and the recent
shortening of its general education cycle,
Poland is preparing a curriculum reform at
pre-primary and primary levels to improve the
teaching of competences. A comprehensive
approach to this reform, stakeholder
involvement, substantial teacher training and
support, and monitoring and evaluation from
an early stage, will be critical to achieving the
required results. Improving the quality and
relevance of initial teacher education, also in
the context of inclusive education, the
attractiveness of the teaching profession and
the selection criteria for accessing the
teaching profession could contribute to a
better quality of teaching and ensure the
reform has a long-lasting effect.
Persistently low enrolment in science,
technology, engineering and mathematics
study programmes (STEM) is limiting the
talent pool, including digital and green
skills and competences, and restricting
innovation capacity in Poland.
The
proportion of higher education students in
STEM study programmes has decreased over
recent years, with Poland sliding further below
the EU average (21.1% vs EU 27.1%). The
enrolment rate in natural sciences remains
particularly low (see Annex 12). Although the
economy needs more innovation and high-
skilled specialists (scientists, teachers, ICT
specialists and engineers), skills and labour
shortages persist especially in STEM fields and
in sectors relevant for the green and digital
transition. The proportion of companies which
reported a labour shortage as a significant
Facilitating learning in science,
technology, engineering, and
mathematics, and boosting basic
skills to support competitiveness
A decline in basic skills among young
people, in particular in vocational
programmes, and rising inequality in
school education
risk affecting Poland’s
competitiveness in the long term.
Poland
has witnessed a decline in basic skills (reading,
mathematics, science) among 15-year-olds
since 2018 in excess of the EU average (
25
).
Levels of underachievement have increased
significantly, moving Poland further away from
the EU’s 2030 target (see Annex
12). This risks
limiting the scope for learning and upskilling of
Polish students and subsequently reducing the
talent pool. Increased inequalities between
different types of secondary schools (see
Annex 12) and between urban and rural
schools (see Annex 11) are leaving students
attending sectoral vocational schools (szkoły
branżowe)
and rural schools at an educational
disadvantage (OECD, 2023). Overall, low
attainment of basic skills is far more acute
among disadvantaged students, with 39%
lacking the minimum competence level in
mathematics, hindering their educational and
professional development later in life (OECD,
2023). Better focusing on basic skills at
primary level and urgently boosting literacy
and numeracy skills in sectoral vocational
schools would facilitate subsequent upskilling
and improve the supply of relevant skills to the
labour market.
(
25
) Compared to 2018, the proportion of low achievers
increased by 8.3 percentage points (pps) in
mathematics (EU: 6.6 pps), 7.5 pps in reading (EU:
3.7 pps), and 4.8 pps in science (EU: 2 pps).
16
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0018.png
limiting factor for production was very high,
reaching 63% in manufacturing in Q4-2024
(EU average of 18%), 57.4% in services (EU
average of 26.8%) and 72.2% in construction
(EU average of 26%) (
26
). 65% of employers
indicate skills shortages as the main barrier to
transformation and expect talent availability
to worsen in the next five years (
27
).
Furthermore, 82% of small to medium-sized
enterprises report facing skills shortages, and
88% have struggled to retain skilled
workers (
28
). The macroeconomic skills
mismatch in Poland rose to 22.3 in 2023,
against a decreasing trend in the EU (from
20.2 in 2022 to 19.6 in 2023) (
29
). On
upskilling and reskilling needs for the green
transition, there are shortages in occupations
such as building structure cleaners, insulation
workers and roofers (
30
) (see Annexes 10 and
12). Improving teaching quality in science,
technology, engineering and mathematics in
schools is needed, while promoting their
learning as from early childhood education
and care would encourage interest from an
early age. Such efforts could be further
supported by raising awareness across the
whole of society about the importance of
science,
technology,
engineering
and
mathematics learning.
Improving the quality and relevance of
higher education is a significant
challenge.
Poland’s system for evaluating
the
scientific output of higher education
institutions is not entirely reliable or
transparent (
31
). The proportion of Polish
graduates with a PhD is low, which is limiting
the innovation talent pool. Moreover, careers in
academia
are
generally
unattractive,
contributing to a rise in the average age of
academic staff (
32
). Improving the evaluation
system and the quality assurance within the
higher education sector alongside more
attractive careers in academia would help
ensure that the necessary talent pool is
created, and optimise investment in a context
of declining student numbers.
Encouraging adult learning and
improving the effectiveness of
vocational education and training
Low levels of adult learning participation
are contributing to skills mismatches
hampering the digital and green
transition, which in turn is limiting
Poland’s competitiveness.
In contrast to the
EU trend, rates of adult learning participation
in Poland are falling. In 2022, some one in five
adults pursued adult learning over the course
of the previous 12 months, compared to an EU
average of almost 40% (see Annex 12).
Poland’s national target for adult learning of
51.7% by 2030 seems currently out of reach.
Increasing the level of adult learning is
important for closing skills gaps and
mismatches. A shrinking labour force and
growing skills shortages are exacerbating the
situation, while businesses have indicated a
lack of skilled workers as a barrier to
investment (see Annex 12). Shortages are
particularly acute in science, technology,
engineering and mathematics, digital skills,
and skills needed for the green transition.
Poland’s vocational education and training
system is lacking in effectiveness, significantly
(
31
) Under the evaluation system, small higher education
institutions in a specific discipline or with new faculties
score disproportionately better than well-established,
larger institutions, resulting in a financial impact on the
latter.
(
32
) Academic staff aged 25-34 made up only 14.1% of
total academic staff in 2022 (EU 20.9%). ESTAT
educ_uoe_perp01.
(
26
) European Commission Business and Consumer Survey,
publication date 8 January 2025.
(
27
) https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-future-of-
jobs-report-2025/.
(
28
)
European Year of Skills - Skills shortages, recruitment
and retention strategies in small and medium-sized
enterprises - September 2023 - - Eurobarometer survey
29
( ) This indicator highlights the comparably greater
difficulty for low- and medium-skilled workers to enter
the labour market, as compared to the high-skilled
workers.
(
30
) European Labour Authority
EURES Report on labour
shortages and surpluses 2024,
2025, based on data
from EURES National Coordination Offices. Skills and
knowledge requirements align with the ESCO taxonomy
on skills for the green transition, with examples
analysed using the ESCO green intensity index.
17
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0019.png
undermining the supply of skills which are in
demand, reducing the employability of
graduates and putting them at greater risk of
unemployment and social exclusion.
Important policy measures to enhance
lifelong learning are being financed under
cohesion policy and the Recovery and
Resilience Facility.
Poland aims to increase
adult learning through reinforced cooperation
and coordination across ministries and local
governments. To improve the supply of green
skills, Poland is creating sectoral qualification
frameworks. Poland is also developing a
strategic framework for digital skills. Using
investments financed under the Recovery and
Resilience Facility, Poland is in the process of
setting up 120 Sectoral Skills Centres aimed at
encouraging the development of green and
digital skills. Regional coordination teams for
vocational education and training and lifelong
learning have been established with support
from the Recovery and Resilience Facility with
a view to improving the coordination of skills
policies at regional level. However, there is no
clear ownership of adult learning policies at
government level. Despite action taken to
promote adult learning, mostly financed by the
EU, Poland is still no closer to achieving its
2030 national skills target.
Better coordination, monitoring and
evaluation, as well as better facilitation
by employers, can help increase the rate
of adult learning participation.
Poland’s
working group on skills development could be
a starting point for establishing a well-
coordinated
and
effective
governance
structure for adult learning. Ultimately, the
structure should arrive at clearly defined and
complementary roles and responsibilities for
all parties involved, with cooperation between
the ministries with responsibilities for labour
and education, implementing organisations
and social partners. By evaluating measures,
evidence-based
policymaking
can
be
supported and the efficiency and effectiveness
of planned/existing measures can be improved.
The 2023 amendment to the Labour Code also
offers the potential to bolster adult learning as
it specifies the circumstances in which
employers must inform employees of their
right to training, cover the cost of employees’
training and provide such training during
working hours.
An individual learning accounts scheme is
currently being piloted with support from
the European Social Fund Plus.
The pilot
project covers all adults between 18-69 years
of age regardless of their employment status
and is being rolled out in selected regions.
Individuals receive training entitlements and
are able to choose which training they take
part in according to their needs from a range
of courses published in an easily accessible
portal, the Development Services Database
(BUR). However, to create an effective
individual learning accounts (ILA) scheme, it is
important to embed the ILAs in an enabling
framework and to underpin the scheme with
adequate funding to ensure its sustainability in
the longer term. To drive the scheme further,
training entitlements could be accompanied by
other enabling measures such as paid training
leave. Paid training leave could offer adults an
incentive to take up training by letting them
keep their salary or by providing income
replacement during periods of training. To
ensure consistency, the ILA scheme could be
integrated with existing schemes, such as
training vouchers for lifelong learning offered
to unemployed persons and jobseekers. It
would also be useful to develop a
comprehensive
monitoring
framework
enabling, for example, the tracking of long-
term outcomes of ILAs, and quality and
performance assessments of training courses.
Engagement of social partners and relevant
stakeholders is critical to ensuring adequate
and sustainable funding for ILAs beyond the
pilot phase through a combination of public
and private financing.
Labour market participation
among disadvantaged groups is
increasing, however gaps remain
Poland’s labour market performance is
strong but will face challenges in the
future.
Poland’s employment rate (persons
aged 20-64) hit 78.4% in 2024, surpassing its
2030 target of 78.3%, while unemployment
18
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0020.png
was at 2.9%, making Poland one of the EU’s
strongest performers. Nevertheless, with an
ageing society and increasing labour
shortages, labour market integration of
underrepresented groups will be important in
the future.
Between 2022 and 2070, Poland’s
population is expected to decline by 16%, four
times the EU average, leading to a 9.8
percentage point decrease in the working-age
labour force
–even
with increased labour
market participation and migration
–
significantly impacting the labour supply and
underscoring the need to bring more people
into the labour market. The primary causes of
Poland’s ageing society are its historically low
fertility rate (1.29 compared to an EU average
of 1.46 in 2022) and changes in its population
structure (see Annex 10).
Obstacles to increasing the labour
market participation of women remain,
although progress has been made.
Low
labour market participation of women is
hampering economic growth and highlights the
existence of gender disparities caused by
insufficient childcare and long-term care
services, especially in rural areas (see
Annexes 10 and 11). Despite investments
under the European Social Fund Plus and the
Recovery and Resilience Facility, the
percentage of children under 3 years of age in
formal childcare has fallen in recent years and
is far below the EU average (see Annex 10).
Poland is also well below the EU average in
terms of the provision of public long-term care
services (3.4% compared to an EU average of
5.8% in 2019), with responsibility for care
mainly assumed by families (see Annex 11).
To increase the number of women in work, it is
important to invest in expanding the female
workforce, enhancing their qualifications and
improving working conditions. Additionally,
efforts should focus on ensuring that the most
disadvantaged children and parents have
access to high-quality childcare. Poland
recently adopted several measures which are
now being rolled out. It has reformed carer’s
leave with the aim of more evenly distributing
the care burden. It has also reformed parental
leave and paternity leave and is rolling out the
Active Toddler programme with support from
the European Social Fund Plus and the
Recovery and Resilience Facility which will
significantly increase the number of places
available in early childhood education and
care. Reform priorities in the area of long-term
care include increasing access to high-quality,
affordable and accessible community-based
long-term care services, and improving
working conditions and work-life balance for
carers (see Annex 11).
The disability employment gap has
widened further in recent years to 35.6%
and is now one of the largest in the EU.
This is partly due to the absence of a legal
basis for supported employment and a lack of
knowledge and skills among employers on how
to integrate persons with disabilities in the
workplace. Although Poland has set itself a
target to increase the number of persons with
disabilities in employment, no concrete and
measurable actions have been so far
implemented for employers and other
stakeholders. The newly launched project to
develop a model of supported employment
and prepare for its introduction as a labour
market instrument, is a positive step. To
further support persons with disabilities,
measures for helping them find employment
could be strengthened, for example by tapping
into the full potential of the social economy to
create economic opportunities and promote
social
inclusion
and
integration
of
disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, the
education gap between persons with
disabilities and persons without, in particular in
higher education, is wide (21.4 pps compared
to an EU average of 11.3 pps). To address the
challenges faced by young persons with
disabilities in acquiring competitive skills and
transitioning to the labour market, Poland’s
current policy priority, reform measures and
investments in inclusive education would
benefit from an inclusive education and
training strategy.
Social dialogue
Meaningful involvement of Polish social
partners in designing and implementing
policies could increase competitiveness
and reduce labour market inequalities.
In
19
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0021.png
Poland, there are still regular violations of
internationally recognised labour rights (
33
).
Meanwhile collective bargaining coverage has
been on a downward trend since the 2000s,
with Poland now registering one of the lowest
levels of coverage in the EU (see Annex 10).
Laws on collective labour agreements and the
minimum wage, presented in June 2024 are
still under review and have not yet been
submitted to Parliament. According to Polish
social partners, the proposed legislation on
collective agreements fails to offer real
incentives to encourage collective bargaining.
However, the Polish government is also
planning to adopt legislation amending the
Social Dialogue Council (RDS) in the second
quarter of 2025 which may be a step in the
right direction. To make social dialogue more
inclusive and enable more effective public
consultations, it would be helpful to broaden
the scope of the Social Dialogue Council,
increase social partners’ legislative rights and
extend the parties represented in the Council.
Collective bargaining on important issues such
as technological innovation, new forms of
work organisation and lifelong learning could
be enhanced by measures such as incentives
to encourage collective bargaining. Other
possible measures include extending the types
of collective agreements available and
reducing the number of areas not covered by
collective agreements.
growth (
34
). This increase has been particularly
marked in Poland’s larger cities and
metropolitan areas. Economic uncertainties
have further contributed to price increases.
With the second highest real mortgage
interest rates in Q3-2024 in the EU (
35
),
Poland’s housing situation is especially
challenging for first-time buyers and renters
–
primarily young people
–
decreasing their
mobility and making planning for the future
more difficult.
More investment in housing and new
policy measures could help to address
Poland’s insufficient housing supply.
In
Poland, investment in housing is the lowest in
the EU (2.2% of GDP compared to an EU
average of 5.8% in 2023), while the rate of
overcrowded households is one of the highest.
Between 2020 and 2024 housing market
shocks were observed (such as the COVID-19
pandemic, Russian war in Ukraine, energy
crisis), while affordable mortgage programme
(“Bezpieczny Kredyt 2%”) fuelled additional
demand in face of supply bottlenecks, which
altogether contributed to rapid housing price
rises. Since 2022, Poland has seen a slowdown
in the housing supply which may have
contributed to higher nominal house prices and
warrants closer monitoring. Between 2021-
2023 construction producer prices for new
residential buildings increased by 25%,
exceeding the EU average of 20%, while the
number of building permits for new dwellings
decreased by 30% (compared to an EU
average decrease of 23%). Housing measures
already in place, such as subsidies for
municipalities to build social housing and a
preferential loans programme for social
housing cooperatives, could be expanded to
increase investment in housing, create a larger
stock of affordable housing and increase
competition with the private housing stock and
private rental properties (see Annex 11).
(
34
) Housing in Europe
–
2024 edition; Eurostat housing
statistics. Eurostat:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-
publications/housing-2024#housing-cost.
(
35
) The global cost of homes in 2024. Best Brokers
https://www.bestbrokers.com/forex-brokers/the-global-cost-
of-homes-in-2024-comparing-the-real-mortgage-
interest-rates-and-home-prices-around-the-world/.
An affordable and efficient
housing market
Poland’s housing shortage is causing
house prices and rent to rise.
Poland is
faced with an acute housing shortage, which
has resulted in spiralling house price and
rental inflation. Since 2015, house prices and
rent have increased by 107% and 66%
respectively, far exceeding the EU average and
slightly
exceeding
household
income
(
33
) International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC):
https://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/2024_ituc_global_rights_index_en.pdf.
20
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0022.png
KEY FINDINGS
To boost competitiveness, sustainability and
social fairness, Poland would benefit from:
•
accelerating the implementation of the
recovery and resilience plan,
including
the
REPowerEU
chapter;
swiftly
implementing
cohesion policy,
taking
advantage of the opportunities under the
mid-term review and making optimal use
of EU instruments, including
InvestEU
and
STEP,
to improve competitiveness;
•
increasing the efficiency of public
spending
by focusing social programmes
on lower-income and at-risk groups and
strengthening the efficiency of public
investment through more coordinated and
transparent planning and systematic
evaluations;
•
addressing the challenges of an ageing
population
by increasing the effective
retirement age and equalising the
retirement age for men and women to
ensure the sustainability and adequacy of
pensions, reforming preferential pension
schemes, and strengthening the healthcare
system;
•
ensuring an effective institutional and
regulatory framework
by simplifying
legislation and reducing unnecessary
bureaucracy, simplifying the tax framework,
and strengthening social dialogue;
•
increasing the digital intensity
of
businesses by accelerating the adoption of
digital technologies, including those with a
high impact on productivity, particularly
among small to medium-sized enterprises,
and improving digitalisation of the public
sector;
•
enhancing innovation through stronger
science-business collaboration and an
attractive research career system
by
carrying out a comprehensive review of
existing instruments, boosting R&D
investment, increasing incentives for
researchers to cooperate with industry and
tapping
into
regional
innovation
ecosystems;
•
reducing reliance on fossil fuels
by
improving energy efficiency, phasing out
fossil fuel subsidies, advancing the
transition of the district heating sector, and
taking further measures to decarbonise the
transport sector;
•
addressing the impact of energy prices
on households and competitiveness
by
accelerating further grid investments,
improving grid flexibility through the
promotion of demand side response,
increased energy storage capacities and
enhanced cross border electricity trading,
promoting the deployment of renewables,
and reducing the tax burden on clean
energy;
•
addressing the growing risk of drought
and floods
by improving the coordination
of policies that affect water resources,
making better use and protecting the
capacity of river valleys, forests, peatlands
and farmland to retain water in the
landscape;
•
reversing the decline in basic skills
and reducing inequalities
in school
education by ensuring the efficient
implementation of the curriculum reform,
enhancing literacy and numeracy in
vocational programmes, and improving the
quality of teacher training;
•
increasing participation in science,
technology,
engineering
and
mathematics in higher education
by
improving the quality of teaching in these
disciplines in schools, enhancing career
21
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0023.png
guidance
and
promoting
science,
technology, engineering and mathematics
learning from an early age;
•
addressing
skills
shortages,
particularly digital skills and basic
skills
among
adults,
increasing
participation in adult learning through
providing more support by employers and a
strengthened VET system;
•
increasing labour market participation
of persons with disabilities and women
by better targeting measures to support
disadvantaged groups, continuing to
improve the quality of and access to formal
home- and community-based long-term
care and early childhood education and
care.
22
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0024.png
ANNEXES
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0026.png
LIST OF ANNEXES
Fiscal
A1.
A2.
Fiscal surveillance and debt sustainability
Taxation
27
27
34
Productivity
A3.
A4.
A5.
A6.
Innovation to business
Making business easier
Capital markets, financial stability and access to finance
Effective institutional framework
37
37
42
47
54
Sustainability
A7.
A8.
A9.
Clean industry and climate mitigation
Affordable energy transition
Climate adaptation, preparedness and environment
59
59
66
72
Fairness
A10. Labour market
A11. Social policies
A12. Education and skills
A13. Social Scoreboard
A14. Health and health systems
78
78
82
87
91
92
Horizontal
A15. Sustainable development goals
A16. CSR progress and EU funds implementation
A17. Competitive regions
95
95
98
106
LIST OF TABLES
A1.1.
A1.2.
A1.3.
A1.4.
A1.5.
A1.6.
A1.7.
A1.8.
A1.9.
General government balance and debt
Net expenditure growth
Net expenditure (outturn and forecast), annual and cumulated deviations vis-à-vis the recommendation
Defence expenditure and the national escape clause
Macroeconomic developments and forecasts
General government budgetary position
Debt developments
RRF
–
Grants
RRF - Loans
29
29
30
30
31
31
32
32
33
25
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0027.png
A1.10.
A1.11.
A2.1.
A3.1.
A4.1.
A5.1.
A6.1.
A6.2.
A7.1.
A8.1.
A9.1.
A13.1.
A14.1.
A16.1.
A16.2.
A17.1.
Projected change in age-related expenditure in 2024-2040 and 2024-2070
Fiscal Governance Database Indicators
Taxation indicators
Key innovation indicators (*)
Making Business Easier: indicators.
Financial indicators
Poland. Selected indicators on administrative burden reduction and simplification
Digital Decade targets monitored through the Digital Economy and Society Index
Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Poland
Key Energy Indicators
Key indicators for progress on climate adaptation, preparedness and environment
Social Scoreboard for Poland
Key health indicators
Selected EU funds with adopted allocations - summary data (million EUR)
Summary table on 2019-2024 CSRs
Selection of indicators at regional level in Poland
33
34
36
42
47
54
56
57
66
72
78
92
94
102
103
108
LIST OF GRAPHS
A2.1.
A2.2.
A3.1.
A3.2.
A4.1.
A5.1.
A5.2.
A5.3.
A5.4.
A5.5.
A6.1.
A6.2.
A7.1.
A7.2.
A7.3.
A8.1.
A8.2.
A8.3.
A9.1.
A9.2.
A10.1.
A10.2.
A11.1.
A11.2.
A12.1.
A14.1.
A14.2.
A15.1.
A16.1.
A16.2.
A17.1.
Tax revenue shares in 2023
Tax wedge for single and second earners, % of total labour costs, 2024
Patent applications filed under the PCT per billion GDP (in PPS €)
in relation to business enterprise expenditure on R&D
(BERD) as a percentage of GDP, 2021
Public-private scientific co-publications as a percentage of the total number of publications, 2023
Making Business Easier: selected indicators.
Net savings-investment balance
International investment position
Capital markets and financial intermediaries
Composition of NFC funding as % of GDP
Composition of household financial assets per capita and as % of GDP
Trust in justice, regional / local authorities and in government
Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG)
GHG emission intensity of manu-facturing and energy-intensive sectors, 2022
Manufacturing industry output production: total and selected sectors, index (2021 = 100), 2017-2023
Greenhouse gas emissions in the effort sharing sectors, 2005 and 2023
Retail energy price components for household and non-household consumers, 2024
Monthly average day-ahead wholesale electricity prices and European benchmark natural gas prices (Dutch TTF)
Poland’s installed renewable capacity (left) and electricity generation mix (right)
Direct dependency(1) on ecosystem services(2) of the gross value added generated by economic sector in 2022
Investment needs and gaps in EUR million, in 2022 constant prices
Key labour market indicators
Employment by age group and sex
Components of AROPE, 2015-2023
In-work AROP rate for contract type
Trends in underachievement in mathematics by students’ socio-economic
background, PISA 2012-2022 (%)
Life expectancy at birth, years
Treatable mortality
Progress towards the SDGs in Poland
Distribution of RRF funding in Poland by policy field
Distribution of cohesion policy funding across policy objectives in Poland
Labour productivity per hour
35
37
39
40
44
48
49
49
51
52
55
56
62
62
63
67
68
70
76
76
79
80
83
84
88
93
93
96
100
100
108
LIST OF MAPS
A17.1.
A17.2.
GDP per head (in purchasing power standard PPS), 2023
Average speed for fixed internet, 2023
106
110
26
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0028.png
FISCAL
ANNEX 1: FISCAL SURVEILLANCE AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
This Annex contains a series of tables relevant for the assessment of the fiscal situation in Poland,
including how Poland is responding to Council recommendations issued under the reformed Economic
Governance Framework.
The reformed framework, which entered into force on 30 April 2024(
36
), aims to strengthen debt
sustainability and promote sustainable and inclusive growth through growth-enhancing reforms and
priority investments. The medium-term fiscal-structural plans (hereinafter, MTPs or plans) constitute the
cornerstone of the framework, setting the budgetary commitment of Member States over the medium
term. The latter is defined in terms of net expenditure growth, which is the single operational indicator for
fiscal surveillance.
Poland submitted its plan on 9 October 2024. The plan covers the period until 2028, presenting a fiscal
adjustment over four years. On 21 January 2025, the Council adopted the Recommendation endorsing
Poland’s plan(
37
). On 21 January 2025, the Council also adopted a Recommendation under Article 126(7)
TFEU (
38
) to correct the excessive deficit in Poland. The corrective net expenditure path recommended by
the Council under the excessive deficit procedure is consistent with the path set out in the plan.
The assessment of the implementation of the Council Recommendation endorsing Poland’s plan is carried
out on the basis of outturn data from Eurostat and
the Commission’s Spring 2025 Forecast and taking
into account the Annual Progress Report (APR) that Poland submitted on 30 April 2025. Furthermore, given
Poland’s request to activate the National Escape Clause
(
39
) in accordance with the Commission
Communication of 19 March 2025 (
40
), the assessment also considers, as appropriate, the projected
increase in defence expenditure based on the Commission Spring 2025 Forecast.
The Annex is organised as follows. First, developments in
government deficit and debt
are presented
based on the figures reported in table A1.1. Then, the assessment of the
implementation of the
Council Recommendation to correct the excessive deficit and of the Council Recommendation
endorsing the plan
follows, based on the relevant figures presented in Tables A1.2 to A1.9, including
data on defence expenditure.
The Annex also provides information on the
cost of ageing
and the
national fiscal framework.
Fiscal
sustainability risks are discussed in the Debt Sustainability Monitor 2024(
41
).
(
36
) Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) on the effective coordination of economic policies
and on multilateral budgetary surveillance, together with the amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure, and the amended Council Directive 2011/85/EU on the budgetary frameworks of Member States are the
core elements of the reformed EU economic governance framework.
(
37
) OJ C, C/2025/642, 10.02.2025, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/642/oj.
(
38
) Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive deficit in Poland, C/2025/5037.
(
39
) On 30 April 2025, Poland requested to the Commission the activation of the National Escape Clause. On this basis, the Commission
adopted a Recommendation COM/2025/611.
(
40
) Communication from the Commission accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Pact of 19
March 2025, C(2025) 2000 final.
(
41
)
European Commission (2025) ‘Debt Sustainability Monitor 2024,’
European Economy-Institutional Papers
306.
27
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0029.png
Developments in government deficit and debt
Poland’s
government deficit amounted to
6.6% of GDP in 2024. Based on the Commission’s
Spring 2025
Forecast, it is projected to decrease to 6.4% in 2025. The government debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to
55.3% at the end of 2024 and, according to the Commission, it is projected to increase to 58.0% by the
end of 2025.
Table A1.1:
General government balance and debt
Variables
1
2
2024
% GDP
% GDP
Outturn
-6.6
55.3
APR
-6.3
57.8
2025
COM
-6.4
58.0
APR
n.a.
n.a.
2026
COM
-6.1
65.3
General government balance
General government gross debt
Source:
Commission Spring 2025 Forecast (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR).
Developments in net expenditure
The net expenditure(
42
) growth of Poland in 2025 is forecast by the Commission(
43
) to be below the
recommended maximum. Considering 2024 and 2025 together, the cumulative growth rate of net
expenditure is projected to be above the recommended maximum cumulative growth rate, corresponding
to a deviation of less than 0.1% of GDP.
Table A1.2:
Net expenditure growth
Annual
REC
2024
2025
2026
Cumulative*
COM
REC
Growth rates
12.7%
n.a.
6.2%
19.6%
5.4%
24.9%
APR
n.a.
19.2%
n.a.
COM
n.a.
19.7%
26.1%
APR
12.7%
5.8%
n.a.
n.a.
6.3%
4.4%
* The cumulative growth rates are calculated by reference to the base year of 2023.
Source:
Council Recommendation to correct the excessive deficit in Poland, Annual Progress Report (APR), and Commission Spring
2025 Forecast (COM).
The assessment of the net expenditure growth and, in particular, the comparison with the recommended
net expenditure path considers that Poland has requested the activation of the national escape clause to
facilitate transitioning to a higher level of defence expenditure. General government defence expenditure
in Poland amounted to 1.6% of GDP in 2021, 1.6% of GDP in 2022 and 2.0% of GDP in 2023 (
44
).
According to the Commission 2025 Spring Forecast, expenditure on defence is projected to amount to
2.7% of GDP in 2024 and 2.8% of GDP in 2025. Based on current projections for defence spending, the
deviation that is projected for Poland is within the flexibility provided by the national escape clause.
(
42
) Net expenditure is defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 as government expenditure net of (i) interest expenditure,
(ii) discretionary revenue measures, (iii) expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by revenue from Union funds, (iv)
national expenditure on co-financing of programmes funded by the Union, (v) cyclical elements of unemployment benefit
expenditure, and (vi) one-off and other temporary measures.
(
43
) Commission Spring 2025 Forecast,
European Economy-Institutional paper 318,
May 2025.
(
44
) Eurostat, government expenditure by classification of functions of government (COFOG).
28
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0030.png
Table A1.3:
Net expenditure (outturn and forecast), annual and cumulated deviations vis-à-vis the
recommendation
Variables
Total expenditure
Interest expenditure
3
Cyclical unemployment expenditure
4
Expenditure funded by transfers from the EU
5
National co-financing of EU programmes
6
One-off expenditure (levels, excl. EU funded)
Net nationally financed primary expenditure (before
7=1-2-3-4-5-6
discretionary revenue measures, DRM)
8
Change in net nationally financed primary expenditure (before DRM)
9
DRM (excl. one-off revenue, incremental impact)
Change in net nationally financed primary expenditure
10=8-9
(after DRM)
11
Outturn / forecast net expenditure growth
12
Recommended net expenditure growth*
13=(11-12) x 7
Annual deviation
14 (cumulated from 13)
Cumulated deviation
15=13/17
Annual balance
16=14/17
Cumulated balance
17
p.m. Nominal GDP
1
2
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
bn NAC
% change
% change
bn NAC
bn NAC
% GDP
% GDP
bn NAC
2023
Outturn
1600.5
70.8
-0.1
46.0
14.0
0.0
1469.9
2024
Outturn
1799.2
80.2
0.1
34.8
9.3
2.4
1672.4
202.5
15.4
187.1
12.73%
12.5%
3.4
3.4
0.1
0.1
3641.2
2025
COM
1967.2
99.8
0.0
71.7
9.7
3.7
1782.3
109.9
6.7
103.2
6.2%
6.3%
-2.1
1.2
-0.1
0.0
3919.1
2026
COM
2104.1
111.1
-0.1
83.8
12.0
0.0
1897.2
114.8
19.4
95.4
5.4%
4.4%
17.0
18.3
0.4
0.4
4161.1
3415.3
* The growth rate for 2024 is not a recommendation but serves to anchor the base, as the latest year with outturn data when
setting the net expenditure path is year 2023.
Source:
Commission Spring 2025 Forecast and Commission's calculation.
Table A1.4:
Defence expenditure and the national escape clause
1
2
3
4
Total defence expenditure
of which: gross fixed capital formation
Flexibility from increases in defence expenditure
Cumulated balance after flexibility
% GDP
% GDP
% GDP
% GDP
2021
1.6
0.3
2022
1.6
0.0
2023
2.0
0.6
2024
2.7
1.2
2025
2.8
1.3
1.2
-1.2
2026
2.7
1.2
1.2
-0.7
Source:
Eurostat (COFOG), Commission Spring 2025 Forecast and Commission's calculation.
29
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0031.png
Table A1.5:
Macroeconomic developments and forecasts
Variables
1=7+8+9
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
2024
Outturn
% change
% change
% change
% change
% change
% change
pps
pps
pps
% pot GDP
% change
%
% change
% change
% change
% change
% GDP
2.9
3.0
8.2
-2.2
2.0
4.2
2.9
1.1
-1.1
-0.8
-0.7
2.9
3.7
3.7
3.6
12.3
0.5
APR
3.7
3.3
3.2
8.9
2.4
3.8
4.2
0.2
-0.5
-0.2
0.4
3.0
3.3
4.5
4.1
2.4
n.a.
2025
COM
3.3
3.4
2.8
6.9
1.6
3.0
3.7
0.1
-0.6
-0.3
0.1
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.2
6.2
1.3
APR
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2026
COM
3.0
2.8
3.2
5.3
2.3
3.1
3.2
0.0
-0.2
0.0
0.3
2.8
2.7
2.8
3.1
4.8
1.0
Real GDP
Private consumption
Government consumption expenditure
Gross fixed capital formation
Exports of goods and services
Imports of goods and services
Contributions to real GDP growth
- Final domestic demand
- Change in inventories
- Net exports
Output gap
Employment
Unemployment rate
Labour productivity
HICP
GDP deflator
Compensation of employees per head
Net lending/borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the
world
Source:
Commission Spring 2025 Forecast (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR)
Table A1.6:
General government budgetary position
Variables (% GDP)
1=2+3+4+5
2
3
4
5
8=9+16
2024
Outturn
42.8
14.5
7.8
15.2
5.3
49.4
47.2
11.5
6.7
19.4
1.2
4.9
3.5
2.2
-6.6
-4.4
-6.2
-0.1
-6.1
-3.9
APR
44.0
14.3
8.3
15.2
6.2
50.3
47.8
11.5
6.6
19.9
0.7
5.2
3.9
2.5
-6.3
-3.8
n.a.
-0.1
-6.2
-3.6
2025
COM
43.8
14.3
8.1
15.1
6.3
50.2
47.6
11.5
6.6
20.0
0.7
5.1
3.7
2.5
-6.4
-3.8
-6.2
-0.1
-6.1
-3.6
APR
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2026
COM
44.4
14.6
8.4
15.0
6.5
50.6
47.9
11.5
6.7
20.1
0.6
5.2
3.8
2.7
-6.1
-3.4
-6.1
0.0
-6.1
-3.4
Revenue
of which:
- Taxes on production and imports
- Current taxes on income, wealth, etc.
- Social contributions
- Other (residual)
Expenditure
of which:
- Primary expenditure
of which:
- Compensation of employees
- Intermediate consumption
- Social payments
- Subsidies
- Gross fixed capital formation
- Other
- Interest expenditure
General government balance
Primary balance
Cyclically adjusted balance
One-offs
Structural balance
Structural primary balance
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
18=1-8
19=1-9
20
21
22=20-21
23=22+16
Source:
Commission Spring 2025 Forecast (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR)
30
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0032.png
Table A1.7:
Debt developments
Variables
1
2=3+4+8
3
4≈5+6+7
5
6
7
8
Gross debt ratio* (% of GDP)
Change in the ratio (pps. of GDP)
Contributions**
Primary balance
'Snow-ball' effect
of which:
- Interest expenditure
- Real growth effect
- Inflation effect
'Stock-flow' adjustment
2024
Outturn
55.3
5.7
4.4
-0.9
2.2
-1.4
-1.7
2.2
2025
APR
57.8
2.6
3.8
-1.4
2.5
-1.9
-2.1
0.2
COM
58.0
2.8
3.8
-1.4
2.5
-1.7
-2.2
0.3
APR
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2026
COM
65.3
7.3
3.4
-0.7
2.7
-1.6
-1.8
4.6
* End of period.
** The 'snow-ball' effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated general government debt, as well as the
impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the general government debt-to-GDP ratio (through the denominator). The stock-flow
adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual accounting (including leads and lags in Recovery and Resilience Facility grant
disbursements), accumulation of financial assets, and valuation and other residual effects.
Source:
Commission Spring 2025 Forecast and Commission's calculation (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR)
Table A1.8:
RRF
–
Grants
Revenue from RRF grants (% of GDP)
1
2
RRF grants as included in the revenue projections
Cash disbursements of RRF grants from EU
2020
n.a.
n.a.
2021
0.0
0.0
2022
0.0
0.0
2023
0.1
0.1
2024
0.3
0.8
2025
1.5
0.4
2026
0.9
1.4
Expenditure financed by RRF grants (% of GDP)
3
4
5
6=4+5
Total current expenditure
Gross fixed capital formation
Capital transfers
Total capital expenditure
2020
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2021
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2022
0.0
n.a.
n.a.
0.0
2023
0.1
n.a.
n.a.
0.0
2024
0.2
n.a.
n.a.
0.1
2025
0.6
n.a.
n.a.
0.9
2026
0.3
n.a.
n.a.
0.6
Other costs financed by RRF grants (% of GDP)
7
8
9
Reduction in tax revenue
Other costs with impact on revenue
Financial transactions
2020
0.0
0.0
0.0
2021
0.0
0.0
0.0
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
2023
0.0
0.0
0.0
2024
0.0
0.0
0.0
2025
0.0
0.0
0.0
2026
0.0
0.0
0.0
Source:
Annual Progress Report.
31
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0033.png
Table A1.9:
RRF - Loans
Cash flow from RRF loans projected in the Plan (% of GDP)
1
2
Disbursements of RRF loans from EU
Repayments of RRF loans to EU
2020
n.a.
n.a.
2021
0.0
0.0
2022
0.0
0.0
2023
0.6
0.0
2024
1.0
0.0
2025
0.3
0.0
2026
1.8
n.a.
Expenditure financed by RRF loans (% of GDP)
3
4
5
6=4+5
Total current expenditure
Gross fixed capital formation
Capital transfers
Total capital expenditure
2020
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2021
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2023
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2024
0.0
n.a.
n.a.
0.1
2025
0.5
n.a.
n.a.
0.5
2026
1.6
n.a.
n.a.
1.0
Other costs financed by RRF loans (% of GDP)
7
8
9
Reduction in tax revenue
Other costs with impact on revenue
Financial transactions
2020
0.0
0.0
0.0
2021
0.0
0.0
0.0
2022
0.0
0.0
0.0
2023
0.0
0.0
0.0
2024
0.0
0.0
0.0
2025
0.0
0.0
0.0
2026
0.0
0.0
0.0
Source:
Annual Progress Report.
Cost of ageing
Total age-related spending in Poland is projected to rise from about 20% of GDP in 2024 to
21% by 2070 (see Table
A1.10). The overall increase is due to healthcare and long-term care spending,
with a decline expected for pension expenditure at unchanged policy. Public pension spending is projected
to follow a downward trend over the next decades. The pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio would fall by
0.9 pps, of which 0.4 pps by 2040, from 11% of GDP in 2024 to 10.1% in 2070.
Public healthcare expenditure is projected at 4.4% of GDP in 2024 (below the EU average of
6.6%) and is expected to increase by 0.6 pps by 2040 and by a further 0.5 pps by 2070 (
45
).
Public expenditure on long-term care is projected at 0.5% of GDP in 2024 (well below the EU average of
1.7%) and is expected to increase by 0.3 pps of GDP by 2040 and by a further 0.6 pps of GDP by
2070 (
46
).
Table A1.10:Projected
change in age-related expenditure in 2024-2040 and 2024-2070
age-related
expenditure
2024 (% GDP)
PL
EU
19.8
24.3
age-related
expenditure
2024 (% GDP)
PL
EU
19.8
24.3
change in 2024-2040 (pps GDP) due to:
pensions
-0.4
0.5
healthcare
0.6
0.3
long-term care
0.3
0.4
education
-0.2
-0.3
total
0.3
0.9
age-related
expenditure
2040 (%GDP)
20.1
25.2
age-related
expenditure
2070 (%GDP)
1.1
1.3
21.0
25.6
PL
EU
PL
EU
change in 2024-2070 (pps GDP) due to:
pensions
-0.9
0.2
healthcare
1.1
0.6
long-term care
0.9
0.8
education
0.1
-0.4
total
Source:
2024 Ageing Report (EC/EPC).
(
45
) Key performance characteristics, recent reforms and investments of the Polish healthcare system are discussed in Annex 14
‘Health
and health systems’.  
(
46
) The adequacy and quality of the Polish long-term care system are covered in Annex 11
‘Social policies’.
32
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0034.png
National fiscal framework
Poland is the only Member State that does not yet have an independent fiscal institution.
However, Poland is currently in the process of setting one up and it is expected to be fully operational as
of 2026.
Procedures for assessing and selecting public investment projects and carrying out ex post
reviews are weak.
Standardised methodologies for project assessments are only in place for EU-
financed investments but could be applied to all major government funded investments. Project selection
procedures vary across ministries. There are no standard criteria for project selection and prioritisation at
central government level (
47
). Ex post reviews focused on implementation policies and procedures are
often only required for EU-financed investments. After sufficient time since a project started delivering
(e.g. three to five years), a comprehensive ex-post review can be carried out to assess the strategic
performance. In Poland, ex-post reviews are neither systematically required, not frequently conducted.
Table A1.11:Fiscal
Governance Database Indicators
2023
Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI)
Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI)
Poland
13.05
0.38
EU Average
14.52
0.73
The Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI) shows the strength of national fiscal rules aggregated at the country level based
on i) the legal base, ii) how binding the rule is, iii) monitoring bodies, iv) correction mechanisms, and v) resilience to shocks. The
Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI) shows the strength of the national MTBF based on i) coverage of the
targets/ceilings included in the national medium-term fiscal plans; ii) connectedness between these targets/ceilings and the
annual budgets; iii) involvement of the national parliament in the preparation of the plans; iv) involvement of independent fiscal
institutions in their preparation; and v) their level of detail. A higher score is associated with higher rule and MTBF strength.
Source:
Fiscal Governance Database.
(
47
) IMF, 2022, Poland technical assistance report public investment management assessment, IMF Country Report no. 22/321.
33
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0035.png
ANNEX 2: TAXATION
This annex provides an indicator-based
overview of Poland’s tax system.
It includes
information on: (i) the tax mix; (ii) competitiveness
and fairness aspects of the tax system; and (iii)
tax collection and compliance.
Poland’s tax revenues are relatively
low in
relation to GDP and rely on consumption
taxes more than the EU average.
Table A2.1
shows
that Poland’s tax revenues expressed as a
percentage of GDP were considerably below the
EU aggregate in 2023. Poland’s tax mix has a
relatively low reliance on labour taxation
(equivalent to 13.5% of Polish GDP compared with
an EU average of 20% in 2023) but a greater
reliance on consumption taxes than the EU
average (equivalent to 11.7% of GDP compared
with an EU average of 10.5%).
Poland has untapped potential to tax
property and scope to improve environmental
sustainability.
Property taxation is underutilised,
being significantly below the EU aggregate (1.4%
of GDP vs an EU average of 1.9%). In 2023, the
share of revenues from taxes on capital in Poland
increased (to 9.9% of GDP), surpassing the EU
average (8.5%). Although Poland’s revenues from
environmental taxes as a share of GDP are above
the EU average (2.6% of Polish GDP), energy taxes
account for the largest share of these
environmental taxes (making up 7.4% of total tax
revenue in Poland and 91.3% of Polish
environmental taxes). To strengthen the
application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, Poland
could consider introducing stricter vehicle-emission
taxes to promote cleaner transportation (transport
taxes make up only 0.5% of tax revenue). Poland
also needs to update its system for vehicle
taxation to ensure that it reflects emissions and
environmental impact. This point was also
reflected in the 2025 OECD Economic Survey (
48
).
There is also scope to increase pollution and
resource taxes (they only account for 0.3% of total
tax revenues in Poland at present), in particular by
expanding taxes on waste disposal (including
incineration) or introducing taxes on: (i) NOx
emissions; (ii) discharges of waste into water; (iii)
fertilisers; and (iv) pesticides. Poland’s carbon-tax
rate remains significantly lower than the EU
average (EUR 68 per tonne of CO
2
equivalent vs an
EU average of EUR 84.80 per tonne).
( )
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-
surveys-poland-2025_483d3bb9-en.html.
48
Graph A2.1:
Tax revenue shares in 2023
Tax revenue shares in 2023, Poland (outer ring)
and EU (inner ring)
28.2
21.9
51.2
26.9
38.5
33.4
Taxes on labour
Taxes on consumption
Taxes on capital
Source:
Taxation Trends Data, DG TAXUD
The corporate tax burden in Poland is
relatively low.
Poland’s forward-looking
average
effective corporate tax rate, which indicates the
expected tax burden for investment, was 12.2% in
2023, significantly below the EU average of
18.9%. Poland’s standard
corporate-income tax
(CIT) rate is 19%, also below the EU average
(which is around 21%), and 21 pps lower than in
1995, when Poland’s standard CIT rate was 40%.
Since 1 January 2025, the new rules related to the
transposition of the Pillar 2 Directive on global
minimum corporate tax have been in force. Poland
has various tax incentives in place, including
special economic zones, incentives for R&D, tax
deductions for investment, and a ‘patent box’
regime. The Polish Deal (Polski Ład), a package of
reforms adopted by the government in 2022, (
49
)
introduced several reforms and tax incentives to
improve the country’s investment climate, with a
special focus on small and medium-sized
enterprises, R&D, and innovation.
Nevertheless, there are indications that the
tax framework is not fully conducive to
innovation and sustainable growth.
Despite
recent reforms, Polish companies still say that
over-regulation is one of the biggest impediments
to investment. Annex 2 gives more detail on the
challenges of predictability in legislation in Poland.
A 2022 study requested by the European
Commission on
Tax compliance costs for SMEs
suggests that tax compliance may be a greater
burden in Poland than the EU average (
50
). As
(
49
)
https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/the-polish-deal--a-
real-profit-for-18-million-poles
(
50
)
https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-
12/221208%20DG%20GROW%20report%20-
%202022%20Tax%20Compliance%20Costs%20SMEs.pdf.
34
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0036.png
Table A2.1:
Taxation indicators
PL
Median (EU-27)
Tax structure
2010
Total taxes (including compulsory actual social contributions) (% of
GDP)
Taxes on labour (% of GDP)
of which, social security contributions (SSC, % of GDP)
Taxes on consumption (% of GDP)
of which, value added taxes (VAT, % of GDP)
Taxes on capital (% of GDP)
Personal income taxes (PIT, % of GDP)
Corporate income taxes (CIT, % of GDP)
Total property taxes (% of GDP)
Recurrent taxes on immovable property (% of GDP)
Environmental taxes (% of GDP)
Effective carbon rate in EUR per tonne of CO
2
equivalents
Tax wedge at 50% of average wage (single person) (*)
Tax wedge at 100% of average wage (single person) (*)
Corporate income tax - effective average tax rates (1) (*)
Difference in Gini coefficient before and after taxes and cash social
transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers) (2) (*)
Outstanding tax arrears: total year-end tax debt (including debt
VAT gap (% of VAT total tax liability, VTTL) (**)
31.4
11.9
10.8
12.4
7.6
7.2
4.4
2.0
1.4
1.1
2.7
NA
32.3
34.2
17.0
4.7
Poland
2021 2022
36.3
14.1
12.8
13.3
8.5
8.9
5.3
2.6
1.6
1.1
2.9
65.4
33.6
34.9
16.2
4.7
25.0
5.6
34.1
13.4
12.7
12.0
7.2
8.8
4.5
2.8
1.5
1.0
2.8
NA
29.4
33.8
15.2
4.6
21.9
8.4
2023
35.1
13.5
13.3
11.7
7.3
9.9
4.4
2.6
1.4
1.0
2.6
68.0
30.4
34.3
12.2
5.3
2024
2010
37.8
19.8
12.9
10.9
6.8
7.1
8.6
2.2
1.9
1.1
2.5
NA
33.9
40.9
21.3
8.6
2021
40.2
20.5
13.0
11.2
7.3
8.5
9.6
2.9
2.2
1.1
2.4
86.0
31.8
39.9
19.3
8.2
35.5
EU-27
2022 2023
39.7
20.1
12.7
10.9
7.4
8.7
9.4
3.2
2.1
1.0
2.1
NA
31.5
39.9
19.1
7.9
32.6
7.0
39.0
20.0
12.7
10.5
7.1
8.5
9.3
3.2
1.9
0.9
2.0
84.8
31.5
40.2
18.9
7.7
2024
By tax base
Some tax types
Progressivity &
fairness
31.2
34.7
31.8
40.3
Tax administration &
considered not collectable) / total revenue (in %) (*)
compliance
10.5
6.6
(1) Forward-looking effective tax rate (KPMG).
(2) A higher value indicates a stronger redistributive impact of taxation.
(*) EU-27 simple average.
(**) Forecast value for 2023. For more details on the VAT gap, see European Commission, Directorate-General for Taxation and
Customs Union, VAT gap in the EU - 2024 report, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2778/2476549
For more data on tax revenues as well as the methodology applied, see the Data on Taxation webpage,
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation-1/economic-analysis-taxation/data-taxation_en.
Source:
European Commission, OECD
shown by the last edition of the
Doing Business
report, produced by the World Bank, a medium-
sized Polish company would need to spend an
average of 334 hours per year to fulfil their tax
obligations
–
the second longest amount of time in
the EU-27 (
51
). Moreover, Poland ranks last out of
the 27 Member States in the tax complexity
index (
52
), which comprehensively measures the
complexity of national CIT systems faced by
multinational corporations. Poland’s complex CIT
system has many negative consequences. Chief
among these problems is that complex CIT
systems generate additional costs that do not
contribute to economic growth in any way, and in
fact inhibit growth. The complexity of the tax
regulations particularly affects smaller companies
that do not have specialised departments dealing
with tax matters. This suggests Poland has scope
to improve both the structure of its tax regulations
and the way that tax processes are carried out by
the country’s tax authorities.
Poland will have to rely increasingly on
accelerating productivity gains to boost
growth.
Poland’s current focus on the promotion
of a digitalised economy, automation and
robotisation, as reflected in its national recovery
and resilience plan and its 2030 productivity
strategy, will be needed to pave the way for future
economic expansion in the absence of a growing
population.
Poland’s labour
tax burden was less
progressive than the EU average in 2024.
Graph A2.2 shows that the labour tax wedge(
53
)
for Poland in 2024 was below the EU average for
single people at all earnings levels, but that the
labour-tax system was overall less progressive
than the EU average (i.e. labour taxes in Poland
increase by less than the EU average as people
earn more). Second earners at a wage level of
67% of the average wage, whose spouses earn
the average wage, were also subject to a tax
wedge that was somewhat below the EU average.
(
53
) The tax wedge is defined as the sum of personal income
taxes and employee and employer social-security
contributions net of family allowances, expressed as a
percentage of total labour costs (the sum of the gross wage
and social-security contributions paid by the employer).
(
51
)
https://archive.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreecono
mies/poland#DB_tax.
(
52
)
https://www.taxcomplexity.org.
35
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0037.png
At the same time, the tax wedge for second
earners was substantially higher than the tax
wedge for single earners at the same wage level.
It is therefore possible that the current design of
the tax-and-benefit system is having a negative
impact on the share of women entering the labour
market.
Graph A2.2:
Tax wedge for single and second
earners, % of total labour costs, 2024
50
Tax wedge, % of total labour costs
the EU average which was 7.0% in 2022. Poland’s
VAT policy gap was also among the highest in the
EU due to the wide application of reduced rates. In
2021, the VAT policy gap increased significantly
–
from 48% to 55%. This increase can be connected
to the measures introduced by the Polish
government in 2022 and 2023,
including ‘anti-
inflation shields’ which temporarily reduced VAT
rates on specific goods, such as fuel, electricity,
and food. While these measures were intended to
alleviate the effects of rising prices on consumers,
they also resulted in lower VAT revenues (
54
).
Poland is relatively advanced in digitally
transforming its tax administration,
which can
help reduce tax arrears. Tax arrears currently
amount to around 25% of total tax revenue. This
is below the EU average, but this EU average is
inflated by large values in a few EU countries.
Poland continues to develop digital platforms,
including ‘e-tax Office’, a service to help taxpayers
meet their tax obligations. However, the delay (due
to audit recommendations) until February 2026 of
the introduction of the mandatory national e-
invoicing system (which aims to improve tax
compliance by ensuring real-time monitoring of
transactions and reducing opportunities for VAT
fraud) may postpone the expected benefits in VAT
collection efficiency.
45
40
37.8
35
30
25
20
50
100
150
37.9
34.7
31.2
33.0
Earnings as % of the average wage
Single earner - PL
Single earner - EU average
Single earner - Single earner - PL (with NTCP)
Second earner - PL
The tax wedge for second earners assumes a first earner at
100% of the average wage and no children. For the full
methodology, see OECD, 2016, Taxing Wages 2014-2015.
Source:
European Commission
Although income inequality in Poland is
modest, the tax-and-benefit system has one
of the smallest inequality-reducing effects in
the EU.
In 2023, the difference between the Gini
index of market income and disposable income
distribution was only 5.3 pps in Poland compared
with an EU average of 7.7 pps. This indicates a
lower effect of taxes and benefit transfers on
reducing income inequality than in other EU
Member States, although somewhat higher than in
the previous year. At the same time, in terms of
disposable income after taxes and benefits, Poland
shows one of the lowest Gini indexes (26.3%)
against the EU average (34.1%), indicating lower
income inequality in Poland than in other Member
States. The reforms introduced under the Polish
Deal in 2022 aimed to improve the progressivity
of the tax system, reducing the tax burden on
lower and middle-income earners.
After years of improving VAT collection,
Poland recently reported an increase in the
VAT gap.
The VAT gap increased to 8.4% in 2022
(although this is still a decline of 5.8 pps in
comparison with 2018 when it was 14.2%) and to
a forecasted 10.5% in 2023. This is higher than
(
54
) VAT Gap in the EU 2024 Report pp. 146-147.
36
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0038.png
PRODUCTIVITY
ANNEX 3: INNOVATION TO BUSINESS
Poland is an emerging innovator, but still
faces challenges in boosting its research and
innovation performance.
As the 2024 European
Innovation Scoreboard points out, Poland’s
research and innovation performance is catching
up with the EU average (currently at 65.9%,
3.3 percentage points up from the previous
year) (
55
), but the country is still considered an
‘emerging innovator’ (
56
). Improvements have been
driven by R&D intensity (gross domestic
expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP)
increasing steadily from 1.03% in 2017 to 1.56%
in 2023. To further boost R&D and innovation, a
new national target should be set closer to the EU
average of 2.24% (2023). This should be
combined with targeted measures to increase the
research and innovation output and strengthen the
attractiveness of research careers. Regarding the
innovation output of firms, Poland faces two key
challenges: a weak science-business collaboration
system and sluggish adoption of (advanced) digital
technologies, resulting in enterprises, especially
SMEs, trailing the EU average.
publications as a percentage of the total number
of publications also demonstrates this (41.6 for
Poland, against the EU average of 55.9 in 2023).
Public R&D expenditure has returned to its 2012
level (0.55% in 2023), with further efforts needed
to get closer to the EU average. In this context,
cohesion policy support through the European
Funds for Smart Economy (FENG), channelled
through the national programme and 16 regional
programmes, is key to boost R&I investments
(total allocation amounting to EUR 16 billion).
Poland’s scientific progress also relies on the
successful and still ongoing reform of the Polish
Academy of Science (PAN), also part of the
enabling conditions under the FENG programme.
The reform seeks to modernise the Academy’s
structure, improve research quality and align its
activities with national innovation goals. It is
essential to ensure that the reform achieves its
objective of fostering an independent research
environment. To boost competitiveness, it is also
essential to improve the evaluation system for
scientific performance in higher education (see
Annex 12). The Excellence Initiative
–
Research
Universities (
58
) has shown potential, with its first
assessment highlighting successful strategic
planning
and
research-driven
education
59
initiatives ( ). The next steps should additionally
focus on internationalisation to sustain progress.
Science and innovative ecosystems
Poland’s scientific
performance shows signs
of improvement, but further progress
depends on sustained increases in public R&D
expenditure and reforms to improve the
competitiveness and internationalisation of
scientific institutions.
Excellent research output,
as measured in top-cited scientific publications,
increased from 4.3% in 2015 to 5.5% in 2021 (
57
),
but remains significantly below the EU average of
9.6%. The low number of international co-
(
55
)
European Commission, 2024,
European Innovation
Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland.
The EIS provides a
comparative analysis of innovation performance in EU
countries, including the relative strengths and weaknesses of
their national innovation systems (also compared to the EU
average).
(
56
) The European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) puts EU Member
States in one of four performance groups based on their
scores: innovation leaders, strong innovators, moderate
innovators and emerging innovators.
(
57
) As measured by scientific publications within the top 10%
most cited scientific publications worldwide as a percentage
of
the country’s
total scientific publications.
Business innovation
Poland is steadily increasing its business
R&D expenditure, but this has yet to produce
stronger innovation outputs.
Poland’s business
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
increased from 0.46% in 2015 to 1% in 2023,
with a shift towards activities with higher added
value and ICT. This is reflected in the growing
number of business-sector researchers per 1 000
active population, from 1.7 in 2015 to 4.6 in 2023.
Through the introduction of R&D tax allowances in
(
58
) The Excellence Initiative
–
Research Universities aims to
enhance the quality of research and education at the best
Polish universities in order for them to become European
universities in the field of research.
(
59
) Holm (2020):
Reflections on the First Progress Review
Conference of the 20 Universities in the ‘Excellence Initiative
– Research Universities’ programme.
37
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0039.png
2016, a major publicly financed measure, R&D tax
incentives increased from 0.003% in 2016 to
0.056% in 2023 as a percentage of GDP. Despite
this increase, however, Poland’s tax incentives still
trail the EU average (0.102% of GDP) and
innovation output (
60
) has not significantly
improved; SMEs, in particular, continue to lag
behind in innovation activities (
61
). The results of
the ongoing analysis with the support of OECD will
be crucial to better understand the impact of the
R&D tax allowances on innovation activity.
Moreover, Poland would benefit from participating
in the unitary patent system, which offers key
advantages in terms of promoting innovation and
enhancing competitiveness (
62
).
Graph A3.1:
Patent applications filed under the PCT
per billion GDP (in PPS
€) in relation to business
enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as a
percentage of GDP, 2021
Patent applications filed under PCT per billion
GDP (in PPS€)
3.5
FR
digital technologies by businesses and their
further development. These initiatives range from
comprehensive digitalisation advice (including
through the European Digital Innovation Hubs) and
grants to SMEs for purchasing and implementing
IT solutions, to the development of digital
technology and infrastructure. The uptake of cloud
computing by enterprises is higher than the EU-
average (
66
). Additionally, Poland is involved in two
out of six EuroHPC JU quantum computer projects
and plans to set up an AI Factory to develop, test
and deploy state-of-the-art AI technologies.
Cooperation between science and business is
limited, reducing Poland’s ability to
commercialise its research.
Science-business
linkages in Poland have been hampered by an
underdeveloped research base and insufficiently
targeted programmes promoting applied research
and academic-private collaboration (see also
Graph A3.2 below). The weakness of science-
business linkages in Poland is reflected in the low
number of public-private scientific co-publications
as a percentage of the total number of
publications (5.6% vs the EU average of 7.7%),
and in the low proportion of public research
financed by businesses (0.014 vs the EU average
of 0.050). Efforts made to address this issue
include the establishment of the Łukasiewicz
Research Network and the creation of the Polish
Association of Centres for Technology Transfer as
part of the Technology Transfer Office network. In
addition,
the
‘implementation
doctorate’
initiative (
67
) put in place in 2017 could help foster
science-business collaboration by aligning skills.
Several measures supporting cooperation between
science and business are also being implemented
under the FENG programme. The effectiveness of
these initiatives and instruments should be
assessed soon to measure the impact, improve
them and identify gaps in the related policy mix.
3
2.5
2
MT LU
SI
ES
LV
CY
0.5
SK
BG
EL
PT
IT
1.5
1
HU
CZ
PL
2
0
0
RO
0.5
1
1.5
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as % of GDP
Source:
Eurostat, Fraunhofer data (PATSTAT), 2024
Despite above EU average growth for
relevant Digital Decade indicators, Poland
lags behind in the uptake of basic (
63
)
and
advanced digital technologies (
64
)(
65
)
by SMEs.
Poland relies on both national measures and
investments under the cohesion policy and the
recovery and resilience plan to support adoption of
(
60
) As measured in patent applications filed under the PCT per
billion GDP (in PPS
€):
0.4 for Poland (2022) vs 2.8 in the EU
(2024).
(
61
)
European Commission, 2024, European Innovation
Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland.
(
62
) After joining the enhanced cooperation framework, Poland is
expected to sign the Unified Patent Court Agreement.
(
63
) Basic digital intensity of SMEs in 2023: 50% in Poland vs
57.7% in the EU.
(
64
) Uptake of AI in 2023: 3.7% in Poland vs 8% in the EU.
( ) Uptake of data analytics by SMEs in 2023: 19.3% in Poland
vs 33.2% in the EU.
65
(
66
) Uptake of cloud computing by enterprises in 2023: 46.5% in
Poland vs 38.9% in the EU.
(
67
) The programme allows doctorate students to be employed in
the business sector while simultaneously working to obtain
their PhD at a university or research institute.
38
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0040.png
Graph A3.2:
Public-private scientific co-
publications as a percentage of the total number
of publications, 2023
12
10
assessment is needed to measure the impact and
identify gaps.
Financing innovation
The financing capabilities of Poland’s
venture capital market has improved
considerably, but further expansion is
necessary.
Poland is the leading destination for
foreign direct investments in Central and Eastern
Europe (
72
), whereas the domestic venture capital
market accounted for only 0.021% of its GDP in
2023, down from 0.028% in 2022 and below the
EU average of 0.078% (
73
). Polish SMEs rely mainly
on internal funding and bank loans to finance their
investments, which greatly limits their R&D
capacity and scale-up and growth opportunities
compared to investments financed by private
equity and venture capital (
74
). The Investment
Fund of the National Centre for Research and
Development will finance innovative SMEs via its
venture capital branch, and the National Bank for
Development (BGK) is implementing a FENG equity
instrument targeting innovative SMEs. This is a
positive step towards the development of a
venture capital culture in the Polish innovation
ecosystem. However, a more comprehensive
approach is necessary to address various
shortcomings, in particular to improve access to
financing for start-ups. Mobilising a portion of
capital from various pension funds could be a way
to increase the domestic financing capacity in the
venture capital and private equity segments of the
capital market. Moreover, other solutions such as
IP-backed financing system may also be very
attractive to the Polish startups and SME’s.
8
6
4
2
0
DE
HU
SI
CZ
ES
PL
EU
Source:
Eurostat 2024
Although there has been considerable
progress, innovation barriers still persist and
further reforms are needed to support Polish
innovators.
Overall, Poland now has business-
friendly regulations and low barriers to trade, but
some areas still require reforms (
68
). The
administrative burden on start-ups remains high,
but recent reforms, such as simplified reporting
and tax obligations, are a step in the right
direction. Service trade restrictions are above the
OECD average; liberalising these markets could
attract more expertise and benefit the country (
69
).
The lack of an experienced, highly skilled ICT
workforce is also holding back Poland’s innovation
capacity, especially in the ICT sector  (
70
). Finally,
Poland’s innovation public procurement
system is
not yet fully developed (
71
). However, it should be
improved through current and upcoming reforms,
including simplification and digitalisation of public
procurement processes. A positive impact is also
expected from Poland’s 2022-2025
State
purchasing policy, which advises all Polish public
buyers to allocate 3% of their budget to R&I
procurement and 20% to procurement of
innovative solutions. The policy mix for fostering
innovation procurement is promising, but an
Innovative talent
Insufficient incentives hold back the
recruitment and retention of top researchers
(
72
) OECD, 2024, Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2024
–
An
OECD Scoreboard, oecd-ilibrary.org.
(
73
) Measured in Venture Capital (market statistics) as a
percentage of GDP, Invest Europe, 2024.
(
74
) OECD, 2024, Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2024
–
An
OECD Scoreboard, oecd-ilibrary.org.
(
68
) OECD, 2023, OECD Economic Survey of Poland, oecd-
ilibrary.org.
(
69
) ibid.
(
70
) Measured by the top 10% most cited ICT publications (%),
Poland has a rate of 5.3% (2021) compared to 8.6% for the
EU (2024). Science Metrix 2024.
(
71
) Measured by innovation procurement as a proportion of total
public procurement, Poland has a rate of 4.3% compared to
9.2% for the EU.
European Commission, 2024, European
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland.
39
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0041.png
in Poland’s public sector.
Poland’s difficulties in
attracting researchers to the public sector is the
consequence of poor working conditions and
perspectives for researchers. The public sector
researcher workforce has remained stagnant since
2017, with numbers consistently below the EU
average (
75
). Poland struggles to attract students
to science and engineering programmes (
76
) and
underperforms when it comes to producing
doctoral graduates (see Annex 12) and attracting
foreign doctorate students (
77
). It also struggles to
offer attractive research careers in the public
sector, largely due to low academic remuneration,
limited transferable skills and weak mobility. It
must address these shortcomings to develop a
performant public research career system (
78
).
Concerning the issuance of EU blue cards, Poland
triplicated the number of new EU Blue Cards in the
last 2 years (last available data for 2023 in
Eurostat), becoming the 2
nd
country in the EU, after
Germany, to use the most this EU measure,
pointing to an increased need of (highly) skilled
workers from employers.
While some efforts have been made to
strengthen entrepreneurship education in
Poland, the lack of a national strategy and
monitoring of initiatives remains an issue.
Based on the Global Entrepreneurship Monitoring
Survey,
the quality and
outcomes of
entrepreneurship education improved in Poland
from 2022 to 2023. However, Poland still ranks
below the average of the participating EU
countries (
79
). A lack of skills remains one of the
barriers to business development. Several
initiatives have been set up in recent years to
support entrepreneurship at all educational levels.
Nevertheless, some issues still need to be tackled:
Poland lacks a targeted national strategy for
(
75
) As measured by researchers employed (FTE) by the public
sector per thousand active population: 3.5 (2023) in Poland
compared to 4.2 (2024) in the EU.
(
76
) Poland lags far behind the EU average in terms of students
enrolled and new graduates in science and engineering per
thousand population aged 25-34.
(
77
)
European Commission, 2024, European Innovation
Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland.
(
78
) European Commission (2017):
Poland’s Higher Education and
Science System
and European Commission (2020):
MORE4
study - Support data collection and analysis concerning
mobility patterns and career paths of researchers.
(
79
) Tarnawa A. (Ed.) (2024). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
Poland 2024. https://www.gemconsortium.org/report/gem-
poland-2024-report.
entrepreneurship education, and the link between
higher education and business is weak.
40
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0042.png
Table A3.1:
Key innovation indicators (*)
Poland
2012
2017
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
EU average
USA
Headline indicator
R&D intensity (gross domestic expenditure on R&D as % of GDP)
0.88
1.03
1.37
1.42
1.44
1.56
:
2.24
3.45
Science and innovative ecosystems
Public expenditure on R&D as % of GDP
Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% most cited publications
worldwide as % of total publications of the country
Researchers (FTEs) employed by public sector (Gov+HEI) per thousand active
population
International co-publications as % of total number of publications
0.55
3.4
3.1
27.6
0.36
4.5
3.6
31.7
0.51
5.1
3.6
34.6
0.52
5.5
3.6
36.1
0.49
:
3.6
39.5
0.55
:
3.5
41.6
:
:
:
:
0.72
9.6
4.2
55.9
0.64
12.3
:
39.3
R&D investment & researchers employed in businesses
BERD financed by the public sector (national and abroad) as % of GDP
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) performed by SMEs as % of GDP
Researchers employed by business per thousand active population
0.33
0.11
0.9
0.66
0.23
3.2
0.86
0.29
3.7
0.89
0.29
4.2
0.95
0.35
4.6
1
:
4.6
:
:
:
1.49
0.4
5.7
2.7
0.3
:
Innovation outputs
Patent applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty per billion GDP (in PPS
€)
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.4
:
:
2.8
:
Digitalisation of businesses
SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity
% SMEs (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 90%)
Data analytics adoption
% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)
Cloud adoption
% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)
Artificial intelligence adoption
% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%)
Academia-business collaboration
Public-private scientific co-publications as % of total number of publications
Public expenditure on R&D financed by business enterprise (national) as % of GDP
3.5
0.019
4.6
0.013
4.8
0.015
5.1
0.014
5.5
0.014
5.6
:
:
:
7.7
0.05
8.9
0.02
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
19.17
2.86
60.95
:
:
:
:
19.31
46.5
3.67
68.95
:
:
5.9
72.91
33.17
38.86
13.48
:
:
:
:
Public support for business innovation
Total public sector support for BERD as % of GDP
R&D tax incentives: foregone revenues as % of GDP
BERD financed by the public sector (national and abroad) as % of GDP
0.055
0
0.055
0.119
0.007
0.112
0.191
0.029
0.162
0.201
0.033
0.168
0.205
0.045
0.16
:
0.056
:
:
:
:
0.204
0.102
0.1
0.251
0.141
0.11
Financing innovation
Venture capital (market statistics) as % of GDP, total (calculated as a 3-year moving
average)
Seed stage funding share (% of total venture capital)
Start-up stage funding share (% of total venture capital)
Later stage funding share (% of total venture capital)
0.004
7.8
43.7
48.5
0.012
5.6
30.6
63.7
0.017
10.4
38.9
50.6
0.022
10.3
49.9
39.9
0.028
10.0
50.9
39.1
0.021
9.7
59.4
30.9
:
:
:
:
0.078
7.3
44.0
48.7
:
:
:
:
Innovative talent
New graduates in science and engineering per thousand population aged 25-34
Graduates in the field of computing per thousand population aged 25-34
17.3
3
17.1
3.1
12
2.9
12.6
3.3
12.6
3.5
:
:
:
:
17.6
3.6
:
:
(*) EU average for the last available year or the year with the largest number of country data.
Source:
Eurostat, DG JRC, OECD, Science-Metrix (Scopus database), Invest Europe, European Innovation Scoreboard
41
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0043.png
ANNEX 4: MAKING BUSINESS EASIER
Poland’s investment climate is bolstered by a
strong economy yet hindered by challenges
such as underdeveloped infrastructure and
regulatory
uncertainty.
Poland
has
demonstrated robust business dynamism in recent
years although the quality of lawmaking still has
some scope for improvement. The country is highly
integrated into the EU single market but faces
transposition and conformity challenges. Public
procurement competitiveness is low, with few
bidders and lengthy procedures, though modest
innovation procurement improvements have been
noted.
Investment rates remain below EU averages.
On average, Polish firms report higher investment
obstacles than their EU peers. The three main
obstacles to investment reported are the
uncertainty about the future (92% of the
companies, 55% considering it as a major
obstacle), the high energy costs (88%) and the
shortage of skilled staff (87%) (
81
). Business-level
analysis confirms that uncertainty about future
profitability and the macroeconomy environment
have an impact on private investment
decisions (
82
). Furthermore, FDI remains relatively
low in Poland, as FDI stock has been stagnating
below 50% GDP (compared to 70% in the euro
area and round 80 in peer countries) (
83
).
Infrastructure needs, particularly in terms of
network grids and transport networks, also
weigh on businesses.
Poland’s network grid
interconnections and transport networks require
significant investment to meet the country’s
growing energy needs and to improve the
connectivity of its regions. Transport infrastructure
was seen as an obstacle to investment by 48% of
Polish businesses (
84
). The development of energy
network interconnections, supported by the Polish
recovery and resilience plan, aims to address
capacity and reliability issues in the electricity grid,
but progress remains slow.
Poland has made considerable progress in
connectivity, but 5G development is slow,
mainly due to the delayed authorisation of the 5G
pioneer bands. Very high-capacity network (VHCN)
coverage (81.1%) is higher than the EU average
(78.8%). This performance is mostly due to the
deployment of fibre, as Poland is ahead of the EU
in general for fibre to the premises (FTTP)
coverage (75.4% vs 64%) and showing strong
growth. While VHCN rural coverage in Poland
(57.2%) is above the EU average (55.6%), the
urban/rural divide remains an issue, limiting access
to the digital world. Poland has relied on
investments under the Recovery and Resilience
Facility and cohesion policy to improve fixed
broadband network coverage where access to
high-speed internet is difficult. 5G coverage in
Poland (71.9%) remains below the EU average
(
81
) EIB Investment Survey 2024 Poland overview, 2025.
(
82
) IMF, Article IV Poland, 2025.
(
83
) IMF, Selected issues, Poland, 2025.
(
80
) EIB Investment Survey Poland, EIB, 2023.
(
84
) EIB Investment Survey European Union 2024, EIB, 2024.
Investment climate
Poland has maintained a strong position as
one of the fastest-growing economies in the
EU,
underpinned by its attractive investment
climate. Factors such as a large domestic market,
relatively low labour costs, and proximity to key
European markets have contributed to robust
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. However,
Poland faces challenges, including underdeveloped
infrastructure in certain regions, regulatory
uncertainty, and labour shortages exacerbated by
demographic decline. The proportion of businesses
facing labour shortages is among the highest in
the EU (63.7%, compared to an EU average of
20.2%). Measures to address labour shortages,
such as promoting workforce participation,
upskilling programmes, and incentives for
innovation in automation, can bolster productivity
and reduce capacity constraints.
Poland’s growth
potential could be raised
further through higher investment and
innovation.
In recent years, private investment
rates have been amongst the lowest in the EU and
remain concentrated in specific sectors, such as
manufacturing, while lagging in others like
renewable energy and advanced technologies,
critical for long-term competitiveness. Investment
in intangible assets, such as research and
development and intellectual property, accounted
for less than 10% of the total, hindering Poland’s
ability to move further up the value chain and into
the industries of the future (
80
).
42
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0044.png
(89.3%) and authorisation for the 5G pioneer
bands came in late: only the 3.4-3.8 GHz band has
been assigned so far, while the auction of 700 and
800 MHz bands was launched in November 2024.
Business awareness of cybersecurity is
improving.
The percentage of enterprises that
experienced security incidents leading to
unavailability of ICT services, due to attacks from
outside (e.g. ransomware attacks, denial of service
attacks) increased slightly in Poland between 2022
and 2024 (2.9% vs 3.02%) but was lower than the
EU average (3.43%). For countering cyberattacks,
a higher proportion of businesses in Poland
(94.11%) declared using some ICT security
measures than the EU average (92.76%). On the
other hand, a smaller proportion of Polish
enterprises (56.84%) than the EU average
(59.97%) made their employees aware of their
obligations in ICT security related issues.
Graph A4.1:
Making Business Easier: selected
indicators.
(1) Regulatory
burden
average (48.9%). The B2B payment gap in Poland
is 16.5 days, above the EU average (15.5
days) (
85
). By contrast, the delay in payment by the
public sector to businesses is decreasing and is
now below the EU average (13.1 days vs 15.2
days). A similar trend can be observed in SMEs, as
23% of Polish companies have experienced
problems due to late payments from private
entities (and 42% suffered them occasionally)
during 2024, some of the highest rates in Europe
and above the EU averages of 13% and 34%,
respectively (
86
). The situation for Polish SMEs is
much better with public entities, as only 4%
experienced regular late payment problems with
the public sector (in line with the EU average of
5%).
Regulatory and administrative
barriers
Poland has demonstrated robust business
dynamism in recent years,
supported by its
resilient economy and a favourable business
environment. Poland’s regulatory framework is
pro-competitive (
87
) and the country performs
better than the average OECD economies in the
Product Market Regulation indicator, that
measures the distortions to competition caused by
the barriers to entry and expansion faced by firms
across the economy (
88
). The business churn rate
was 25.2% in 2022, above the EU average of
19.2%, making Poland one of the most dynamic
countries in Europe. Enterprise births in the
business economy were 12.22% and deaths at
12.95%, also above the EU averages. In addition,
high growth businesses (growth in employment by
more than 10%) accounted for 9.42% of
companies and 14.29% of employees (against an
EU average of 9.17% and 12.23%, respectively).
Effective governance structures, with a clear
commitment to consistent and predictable
policies and coordination efforts with
stakeholders will impact growth and private
(
85
) European Payment Report, 2024. Intrum, 2024.
(
86
) Survey on the access to finance of enterprises, Analytical
Report 2024.
(
87
) OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2025, 2025.
(
88
) OECD Product Market Regulation indicators, 2024.
Regulation as a major
obstacle to investment
24.5
30.8
(2) Single
Market
41.6
EU Trade Integration
35.2
(3) Shortages
Material shortages as a
factor limiting production
10
9.2
16.6
(4) Late payments
from public entities
14.5
47.9
from private entities
65.3
0
10
20
30
40
Share (%)
50
60
70
EU27
PL
Share of (1) enterprises, (2) average intra-EU exports and
imports in GDP, (3) firms, (4) SMEs.
Sources:
(1) EIB IS, (2) Eurostat, (3) ECFIN BCS, (4) SAFE
survey.
Late payments are a growing concern.
In
2024, late payments from business-to-business
(B2B) continued to increase, risking disrupting
SMEs’ cash flows. The share of SMEs experiencing
late payment in Poland is 53.4%, above the EU
43
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0045.png
investors confidence.
Trust in Poland’s justice
system has eroded in recent years, raising
concerns about its impact on the business
environment. Private sector confidence in
investment protection is among the lowest in
Europe, reflecting widespread concerns about the
judiciary’s independence and dampening business
confidence (
89
).
Businesses
frequently
cite
difficulties in enforcing their rights in court,
pointing to issues with the quality, efficiency, and
impartiality of the justice sector. However, recent
progress on the disbursement of EU funds and
significant efforts to implement the Action Plan on
Rule of Law offer positive signs, with the potential
to bolster investor confidence and increase
Poland’s attractiveness for future investment
opportunities.
The quality of lawmaking still has some
scope for improvement.
During the last decade,
the volatility of the law (number of changes in
business rules) has more than doubled. In 2023,
24% of the laws were approved without public
consultation, slightly above the average of the last
five years (and 49%, despite the reference to
consultations,
did not include the government’s
replies to the comments of the social partners) (
90
).
Poland recently passed new legislation, included in
the recovery and resilience plan, to limit the use of
fast-track procedures and requiring an impact
assessment and public consultation of draft laws,
which should increase transparency. Also, the time
available to companies to prepare for changes in
the law was reduced. Laws related to business
activities have entered into force on average only
31 days after adoption (this so-called
“vacatio
legis”
period has been reduced by 22 days over a
decade). According to the EIB Investment Survey,
25% of the firms devote more than 10% of the
staff to regulatory requirements (above the EU
average of 17%). The six-month
’vacatio legis’ for
tax laws that could negatively affect taxpayers,
recently adopted by the Council of Ministers in
May 2025, could contribute to a more stable
regulatory environment.
Perceptions of entrepreneurship in Poland
are in line with many European economies on
a social level.
Around a half of Polish adults
(
89
) Eurobarometer 520, 2024, Perceived independence of the
national justice systems in the EU among companies.
(
90
) Grand Thornton Barometer, 2024, Analysis of the stability of
the legal environment in the Polish economy.
know someone who has recently started a
business, and a similar proportion consider
themselves to have the skills and experience to do
the same. Meanwhile, around three in four adults
see opportunities for starting a business as good,
although a half of these would not do so for fear
it might fail (
91
). Despite these comparable
perceptions, the percentage of Polish adults who
expect to start a business in the next three years
was 2.6%, the lowest by a substantial margin of
all
economies covered by
the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor in 2023. One shadow
over business intentions may be that nearly one in
two adults reported their household income had
fallen in 2023.
Single market
Poland is well integrated into the single
market.
Around 70% of its foreign trade takes
place within the EU (in 2023, over 75% of Poland’s
exports and 50% of imports involve other EU
Member States), illustrating the importance of
intra-EU economic integration. Polish companies
are also major service providers in the EU market
–
in the transport sector, accounting and tax
services, and the ICT industry, among others. In
addition, in 2022 around 90% of FDI came from
EU countries.
Further efforts are needed to reduce
transposition and conformity deficits,
which
are above the EU average, to improve the smooth
functioning of the single market in Poland. The
transposition deficit (the percentage of single
market directives not transposed) reached 1.7% in
December 2024, above the EU average of 0.8%.
The average delay in transposing directives and
the conformity deficit (the percentage of all
directives transposed incorrectly) were also above
the average EU figures. The number of
infringements was also quite high, again above
the EU average, although lower than for Member
States of comparable size. This persistent
compliance gap may undermine the trust of firms
and the public in the effective functioning of the
single market. Poland resolved 97% of all SOLVIT
(
91
) Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM Global Report
2023/2024, 2024.
44
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0046.png
EU rights resolution cases it handled as lead
centre (above the EU average of 4.9%) in 2024.
Poland has made great strides in improving
its regulatory environment in the last years,
but challenges persist.
The regulatory
arrangements for several professional services,
such as lawyers, architects and civil engineers is
still high compared to peer countries. Reducing
entry barriers in regulated professions could
address the labour shortages in some sectors (
92
).
Other sectors which could also benefit from
regulatory barriers to competition being reduced
include electricity and transport. In some industries
a lack of transparency over the issuing of permits
and increased uncertainty about government
policies are affecting investment decisions (for
instance, in the renewables sector) (
93
). In retail,
the regulatory environment has been made stricter
in recent years with the introduction of a retail tax
and a complete ban on shops opening on Sundays.
Public procurement
Competition in the public procurement
system could be improved.
Poland’s overall
performance on public procurement is well below
the EU average, as it attracts too few bidders
(especially for a large country) and the procedures
can be lengthy and complex. The public
procurement law that entered into force in January
2021 did not immediately address the key
weaknesses in public procurement in Poland, so
the system still suffers from the low number of
companies submitting tenders. This results in a
high level of single bids, which has remained at an
exceptionally high level for years (56% in 2024
and above 50% since 2018). The proportion of
direct awards is 7%, in line with the EU average.
The data also indicate a decreasing trend in SMEs
interest in public procurement contracts with SME
participation was 55% and SME bids 59% in 2023,
both figures being below the EU averages.
(
92
) IMF, Article IV Poland, 2025.
(
93
) OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators, 2024.
45
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0047.png
Table A4.1:
Making Business Easier: indicators.
Poland
POLICY AREA
INDICATOR NAME
2020
Investment climate
Material shortage, firms facing constraints, %
1
Shortages
Labour shortage, firms facing constraints, %
1
Vacancy rate, vacant posts as a % of all
available ones (vacant + occupied)
2
Transport infrastructure as an obstacle to
investment, % of firms reporting it as a major
obstacle
3
Infrastructure
VHCN coverage, %
4
FTTP coverage, %
4
5G coverage, %
4
6.9
61.5
0.7
20.0
62.5
1.3
29.9
63.4
1.3
14.9
66.3
1.0
9.2
63.7
0.9
10.0
20.2
2.3
2021
2022
2023
2024
EU-27
average
9.4
-
-
-
7.8
70.0
51.9
34.2
6.9
70.7
59.5
63.4
9.6
81.1
75.4
71.9
6.4
-
-
-
13.4
78.8
64.0
89.3
Reduction of regulatory and administrative barriers
Impact of regulation on long-term investment,
Regulatory environment
% firms reporting business regulation as a
35.5
34.3
32.3
3
major obstacle
Payment gap - corporates B2B, difference in
17.1
10.1
17.1
days between offered and actual payment
5
Payment gap - public sector, difference in days
20.4
9.0
21.7
between offered and actual payment
5
Late payments
Share of SMEs
experiencing late
payments, %*
6
from public or private
entities in the last 6
months
from private entities
in the previous or
current quarter
from public entities in
the previous or
current quarter
33.7
30.8
24.5
15.9
16.8
68.4
18.1
13.1
-
15.6
15.1
-
66.3
65.5
65.2
-
-
-
-
65.3
47.9
-
-
-
-
14.5
16.6
Integration
Single Market
EU trade integration, % (Average intra-EU
34.8
imports + average intra EU exports)/GDP
2
EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index
7
Transposition deficit, % of all directives not
transposed
8
Conformity deficit, % of all directives
transposed incorrectly
8
SOLVIT, % resolution rate per country
8
Number of pending infringement proceedings
8
0.047
1.8
1.6
90.0
39.0
38.8
0.047
1.5
1.6
88.0
37.0
43.1
0.047
2.1
1.7
91.3
34.0
38.8
0.047
1.6
1.5
80.0
31.0
35.2
0.053
1.7
1.3
97.0
31.0
41.6
0.050
0.8
0.9
84.9
24.4
Compliance
Public procurement
Single bids, % of total contractors**
8
Competition and
transparency in public
procurement
Direct awards, %**
8
51
6
50
7
52
9
54
9
56
7
-
7.0
*Change in methodology in 2024: reporting late payments from public and private entities separately.
**The 2024 data on single bids is provisional and subject to revision. Please note that approximately 18% of the total data is
currently missing, which may impact the accuracy and completeness of the information. Due to missing data, the EU average of
direct awards data is calculated without Romania.
Sources:
(1) ECFIN BCS, (2) Eurostat, (3) EIB IS, (4) Digital Decade Country reports, (5) Intrum Payment Report, (6) SAFE survey,
(7) OECD, (8) up to 2023: Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, 2024: Public procurement data space (PPDS).
46
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0048.png
ANNEX 5: CAPITAL MARKETS, FINANCIAL STABILITY AND ACCESS TO FINANCE
Poland’s financial sector is characterised by
a resilient banking system, growing non-bank
financial intermediation segment and is
underpinned by a moderate level of domestic
savings.
Poland continues to attract international
investors and remains a net borrower from the
global financial system. An overwhelming majority
of Polish firms (96.5%) are microenterprises.
Neither big nor small firms have major issues in
accessing external funding but they exhibit a clear
preference for financing investment from internal
resources. Not surprisingly, owners’ equity is a
prevalent source of funding, followed by bank
credit. Direct and indirect retail participation in
Poland’s capital
markets is low but slowly
improving. The investment policies of domestic
institutional investors are quite conservative and
very few dare to invest in financing new ventures.
This is a limiting factor for the set-up and
subsequent scale-up of innovative start-ups with
no or limited profitability. The capital markets,
including the Warsaw Stock Exchange, are among
the region’s leaders, but are not providing a true
alternative to bank finance at present. Financial
literacy, at 43.5 (composite indicator), lags the
EU’s average of 45.5 and is spread very unevenly
across the society.
net investment, combined with government
deficits has been overall quite volatile over the
past decade and averaged a positive 0.3% of GDP
(2014-2023) with a peak in 2020 at close to -4%
of GDP.
Graph A5.1:
Net savings-investment balance
25 % of GDP
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Private investment, net
Private saving, net
Borrowing from the rest of the world
Lending to the government
Private saving, gross
Source:
AMECO
Availability and use of domestic
savings
Net savings are primarily directed toward
domestic investments and financing the
government.
Over the past decade, the private
savings ratio, net of fixed capital consumption, has
shown moderate fluctuations around a ten-year
average of approximately 7.1% of GDP, peaking at
close to 12% in 2020 (graph A5.1). The net private
investment ratio, which indicates the private
sector’s contribution
to capital accumulation within
the country, has been relatively stable, averaging
3.9% of GDP over the same period, with 2021 and
2022 marking the highest points of the series (as
the post-Covid recovery settled in) at 6.9% and
7.2%, respectively. Meanwhile, the government
budget has experienced persistent deficits,
averaging around 2.8% of GDP annually (2014 to
2023) and peaking in 2020 at 6.9%. Increased
public spending has been driven predominantly by
social benefits, energy price mitigation measures
and more recently increased spending on defence.
The balance between net domestic savings and
Between 2017 and 2024 the economy halved
its position as a net debtor to the global
market.
As of Q3 2024, total assets held by
Polish residents abroad reached 55.8% of GDP,
while liabilities to third country nationals were
equivalent to 86.6% of GDP, yielding a net
international investment position (NIIP) of -30.8%
of GDP (graph A5.2). Foreign direct investment
liabilities, standing at 46.2% of GDP, dwarf direct
investment assets at 11.4% of GDP, underscoring
the country’s heavy reliance on foreign capital
inflows. Portfolio investment liabilities, kept on
decreasing over the years and stood at 18% of
GDP in 2024, down from over 30% in 2017. Polish
portfolio assets stood at 7.5% of GDP in 2024,
contributing to the negative balance in Poland’s
NIIP. Official reserve assets remained at 23.1% of
GDP in 2024, offering a sizeable safety buffer
against external shocks. Other investment
liabilities, at 22.4% of GDP, outweigh assets
(13.8%), further deepening the NIIP deficit. This
configuration highlights the economy’s deep
integration into international capital flows,
predominantly as a recipient of foreign direct
investment, supporting domestic growth while
keeping Poland’s persistent net debtor status.
47
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0049.png
Graph A5.2:
International investment position
80
% of GDP
60
Graph A5.3:
Capital markets and financial
intermediaries
120
% of GDP
MFIs
Non-financial corporations
Insurance and pension funds
Non-financial corporations
Financial corporations
Government
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
100
80
60
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024-Q3
Foreign Direct Investment, Assets
Other investment, Assets
Foreign Direct Investment, Liabilities
Portfolio Investment, Assets
Official reserve assets
Portfolio Investment, Liabilities
-80
-100
-120
-140
Insurance corporations
Other investment, Liabilities
NIIP
Source:
ECB
0
Listed equity
Bonds
Assets by sector
Structure of the capital markets and
size of the financial sector
The domestic capital market is relatively
modest in European comparison.
The Warsaw
Stock Exchange (WSE) is the primary platform for
equity trading in Poland. The market capitalisation
remained fairly stable in 2023 and 2024 at 21.5%
of the GDP, around a third of the European
average of 68% of GDP. Non-financial
corporations account for approximately 60% of
the capitalisation, underscoring the stock market’s
role in supporting mostly some of the largest
Polish non-financial corporations. The outstanding
volume of private sector debt securities stood at
11.9% of GDP in 2023, with monetary financial
institutions (MFIs) contributing around 65% of this
total, driven by a banking sector that plays a
central role in providing financing for local
households and corporate clients. General
government bonds dwarf the rest of the bond
market and account for 35% of GDP in 2023,
influenced by increased public borrowing to fund
infrastructure projects, energy transition initiatives
and investments into defence amid geopolitical
tensions.
Source:
ECB, EIOPA, AMECO
Poland’s
financial
sector
remains
predominantly bank-driven, with non-bank
financial intermediaries gradually expanding
their footprint.
By Q3 2024, the banking sector’s
assets reached 88.6% of GDP, far below the EU
average of 247.2% but well above any other part
of the domestic financial system. The banking
system is moderately concentrated with the top
five lenders owning 58.5% of total assets. 58.6%
of the sector is domestically owned with a large
share (49.6%) of state-owned banks in the
system. The insurance sector, with assets below
7% of GDP in 2023 is relatively small but it is a
rapidly growing market segment of the domestic
financial market. PPension funds constitute the
third pillar of the pension system. These include:
employee pension schemes (PPE) and employee
capital plans (PPK) which are slowly getting
traction. Altogether pension assets represent about
6% of the GDP, whereas local asset managers
have under management assets worth about
10.5% of the GDP. In addition, under the third
pillar there are individual retirement accounts (IKE)
and individual retirement security accounts (IKZE).
Resilience of the banking sector
The banking sector is resilient despite some
country specific challenges.
Local lenders are
well capitalised with a Common Equity Tier 1
(CET1) ratio at 18.1% (Q3 2024), above the EU
average of 16.7%, reflecting the sector’s steady
accumulation of high-quality capital amid tighter
risk management practices. Both liquidity and
48
MFIs
20
Other financials
40
Investment funds
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0050.png
profitability metrics (in Table A5.1) are very strong,
and all major domestic banks have navigated the
EU-wide stress tests effectively, showcasing
resilience against adverse scenarios. However, the
sector also has some soft spots. In particular, the
legacy forex mortgages as well as the more recent
legal attempts to question the fairness of the
Polish interest rates benchmark Wibor continue to
pose a legal and possibly very costly challenge.
Most of the banking sector meets the MREL
(Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible
Liabilities) and the combined buffer requirement in
addition to MREL, comfortably exceeding all
regulatory requirements imposed on the sector.
Capital surpluses over the combined buffer
requirement considered in addition to the MREL-
TREA reached over 5% of TREA just in the first half
of 2024.
Asset quality in Polish banks has seen a
gradual improvement.
The non-performing loan
(NPL) ratio has been slowly but gradually declining
over the past years. For total loans it stood at
3.9% in Q3 2024 and was almost the double of
EU’s average ratio of 1.9%. Households’ NPLs
stood at 4%, while non-financial corporation NPLs
reached 5.3%. The NPL coverage ratio, however, at
57.1% in Q3 2024, largely surpassed the EU
average of 42.6%, indicating the sector’s tendency
for rapid and strong provisioning for potential
losses. While mortgages are typically a well
performing asset class, Polish banks continue to
face ongoing pressure from legal disputes over the
FX mortgage contracts, with court rulings
increasingly favouring consumers, necessitating
higher provisions and negatively impacting the
lenders’ profitability.
Liquidity remains solid, bolstered by stable
and rather conservative funding structures.
Domestic monetary financial institutions (MFIs)
exhibit low liquidity funding risk, with the short-
term aggregate liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) at
232.6% and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) at
169.7% in Q3-2024, both well above minimum
requirements. The loan-to-deposit ratio stood at
merely 68.8% in Q3 2024, well below the EU area
average of 95.5%, reflecting a conservative
funding model reliant on domestic deposits, which
constitute 71% of total assets. A distinctive
feature of the Polish banking sector is its exposure
to government securities, with banks holding close
to 30% of the balance sheet government bonds.
Debt issuance has remained steady but rather
small. In fact, the role of debt instruments in bank
funding has been insignificant at just 3% of
liabilities.
Resilience of the non-bank financial
intermediaries
Poland’s insurance sector is expanding on the
back of strong economic growth.
The sector is
among the largest in Central and Eastern Europe,
reflecting a robust market that has grown steadily
in recent years. One of its key strengths is the
strong performance of the non-life insurance
segment, driven predominantly by
strong
economic growth. In mid-2024, the sector-wide
ratio stood at 220% and was 30 percentage points
below the EEA average of 251%. In the life
insurance segment, the ratio stood at 249%, some
19 percentage points below the end-2023 figure,
whereas in the non-life segment the ratio stood at
209%, 7 percentage points less than at the end of
2023. A domestic specificity is the sector’s reliance
on state-owned insurer PZU, which hold a
significant market share and heavily influence
pricing policies.
Regulatory oversight remains proactive, with
no major vulnerabilities detected in the
insurance segment.
The local supervisor KNF, in
collaboration with EIOPA conducts regular stress
tests. The latest 2024 exercise included a capital
and liquidity scenario and revealed resilience of
local insurers. Furthermore, the KNF conducts
regular annual stress tests. The 2023 exercise
included flood and windstorm risks, where
domestic insurers do have a moderate exposure.
Insurance penetration in Poland reached 2.3% of
GDP in 2023, below the EU average of 6.4%,
suggesting a moderate protection gap, particularly
in rural areas where agricultural insurance uptake
lags. While there are no major vulnerabilities in the
sector, the high reliance on expected profits
included in future premiums (EPIFP) within own
funds persists, alongside the unregulated double
gearing of capital. By end-2023, EPIFP in life
insurance reached approximately EUR 2.7 bn,
equivalent to over half of own funds. Meanwhile,
non-life insurers held over EUR 6 bn in
participations in insurance and banking entities by
mid-2024, not deducted from own funds per
regulations, and causing a double gearing across
parent and subsidiary risks. Adjusting the solvency
49
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0051.png
for these two items would slash the non-life
solvency ratio by 60 points down to 149%.
Sources of business funding and the
role of banks
External funding does not play a major role
in the financing of Polish firms.
The overall
external funding of non-financial corporations
(NFCs) was equivalent to 96% of GDP in 2023
(Graph A5.4), significantly less than the EU
average of 230% of GDP. Not surprisingly, given
the small size of Polish NFCs, the equity of the
firms’ owners remains the most significant item in
the funding mix, accounting for over 35.5% of
total external funding. This is followed closely by
bank loans, representing 31.46% of the funding
mix, a few percentage points above the EU
average of 27.23%. Market equity financing,
through listed shares and bonds, represented a
modest 14% of the funding mix, significantly
lower than the EU average of around 24%. This
pattern underscores the strong reliance of Polish
firms on traditional bank financing over capital-
market-related funding, which given the small size
of local firms is not surprising.
Graph A5.4:
Composition of NFC funding as % of
GDP
250
approach towards external funding overall, and, on
the other, some possible difficulties that the
relatively small Polish firms (the vast majority
being microenterprises) might have in accessing
external financing. Notwithstanding these figures,
85% of Polish entrepreneurs believe that they
made adequate investments to meet market
needs (
94
) over the past three years compared to
the EU average of 80%.
Credit growth remains low but positive.
Corporate credit growth has been very volatile in
the past few years with an almost 10% uptick in
annual growth back in 2022, and then close to
zero lending growth in 2023. In 2024, demand for
new corporate loans started to pick up again with
0.9% year-on-year growth in the first half of
2024. More importantly, in 2024, credit demand
was widespread across both large and small firms’
segments. This credit recovery is expected to
continue into 2025 as policy rates remain stable.
Lending to households was relatively more
dynamic in 2024, with year-on-year growth of
4.5% in the first half of 2024. Both mortgages
and consumer lending saw a marked rise in
demand. Overall, household credit is poised for
gradual growth, supported by economic growth
and generally positive consumer confidence data.
Capital markets and the participation
of retail investors
Poland's
capital
market
attracts
international investors.
Foreign investors
contribute the biggest share to equity turnover on
the WSE main market, generating 65% of turnover
(2023). Overall, domestic institutional investors
generated 19% of the 2023 turnover whereas the
share of retail investors was 16%. The Initial
Public Offerings (IPO) activity of the WSE remains
overall rather subdued, with only a handful of
companies listing on the main market in the years
2023 and 2024. The much smaller NewConnect
segment is more dynamic but small and highly
illiquid. The Polish government has launched
several measures to bolster the capital market.
The main one was the 2019 Capital Market
Development Strategy, developed jointly with the
EBRD and financed largely from EU funds. The
(
94
) Source: EIB 2024 Investment Survey.
200
% of GDP
150
100
50
0
Loans
Bonds
PL
EU
Trade credit and advances
Listed shares
Other equity
Unlisted shares
The sum of NFC liabilities only reflects the total for the NFC
liabilities considered. Reference period 2023.
Source:
Eurostat
Polish firms are heavily reliant on internal
funding.
According to the 2024 EIB Investment
Survey, 72% of investment needs of Polish firms
are covered by internal funding, against an EU
average of 66%. This reliance on internal funds
highlights, on the one hand, a rather cautious
50
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0052.png
strategy covered the period 2019-2023 and aimed
to increase market liquidity and the role of capital
market instruments in financing local NFCs.
Polish households take a conservative
approach to managing their financial assets.
About 60% of households’ financial assets are
held in current accounts and bank deposits, almost
twice the EU average of around 32% (Graph A5.5).
The capital market participation of households
trails behind other EU Member States. Polish
households have about a quarter of their financial
wealth invested in listed stocks, bonds, and
pension and investment funds. This figure is low
when compared to the EU average of around 45%
and reflects, on the one hand, the cautious
behaviour of local households, and, on the other,
their relatively low financial wealth compared to
the EU average. In aggregate, Polish households
have financial assets equivalent to 81% of Polish
GDP, whereas the EU average stands at 210% of
GDP. In 2023, the average monthly available
income per capita in Poland stood at
PLN 2 678 (
95
) (about EUR 620) and remains quite
modest by European standards, whereas the
saving rate in 2023 stood at 13.2%, the same
level as the EU average.
There is still ample space to increase the
level of direct or indirect retail investment.
Boosting the weight of the capital market in
Poland has to go through educating and increasing
investors’ confidence in the market and making
access to capital easier and cheaper for local
NFCs. The authorities have already introduced
measures to encourage greater household
participation in the capital markets, including tax
incentives through pension investment accounts
(such as the Individual Retirement Account (IKE) or
the Individual Pension Security Account (IKZE)
allowing for tax-deductible contributions(
96
) and
financial education programmes. The tangible
impact of these initiatives has been limited so far
but the process of getting Polish households to
invest in capital markets is ongoing. Nevertheless,
the relatively low level of wealth of Polish
households and, on average, moderate levels of
(
95
)
Source: Poland’s
Statistical Office, the situation of
households in 2023 based on the results of the household
budget survey.
(
96
) IKE and IKZE individual accounts have jointly over 1 million
users. These initiatives date back to 2004 and 2012
respectively.
financial literacy result in a very conservative
attitude towards investment decisions. In this
respect, the stability and predictability around
pensions and savings is key to build retail
investors confidence.
Graph A5.5:
Composition of household financial
assets per capita and as % of GDP
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
PL
EU
PL
EU
per capita (000 EUR) (lhs)
% of GDP GDP (rhs)
250
200
150
100
50
0
Currency and deposits
Investment funds
Listed shares
Other equity
Insurance and pension funds
Bonds
Unlisted shares
HH Debt (liability)
The sum of household assets only reflects the total for the HH
assets considered. Reference period 2023.
Source:
Eurostat
The role of domestic institutional
investors
Poland’s asset management industry: still
has a long way to go to reach the EU’s
average size.
The combined assets under
management (AUM) of local asset managers at
end-2023 were around EUR 74 bn, equivalent to
about 10%
of Poland’s GDP, very far from the EU
average of 198% of GDP in 2023 (
97
). Mutual
funds continue to dominate the market, with a
significant portion of investments channelled into
bond funds (37% of the market) and equity
(around 20%). The market has good chances of
continued growth as households become aware of
investment options other than low-yielding bank
deposits. Moreover, the introduction of employee
capital plans (PPK)
–
the voluntary third-pillar
long-term savings programme
–
back in 2019 has
also triggered more interest in the opportunities
offered by the capital markets. Local asset
managers are hopeful for more inflows in the third
pillar as the PPKs gradually gains a critical mass.
(
97
) Source: EFAMA, Asset Management in Europe, December
2024.
51
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0053.png
The Polish insurance sector remains a small
EU player.
The sector’s investment portfolio is
mainly composed of fixed-income securities, with
government bonds accounting for approximately
45% of total assets (
98
) compared to just 19% for
the European Economic Area as a whole. This
conservative approach ensures low risk and
predictable stable returns. Corporate bonds make
up around 6% of AUM, whereas equities represent
about 16% of the portfolio. Lastly, around 24% of
AUM are invested in investment funds, with a
significant portion allocated to mixed and equity
funds. Cash and deposits, held mostly for liquidity
management, are roughly 2% of the allocation.
Polish pension funds are undergoing a major
transformation.
The Polish open pension funds
(known as OFE in Poland) constitute
the pension’s
second pillar and manage over EUR 50 bn worth
of assets of future retirees, mostly allocated to
listed equities (about 90% of AUM). Voluntary third
pillar funds, PPK (Pracownicze Plany Kapitalowe)
are bound to play a crucial role in the future but
currently their AUM are not very sizeable (about
EUR 7 bn in early 2024). PPK funds have a
diversified approach to investing, with 40% of
AUM invested into equities, about 35% into bonds,
and a further 25% in mixed and other assets. To
further develop access to finance and capital
markets, and to make the pension system more
sustainable in light of demographic challenges, the
current pay-as-you-go system could be
progressively supplemented with a funded capital-
based system, which would invest contributions
into a highly diversified financial portfolio.
The participation of domestic institutional
investors in providing funding for start-ups
and venture capital investors is low.
A recent
paper (
99
) published by the Centre for European
Policy Studies (CEPS) showed that, on average,
pension funds in Poland accounted for only 6% of
private equity and venture capital funds raised
annually over 2007-2023, a figure that falls
substantially short of the 19% for the Baltic states
or over 20% shares for Nordic Member States.
About 30% of the funds allocated to venture
capital are provided by the government or
government-related agencies and the rest through
specialised investors. There seem to be particularly
(
98
)
Source: Polska Izba Ubezpieczeń, Insurance in figures.
( ) Source:
Closing the gaping hole in the capital market for EU
start-ups
–
the role of pension funds
–
CEPS.
99
significant limitations for pension funds to invest
in this asset class, even as low as 0% according to
OECD figures (for investments into private
investment funds). This can be a hurdle for
financing innovation, and could contribute to low
returns for policyholders.
The depth of available venture and
growth capital
The Polish venture capital market: promising
but far from able to meet the needs of local
start-ups.
The market has been growing
undisputably over the past decade, both in the
segment of private equity (PE) (equivalent to
0.15% of GDP in 2023) and in the venture capital
(VC) segment (equivalent to 0.02% of GDP in
2023). However, these figures are still significantly
lower than the EU averages of 0.6% and 0.08% of
GDP respectively, and the number of VC/PE deals
remains relatively low in Poland. This indicates
that this part of the capital markets is still
maturing (
100
). Companies in the growth phase
often require strong backing through both capital
injections and the transfer of management know-
how, which local investors are not always able to
provide in the appropriate proportions. This
suggests that while there is a solid foundation for
VC in Poland, there is still a financing gap for
early-stage firms (
101
). The Polish Development
Fund (PFR) plays a crucial role in Poland’s strategy
to build a venture-capital-oriented culture. PFR
offers grants, loans and equity investments to
start-ups. Nevertheless, the authorities have yet to
develop a more comprehensive strategy to
address various shortcomings in the local VC
market, including investment allocation hurdles.
Financing the green transition
Poland’s green transition financing needs are
enormous.
Poland is the second highest source of
carbon emissions in the EU after Germany. As is to
(
100
) Source: PFR Ventures, Polish VC Market Outlook Q3 2024.
(
101
)
Source: Endeavor Poland Report, Poland’s technology
ecosystem needs to focus resources on companies with the
most potential.
52
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0054.png
Table A5.1:
Financial indicators
Total assets of MFIs (% of GDP)
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio
Total capital adequacy ratio
Overall NPL ratio (% of all loans)
NPL (% loans to NFC-Non financial corporations)
NPL (% loans to HH-Households)
NPL-Non performing loans coverage ratio
Return on Equity
Loans to NFCs (% of GDP)
Loans to HHs (% of GDP)
NFC credit annual % growth
HH credit annual % growth
Stock market capitalisation (% of GDP)
Initial public offerings (% of GDP)
Market funding ratio
Private equity (% of GDP)
Venture capital (% of GDP)
Financial literacy (composite)
Bonds (as % of HH financial assets)
Listed shares (as % of HH financial assets)
Investment funds (as % of HH financial assets)
Insurance/pension funds (as % of HH financial assets)
Total assets of all insurers (% of GDP)
Pension funds assets (% of GDP)
1-3
4-10
11-17
18-24
25-27
1
Banking sector
2017
94.8
16.3
18.0
6.6
8.9
6.0
56.2
2018
91.5
16.1
17.9
6.2
8.4
5.8
54.8
2019
91.3
15.9
17.8
6.1
8.1
5.7
55.6
2020
101.0
17.5
19.6
6.0
8.0
5.4
59.2
2021
99.2
16.1
17.9
5.0
6.5
4.7
59.6
2022
91.8
16.3
18.0
4.3
5.7
4.5
59.9
2023
95.5
18.0
19.5
4.1
5.2
4.7
60.0
11.6
11.9
24.2
0.6
1.0
22.2
0.01
45.2
0.06
0.01
42.5
0.8
3.9
5.2
14.8
6.6
-
2024-Q3
88.6
18.1
19.4
3.9
5.3
4.0
57.1
16.1
10.9
21.9
0.9
4.5
21.5
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6.0
-
EU
247.2
16.7
20.1
1.9
3.5
2.1
42.6
10.1
30.1
44.4
0.5
0.3
67.6
0.05
49.6
0.41
0.05
45.5
2.7
4.8
10.0
27.8
53.4
22.8
6.9
7.0
6.9
3.1
4.8
7.3
17.0
16.5
16.0
14.4
13.5
12.8
34.9
33.7
33.8
32.9
31.2
25.9
8.6
6.6
2.9
-6.4
4.5
9.6
6.4
5.6
6.5
1.5
5.0
-4.4
-
-
-
23.0
24.1
17.9
0.06
0.03
0.02
0.06
0.11
0.01
48.4
45.9
44.7
47.8
47.5
46.1
0.54
0.18
0.11
0.11
0.21
0.07
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.8
3.0
2.6
2.9
3.9
4.1
3.6
7.4
6.0
6.7
5.8
5.8
4.5
17.6
15.5
14.8
13.1
14.1
12.6
10.1
8.8
8.4
8.4
7.3
5.9
-
-
-
-
-
-
Colours indicate performance ranking among 27 EU Member States.
(1) Annualised data.
Credit growth and pension funds EU data refers to the EA average.
Source:
ECB, ESTAT, EIOPA,
DG FISMA CMU Dashboard,
AMECO
be expected, the economy requires significant
investments to meet its climate goals. The Polish
government has outlined a comprehensive
strategy, including its national energy and climate
plan (NECP), which aims to achieve climate
neutrality by 2050. This strategy places a lot of
emphasis on both public and private sector
participation to finance this challenging transition.
Poland has been one of the pioneers in issuing
sovereign green bonds, with a first issuance back
in 2016. There have been a few more green bonds
(EUR 5.5 bn in total) issued by Poland since then.
Nevertheless, the current level of green bond
issuance remains below the EU average (
102
),
highlighting the need for further development in
the green finance market.
Non-banks sector
access to alternatives to bank credit for domestic
firms. Since 2017, financial education has been
included in the curriculum for primary and
secondary schools, with the aim of equipping
pupils with basic financial skills and knowledge.
According to the 2023 Eurobarometer survey(
103
),
only 16% of Poles have a high level of financial
literacy, 65% a medium level, and 19% a low
level, compared to the EU averages of 18%, 64%,
and 18%, respectively. This results in an overall
financial literacy score of 43.5, vs the EU average
of 45.5. The national strategy for financial
education focuses on several key objectives, which
include increasing the ability of households to plan
their finances responsibly, manage risks and
access unbiased financial information.
Financial literacy
Insufficient levels of financial literacy in
Poland are one of the reasons for low
participation in the country’s capital
markets.
Financial literacy is essential for
encouraging retail-investor participation in capital
markets. It is also a prerequisite for facilitating
(
102
) Source: AFME CMU Key performance indicators, seventh
edition, November 2024.
(
103
) Source: (https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2953
53
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0055.png
ANNEX 6: EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Poland’s institutional framework influences
its competitiveness.
Poland has made some
improvement in regulatory governance and
digitalisation. However, challenges remain,
including a complex and fast-changing legislative
environment. While Poland performs well in digital
health services, it lags in other digital services for
citizens and businesses. Poland is undertaking
reforms to address low retention rates in the civil
service, which are mainly due to an unattractive
working environment. Poland is also taking steps
to combat corruption as well as to ensure judicial
independence.
Graph A6.1:
Trust in justice, regional / local
authorities and in government
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
and 35% to more integrity in the public
administration (EU 23%). Clearer information
about procedures and services and more user-
friendly digital services could also improve
citizen’s interactions with Poland’s public
administration (
105
). The perceived quality of
government has deteriorated slightly and remains
at values below the EU average (
106
).
Quality of legislation and regulatory
simplification
Overall performance in developing and
evaluating legislation is above the EU
average.
Performance is more developed for
stakeholder engagement and regulatory impact
assessment than for ex post evaluation of
legislation. The latter shows a gap with respect to
the EU average on account of weaker
requirements
governing
the
methodology,
systematic adoption and transparency of ex post
evaluation of both primary and subordinate
legislation. Moreover, there is scope for improving
the requirements governing the transparency,
oversight and quality control mechanisms of
regulatory impact assessments (Graph A6.2), as
well as for further strengthening the mechanisms
for simplifying regulation. For example, ex post
evaluations of legislation are required to contain
an assessment of administrative burdens and
substantive compliance costs but only for some
primary laws (table A6.1). The Polish recovery and
resilience plan provides for reforms to improve the
quality of law-making and involve social partners
more in the legislative process.
0.3
0.2
0.1
Autumn
Spring
Autumn
Autumn
Autumn
Autumn
Autumn
Autumn
Summer
Summer
Autumn
Winter
Spring
Spring
Spring
Spring
Winter
Spring
Spring
0
2014 2015
2016
2017
2018
2019 2020 2022
2023
2024
Justice, legal system EU27
Justice, legal system PL
Regional or local public authorities EU27
Regional or local public authorities PL
Government EU27
Government PL
(1) EU-27 from 2019; EU-28 before
Source:
Standard Eurobarometer surveys
Public perceptions
Trust in government visibly increased in
2024, with Poland scoring 0.51, well above
the EU-27 average of 0.33(
104
).
Moreover, trust
in regional / local authorities and trust in justice
both score above the EU average and have
reached their highest levels since 2014 (Graph
A6.1). When asked about improvements that can
increase trust in the Polish public administration,
55% of citizens pointed to less bureaucracy (EU:
52%), 47% to more transparency around decision-
making and the use of public money (EU: 44%)
(
104
)
Understanding Europeans’ views on reform needs
- April
2023 - - Eurobarometer survey,
Country Fact Sheet.
Efficiency of selected administrative
procedures
Some
indicators point to Poland’s public
administration taking longer than in other
Member States to complete procedures.
The
OECD product market regulation indicator shows
that that Poland’s licensing system is slightly more
(
105
)
Flash Eurobarometer 526 -
Understanding Europeans’ views
on reform needs
(
106
)
Inforegio
–
European Quality of Government Index
54
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0056.png
Table A6.1:
Poland. Selected indicators on administrative burden reduction and simplification
Ex ante impact assessment of legislation
When developing new legislation, regulators are
required to …
Ex post evaluation of legislation
Is required to consider the consistency of regulations
and address areas of duplication.
Is required to contain an assessment of administrative
burdens.
Is required to contain an assessment of substantive
compliance costs.
Compares the impact of the existing regulation to
alternative options.
Periodic ex post evaluation of existing regulations is
mandatory.
Government uses stock-flow linkage rules when
introducing new regulations (e.g., one-in one-out).
A standing body has published an in-depth review of
specific regulatory areas in the last 3 years.
In the last 5 years, public stocktakes have invited
businesses and citizens to assess the effectiveness,
efficiency, and burdens of legislation.
Identify and assess the impacts of the baseline or
‘do nothing’ option.
Identify and assess the impacts of alternative non-
regulatory options.
Quantify administrative burdens of new
regulations.
Quantify substantial costs of compliance of new
regulations.
Assess macroeconomic costs of new regulations.
Assess the level of compliance.
Identify and assess potential enforcement
mechanisms.
Yes / For all primary laws
For major primary laws
For some primary laws
No / Never
(1) This table presents a subset of iREG indicators focusing on regulatory costs. The indicators refer to primary legislation.
Source:
OECD (2025), Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 [https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en] and Better Regulation across the
European Union 2025 (forthcoming).
burdensome than the EU average, with scope for
alignment with best practices. For example, while
the government keeps an up-to-date online
inventory of all permits and licences
required/issued to businesses by public bodies, it is
not available online for consultation and the
inventory is not kept by a single body. In addition,
there is no requirement for public bodies at central
level to observe the once-only principle (see also
Annex 4). Moreover, according to a report
monitoring implementation of the Commission
Recommendation and Guidance on speeding up
permit-granting procedures for renewable energy
and related infrastructure projects (
107
), there is
scope for further aligning national practices in
Poland with the guidance. Also, unlike 19 other EU
Member States, Poland lacks a dedicated
institution for promoting pro-productivity policies.
Graph A6.2:
Indicators of Regulatory Policy and
Governance (iREG)
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Primary laws Subordinate Primary laws Subordinate Primary laws Subordinate
regulations
regulations
regulations
PL_Stakeholder
engagement
PL_Regulatory Impact
Assessment
PL_Ex-post evaluation of
legislation
Methodology
Transparency
2021
Systematic adoption
Oversight and quality control
EU-27
Source:
OECD (2025), Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 and
Better Regulation across the European Union 2025
(forthcoming).
Social Dialogue
(
107
) European Commission: Directorate-General for
Energy,
Monitoring the implementation of the Commission
recommendation and guidance on speeding up permit-
granting procedures for renewable energy and related
infrastructure projects
–
Final report,
Publications Office of
the European Union, 2025, .link.
Meaningful involvement of social partners in
designing and implementing reforms and
policies is crucial for their success.
In Poland,
the Social Dialogue Council provides a forum for
unions and employers to influence government
55
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0057.png
Table A6.2:
Digital Decade targets monitored through the Digital Economy and Society Index
Poland
2022
Digitalisation of public services
Digital public services for citizens
1
Score (0 to 100)
EU-27
2024
64
2023
2023
60
2022
2024
79
2023
Digital Decade
target by 2030
EU-27
100
2030
100
2030
100
2030
57
2021
2
3
Digital public services for businesses
Score (0 to 100)
70
2021
73
2022
73
2023
85
2023
79
2023
Access to e-health records
Score (0 to 100)
na
2021
86
2022
90
2023
Source:
State of the Digital Decade report 2024
policy, including by commenting on employment
and social legislation. According to social partners,
the social dialogue in Poland has produced no
tangible results since the Council was established
in 2015, and they signal a deterioration in their
involvement (see also Annex 10). The opinions and
demands of the social partners are not always
considered. Deadlines as laid down in the act
regulating the public consultation procedure, are
not always respected. Sometimes public
consultations on draft legislation are omitted
altogether. Ensuring proper and systematic
involvement and capacity building of social
partners (including regional and sectoral ones) will
be key for the successful implementation of
economic, labour market, and social policies. For
the period 2021-2027, Poland allocated nearly
EUR 71 million from the ESF+ to support social
partners at the regional and national levels,
enhancing their role in policy-making and social
dialogue (
108
).
developing electronic documentation management
system and adding new key public services,
drawing on both national and EU funding.
Poland already has an eID scheme.
The use of
eID to access public services is 36.5%, slightly
above the EU-27 average of 36.1%. This result is
likely due to the widespread use of the mObywatel
(
109
) application and the personal profile (profil
osobisty) that is available in the national ID card
and that enables eID. However, Poland has not yet
set up and notified eID schemes for legal persons
under the eIDAS Regulation (
110
). This means that
Polish businesses cannot authenticate themselves
to access public services provided by other
Member States, including those enabled by the
Once-Only Technical System, part of the EU Single
Digital Gateway (
111
). Regarding accessibility, in
addition to regulatory measures, Poland is
implementing several initiatives aimed at
supporting public entities in meeting accessibility
standards.
Digital public services
Performance regarding digitalisation of
public services is mixed.
Poland scores below
the EU average on the provision of public services
for citizens and businesses online, but its score for
online access to e-health records is much higher
than the EU average (table A6.2). Poland could
improve its performance in this area by further
(
108
) For an analysis of the involvement of
Poland’s
social
partners at national level in the European Semester and the
Recovery and Resilience Facility, see Eurofound (2025),
National-level social governance of the European Semester
and the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
Civil service
Poland’s civil service has a good age
distribution and further improved its good
education profile.
Poland has the second-highest
ratio of 25-49-year-olds to 50-64-year-olds
among public sector workers, well above the EU
(
109
)
https://www.gov.pl/web/mobywatel
(
110
) European Commission,
eIDAS Dashboard
(
111
) European Commission,
Once-Only Technical System
Acceleratormeter
56
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0058.png
average (2.9 compared to 1.5). In Poland, 72.6%
of public sector employees have completed higher
education
–
significantly above the EU average of
54%. Poland also scores above the EU average in
terms of participation of employees in education
and training (20.7% compared to 18.9%) (
112
). On
the other hand, the share of women in senior
administrative positions was 40.7% below the EU-
27 average of 46.5% (
113
).
Poland is facing challenges to attract and
retain talent in public administration.
The
interest of individuals under 29 years of age to
vacancies is very low proportion (only 6.5%
compared with 7.1% in 2022 and 15.2% in the
national economy as a whole) (
114
). The Polish civil
service is deemed unattractive due to several
factors, including the significantly lower salaries
than in the private sector. Enhancing the
attractiveness of working in the public sector is a
primary goal for 2023-2024 in response to an
ageing workforce. Reform initiatives include a new
salary scheme (
115
) and communicating the
benefits of working in the public sector through job
fairs and student meetings. Offering more
teleworking opportunities could also help, given
that frequent teleworking in the civil service is
significantly less common than in the EU.
Integrity
Businesses consider corruption is not
appropriately punished, but new reforms are
being implemented to strengthen the
legislative framework against corruption.
In
Poland, 43% of companies consider that
corruption is widespread (EU average 64%) and
27% consider that corruption is a problem when
doing business (EU average 36%) (
116
). Moreover,
only 22% of companies believe that people and
businesses caught for bribing a senior official are
appropriately punished (EU average 31%) (
117
).
Poland has not yet fully tackled all risks
concerning effective enforcement against high-
level corruption (
118
). However, some steps have
been taken to address systemic weaknesses and
to enable a more robust track record against
corruption, with several investigations ongoing.
Progress has also been made to ensure the
independence of the prosecution service from the
Government. The scope of immunities for top
executives and impunity clauses are also issues
(
119
). Digitalisation rates of asset declarations of
public officials and politicians are low, and there is
no central submission and monitoring system for
asset declarations of public officials in place
supporting the tracing of illicit wealth and undue
influence (
120
). The effectiveness of combating
foreign bribery in practice is still rather low.
Furthermore, public procurement remains in focus.
24% of companies (EU average 27%) think that
corruption has prevented them from winning a
public tender or a public procurement contract in
practice in the last three years (
121
). Amendments
to the Criminal Code introduced law enforcement
measures with the aim to increase penalties for
undue interference in public tendering. Apart from
public procurement, the construction sector
features as the main risk sector for corruption (
122
).
While Poland has public registers for
lobbyists in place, there is room for further
transparency.
There are significant concerns
regarding the effectiveness of the registers for
lobbyists currently in place, with persistently low
registration rates, some deregistration and
insufficient oversight and enforcement in practice.
In addition, Poland does not have lobbying rules in
place which would oblige persons exercising top
(
116
) Flash Eurobarometer 543 on businesses’
attitudes towards
corruption in the EU (2024).
(
117
) Ibid.
(
118
) See the 2024 country-specific chapter for Poland of the Rule
of Law Report, p. 18.
(
119
) Ibid., pp. 19-20,
(
120
) Ibid., pp. 21-22.
(
121
) Flash Eurobarometer 543 on businesses’
attitudes towards
corruption in the EU (2024).
(
122
) See the 2024 country-specific chapter for Poland of the Rule
of Law Report, p. 25.
(
112
) Eurostat. Labour Force Survey. 2024 data.
(
113
)
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), ‘Gender
Statistics Database’, available at: link
(
114
)
Civil Service (2024).
Report of the Head of the Civil
Service on the state of the civil service and the
implementation of the tasks of this service in 2023,
available at:
link.
(
115
)
The amended Civil Service Act endorsed on 14 June
2023 made it possible to pay civil servants for overtime
work as of 1 January 2024. Previously, only compensatory
time off was the only option.
link
57
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0059.png
executive functions to disclose their contacts with
interest representatives, including businesses (
123
).
Justice
The overall efficiency of ordinary and
administrative courts remains relatively
stable, with improvement in first instance
administrative cases.
The average length of civil
and commercial proceedings in first instance
courts is 357 days (compared to 362 days in
2022). The average length of administrative
proceedings at first instance courts is 130 days
(compared to 163 days in 2022). The quality of
the justice system is good overall. Poland adopted
a system of electronic case management and case
allocation based on objective criteria and is
making use of distance communication
technology. Poland is continuing to implement its
2024 ‘Action plan on the rule of law’ to
address
concerns regarding judicial independence (
124
).
(
123
) Ibid., pp. 20-21.
(
124
) For more detailed analysis of the performance of the justice
system in Poland, see the upcoming 2025 EU Justice
Scoreboard and 2024 Rule of Law Report.
58
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0060.png
SUSTAINABILITY
ANNEX 7: CLEAN INDUSTRY AND CLIMATE MITIGATION
Poland faces significant challenges regarding
its clean industry transition and climate
mitigation:
its investment in green transition
technologies
lags
behind
EU
averages,
compounded by a burdensome regulatory
environment impacting new business creation.
Poland’s industry remains highly emission-
intensive, and it risks missing its 2030 effort
sharing target, particularly as greenhouse gas
emissions from domestic road transport have
remained on an increasing trend. Air quality
remains problematic, with high levels of emissions
from residential buildings and, in several urban
areas, from the road transport sector. Poland also
struggles with waste management, being at risk of
missing EU recycling and landfilling targets. The
extended producer responsibility for packaging is
yet to be implemented. This annex reviews the
areas in need of urgent attention in
Poland’s clean
industry transition and climate mitigation, looking
at different dimensions.
European Interest (IPCEIs) launched for batteries
and hydrogen.
Furthermore, there are 24 facilities dedicated to
the production of heat pumps, contributing to the
country’s overall manufacturing capacity. More
modestly, Poland displays between 400 and 450
MW/y (2% of EU capacity) of manufacturing
capacity for solar PV, approximately 1.75-2 GW for
wind towers, and 2
–
2.5 GW for blades.
Poland has a strong policy framework
supporting the scale-up of manufacturing
capacity.
Poland’s industrial policy supports net-
zero technologies, providing an overarching
framework, which is accompanied by various
sectoral agreements aiming to develop production
capacities, namely in hydrogen, photovoltaics,
biogas, biomethane, and offshore wind energy. In
September 2024, the European Commission
approved a state aid scheme in the amount of EUR
1.2 billion to support investment (grants) in the
production of batteries, solar panels, wind turbines,
heat pumps, electrolysers and equipment for
carbon capture usage and storage, as well as
components of these net-zero technologies.
However, despite expanding R&D spending
and the implementation of a Green
technology Accelerator, Poland's investment
rate in green transition and clean
technologies is below the EU average.
There
are significant gaps in funding for innovation,
especially for high-risk, early-stage R&D projects
in clean-tech sectors, and Poland lacks an
overarching strategy for energy R&D and
dedicated innovation clusters that support
collaboration.
Additionally,
the
regulatory
environment in Poland is seen as burdensome,
especially regarding the creation of new firms,
which increases uncertainty for investors. More
steps to streamline permitting and green
procurement
requirements
would
further
strengthen Poland’s clean tech manufacturing
potential.
Transforming the car industry
The auto industry accounts for 7.2% of
manufacturing jobs in Poland
(slightly below
the EU average of 8.1% in 2022), employing
directly more than 200 000 people. In terms of
production, some 615 000 vehicles were made in
Strategic autonomy and technology
for the green transition
Net zero industry
Poland has emerged as a strategic cleantech
hub in the EU, underpinned by growing
investment, expanding renewable energy
deployment and a growing role in clean
technology
manufacturing.
With
a
manufacturing capacity amounting to between 8
and 90 GWh/y (36 - 39% of total EU capacity)(
125
)
for battery and storage technologies, Poland’s
growing manufacturing sector is particularly
important for batteries. The country produces 60%
of all lithium batteries made in Europe and ranks
as the world’s second-largest
battery exporter
after China. However, Poland still faces skill
shortages in the battery sector, requiring upskilling
and reskilling efforts to support its growing
industry. In addition, it has a significant
participation in the Important Projects of Common
(
125
) European Commission: Directorate-General for Energy, The
net-zero manufacturing industry landscape across the
Member States 2025.
59
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0061.png
Poland in 2023 (around 40% were cars and more
than 50% vans) in 19 different plants (9 of them
dedicated to battery electric vehicles) (
126
).
Furthermore, Poland’s motorisation rate (the
number of passenger cars per thousand
inhabitants) is 601, one of the highest in the EU in
2023 (the EU average is 570). The average age in
cars is 14.9 years, one of the highest in the EU and
above the EU average of 12.3 years.
The transition to e-vehicles represents a
business opportunity for the auto industry.
Poland has established itself globally as a key
player in battery manufacturing, recently
surpassing the United States to become the
world’s second-largest
producer of lithium-ion
batteries, after China. However, faster progress in
electrifying its passenger car fleet is needed if
Poland is to achieve the decarbonisation targets:
the percentage of new zero-emission cars in 2023
is still 3.6%, well below the EU average of 14.5%
in 2023. The high upfront cost of e-vehicles
(compared to conventional vehicles) and the lack
of adequate charging infrastructure are two of the
main barriers to achieving these fleet
electrification targets.
of the Polish production of coking coal (for its
derivative, coke, this reaches 60–70%), 30–40%
of for refined copper, more than 50% for
elemental sulphur and more than 90% for refined
silver. Only for copper does this share have a
declining trend, due to growing domestic
consumption. Poland’s strategic dependency on
raw material in 2023 is slightly above the EU
average, indicating a moderate level of import
concentration (
127
).
Climate mitigation
Industry decarbonisation
Manufacturing represents less than a fifth of
Poland’s greenhouse gas emissions yet
remains emissions intensive.
At 15%, the share
of industry in Poland’s total greenhouse emissions
is below the EU average of 21% (
128
). By 2022, the
emissions intensity of Poland’s manufacturing
production has decreased by 30% compared to
2017 more than in the EU overall (20%). However,
at 510 g CO2eq per euro of gross value added
(GVA), it emits 80% more greenhouse gases than
the EU overall. At 55 and 45% respectively, the
shares of energy- and non-energy-related
emissions in manufacturing in Poland (the latter
are related to industrial processes and product
use) show an opposite relation to that of the EU
(43 and 57%).
Poland’s manufacturing
sector would benefit
from the decarbonisation of its energy
supply and process electrification.
Between
2017 and 2022, the energy-related greenhouse
emissions intensity of manufacturing in Poland
decreased by 24%, above the EU average
Critical raw materials
Poland is a crucial link in the supply chain of
several mineral raw materials
(including some
critical ones) for the sustainable development of
the EU. In some cases, the minerals produced in
Poland play an important role in ensuring the
bloc’s mineral security. This applies in particular to
coking coal (and its derivative product, coke),
copper, silver and elemental sulphur. The National
Raw Material Policy for 2050, approved in March
2022, aims to ensure Poland’s raw material
security by guaranteeing access to necessary raw
materials (domestic and imported) in the long
term.
Poland is a significant exporter of these raw
materials to the EU and some non-European
countries,
due to its intensive extraction of
high-quality minerals. Exports account for 20–30%
(
126
)
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA)
-
The Automobile Industry Pocket Guide 2024/2025 (2024).
(
127
) Single
Market Scoreboard 2024. ‘Import concentration’
measures how much a country relies on a limited number of
sources for a basket of critical raw materials.
(
128
)
In 2023. Manufacturing includes all divisions of the “C”
section of the NACE Rev. 2 statistical classification of
economic activities. In the remainder of this section, unless
indicated otherwise, data on manufacturing refer to the
divisions of the NACE section C excluding division C19
(manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products), and
the year 2022. The source of all data in this section is
Eurostat; data following the UNFCCC Common Reporting
Framework (CRF) are from the European Environment Agency
(EEA), republished by Eurostat.
60
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0062.png
(16%) (
129
). At the same time, the intensity of
manufacturing regarding process and product use-
related greenhouse emissions declined by 20%,
slightly below the EU overall (23%). In this period,
the share of electricity and renewables in the final
energy consumption of Polish manufacturing only
increased by one percentage point, to 41%.
However, the energy intensity of manufacturing
decreased significantly
–
by 22% - from 2.2 GWh
per euro of GVA to 18 GWh/€. Poland’s
manufacturing sector relies on the grid for 78% of
its electricity consumption and on indirect heat
from the power sector for 39% of its heat
consumption.
Graph A7.1:
GHG emission intensity of manu-
facturing and energy-intensive sectors, 2022
4.5
4
3.5
produce hydrogen. The chemicals industry is one
of the biggest consumers of both natural gas and
hydrogen. The metals sector too is quite emissions
intensive by EU standards, with 4.1 kg CO2eq/€
(EU overall: 3.5 kg). More broadly, Poland has third
highest hydrogen consumption in the EU,
dominated by fossil fuels in production, including
imported natural gas (
131
).
Graph A7.2:
Manufacturing industry output
production: total and selected sectors, index
(2021 = 100), 2017-2023
115
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
KG CO
2
eq / €
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
Manufacturing
Manufacture of paper and paper products
0
C-C19
C17
Poland
C20
EU-27
C23
C24
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Manufacture of basic metals
Source:
Eurostat.
Source:
Eurostat.
The greenhouse emissions intensity of
Poland’s chemicals industry is the fourth
highest in the EU,
at 3.2 kg of CO2eq per € of
GVA (
130
):
A significant share of the sector’s
emissions stems from the use of natural gas to
(
129
) For the GHG emissions intensity of GVA related to energy use
and industrial processes and product use respectively, GHG
emissions are from inventory data in line with the UNFCCC
Common Reporting Format (CRF), notably referring to the
source sectors CRF1.A.2
–
fuel combustion in manufacturing
industries and construction and CRF2
–
industrial processes
and product use. The CRF1.A.2 data broadly correspond to
the NACE C and E sectors, excluding C-19. GVA data (in the
denominator for both intensities) are aligned with this
sectoral coverage. Therefore, they are not fully consistent
with the data referred to in other part of this section.
(
130
) The two sectors considered above
–
the manufacture of
chemicals and chemical products (NACE division C20) and
the manufacture of basic metals (C24) are energy-intensive,
consuming much energy both on site and/or in the form of
purchased electricity
–
and greenhouse gas emissions
intensive, in various combinations. Furthermore, the
manufacture of paper and paper products (NACE division
C17) and of
“other” non-metallic
mineral products (C23)
(including manufacturing activities related to a single
substance of mineral origin, such as glass, ceramic products,
tiles, and cement and plaster) are typically energy- and
greenhouse gas emission-intensive industries.
Poland urgently needs a policy framework to
advance industrial transformation.
The
manufacturing sector accounts for about 16% of
GDP and 31% of employment in Poland.
Meanwhile, its transformation to date fails to
effectively
balance
decarbonisation,
competitiveness and resilience. An effective policy
framework, grounded in sectoral analysis, could
help accelerate the clean industry transformation.
This could include tax incentives to promote
electricity over fossil fuels and a stable legal rules
to support projects in carbon capture and
storage/use, among others.
Reduction of emissions in the effort sharing
sectors
To attain its 2030 effort sharing target,
Poland needs to swiftly specify and
implement further climate mitigation policies
(
132
).
In 2023, greenhouse gas emissions from
(
131
) See
European Hydrogen Observatory
–
Hydrogen Demand.
(
132
)
The national greenhouse gas emission reduction target is set
out in Regulation (EU) 2023/857 (the Effort Sharing
61
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0063.png
Poland’s effort sharing sectors are expected to
have been 4.1% above those of 2005. If
implemented, additional policies considered by
Poland are projected
–
by 2030
–
to reduce these
emissions by 7.2% (or 18.2%) relative to 2005
levels, depending on the additional measure
scenario chosen (
133
). In the most ambitious range,
this provides for the overachievement of Poland’s
effort sharing target, a reduction of 17.7%, by 0.5
percentage points. Given the large impact of the
additional measures that are not yet implemented,
swift and steady adoption will be critical for the
implementation of the full set of measures.
Swift action on decarbonising transport
appears necessary in Poland.
Between 2005
and 2023, greenhouse gas emissions from road
transport nearly doubled in Poland, while they fell
by 5% in the EU overall. Road transport remains
dominated by internal combustion engine vehicles,
with less than 5% of newly registered cars in
2023 being electric. Poland also has the largest
stock of trucks and vans in the EU, accounting for
18% in 2023. Policies to help bring road transport
emissions down are underway, but they are yet to
deliver results. Under its resilience and recovery
plan (RRP), Poland is deploying policies to promote
an uptake of electric vehicles by private users and
businesses and to subsidise the purchase of
electric buses by municipalities. Poland is also
using EUR 444 million from the ETS (EU Emissions
Trading Scheme) Modernisation Fund to deploy
charging stations inter alia for heavy-duty electric
vehicles.
Graph A7.3:
Greenhouse gas emissions in the
effort sharing sectors, 2005 and 2023
250
200
MtCO2e
150
100
50
0
2005
Domestic transport (excl. aviation)
Agriculture
Waste
2023
Buildings (under ESR)
Small industry
Source:
European Environment Agency
The decarbonisation of the buildings sector
needs to accelerate to help reduce emissions,
air pollution and energy poverty.
Emissions
from the buildings sector have been decreasing
gradually, falling to 25% below 2005 levels by
2023, less than the EU average (33%). Poland
remains among the ten EU Member States where
emissions reductions have been advancing most
slowly. Recent progress can be attributed to the
policies promoting heat source replacement for
e.g., Clean Air priority programme, and installation
of small-scale renewable sources. Since 2018,
Poland has earmarked nearly EUR 7 billion to
support heat source replacement and EUR 1 billion
to support the installation of small-scale
renewables in residential buildings. However, about
1.5 million households in Poland still use coal for
individual heating and 7.5 million buildings need
thermal modernisation. Poland has been reviewing
its policies for the building sector with a view to (i)
incentivising heat source replacement, together
with investment in building renovation and (ii)
accelerating implementation.
Sustainable industry
Regulation). It applies jointly to buildings (heating and
cooling); road transport, agriculture; waste; and small industry
(known as the effort sharing sectors).
(
133
)
The effort sharing and sectoral emissions for 2023 are
Circular economy transition
There is room for boosting Poland’s
circularity transition.
Poland’s circular use of
material was 7.5% in 2023, showing a slight
increase following a gradual decline since 2014.
This puts Poland’s rate below the EU average of
11.8%. Poland also lags in terms of resource
based on approximated inventory data. The final data will be
established in 2027 after a comprehensive review.
Projections on the impact of current policies (“with existing
measures”, WEM) and additional policies (“with additional
measures”, WAM) are based on Poland’s final energy and
climate plan.
62
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0064.png
productivity, although its performance has been
constantly improving over the past decade.
In 2023, the country generated EUR 0.86 per kg of
material consumed, which is below the EU average
of EUR 2.22 per kg. Poland has a Roadmap for the
Transition to a Circular Economy (
134
) in place
(adopted in 2019), which focuses on four areas of
action:
sustainable
industrial
production,
sustainable consumption, bioeconomy and new
business models. The roadmap contains a set of
tools aiming to create the conditions for
implementing a new economic model in Poland.
The measures included mainly concern analytical
and conceptual work, information and promotion,
as well as coordination in areas in the remit of
individual ministries. The implementation of the
roadmap has been slow, but first steps include the
establishment of a circular economy government
information platform and an indicator system
assessing the progress of the transition. As part of
Poland’s National Recovery and Resilience
Plan (
135
), new end-of-waste regulations for key
industrial waste are planned. They shall include
definitions of selected secondary raw materials
and facilitate the circulation and use of waste as
secondary raw materials.
Municipal waste generation in Poland has
increased in the last decade, but with 364
kg/cap of municipal waste generated in
2022, the country is still significantly below
the estimated EU average of 515 kg/cap.
Positive trends have been observed in
recycling.
After a period of stagnation, the
municipal waste recycling rate (incl. preparing for
reuse) has significantly increased in recent years.
In 2022, the rate was 41%, which is slightly below
the estimated EU average of 49%. Poland’s overall
packaging waste recycling rate significantly
increased between 2010 and 2019 and reached
56% in 2019. Still, Poland is at risk of missing
both 2025 targets set out in the Waste Framework
Directive: the 55% preparing for re-use and
recycling target for municipal waste and the 65%
packaging waste recycling target. Poland is also at
risk of not meeting the 2035 target of max 10%
of municipal waste landfilled (
136
).
Current investment in the circularity
transition has been insufficient.
Poland is
estimated to need total additional investment
worth at least EUR 1.25 billion a year for its
circular economy transition, including waste
management, representing 0.2% of Poland’s GDP.
Of the circular economy gap, EUR 265 million
relate to recent initiatives, such as eco-design for
sustainable products, packaging and packaging
waste, labelling and digital tools, critical raw
materials recycling and measures proposed under
the amended Waste Framework Directive, and EUR
723 million constitutes a further investment need
to unlock Poland’s circular economy potential
(
137
).
Zero pollution industry
Despite positive trends in emission reduction
from individual heating sources in buildings,
air quality in Poland continues to give cause
for concern.
Emissions of several air pollutants
have fallen significantly since 2005, while GDP
growth has continued. Poland has made
substantial progress in reducing emissions under
the National Air Pollution Control Programme
(NAPCP). The latest reported data show that the
2020-2029 emission reduction commitments have
been met and that the 2030 onwards emission
reduction commitments are projected to be
reached. Still, in 2023, exceedances above the
limit values set by the Ambient Air Quality (AAQ)
Directive (
138
) were registered for NO
2
in four air
quality zones (
139
), and for PM
10
in two air quality
zones (
140
) in Poland. Furthermore, the target
values for ozone concentrations have not been
met in one air quality zone, the target values for
arsenic concentrations in two air quality zones, and
(
136
) Circular economy country profile
–
Poland. (Link) accessed 9
November 2024.
(
137
) European Commission, DG Environment,
Environmental
investment needs & gaps assessment programme,
2025
update. Expressed in 2022 prices.
(
134
) Polish Roadmap for the Transition to Circular Economy, 2019.
(https://gozwpraktyce.pl/regulacja/mapa-drogowa/ ).
(
135
)
Poland’s recovery and resilience plan, 2022.
(https://www.funduszeeuropejskie.gov.pl/media/109762/KPO.
pdf
).
(
138
)
Directive 2008/50/EU on ambient air quality and cleaner air
for Europe
.
(
139
) Aglomeracja Wroclawska, Aglomeracja Krakowska,
Aglomeracja Warszawska and Aglomeracja Górnoslaska.
(
140
) Strefa Dolnoslaska and Strefa Malopolska.
63
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0065.png
for benzo(a)pyrene (BaP) concentrations in twenty-
one air quality zones (
141
).
Polish industry still releases large amounts
of air and water pollutants.
Poland has the
second-highest industrial air pollution damage in
the EU, and ranks third in emissions intensity,
significantly exceeding the EU average of EUR
27.5 / EUR thousand GVA (gross value added). The
primary source of air emissions in Poland is the
energy sector, which is a major contributor to
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur dioxide
(SO2), mercury (Hg) and nickel (Ni), while the
metal industry is a significant source of copper
(Cu), lead (Pb) and zinc (Zn) emissions. Additionally,
the chemical industry is a key contributor to
emissions of non-methane volatile organic
compounds (NMVOC). Moreover, in EU rankings
Poland has the 3
rd
highest emissions of heavy
metals to water and is in 4
th
position for emissions
intensity, above the EU average intensity of 0.864
kg/EUR billion GVA. The main contributors to
emissions to water in Poland are the waste
management sector for nitrogen, total organic
carbon and heavy metals, and wastewater
treatment for phosphorus.
The costs of pollution remain far higher than
the investment into pollution prevention and
control.
The latest available annual estimates (for
2022) by the European Environment Agency (
142
)
for Poland attribute 391 000 years of life lost to
fine particulate matter (PM
2.5
) (
143
). To meet its
environmental objectives on pollution prevention
and control and address the health and economic
costs of pollution, Poland needs an additional EUR
1.6 billion per year (0.24% of GDP), mostly related
to clean air and noise (
144
).
(
141
) European Environment Agency,
Eionet Central Data
Repository.
(
142
) European Environment Agency,
Harm to human health from
air pollution in Europe: burden of disease 2024.
(
143
) Particulate matter (PM) is a mixture of aerosol particles (solid
and liquid) covering a wide range of sizes and chemical
compositions. PM
10
refers to particles with a diameter of 10
micrometres or less. PM
2.5
refers to particles with a diameter
of 2.5 micrometres or less. PM is emitted from many human
sources, including combustion.
(
144
) European Commission, DG Environment,
Environmental
investment needs & gaps assessment programme,
2025
update. Expressed in 2022 prices.
64
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0066.png
Table A7.1:
Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Poland
Strategic autonomy and technology for the green transition
Net zero industry
Operational manufacturing capacity 2023
- Solar PV (c: cell, w: wafer, m: module), MW
- Wind (b: blade, t: turbine, n: nacelle), MW
Automotive industry transformation
Motorisation rate (passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants), %
New zero-emission vehicles, electricity motor, %
Critical raw materials
Material import dependency, %
Climate mitigation
Industry decarbonisation
GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing production, kg/€
Share of energy-related emissions in industrial GHG emissions
Energy-related GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing
and construction, kg/€
Share of electricity and renewables in final energy consumption
in manufacturing, %
Energy intensity of manufacturing, GWh/€
Share of energy-intensive industries in manufacturing production
GHG emissions intensity of production in sector [...], kg/€
- paper and paper products (NACE C-17)
- chemicals and chemical products (NACE C20)
- other non-metallic mineral products (NACE C23)
- basic metals (NACE C24)
Reduction of effort sharing emissions
GHG emission reductions relative to base year, %
- domestic road transport
- buildings
2005
Effort sharing: GHG emissions, Mt; target, gap, %
Sustainable industry
Circular economy transition
Material footprint, tonnes per person
Circular material use rate, %
Resource productivity, €/kg
Zero pollution industry
Years of life lost due to PM2.5, per 100,000 inhabitants
Air pollution damage cost intensity, per thousand € of GVA
Water pollution intensity, kg weighted by human factors per bn € GVA
1,479
1,148
1,056
1,335
77.4
1.8
1,541
-
702
571
27.5
0.9
2018
16.8
10.5
0.7
192.5
Poland
2019
16.1
9.2
0.8
2020
15.8
7.4
0.8
2021
16.2
7.0
0.9
2022
16.1
6.7
1.0
2023
15.8
7.5
1.1
0.90
3.62
3.55
4.08
0.79
3.55
3.57
4.70
2018
79.7
-2.6
0.82
3.42
3.82
4.19
2019
82.5
-12.7
0.72
3.36
3.79
3.91
2020
74.4
-11.2
0.68
3.73
3.87
4.16
2021
7.7
88.7
-8.8
2021
207.3
2017
0.67
46.2
264.7
40.0
2.24
2018
0.65
44.7
249.8
39.8
2.18
Poland
EU-27
400-450 (m)
2000-2500 (b), 1750-2000 (t)
2017
507
0.10
2017
2018
524
0.13
2018
19.5
2019
541
0.26
2019
19.5
- Electrolyzer, MW
- battery, MWh
2020
566
0.85
2020
19.3
2021
579
1.57
2021
19.7
2022
584
2.68
2022
20.8
-
85000-90000
2023
601
3.58
2023
19.9
Trend
2018
539
1.03
2018
24.2
2021
561
8.96
2021
22.6
Poland
2019
0.6
44.8
236.1
40.5
2.07
2020
0.6
44.6
233.0
41.8
2.12
2021
0.61
45.9
238.3
39.2
2.14
2022
0.51
45.0
201.9
40.8
1.75
14.4
0.61
3.22
3.60
4.08
2022
2.0
91.4
-20.5
2022
196.2
-
-
-
-
2023
4.1
95.4
-25.0
2023
200.4
2023
 
45.9
-
38.3
1.58
EU-27
2017
0.34
44.8
158.4
43.3
1.29
2022
0.27
42.5
132.9
44.2
1.09
7.3
-
-
-
-
0.73
1.25
2.53
2.79
2018
1.4
21.4
0.68
1.26
2.24
3.49
2023
5.2
32.9
WAM
0.5
Target
-17.7
Trend
WEM
-3.4
EU-27
2018
14.7
11.6
2.1
2021
15.0
11.1
2.3
Source:
Net zero industry:
European Commission:
The net-zero manufacturing industry landscape across Member States: final
report,
2025.
Automotive industry transformation:
Eurostat.
Critical raw materials:
Eurostat.
Climate mitigation:
See
footnotes in the "climate mitigation" section; reduction of effort sharing emissions:
EEA greenhouse gases data viewer;
European
Commission,
Climate Action Progress Report,
2024.
Sustainable industry:
Years of life lost due to PM2.5: Eurostat and EEA,
Harm to human health from air pollution in Europe: burden of disease status,
2024. Air pollution damage: EEA,
EU large industry
air pollution damage costs intensity,
2024. Emissions covered: As, benzene, Cd, Cr, Hg, NH3, Ni, NMVOC, NOX, Pb, dioxins, PM10,
PAH, SOX. Water pollution intensity: EEA,
EU large industry water pollution intensity,
2024. Releases into water covered from
cadmium, lead, mercury, nickel. Other indicators: Eurostat.
65
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0067.png
ANNEX 8: AFFORDABLE ENERGY TRANSITION
This annex outlines the progress made and
the ongoing challenges faced in enhancing
energy competitiveness and affordability,
while advancing the transition to net zero.
It
examines the measures and targets proposed in
the final (draft) updates to the national energy
and climate plans (NECPs) for 2030.
The decarbonisation of the Polish energy
system is progressing, but challenges persist.
District heating remains largely reliant on coal and
grid bottlenecks hinder further renewable energy
penetration. While household energy prices are
capped, industry pays among the highest
electricity prices in the EU. Significant investment
in non-fossil grid flexibility, enhanced cross-border
flows and more consumer empowerment could
play an important role. Electrification is
progressing slowly, also due to the unfavourable
electricity/gas price ratio, exacerbated by high
taxation on electricity compared to gas. Both
Industrial and household consumers pay electricity
around 3 times as much as gas.
energy, network costs, and taxes. However,
prices remain below the EU average,
primarily
due to government intervention. Taxes represent
46.6% of the total electricity cost for households,
significantly higher than the EU average of 25%.
This stands in stark contrast to gas, where taxes
account for only 19.4% of the total cost, compared
to the EU average of 27.8%.Since 2022, Poland
has frozen regulated household electricity prices
at 2021 levels (PLN 412/MWh) for annual
consumption up to 3,000 kWh, with higher
thresholds for farmers and large families.
Consumption above these limits is charged at PLN
693/MWh.
In contrast, retail energy prices for industrial
consumers have declined but remain above
the EU average.
As with households, taxes and
levies are heavily weighted towards electricity:
they account for 37.2% of the total cost of
electricity (compared to the EU average of 15.4%),
but only 1.4% for gas (vs 11.6% EU average).
With an average of 96 EUR/MWh in 2024(
145
),
Poland had the EU’s seventh highest
wholesale electricity prices.
While prices in
Poland declined early in the year amid falling
natural gas costs, they surged during the
spring/summer and again in the winter, diverging
from Central Western European (CWE) markets.
Despite lower consumption compared to 2023,
lower coal output (-8% in 2024), a strained net
importing position
1
as well as limited non-fossil
flexibility created an electricity supply-demand gap
(which was exacerbated in the winter due to lower
wind power generation compared to 2023). This
gap was mainly covered by costly natural gas-
fired generation (+24% in 2024) ramping up
especially during peak demand hours. These
conditions caused price spikes in the evening hours
(18h-21h), when solar output declined and
demand remained high, especially during the
summer. On the other hand, average daytime
hourly prices were lower compared to 2023, likely
owing to the uptake of solar output in Poland
(+37% in 2024). More broadly, fossil fuels still
accounted for 70% of electricity generation in
Poland throughout 2024, maintaining their
Energy prices and costs
Graph A8.1:
Retail energy price components for
household and non-household consumers, 2024
(i) For household consumers, consumption includes all bands
for electricity and gas. Taxes and levies are shown including
VAT.
(ii) For non-household consumers, consumption band is ID for
electricity and I4 for gas. Taxes and levies are shown
excluding VAT and recoverable charges, as these are typically
recovered by businesses.
Source:
Eurostat
In 2024, Poland’s retail electricity prices for
households have risen slightly, driven by
increases across all price components—
(
145
) Fraunhofer (ENTSO-E data).
66
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0068.png
structural role as dominant
–
and costly
–
marginal price-setting technologies(
146
).
Graph A8.2:
Monthly average day-ahead wholesale
electricity prices and European benchmark
natural gas prices (Dutch TTF)
The planned investments focus more on the
internal constraints of the grid.
The new
national network development plan, which runs
until 2034, envisages PLN 64 billion of
investments to modernise transmission networks.
The modernisation plan assumes that the network
will have greater capacity to connect renewable
energy sources. Also, the Polish transmission
system operator has already started to make
investments that will allow energy to be collected
from offshore wind farms and a nuclear power
plant to be built in the future.
Poland is part of three capacity calculation
regions (CCRs), namely Core(
147
), Baltic(
148
)
and Hansa(
149
).
Member States should ensure
that a minimum of 70% of technical cross-border
capacity is available for trading. With regard to
this target of 70%, Poland has declared allocation
constraints limiting total exchanges to and from
the Polish bidding zone(
150
). In June 2024, the
Polish transmission system operator implemented
significant reform of the balancing market, which
is expected to first mitigate and ultimately
eliminate the allocation constraint. To increase
cross-border capacity, Poland drew up an action
plan to reinforce the internal electricity grid.
Furthermore, Poland has a derogation in place for
the 70% criterion granted on the grounds of
excessive loop flow from neighbouring Member
States. A derogation enables a lower level of
trades for a time-limited period if needed for
operational security reasons.
Permitting remains an obstacle for grid
development.
The general permitting process for
infrastructure projects is complicated. Obtaining all
the necessary opinions and consents necessary at
various steps of the procedure may take several
years(
151
). Although there are no special provisions
(
147
)
Core is the CCR which covers central European
countries namely Austria, Belgium Czechia, Germany, France,
Croatia, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia,
Slovakia and, once connected, Ireland. A CCR is a group of
countries which calculate cross-border electricity trade flows
together.
(
148
)
Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland
are part of the Baltic CCR.
(
149
)
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany
and Poland are in the Hansa CCR.
(
150
) See 2024 ACER market monitoring report.
(
151
)
Milieu (2025)
Study on national permit-granting
process applicable to energy transmission infrastructure projects
with a focus on projects of common interest and projects of
mutual interest under Chapter III of Regulation (EU) 2022/869.
Overview Report.
(i) the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) is a virtual trading point for
natural gas in the Netherlands. It serves as the primary
benchmark for European natural gas prices.
(ii) CEE and CWE respectively provide average prices in the
central-western European (Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria) and central-
eastern European (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary,
Slovenia and Romania) markets.
Source:
S&P Platts and ENTSO-E
Flexibility and electricity grids
The Polish electricity system remains weakly
interconnected.
The
development
and
modernisation of the network is crucial for further
deployment of renewables. In recent years, Poland
has not managed to improve its level of
interconnectivity with other countries. In 2024 this
stood at 5%, well below the 15% target for 2030.
While capacity allocation constraints play a role
here, there are also no projects in the pipeline that
would increase transfer capacity on the western
borders. The only electricity cross-border project of
common interest at the moment is the Harmony
Link with Lithuania. The project has faced some
delays and is now planned to be an overland
alternating current line (initially high voltage direct
current subsea cable) to be commissioned in 2030.
(
146
)
Yearly electricity data, Ember (generation and
consumption data throughout the paragraph).
67
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0069.png
for projects of common interest/projects of mutual
interest, an updated manual of procedures tailored
to these projects was published in 2023.
Furthermore, the Transmission Act and Gas Act
established accelerated and more effective
permit-granting procedures, which make it
possible to implement projects in an effective and
satisfactory manner.
Despite some progress, non-fossil flexibility,
including storage and demand-side response,
is underutilised.
Demand response faces large
market access barriers. While demand response
can participate in the capacity market and has
been awarded contracts representing 4-8% of the
total awarded capacity over the 2021-2028
period, its access to wholesale energy markets is
currently not allowed. Access to the balancing
market is possible but barriers remain, such as a
long prequalification time or minimum bid size.
The Polish capacity market has also awarded
contracts to non-fossil flexibility assets such as
battery storage or pumped hydro storage
(respectively 2 GW and 1.15 GW for 2028). Today,
1.76 GW of storage is operational in Poland and a
further 2.7 GW has been announced.
In the last few years, Poland has experienced an
increasing occurrence of negative prices. While this
is still a rarer phenomenon than in other Member
States, it has taken on greater significance due to
the growth of renewables in the mix leading to
periodic energy surpluses when weather conditions
are favourable. Traditional sources, like coal-fired
plants, have limited operation flexibility and
struggle to adjust output to match the varying
production of renewable energy sources (RES.
Negative prices occurred 43 times in 2023 and 53
times in 2024. In July 2023, Poland amended its
energy law to introduce mandatory compensation
for generators affected by redispatching. However,
its implementation lacks transparency in the
calculation of fair compensation.
Consumer empowerment is progressing
slowly, despite its high potential
(7.9% of
households in Poland generated electricity in
2023, one of the highest values in the EU). As of
August 2024, customers will have the right to
enter into contracts involving dynamic electricity
prices with any supplier that serves more than
200 000 customers. Although there was a
significant increase in rolling out smart meters to
household consumers in 2023 (by 9.3 pps
compared to 2022), only 27% of Polish
households have access to smart meters, well
below the EU average of 63% and the 2030 80%
target. Households have been taking up the role of
prosumers gradually, with 7.9% generating their
own electricity(
152
). Despite the 2023 update of the
legislative framework, the development of energy
communities remains limited, with around 50
reported(
153
). National public procurement rules
have been reported as a significant obstacle,
preventing municipalities from prioritising locally
produced energy and making suppliers hesitant to
enter into an agreement to take on balancing
responsibilities
on
behalf
of
energy
154
communities( ).
In 2023, electricity accounted for 16.6% of
Poland’s final energy consumption, below the
EU average of 22.9%, and this share has
remained largely stagnant in the last
decade(
155
) also due to an extremely
unfavourable electricity/gas price ratio.
Further progress in electrification across sectors is
required for cost effectively decarbonising the
economy and bringing the benefits of affordable
renewable generation to consumers. When it
comes to households, electricity accounts for
12.5% of final energy consumption, while in
industry it represents 26.4% (see also Annex 7).
For the transport sector, this share remains
negligible at 1.4%. Electricity was 2.9 times more
expensive than gas for Polish households in 2024,
mainly due to unfavourable tax treatment. Before
taxes, the ratio is only 1.6. Similarly, the ratio for
energy intensive industrial consumers in 2024 was
3.1, while it was only 2 before taxes (
156
).
(
152
)
All data on consumer empowerment are from the
ACER Market Monitoring report 2023, i.e. based on data covering
2022.
(
153
) ESPON TANDEM project.
(
154
)
Energy Communities Repository: Barriers and action
drivers for the development of different activities by renewable
and citizen energy communities.
(
155
)
CAGR (compound annual growth rate) of -0.3%
between 2013 and 2023 and minimum/maximum share of
16.5% and 18.1%, respectively.
(
156
)
Analysis based on Eurostat data for the second
semester of 2024 and on ACER data for 2025. For household
consumers, consumption bands include all bands for electricity
and gas. For non-household consumers, consumption band is ID
for electricity and I4 for gas, referring to large-sized consumers,
providing an insight into international competitiveness (price
used for the calculation excludes VAT and other recoverable
taxes/levies/fees as non-household consumers are usually able
to recover VAT and some other taxes).
68
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0070.png
Renewables and long-term contracts
Solar power continued its steep upward
trajectory. In 2024, total capacity installed
increased by 45%, to 5.8GW.
Despite the
relaxation of the 10h rule, the potential of wind
energy in Poland remains largely untapped.
In
2024, total onshore wind installed capacity
increased only by 7.5%, from 9.3 GW to
10 GW.
Hydropower capacity remained unchanged
at 2.4 GW in 2023 compared to 2022. In 2024
renewable energy sources accounted for 30% of
the electricity mix, increasing from 27.2% in 2023
(vs EU overall RES share of 47%)(
157
).
Graph A8.3:
Poland’s installed renewable capacity
(left) and electricity generation mix (right)
more personnel will be required to deal with the
expected increase in permitting procedures. (Add if
available amount of capacity permitted in 2024.)
There is thus room for further improvement to
shorten the permit-granting procedure for RES,
especially taking into consideration the guidance
on speeding up permit-granting procedures. The
share of renewables in final energy consumption,
calculated as per the RED methodology, has
slightly declined in 2023 to 16.5%, one of the
lowest values in the EU.
The Polish energy mix is still dominated by
fossil fuels, which cover 85% of total
available energy.
This is higher that the EU
average of 75%. Between 2022 and 2023, the
share of coal has significantly declined by more
than 5 percentage points, from 40.2% to 34.7%.
Renewables have slightly increased, from 12.8%
to 14.3%.
Poland has provided a clear picture on upcoming
auctions of offshore wind for the coming years in
the Union Renewables Development Platform, with
4 GW being auctioned in 2025, 2027 and 2029.
Poland also pledged to boost onshore wind
generation, albeit by comparatively modest
amounts.
"Other" includes solid biofuels, renewable municipal
waste, liquid biofuels and biogas
Source:
IRENA, Ember
Poland has made some progress towards
speeding up permitting, also by implementing
reforms included in its recovery plan.
It has
made visible efforts to improve internal
coordination, digitalise procedures and ease
conditions for grid connection. Progress includes
new rules on cable pooling and more coordinated
grid development as well as the identification and
planning of locations for projects. Several
significant initiatives have been undertaken, such
as identifying necessary priority investments in
grid expansion and modernising the law on spatial
planning. The envisaged reform of the distance
law for wind installations with a reduction of the
minimum distance from 700m to 500m is likely to
significantly increase the area available for wind
power. At the same time, there is no unified
process for the single contact point, and there are
no established rules for repowering. Moreover,
(
157
) Yearly electricity data, Ember.
Regarding power purchase agreements(
158
),
Poland is among the top 8 EU countries
with a
contracted volume of 0.7 GW and 231 deals in
2024. This marks a slight decrease in contracted
capacity (from 0.75 GW) but an increase in the
number of deals (from 16) concluded compared to
the previous year.
In Q4 of 2024, Poland adopted a dedicated
Hydrogen Act, which updates the existing energy
legislation and is expected to accelerate the
growth of the low-carbon and renewable hydrogen
economy, as well as the planning of supporting
infrastructure. However, Poland has yet to explore
the potential benefits of system integration, such
as utilising excess renewable energy to produce
fully renewable hydrogen by strategically locating
electrolysers
and
leveraging
Power-to-X
technologies to produce hydrogen and other
derivatives.
(
158
)
European PPA Market Outlook 2025, Pexapark.
69
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0071.png
Energy efficiency
In 2023, energy consumption continued its
decline after years of steady growth, with
exceptions in 2020 and 2022.
Primary and final
energy consumption fell by 5.1% and 2.3%,
reaching 93.6 Mtoe and 69.9 Mtoe, respectively.
While Poland’s draft updated NECP aligns with the
formula laid down in Annex I to the recast Energy
Efficiency Directive, additional measures are
needed to meet the ambitious 2030 targets.
Energy intensity decreased across all
sectors, but transport remains the largest
energy consumer (over 30% final energy
consumption) with limited progress in
reducing consumption.
Poland’s cumulative
energy savings target under Articles 8 to 10 of the
Energy Efficiency Directive for 2021-2030 is
44 870 ktoe. Data from the NECP for 2023
indicate that expected savings would significantly
exceed this, correcting the underperformance seen
in 2021. The draft NECP update in 2024 includes
three new energy efficiency programs alongside
the existing white certificate scheme to ensure
targets are met.
Poland has an effective national financing
framework for energy efficiency that
primarily involves grants (35%), mixed
schemes (32%) and financial instruments
(27%).
Funding targets industry/SMEs (26%),
residential buildings (24%), public buildings (12%),
and district heating (12%). However, Poland has
notified the Commission of its comprehensive
heating and cooling assessment required under
the Energy Efficiency Directive.
The long-term renovation strategy aims to
cut buildings’ primary energy consumption by
4% between 2018 and 2030.
Heating and
cooling accounted for 82% of residential final
energy use in 2022, with renewables supplying
23%. Final energy consumption in households fell
3.8% in 2023, though it increased by 3% after
climate corrections. Greater efforts are needed to
meet the 2030 efficiency targets in buildings.
Heat pump deployment fell by 40% in 2023
due to an unfavourable electricity/gas price
ratio and increased popularity of gas and
biomass boilers.
Heating and cooling account for
81% of residential energy consumption, with only
20% from renewables. Heat pump incentives exist,
covering up to EUR 10 750 per installation.
However, their impact is likely to be offset by
electricity’s expensiveness
compared to other
fossil solutions.
Structural challenges persist in district
heating
decarbonisation,
despite
coal
reliance in this area declining from 73% in
2022 to 69% in 2023.
Poland has put in place
policies to phase out individual coal-based heating
and set targets to eliminate the installation of gas
boilers in new buildings. However, challenges
remain. The share of households using coal-based
individual heating fell from 40% in 2012 to 20%
in 2021. However, 50% of households are
connected to district heating, where coal remains
by far the main energy source. Such a large share
of coal in heating supply is quite unique in Europe,
as no other country presents comparable levels.
Despite technical and financial challenges,
decarbonisation efforts can leverage district
heating as a key enabler of system flexibility,
using power-to-heat technologies to stabilise the
electricity grid, integrate renewable energy sources
and unlock the potential of geothermal and solar
thermal heating.
Fossil fuel subsidies
In 2023, environmentally harmful(
159
) fossil
fuel subsidies without a planned phase-out
before 2030 represented 0.92%(
160
) of
Poland’s GDP(
161
), above the EU weighted
average of 0.49%.
Tax measures accounted for
75% of this volume, while income/price support
and direct grants represented 23% and 2%,
respectively. Fossil fuel subsidies without a
planned phase-out before 2030 and which do not
(
159
) Direct fossil fuel subsidies that incentivise maintaining or
increasing in the availability of fossil fuels and/or use of
fossil fuels.
(
160
) Numerator is based on volumes cross-checked with the
Polish authorities. For all Member States, it includes public
R&D expenditures for fossil fuels as reported by the IEA
(Energy Technology RD&D Budgets) and excludes, for
methodological consistency, excise tax exemption on
kerosene consumed in intra-EU27 air traffic.
(
161
) 2023 Gross Domestic Product at market prices, Eurostat.
70
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0072.png
Table A8.1:
Key Energy Indicators
Poland
2017
Gas Consumption (in bcm)
Gas Consumption year-on-year change [%]
Gas Imports - by type (in bcm)
Gas imports - pipeline
Gas imports - LNG
Gas Imports - by main source supplier [%]
Germany
Ukraine
United States
Russia
20.1
4.4%
15.7
14.0
1.8
22.7%
0.0%
0.6%
65.6%
EU
2019
20.8
2.9%
17.5
14.0
3.5
22.6%
0.0%
5.4%
55.0%
2018
20.2
0.5%
15.8
13.0
2.7
18.8%
0.0%
0.5%
61.6%
2020
21.3
2.6%
17.4
13.6
3.8
21.0%
0.6%
5.7%
54.9%
2021
22.8
7.2%
18.5
14.4
4.1
17.7%
2.0%
8.6%
56.6%
2022
19.6
-13.9%
15.2
9.0
6.2
28.9%
0.5%
22.6%
19.6%
2023
20.2
2.9%
15.9
9.2
6.7
7.3%
3.5%
0.0%
0.0%
Source:
Eurostat, ENTSO-E, S&P Platts
specifically address, in a targeted way, energy
poverty nor genuine energy security concerns
included ongoing subsidies to the coal mining
industry, tax exemptions for coal and fuel oil(
162
),
and excise duty refunds on diesel used in
agriculture. Additionally,
Poland’s 2023 average
Effective Carbon Rate(
163
) averaged EUR 68 per
tonne of CO₂, below the EU weighted mean of EUR
84.80(
164
).
In 2024, Poland confirmed its EUR 1.6 billion
subsidy to coal mining. The 2021 social contract
outlines a gradual phase-out of coal until 2049
–
the latest phase-out date in the EU. Coal mining in
Poland has become increasingly uncompetitive.
Similarly, the share of coal in the power mix is
rapidly declining, to the advantage of renewable
energy sources. Poland has therefore the
opportunity to act in advance of the official phase-
out date and send a strong and credible signal to
the market and to investors.
(
162
) Fuel oil used for the following purposes is exempted from
excise duty the production of electricity and heat in
cogeneration, in agricultural, horticultural, greenhouse and
forestry activities.
(
163
) The Effective Carbon Rate is the sum of carbon taxes, ETS
permit prices and fuel excise taxes, representing the
aggregate effective carbon rate paid on emissions.
(
164
) OECD (2024), Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024.
71
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0073.png
ANNEX 9: CLIMATE ADAPTATION, PREPAREDNESS AND ENVIRONMENT
The impacts of climate change threaten
Poland’s economy and
society, and water-
related
ecosystems
are
particularly
vulnerable.
Better governance of adaptation is
critical to building resilience, including better
coordination between national, regional and local
bodies and integration of climate risk assessment
into sectoral policy design and strategic planning.
Some progress has been made in Poland in this
respect, but a comprehensive and systematic
approach to adaptation governance is still lacking.
Recent events, such as the Oder River disaster in
2022 and the floods in 2024, show that water-
related ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to
climate change impacts. Meanwhile, the design of
Poland's water management system prioritises the
industrial use of rivers, without giving sufficient
consideration to environmental and resilience
aspects. A more balanced and preparedness-
oriented approach to governance is urgently
needed to ensure not just the long-term
sustainability of water-related ecosystems, but
also the competitiveness of sectors that rely on
their ecosystem services.
losses accounting for EUR 13.7 billion between
1980 and 2023 (
165
). Their impact was further
exacerbated by productivity deficits as well as the
costs of rehabilitation and assistance (
166
). In
September 2024, south-west Poland suffered
severe floods, with the resulting direct losses
estimated at EUR 3 to 6 billion and rehabilitation
and recovery still underway A wide climate
protection gap continues to pose a challenge to
Poland’s public finances,
at both national and
regional levels. On average, only 7% of losses
from extreme weather- and climate-related events
over the period 1980-2023 were insured,
compared to 62% in Denmark (
167
).
Poland's agricultural sector needs systemic
adaptation to climate change in order to
maintain its strategic importance for the
economy and food security.
In 2023, agriculture
accounted for 3% of the Polish gross domestic
product (GDP), the seventh highest in the EU and
above the EU-27 average. A composite
assessment shows that the resilience of
agriculture in Poland has improved in 2007-2021;
however,
growing
climate
change-related
pressures call for further effort to increase
resilience and preparedness. In addition to drought,
flooding, heatwaves and frost damage, as well as
extreme weather events, agriculture is exposed to
new diseases and pests, and environmental
pressures, chiefly water and soil quality
degradation. The wide-scale uptake of nature-
based agricultural practices to boost resilience and
biodiversity, protect against erosion and improve
the retention of water is key to fostering resilience.
A good understanding of climate change impacts
and risks would also help identify opportunities for
the sector to diversify.
Poland is deploying investment programmes
and support schemes to boost preparedness
and improve adaptation in the face of an
increased flood and drought risks.
In 2024,
Poland announced EUR 250 million investment in
water infrastructure to manage flood waves and
to increase water retention. In parallel, Poland
allocated EUR 55 million to environmental
(
165
) EEA, 2024,
Economic losses from weather- and climate-
related extremes in Europe,
Link.
(
166
) ING, 2024,
Updated: Polish flood damages may be limited
but GDP impact could be higher than that,
Link.
(
167
) EEA, 2024,
Economic losses from weather- and climate-
related extremes in Europe,
Link.
Climate adaptation and preparedness
Poland faces intensifying impacts of climate
change, in particular an increased risk of
drought, flooding and heatwaves, as well as
other extreme weather events.
These impacts
threaten the security of critical infrastructure and
expose important sectors of the economy to
losses, such as agriculture and food production,
the biomass industry and tourism. They also pose
a welfare risk, putting emergency, health and
sanitary services under pressure. The severity and
frequency of climate change impacts vary
regionally, which poses an additional challenge in
terms of adaptation governance. An effective
approach needs to draw from regularly updated
sector-specific climate risk assessments and
mobilise action at both national and regional
levels.
Losses and damage caused by climate
change-related extreme events are a
growing threat to Poland’s economy and its
people.
Between 1980 and 2023, economic
losses due to extreme weather events amounted
to EUR 20.6 billion. The largest direct losses were
caused by droughts and floods, with flood-related
72
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0074.png
restoration projects to improve adaptation (
168
).
Poland is also using over EUR 2.5 in EU cohesion
policy funding to support adaptation and
preparedness measures in cities. Under the
common agricultural policy (CAP) strategic plan,
Poland has initiated measures to help retain water
in soils and grasslands (e.g. eco-schemes involving
the protection of peatlands and wetlands). They
involve creating water retention areas to mitigate
drought and control carbon emissions by
preserving organic matter.
Vulnerable groups in Poland are particularly
threatened by climate change impacts.
The
heat-related mortality rate doubled between
2003-2012 and 2013-2022, with children and
older people (around 40% of people in Poland)
particularly exposed to an increased risk of
heatwaves.
Still,
preparedness
measures
coordinated at national level are lacking. Also,
changing seasonal blooming patterns and the
emergence of new allergens, exacerbated by poor
air quality, pose a threat to some 30% of people in
Poland who suffer from pollen allergies. In 2024,
the Polish Health Council issued recommendations
for interministerial measures to help reduce
exposure to climate change impacts and air
pollution. Among other measures, the Council
recommended extending medical studies curricula
to cover climate and environmental pressures,
raising awareness of those pressures among
patients and improving the resilience of medical
infrastructure to climate change impacts.
In the absence of nationally coordinated
action, a dedicated project for cities helps
advance climate adaptation in the health
sector in Poland.
The project establishes a
methodology for developing urban adaptation
plans that consider vulnerable sectors' and groups’
exposure to climate change impacts. In almost all
of the 44 cities with over 100 000 inhabitants
participating in the project, actions to improve the
public health sector’s
resilience to climate change
impacts have been developed. These actions
involve improving the functioning of municipal
services and social infrastructure, broadening the
uptake of early warning systems, and increasing
public awareness. They are directed towards
vulnerable groups
–
the elderly, isolated, persons
with disabilities and chronically ill, as well as
people in the crisis of homelessness.
Strategic documents underpinning climate
adaptation governance in Poland are yet to
be updated.
An update of Poland’s
national
adaptation strategy has been underway since
2022. The updated document is expected to
expand on priority action points included in the
original strategy, adopted in 2013
–
afforestation
to mitigate drought, improved water retention and
sustainable management of rainwater. However,
the update also needs to cover emerging risks and
reflect a growing knowledge and experience base
by means of adaptation solutions. Poland is also
yet to develop its vulnerability assessment that
should inform the update of the national
adaptation strategy.
Poland still lacks appropriate institutional
mechanisms for effective climate adaptation
governance.
A legal framework with regularly
updated targets and strategic objectives is lacking,
as is effective central coordination between the
local, regional and national levels. Moreover, there
is considerable scope for integrating climate
adaptation and public funding considerations into
sectoral policies, for policy monitoring and for
predicting climate risks. Climate adaptation
solutions also need to be backed by legal and
procurement frameworks to enable and facilitate
their deployment.
Water resilience
Water-related ecosystem services in Poland
continue to be compromised in the absence
of sustainable water management.
Meanwhile,
pressures related to water availability, quality and
rehabilitation, as well as its efficient use, are
exacerbated by increasingly severe droughts.
Poland’s water productivity, standing at EUR
61
per m
3
of abstracted water in 2022, has slightly
improved over the last five years, but is
considerably lower than that of many other
Member States, being among the ten lowest
values in the EU-27. The water exploitation index
plus (WEI+) reached 6.3 in 2022, which is the
eighth highest value in the EU-27. Seasonal data
show that the highest WEI+ value (11.6) was
reached in the third quarter of 2019 and the
second highest value (10.4) in the second quarter
(
168
) Polish Government, 2024,
Działania MKiŚ związane z
adaptacją do zmian klimatu,
Link.
73
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0075.png
of 2016. The economic sector responsible for the
greatest water consumption is electricity cooling,
which absorbed 1.6 billion m
3
of water in 2022. To
reduce the use of water in the energy sector,
Poland would need to rely more on renewable
energy sources.
The assessment of the third river basin
management plan shows that there has been
significant deterioration in the ecological
status and potential and the chemical status
of surface water bodies,
as compared to the
status reported in the second plan (covering the
period 2015-2021). There has been a slight
deterioration in the quantitative status of
groundwater bodies, and a slight improvement in
their chemical status. Worryingly, the number of
surface water bodies reported as having good or
better ecological status/potential has fallen from
31% to 8.4%, compared with the second plan.
Among all of the Member States, this is the
greatest reduction in ecological status between
the two assessments. It is particularly striking that
none of the transitional and coastal water bodies
are in good ecological status. Only 24.8% of
surface water bodies have good chemical status,
representing a significant deterioration since the
second plan. The failure to achieve good chemical
status is mostly due to ubiquitous persistent bio-
accumulative and toxic substances which are
difficult to address and are often from
transboundary sources. In Poland, these are mainly
polycyclic
aromatic
hydrocarbons
(PAHs),
polibrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), and
mercury and its compounds.
Poland’s wastewater treatment is a
particular cause for concern.
Despite
investments co-financed from EU funds, Poland
has yet to fully implement the Urban Wastewater
Treatment Directive. Overall, the compliance rate
was 87% in 2020, which means that 340
agglomerations, generating 10.7 million p.e. of
urban wastewater, did not comply with the
requirements of the Directive. It is essential that
Poland takes the necessary measures to fully
comply with those requirements, making use of
the available EU funding, i.e. the European
Regional Development Fund and the Recovery and
Resilience Facility. This is all the more important
as the Directive has been revised, strengthening
existing treatment standards and establishing a
new additional treatment of micropollutants in
urban wastewater (
169
). In Poland, discharges from
urban wastewater contribute to bad water quality
in 27.7% of rivers, 8% of lakes, 85.7% of
transitional and 50% of coastal waters. As shown
in Graph A9.2, the investment needs for water
protection and water management are substantial,
with a financing gap of EUR 1.5 billion (0.23% of
gross domestic product (GDP)) per year by 2027.
Roughly 73% of the gap can be attributed to
unaddressed financing needs in wastewater
management. Further infrastructure development
would help improve water management, e.g.
wastewater collection and treatment, water reuse,
reducing leaks in the networks and the general
water supply. Additional investments are needed
to improve monitoring (quality and quantity) and
support nature-based solutions, flood prevention
and river restoration.
Biodiversity and ecosystems
The state of nature and ecosystems
continues to degrade in Poland, reducing the
country’s climate resilience.
According to the
latest available data, only 20% of the country’s
habitats have a good status, while the share of
habitats classified as having bad or poor
conservation status has increased to 78.3%. This
situation has severe implications for Poland’s
climate resilience, as the loss of biodiversity
impairs ecosystems’ ability to provide services that
help mitigate the effects of climate change, such
as regulating water cycles, maintaining soil health,
and sequestering carbon.
Progressive environmental degradation and
biodiversity loss also pose significant
economic and social risks.
Poland is among the
Member States with a high supply chain
dependency on ecosystem services, with 69% of
its gross value added showing a medium to high
level of dependency, compared to the EU-27
average of 55%. Several sectors, such as
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, construction and
water utilities (see Graph A9.1) are particularly
dependent on ecosystem services, with 100% of
those sectors' gross value added directly
dependent on ecosystem services. This means that
(
169
) Directive 2024/3 019, of 27 November 2024. The deadline
for transposition is 31 July 2027.
74
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0076.png
failure to maintain ecosystems' capacity to deliver
services could entail significant costs or even stop
production in these sectors. Protecting and
restoring key ecosystems would ensure that the
long-term competitiveness of these economic
sectors is preserved.
Graph A9.1:
Direct dependency(1) on ecosystem
services(2) of the gross value added generated by
economic sector in 2022
0%
Agriculture
Forestry
Fishery and acquaculture
Mining and metals
Construction
Water utilities
Healthcare delivery
Aviation travel and tourism
Food beverages and tobacco
Supply chain and transport
Public services and others
Electricity
Chemical and materials industry
Electronics
Oil and gas
Real estate
Heat utilities
Automotive
Retail consumer goods and…
Information technology
Banking and capital markets
Insurance and asset…
Digital communications
High
Medium
Low
20%
40%
60%
80% 100%
Directive, corresponding to 4% of its territory (
170
).
Poland will need EUR 5 billion of investment per
year over the period 2021-2027 to effectively
conserve and restore its natural capital, mitigate
the impacts of climate change, and preserve the
country’s rich biodiversity (see Graph A9.2). The
current level of biodiversity financing is estimated
at EUR 1.3 billion per year. To meet the
environmental objectives concerning the protection
and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems
and other relevant horizontal measures, Poland
would need an additional EUR 3.7 billion per year,
leaving an investment gap corresponding to 0.6%
of its GDP.
Graph A9.2:
Investment needs and gaps in EUR
million, in 2022 constant prices
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
-
Biodiversity
Baseline
Gap
Water
(1) Dependency based on the sector’s own operations,
excluding value chain operations within countries and across
international value chains. A high dependency indicates a high
potential exposure to nature-related shocks or deteriorating
trends, which means that the disruption of an ecosystem
service could cause production failure and severe financial
loss.
(2) Ecosystem services are the contributions of ecosystems to
the benefits that are used in economic and other human
activity, including provisioning services (e.g. biomass
provisioning or water supply), regulating and maintenance
services (e.g. soil quality regulation or pollination), and cultural
services (e.g. recreational activities).
Source:
Hirschbuehl et al., 2025,
The EU economy's
dependency on nature,
Link.
Source:
European Commission, DG Environment,
Environmental investment needs & gaps assessment
programme, 2025 update.
Sustainable agriculture and land use
Poland’s carbon
removals fall short of the
level of ambition needed to meet its 2030
target for land use, land use change and
forestry (LULUCF).
Poland is facing significant
challenges in enhancing the carbon-absorbing
(
170
) European Commission, 2022,
Impact Assessment
accompanying the proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on nature restoration,
part
1/12, p. 22.
Targeted action on nature protection and
restoration is needed
to meet Poland’s
nature restoration targets.
Taking Natura 2000
and other nationally designated protected areas
into account, Poland legally protects 39.6% of its
land areas (EU-27 average 26%) and 21.9% of its
marine areas (EU-27 average 12%). Poland strictly
protects approximately 1.5% of its territory
(combined area of national parks and natures
reserves). It also needs to restore up to 14 483
km
2
of habitats listed in Annex I to the Habitats
75
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0077.png
capacity of its land-use sector, as carbon removals
have declined at a worrying speed in recent years.
To meet its 2030 LULUCF target, additional carbon
removals of -3.3 million tonnes of CO
2
equivalent
(CO
2
eq) are needed (
171
). The latest available
projections show a gap to target of 5.9 million
tonnes of CO
2
eq for 2030 (
172
). Additional
measures therefore need to be applied to reach
the 2030 target.
Poland’s
agriculture sector remains a steady
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and
continues to have a significant impact on air,
water and soils.
In 2022, agriculture was
responsible for a total of 33.3 million tonnes of
CO
2
eq, accounting for around 9% of the country’s
total emissions. Poland's utilised agricultural area
(UAA) covered 14.6 million hectares in 2023 and
has remained stable over the last decade. Poland’s
nitrogen balance of 47.4 kg of nitrogen per
hectare of UAA in 2019 (the most recent data
available) has only slightly improved since 2013.
However, the data published by Statistics Poland
(
173
) suggests that the situation has recently
improved, with nitrogen values going down to 38.7
kg per hectare of UAA (
174
) in 2021 and 30.5 kg in
2020. Although the livestock density index was
0.69 in 2020, thus slightly below the EU average
of 0.75, ammonia emissions accounted for 96% of
total emissions from agriculture, which is above
the EU-27 average of 90%, and has not changed
significantly over the last decade. Poland is only
slowly transitioning to a sustainable food system
by implementing policies to reduce the
environmental impact of agriculture. In 2022,
3.6% of its agricultural land had landscape
features such as woods and non-productive
grasslands, below the EU average of 5.6%. Organic
farming, with reduced use of synthetic fertilisers
and pesticides, made up 3.9% of Poland’s
agricultural land, which is among the worst results
in the EU-27.
(
171
) National LULUCF targets of the Member States in line with
Regulation (EU) 2023/839.
(
172
) Climate Action Progress Report 2024 COM/2024/498.
(
173
) Green economy indicators in Poland 2024 (Link)
(
174
) As the UUA definition used by Statistic Poland is slightly
different, the values might not be fully comparable with
those quoted above, but nevertheless they show a declining
trend.
76
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0078.png
Table A9.1:
Key indicators for progress on climate adaptation, preparedness and environment
Climate adaptation and preparedness:
Drought impact on ecosystems
[area impacted by drought as % of total]
Forest-fire burnt area
(1)
[ha, annual average 2006-2023]
Economic losses from extreme events
[EUR million at constant 2022 prices]
Insurance protection gap
(2)
[composite score between 0 and 4]
Heat-related mortality
(3)
[number of deaths per 100 000 inhabitants in 2013-
2022]
Sub-national climate adaptation action
[% of population covered by the EU Covenant of
Mayors for Climate & Energy]
Water resilience:
Water Exploitation Index Plus, WEI+
(4)
[total water consumption as % of renewable
freshwater resources]
Water consumption
[million m
3
]
Ecological/quantitative status of water bodies
[% of water bodies failing to achieve good status]
Surface water bodies
Groundwater bodies
Biodiversity and ecosystems:
Conservation status of habitats
(6)
[% of habitats having a good conservation status]
Common farmland bird index
2000=100
Protected areas
[% of protected land areas]
Sustainable agriculture and land use:
Bioeconomy's added value
(7)
[EUR million]
Landscape features
[% of agricultural land covered with landscape
features]
Food waste
[kg per capita]
Area under organic farming
[% of total UAA]
Nitrogen balance
[kg of nitrogen per ha of UAA]
Nitrates in groundwater
(8)
[mgNO
3
/l]
Net greenhouse gas removals from LULUCF
[Kt CO
2
-eq]
2018
34 378
-
2019
36 509
-
2018
20.0
-
-
2019
-
-
-
(5)
Poland
2018
5.43
386
890
-
15
2019
14.51
386
-
-
15
2020
2.57
386
51
-
15
2021
1.82
386
30
-
15
2022
7.16
386
1
1.38
15
2023
7.96
386
1
1.38
EU-27
2018
6.77
2021
2.76
24 142
62 981
12
13
15
15
16
17
41
44
Poland
2018
5.2
2019
6.8
2020
6.2
2021
5.1
2022
6.3
2023
-
EU-27
2018
4.5
2021
4.5
3 314
3 101
2 875
2 996
3 076
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Poland
2020
-
-
-
64%
9%
-
-
-
-
-
-
EU-27
59%
93%
2021
-
-
40
2022
-
-
40
2023
-
-
-
2018
14.7
72.2
-
2021
-
74.4
26
Poland
2020
37 846
-
2021
39 006
-
2022
2023
EU-27
2018
634 378
2021
716 124
4
-
-
3.3
61.8
-
(9)
-
3.5
47.4
-
22 561 -
119
3.5
-
-
23 330 -
122
3.8
-
-
23 917 -
123
3.9
-
-
35 644
-
-
7.99
-
-
-
256 077 -
240 984
-
-
40 960 -
(1) The data show the average for the timespan 2006-2023 based on EFFIS - European Forest Fire Information System.
(2) Scale: 0 (no protection gap)
–
4 (very high gap). EIOPA, 2024, Dashboard on insurance protection gap for natural catastrophes.
(3) van Daalen, K. R. et al., 2024, The 2024 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: unprecedented
warming demands unprecedented action. The Lancet Public Health.
(4) This indicator measures total water consumption as a percentage of the renewable freshwater resources available for a given
territory and period. Values above 20% are generally considered to be a sign of water scarcity, while values equal or greater than
40% indicate situations of severe water scarcity.
(5) European Commission, 2024, seventh Implementation Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) (Third
River Basin Management Plans and Second Flood Risk Management Plans).
(6) For this indicator, the EU average includes the figure for the UK under the previous configuration, EU-28.
(7) European Commission, 2023, EU Bioeconomy Monitoring System dashboards.
(8) Nitrates can persist in groundwater for a long time and accumulate at a high level through inputs from anthropogenic sources
(mainly agriculture). The EU drinking water standard sets a limit of 50 mg NO
3
/L to avoid threats to human health.
(9) Net removals are expressed in negative figures, net emissions in positive figures. Reported data are from the 2024
greenhouse gas inventory submission. 2030 value of net greenhouse gas removals as in Regulation (EU) 2023/839
–
Annex IIa.
Source:
Eurostat, EEA
77
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0079.png
FAIRNESS
ANNEX 10: LABOUR MARKET
In recent years, Poland's labour market has
been resilient and continues to perform well.
However, the country still faces structural
challenges that have a detrimental impact on its
competitiveness and potential economic growth.
These challenges are exacerbated by a lack of
progress in social dialogue and labour rights, and
include stark regional imbalances, demographic
change and the underrepresentation of women
and vulnerable groups in the labour market. The
2030 employment rate target has been reached.
However, further steps to help achieve the target
include creating a more inclusive labour market to
harness the potential of underrepresented groups,
tackling labour shortages, and enhancing job
quality.
Graph A10.1:
Key labour market indicators
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
76
74
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
58
historically high level of 74.7%, below the EU
average (75.4%). With unemployment at 2.9%,
Poland is among the ‘best performers’ in the EU,
which has an average unemployment rate of
5.9%. However, there are major territorial
disparities due to regional imbalances in
socioeconomic development (see Annex 17): in
less developed, generally post-industrial, regions,
the employment rate is lower, and the workforce is
lower-skilled. In 2023, the difference between the
highest and lowest employment rate in provinces
was 8.7 percentage points (pps)
(Dolnośląskie
Province - 74.3%, Podkarpackie Province - 65.6%).
Similar patterns have been recorded for activity
and unemployment rates. Looking ahead, the
growth of the employment rate is expected to slow
down in 2025 and 2026, due to the shrinking
working-age population, though the rising
employment rate of displaced people from Ukraine
may partly offset this trend.
Insufficient childcare services contribute to
fewer women in work, hampering economic
growth and highlighting gender disparities.
In
2024, Poland’s gender equality score improved but
remains significantly below the EU average (
175
).
While the gender employment gap (age 20-64)
decreased by 3.2 pps from the 2020 figure to
11.6 pps in 2024, it remains above the EU average
of 10 pps. Disparities between men and women
tend to be caused by parenthood, in the case of
women, and their prevalent role in caregiving and
domestic work. Continued efforts are needed to
address challenges in the availability of and
access to high-quality affordable childcare and
insufficient work-life balance opportunities. A
recent study found that 94% of mothers who are
not working would like to rejoin the workforce.
However, 70% of them say that they are afraid
that after returning to work they will not be able to
find a healthy balance between work and childcare
(
176
). Most people fleeing the war in Ukraine were
women with children who, due to family
responsibilities, stay home, or can only look for
part-time work (
177
). The proportion of children
(
175
)
Poland’s Gender Equality Index
score was 63.4 in 2024, up
from 61.9 in 2023, out of 100 points. EU average was 71 in
2024.
(
176
)
"Macierzyństwo a aktywność zawodowa" (Motherhood and
professional activity), Rodzic Foundation, 2021
(
177
) National Bank of Poland: Living and economic situation of
Ukrainian migrants in Poland in 2024. Survey report.
2017
2018
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Activity rate 15-64 (rhs)
Unemployment rate 15-74 (lhs)
Long-term unemployment rate 15-74 (lhs)
Youth unemployment rate 15-24 (lhs)
NEET rate 15-29 (lhs)
Activity rate and Employment rate (% of population), 20-64
Unemployment long-term unemployment rate (% of labour
force), 15-74
Youth unemployment rate (% of labour force), 15-24
NEET: Not in employment, education or training (% of
population), 15-29
Source:
Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a, une_rt_a, edat_lfse_20,
une_ltu_a]
Poland's labour market remains robust,
albeit with regional variations.
In 2024 the
labour market in Poland continued to improve
despite weak economic growth. The employment
rate (age 20-64) reached 78.4%, higher than the
EU average of 75.8%, and above the national
target 2030 (78.3%) (see Social Scoreboard in
Annex 13). The activity rate in 2024 rose to
2024
78
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0080.png
under the age of 3 receiving formal childcare
decreased by 2.1 pps between 2021 and 2024
and is now 15.1%, far below the EU average
(39.2%). Amendments to the Labour Code in April
2023 include provisions for carers' leave, shared
parental leave and paternity leave. Existing
measures supported by the ESF+ and the Recovery
and Resilience Facility (RRF), including Active
Toddler on Early Childhood Education and Care and
benefits under the Active Parent, are steps in the
right direction, but it would also be beneficial to
adopt more targeted measures to help women to
enter and stay in the workforce. Poland is also well
below the EU average in providing public long-
term care services (3.4% vs 5.8% in the EU in
2019); care responsibilities fall mainly on families
(see Annex 11). Closing (territorial) gaps in access
to quality and affordable childcare and long-term
care services, particularly for those lagging
furthest behind, is important. Also, greater
flexibility and improved benefits during parental
leave may contribute to domestic tasks being
shared more fairly, a reduction in gender
stereotypes and a narrowing of the gender
employment gap.
Graph A10.2:
Employment by age group and sex
0
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
Male
Female
20
40
60
80
100
are being undertaken to support the labour market
integration of persons with disabilities, including
the development of a network of information and
counselling centres, support programmes for
students and graduates with disabilities to
facilitate their transition into the labour market,
and actions to increase the accessibility of higher
education institutions, partly funded via ESF+.
Existing labour market tools are still not meeting
the required objectives, despite a comprehensive
diagnosis of obstacles and a call for bold
investment in evidence-based policy reform(
178
).
Employers’
preparedness
to employ persons with
disabilities remains a challenge due to the absence
of a legal basis for supported employment and the
knowledge and skills on how to integrate such
people into the workplace. The education gap of
this group is also a concern. The tertiary education
rate of persons with disabilities was 32% in
2021/2022, and the mean tertiary education gap
in those years stood at 18.4 pps (EU 11.3 pps)(
179
).
In addition, the proportion of young people (aged
16-29) not in employment, education or training
(NEETs) with disabilities (40%) is one of the
highest in the EU. Poland has set a target of 40%
for the employment of persons with disabilities by
2030.
Older people (aged 55 to 64) also experience
relatively low employment rates, accounting
for more than 32% of Poland's economically
inactive
working-age
population.
The
employment rate of older women is particularly
low, at 48.3% as opposed to 59.4% in the EU,
compared to 70.7% for older men (71.4% in the
EU). This is largely due to the lower retirement age
for women (60 vs 65 for men). The employment
rate of people aged 20-64 with lower levels of
educational attainment is also much lower than
the EU average (47.7% vs 58.7% EU) and this is
especially true of older people (55-64) with lower
skills (38.1% vs 49.6% in the EU). Most of the
labour-market instruments currently implemented
in Poland to tackle these problems are highly
dependent on the EU cohesion policy funds and
the recovery and resilience plan (RRP), which poses
challenges for their long-term sustainability. To
further support vulnerable groups, it would be
beneficial to strengthen measures to help them
(
178
) European Semester 2024-2025 country fiche on disability
equality
(
179
)
European comparative data on persons with disabilities -
Publications Office of the EUI
2024 Employment rate, % of population
Source:
Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_ergaed]
Vulnerable groups, including persons with
disabilities, older people and low-qualified
adults, also face barriers to labour market
integration.
Following an increase from 31.1 pps
in 2022 to 35.6 pps in 2024, the disability
employment gap is among the widest in the EU
(24 pps). Disability or illness is one of the main
causes of economic inactivity in Poland. Initiatives
79
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0081.png
find employment, including tapping into the full
potential of the social economy.
Given Poland’s ageing population and
declining birth rates, it is essential to
integrate underrepresented groups more
effectively.
Poland's population has fallen by
over 1.35 million since 2018, the last year in
which the population grew. In 2024,
the country’s
population fell by 133 000, the largest such fall in
the EU. The demographic trend is deteriorating
despite unprecedented levels of immigration in
recent years, mostly from Ukraine. Causes of this
include the country's historically low fertility rate
(1.29 vs 1.46 in the EU in 2022), changes in the
population structure and delayed parenthood.
Between 2022 and 2070, Poland's population is
expected to fall by 16%, four times the EU (4%),
with the working-age population (20-64) expected
to decrease by 9.8 pps (7 pps for the EU)(
180
).
Nine Polish regions are among the 82 EU
regions facing a sharp decline in their
working-age population.
The situation in
Łodzkie is particularly concerning, as it
is
experiencing a talent development trap, a
shrinking working-age population and a lack of
individuals with higher education. Eight other
Polish regions, mostly in Eastern Poland, are at risk
of falling into this trap due to net migration of
people aged 15-39. These demographic shifts will
exacerbate shortages of people entering work. It
would therefore be of benefit to implement
measures to get underrepresented groups into
work. One reform under the RRP aims to increase
the labour-market participation with a view to
helping the Polish economy to achieve higher
productivity,
crisis
resilience
and
global
competitiveness. Cohesion policy supports the
functioning of the public employment services,
specifically for persons with disabilities, and
inclusive education for children with disabilities. In
2023, the ESF funded 23 education support
centres, a qualification framework for special-
needs assistants, and training of 28 000 school
staff on inclusive education.
There is a growing shortage of workers,
posing challenges in some sectors.
The
proportion of companies reporting a shortage of
labour force as a significant factor limiting
production was very high, at 63% in
(
180
) 2024 Commission Ageing Report
manufacturing in Q4-2024 (18% in the EU), 57.4%
in services (26.8% in the EU), and 72.2% in
construction (26% in the EU) (
181
). The challenges
in the construction sector may be even more
severe given its relative dependency on workers
from other countries, including non-EU nationals
(ELA report, 2023). At the same time, the job-
vacancy rate remains relatively low at 0.9% in
2024 and below its pre-pandemic level of 1.1% in
2019. In December 2023, the Polish government
approved a law to improve third country nationals’
access to the Polish labour market, including
integration programmes such as Polish language
tuition. In addition to targeted active labour
market policies and upskilling and reskilling, legal
migration and attracting talent could help retain
workers with adequate skills in key sectors and
bolster Poland’s competitiveness.
Poland has seen robust wage growth but real
wages remained subdued.
Nominal wage
growth reached 12.3% in 2022 and 13.1% in
2023, more than twice the EU average of 4.8%
and 5.9%, respectively(
182
). However, due to high
inflation this has not led to significant real wage
growth, which decreased by 0.7% in 2022 before
increasing slightly by 1.6% in 2023. Nominal wage
growth is expected to reach 11.5% in 2024 before
falling to 5.9% in 2025. The increase in real wages
(by 7.4% in 2024) is driven by continued wage
growth and steep disinflation (inflation fell from
13.2% in 2022 to 3.7% in 2024). The statutory
minimum wage also increased by almost 55%
between January 2022 and January 2025, an
increase of around 23% in real terms.
While in-work poverty has decreased from
pre-pandemic highs, it remains slightly above
the EU average (9.1% vs 8.2%).
Over the past
decade, wage growth has fallen short of what may
be expected based on the usual macroeconomic
drivers of wage growth (
183
). More recently, unit
(
181
) European Commission Business and Consumer Survey,
publication date 8 January 2025
(
182
) For nominal wage growth, pay per employee is considered. It
includes: i) Wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind;
and ii) Social contributions payable by employers. For real
gross wages, the deflator used is HICP. Real wages using this
deflator then can differ from real wages shown in AMECO
(that uses private consumption as deflator). Data for 2024
and 2025 are based on the European Commission Autumn
2024 economic forecast.
(
183
) Wage benchmarks are predicted by developments in
inflation, productivity, the trade balance and the
unemployment rate.
80
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0082.png
labour costs (ULCs)(
184
) rose more steeply in
Poland than in most EU Member States, growing
by 7.9% in 2022, 13.6% in 2023 and 7.9% in
2024, although they are forecast to fall sharply to
2.4% in 2025. Poland’s export market shares have
been growing since 2019, well above EU average,
strong wage developments may weigh on
competitiveness prospects.
Poland's underdeveloped social dialogue and
labour rights framework exacerbates labour
market inequalities.
Poland has not improved its
social dialogue in recent years and the social
partners have noted a deterioration in their
engagement. The 2024 Global Rights Index (
185
),
which documents breaches of internationally
recognised labour rights, listed Poland among the
countries where governments and/or companies
regularly interfere in, or fail to fully guarantee,
important aspects of collective labour rights.
Furthermore, there are deficiencies in laws as well
as established practices, which enable frequent
violations (see Annex 6) (
186
).
Collective bargaining coverage in Poland has
been on a long-term downward trend since
the 2000s and, at 13.4% is one of the lowest
in the EU (
187
).
It has been 10 years since the last
industry-wide collective agreement was concluded
in Poland. At company level, social dialogue is
characterised by a small number of collective
agreements and coverage for few employees. -
Two draft laws, on collective labour agreements
and minimum wage, were drawn up in June 2024
but have not yet been submitted to Parliament. In
July 2024, the social partners took an
unfavourable view of a new draft law on collective
agreements, as it offers no real incentives to
encourage collective bargaining (
188
). The
(
184
) Unit labour costs are defined as the ratio of total labour pay
per employee to output per persons employed (labour
productivity).
(
185
) International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC):
https://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/2024_ituc_global_rights_index_en.pdf
186
( ) This was also the case with the national medium-term
fiscal-structural plan submitted to the Commission in
November 2024, in which Poland cited time pressure as the
reason for not conducting mandatory consultations, using an
exception of Regulation 2024/1263.
(
187
) OECD (2019)
(
188
)
https://legislacja.gov.pl/docs//2/12386550/13066364/
13066367/dokument704962.pdf
government also plans to adopt a bill on changes
to the Social Dialogue Council in the second
quarter of 2025, which may prove to be a step in
a right direction. Properly functioning collective
bargaining on wage setting and the effective
involvement of social partners in setting and
updating statutory minimum wages can
strengthen incentives to work, support wage
adequacy and ensuring that productivity gains are
shared more fairly across society. A more
collaborative approach can lead to more balanced
and sustainable wage policies, which would boost
workers' living standards and economic
competitiveness.
The workforce is adapting to the green and
digital transitions, with a growing need for
skilled workers in emerging sectors.
In 2024,
employment in the country’s energy-intensive
industries was relatively high at 5.4% of total
employment, while jobs in the green economy
have expanded. Between 2016 and 2021,
employment in the environmental goods and
services sector grew by 44.3%, reaching 1.8% of
total employment (EU: 2.7%). The job vacancy rate
in construction, a key sector for the green
transition, is well below the EU average (1.6% vs
3.8% in 2023). Although the greenhouse gas
emission intensity of Poland’s workforce has
improved, down from 21.3 tonnes per worker in
2015 to 18.7 in 2023, it is still 6.4 pps above the
EU average of 12.3), reflecting some progress in
the green transition.
The digital transition has also seen steady
growth, with ICT specialists accounting for
4.3% of total employment in 2023, compared
to 4.8% in the EU.
Small and medium-sized
enterprises in Poland have reported a lack of
qualified ICT personnel as one of the main barriers
for digitalisation of businesses. Women accounted
for 19.1% of ICT specialists, just below the EU
average (19.4%), but still lower than in many other
Member States and some way off the 29.0%
target Poland set itself in the Digital Decade
strategic roadmap. Digital skills among the
working population in Poland are still short of what
may be expected. It would therefore be beneficial
to enhance upskilling and reskilling (see Annex 12).
81
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0083.png
ANNEX 11: SOCIAL POLICIES
Overall, Poland’s social situation has
improved, but the country continues to face
challenges with higher poverty levels among
people in rural areas and older people.
The
key contributing factors include inadequate access
to early childhood education and care, health and
social services, especially in rural areas and for
disadvantaged groups. Demographic shifts raise
concerns about the sustainability of pensions,
including their future adequacy, especially for
women. Adressing the limited capacity and
coverage of the social protection system and
segmentation of the labour market will contribute
to Poland’s sustainable
and inclusive growth and
competitiveness.
A stable decline in poverty is visible across
its components.
In 2024, the at-risk-of-poverty
or social exclusion (AROPE) rate decreased slightly
(0.3 pps) compared to 2023, and was 16% , close
to the rate in 2022. Relatively high annual
inflation rates (10.9% in 2023) (
189
) and, to a
lesser extent, the unprecedented influx of refugees
from Ukraine may have impacted the development
of poverty indicators. Nevertheless, the AROPE rate
in 2023 remained lower than in the EU on average
(21%), also for children: 16.1% vs 24.2% in the
EU). For the components of AROPE, the at risk of
poverty (AROP) and severe material and social
deprivation (SMSD) slightly increased between
2022 and 2023 (respectively from 13.7% to 14%
and from 2.8% to 3%), while the very low work
intensity (VLWI) decreased (see Graph A11.1).
Addressing the existing challenges will contribute
to achieving the 2030 national target on poverty
reduction, which is a decrease by 1.5 million
people compared to the 2019 level, so far reduced
by 603 000 people.
Graph A11.1:
Components of AROPE, 2015-2023
25
20
15
10
5
0
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
At-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rate
At-risk-of-poverty rate
Severe material and social deprivation
People living in low work intensity households
% of total population
Source:
Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_peps01n, ilc_li02, ilc_mdsd11,
ilc_lvhl11n]
Regional disparities are high while rural
areas and vulnerable groups are particularly
affected by poverty and social exclusion.
In
2023, AROPE rates in some regions doubled or
almost tripled those in other regions: Podlaskie
(27%), Warminsko-Mazurskie (24.7%) and
compared to Śląskie (10.7%) or Opolskie (11.9%).
Poverty risks are mainly driven by limited
economic opportunities, inadequate access to
quality education and employment support, gaps
in social protection, health and social services,
especially in rural areas and for vulnerable groups
(see Annex 10 and 11). In 2023, the AROPE rate in
rural areas was 10.5 pps higher than in urban
areas. In 2022, students from rural secondary
schools achieved on average significantly lower
results in basic skills than those in urban schools,
and the gap is wider than the EU average (
190
).
Consequently, the urban-rural gap in tertiary
educational attainment level remains wide in
Poland (61.3% in cities vs rural 33.5% in 2023),
limiting the competitiveness and innovation
capacity of the rural areas. Vulnerable groups
include also persons with disabilities and refugees
(almost 1 million from Ukraine) of which half live
below the poverty line. For the 2021-2027 period,
Poland dedicates over 4% of the European Social
(
190
) Students in rural schools achieved 70 score points less in
reading (EU 52), 64 in maths and 62 in science (EU 46).
OECD (2023). PISA 2022 Results (Volume I).
https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en
.
(
189
)
Annual inflation up to 2.0% in the euro area - Euro indicators
- Eurostat
82
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0084.png
Fund Plus (ESF+) national envelope to the new
European Funds for Food Aid programme
(EUR 525 million), with 10% of the target group of
the programme being Ukrainian refugees.
Moreover, the ESF + national and regional
programmes are allocating EUR 4 818 million on
active inclusion and affordable services, part of
which will go to poverty reduction activities.
Complementary initiatives such as support
systems for non-EU nationals and opportunities
for their comprehensive integration could further
help address the challenges.
Poland faces challenges in improving early
childhood education and care, particularly for
children at risk of poverty and exclusion.
By
2030, Poland aims to reduce the number of
children experiencing AROPE by at least 300 000
compared to 2019. The underlying numbers
(1 089 000 in 2019 vs 1 136 000 in 2023), are so
far not showing progress towards the 2030 target.
The universal child benefit was significantly
increased (by 60%) in January 2024. Risks of
poverty are more pronounced for children whose
parents have low educational attainment or in
households with many children. To mitigate the
impact of poverty on children, Poland is
implementing the European Child Guarantee with
support from the EU cohesion policy funds. The
2024 progress report shows progress in some
areas, e.g. the
‘For Life Programme’
provides
comprehensive support to children with disabilities
and their families, while more efforts are needed
to achieve the 2030 target. EUR 704 million from
the ESF+ and EUR 610 million from the Recovery
and Resilience Fund (RRF) were allocated to create
over 100 000 new childcare places and improve
services, including those for children with
disabilities. The design, rollout, and impact of this
reform should be closely monitored to ensure that
children in need indeed benefit from it. The share
of children under three participating in formal
childcare declined by 0.8 pps between 2022 and
2024, from 15.9% to 15.1%. The participation of
children above three in early childhood education
and care remains below the EU-level 2030 target
(92.4% vs 96%) (see Annex 12) . Participation is
even lower among children at risk of poverty or
social exclusion, barely 1.6% of those under three
and 55.7% in the older age group in 2023 (see
Annex 10).
Employment status has an important
influence on poverty risks.
Poland has a high
share of workers in atypical forms of employment,
notably solo self-employed, (15% of total
employment vs 9% in the EU), and temporary
contracts (15.5% of total salaried employment vs
13.5% in the EU). Figures for 2023 point to a high
AROP rate for the self-employed (28.4%), almost
8 pps higher than in the EU (20.7%). Part-timers
are also affected by higher-than-average AROP
(18.6% compared to 8.6% among full timers) as
well as material and social deprivation (9.4%
compared to 3.9% among full timers). The higher
AROP rate among individuals in non-standard
forms of work is largely attributed to persistent
gaps in access to social protection. This means
that, despite slight declines in last years, in-work
at-risk-of poverty in Poland remains high, at 9.1%
in 2023 (EU: 8.3%), specifically for part-time
employees (see Graph A11.2). Persons with
disabilities are also at a highest rate of poverty
and social exclusion, at 25.5%, which is linked to
their
lower
educational
attainment
and
employment, and high disability employment gap
(see Annex 10).
Graph A11.2:
In-work AROP rate for contract type
25
20
15
10
5
0
2017
2014
2015
2016
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
% of employed Total
% Part-time
% Full-time
% Temporary
% Permanent
In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate (% of employed). Employed
who have an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the
national equivalised median income.
Source:
Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_iw01, ilc_iw05, ilc_iw07]
The social protection system presents
adequacy and coverage gaps.
Despite one of
the highest growth levels, spending on social
protection benefits still lags behind the EU average
(22.1% of GDP in 2023 vs EU: 26.8%). It relies
heavily on non-means-tested cash benefits
(72.9% in total expenditure vs EU: 64.5%),
particularly in the form of universal allowances for
83
2023
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0085.png
families with children (15.6% vs EU: 8.6%), which
results in a welfare system with limited
redistributive capacity. While there was a recent
substantial increase in family and child benefits,
Poland’s spending on unemployment and disability
benefits as a percentage of GDP is very low (0.2%
vs EU: 1% on unemployment and 1% vs EU: 1.9%
on disability in 2023) and has fallen. In 2023, the
share of those in working age (16-64) and AROP
receiving any benefits before social transfers was
very low for self-employed (2.9% vs EU: 12.7%),
temporary contract workers (5.1% vs EU: 39.2%),
part-timers (7.1% vs EU: 33.3%) and unemployed
(12.2% vs EU: 52.4%). Among short-term
registered unemployed (15-64), around 28%
received unemployment benefits/assistance in
2023, compared to 58% in the EU. Adequacy of
minimum income benefits was very low in 2022.
Households on minimum income benefits had a
net income of 33.9% of the at-risk-of-poverty
threshold, and 31.2% of the net income of a low-
wage worker (55.6% vs EU: 46.1%).
Demographic trends pose a significant
challenge for the future adequacy and
sustainability of the pension system.
Old-age
poverty is below the EU average, with AROPE for
people aged 65 and above at 18% vs EU: 19.7%).
However, the pension system faces increasing
challenges as the population in Poland is one of
the fastest-ageing populations in the EU. The very
low pensionable age of women (60 years for
women vs 65 years for men) implies low effective
retirement ages, negatively impacting women’s
labour market participation and their future
pension adequacy. The employment rate of
women aged 55-64 is 47% vs EU 58% while for
men in the same age group it is 70.3% vs EU
70.1% (see Annex 10). The existence of
preferential pension schemes for miners and
farmers puts a further strain on the fairness and
sustainability of the pension system. With the
projected decrease in working-age population (20-
64) by 30% to 16 million in 2070 and expected
increase in the population aged 65 and over to
10.3 million (
191
), the old-age dependency ratio)
will increase from 0.3% in 2022 to about 0.6% in
2070. The pension replacement rate is projected to
drop between 2022 and 2062 from 76.3% to 54%
for single men, and from 63.3% to 45% for single
women (
192
). To ensure pension adequacy and
sustainability, as well as increase competitiveness,
it would beneficial if Poland introduced reforms
that promote longer working lives, especially for
women and existing preferential pension regimes.
The long-term care system is unable to meet
the needs of the ageing population.
In 2022,
Poland’s public spending on long-term care (LTC)
was 0.5% of GDP, less than one third of the EU
average (1.7%) and accounted for only 2.8% of
Poland’s total cost of ageing, compared to 7.1% in
the EU. Public LTC spending in 2022 was mainly
directed to residential care (65.4% vs EU: 46.2%),
followed by home care (34% vs EU: 28.8%) with
only a small share going to cash benefits (0.5% vs
EU: 25%) (
193
). In 2019, Poland’s older population
(65+) in need of LTC accounted for 35.9%, while
the EU average was 26.6%. In contrast, the share
of older individuals using formal home care
services was much lower (18.8% vs EU: 28.6%).
Relatively high share of people in need of care live
in rural areas, where the provision of formal
services is poorer. LTC quality assurance is
fragmented, lacks quality standards for home care
and provides only minimal quality standards in
residential care. With responsibility for care lying
within local authorities, the absence of a coherent
approach to quality contributes to regional
disparities. Due to the lack of formal LTC capacity,
Poland’s informal carers face a heavy care burden,
without recognition or adequate support. There is
no legal definition of informal care and legislation
to identify carers. Also, professional training or
requirements regarding informal care are not in
place. The Ministry of Senior Policy is working on a
care voucher to support older dependent people or
their care providers. However, without legal
recognition of informal carers, planned support
(training, information, psychological counselling)
would not reach all those who need it. The number
of LTC workers per 100 individuals 65+ is very
low, standing at 0.4 in Poland vs 3.2 in the EU in
2023). The World Bank carried out a strategic
review of LTC in Poland to identify and implement
reform priorities which feature into recovery and
(
192
) Theoretical replacement rates after a 40 year career ending
at the standard pensionable age. Source: European
Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social
Affairs and Inclusion,
The 2024 pension adequacy report
–
Current and future income adequacy in old age in the EU.
Volume II,
Publications Office of the European Union, 2024,
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/550848.
(
193
)
2024 Ageing Report
(
191
)
2024 Ageing Report
–
Country Fiche for Poland
84
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0086.png
resilience plan (RRP). The results show a need to
increase access to high-quality, affordable and
accessible community-based LTC services, while
improving working conditions and the work-life
balance for carers.
lack of public transport and poor housing
conditions
negatively
impact
living
standards.
Between 2011 and 2022, the share of
trains and buses in inland transport in Poland has
declined from 22.6% to 17.3% and reliance on
private cars for inland transport increased from
77.4% to 82.7%. As rural areas often lack
effective public transport infrastructure, people in
these areas are more reliant on private cars
(41.9% of people living in rural areas compared to
34.3% of people in cities in 2023). While the share
of the Polish population facing housing costs
above 40% of their total disposable household
income is lower than the EU average (5.9 vs 8.8%),
it has been increasing in recent years and the
share of people living in an overcrowded
household was more than double that of the EU
(33.9% vs 16.8%) in 2023. For people below the
poverty threshold, this share is 40.3% (EU: 29.7%).
House prices are sharply rising.
House prices in
Poland have increased by 107% since 2015. They
grew by 8.8% in 2023 and accelerated further in
2024 (+15% year-on-year) in the context of rising
demand for housing as well as additional
mortgage support for first time buyers adopted in
the run-up to the 2023 parliamentary elections.
However, there are no signs of overvaluation.
Mortgage rates increased significantly from 3.1%
in 2021 to 8.3% in 2023. Housing transactions
increased by 3.9% in 2023 after having fallen by
8.2% in 2022. Building permits dropped by 12.6%
and 18.9% in 2022 and 2023 respectively but
have started to increase in 2024. The slowdown of
new housing supply may support further increases
in nominal house prices, which would warrant
closer monitoring.
Overall housing affordability has remained
stable over the past decade.
House price
growth has been broadly in line with household
income since 2015. The standardised house price-
to-income ratio increased from 2016 to 2021 but
has eased since then, returning close to its 2015
level. It is currently around 10% below its long-
term average. Taking into account the cost of
mortgages, the borrowing capacity of households
remained broadly stable over the past decade.
While the rental market is rather small, the ratio of
new rents to incomes remained stable over the
last decade. 30 330 people, representing 0.08% of
the total population have been homeless in the
country (2019) (
194
). Of these, 15% are women,
85% are men. The Ministry of Family, Labour and
Social Policy in Poland conducted
a nationwide
study of homelessness
in February 2024 (
195
). The
study found that approximately 31 000 people are
living in homelessness in Poland, 10% of whom
are migrants. As many as 60% of these migrants
are Ukrainian. There has been a sharp rise in the
number of homeless children, with non-Polish born
children accounting for 40% (compared to 9% in
2019). Most of these children live in special
institutions or homes for mothers with children or
pregnant women (
196
). Poland has implemented
measures to improve housing affordability and
availability with the use of cohesion policy funds.
Through these funds, Poland has invested in
services to address homelessness including
through ‘street working services’ to support
homeless people, as well as housing projects, in
particular via the Housing First model.
Interventions include the creation and operation of
training and assisted housing (e.g. for people with
mental health issues and refugees) and
investments in infrastructure and equipment to
support social housing.
While energy poverty is decreasing,
untargeted retail price interventions might
hinder further progress.
The share of the
population unable to keep their homes adequately
warm is below the EU average (4.7% in 2023 vs
10.6%), but showing an increase of 1.5 pps
compared to 2021. In contrast, 4% of people
faced arrears on utility bills in 2023, which has
fallen by 1.2 pps since 2021, and is still well below
the EU average of 6.9%. However, this positive
situation is influenced by continued untargeted
price interventions in the retail sector which were
introduced in 2022 and are going to continue in
2025. Poland is actively addressing energy poverty
with immediate social policy interventions,
including subsidies and financial assistance, such
as the ‘energy allowance’ and the ‘energy lump
sums’, and ongoing price interventions for gas and
(
194
) OECD Country Notes on Homelessness data.
(
195
)
https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/news/poland-
homelessness-among-migrants_en
and
https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/wyniki-ogolnopolskiego-
badania-liczby-osob-bezdomnych---edycja-2024.
(
196
) Ibid.
85
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0087.png
caps on electricity. Poland’s
long-term measures
focus on energy efficiency when renovating
buildings and the integration of renewable energy
in residential buildings. Currently, there is a limited
focus on vulnerable households which is likely to
change with the implementation of the Social
Climate Fund. The country’s strategy also aims to
phase out fossil fuels (coal and oil) in residential
heating by 2030, which is applied across the
whole population.
86
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0088.png
ANNEX 12: EDUCATION AND SKILLS
Poland’s competitiveness is limited by falling
basic skills, the limited pool of skills in
science,
technology,
engineering
and
mathematics
(STEM),
and
the
low
effectiveness of VET and participation in
adult learning.
The higher proportion of 15-year-
olds failing to meet the minimum basic skills level
and increased inequalities in education result in
more than a third of disadvantaged pupils (39%)
lacking basic skills, which affects their upskilling
opportunities and employment prospects later in
life. Vocational education and training (VET) do not
adequately respond to labour market needs,
leading to skills shortages and mismatches. The
low attractiveness of teaching and insufficient
preparation of teachers further affects student
outcomes. Higher education does not sufficiently
support innovation and sustainable development,
partly due to the low number of STEM students,
particularly in natural sciences. Additionally, the
low level of digital skills exacerbates skills
shortages, and participation in adult learning
remains very low. Major weaknesses in skills
development and human capital formation hinder
Poland’s potential for research and innovation,
productivity growth and competitiveness.
The strong decline in basic skills among
young people risks hampering skills
development later in life and harms the
economy in the long run.
In the 2022 OECD
Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA), 23% of 15-year-olds underperformed in
mathematics, 22.2% in reading and 18.6% in
science. While these rates are below the EU
averages, they show a worrying trend. Compared
to 2018, the underachievement rates increased
more than the EU average (
197
). The highest
proportion (over 60%) of underperforming
students is clustered in VET stage I sectoral
vocational schools (szkoły
branżowe),
which are
attended by 12% of all students (
198
). These
students will likely face learning difficulties and
employment challenges later in life.
The decline in basic skills can be attributed
to the shortening the common general
(
197
) Compared to 2018, the proportion of low achievers
increased by 8.3 percentage points (pps) in mathematics (EU:
6.6 pps), 7.5 pps in reading (EU: 3.7 pps), and 4.8 pps in
science (EU: 2 pps).
198
( ) 66% in mathematics, 65% in reading, and 55% in science
(Bulkowski, et al., 2023).
PISA2022_najwazniejsze_wyniki_badania.pdf
education period by one year and advancing
student tracking between general and
vocational paths, which was introduced in
2017.
Therefore, there is a need for systemic and
targeted measures to improve basic skills among
disadvantaged groups and in VET schools. The
steep decline in the proportion of top-performing
students in basic skills points to structural quality
issues in general education, which may further
decrease participation in STEM fields in higher
education. The learning loss recorded by PISA
between 2018 and 2022 risks limiting the
competitiveness and innovation capacity of the
Polish economy (
199
).
Low participation in early childhood
education and care (ECEC) among children
aged three and below also hampers learning
foundational skills.
At 12.6%, participation in
formal childcare of children below three is among
the lowest in the EU, and participation is minimal
for children at risk of poverty or social exclusion
(1.6%) (see Annex 11). The rate is also
comparatively low for three-year-olds (80.2% vs
EU 88.7% in 2022), and for the whole 3-6 age
group in the regions of Warminsko-Mazurskie,
Kujawsko-Pomorskie, and Mazowieckie, excluding
Warsaw (around 88%) (
200
).
Graph A12.1:
Trends in underachievement in
mathematics by students’ socio-economic
background, PISA 2012-2022 (%)
50
45
40
35
30
%
25
20
15
10
5
0
2012
2015
2018
2022
Disadvantaged PL
Advantaged EU
Disadvantaged EU
2030 EU target
Advantaged PL
Source:
OECD (2023).
Deteriorating equity affects basic skills
achievement and risks deepening inequalities
in education.
The socio-economic gap in basic
(
199
) M. Jakubowski, T. Gajderowicz, H. A. Patrinos, SSRN. (2023).
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4462427
.
200
( ) Eurostat: educ_uoe_enra21.
87
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0089.png
skills among 15-year-olds widened by 10.6 pps
between 2018 and 2022 (EU: 7.7 pps), reflecting
the increased impact of students’ socio-economic
background on their performance (Graph A12.1).
The achievement gap between students in rural
and urban schools is higher than the EU average
(Annex 10), suggesting issues with teaching
quality. The notable shift towards private
education and homeschooling in recent years
deepens inequalities in the system (
201
). Boys make
up the majority of students attending VET stage I
sectoral schools (66.7%), which often have poor
educational outcomes. The gender divide is
reflected later in the wide tertiary educational
attainment gap in favour of women. Poland has
been implementing inclusive education measures
and investments supporting the needs of pupils
with disabilities. Nevertheless, a targeted national
strategy is missing, and a significant proportion of
students with special educational needs is enrolled
in special schools, especially at upper secondary
level (80%) (
202
).
Poland is preparing a curricular reform to
better equip students for life and the future
world of work.
It aims to improve teaching
competences, including transversal ones (e.g.
problem-solving, cooperation, critical thinking,
socio-emotional competences) to help students
better adapt to future labour market needs. The
reform at pre-primary and primary levels is to be
launched in September 2026. The new subjects of
health education and civic education are to be
introduced in September 2025. To ensure the
reform is implemented efficiently and sustainably,
the following will be crucial: (i) stakeholder
involvement; (ii) clear communication; (iii)
substantial training and support for teachers and
schools; and (iv) careful planning, including
evaluation and monitoring from an early stage.
Worsening teacher shortages and insufficient
quality of teacher education programmes
risk lowering student outcomes.
Despite
measures in place since 2024, national statistics
show persisting teacher shortages across Poland,
(
201
)In 2024, 10% of students attended private secondary
schools and more than 5% primary schools, compared to
4.2% and 3.2%, respectively, a decade ago.
https://wydawnictwo.krytykapolityczna.pl/nierownosci-po-
polsku-1277
202
( )Statistics Poland (2024).
https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultakt
ualnosci/5487/26/6/1/osoby_niepelnosprawne_w_2023_r..
pdf
.
mainly due to a lack of candidates (
203
). Shortages
affect teachers of all subjects and in VET, and they
have increased among ECEC, special teachers and
pedagogues. Teachers’ actual salaries are low
compared to those of other tertiary-educated
professionals, ranging from 59% at pre-primary to
72% at upper secondary level (EU: 72% and 87%
respectively) (
204
). Teachers’ high workloads
and
poor working conditions deter young people from
the profession (
205
). Consequently, the teaching
profession is ageing fast (
206
) and does not attract
high-performing graduates (
207
). Teachers do not
receive sufficient training (
208
), including on
teaching
multinational
classes (
209
).
The
requirements for providing initial teacher
education were lowered in 2023 (
210
), abandoning
efforts to improve its quality. The newly prepared
curriculum reform will also require modernising
and improving the relevance of teacher training
programmes.
The VET system’s low effectiveness hampers
the supply of skilled workers.
The employment
rate of recent VET graduates was 78.7% in 2023
(compared to 81% in the EU and 85.6% for higher
education graduates), down by 3.6 pps from 2022.
Polish VET students benefit less from work-based
learning than their EU peers (58.4% vs 64.5% in
the EU). 25% left school without any
qualifications, and almost two years after
graduation, 20% of students that left were still not
in education, employment or training (NEET). A lack
of professional qualifications, combined with low
levels of basic skills, create a risk of
unemployment and social exclusion later in life.
Technical secondary schools are more effective,
but only 33% of graduates continue education at
tertiary level.
(
203
)
https://www.barometrzawodow.pl/modul/publi
kacje?publication=national&year=2025.
204
( ) OECD (2024). Education at a Glance 2024.
http://data-
explorer.oecd.org/s/5q.
(
205
) https://nauczyciel2040.pl/.
(
206
) Eurostat, UOE, [educ_uoe_perp01].
(
207
) Integrated Skills Strategy 2030 (2020).
https://zsu2030.men.gov.pl/app/files/ZSU2030_ogolna.p
df;.
208
( ) S.M. Kwiatkowski, J.
Łaszczyk,
Kandydaci na studia
w perspektywie 2025-2030. Trendy
…,
op.cit., page. 218
https://www.frp.org.pl/images/publikacje/publication/kras
p_2022.pdf.
209
( ) CEO (2024).
https://ceo.org.pl/przedstawiamy-raport-
uczniowie-i-uczennice-z-ukrainy-w-polskiej-szkole-rok-
szkolny-2023-24/.
210
( )
https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/DU/2023/1672.
88
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0090.png
Despite high tertiary attainment, policy
efforts are needed to increase enrolment in
STEM, in particular in natural sciences.
In
2024, the proportion of people aged 25-34
holding a tertiary diploma was 45.7%, in line with
the EU target. The gender gap in favour of women
(17.9 pps) is one the widest in the EU. The
proportion of students (ISCED 5-8) in STEM
decreased from 26.8% in 2017 to 21.1% in 2022,
remaining below the EU average (27.1%). At VET
ISCED 3-4, participation in STEM is above the EU
average (42.3% vs 36.2% in the EU). The
enrolment rate in ICT is close to the EU average
(5.1% vs 5.2% in the EU); however, the proportion
of female students is comparatively low (16.1% vs
20.2% in the EU). The proportion of graduates in
natural sciences, mathematics and statistics is less
than half the EU average (3.3% vs 7.3% in the EU
in 2022). Only 26.2% of students are female in
engineering and technology programmes (
211
).
Poland has also the lowest proportion of PhD
students in the EU (
212
), and the rates are likely to
remain low as only 13% of top-performing 15-
year-olds in mathematics and science plan a
career as a scientist or engineer (OECD
21.2%) (
213
). The low proportion of STEM tertiary
students will exacerbate skills shortages, limiting
Poland’s competitiveness and innovation capacity
(see Annex 3).
Improving the quality and relevance of
higher education are major challenges,
including with regard to the green transition.
The content and forms of studies are not aligned
with labour market needs, which need profiles in
topics such as climate change, energy security,
and transversal and social competences (
214
).
There is a need for Poland to make the evaluation
system of higher education institutions’ scientific
performance more transparent and reliable.
Although improving the quality of academic
teaching and learning has been one of the
country’s recent objectives, no new measures have
been implemented so far (
215
). Poland is
developing a long-term higher education
internationalisation strategy, also supported by the
ESF+ (
216
).
Given the shrinking labour force and skills
shortages, skills development is crucial for
competitiveness, resilience and fairness.
65%
of organisations indicate skills shortages as the
main barrier to transformation and expect talent
availability to worsen in five years (
217
). Also, 82%
of SMEs report facing skills shortages, and 88%
struggle to retain skilled workers (
218
). The
macroeconomic skills mismatch in Poland rose to
23.1 in 2024, against a decreasing trend in the EU
(from 20.2 in 2022 to 19.2 in 2024) (
219
). This
highlights the need for upskilling and reskilling,
especially for the green and digital transitions.
Policy measures financed by the Recovery and
Resilience Facility (RRF) aim to boost lifelong
learning through cooperation and coordination and
improve the supply of green skills through sectoral
qualification frameworks. To support this objective,
Poland aims to create 120 sectoral skills centres
to boost the quality of VET by involving employers
more in the learning process and to develop green
and digital skills. Additionally, under European
Social Fund Plus (ESF+) project, Industry
Agreement for VET is being implemented; however
there is still a lot of room for improvement.
As part of the broader need for upskilling
and reskilling, developing green competences
and skills is particularly critical for the green
transition.
The country’s economy is energy
intensive and is facing restructuring to decrease
dependence on coal. Decarbonising
Poland’s
economy could lead to a two-thirds decline in coal
sector employment by 2030 compared to 2019,
requiring support for 14 000-36 000 workers (
220
).
Poland is the largest recipient of the Just
Transition Fund (JTF): the Silesia region, with 90%
of employment in the coal industry in Poland, is
the biggest beneficiary in the EU (EUR 2.2 billion,
57.6% of Poland’s allocation). The
JTF will support
mining industry workers by improving their skills
and training, focusing on the green and digital
(
216
)
https://mapadotacji.gov.pl/projekty/1686834/.
(
217
)
https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-future-of-jobs-
report-2025/.
(
218
)
European Year of Skills - Skills shortages, recruitment and
retention strategies in small and medium-sized enterprises -
September 2023 - - Eurobarometer survey.
219
( ) This indicator highlights the relatively higher difficulty of the
low- and medium-qualified in entering the labour market, as
compared to the high-qualified
220
( )
IBS-Research-Report-01-2021.pdf.
(
211
) Knapinska, 2024.
https://www.dziewczynynapolitechniki.pl/pdfy/raport-kobiety-
na-politechnikach-2023.pdf
212
( ) ESTAT: 0.5% vs EU 1.3%, 2022.
(
213
) OECD, 2019. PISA 2018 Results. Volume II.
(
214
) Development forecast of higher education. (KRASP, 2024)
53-IV-2024_Raport_Prognoza_rozwoju_Woznicki.pdf.
(
215
)
https://www.gov.pl/web/nauka/zgromadzenie-plenarne-krasp-
z-udzialem-ministra-nauki.
89
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0091.png
economies. On upskilling and reskilling needs for
the green transition, there are shortages in
occupations, such as building structure cleaners,
insulation workers and roofers (
221
).
To tackle the high level of digital skills
shortages, Poland has adopted a strategic
approach to digital education.
In 2023, only
44.3% of people aged 16-74 had at least a basic
level of digital skills, well below the EU average of
55.6% (
222
). 87% of businesses indicate that the
lack of skilled staff poses a barrier for investment
(
223
). Many small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) struggle with employees’ low levels of
digital skills, which hinders these businesses’
competitiveness and ability to innovate and adapt
to new technologies. In 2023, only 50% of SMEs in
Poland had reached a basic level of digital
intensity (EU 58%) (
224
). A lack of digital skills is
reflected in lower levels of innovation compared to
the EU average: only 43.5% of SMEs in Poland
introduce innovative products. In 2024, Poland
adopted a comprehensive digital education
strategy for 2035 (
225
), which focuses on
improving teachers and students’ digital skills and
integrating digital technologies into teaching and
learning. By 2026, 31 000 schoolteachers will
have been trained in digital skills (financed from
the RRF), and by 2027, 2 000 higher education
staff will have received similar training (financed
from the ESF+). In 2024, the pilot phase of Digital
Development Clubs project was launched. The
project aims to establish local digital competences
development centres in municipalities across
Poland. After the pilot phase in up to 64
municipalities, the project is to be expanded to
approximately 2 000 municipalities and provide
training in digital skills to around 463 850 adults
Participation in adult learning is low,
hindering the workforce’s adaptability.
In
2022, the rate of adult participation in learning (in
the previous 12 months) was low at 20.3% (EU
39.5%). This was down slightly (by 0.6 pps) from
(
221
) European Labour Authority
EURES Report on labour
shortages and surpluses 2024,
2025, based on data from
EURES National Coordination Offices. Skills and knowledge
requirements align with the ESCO taxonomy on skills for the
green transition, with examples analysed using the ESCO
green intensity index.
(
222
)
DESI 2024.
(
223
)
EIB Investment Survey
2024
(
224
)
Digitalisation in Europe
–
2024 edition - Interactive
publications - Eurostat.
225
( )
https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/M2024000081201.pdf.
2016 and also significantly lower than the
country’s 2030
target of 51.7%. Based on the
2023 OECD Survey of Adult Skills (
226
), Poland saw
significant drops in results compared to 2012, with
a 31-point decline in reading and 21 in
mathematics reasoning. 39% of respondents
struggled with reading, 38% with maths, and 48%
with problem-solving tasks (
227
). The low share of
adult participation in learning is largely due to low
participation in non-formal education, which is
17.8% (EU 38.1%), particularly among older age
groups, people with lower educational attainment,
and those outside the labour force. Focusing on
groups who are less qualified is essential for
closing the qualification gap between the
workforce and labour market needs and increasing
competitiveness.
Measures are needed to boost adult learning.
Lifelong learning suffers from a lack of policy
coordination at national and regional levels, and
there is no clear
‘owner’
of adult learning policy.
Regional coordination teams for VET and lifelong
learning have been set up with the support of the
RRF to improve the coordination of policies at
regional level. Despite ongoing action promoting
adult learning, mostly financed from EU funds,
there is no visible progress towards the national
skills target. After ongoing public consultations are
completed, a pilot project will be launched on
individual learning accounts (ILAs) to overcome
individuals’
financial and motivational barriers.
Dialogue with social partners on implementing
effective measures, such as ILAs, is needed, as
well as more awareness of the benefits of lifelong
learning. The skills validation system in Poland is
highly formalised and does not improve the
recognition of skills or qualifications developed
outside the formal system. Only a few Polish
institutions have signed up to the Pact for Skills,
despite the presence of numerous sectoral skills
councils already supported by the ESF+.
(
226
) PIAAC:
https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/piaac.html.
227
( ) Patterns identified for Poland could suggest disengagement
or lack of effort during the assessment, which may have an
impact on the estimated proficiency of the overall Polish
population.
90
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0092.png
ANNEX 13: SOCIAL SCOREBOARD
Table A13.1:Social
Scoreboard for Poland
Social Scoreboard for Poland
Adult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on
the job training, % of the population aged 25-64, 2022)
Early leavers from education and training
(% of the population aged 18-24, 2024)
Equal opportunities and
access to the labour market
Share of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills
(% of the population aged 16-74, 2023)
Young people not in employment, education or training
(% of the population aged 15-29, 2024)
Gender employment gap
(percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2024)
Income quintile ratio
(S80/S20, 2024)
Employment rate
(% of the population aged 20-64, 2024)
Dynamic labour markets
and fair workingconditions
Unemployment rate
(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2024)
Long term unemployment
(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2024)
Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth
(index, 2008=100, 2023)
At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate
(% of the total population, 2024)
At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children
(% of the population aged 0-17, 2024)
Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction
(% reduction of AROP, 2024)
Social protection and
inclusion
Disability employment gap
(percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2024)
Housing cost overburden
(% of the total population, 2024)
Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare
(% of the under 3-years-old population, 2024)
Self-reported unmet need for medical care
(% of the population aged 16+, 2024)
Critical situation
To watch
Weak but improving Good but to monitor
On average
Better than average
Best performers
20,3
4,1
44,3
9,4
11,6
3,85
78,4
2,9
0,8
151,9
16,0
16,1
41,5
35,6
5,2
15,1
3,8
(1) Update of 5 May 2025. Members States are categorised based on the Social Scoreboard according to a methodology agreed
with the EMCO and SPC Committees. Please consult the Annex of the Joint Employment Report 2025 for details on the
methodology (https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/joint-employment-report-2025-0).
Source:
Eurostat
91
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0093.png
ANNEX 14: HEALTH AND HEALTH SYSTEMS
Poland’s health system faces significant
challenges. These need to be addressed if the
country is to improve the health of its
population and social fairness, while
boosting the competitiveness of its economy.
The key challenge is low life expectancy, which is
linked to high preventable and treatable mortality.
These factors are associated with suboptimal cost-
effectiveness and funding of the health system,
which still features a hospital-centred care model,
insufficient focus on disease prevention and
outpatient care, and shortages of healthcare
workers.
Life expectancy at birth in Poland rebounded
above its pre-COVID-19 level but was still
below the EU average in 2023.
The country has
a striking gender gap, with women expected to live
7.5 years longer than men and 3.3 years longer in
good health (see Annex 17). As mortality from
COVID-19 had started to fall by 2022, life
expectancy increased again, rising to slightly
above pre-pandemic levels. Treatable mortality
rates are higher in Poland than the EU average,
suggesting shortcomings in the effectiveness of
the health system. In fact, the rate of treatable
mortality in Poland has barely improved since
2012. Poland participates in several joint actions
funded by EU4Health aimed at reducing the
burden of cardiovascular diseases, cancer,
diabetes and respiratory diseases.
Graph A14.1:
Life expectancy at birth, years
81.3
78.0
communicable diseases such as cancer and
diseases of the circulatory system (‘cardiovascular
diseases’)
is high compared to the rest of the EU
(
228
). Between 2022 and 2040, the population at
working age in Poland is forecast to shrink by
0.5% every year as a result of lower birth rates
(EU average: 0.3%).
Graph A14.2:
Treatable mortality
per 100 000 population
133.1
133.7
144.2
145.9
140.0
91.3
2018
89.2
2019
Poland
91.7
2020
EU
93.3
2021
89.7
2022
Age-standardised death rate
(mortality that could be
avoided through optimal quality healthcare)
Source:
Eurostat (hlth_cd_apr)
80.4
76.4
80.1
80.6
77.2
81.4
78.4
75.4
Poland’s health system is still strongly
hospital centred.
In 2022, health spending per
inhabitant was lower than the EU average, with
the largest share going to inpatient and day care
(around 37% of total health expenditure). This,
together with a high number of hospital beds (567
per 100 000 population in 2022, much higher than
the EU average), illustrates the country’s strongly
hospital-centred model of healthcare. Over-
reliance on hospitals within a health system can
hamper healthcare accessibility, and suggests
opportunities for optimising the cost-effective
allocation of resources. The Polish recovery and
resilience plan (RRP) sets out to transform some of
these hospital beds into long-term care and
geriatric care beds.
Poland’s share of health spending covered by
public funds is among the lowest in the EU, and
the level of out-of-pocket payments is above the
EU average. Around two thirds of all out-of-pocket
payments are for outpatient pharmaceuticals (
229
).
Investment in the health system has historically
been low in Poland. This is reflected in the low
availability of key diagnostic technology: Poland
2019
2020
Poland
2021
EU
2022
2023
Source:
Eurostat (demo_mlexpec)
Shortcomings in the effectiveness of the
health system also negatively impacts
Poland’s
workforce,
productivity
and
competitiveness.
In Poland, mortality at working
age as a proportion of total mortality is
significantly higher than the EU average,
exacerbating the effects of population ageing on a
shrinking labour force. The rate of potential
productive life years lost due to non-
(
228
) Update to 2022 data of analysis presented by Health at a
Glance: Europe 2016 - © OECD 2016
(
229
) OECD/European Commission (2024),
Health at a Glance:
Europe 2024: State of Health in the EU Cycle,
pp. 186-187.
92
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0094.png
Table A14.1:Key
health indicators
2019
Cancer mortality per 100 000 population
Mortality due to circulatory diseases per 100 000 population
Current expenditure on health, purchasing power standards, per capita
Public share of health expenditure, % of current health expenditure
Spending on prevention, % of current health expenditure
Available hospital beds per 100 000 population**
Doctors per 1 000 population*
Nurses per 1 000 population*
Mortality at working age (20-64 years), % of total mortality
Number of patents (pharma / biotech / medical technology)
Total consumption of antibacterials for systemic use,
daily defined dose per 1 000 inhabitants****
283.4
492.5
1 592
71.8
2.1
554
3.3
5.6
23.1
39
23.6
2020
279.7
523.8
1 616
72.3
1.9
563
3.4
5.6
21.4
42
18.5
2021
259.9
541.4
1 783
72.5
2.1
578
3.5
5.8
20.9
37
20.2
2022
268.0
489.6
1 960
73.7
1.9
567
3.6
5.8
20.5
24
23.6
2023
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
19.9
50
23.2
EU average*
(latest year)
234.7 (2022)
336.4 (2022)
3 684.6 (2022)
81.3 (2022)
5.5 (2022)
444 (2022)
4.2 (2022)*
7.6 (2022)*
14.3 (2023)
29 (2023)***
20.0 (2023)
*The EU average is weighted for all indicators except for doctors and nurses per 1 000 population, for which the EU simple
average is used based on 2022 (or latest 2021) data except for Luxembourg (2017). Doctors’ density data refer to practising
doctors in all countries except Greece, Portugal (licensed to practise) and Slovakia (professionally active). Density of nurses: data
refer to practising nurses (EU recognised qualification) in most countries except France and Slovakia (professionally active) and
Greece (hospital only). **‘Available hospital beds’ covers somatic care, not psychiatric care. ***The EU median is used for patents.
Source:
Eurostat database; European Patent Office; ****European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) for 2023.
has among the EU’s fewest medical imaging
devices per capita.
Of the country’s health allocation under the
cohesion policy funds for 2021-2027 (EUR 2.58
billion), EUR 1.87 billion is planned for investments
in health infrastructure and equipment. In addition,
the Polish RRP allocates EUR 3.8 billion to health
reforms and supporting investments. These funds
will be used to develop and modernise
infrastructure, and to restructure public hospitals,
including by shifting certain health services from
hospitals to lower levels of care. Other RRP
reforms aim to align the hospital care system with
demographic trends and population health needs
by concentrating services where they are needed
and (re-)profiling hospitals.
Poland places insufficient focus on disease
prevention.
In 2022, Poland spent among the
least on prevention in the EU as a share of total
spending on health (1.9%). Cardiovascular
diseases and cancer remain the leading causes of
death, with mortality rates higher than the EU
average. Mortality linked to air pollution is also
high (see Annex 7). The rate of preventable
mortality remains consistently above the EU
average. Behavioural risk factors are key drivers of
preventable mortality rates in Poland, for example
smoking, poor diet and consequent obesity, and
alcohol consumption (
230
). High levels of
hospitalisation for congestive heart failure and
diabetes suggest a lack of care coordination,
further suggesting a need to strengthen primary
care. Reforms set out in the Polish RRP aim to
(
230
)
Health at a Glance: Europe 2024,
Chapter 4.
improve access to and the quality of oncological
and cardiological care by introducing national
networks in these areas and standardised care
along the entire patient pathway in the areas of
primary care, specialised outpatient healthcare,
hospital treatment and rehabilitation. In 2023, the
consumption of antibiotics was above the EU
average, despite the national target (
231
) to reduce
total consumption by 27% between 2019 and
2030. This raises concerns about antimicrobial
resistance. A strategy to prevent and limit
healthcare-associated infections was approved at
the end of 2023.
Poland faces challenges in access to
healthcare related to waiting times, as well
as
geographical
and
income-related
disparities in unmet needs for medical care
(see Annex 17). In 2024, the proportion of the
Polish population reporting unmet needs for
medical care was higher than the EU average
(3.8% vs 2.5%) (see Annex 11). This was due to
cost (15.8%), distance (5.3%) and waiting times
(78.9%). Moreover, unmet needs reported by
people reporting needs in Poland is higher than EU
average (5.2% vs 3.6%). Also, the uneven
geographical distribution of doctors is a major
barrier to access to care in peripheral regions.
Poland faces persistent shortages of health
professionals, with among the lowest
numbers of doctors and nurses per
inhabitant in the EU, which hampers the
(
231
) National target set by the Council Recommendation on
stepping up EU actions to combat antimicrobial resistance in
a ‘one health’ approach,
2023/C 220/01.
93
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0095.png
provision of healthcare.
The density of doctors
in Poland is still below the EU average (3.6 per
1 000 population in 2022 vs 4.2). Poland has one
of the lowest shares of general practitioners (GPs)
in the EU (9% vs an EU average of 21%).
Furthermore, around 22% of physicians are aged
between 55 and 64, raising concerns about the
long-term accessibility of health services. Poland
is taking measures to address these challenges.
The remuneration of GPs have risen sharply and
faster than those of specialists since 2012,
thereby narrowing the remuneration gap.
Moreover, the number of newly-physician
graduates has increased since 2019, approaching
the EU average in 2022 (15.1% vs 15.5%).
The density of practising nurses in Poland is also
among the lowest in the EU with 5.8 nurses per
1000 in 2022 (EU average: 7.6). The nursing
workforce is generally older, with almost a third of
nurses aged 50-59 compared to a fifth of doctors
(
232
). Nurses in Poland received substantial pay
increases in 2022 - of close to 30% on average.
This includes a higher pay hike for nurses with
certain qualifications. The remuneration of hospital
nurses in
relation to the country’s average wage
was one of the highest in the EU in 2022. This has
resulted in worsening financial situations for many
county hospitals, and some have stopped
recognising qualifications acquired by nurses and
non-medical health workers to avoid increasing
pay. Increases in the prices of hospital services
introduced in 2023 are expected to alleviate some
of these problems (
233
). Further pay increases were
granted in 2023 to improve the attractiveness and
retention of nurses. Through its RRP, Poland is also
implementing reforms to incentivise young people
to pursue medical studies and subsequently
practise medicine in the country. Poland has also
introduced
legislation
to
increase
the
attractiveness of medical professions and boost
working conditions. Finally, Poland is investing in
increasing the capacity of medical teaching
facilities and supporting students undertaking
medical studies. Poland participates in the HEROES
joint action (
234
) under EU4Health, through which
EU countries share knowledge and experience on
health workforce planning.
The potential of Poland’s health system to
drive innovation and foster industrial
development in the EU medical sector is not
being fully exploited.
Poland is among the EU
countries that report considerable public spending
on health research and development. This is
reflected in the number of European patents
granted: 50 in 2023 in the combined areas of
pharmaceuticals, biotechnologies and medical
technologies (vs an EU-level median of 29) (
235
).
Clinical trial activity in Poland is comparatively
high (
236
). RRP measures aim to improve the
quality and efficiency of the healthcare system by
supporting research and development in the areas
of medicine and health.
Poland aims to scale up the digitalisation of
its health system, with support from EU
programmes.
The shares of people accessing
their personal health records online and using
online health services (excluding phone) instead of
in-person consultations increased in 2024
compared to 2022 (with levels above the
respective EU averages) (see Annex 6). That said,
there is considerable room for further deployment.
Moreover, there are wide differences in patient use
depending on their socio-economic background.
Significant investments under the RRP and the
cohesion policy aim to boost the digital
transformation of the healthcare sector in Poland
(see Annex 16). Measures focus on accelerating
the digital transformation of health by introducing
new digital health services and further developing
existing ones. Poland participates in several
EU4Health-funded projects which facilitate the
implementation of the European Health Data
Space and strengthen digital infrastructure in
Poland (
237
).
(
232
)
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and
Policies (2023), Poland: Country Health Profile 2023, State
of Health in the EU.
233
( )
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and
Policies (2023), Poland: Country Health Profile 2023, State
of Health in the EU.
234
( )
JA HEROES | Health workforce planning project.
(
235
)
European Patent Office,
Data to download | epo.org.
236
( )
EMA (2024),
Monitoring the European clinical trials
environment,
p. 9.
(
237
) TEHDAS2 - Second Joint Action Towards the European Health
Data Space, eCAN - Joint Action on strengthening ehealth
including telemedicine and remote monitoring for health care
systems for cancer prevention and care, Xt-EHR - Extended
EHR@EU Data Space for Primary Use
94
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0096.png
HORIZONTAL
ANNEX 15: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
This Annex assesses Poland’s progress on the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) along
the
dimensions
of
competitiveness,
sustainability,
social
fairness
and
macroeconomic stability.
The 17 SDGs and their
related indicators provide a policy framework
under
the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. The aim is to end all forms of
poverty, fight inequalities and tackle climate
change and the environmental crisis, while
ensuring that no one is left behind. The EU and its
Member States are committed to this historic
global framework agreement and to playing an
active role in maximising progress on the SDGs.
The graph below is based on the EU SDG indicator
set developed to monitor progress on the SDGs in
the EU.
Poland is improving on SDGs related to
competitiveness
(SDGs 4, 8 and 9).
Poland
performs well on its employment rate among
people aged 20-64 (SDG 8; 78.4% in 2024, vs
72.6% in 2019; EU average of 75.8% in 2024). On
Graph A15.1:
Progress towards the SDGs in Poland
the downside, the share of adults with at least
basic digital skills (SDG 4) remains low (44.3% in
2023; EU average: 55.6%). Poland is also moving
away from the EU average on the indicator for the
investment share of GDP (SDG 8; 17.7% in 2023,
vs 18.8% in 2018; EU average of 22.4% in 2023).
The Polish recovery and resilience plan (RRP)
includes several measures to improve the
investment climate. Poland is improving, but still
needs to catch up with the EU average on
indicators for and innovation, and sustainable
industry (SDG 9), including gross domestic
expenditure on R&D (1.56% of GDP in 2023, vs
1.19% of GDP in 2018; EU average of 2.24% in
2023). The same is true of air emissions intensity
of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) from industry
(0.13 g per euro in 2022; EU average: 0.06 g).
While Poland is improving on some of the
SDGs related to
sustainability
(SDGs 6, 7, 9,
11, 12, 13, 14), it is moving away from some
of the targets for SDG 2 (Zero hunger) and
SDG 15 (Life on land).
Under SDG 2, the area
For detailed datasets on the various SDGs, see the annual Eurostat report ‘Sustainable
development in the European Union’;
for
details on extensive country-specific data on the short-term progress of Member States:
Key findings
–
Sustainable development
indicators - Eurostat (europa.eu).
A high status does not mean that a country is close to reaching a specific SDG, but signals that it
is doing better than the EU on average. The progress score is an absolute measure based on the indicator trends over the past
five years. The calculation does not take into account any target values, as most EU policy targets are only valid for the aggregate
EU level. Depending on data availability for each goal, not all 17 SDGs are shown for each country.
Source:
Eurostat, latest update of 28 April 2025. Data refer mainly to the period 2018-2023 or 2019-2024. Data on SDGs may
vary across the report and its annexes due to different cut-off dates.
95
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0097.png
under organic farming in Poland (3.9% of the
utilised agricultural area in 2022) is below the EU
average (10.5% in 2022). Government support to
agricultural R&D was only EUR 0.2 per inhabitant
in Poland in 2023, compared to the EU average of
EUR 8.1. As for SDG 6, the percentage of inland
water bathing sites with excellent water quality in
Poland rose from 26.7% in 2018 to 54.9% in
2023 but needs to catch up with the EU average
of 78.6% in 2023. Poland has made some
progress on energy consumption indicators,
including the share of renewable energy in gross
final energy consumption (SDG 7; from 14.9% in
2018 to 16.6% in 2023; EU average 24.6% in
2023). However, it needs to catch up with the EU
average on per capita net greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions (SDG 13; 8.6 tonnes in 2023; EU
average: 6.8 tonnes in 2023). Moreover, Poland is
rapidly losing carbon sinks, with the net GHG
emissions from land use and forestry (LULUCF)
increasing from -131.3 tonnes CO
2
eq. per km² in
2018 to 104.7 in 2023; EU average: -47.0). In
addition, Poland’s energy import dependency
(SDG 7) increased from 43.5% in 2018 to 48.0%
in 2023 (EU average: 58.3% in 2023). As for
affordable energy, the percentage of the Polish
population unable to keep their homes adequately
warm was lower (4.7% in 2023) than the EU
average (10.6%). Poland’s RRP includes measures
to address some of the energy-related challenges,
namely the energy renovation of buildings, energy
efficiency of business and the decarbonisation of
energy production. While Poland is improving on
several SDG indicators related to SDG 11
(Sustainable cities and communities), its share of
buses and trains in total passenger transport has
fallen but remains above EU average (from 20.3%
in 2017 to 17.3% in 2022; EU average 16.6% in
2022). The country is improving on the number of
premature deaths due to exposure to fine
particulate matter (PM2.5) but is still performing
below EU average (a decrease of 118 per 100 000
in 2017 to 94 in 2022; EU average: 53). On
SDG 14, Poland is progressing on the share of
coastal water bathing sites with excellent water
quality (55.1% in 2023, vs 30.8 in 2018), but is
below the EU average (88.8%). Poland does not
provide data for half of the SDG 14 sub-themes.
The country is moving away from the targets for
SDG 15 (Life on land), due an increase in the
impact of drought on ecosystems (from 5.4% of
the land area in 2018 to 8.0% in 2023). It also
remains above the EU average on this (3.6% in
2023).
Poland is improving on most SDGs related to
social fairness
(SDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10).
It
performs well on the indicators for: (i) people at
risk of poverty or social exclusion (SDG 1; 16.3% in
2023, vs 18.2% in 2018; EU average of 21.3% in
2023); (ii) the severe material and social
deprivation rate (SDG 1; 2.3% of the population in
2024, vs 4.5% in 2018; 6.4% EU average in 2024);
and (iii) income distribution (SDG 10; 3.85 in 2024,
vs 4.25 in 2018; EU average of 4.66 in 2024). In
addition, the long-term unemployment rate fell
(SDG 8; 0.8% in 2024 vs 1.0% in 2018; EU
average of 1.9% in 2024). Poland also improved
and performed better than the EU average on
early leavers from education and training (SDG 4;
4.1% in 2024; EU average: 9.3%). However, Poland
needs to take measures to significantly reduce
avoidable mortality (SDG 3; 383.7 deaths per
100 000 in 2022; EU average: 257.8). Poland also
needs to catch up with the EU average on gender
equality in employment, in particular on positions
held by women in senior management (SDG 5;
20.5% of positions in senior management were
held by women in 2024; EU average: 32.6%). On
SDG 4 (Quality education), the percentage of low-
achieving fifteen-year-olds in mathematics
increased strongly (from 14.7% in 2018 to 23% in
2022) moving away from the EU-level 2030
target, even though it is still lower than the EU
average (29.5% in 2022).
Poland is improving on SDGs related to
macroeconomic stability
(SDGs 8, 16, 17), but
still needs to catch up with the EU average
on some indicators.
It has improved on SDG 8
(Decent work and economic growth), although real
GDP per capita (increase from EUR 12 870 in
2017 to EUR 16 470 in 2024) remains below the
EU average (EUR 33 530 in 2024). On justice and
strong institutions (SDG 16), Poland has increased
its general government total expenditure on the
law courts (SDG 16; increase from EUR 61.8 in
2017 per capita to EUR 91.9 per capita in 2023)
but needs to catch up with the EU average of
EUR 121.7. However, perceptions of the
independence of the justice system have become
more negative, with the percentage of people who
consider it to be fairly good and very good sharply
dropping from 39% in 2019 to 28% in 2024 (the
EU average in 2023 was 52%). The perceived
judicial independence among companies has
slightly increased from 18% in 2021 to 22% in
2024. Poland’s Corruption Perceptions Index has
also deteriorated (from 58 in 2018 to 53 in 2023;
EU average: 62 in 2024). The Polish RRP includes
96
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0098.png
measures on the independence of the justice
system. On the share of households with a high-
speed internet connection (SDG 17), Poland has
made considerable progress (from 60.3% in 2019
to 81.1% in 2023) and is above the EU average
(78.8% in 2023).
As the SDGs form an overarching framework, any
links to relevant SDGs are either explained or
depicted with icons in the other annexes.
97
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0099.png
ANNEX 16: CSR PROGRESS AND EU FUNDS IMPLEMENTATION
Poland faces structural challenges in a wide
range of policy areas, as identified in the
country-specific recommendations (CSRs)
addressed to the country as part of the
European Semester.
They refer, among other
things, to improving the adequacy of the pension
system, better targeting social benefits,
healthcare, improving labour market participation,
education and skills, research and innovation,
improving the regulatory environment, investing in
digital transformation and infrastructure, as well
as in energy, renewables and energy efficiency
and in the sustainable use of water resources.
The Commission has assessed the 2019-2024
CSRs considering the policy action taken by
Poland to date and the commitments in its
recovery and resilience plan (RRP).
At this
stage, Poland has made
at least ‘some progress’
on 45% of the CSRs (
238
),
and ‘limited progress’ on
45% (Table A16.2).
EU funding instruments provide considerable
resources
to
Poland
by
supporting
investments and structural reforms to
increase competitiveness, environmental
sustainability and social fairness, while
helping to address challenges identified in
the CSRs.
In addition to the EUR 59.8 billion
funding from the Recovery and Resilience Facility
(RRF) in 2021-2026, EU cohesion policy funds (
239
)
are providing EUR 75.5 billion to Poland
(amounting to EUR 92 billion with national co-
financing) for 2021-2027 (
240
) to boost regional
competitiveness and growth. Support from these
instruments combined represents around 18% of
2024 GDP (
241
). The contribution of these
instruments to different policy objectives is
outlined in Graphs A16.1 and A16.2. This
substantial support comes on top of financing
(
238
) 11% of the 2019-2024 CSRs have been fully implemented,
0% substantially implemented, and some progress has been
made on 34%.
(
239
) In 2021-2027, cohesion policy funds include the European
Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the
European Social Fund Plus and the Just Transition Fund. The
information on cohesion policy included in this Annex is
based on adopted programmes with the cut-off date of 5
May 2025.
(
240
) European territorial cooperation (ETC) programmes are
excluded from the figure.
(
241
) RRF funding includes both grants and loans, where
applicable. GDP figures are based on Eurostat data for 2024.
provided to Poland under the 2014-2020
multiannual financial framework, which financed
projects until 2023 and has had significant
benefits for the economy and Polish society.
Project selection under the 2021-2027 cohesion
policy programmes has accelerated, while
significant volumes of investment are yet to be
mobilised.
The Polish RRP contains 56 investments and
55 reforms to stimulate sustainable growth,
decarbonise the economy, accelerate the
digital transition and strengthen the
independence of the judiciary.
A year before
the end of the RRF timespan, implementation is on
its way, with 35% of the funds disbursed. At
present, Poland has fulfilled 25% of the
milestones and targets in its RRP (
242
). The initial
delays in implementation have been offset in the
past year. Since December 2023, there has been
significant acceleration, leading to Poland
submitting three payment requests, covering 5 out
of 9 instalments. Still, considerable efforts are
needed to ensure completion of all RRP measures
by 31 August 2026.
Poland also receives funding from several
other EU instruments,
including those listed in
Table A16.1. Most notably, the common
agricultural policy (CAP) provides Poland with an
EU contribution of EUR 22.1 billion under the CAP
strategic plan for 2023-2027 (
243
). A further
EUR 504.9 million are available under the Asylum,
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), together
with the border management and visa instrument
(BMVI) and internal security funds. Operations
amounting to EUR 1.01 billion (
244
) have been
signed under the InvestEU instrument backed by
the EU guarantee, improving access to financing
for riskier operations in Poland.
(
242
) As of mid-May 2025, Poland has submitted 3 payment
requests; the last one being under assessment.
(
243
)
An overview of Poland’s formally approved strategy
to
implement the EU’s common agricultural policy
nationally
can be found at:
https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-
country/cap-strategic-plans/poland_en
.
(
244
) Data reflect the situation on 31.12.2024.
98
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0100.png
Graph A16.1:
Distribution of RRF funding in Poland
by policy field
Green transition
Digital transformation
Smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth
Social & territorial cohesion
Health & resilience
Next generation
(1) Each RRP measure helps achieve the aims of two of the
six policy pillars of the RRF. The primary contribution is shown
in the outer circle, while the secondary contribution is shown
in the inner circle. Each circle represents 100% of the RRF
funds. Therefore, the total contribution to all pillars displayed
on this chart amounts to 200% of the RRF funds allocated.
Source:
European Commission
Graph A16.2:
Distribution of cohesion policy
funding across policy objectives in Poland
Smarter Europe
Greener Europe
Connected Europe
Social Europe
Europe closer to citizens
JTF specific objective
specialisation,
industrial
transition,
entrepreneurship, and business adaptability.
Poland has already started to take up the
opportunities of the Strategic Technologies for
Europe Platform under cohesion policy by investing
into cutting edge technologies and bolstering the
EUs biotech industry with a pioneering project
developed in the Bródnowski Hospital on gene
therapy for Parkinson Disease. Additionally,
cohesion policy funds will help complete
broadband infrastructure, targeting additional
businesses that will gain access to very high-
capacity broadband. A further EUR 6 billion,
primarily from European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)
and complemented by the Just Transition Fund
(JTF) and ERDF, is supporting skills development.
The ERDF will specifically invest EUR 153 million in
skills development for smart specialisation,
industrial transition, entrepreneurship, and
business adaptability. Under the European Funds
for Social Development programme, a training
loan project was launched in 2023 and now has
over 16 150 participants. A new EUR 26 million
ESF+ pilot for individual learning accounts will
support 7 700 adults from 2026. Additionally,
ESF+ regional programmes support upskilling for
low-skilled adults through upskilling pathways and
local knowledge centres, focusing on green and
digital skills.
Other
funds
are
contributing
to
competitiveness in Poland, for instance
through open calls.
The Connecting Europe
Facility has financed strategic investments for
instance in rail infrastructure, the development of
alternative
fuel
infrastructure
and
the
modernisation of Poland's maritime transport
network; integration of the energy market,
decarbonisation of the energy system and security
of energy supply, including the diversification of
natural gas sources and routes; as well as
capacity, resilience and security of backbone
digital infrastructure and advanced 5G connectivity
along transport paths. Horizon Europe has
supported research and innovation from scientific
breakthroughs to scaling up innovations, with
Digital, Industry and Space and Climate, Energy
and Mobility as top priorities in Poland. The
Technical Support Instrument (TSI) supports
actions in Poland for instance for enhancing the
implementation of the Just Transition and
improving regional capacity to access EU funding.
Poland’s RRP
measures
to
also contains
improve
the
ambitious
business
Source:
European Commission
Cohesion policy funds aim to increase the
productivity and competitiveness of Polish
firms and improve the business environment.
EUR 8.9 billion is earmarked for enhancing
research and innovation, while EUR 3.7 billion will
go towards supporting the growth and
competitiveness of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). The European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) supports investments in
43 000 businesses, including over 7 000 SMEs
introducing product or process innovations. This
funding will support cooperation between the
science and business sectors, which is important
for strengthening technology transfers. More than
1 000 businesses will receive support to
collaborate with research organisations, while over
300 research organisations will participate in joint
research projects. The ERDF will invest EUR 153
million in skills development for smart
99
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0101.png
environment and competitiveness.
As part of
the measures covered by payment requests
submitted over the past year, a legislative package
entered into force aimed at eliminating legal
barriers affecting the business climate. An
important reform was also adopted to improve the
business environment, by limiting the use of fast-
track legislative procedures in the Sejm, the
Senate and the Council of Ministers and by
requiring impact assessments and public
consultations for draft legislation.
EU funds are playing a significant role in
promoting environmental sustainability and
the green transition in Poland during the
current seven-year EU budget (multiannual
financial framework).
A significant investment
amounting to a EUR 26.6 billion is earmarked for
climate action under the cohesion policy. Annual
investments estimated at EUR 4.8 billion focus on
reducing pollution, with most of this funding
targeting improvements in air quality. In the water
sector, annual investments of around EUR 2.8
billion are supported by the Cohesion Fund, with
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
financing projects focusing on wastewater
management and the supply of drinking water.
These efforts reflect the strategic use of cohesion
policy to boost Poland’s compliance with the EU
Water Framework Directive. Furthermore, Poland’s
CAP strategic plan allocates EUR 2 billion for
environmental and climate objectives under rural
development and EUR 4.3 billion for eco-schemes.
The plan focuses on enhancing sustainability in
agriculture through investments in renewable
energy, organic farming (aiming to double the area
covered by organic farming by 2030), and eco-
schemes promoting environmentally friendly
practices. The plan also allocates funds to improve
energy efficiency in farm buildings and raise
animal welfare standards. Additionally, it supports
knowledge exchange and training for over
127 000 individuals, emphasising environmental
and climate performance.
The Polish RRP, including the REPowerEU
chapter, has a comprehensive set of reforms
and investments for the green transition.
In
particular, Poland already amended the
Electromobility Act and the Monitoring and
Controlling Quality of Fuels Act to pave the way
for low-carbon and renewable hydrogen to serve
as alternative fuel for transport and amended
legislation to incentivise investments in onshore
wind power by allowing plants to be located closer
to residential buildings than the minimum distance
of 10 times the height of the installation. On top
of an initial increase of installed capacity of
onshore wind and photovoltaic installations from
11.2 GW to 23.13 GW, the REPowerEU chapter
sets a target to reach 30 GW of onshore wind and
photovoltaics installed capacity. Poland is also
supporting investments in offshore wind farms;
updated its ‘Clean Air’ priority programme by
increasing support for low-income groups for
energy renovations of buildings, created a support
scheme targeting energy efficiency and renewable
energy sources in companies, and supported the
development of sustainable urban mobility plans.
Promoting fairness, social cohesion and
improving access to basic services are
among the key priorities of EU funding in
Poland.
Over 8.5% of the ERDF funding has been
earmarked for supporting education, social
inclusion and equal access to healthcare, as well
as for enhancing the role of culture and
sustainable tourism. Some 13 million people per
year will be using new or modernised healthcare
facilities and more than 4 600 people will benefit
from new or modernised social housing. In
addition, 16 000 children will have access to new
or modernised childcare facilities. Poland is using
the ESF+ to address material deprivation through
a food aid programme worth EUR 525 million,
including support for Ukrainian refugees.
Combined ESF+ and ERDF funding of EUR 4.8
billion is improving access to social services and
promoting inclusion, while EUR 503 million is
supporting job creation through social enterprises.
To increase childcare accessibility, EUR 1.3 billion
from ESF+ and the RRF will create 100 000 new
places, including specialised care for children with
a disability. In addition, the AMIF supports
integration measures, including language training,
civic orientation courses, exchanges with host
society, information and other support services.
Emphasis is placed on the creation of a
comprehensive support structure for the
integration of third-country
nationals (‘one-stop
shops’). Support is provided for the integration of
vulnerable Ukrainians, to help them transition to
independent housing, reduce language barriers,
and integrate in the labour market.
Poland’s RRP contains several reforms and
investments related to fairness and social
policies.
Measures covered by the payment
100
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0102.png
Table A16.1:Selected
EU funds with adopted allocations - summary data (million EUR)
Instrument/policy
RRF grants (including the RepowerEU allocation)
RRF loans
Allocation 2021-2026
25 276.9
34 541.3
Disbursed since 2021 (1)
7 301.3
13 464.2
Disbursed since 2021 (3)
(covering total payments to the
Member State on commitments
originating from both 2014-
2020 and 2021-2027
programming periods)
39 785.7
21 713.7
9 670.9
7 150.1
1 251.0
338.4
Instrument/policy
Allocation 2014-2020 (2)
Allocation 2021-2027
Cohesion policy (total)
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
Cohesion Fund (CF)
European Social Fund (ESF, ESF+) and the Youth Employment
Initiative (YEI)
Just Transition Fund (JTF)
Fisheries
European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF)
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)
Migration and home affairs
Migration, border management and internal security - AMIF,
BMVI and ISF (4)
The common agricultural policy under the CAP strategic
plan (5)
Total under the CAP strategic plan
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF)
European Fund for Agricultural Development (EAFRD)
78 797.3
42 163.9
23 139.9
13 493.5
75 460.1
47 416.7
11 283.1
12 913.0
3 847.3
531.2
512.4
282.5
Allocation 2023-2027
22 131.3
17 430.7
4 700.6
504.9
222.9
Disbursements under the
CAP Strategic Plan (6)
7 142.1
6 614.2
527.9
(1) The cut-off date for data on disbursements under the RRF is 31 May 2025.
(2) Cohesion policy 2014-2020 allocations include REACT-EU appropriations committed in 2021-2022.
(3) These amounts relate only to disbursements made from 2021 onwards and do not include payments made to the Member
State before 2021. Hence the figures do not comprise the totality of payments corresponding to the 2014-2020 allocation. The
cut-off date for data on disbursements under EMFAF and EMFF is 29 April 2025. The cut-off date for data on disbursements
under cohesion policy funds, AMIF, BMVI and ISF is 5 May 2025.
(4) AMIF - Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund; BMVI - Border Management and Visa Instrument; ISF - Internal Security Fund.
(5) Expenditure outside the CAP strategic plan is not included.
(6) The cut-off date for data on EARDF disbursements is 5 May 2025. The information on EAGF disbursements is based on the
Member State declarations until March 2025. Disbursements for the Direct Payments (EAGF) started in 2024.
Source:
European Commission
requests submitted over the last year include,
among others, the set-up of at least 14 regional
teams coordinating policies on vocational
education and training and lifelong learning, an
amendment to the Labour Code introducing the
possibility of remote work outside the workplace
and flexible forms of working time arrangements,
and a reform of personal income taxation to
incentivise workers to continue working beyond the
statutory retirement age. In the field of digital
skills, Poland introduced minimum binding
standards for equipping schools with digital
infrastructure, launched a digital competence
development programme and laid down
requirements to support the development and
monitoring of digital competences in education;
and created a Digital Competence Development
Centre. In the area of health, Poland introduced a
reform to strengthen the quality of health services
provided by medical services, introduced
legislation to improve the attractiveness of
medical jobs and improve the working conditions
of medical workers, as well as a strategic plan to
develop the biomedical sector.
101
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0103.png
Table A16.2:Summary
table on 2019-2024 CSRs
Poland
2019 CSR 1
Ensure that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure does not
exceed 4.4% in 2020, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 0.6% of GDP.
Take further steps to improve the efficiency of public spending, including by improving the
budgetary process.
2019 CSR 2
Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system
by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and by reforming the
preferential pension schemes.
Take steps to increase labour market participation, including by improving access to
childcare and long-term care, and remove remaining obstacles to more permanent types of
employment.
Foster quality education and skills relevant to the labour market, especially through adult
learning.
2019 CSR 3
Strengthen the innovative capacity of the economy, including by supporting research
institutions and their closer collaboration with business.
Focus investment-related economic policy on innovation
Focus investment-related economic policy on transport, notably on its sustainability
Focus investment-related economic policy on digital infrastructure
Focus investment-related economic policy on energy infrastructure
Focus investment-related economic policy on healthcare
Focus investment-related economic policy on cleaner energy, taking into account regional
disparities
Improve the regulatory environment, in particular by strengthening the role of consultations
of social partners and public consultations in the legislative process.
2020 CSR 1
Take all necessary measures, in line with the general escape clause of the Stability and
Growth Pact, to effectively address the COVID-19 pandemic, sustain the economy and
support the ensuing recovery. When economic conditions allow, pursue fiscal policies aimed
at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions and ensuring debt sustainability, while
enhancing investment.
Improve resilience, accessibility and effectiveness of the health system, including by
providing sufficient resources and accelerating the deployment of e-health services.
2020 CSR 2
Mitigate the employment impact of the crisis, in particular by enhancing flexible and short
time working arrangements.
Better target social benefits and ensure access to those in need.
Improve digital skills.
Further promote the digital transformation of companies and public administration.
Assessment in May 2025
Some progress
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
Relevant SDGs
Some progress
Limited progress
Limited progress
SDG 8, 16
SDG 8
Some progress
Limited progress
Some progress
Limited progress
Some progress
Some progress
Some progress
Limited progress
Some progress
Some progress
Some progress
Limited progress
SDG 3, 4, 5, 8
SDG 4
SDG 9
SDG 9, 10, 11
SDG 10, 11
SDG 9, 10, 11
SDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13
SDG 3, 10, 11
SDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13
SDG 16
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
Limited progress
Limited progress
Some progress
No progress
Limited progress
Some progress
SDG 3
SDG 8
SDG 1, 2, 10
SDG 4
SDG 9, 16
(Continued on the next page)
102
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0104.png
Table (continued)
2020 CSR 3
Continue efforts to secure access to finance and liquidity for companies.
Front-load mature public investment projects
and promote private investment to foster the economic recovery.
Focus investment on the green and digital transition, in particular on digital infrastructure,
clean and efficient production and use of energy,
and sustainable transport,
contributing to a progressive decarbonisation of the economy, including in the coal regions.
2020 CSR 4
Enhance the investment climate, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence.
Ensure effective public consultations and involvement of social partners in the policymaking
process.
2021 CSR 1
In 2022, pursue a supportive fiscal stance, including the impulse provided by the Recovery
and Resilience Facility, and preserve nationally financed investment.
Some progress
Some progress
Limited progress
Limited progress
Some progress
Some progress
Limited progress
Limited progress
Substantial progress
Full implementation
Some progress
Not relevant anymore
SDG 16
SDG 16
SDG 8, 9
SDG 8, 16
SDG 8, 9
SDG 9, 10, 11
SDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13
SDG 10, 11
SDG 6, 10, 11, 12, 15
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
When economic conditions allow, pursue a fiscal policy aimed at achieving prudent medium-
term fiscal positions and ensuring fiscal sustainability in the medium term.
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
At the same time, enhance investment to boost growth potential. Pay particular attention to
the composition of public finances, on both the revenue and expenditure sides of the
budget, and to the quality of budgetary measures in order to ensure a sustainable and
inclusive recovery. Prioritise sustainable and growth-enhancing investment, in particular
investment supporting the green and digital transition.
Give priority to fiscal structural reforms that will help provide financing for public policy
priorities and contribute to the long-term sustainability of public finances, including, where
relevant, by strengthening the coverage, adequacy and sustainability of health and social
protection systems for all.
2022 CSR 1
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
Limited progress
In 2023, ensure that the growth of nationally financed primary current expenditure is in line
with an overall neutral policy stance, taking into account continued temporary and targeted
support to households and firms most vulnerable to energy price hikes and to people fleeing
Ukraine. Stand ready to adjust current spending to the evolving situation.
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
Expand public investment for the green and digital transitions, and for energy security taking
into account the REPowerEU initiative, including by making use of the Recovery and
Resilience Facility and other Union funds.
For the period beyond 2023, pursue a fiscal policy aimed at achieving prudent medium-term
fiscal positions.
Improve the efficiency of public spending, including by continuing the reform of the budget
system.
Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system
by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and by reforming the
preferential pension schemes.
2022 CSR 2
Swiftly finalise the negotiations with the Commission of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy
programming documents with a view to starting their implementation.
Full implementation
SDG 8, 16
Not relevant anymore
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
SDG 8, 16
Limited progress
SDG 8
Progress on the cohesion policy programming documents is monitored
under the EU cohesion policy.
(Continued on the next page)
103
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0105.png
Table (continued)
2022 CSR 3
Increase labour market participation, including by improving access to childcare and long-
term care, and remove remaining obstacles to more permanent types of employment.
Foster quality education and skills relevant to the labour market, especially through adult
learning and improving digital skills.
Better target social benefits and ensure access to those in need.
2022 CSR 4
Improve the resilience, accessibility and effectiveness of the health system, including by
providing sufficient resources to reverse the pyramid of care and accelerating the
deployment of e-health services.
Strengthen the innovative capacity of the economy, including by supporting research
institutions and their closer collaboration with business.
Enhance further digitalisation of businesses and public administration, including through
development of infrastructure.
2022 CSR 5
Enhance the investment climate, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence.
Ensure effective public consultations and involvement of social partners in the policymaking
process.
2022 CSR 6
Reduce overall reliance on fossil fuels
by removing regulatory, administrative and infrastructural barriers to accelerate permitting
procedures and deployment of renewable energy sources.
Limited progress
Some progress
SDG 3, 4, 5, 8
Limited progress
No progress
Limited progress
SDG 4
SDG 1, 2, 10
Limited progress
SDG 3
Limited progress
Some progress
Substantial progress
Full implementation
SDG 9
SDG 9, 16
SDG 16
Some progress
Limited progress
Limited progress
Limited progress
SDG 16
SDG 7, 9, 13
SDG 7, 8, 9, 13
Reform building renovation policies and support schemes to incentivise deeper energy
efficiency, promote energy savings and faster phase-out of fossil fuels in heating and
accelerated deployment of heat pumps.
Limited progress
SDG 7
Accelerate modal shift towards public transport and active mobility and promote faster
uptake of electric vehicles with incentives and investment in charging infrastructure.
Limited progress
SDG 11
Improve long- and medium-term strategic planning of the green transition by updating
national energy policies in line with the European Green Deal objectives and the
REPowerEU Communication to provide certainty to the business community and use
funding effectively with a view to accelerating clean energy investments.
2023 CSR 1
Wind down the emergency energy support measures in force, using the related savings to
reduce the government deficit, as soon as possible in 2023 and 2024. Should renewed
energy price increases necessitate new or continued support measures, ensure that these
are targeted at protecting vulnerable households and firms, fiscally affordable, and preserve
incentives for energy savings.
Ensure prudent fiscal policy, in particular by limiting the nominal increase in nationally
financed net primary expenditure in 2024 to not more than 7.8%.
Preserve nationally financed public investment and ensure the effective absorption of RRF
grants and other EU funds, in particular to foster the green and digital transitions.
Limited progress
SDG 7, 9, 11, 13
Limited progress
Limited progress
SDG 8, 16
No progress
SDG 8, 16
Full implementation
SDG 8, 16
For the period beyond 2024, continue to pursue a medium-term fiscal strategy of gradual
and sustainable consolidation, combined with investments and reforms conducive to higher
sustainable growth, to achieve a prudent medium-term fiscal position.
Improve the efficiency of public spending, including through better targeting of social
benefits.
Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system
by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and reforming preferential
pension schemes.
2023 CSR 2
Urgently fulfil the required milestones and targets related to the protection of the financial
interests of the Union with a view to allowing for a swift and steady implementation of its
recovery and resilience plan. Swiftly finalise the REPowerEU+C66 chapter with a view to
rapidly starting its implementation. Proceed with the speedy implementation of cohesion
policy programmes, in close complementarity and synergy with the recovery and resilience
plan.
Not relevant anymore
SDG 8, 16
No progress
SDG 1, 2, 8, 10, 16
Limited progress
SDG 8
RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP
payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the
achievement of the milestones and targets, to be reflected in the country
reports. Progress with the cohesion policy is monitored in the context of
the Cohesion Policy of the European Union.
(Continued on the next page)
104
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0106.png
Table (continued)
2023 CSR 3
Enhance the investment climate, including by safeguarding judicial independence.
2023 CSR 4
Accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuels
and (accelerate) the deployment of renewable energy. Reform the legal framework for grid
connection permitting and for renewable energy sources, including energy communities,
biomethane and renewable hydrogen.
Implement measures to promote energy savings and gas demand reductions. Scale up
investment in energy efficiency for buildings and decarbonise the heat supply in district
heating to address energy poverty.
Further promote sustainable public transport modes.
Step up policy efforts aimed at the provision and acquisition of skills and competences
needed for the green transition, including for building renovation.
2024 CSR 1
Submit the medium-term fiscal-structural plan in a timely manner.
In line with the requirements of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, limit the growth in
net expenditure in 2025 to a rate consistent with, inter alia, reducing the general
government deficit towards the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value and keeping the general
government debt at a prudent level over the medium term.
Improve the efficiency of public spending, including through better targeting of social
benefits
as well as more transparency in investment planning and wider use of standardised
procedures for project assessment and selection.
Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and reinforce the sustainability of the
pension system, including by taking measures on effective retirement age and reforming
preferential pension schemes.
2024 CSR 2
Full implementation
Full implementation
Limited progress
Limited progress
SDG 7, 9, 13
SDG 8, 9, 16
Some progress
SDG 7, 8, 9, 13
Limited progress
SDG 1, 2, 7, 10
Limited progress
Limited progress
Some progress
Full implementation
SDG 11
SDG 4
SDG 8, 16
Full implementation
SDG 8, 16
No progress
SDG 1,2,8, 10, 16
No progress
SDG 8, 16
Limited progress
SDG 8
Strengthen administrative capacity to manage the recovery and resilience plan, accelerate
investments and maintain momentum in the implementation of reforms. Address relevant
challenges to allow for continued, swift and effective implementation of the recovery and
resilience plan, including the REPowerEU chapter, ensuring completion of reforms and
investments by August 2026. Accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy
programmes. In the context of the mid-term review continue focusing on the agreed
priorities, taking action to better support and integrate non-EU nationals, while considering
the opportunities provided by the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform initiative to
improve competitiveness.
RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP
payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the
achievement of the milestones and targets. Progress with the cohesion
policy is monitored in the context of the Cohesion Policy of the European
Union.
2024 CSR 3
Take steps to increase labour market participation of disadvantaged groups, including by
improving quality of and access to formal home- and community-based long-term care.
Foster competition in public procurement processes, making these more efficient and less
cumbersome, especially for SMEs.
Support private investments by fostering digitisation of companies.
2024 CSR 4
Take measures to accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuels in the district heating sector by
shifting to renewable energy.
Improve policies related to the protection and sustainable use of water resources to ensure
the long-term sustainability of sectors that rely on ecosystem services.
Some progress
Limited progress
SDG 3, 8, 10
Some progress
Some progress
Limited progress
Limited progress
SDG 9
SDG 9
SDG 7, 9, 13
Limited progress
SDG 6, 12, 15
Source:
European Commission
105
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0107.png
ANNEX 17: COMPETITIVE REGIONS
The Polish economy continues to be
characterised by a more competitive capital
and western regions, which also have higher
labour productivity compared to the eastern
part of the country.
Furthermore, regions
bordering Russia and Belarus experience additional
challenges. The picture is more nuanced regarding
the green transition, which is a major challenge at
national level, but where eastern regions are well
placed to take advantage of opportunities in
renewable energy. The south-western regions
reliant on coal and heavy industries, as well as
more industrialised central Poland, face additional
challenges. In some regions, housing affordability
is increasingly becoming a concern. Innovation
levels are below the EU average throughout
Poland except in the capital.
Map A17.1:
GDP per head (in purchasing power
standard PPS), 2023
its GDP per head since 2014. Between 2014
and 2023, average annual real GDP per
capita growth in Poland (4.1%) and all its
regions was more than double the EU rate
(1.6%).
The economy grew by 2.9% in 2024, and,
according to the European Commission Autumn
2024 Forecast, is expected to increase by 3.6% in
2025, as consumption growth remains strong and
investment accelerates (
245
). The largest increase
in GDP compared to 2013 (4% or more per year)
took place in the regions of Warszawski Stołeczny,
Pomorskie,
Małopolskie,
and
Mazowiecki
246
Regionalny ( ). Looking at NUTS 3 subregions, the
eight biggest and richest metropolises (out of 73
NUTS 3 subregions), primarily Miasto Warszawa
(14%), together with Miasto Kraków, Trójmiejski,
Miasto Poznań, Miasto Wrocław, Katowicki,
Warszawski Zachodni and Miasto Łódź, generate
one third of Polish GDP. Five (Trójmiejski, Miasto
Krakow, Katowicki, Miasto Poznań and Miasto
Łódź) reached annual growth above 4% between
2014 and 2022 being outpaced by several less
prosperous regions. This trend provides an
opportunity to reduce regional economic
disparities, which have remained broadly static.
Despite significant economic progress, the
competitiveness of Polish regions (
247
)
remains low compared to the EU average,
except for the capital region, and varies
significantly,
impacted
by
geographic
location, demographic trends, productivity
and investment patterns.
While western regions
and the capital city show strong performance,
eastern regions lag behind. Warszawski
Stołeczny
leads across multiple indicators, including
demographic growth, foreign direct investment,
R&D spending, innovation capacity, skilled
workforce availability, employment rates and
infrastructure connectivity (see Annex 3).
Source:
Eurostat
(
245
) Council Recommendation endorsing the national medium-
term fiscal-structural plan of Poland COM(2024) 723 final.
Competitiveness
Poland has been steadily catching up with
the rest of the EU for two decades, doubling
(
246
) This translated into average GDP per head growth of 3.8% in
Warszawski Stołeczny (with a
significant increase in
population) and 4.6% in Mazowiecki Regionalny (with a
decline in population).
(
247
)
EU Regional Competitiveness Index 2.0, 2022
106
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0108.png
Table A17.1:Selection
of indicators at regional level in Poland
GDP per
head
(PPS)
Productivity -
Real
Real
Productivity -
GDP per
productivity
productivity
Real GDP per
GDP per
person
growth
growth
head growth
hour worked
employed
(per person
(per hour
(PPS)
(PPS)
employed)
worked)
Employment
in high-
technology
sectors
European
Quality of
Government
Index
Regional
innovation
index
Housing
Greenhouse
afordability gas emissions
Air quality
Index
EU-27 = 100
Average
annual
% change
Index
EU-27 = 100
Average
annual
% change
Index
EU-27 = 100
Average
annual
% change
% of total
employment
EU-27=0
Price-to-
tCO2eq. per
income ratio
person
Concentra-
tion of PM
2.5
2023
European Union (27 MS)
Poland
Małopolskie
Śląskie
Wielkopolskie
Zachodniopomorskie
Lubuskie
Dolnośląskie
Opolskie
Kujawsko-pomorskie
Warmińsko-mazurskie
Pomorskie
Łódzkie
Świętokrzyskie
Lubelskie
Podkarpackie
Podlaskie
Warszawski stołeczny
Mazowiecki regionalny
100
77
69
80
81
63
62
83
62
62
54
74
73
58
53
55
60
155
70
2014-2023
1.6
4.1
4.1
4.2
3.9
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.5
3.7
3.9
4.1
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.9
4.4
3.8
4.6
2023
100
82
72
87
83
69
68
87
69
67
60
78
78
64
59
64
62
134
86
2014-2023
0.6
2.4
2.1
2.6
2.6
1.8
2.1
1.3
1.7
2.2
1.9
2.2
2.8
2.6
3.0
2.8
2.7
1.8
3.9
2022
100
65
58
70
63
56
56
75
57
55
47
66
59
45
47
51
49
107
67
2013-2022
0.9
2.6
1.8
2.9
2.5
2.0
2.1
2.4
1.9
2.7
1.6
2.3
2.3
1.7
2.7
2.2
2.8
2.7
3.0
2024
5.2
4.7
6.2
4.8
2.8
3.6
2.3
6.0
1.8
3.9
2.0
6.8
4.0
1.0
2.7
2.0
2.4
11.1
1.6
2024
2023
109
64
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.9
-1.1
-1.3
-0.9
-0.9
-1.0
-0.7
-0.7
-1.2
-1.1
-1.1
-0.9
-1.1
-0.9
87
63
61
56
50
75
51
60
59
73
64
49
64
62
63
103
40
2019
11.0
12.8
7.9
9.7
11.0
8.7
10.2
7.9
10.3
10.0
15.4
9.6
10.8
12.2
11.0
12.7
15.1
10.6
2023
7.1
9.9
5.4
12.4
7.8
10.8
9.1
9.7
25.9
10.8
6.2
5.6
15.6
16.0
10.4
6.0
7.1
3.5
18.1
2021
10.1
16.1
19.4
20.9
15.9
10.8
12.1
14.8
16.5
14.7
11.9
11.9
18.0
16.3
14.9
15.3
11.8
18.7
15.4
Source:
Eurostat and JRC
Graph A17.1:
Labour productivity per hour
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Other NUTS2 regions
Capital region
National average
EU27
Unit: Real GDP per hour worked (EUR, 2015 prices)
Source:
ARDECO (JRC)
Gaps in labour productivity levels between
Warszawski Stołeczny and other regions
have remained constant over the last five
years (Graph A17.1), while Poland as a whole
has been catching up with more developed
Member States.
Labour productivity in the capital
is much higher not only compared to other Polish
regions, but also other Member States. Warsaw
attracts
a
significant
concentration
of
multinational corporations, particularly in business
services (finance, IT, consulting) which bring in
advanced technologies and skilled jobs, raising
productivity levels. Additionally, the availability of
a highly educated workforce, with many
universities and research institutions in Warsaw,
contributes to higher productivity. Warsaw’s higher
productivity is also due to strong infrastructure
and its greater integration with global markets.
Although their productivity is lower than Warsaw’s,
Miasto Poznań (the
capital of Wielkopolskie, with
its diversified economy, strong education and
research and skilled workforce), Trójmiasto (with a
strategic location, strong maritime industry,
investments in logistics and infrastructure, and
growing IT sector), and Miasto
Wrocław (the
capital of Dolnośląskie, with its diversified
economy and strong industrial sectors and a
growing knowledge economy with highly skilled
workforces and strong R&D infrastructure), show
leading to relatively high productivity levels for
regional
cities. Wrocław’s proximity to the German
border provides added advantages in trade and
cross-border cooperation.
Intraregional differences indicate that the
highest productivity per hour was still
characteristic of sub-regions of large urban
agglomerations.
The highest were Miasto
Warszawa (117% of the EU), Warszawski Zachodni
(97%) and Poznań (85%).
Highest productivity per
hour is also concentrated in regions with
significant economic activities, such as Płock
(17%), which specialises in oil refining and
2015 EUR per hour worked
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
107
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0109.png
petrochemicals, supported by its favourable
location on the Vistula river and ongoing
investments in transportation and energy
infrastructure, and Legnicko-Glogowski (99%), with
its industrial specialisation and renewable energy
replacing mining. The lowest indicators (below
60% of the EU average) were recorded in the
eastern and south-eastern sub-regions.
Efforts to improve productivity may be
undermined by the deepening unfavourable
demographic trends, notably by the decline in
the working-age population (
248
) and
population ageing (
249
).
It is assumed that the
proportion of people aged over 65 in large cities in
2060 will range from approximately 29% to 40%
(
250
), which creates economic, fiscal and social
challenges. The population will decrease in most
regions (most notably in Śląskie), except for
Warszawski Stołeczny (where population growth is
assumed). This negative trend is already felt
severely in Eastern Poland. Some of the least
developed eastern regions (Świętokrzyskie and
Warmińsko-Mazurskie)
were loosing 1.7% of the
working-age population (20-64 years old) per year
and 1.4-1.6% of the young population per year.
Świętokrzyskie and Łódzkie are the regions with
the least sustainable population structure, with
22% of the population aged 65+, while the
proportion of older people (aged 65+) is increasing
in all regions, with the highest increase in
Warmińsko-Mazurskie.
Only the capital city, being
the most popular destination for regional and
international migration, bucked these trends, with
an increase of 0.2% in the working-age population
and 1.6% in the young population per year.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Poland
shows pronounced regional concentration,
with such investment heavily concentrated in
two regions, Dolnośląskie and Warszawski
Stołeczny, which together account for nearly
40% of the country’s FDI (2010-2024).
This
concentration contrasts sharply with regions like
Warmińsko-Mazurskie,
where FDI contributes only
0.14% to regional GDP, compared to the national
average of 2.63%. Similarly, Podlaskie and
(
248
) DG JRC/DG REGIO elaboration.
(
249
) Statistics Poland, Regional Development of Poland. Analytical
Report 2023.
(
250
) Statistics Poland, Regional Development of Poland. Analytical
report 2023.
Świętokrzyskie struggle to attract foreign
investment, limiting their capital formation and job
creation potential. Despite these regional
imbalances, FDI’s still has an overall impact on
employment in Polish regions (
251
).
Poland could build on its economic potential
opportunities while tapping into clean tech
value chains with specific manufacturing
competencies.
These are: electric vehicle (EV)
batteries (electrical control / distribution boards,
Direct Current motors); wind energy components
(gearing, ball screws, carbon/graphite electrodes);
and solar components (glass mirrors, lighting
arresters) (
252
). Initial mapping suggests regional
concentration
patterns.
The
strongest
manufacturing base appears in western and
southern Poland,
particularly in the Dolnośląskie,
Śląskie and Wielkopolskie regions, which combine
an automotive sector legacy with growing clean
tech manufacturing capabilities. These regions
show particular potential for EV battery value
chain development, building on their electrical
control systems and DC motors competencies.
Diversified regional competitive potential is
linked with economic differences between
regions showing uneven innovation patterns.
The leading region, Warszawski Stołeczny (with
Summary Innovation Index at 103) scored at least
twice as high in comparison with the lowest
performing regions of Świętokrzyskie, Lubuskie,
Opolskie (around 50) and its neighbouring region
Mazowiecki Regionalny (40). Notably, only two
regions were classified as Moderate Innovators
(the capital city region and Małopolskie), while all
the others were classified as Emerging Innovators.
However, all regions have registered steady
progress since 2016, in particular thanks to
increased innovation activities (
253
). In 2022, over 4
in 10 (43%) Polish firms developed or introduced
new products, processes or services as part of
their investment activities. This is above the EU
average (39%) (
254
).
(
251
) OECD: Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, 2025.
(
252
) World Bank, EU Regular Economic Report, Clean Tech Value
Chains, 2024.
(
253
) Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2023,
EIS interactive tool
2024 | Research and Innovation.
(
254
) EIB Investment Survey Country Overview 2023: Poland.
108
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0110.png
This pattern is also visible in business R&D
investment (1% of GDP, compared to 1.5% in
the EU) highly concentrated in the capital
region.
In 2022, only Warszawski Stołeczny (2.1%
of GDP) and Małopolskie (1.7%) exceeded the EU's
GDP share for business enterprise R&D (
255
).
Warszawski Stołeczny also leads with the highest
employment in knowledge-intensive services
(54%) and high-tech sectors (11%) in 2024.
Pomorskie, Małopolskie, and Dolnośląskie are also
above the EU average (5.2%) for high-tech
employment. In contrast, regions such as
Warmińsko-Mazurskie,
Świętokrzyskie
and
Mazowiecki Regionalny spent less than 0.3% of
GDP on business enterprise R&D and employed
less than 2% of workers in high-tech sectors,
making them the worst innovation performers in
Poland, with productivity levels significantly below
the Polish average.
Further challenges arise from the impact of
the Russian war of aggression, which
affected the ability to do business of small
and medium-size enterprises in eastern
regions, in particular those bordering Russia
and Belarus.
Due to the increased threat
perception, eastern regions suffer from
a decline of flows of trade and people, disrupted
movement of goods and damage to energy and
communication connections, leading to socio-
economic difficulties and rising security concerns.
In all four eastern regions, particularly those
bordering Russia and Belarus, war affects key
areas of business operations, such as company
operating costs, business risk and prices of supply
and investment goods, and therefore affects its
competitiveness. Most companies reduced their
investment outlays and frequently had to increase
the prices of their products or services (
256
).
Insufficient infrastructure and connectivity
remain the major problem for the less
developed
eastern
regions,
hindering
productivity and mobility in the labour
market.
Despite the dynamic development of the
road infrastructure between 2011-2022 (increase
of the total length of motorways and expressways
by 717% in the eastern regions vs. 170% in
Poland in relative numbers (
257
), a low level of the
transport accessibility creates barriers for the
competitiveness, mobility on the labour market
and access to the public services of these regions
(
258
). Better accessibility is crucial for attracting
and retaining investments and contributes to
competitiveness. Improving connectivity by road
and rail networks in the peripheral regions,
improves the ease with which goods and services
are transported, facilitating better market access.
Meanwhile, only the capital region was above the
EU average in 2021 (81% of the population
reachable within 1.5
hours by car). Świętokrzyskie
was the worst performing region (39%). Only the
capital region (24%) and Pomorskie (21%) have a
rail performance above the EU average, while
Świętokrzyskie and Lubelskie lag behind on around
3%. Compared to 2011, the total length of railway
lines in use in the country decreased by 4.1%, with
the largest fall recorded in the Warmińsko-
Mazurskie region (-11.9%).
Ensuring access to high-speed internet in all
regions, particularly rural and remote areas,
is crucial for bridging the digital divide and
helping regions be competitive.
Poland made
good progress in fast and ultra-fast broadband
coverage, but regional disparities remain. In 2023,
93% of Polish households had access to the
internet (compared with 70% in 2012). This figure
ranged from 95% in Warszawski Stołeczny and
Opolskie to 87% in Zachodniopomorskie. Fixed
High-Capacity Network coverage in Poland is
almost 82%, compared to the EU average of 79%.
At the same time, at regional level there are
disparities in the access to ultra-fast broadband.
Lubuskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie
in the east and
Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie and Dolnośląskie
are the regions with the lowest percentage of
households with the access to 100 Mpbs internet
(between 72-78% coverage). The expansion of
broadband internet access and the development of
digital infrastructure are necessary to allow
businesses in less developed regions to participate
in the digital economy, boost innovation, and
attract tech-based industries.
(
255
) Statistics Poland.
(
256
)
Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny, Wpływ wojny w Ukrainie na
działalność polskich firm,
2023.
(
257
)
Statistics Poland,
Regional development of Poland. Analytical
report 2023.
(
258
) PARP, Raport o stanie sektora malych i srednich
przedsiebiorstw w Polsce, 2024.
109
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0111.png
Map A17.2:
Average speed for fixed internet, 2023
capacity, economic growth and access to essential
public services.
Social fairness
The problem of access to high quality public
services is particularly acute in smaller cities
and rural areas of Poland, affecting various
aspects of life, including healthcare.
Only
19% of people in rural areas live within a 10-
minute drive of the nearest health centre,
compared with 29% in the EU, and the situation is
even more dire in certain regions, such as
Lubuskie. According to Statistics Poland (GUS),
people living in rural areas, particularly the eastern
regions of Poland, live shorter lives in good health
than those living in urban areas and in the west of
the country. There are also differences between
men and women, with women living longer (see
Annex 14). Investing in rural infrastructure,
improving transport options and increasing the
availability of healthcare services could help to
bridge the existing gaps. Moreover, a well-
organised social care system, including long-term
care, would help to relieve the burden the
healthcare system.
In some Polish regions, demand for housing
still outstrips supply, leading to rapid price
increases
and
quickly
diminishing
affordability.
In 2022, the number of dwellings
per 1 000 inhabitants was among the lowest in
the EU (412), also leading to overcrowding. The
price of new apartments’ in major Polish
cities
(such as Warsaw, Krakow and Wrocław) exceeded
EUR 2 000 per square metre (a 50% increase
compared to 2015). Although approximately
100 000 new units were built demand still
outstrips supply. In 2023 approximately 4.9% of
the Polish households faced energy poverty,
measured by inability to keep their home
adequately warm, ranging from 8.1% in Opolskie
to 2.5% in Podlaskie (
262
). Housing policies to date
have proven ineffective, and the allocated
financial resources insufficient. In 2024, housing
cost overburden (
263
) in Poland was 5.2%, below
(
262
) Eurostat, EU-SILC.
(
263
) The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the
population living in households where the total housing costs
(‘net’ of housing allowances) represent more than 40% of
disposable income
(‘net’ of housing allowances’).
Source:
Eurostat, JRC
The European Quality of Government Index
(
259
) shows that the regional quality of
government in Poland has deteriorated since
2021 despite improvement between 2010
and 2017.
The recent fiscal reform of local
governments’ units (
260
) is an important step
towards improving the quality of regional
governance in Poland. The improved capacity of
regions to co-finance investments, particularly
those under EU funds, should help improve
competitiveness at regional level. A transparent
and stable financing system, independent of the
central government, should help regions and local
administrations
with
long-term
planning,
particularly in the areas of investment and human
capital (
261
), improving regions' administrative
(
259
)
European Quality of Government Index 2024| University of
Gothenburg
(
260
) Act on the revenues of the self-government units (Dz. Ustaw
RP, Poz. 1572, 1/10/2024).
(
261
) Human capital encompasses knowledge, skills and
competences, highlighting the importance of education,
training and experience in building a workforce that drives
economic growth, innovation and productivity.
110
 kom (2025) 0221 - Ingen titel
3035452_0112.png
the EU average (8.2%), with relatively small
differences between cities (5.7%) and rural areas
(4.9%). At regional level, however, it varies from
2.4% in the least economically developed region
of Podkarpackie to 7.5% in Zachodniopomorskie
and Pomorskie. A large influx of refugees from
Ukraine has put additional pressure on Poland’s
housing market. Finally, a substantial challenge for
the construction industry is the need to align with
environmental, social and government regulations
and improve buildings' energy efficiency (
264
).
Sustainability
Transitioning to a greener economy is a
challenge, especially for five regions reliant
on coal and heavy industries.
These regions
(Dolnośląskie, Małopolskie, Wielkopolskie, Śląskie
and Łódzkie) receive support from the Just
Transition Fund. Shifting away from coal threatens
local economies, risking job losses and social
unrest.
Additionally, the infrastructure needed to support
green energy is still underdeveloped. In 2023,
Poland’s
average greenhouse gas emissions per
capita were significantly higher than the EU
average (9.9 tonnes of CO
2
equivalent, compared
to 7.1 tonnes in the EU). Values above the EU
average were recorded in 11 of the 17 regions,
reaching 26 tCO
2
eq in Opolskie. These transitions,
while challenging, present significant opportunities
for
local
industries
to
increase
their
competitiveness
through
technological
modernisation and access to growing green
technology markets, particularly as environmental
standards become increasingly important in global
supply chains.
Polish regions face both challenges and
opportunities in transitioning to renewable
energy.
The country’s official reports confirm the
growing importance of renewables, which
exceeded 27% of national energy production in
2023. Warmińsko-Mazurskie
and Podlaskie lead
the way, with outstanding renewable energy
shares of 97.6% and 85.4% respectively,
demonstrating the effectiveness of regional
( ) Real Estate Guidebook Poland 2024: Awaiting market revival.
Key trends driving the real estate market in Poland (Real
Estate Guide in Poland 2024 | EY - Global).
264
investments and favourable geographic conditions.
Wielkopolskie and Zachodniopomorskie also
perform strongly, contributing 74.6% and 70.0%
to renewable energy production, highlighting
successful targeted initiatives. Overall, Pomorskie
and Zachodniopomorskie, making the most of their
maritime industry background
and port
infrastructure, are well positioned to develop wind
energy component manufacturing, particularly for
the growing offshore wind sector. At the other end
of the spectrum, Opolskie and Mazowieckie lag
behind, with renewable shares of 6.2% and 9.8%
respectively, indicating significant potential for
growth and development. These disparities
underscore the need for tailored strategies to
boost take-up of renewables in lower-performing
regions. Continued investment, supportive policies
and technological advancements will be crucial to
bridge these gaps and advance Poland’s
renewable energy landscape.
Most regions lag behind other less developed
EU regions in developing green infrastructure
and creating environmental sector jobs.
Green
employment in Poland, with 10% of jobs classified
as sustainable and competitive, is also below the
EU average of 15% (
265
). It is concentrated in the
capital region (31%), followed by Dolnośląskie and
Śląskie (20% and 16% respectively). In contrast,
10 of the remaining regions, including the less
economically developed regions, are below the EU
benchmark for less developed regions (6%), with
Lubelskie and Świętokrzyskie at the bottom on less
than 1%.
(
265
)
JRC :Measuring transition to a competitive and sustainable
economy.
111