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Europaudvalget 2025
KOM (2025) 0287
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EUROPEAN

COMMISSION

Brussels, 6.6.2025

SWD(2025) 147 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Report on the 2024 elections to the European Parliament

{COM(2025) 287 final}

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Table of contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 2

Participation in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament ................................................... 7

2.1.

Turnout .................................................................................................................................. 7

2.2.

Informing about the elections, engaging with and communicating to citizens, and

supporting electoral rights ................................................................................................................ 12

2.3.

2.3.1.

2.3.2.

2.3.3.

2.3.4.

2.3.5.

2.3.6.

Participation of specific groups ........................................................................................... 17

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 17

Young people .............................................................................................................. 17

Women ....................................................................................................................... 22

Persons with disabilities ............................................................................................. 27

Mobile EU citizens and EU citizens residing in third countries ................................... 31

Other groups ............................................................................................................... 36

Cooperation in support of free, fair and resilient elections ......................................................... 37

Protecting the integrity and resilience of the electoral process................................................... 40

4.1.

4.2.

4.3.

4.4.

4.5.

4.6.

4.6.1.

4.6.2.

4.7.

Preparedness, monitoring and response ............................................................................ 40

Foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation................................. 44

Use of AI............................................................................................................................... 50

Data protection.................................................................................................................... 53

Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring cyber resilience .......................... 55

Fair campaigning and funding of the election campaign .................................................... 60

Fair campaigning ......................................................................................................... 60

Funding of the election campaign .............................................................................. 62

Safety: protection of candidates and elected representatives ........................................... 63

European dimension and the exercise of EU electoral rights ....................................................... 65

5.1.

5.2.

5.2.1.

5.2.2.

5.2.3.

5.2.4.

5.2.5.

5.3.

The European dimension..................................................................................................... 65

Monitoring and enforcement of EU electoral rights and electoral law .............................. 67

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 67

Electoral Act ................................................................................................................ 68

Electoral rights ............................................................................................................ 68

Prevention of multiple voting ..................................................................................... 69

Oversight by the Commission and evolution of relevant EU case-law ....................... 72

Publication of results (officials and polls) ............................................................................ 77

Election observation ..................................................................................................................... 77

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NTRODUCTION

This Commission Staff Working Document accompanies the Report on the 2024 elections to the

European Parliament, detailing its findings, following the same structure.

The elections to the European Parliament, which take place every five years, are among the world’s

largest democratic exercises.

Between 6 and 9 June 2024, European Union (‘EU’) citizens directly elected 720 Members of the

European Parliament (MEPs) from around 18 400 candidates

with approximately 180 million votes

cast across the EU, of nearly 360 million eligible voters

. The turnout (50.74%) closely mirrored that

of the 2019 elections.

The 2024 elections were organised amidst major transformations being faced by democracies in the EU

and beyond. Election campaigns have moved significantly to the online sphere with social media

playing an increasingly important role. As highlighted in the Commission’s European Democracy

Action Plan

, this has brought new opportunities for direct interactions between political actors and

voters. It can encourage democratic engagement and is also particularly effective in terms of involving

young people in the democratic life. At the same time, the prevalence of campaigning online has also

resulted in the need to mitigate specific risks. There is a higher need to address challenges such as those

posed by cyber-threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), disinformation or by

the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, than before. In this context, citizens show a high

level of concern about various forms of interference in elections, including through disinformation,

cyber attacks or the covert influence of foreign countries.

Background info on Eurobarometer

In 2023, a survey on citizenship and democracy uncovered a high level of concern about various

forms of interference in elections in Europe

. Indeed, almost eight in ten respondents (78%) expressed

concerns about disinformation influencing people’s voting decisions, with almost half (47%) very

concerned about this. Around seven in ten were concerned about elections being manipulated through

cyberattacks (72%) and about foreign countries influencing elections covertly (70%)

. Alongside

these concerns, more than six in ten respondents are also worried about being pressured into voting

a particular way (65%), and about the results of an election being manipulated (63%). A slimmer

majority (53%) express concern about people voting when they are not entitled to.

The main responsibilities regarding elections are for the Member States. It is their competence and

responsibility to lay down the specific conditions for the conduct and organisation of elections, in

accordance with their national legislation, international obligations and applicable EU law, and their

authorities and courts have primary responsibility for exercising oversight and ensuring compliance

with the relevant rules. For elections to the European Parliament, certain common principles and

As reported by the Civil Society Organisation and Election Observer Network Election-Watch.EU.

Eurostat,

Persons eligible to vote in the 2024 European Parliament elections by category of voters,

last updated

2 August 2024. Related metadata:

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/demo_popep_esms.htm.

Communication

from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and

Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on

the European democracy action plan,

COM/2020/790

final, 3 December 2020.

Eurobarometer 528 on Citizenship and democracy.

Fieldwork: April-May 2023. Publication: 06 December 2023.

About eight in ten respondents (81%) agreed that foreign interference in our democratic system is a serious

problem that should be addressed, and over seven in ten (74%) agree that such interference can affect citizens’

voting behaviour.

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procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act

and the rules enabling mobile EU

citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the European Parliament in their

country of residence.

EU action in support of free and fair elections offers important added value. Since 2019, as part of a

broader effort to promote and strengthen democracy, the EU has reinforced its support to Member States

in this field. Initiatives such as those under the 2020 European Democracy Action Plan

, the 2021

package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections in the EU

, and the

2023 Defence of Democracy package

provide new tools to reinforce the resilience of democracies and

elections in the EU.

Non-exhaustive overview of actions undertaken to protect democracy in the 2019-2024 mandate

European Democracy Action Plan (2020)

1) Protect the

integrity of elections and promote democratic participation:

•

See in particular 2021 package of measures to protect integrity of elections below

2) Strengthen

media freedom and media pluralism

•

See different measures on media freedom presented in 2021/2022 below

Counter foreign interference and disinformation

•

Developing EU toolbox for countering foreign interference

•

Code of Practice on Disinformation

•

Work on media literacy

Package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect integrity of elections (2021)

1) Regulation on

transparency of political advertising:

proposal on political advertising

(Adopted in 2024, will fully apply as of Autumn 2025)

2) Proposals to update Directives on

electoral rights of mobile EU citizens

in municipal and

European Parliament elections

3) Proposal to amend

Regulation on European political parties and foundations

Different measures to strengthen free media (2021-2022)

•

Recommendation on safety of journalists

(Presented by the Commission in 2021)

•

Package on abusive litigation (SLAPP) to protect journalists and civil society: Directive

(Entered into force 2024)

and Recommendation

(Presented in 2022)

•

Package on media freedom: Recommendation on safeguards for editorial independence and

ownership transparency in the media sector, and proposal for a Regulation: European

Media Freedom Act – proposal for a Regulation

(Adopted, entered into force 2024, will

fully apply as of August 2025)

Defence of Democracy Package (2023)

1) Directive on

transparency of interest representation on behalf of third countries

2) Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes

(Presented in December

2023)

3) Recommendation to promote the inclusive and effective participation of citizens and civil

society organisations in public policy making processes

(Presented in December 2023)

Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage,

OJ L 218,

8.10.1976.

Communication

from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and

Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on

the European democracy action plan,

COM/2020/790

final, 3 December 2020.

European Commission,

European Democracy: Commission sets out new laws on political advertising, electoral

rights and party funding,

21 November 2025.

European Commission,

Defence of Democracy – Commission proposes to shed light on covert foreign influence,

12 December 2023.

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Other tools

•

Important legislation in the

digital field,

notably the Digital Services Act

(Adopted, fully

applies as of February 2024)

(and

its

Guidelines

on the mitigation of systemic risks for

electoral processes

) and AI act

(entered

into force 2024, will fully apply as of August

2026

)

As part of this work, the December 2023 Commission Recommendation on inclusive and resilient

elections (hereafter, ‘the 2023 Recommendation on elections’)

, provides an important blueprint to

support the preparations for and conduct of elections. It is addressed to Member States, European and

national political parties, political foundations, and campaign organisations in the context of preparation

for elections in the EU, including the 2024 elections to the European Parliament.

The Recommendation on elections includes measures (1) supporting voter turnout and inclusive

participation, (2) encouraging election integrity and fair campaigning, (3) on transparency for

affiliations and political advertising, (4) promoting election observation, (5) protecting election-related

infrastructure and ensuring resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats, (6) protecting election-

related information, (7) regarding funding from third countries of political parties, political foundations,

electoral campaigns and candidates, (8) promoting easy access to electoral rights for elections to the

European Parliament, (9) enhancing the European nature of the elections to the European Parliament,

(10) addressing the risk of multiple voting in the elections to the European Parliament, and (11)

strengthening election networks and electoral cooperation.

The EU toolbox also includes several legislative and regulatory measures which are relevant in the

electoral context, including the Digital Services Act (DSA)

and its Guidelines on the mitigation of

systemic risks for electoral processes

, the Regulation on transparency and targeting of political

advertising

or the Artificial Intelligence Act

Preparations for the 2024 elections to the European Parliament saw unprecedented cooperation between

the Member States, EU institutions and stakeholders. On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the

EU activated the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements in information-sharing

European Commission,

Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks

for electoral processes,

26 April 2024.

The AI Act entered into force on 1 August 2024 and will be fully applicable 2 years later on 2 August 2026,

with some exceptions: prohibitions and AI literacy obligations entered into application from 2 February 2025,

the governance rules and the obligations for general-purpose AI models become applicable on 2 August 2025,

and the rules for high-risk AI systems - embedded into regulated products - have an extended transition period

until 2 August 2027.

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829

of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral

processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European

Parliament, presented as part of the Defence of Democracy Package,

OJ L, 2023/2829.

Regulation (EU) 2022/2065

of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single

Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act),

OJ L 277, 27.10.2022.

European Commission,

Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks

for electoral processes,

26 April 2024.

Regulation (EU) 2024/900

of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the

transparency and targeting of political advertising,

OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024.

Expert group on electoral matters - Right

to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections for the EP and in municipal elections (E00617).

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689

of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down

harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013,

(EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU)

2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act),

OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024.

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mode in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 European elections

, which aided the exchange of

information among Member States and EU institutions.

The European Cooperation Network on Elections

(ECNE), a network supported by the Commission

and consisting of national contact points appointed by Member States, held a wide range of thematic

sessions on free, fair and resilient elections, sharing best practices and information, with the

participation of the European Parliament. Cooperation between ECNE and other EU networks took

place, as well as engagement with a broad range of stakeholders including elections observers. In

addition, a wide range of initiatives and cooperation structures were activated with new ones being set

up to tackle threats such as FIMI, disinformation, cybersecurity threats or other issues affecting the

integrity of elections. This includes for example the ad hoc Working Group in the European Board of

Digital Services under the DSA, or the dedicated Taskforce of the European Digital Media Observatory,

as well as the Expert group on electoral matters

The European Parliament actively supported the smooth conduct of the 2024 elections, with a

communication strategy aimed at supporting and complementing Member States actions and providing

a European perspective to the elections. The European Parliament also took specific measures to combat

disinformation, taking an approach focusing on proactive communication, resilience-building,

situational awareness and rapid response, ensuring a secure information environment for all EU citizens.

In its Conclusions on democratic resilience and safeguarding electoral processes from all forms of

foreign interference

in May 2024, the Council invited the Commission to thoroughly analyse the

lessons to be learned from the 2024 elections to the European Parliament

. In June 2024, the Council

also approved Council Conclusions on enhancing and protecting free, open and informed democratic

debate

This Staff Working Document accompanies the Report on the conduct of the 2024 elections. It follows

the same structure and adds further information on the findings contained in the Report. Both documents

are based on a wide variety of sources including:

a call for evidence published in 2024

;

Council of the European Union,

Foreign interference: Presidency reinforces exchange of information ahead of

the June 2024 European elections,

24 April 2024.

European Commission,

European cooperation network on elections website.

Council of the EU,

Democratic resilience: Council approves conclusions on safeguarding electoral processes

from foreign interference,

21 May 2024.

The Council also invited the Commission to “present comprehensive feedback to the Council on the

effectiveness of the relevant mechanisms, networks, tools and measures, and report on any issues and gaps

identified in the available tools so that they can be rectified”.

Council of the European Union,

Council conclusions on enhancing and protecting free, open and informed

democratic debate,

14 June 2024.

The

call for evidence

was online from 6 November to 4 December 2024. It received 22 responses from citizens

and civil society organisations. The responses addressed a diverse range of concerns and recommendations. For

instance, one respondent called for higher thresholds to limit their entry of anti-democratic parties into Parliament.

Issues raised also related to inadequate voter engagement and fragmented information, particularly regarding the

lack of transparency on candidates, voting records, and key parliamentary decisions. Calls were made for

improved communication strategies, transnational candidate lists, and better platforms to empower voters in the

future. Broader concerns included the need for the EU to remain a strong, democratic bloc amid rising geopolitical

tensions and the resurgence of far-right ideologies. Participants emphasized the importance of reforming voting

rules to prevent individual Member States blocking decisions-making processes. The need for pluralistic and

uncensored media, greater innovation in sustainability, healthcare, and environmental solutions, and more

localized engagement by representatives was also highlighted. Several civil society organizations contributed

analyses on election integrity, the role of digital platforms, disinformation, and the upcoming European

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responses to Commission surveys returned by Member States

and European and national

political parties

;

exchanges with Member States in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on

Elections

and other relevant expert groups such as the Expert group on electoral matters

(E00617), and the Network and Information Systems (‘NIS’) group;

feedback from the signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation on the measures taken

around the 2024 European Parliament elections;

Eurobarometer and other surveys including the post-election survey published by the European

Parliament

, and other relevant studies;

direct feedback from citizens including via Europe Direct Contact Centre and Your Europe

Advice;

reports from election observers, civil society, and bodies such as the European Digital Media

Observatory, the High-Level Group on gender mainstreaming, the Advisory Committee on

Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, the European Institute for Gender Equality and the

European Data Protection Board.

Democracy Shield initiative. Reports called attention to transparency and compliance issues with EU regulations,

risks to democratic resilience from disinformation and technology misuse, and opportunities to generally

strengthen trust and participation in democratic processes.

25 Member States responded to this questionnaire. The Commission received responses from Belgium,

Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and

Sweden.The Commission did not receive responses from Cyprus and Poland.

The Commission received 6 responses from European political parties and almost 60 responses from national

political parties (see Annex).

An overview of relevant ECNE meetings can be found in Section 3.

EU Post-electoral survey 2024.

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ARTICIPATION IN THE

2024

ELECTIONS TO THE

UROPEAN

ARLIAMENT

2.1. Turnout

Observations

In the June 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the

overall turnout remained stable

at 50.74%,

confirming the positive trend of the 2019 elections

Figure 1: Overall turnout results 1979 to 2024

TURNOUT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

ELECTIONS 1979-2019 (%)

EU-9

1979

EU-10

1984

EU-12

1989

EU-12

1994

EU-15

1999

EU-25

2004

EU-27

2009

EU-28

2014

EU-28

2019

EU-27

2024

61,99

58,98

58,41

56,67

49,51

45,47

42,97

42,61

50,66

50,74

Source: European Commission (based on the

2024 European election results

as published by the

European Parliament)

There were however

substantial differences between Member States,

ranging from 89.01% in

Belgium

to 21.35% in Croatia. Turnout increased in 15 Member States

, with double-digit increases

on the 2019 figures in Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, and significant increases in countries

where turnout was previously low, such as Czechia, the Netherlands and Portugal. Meanwhile, turnout

decreased in 11 Member States

, including by double digits in Greece, Spain and Lithuania. There were

also significant decreases in Denmark, Italy, Poland and Croatia.

In 2019, turnout amounted to 50.66% of eligible voters. If the UK is excluded from the results, this number

rises to 52.4%.

In Belgium, voting is compulsory. Voting is also compulsory in Bulgaria, Greece and Luxembourg. The highest

turnout for the European Parliament elections can indeed be seen in Belgium and Luxembourg. At the same time,

Greece and Bulgaria show lower compliance.

In the 2024 European Parliament elections turnout increased in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Ireland,

France, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia compared to the

previous elections in 2019. In Estonia, turnout remained stable.

In the 2024 European Parliament elections turnout decreased in Denmark, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy,

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland, Finland and Sweden compared to the previous elections in 2019.

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Figure 2: Overall turnout results 1979 to 2024

Turnout - European Parliament elections 2019 and

2024 (in %)

82,29

100

BE LU MT DE HU CY DK AT SE RO FR IE IT ES NL SI EL PL FI EE PT CZ SK LV BG LT HR

2019

2024

2024 EU average = 50.74

89,01

72,98

64,74

59,46

58,86

58,25

56,25

53,39

51,49

50,65

52,4

48,31

46,39

46,18

41,24

40,65

40,38

41,8

37,64

36,47

36,45

34,38

33,82

33,78

28,97

Source: European Commission (based on the 2024 European election results as published by the European Parliament)

Several circumstances may explain the changes observed, although it is difficult to draw concrete

conclusions.

One element that has an impact is whether the elections to the European Parliament are held alongside

other elections. For example, in Hungary, which saw an increase in turnout of +16.10%, elections to

the European Parliament were held alongside local elections. This merged election agenda seemed to

have boosted participation significantly

. In Greece, Spain, and Lithuania, where turnout decreased

compared to 2019, the 2024 elections to the European Parliament were not held alongside other

elections, whereas this had been the case for the 2019 elections

. At the same time, this correlation

does not always hold: in Italy, a decrease in turnout of -6.19 percentage points can be noted, while local

elections

were held concurrently with the 2024 European elections, a similar setup to the 2019

elections

. Overall, research shows that there is indeed a significant rise in turnout for almost all

countries with parallel electoral events, with a few exceptions

Three months before the elections, the

European Parliament’s spring 2024 Eurobarometer survey

had found that 60% of Europeans expressed an interest in the 2024 elections. This represented an

increase of +11 percentage points compared to the survey of spring 2019, ahead of the previous elections

to the European Parliament. This increase in interest applied to all Member States

(see figure below).

According to the European Parliament Spring 2024 Survey, the interest of Hungarian voters in the European

elections increased by 15 percentage points since spring 2019 (from 50% of respondents in 2019 to 65% in 2024).

In 2019, the European Parliament elections were held alongside the first round of local and regional elections

in the case of Greece, local elections in the case of Spain, and the second round of Presidential elections in the

case of Lithuania.

In 3 698 municipalities out of a total 7 918.

In 3 844 municipalities out of a total 7 914.

European parliament,

Stock-taking of the 2024 European Parliament Elections: Political Representation:

Turnout and Vote Choice,

briefing requested by AFCO Committee.

‘EP Spring 2024 Survey: Use your vote – Countdown to the European elections’

with more than 26 000

respondents in all EU Member States.

21,35

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Europeans also indicated they were very much aware of the importance of the elections in the ongoing

geopolitical context, with more than eight in ten (81%) agreeing that it makes voting even more

important. Most Europeans agreed that ‘voting is important to keep democracy strong’ (86%) and that

‘voting is important to ensure a better future for the next generations’ (84%). However, this overall

increased interest in the elections to the European Parliament was not reflected in a significantly higher

turnout compared to 2019. In addition, interest in the European Parliament elections has evolved

differently across Member States since 2019.

Figure 3: Evolution of EU citizens’ interest in the European Parliament elections 2019-2024

2019

2024

Chan

(pp)

Source: European Parliament Spring 2024 Survey: Use your vote - Countdown to the European elections

The

European Parliament’s post-election survey

held in June and July 2024, showed that the main

topics eventually motivating EU citizens to vote were rising prices and the cost of living (42%),

followed by the general economic situation (41%). For a third of voters (34%) the international situation

was a topic that encouraged them to vote, while a similar proportion mentioned defending democracy

and the rule of law (32%).

In that same survey, more than one in two EU citizens (56%) consider that their voice counts in the EU,

which represents an increase of +8 percentage points compared to spring 2024. A similar, while slightly

lower, increase was seen in 2019, with figures rising from 49% to 56% in the months leading up to the

elections. Pro-EU attitudes translate directly into voting in the elections to the European Parliament:

67% of people with a positive image of the EU voted, compared to 42% with a neutral image and 36%

with a negative image.

Voting in the elections to the European Parliament also seems to have become a democratic habit for

many: asked why they voted, 46% of voters say they always do, while 42% say it is their duty as citizens.

20% say they want to support the political party they feel close to. The decision on whom to vote for in

the 2024 European elections was based mainly on how close the proposals of the parties were to the

ideas and values held by voters. Proposals on European issues were the most frequent reason, given by

47% (+4 percentage points since 2019) of the voters.

The two main reasons for not voting in the 2024 European elections are a lack of trust or dissatisfaction

with politics in general (21%, 1 percentage point decrease since 2019) and a lack of interest in politics

(20%, 2 percentage point increase since 2019). Other reasons include the belief that voting has no

consequences or does not change anything (17%, 3 percentage point increase since 2019). This means

that genuine political engagement reasons may explain non-participation.

EU Post-electoral survey.

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Figure 4: Main reasons to vote in the 2024 elections compared to the 2019 elections

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

Households’ financial situation poses differences in turnout in the European elections, with the socio-

economic divide widening since 2019

. Those who encounter difficulties paying bills most of the time

(35%, 3 percentage points less than in 2019) are much less likely to have voted than those who never

or almost never do (57%, 3 percentage points more than in 2019). Another factor influencing turnout is

the level of education: 59% of voters who finished their formal education at the age of 20 or older voted

in the elections, while the turnout was 49% for those who finished at the age of 16-19, and 44% for

those who finished at the age of 15 or younger

. On 21 March 2024, Member States discussed about

drivers for political participation, including turnout in elections, in a thematic session of the European

Cooperation Network on Elections. According to research presented by Professor Kasper Møller

Hansen during the session

, social aspects may affect voting behaviour and turnout more than cost or

ease of voting

EU Post-electoral survey.

Kasper Møller Hansen is a professor of political science at the University of Copenhagen’s Department of

Political Science.

For instance, research by Professor Kasper Møller Hansen shows that if the mother of a household does not

vote, this would affect the voting behaviour of her children their entire life, making them less prone to vote (more

than in the case of the father not voting, especially for first time voters). Similarly, if the parents in a household

vote, their children will most likely do so as well. It also shows the importance of the social dimension of voting,

as most people go to the polls in groups.

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Measures taken by Member States and political parties to increase turnout in the 2024 elections to

the European Parliament

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

calls on Member States to take measures in support of

broad turnout. This includes taking the necessary steps to facilitate, where applicable, voter and

candidate registration, including by providing the necessary information, tools and support at local

level and making tools such as online registration or electronic collection of support signatures for

candidates easily accessible and user friendly. The 2023 Recommendation on elections further calls

on Member States to ensure that citizens are informed about the availability and accessibility of

complementary voting methods, such as advance, mobile, postal, and electronic voting (‘e-voting’)

and provide them with the necessary support at all levels, including at local level. The 2023

Recommendation on elections also calls on Member States to have in place voting hours long-enough

to accommodate the needs of as many voters as possible and help ensure that the greatest number of

people can exercise their right to vote.

Many Member States reported that they had taken a wide range of measures to facilitate voter and

candidate registration, with a large majority providing a dedicated website

. For example, Ireland's

reported that, while the 31 electoral registers are run by the respective local authorities, there is a single

website where the electorate could register to vote or check or update their details in less than three

minutes. Hungary reported to have sent postal notices to all voters which contained QR codes leading

to a dedicated website, to make electronic administration easier. All election offices also had a hotline

to answer telephone and e-mail enquiries. Germany also provided an online tool to facilitate candidate

registration.

When it comes to

complementary voting methods,

France reported that citizens were able to register

their delegate for proxy voting completely online, without presenting themselves physically before a

competent authority, for the first time. Portugal allowed for the first time voters to vote in any polling

station set up in Portugal or abroad, independently from their place of residence in Portugal. Italy, for

the first time, introduced new rules allowing students domiciled in a municipality outside their region

of residence to vote in the municipality of temporary residence, or in the commune capital of the Region,

under certain circumstances. Sweden reported that advance voting is possible both from within the

country on various locations in every municipality and through mobile voting clerks (from day 18 before

election day), as from abroad (from day 24 before election day). Postal voting from abroad starts 45

days before election day. Other Member States such as Latvia, Malta, Lithuania and Estonia reported

that they also provided for advance voting under certain circumstances. In Slovenia, voters can vote at

specific polling stations outside their district of permanent residence or sometimes even at home, under

certain requirements. In Latvia, voters have the opportunity to vote at any polling station without

registration in advance. In Luxembourg, every voter can use postal voting without any justification and

free of charge. Estonia provides for electronic voting (i-voting). Czechia reported that voters can apply

for a voter’s absentee card (the voter applies to the municipal authority in his/her place of residence and

then can vote at any polling station) or they can vote by mobile ballot box on request due to any serious

reasons (e.g. at home or hospital). In Bulgaria, voters can cast their vote either by paper ballot or by

machine (in all polling stations with at least 300 registered voters).

As regards

voting hours and days:

in most Member States

, the polling stations were opened at least

until 8:00 pm. In Czechia the polling stations were opened on 7 and 8 June, while Italy opened them

on 8 and 9 June. Compared to 2019 elections, voting hours on the day of the elections remained the

same in all Member States.

Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal,

Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.

Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,

Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.

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2.2. Informing about the elections, engaging with and communicating to citizens,

and supporting electoral rights

National authorities, the European Parliament and the Commission, other EU institutions, bodies and

agencies, as well as other stakeholders including civil society organisations, took a wide range of

initiatives to inform, engage and communicate ahead of the 2024 elections.

Efforts at EU level

The European Parliament’s campaign sought to provide a European perspective to the elections and

showing democracy in action.

The main and final phase of the campaign centred on the call for action: ‘Use your vote, or others will

decide for you’. The dedicated ‘one-stop-shop’ website for the 2024 elections

(EE24 website)

provided comprehensive information covering organisation and voting processes in the Member States.

It was organised in close cooperation with the Commission.

The Commission also approached the 2024 elections as a communication priority. Recognising the

shared interest in a resilient democracy and the common responsibility for the EU’s democratic

legitimacy, it complemented and supported the European Parliament’s communication efforts as part

of a joint interinstitutional effort.

The Commission communicated with impact both on the proactive and the defensive side. Extensive

communication on the concrete results and benefits of its work for citizens during the previous mandate

supported awareness of what was at stake. The Commission complemented these efforts by providing

factual information to citizens about the elections, their electoral rights and the importance of voting.

In this context, it activated its networks and different groups of multipliers and helped to grow the

European Parliament’s ‘together.eu for democracy’-community. Young and first-time voters were an

important target audience for EU-level activities, as were ‘mobile EU citizens’ (EU citizens who have

moved to another Member State to work, live or study). The Commission also supported massively and

amplified the European Parliament’s ‘Use your vote’-campaign through all its channels.

Communication activities of the Commission also focused on preventing and tackling FIMI, including

disinformation, as explained further in Section 4.2.

Some of the main outputs and results in key areas

1) COMMUNICATING THE COMMISSION’S ACHIEVEMENTS

•

The

webpages

on the achievements of the College attracted 113 000 page views.

The brochure‘Keeping

our promise to YOU!

aiming to inform young people about the

Commission achievements, was published online in all EU languages.

A total of 708 posts about #EUdelivers were published by the European Commission’s

Social Media Network (SMN), i.e., the central and local accounts, DGs and

Commissioners, generating over 14 million impressions and 307 000 interactions in the

first semester of 2024.

The hashtag #EUdelivers generated 2 600 mentions in the first semester of 2024.

European Citizens’ Panels have become a regular feature of EU democracy. Since 2022,

five panels took place: Tackling Hatred in Society (2024), Energy Efficiency (2024),

Learning Mobility (2023), Virtual Worlds (2023), Food Waste (2022). The launch of the

new digital, multilingual Citizens Engagement Platform helped reinforce the awareness of

citizens that the EU is not only delivering policy for citizens but also with citizens by

involving them in policymaking.

•

European Parliament,

European Elections 6-9 June 2024,

last accessed 12 March 2025.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

•

Directorate-General (DG) for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (EAC) organised the

European Week of Youth 2024 (12-19 April) jointly with the Parliament with 2 056

activities across 39 countries, generating a direct reach of more than 2.3 million of which

more than 1.8 million young / first-time voter participants.

2) INFORMING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS

•

The Commission at all levels and through all channels informed citizens about the

elections, electoral rights and the importance to vote, including through a targeted

information campaign for mobile EU citizens living in another EU country or in the United

Kingdom. This campaign was run by the DG for Justice and Consumers (JUST) in

cooperation with DG for Communication (COMM) and the European Parliament and had a

total cumulative reach of 24 million across two waves. It garnered more than 79 million

impressions and drove over 350 000 clicks to the EP’s elections’ website.

The

EP’s elections website

was promoted as the main reference on elections-related

information. DG JUST helped feed its ‘how to vote’-section with accurate information. The

EU website

and the Commission core website generated 3.1 million views of pages

promoting the European elections.

The

Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC)

acted as citizens’ elections helpline and was

referred to on the EP’s elections page as the single point of contact. 2 715 elections-related

questions were answered.

The hashtag #EUElections2024 generated 3 300 mentions from January to June 2024 on

the Commission’s social media channels.

The Commission produced a flyer for young people and first-time voters in 24 languages:

Get ready! The countdown to the 2024 European elections has begun,

generating close to

400 000 distributed copies, 3 036 downloads and 5 331 visits. The Commission’s

Learning

Corner page on European elections

was also actively used.

The Commission’s Visitors’ Centre and Experience Europe exhibition centre in Brussels

communicated about the European elections to visiting groups, reaching an overall figure

of 44 796 visitors.

The total reach of Representations’ elections related actions was 213.5 million, excluding

social media actions.

•

3) ACTIVATING NETWORKS AND MULTIPLIERS

•

Commission Services, including the Representations, and Commission networks organised

4 319 events with around 3.5 million participants. As part of this effort, the EUROPE

DIRECT network alone organised 3 185 events with 955 500 participants. Overall, some

40 networks were activated.

The Commission contributed to growing

the together.eu

for democracy-community of the

European Parliament where 380 000 people registered altogether as a result of the

collective efforts.

The Commission activated different groups of multipliers. For example, the Commission

activated influencers to boost awareness and engagement with new and younger audiences.

Content creators participated in a study visit and a content creator bootcamp. Both

activities combined generated 52 European election-specific posts, 2.9 million impressions

and 41 000 engagements (estimated reach of 3 million people). DG COMM also activated

UEFA Europa League winner of 2022, Eintracht Frankfurt, who ran an elections campaign

reaching almost 1 million people.

For its part, the EEAS set up a working group with the foreign ministries of the Member

States to kick off communication on the European elections outside the EU and to

encourage the exchange of best practices for such information campaigns. Coordinated by

the EEAS and together with Member State embassies/consulates the 145 EU Delegations

reached out to citizens living outside the EU. Concrete outputs included the creation of an

•

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EEAS European elections 2024 website as well as a dedicated European elections 2024

page on every EU Delegation website bringing together information, links and contacts.

The EEAS also launched a worldwide joint social media initiative of EU Delegations and

EU Member States embassies/consulates on the European elections using the social media

products of the European Parliament and additional 26 campaign videos. The EEAS and

EU delegations posted more than 2000 posts on the European elections which estimate

have reached more than 11 million recipients and had high levels of engagement with over

600,000 views, reactions and comments across channels. The EEAS coordinated this

communication with the Commission, the European Parliament and the European

Parliament’s Local Offices.

4) SUPPORTING THE EP’S GO-TO-VOTE CAMPAIGN

•

The Commission amplified the EP’s ‘use-your-vote’ campaign through all its channels, at a

similarly ambitious level as in 2019. Across all social media platforms on the

Commission’s central accounts, posts with the campaign’s hero video amassed over 3.7

million impressions and close to 100 000 interactions.

•

The Commission used the EP campaign hashtag #UseYourVote generating 920 posts, 18.6

million impressions, nearly 470 000 interactions, and 4.4 million video views across the

Commission’s social media accounts, including central, Representations, DGs, and

Commissioners. Thanks to the coordinated interinstitutional effort, the hero video achieved

525 million views altogether.

5) COMMUNICATING INTERNALLY AND EMPOWERING STAFF

•

The Commission mobilised its staff and encouraged colleagues to engage as citizens and

multipliers, too, while being mindful of their rights and obligations.

Digital staff advocacy: the elections posts on Haiilo were shared 1 810 times and generated

1 000 clicks on social media and 1 760 social media reactions.

757 European Commission staff members conducted a Back to School/ University visit

between 31 March 2023 and 10 June 2024, and helped raise awareness about the EU and

the elections, reaching 52 595 students.

The dissemination of information was also supported by promoting the ‘Guide to EU citizenship’

Eight Member States also explicitly reported having used the Guide in their national communication

efforts

The Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC) acted as an ‘elections helpline’ for the 2024 elections at EU

level. Between September 2023 and June 2024, the EDCC replied to 2 797 questions related to the 2024

elections to the European Parliament: 1 580 by webform, 975 by phone and 242 by chat. The EDCC

was open during the election days (6 to 9 June, 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. CET). During the election days, the

EDCC replied to 377 European elections related questions, mostly about electoral rights and formalities,

perceived missing information from Member States and perceived obstacles/incidents preventing

citizens from voting during the election days, alleged electoral fraud, security threats and other matters

related to the elections (such as, voting systems). More information about the content of the questions

is included in Section 5.1.4.

European Commission,

Guide to EU citizenship,

06 December 2023.

Czechia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia.

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Figure 5 European elections related questions answered by the EDCC between September 2023

and June 2024 per channel

Source: European Commission Directorate-General for Communication

The Commission used

available funding to support national authorities and civil society

organisations in implementing projects

to encourage EU citizens to get involved in the democratic

process, including under the 2021-2027 Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme.

Through the two CERV strands managed by the European Education and Culture Executive Agency

(EACEA), ‘Union Values’ and ‘Citizen’s engagement and participation’, the programme provides

pathways for citizens to become engaged in the democratic life of their communities. Between 2021

and 2024, these two CERV strands allocated EUR

26.5 million

to finance

46 projects

aimed at

encouraging European citizens to get involved in the democratic process and promoting and enhancing

the exercise of EU citizenship rights.

Under the ‘Citizen’s engagement and participation’ strand, the Commission has given the possibility to

people and civil society organisations to take part in and contribute to the EU's democratic and civic

life. During these years, many activities have looked in particular at the European Parliament elections

of 2024, and at innovative approaches and tools to help citizens make their voices heard and publicly

exchange views on all areas of EU action, including via digital tools (e-democracy).

With regards to the actions involving local authorities (mostly Network of Towns actions), the

Commission has promoted exchanges between people of different countries, with the aim to give them

the opportunity to broaden their perspective and develop a sense of European belonging and identity.

While maintaining a bottom-up approach, the programme has also provided an opportunity to focus on

EU priorities, notably contribute to increasing the turnout and inclusive candidacy at the European

Parliament elections.

Under the ‘Union Values’ strand, the aim has been to encourage and facilitate active and inclusive

participation in building a more democratic EU, as well as raising awareness on rights and values

through support to civil society organisations.

Under this strand, the Commission has set up 4-year framework partnership agreements with European

networks, civil society organisations active at EU level and European think tanks whose statutory aims

are to protect and promote Union values. It has also provided grants to support the annual work

programmes of the organisations which have signed framework partnership agreements active in the

area citizens’ engagement.

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Examples of projects supported by CERV

•

The “Digital Civic Participation”

project included innovative tools to raise EU citizens’

awareness of their political rights and of the procedures to participate in European Parliament

elections.

The Network of Towns project NOTE

(Network of Organizations and Towns for the

European Elections) developed tools to encourage active citizenship and informed

participation in the 2024 European Elections through and with young citizens.

The Make your Vote! Project

raised awareness on the importance of the elections.

The Citizen Z initiative

included different innovative deliberative practices for youth

engagement ahead of the 2024 European Elections.

•

Measures reported by Member States

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages Member States to provide the necessary

information to citizens, including with a sufficiently wide language selection for explaining the

electoral process to voters and candidates. The Recommendation also calls on Member States to

promote initiatives, including at local level, aiming at increasing election accessibility and political

engagement, well ahead of the election days. Such activities could include awareness-raising

initiatives, information campaigns and other outreach through platforms and channels used by

different groups of citizens, conferences or debates, for instance by promoting exchanges between

EU citizens on EU-related topics to foster a better understanding of different perspectives. Special

focus should be placed on young people, especially first-time voters, as well as on addressing the

barriers limiting the opportunities of members of different groups to vote and stand as candidate.

Information about elections, including its form and content, should be adapted to the special needs

of those different groups.

The

Member States

also engaged in communication activities. In response to the survey launched by

the Commission, most Member States reported having made efforts to support turnout, including via

numerous communication and awareness-raising activities. A large majority of Member States reported

to have carried out awareness raising initiatives and/or information campaigns to increase election

accessibility and political engagement

. Some also organised debates

. For example, Germany

organised a ‘Use your voice’ campaign to provide information on how to vote, accompanied by specific

communication activities on the electoral process and debunking of disinformation. Luxembourg also

launched a wide ‘I can vote’ campaign and developed a communication kit for municipalities and

associations. Ireland reported to have carried out a comprehensive six-week campaign to inform and

engage the public about the elections, including advertising across traditional and social media

channels. This was complimented by a programme of public engagement and events with community

groups to encourage voter registration, including minority groups, young voters in schools and

universities, older voters in community groups and those living in traditionally low electoral turnout

areas. Hungary produced different film and radio spots. In Slovenia, a dedicated campaign on the

elections and the 20

anniversary took place. Slovakia launched an extensive information campaign

through municipal and city offices, official social media platforms, television, and radio. The

Digital Civic Participation – D.C.P. v 2.0

(a project dedicated to digital participatory e-democracy tools).

Network of Organizations and Towns for the European Elections - Fattoria Pugliese Diffusa,

project start date

01 January 2023.

Foundation for entrepreneurship, culture and education,

Make your Vote!,

project duration 01 December 2022-

31 May 2024.

Citizen Z.

Czechia, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,

Slovakia and Finland.

Greece, Croatia, Lithuania and Portugal.

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Netherlands provided communication materials to interest groups and municipalities, taking into

account a wide spectrum of accessibility including on low literacy, mental disability or dementia. Malta

undertook different campaigns on traditional and social media about different aspects of the electoral

process, including on the new voting document delivery system. Other Member States stick to purely

informing about the organisation of elections as their legislation does not allow them to promote

political participation. Czechia used QR codes on their printed materials leading to the electoral website,

where information could be found in easy-to-read format and also videos in Czech sign language.

Member States authorities further supported citizens’ participation by

providing helplines.

For

example, Austria established a hotline and call centre. In Sweden, a voter customer service received

over 8 000 contacts via phone, website and social media. In Hungary, an election helpline was reached

more than 100 000 times. In the context of ECNE and supported by the Commission, an overview of

election helplines was prepared for the EDCC to ensure for better coordination, complementarity of the

services and streamline the service to the citizens for the appropriate support.

Member States’ efforts to communicate to specific groups are further explained in Section 2.3.

2.3. Participation of specific groups

2.3.1.

Introduction

The inclusion of all groups is an essential element of healthy democracies The Commission report on

the 2019 elections to the European Parliament

had underlined, among others, that there is still progress

to be made on inclusiveness and democratic participation in elections of younger people, women,

citizens residing in a Member State other than their own (‘mobile EU citizens’), persons with

disabilities, and other groups.

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

recalls that it is necessary to support the participation in

elections, as voters and as candidates, of all groups of citizens, taking into account their specific

needs and the challenges they are confronted with. The Recommendation suggests, among others,

that to support high voter turnout and support broad citizen participation in the democratic process,

Member States should pay attention to the fact that different groups, including older persons, may

face obstacles when accessing internet and digital technologies or may lack skills to effectively use

them. The Recommendation calls on Member States and political actors to take steps to effectively

address the needs of the different groups, including in their communication activities. Moreover, it

suggests that Member States should, well ahead of the election days, promote initiatives aiming at

increasing election accessibility and political engagement, such as awareness-raising initiatives,

information campaigns and other outreach through platforms and channels used by different groups

of citizens. The 2023 Recommendation on elections puts a special focus on young people, especially

first-time voters, as well as on addressing the barriers limiting the opportunities of members of

different groups to vote and stand as candidate.

2.3.2.

Introduction

Young people

One out of 6 people in the EU is aged between 15 and 29 years old, representing 73.6 million people

In the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, it was estimated that there were almost 21 million

eligible ‘first-time voters’ (persons who have reached voting age since the last European elections in

2019), with the highest number of eligible voters expected in Germany (5.1 million persons), France (4

European Commission,

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and

the European Economic and Social Committee - Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament,

COM/2020/252 final.

Eurostat,

Young people aged 15-29 years old, 01 January 2020,

05 January 2022.

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million) and Italy (2.8 million). The highest shares of first-time voters were expected in Belgium, France

and Germany with 9.7%, 8.0% and 7.9% of all eligible voters, respectively

Young people may experience particular challenges to exercise their electoral rights. For example,

limited access to postal or electronic voting options might be a barrier particularly for students studying

abroad or from rural areas. High costs associated with sending ballots or traveling to vote might also

discourage in particular young people from participating. The timing of elections, which often coincides

with exam sessions, can also make it more difficult for students to vote

In most Member States, citizens can vote in the elections to the European Parliament from the age of

18. The 2024 elections saw more Member States lowering the voting age and allowing citizens to vote

from 16 years old (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria)

. One country (Greece) gives citizens the

right to vote from 17 years old

Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), ‘Voting

age for European elections’,

May 2023, updated in August

2023.

There are also differences in the minimum age to stand as a candidate, with most Member States

requiring candidates to be 18 years old. In some countries it is 21 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia,

Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia), 23 (Romania) or 25 (Italy and Greece)

European elections 2024: people eligible to vote,

04 April 2024.

Meeting with the European Youth Forum and DG JUST, 16 September 2024.

In the 2019 European Parliament elections, this was not yet the case for Belgium and Germany.

Cyprus also approved a bill conferring voting rights to 17-year-olds in January 2025, which will apply as of the

next national parliamentary elections in May 2026.

Briefing

by the Parliament on the 2024 European elections, including an overview of the legal framework

framing the elections, February 2024.

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Observations

Before the elections,

more than 6 in 10 (64%) young EU citizens (15-30) had expressed their intention

to vote in the upcoming European elections, while 13% indicated they would not vote – despite being

eligible

. Among the reasons why young people did not intend to vote in the 2024 European elections,

the first three related to a lack of interest in, or distrust of, the political system in general (around 19%).

Among those with no intention to vote in elections, 16% did not believe the EU deals with young

people’s problems or said that they did not like any political groups or candidate, while around 14%

were not aware of the elections. 10% of young people declared they did not vote because they did not

understand the role of the EU, while 7% did not intend to take part in the elections because they oppose

to the EU.

Figure 6: Reasons not to vote in 2024 European elections, by age groups, EU average, 2024 (prior

to the elections)

Source: Eurobarometer on Youth and Democracy, 2024, VOLUME B. Q14 What are your reasons for not planning to vote or

being unsure about voting in the European elections? (15-18; 19-24; 25-30) [MULTIPLE ANSWERS]. Notes: Data are

ordered by decreasing number of young people (15-30) not intending to vote in the next European elections. Data extracted

on 13.05.2024.

According to the

European Parliament’s post-election survey

, only 36% of those aged 15-24 (if

eligible), and 46% of those aged 25-39 actually voted in the 2024 elections.

This represents a decrease of 6 percentage points since 2019, partially offsetting the 14 percentage

points increase between 2014 and 2019. Indeed, in the 2019 elections to the European parliament, both

Europe’s young and first-time voters drove turnout figures up.

Eurobarometer, Youth and Democracy:

In eight Member States the percentage of young people entitled to vote

who intended to vote in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament was above the EU average (64%) with a

peak in Romania and Portugal (almost 80%). Conversely, the highest share of young people stating they

did not

intend to vote although eligible was recorded in Malta and Luxemburg (31% and 25%). In Finland, Sweden and

Latvia around 15% of young people did not know whether they were eligible to vote or whether they intended to

vote.

EU Post-electoral survey 2024.

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Figure 7: Turnout by age group

Voted

2019

Age

16/18-24

25-39

40-54

55+

Education (end of)

15-

16-19

20+

Still studying

47%

50%

61%

53%

Voted

2019

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

Voted

2024

Difference

‘24-‘19

(pps)

44%

49%

53%

56%

36%

46%

51%

58%

-8

-3

-2

44%

49%

59%

45%

Voted

2024

-3

-1

-2

-8

Difference

‘24-‘19

(pps)

Age remains a determining factor in voter turnout, with older people still more likely to vote than young

people: 51% of those aged 40-54, and 58% of citizens aged 55 and over voted

Age is also the main socio-demographic difference in

when

EU citizens decided to vote

: older

respondents mostly say that they always vote. This is lower among younger people (84% of those aged

55 or over, falling to 58% of those aged under 25). Close to three in ten voters below 25 say they decided

to vote a few weeks or months before the day of the elections (28% compared with 12% of those aged

55 or over), and 14% on the day of the elections or a few days before (compared with 4%).

In the February 2025 Youth survey, young people who declared they had voted in the 2024 elections

were asked why they voted for the party or candidate they chose

. The most common reason for having

voted for a specific party or candidate was that their ideas aligned with the respondent's views (selected

by 30% of respondents). The second most-mentioned reason is the belief that the chosen party or

candidate can change things, selected by 25% of respondents. About one in six respondents say they

voted for a party or candidate because they heard or read positive things about them (17%); similar

shares are found for having voted strategically to avoid the electoral success of another party (16%) and

the party or candidate prioritizes matters important to young people (16%). Smaller shares mention that

they usually vote for the chosen party or candidate (13%), they liked the party or candidate's electoral

campaign on social media (13%), they disliked all other parties or candidates (12%), or people they

trust were supporting the party or candidate (12%).

Young people who declared that they did not vote in the 2024 European elections were also asked about

their main reasons for not having voted. The most common reasons are other commitments (16%) and

not having enough information to make a choice (16%), followed by not finding any relatable candidate

or political party that represented their views (15%) and a general distrust or dissatisfaction with

politicians and politics (15%). Slightly fewer non-voters mention technical or procedural issues, such

as not registering on time (12%). One in ten respondents (10%) think that their vote would not have

changed anything. Less common reasons for not having voted include not knowing there were European

Elections in June 2024 (7%), not understanding the role of the European Parliament (6%), and the fact

Numbers from 2019 represent those with the UK excluded from the count.

EU Post-electoral survey 2024.

Eurobarometer,

Youth survey 2024,

February 2025.

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that none of their friends voted, so they did not feel like it mattered (6%). Opposition to the EU as

reason for non-participation in the elections is mentioned by only 4% of non-voters.

In terms of

representation (elected candidates)

young people (under the age of 40) remain

underrepresented in EU decision-making following the 2024 elections. They hold only 19.17% of the

seats in the new European Parliament with 138 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This

number has decreased: in 2019, MEPs under the age of 40 held 21% of the seats

Five Member States have no elected MEPs under 35 (Belgium, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg and

Romania). Eight Member States have only one MEP under 35 (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia,

Estonia, Finland, Hungary, and Lithuania)

. Average age of MEPs per Member State ranges from 40.5

years to 62

. The share of seats for young people also differs between the different political groups,

with some allocated only 4.79% of their seats to young people while others allocated 20.75%

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

calls for Member States to promote initiatives aiming at

increasing election accessibility and political engagement with special focus on young people,

especially first-time voters. The Recommendation encourages Member States to support young

citizens in the exercise of their electoral rights, both as voters and candidates, for example through

citizenship education, organisation election simulations in schools or carrying out youth-friendly

communication campaigns. Member States are also encouraged to promote the ‘Guide to EU

citizenship’

15 of the 25

Member States

that replied to the Commission survey indicated that they had placed a

specific emphasis on young people or first-time voters when it came to promoting easy access to the

exercise of electoral rights

. For example, Croatia worked on educating high school pupils as young

voters about what they need to know to participate in elections. Malta undertook specific activities to

inform first-time voters.

Political parties

also took measures to support turnout by young people. They sought innovative ways

to engage these groups through tailored social media strategies and youth-centred initiatives.

European

political parties have made extensive use of social platforms to reach young audiences

. One party even

enlisted young influencers to more effectively engage with first-time voters and young people

. Some

parties reported tailoring their social media strategies to specific demographics: TikTok and Instagram

for younger audiences, and Facebook for older age groups

. Young people and first-time voters also

appeared to be high on the agenda for

national

political parties. Of almost 60 national parties that replied

to the survey, around 57% explicitly reported that they hadaddressed young people or first-time voters

in the run-up to the elections

. One notable practice was to specifically focus on topics that concern

young people such as minimum wage or housing

, and providing explanations about the elections to

first-time voters

or hosting special events

. Additionally, some parties made an effort to address

Statistics by the European Parliament on the 2024 European elections.

European Youth Forum,

European Elections 2024: Young People never had a chance,

31 July 2024.

Luxembourg has the oldest MEPs on average, Malta has the youngest MEPs on average.

European Youth Forum,

European Elections 2024: Young People never had a chance,

31 July 2024.

European Commission,

Guide to EU citizenship,

06 December 2023.

Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta

Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland.

European Democratic Party, Party of European Socialists, European Green Party.

European Democratic Party.

European Free Alliance.

Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

Croatia, Slovenia.

Slovenia.

Austria.

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young people by translating election manifestos in shorter versions

. Further efforts included a range

of strategies such as creating music and video content that appealed to young audiences, targeted

advertising campaigns, and even partnering with influencers to connect with younger demographics

and promote their party's message effectively.

2.3.3.

Introduction

Women

In its

Gender Equality Strategy

2020-2025

the Commission committed to apply equal opportunities

to women and achieve gender balance in decision-making and in politics. In the 2024 Report on Gender

Equality in the EU

, the Commission recalled the need for an equal participation of women and men

in political decision-making positions to better reflect the composition of society and strengthen

democracy in the EU.

Observations

The

participation of women as voters

in the 2024 European elections fell slightly compared to the

elections in 2019 (by one percentage point). The gender gap in turnout remained stable at 3 percentage

points

Figure 8: Turnout men/women

Voted

2019

EU27

Man

Woman

52%

54%

51%

Voted

2019

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

Voted

2024

51%

53%

50%

Voted

2024

Difference

‘24-‘19

(pps)

-1

Difference

‘24-‘19

(pps)

According to the European Parliament’s post-election survey

, there are some differences regarding

the main reasons why women and men decided to vote in the 2024 European elections. More women

declared having voted because they always vote (47% of women, compared to 45% of men) or because

this is their duty as a citizen (43% of women, compared to 41% of men). Conversely, more men declared

that the main reason for voting was that they are in favour of the EU (18% of men, compared to 15%

of women) or because they are very interested in European affairs (10% of men, compared to 8% of

women).

While

female representation in the European Parliament

has more than doubled since the first direct

elections in 1979, in 2024 the share of women decreased by 0.9 percentage points, compared to the

Luxembourg.

Communication

from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic

and Social Committee, A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, COM(2020) 152 final, 5 March

2020.

European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers,

2024 report on gender equality in the

EU, Publications Office of the European Union,

2024.

The gender gap in voter turnout reduced from 4 percentage points in 2014 to 3 percentage points in 2019.

Eurobarometer,

EU post-electoral survey 2024,

October 2024.

When asked about the main topics that encouraged people to vote, more women than men declared voting

because of the rising prices and the cost of living (44% of women, compared to 40% of men), the environment

and climate change (30% of women, compared to 26% of men) and social protection, welfare and access to

healthcare (26% of women, compared to 22% of men). Conversely, more men declared voting because of the

economic situation (45% of men, compared to 38% of women), migration and asylum (30% of men, compared to

26% of women), and the EU’s defence and security (30% of men, compared to 26% of women).

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

2019 elections

. This is the first time that the representation of women in the European Parliament has

fallen. Women make up only 38.5 % of all MEPs

Figure 9: Evolution of women MEPs in the European Parliament

50,00%

40,70%

40,00%

30,30%

30,00%

25,90%

17,90%

31%

35%

36,80%

38,50%

19,30%

20,00%

15,90%

10,00%

0,00%

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

2009

2014

2019

2024

Constitutive session following elections

Source: European Institute for Gender Equality

Furthermore, there remain major differences between Member States in terms of elected female MEPs.

Only Finland, France and Sweden elected more women than men with 9 of 15, 41 out of 81 and 13 out

of 21 MEPs, respectively. This represents an increase compared to 2019 where only Finland and

Sweden elected more women than men. In 2024, ten Member States elected at least 40% of each gender

(Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Spain).

In eight Member States women account for less than 30% of elected MEPs (Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece,

Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Romania). As in 2019, all MEPs from Cyprus are men.

Following the 2019 elections, women represented 39.4% of members of the European Parliament. This figure

corresponds with the gender balance of MEPs after the redistribution of seats post-Brexit (2020).

European Parliament,

MEP’s gender balance by country – 2024,

06 September 2024.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

Figure 10: Female MEPs, 2024

Female Members of the European Parliament

Sweden

Finland

France

Spain

the Netherlands

Hungary

Slovakia

Ireland

50,62%

50%

48,39%

47,62%

46,67%

42,86%

41,67%

40,91%

40%

38,53%

38,10%

38,01%

36,46%

33,33%

61,90%

60%

Croatia

Belgium

Austria

EU average

Czechia

Portugal

Germany

Denmark

Luxembourg

Slovenia

Italy

Greece

Estonia

Poland

Bulgaria

Latvia

Romania

Lithuania

Malta

Cyprus

33,33%

32,89%

28,57%

28,30%

23,53%

22,22%

18,18%

16,67%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Female MEPs

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024

Five out of the 10 lead candidates put forward by European political parties were women. However,

election observers

have pointed out that generally only around 30% of total candidates for the elections

were women.

Finally, as also explained in Sections 4.7 below, female politicians also reportedly faced an acute risk

of harassment, abuse, and disinformation campaigns online in the context of the 2024 elections to the

OSCE/ODIHR,

Special Election Assessment Mission, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 2024,

November 2024.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

European Parliament

. In the run-up to the elections, a rise in online gender-based disinformation about

female EU leaders and candidates was observed

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages Member States to promote measures to support

gender equality regarding access to and participation in elections, such as alternating women and

men on candidate lists, using other types of gender quotas, linking the allocation of public funding

for political parties to the promotion of political participation of women or other similar measures.

The Recommendation also encourages gender balance in governing bodies of electoral management

bodies, as well as monitoring, supporting and regularly evaluating progress on gender equality in

the exercise of electoral rights, including through the collection, analysis and dissemination of data

on women and men both as voters and candidates in elections, in elected positions and in decision-

making positions in political parties. Moreover, the Recommendation encourages political parties to

put in place internal policies on gender balance, targeted training and awareness raising, as well as

gender balance in electoral lists and their own governing bodies. The 2023 Recommendation on

elections also encourages Member States and political parties to take measures to effectively prevent

and address gender-based hate speech against politically active women that aims to discredit them

or discourage them from political participation.

In response to a Commission survey,

Member States

shared insights on gender equality in the conduct

of the 2024 elections. The responses revealed significant variations in efforts to promote gender equality

across Member States.

Several Member States have adopted legislative mandates to support gender representation, with

notable examples like Greece and Spain, where laws require at least 40% representation of each gender

on candidate lists. Italy and Portugal also have implemented stringent measures, including Italy's

requirement for gender alternation on lists and voters needing to choose candidates of different genders.

Currently, 11 Member States have laid down quotas in their national legislation (10 of those Member

States also had legislative quotas applicable for the elections to the European Parliament)

and some

go further, alternating women and men on candidate lists (‘zipped lists’)

. In addition to alternating

women and men on candidate lists and using other types of gender quotas, some Member States

continue to link the allocation of public funding for political parties to the promotion of political

participation of women for example in Finland, Ireland and Italy. These are good practices that were

highlighted in the 2023 Recommendation on elections as referred above.

Data collection, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms vary greatly across Member States. For

instance, Denmark and Luxembourg have well-established systems for tracking progress through data-

driven reports and statistical monitoring.

When it comes to gender balance in electoral management bodies, progress remains limited across most

Member States. Although some, like Denmark and Finland encourage balance through quotas or

statistical monitoring, many Member States do not promote gender parity in these roles. Notably, Latvia

reports 77% of local election commission leadership positions being held by women. Emerging efforts

were also reported by countries like Czechia, where a national Gender Equality Strategy (2021–2030)

Global Disinformation Index,

Gendered Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections,

June 10 2024.

Global Disinformation Index,

Gendered Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections,

June 10 2024.

Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. Ireland

has a quote for national elections but not for the European Parliament elections.

For example Spain, Italy and Portugal. In Spain, it is mandatory in any electoral list to have 60% of women in

each group of 5 candidates. In addition, in Belgium, a quota system applies to electoral lists and the first two

candidates on each list must be of different sexes.

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includes measures to enhance women's political participation. Similarly, Slovakia highlighted a historic

record of women candidates and elected representatives.

The High-Level Group on gender mainstreaming (E01240)

and the Commission’s Advisory

Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men

also reported on measures implemented in

the Member States to promote women’s participation in the 2024 European Parliament elections and

their impact. In Bulgaria, a series of public political debates were organised to discuss specific

challenges women encounter in participating in elections at the individual, party and system level, with

the participation of female candidates for the European elections from leading political parties. In

Cyprus, the Office of the Commissioner for Gender Equality organised an event in collaboration with

civil society to promote the Cypriot female candidates for the 2024 European Parliament elections. In

Ireland, state funding is provided to encourage and support women to run as candidates in elections by

providing training and mentoring support.

In France, political parties are obliged to present an equal

number of men and women for regional, municipal, senatorial and European elections in order to have

their lists registered. In Hungary, gender quotas on candidate lists in elections apply so that there are no

less than 40% of candidates of each sex. Lithuania provided funding for NGOs to encourage women to

get involved and participate in political life and elections, as well as to reduce stereotypes related to

gender in political activity through educational, informational, analytical and advocacy activities. In

Finland, the Council for Gender Equality carried out a social media campaign highlighting the

importance of the European Parliament and the EU for gender, and the National Council of Women of

Finland together with the Coalition of Finnish Women’s Associations organised a panel discussion

Europe at the Crossroads on 15 May 2024. In Latvia, two NGOs held pre-election debates for candidates

on various issues of women's rights. In Greece, the Ministry of Social Cohesion and Family organises

awareness-raising campaigns to support and empower women candidates as well as seminars for female

candidates and elected officials.

At the same time, in response to a survey, the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal

Opportunities for Women and Men also reported on specific challenges women encountered in

participating in the 2024 European Parliament elections. In Bulgaria, the Council for Electronic Media

identified that, in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections, the male-female ratio varied

95-69% men, 5-31% women for the 7 most influential radio and television programmes.

In response to a Commission questionnaire on supporting gender equality in the context of the 2024

European elections,

European

political parties

outlined internal policies on gender balance, such as

encouraging gender balance on electoral lists as outlined in their party manifestos

, appointing the

youngest-ever

Spitzenkandidatin

(female lead candidate) to demonstrate a commitment to promoting

gender balance on electoral lists, or by having a ‘Women’s Forum’

. In another European political

party, the governing body is required to follow statutes that ensure gender balance and geographical

diversity within the party’s leadership

. Additionally, gender balance was promoted in electoral lists

through quotas and rules mandating that at least one co-chair or candidate must be held by a woman

One party took no specific measures beyond encouraging gender balance on electoral lists in accordance

with national laws

100

. Another did not report any efforts to promote gender equality in governing bodies,

electoral lists, or internal party structures at all

101

For more information on this committee,

see Register of Commission Expert groups.

For more information on this committee,

see Summary on Eurolex.

Ireland contributes funding, through the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, and the

Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, towards Women for Election, a civil society

non-governmental organisation, which together with the National Women’s Council of Ireland, held a hustings

for women candidates to meet women voters in each of the three Irish European constituencies.

European Democratic Party.

European Free Alliance.

Party of European Socialists.

European Green Party.

100

European People’s Party.

101

European Conservatives and Reformists.

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A similar trend can also be observed at

national

party level where some national parties reported having

very ambitious internal gender policies in place for their electoral lists, governing bodies, or both, while

others indicated having taken no measures at all

102

. For instance, one party ensured balance in electoral

lists and governing bodies in accordance with party statutes

103

. Another national respondent followed

gender quotas for electoral lists and governing bodies

104

, or promoted gender balance through programs

designed to empower women

105

. One response to the survey showed a very high level of inclusiveness,

where rules for the governing body following e.g. a “40/60 principle” also accounted for non-binary

candidates

106

. Several respondents reportedly achieved gender balance through parity on both the

electoral lists and in governing bodies

107

. One other example of special measures to achieve gender

equality within the governing body included having a special seat for women’s organizations

108

, or

ensuring that 50% of the positions in governing bodies, such as presidents, were held by women

109

Some national parties focused on gender equality on the electoral list, for example through parity.

However, they focused less on gender equality in the governing bodies

110

. Additionally, it was reported

by one national party that gender specific policies had little impact on gender equality in practice

111

In Slovenia, four political parties signed a memorandum to use zipped systems in electoral lists, and

three other parties used such zipped systems despite not signing the memorandum, and all parties put a

woman in at least the second place on the list

112

2.3.4.

Introduction

Persons with disabilities

More than 100 million people in the EU have some form of a disability

113

. In March 2021, the

Commission’s 2021-2030

Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

114

announced several

actions to foster participation in elections of persons with disabilities, such as working with Member

States in the European Cooperation Network on Elections to support full electoral participation and

accessibility of the European elections, discussing inclusive candidate practices in the framework of the

high-level on elections announced by the European Democracy Action Plan, and preparing a guide of

good electoral practice addressing participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral processes.

The following actions were taken in follow-up to the Strategy:

•

Member States took different steps to support the electoral rights of persons with a disability

which were, among others, supported by dedicated discussion and close cooperation with the

European Cooperation Network on Elections

115

. Member States shared within the framework

of this network practices promoting electoral participation of citizens with disabilities,

including in the context of the preparation of election reforms, optimisation of postal voting

and Braille ballots, specific training for election officials, and use of generative artificial

intelligence to increase accessibility of electoral information.

102

103

Czechia, Latvia, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia.

Austria.

104

Slovenia.

105

Austria.

106

Italy.

107

Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy and Sweden.

108

Estonia.

109

Poland.

110

Luxembourg and Slovenia.

111

Finland.

112

Replies to a Commission’s questionnaire by the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities

for Women and Men.

113

Council of the European Union,

Disability in the EU: facts and figures,

last reviewed 18 February 2025.

114

Communication

from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and

Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with

Disabilities 2021-2030, COM/2021/101 final, 03 March 2021.

115

Meetings of 16 January, 29 March and 27 September 2023.

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•

At a meeting of the European Cooperation Network on Elections on 12 June 2023, the European

Parliament presented its communication plans for the European elections, including as regards

persons with disabilities.

During the same meeting, the European Disability Forum presented the EU-funded project

‘Disability Rights in European Elections’ aiming to increasing political participation of persons

with disabilities through mobilisation and awareness raising.

During the high-level event on elections held on 23 and 24 October 2023

116

, a session was

dedicated to measures fostering inclusive political representation of different groups, including

persons with disabilities. The European Disability Forum presented the different barriers that

persons with disabilities face when exercising their election rights, including in terms of

insufficient funding for ensuring disability-inclusive elections. Member States, such as Spain,

Austria and Czechia expounded on their constant efforts to remove all obstacles regarding the

right to vote, including providing accessible information on election in different formats and

modes, specific training for election officials and accessible Braille ballots. Finland presented

its practices in engaging different groups, including persons with disabilities, to participate in

society and politics. A further session addressed best practices for ensuring electoral rights for

persons with disabilities, such as providing accessible communication and facilities.

On 6 December 2023, the Commission published the guide on good electoral practices for

persons with disabilities

117

, as part of a larger package of measures fostering EU citizenship

118

In the preparation of the guide, the Commission relied on targeted exchanges among the

membership of the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the support of a dedicated

subgroup of the same network. A vast majority of Member States sent contributions to a survey

launched by the Commission on electoral frameworks and practices addressing participation in

elections of persons with disabilities. A network of academics supporting the Commission in

its work on EU citizenship also contributed with a targeted study on the participation of citizens

with disabilities in elections

119

. The Commission actively sought to involve stakeholders,

including through ad-hoc consultations of all actors active on the topic of electoral rights of

persons with disabilities. The Guide reflects various measures taken by Member States to

address the obstacles faced by citizens with disabilities when interacting with the electoral

environment, including election materials, facilities, and procedures. It aims to support efforts

to ensure that citizens with disabilities can exercise their electoral rights effectively.

Findings and monitoring of election accessibility

Election observers reported that participation by persons with disabilities improved in the 2024

elections to the European Parliament, thanks to alternative voting measures, better polling station

accessibility and ballot readability for example

120

. However, they noted that it still varies between

Member States. Election observers indicated that some Member States, including Luxembourg,

improved their legislation to require polling station accessibility and facilitate participation by providing

free transport or other services. However, accessibility remains an issue, especially in Cyprus, Malta or

Romania

121

. In addition, several Member States (i.e. France, Belgium, Cyprus and Malta) do not provide

116

117

European Commission,

High-level event on Elections,

23/24 October 2023.

Guide

of good electoral practices in Member States addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities in

the electoral process, Brussels, SWD(2023) 408 final, 06 December 2023.

118

The 2023 Citizenship package included a Compendium of e-voting and other Information and communication

technology practices, prepared in cooperation with Member States and the Council of Europe. The Compendium

also addresses the needs of persons with disabilities, fostering election accessibility.

119

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

120

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

121

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024. For instance according to data collected by other electoral observers (expertforum.ro) in

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any alternative to vote in-person for persons with disabilities who cannot physically visit polling stations

on election day

122

As regards persons with disabilities being elected, underrepresentation still persists in 2024. While

official figures are not available, it seems that there are three MEPs with disabilities in the new European

Parliament (compared to seven MEPs with disabilities in the previous Parliament)

123

. Civil society

organisations and other relevant stakeholders working on disability-related issues continue to call for

accessible electoral procedures and more candidates with disabilities, including by referring to Article

29 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to which the EU and all its Member

States are parties

124

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

calls on Member States to support the electoral

participation of persons with disabilities, both as voters and candidates, and prevent and remove the

barriers they encounter when participating in elections. Such barriers include the blanket removal

of electoral rights of persons with intellectual and psycho-social disabilities without individual

assessment and possibility of judicial review.

The Recommendation also encourages Member States to make best use of the guide of good electoral

practices, and to continue to work with the Commission in the framework of the European

Cooperation Network on Elections, also taking into account views expressed by entities representing

the interests of persons with disabilities.

Additionally, the Recommendation invites Member States to consider implementing practical

measures to ensure accessibility of polling stations, including by making use of means such as QR

codes, Braille, large printouts, audio and easy-to-read guides, tactile stencils, magnifying glasses,

extra lighting, stamps, and accessible writing utensils. Political parties are also called to address

the needs of persons with disabilities in their campaigning, for example by organising events in

accessible locations and by using means, modes and formats of communication. Member States and

political parties should also consider providing other forms of support, such as telephone assistance,

sign interpretation, accessible transport and accessible procedures for requesting accommodation.

Member States should also support the participation of persons with disabilities as election officials

and ensure the wide dissemination of best practices supporting participation of citizens with

disabilities in the electoral process.

Most

Member States

took specific measures to support participation in elections by persons with

disabilities. In doing so, 20 of the 25 responding Member States explicitly stated that that responded to

the Commission’s survey explicitly stated they had made use of the Commission’s guide addressing the

participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral process

125

A wide range of national good practices can be highlighted in this regard. Austria improved the ballot

paper by adding a bevel on one side for persons with visual impairments, to be used together with a

template, and ensured suitable guidance for blind persons. In addition, a template with Braille lettering

for signing the affidavit for postal ballots was introduced. Furthermore, new legislation ensured that in

Romania, the electoral process is not fully accessible to persons with disabilities even though there have been

some improvements. There are no special tools for assisted voting (eg. Braille) and 225 out of the 917 polling

stations visited by election observers on election day in Romania were not accessible to persons with disabilities.

122

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

123

As indicated by the Vice-Chair of the Employment and Social Affairs Committee Katrin Langensiepen.

124

Disability Intergroup: 2024 EU elections and re-establishment of the intergroup - European Disability Forum

125

Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg,

Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

every building where polling stations are located, at least one has to be fully accessible for people with

disabilities. Belgium put in place free adapted transport service for persons with disabilities to get to

the polling stations and enabled persons with disabilities to act as election officials. It also piloted the

use of Braille ballots in two electoral cantons. Slovenia

126

and Czechia passed legislation enabling all

persons with disabilities to vote, regardless of their legal capacity. Slovenia’s new rules were already

applicable for the 2024 European Parliament elections, Czechia’s rules will be applicable as of January

2026. Czechia also published information in accessible format, advised municipalities to place the

polling station, if possible, in accessible buildings and publish this information, and spread information

through relevant representative organisations, among other measures. Greece made available online a

specially adapted ballot and ensured full accessibility of official election information. Spain extended

accessible signage on elections

127

to all the capital cities of the Autonomous Communities, and to the

Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla. It also supported election officials with disabilities by making

provision in its legislation for the use of free magnetic induction loop service for deaf or hearing-

impaired people who use hearing aids (both holders and stand-in). Blind or severely visually impaired

persons were provided with the necessary tools and mechanisms to enable them to carry out their duties

with due autonomy. Estonia developed a checklist for the accessibility of polling stations and trained

polling staff on the needs of voters with disabilities. In France, polling stations must be accessible to all

types of disability; they must have at least one polling booth that is accessible to people in wheelchairs;

the ballot box must be accessible and the president of the polling station must take all necessary

measures to facilitate independent voting by persons with disabilities. French Electoral Code also

obliges candidates to ensure campaigns’ accessibility. Croatia made specific efforts to train and guide

its election officials on how to ensure the accessibility of the voting process, and made available election

information through more than one sensory channel.

Hungary supported the accessibility of election information and political advertising broadcast on

audio-visual media services and provided Braille templates for voters with visual impairments.

Germany indicated polling station accessibility on voter notifications and ensured that blind and

visually impaired voters were able to use free ballot paper templates provided by associations for the

blind, allowing them to vote independently. These templates included tactile markings and audio

instructions, ensuring secrecy and accessibility in the voting process. For orientation purposes, the upper

right corners of all ballot papers were punched or cut off and the upper right corner of the ballot paper

template was also cut off.

Ireland put in place visual aids like photographs and emblems on ballots, large-print ballot displays,

and ballot paper templates for visually impaired voters. It also conducted extensive outreach, including

in cooperation with disability organisations. Malta supported persons with visual impairments by

providing Braille templates, as well as a playback listening devices and implemented priority queues

for persons with disabilities (within a specific time bracket). Luxembourg facilitated transportation of

persons with disabilities to the polling stations, made use of tactile templates to ensure independent

voting, organised targeted political sessions for voters encountering difficulties in understanding

political programmes and took additional steps to improve the legibility of ballot papers.

The Netherlands organised a webinar and a workshop on accessible elections for election officials. It

provided accessible voting documents and subsidised various initiatives to disseminate accessible

information about which facilities can be found in polling stations to make voting more accessible for

persons with disabilities (waarismijnstemlokaal.nl), to organise livestreams for persons with hearing

126

In January 2024, the Slovenian Parliament confirmed an amendment to the National Assembly Election Act,

which restores the right to vote to all adult citizens, who were deprived of the right to vote because they were

placed under guardianship due to intellectual and psychosocial disabilities or parental rights were extended to

their parents.

127

Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Elecciones Europeas,

Provisional Results,

last accessed 19 February 2025.

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impairments with information on the European Parliament elections and to help municipalities recruit

persons with intellectual disabilities as polling officials and support them doing this work.

Portugal took specific measures to follow up on the Commission’s guide of good electoral practices for

persons with disabilities, including by raising awareness, improving accessibility of election

information in cooperation with disability organisations, and using Braille matrices and enlarged

printouts. Romania conducted a comprehensive assessment of the accessibility of the voting process

with the consultation of disability organisations and provided election information in accessible formats

and modes. Slovakia provided sound recordings of candidate lists for the persons with hearing

impairments and supported the accessibility of political debates, including by using sign language.

Sweden produced information materials regarding when, where and how to vote in different forms of

media and languages, for example videos in sign language, “easy to read Swedish”, and Braille.

Regarding measures taken by

political parties

to increase participation in elections of persons with

disabilities, about 26% of the almost 60 national political parties that replied to a Commission’s

questionnaire indicated that they had taken such specific measures for the 2024 European Parliament

elections.

128

These measures included adding subtitles to campaign materials for individuals with

hearing impairments, distributing accessible campaign materials, creating resources for the persons with

visual impairments, hosting events in accessible venues, and using sign language during events. Only

one party explicitly mentioned having candidates with disabilities

129

, while another reported lacking

data on this aspect.

130

In this regard, the European Disability Forum conducted tests on the accessibility of websites of seven

European Political Parties ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, finding that they are vastly

inaccessible to users with disabilities, with some components even reversing default accessibility

measures

131

2.3.5.

Introduction

Mobile EU citizens and EU citizens residing in third countries

Mobile EU citizens (EU citizens who have moved to another Member State to work, live or study) have

the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament in their Member State

of residence under the same conditions as nationals of that Member State, in line with EU law

132

. Under

national electoral rules and procedures, mobile EU citizens can also choose to vote in their Member

State of origin

133

. The number of mobile EU citizens on 1 January 2023 was 14 million

134

. It is not

known how many of them are eligible to vote or to stand as candidates.

128

129

Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

Spain.

130

Greece.

131

European Disability Forum,

Access Denied: The (in)accessibility of European Political Party websites,

April 2024. The findings are also endorsed by the

Funka Foundation,

a Swedish knowledge centre on accessibility.

132

This right, enshrined in Article 22(2) TFEU and Article 39(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is

given effect in Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the

exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the

Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34–38. Mobile EU

citizens may vote on the lists of their countries of origin in line with applicable national law (e.g. postal voting,

vote in consular posts etc.).

133

All but four Member States (Czechia, Ireland, Malta and Slovakia) allow for some possibility of voting from

another Member State, either at an embassy/consulate, by post or on the internet. Denmark, Germany, Ireland,

Cyprus and Malta limit the right to vote in the European elections in their state of origin when their citizens have

been resident outside their territory for a certain period. Conditions vary.

134

On 1 January 2024 there were 13.974.500 mobile EU citizens.

EU population diversity by citizenship and

country of birth - Statistics Explained.

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In addition, there are around 25-30 million EU citizens residing in third countries, outside the European

Union, who have the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament, according to national

electoral procedures. This opportunity, if provided by national law, allows them to participate in the

democratic processes of their home Member State, maintaining their involvement with the EU despite

being geographically distant.

Observations

Turnout among mobile EU citizens in the 2024 elections appears to have remained lower than that of

nationals. The availability of relevant data varies greatly between Member States. Data received from

Member States shows that the registration of mobile EU citizens in the Member States of residence

remains low across the EU from 0.28% of registrations in Latvia to 22.03% in France. There also

positive signs, however. For example, in Luxembourg, despite the proportion of mobile EU citizens

registering to vote in the elections only being around 17.82% for 2024, this is the highest number ever

recorded in Luxembourg. This figure has consistently increased since 1994, when it was just 7.4%.

Most Member States do not collect data on the turnout of mobile EU citizens who registered to vote.

Where data are available, turnout of mobile EU citizens ranges from one third to two thirds of those

who registered: 27.2% in Finland, 40.1% in Lithuania, and 59.63% in Czechia

135

Table 1: Number of national and non-national (mobile) EU citizen voters on the electoral roll,

2024 European elections

Member

State

Resident

nationals on

electoral roll

in own

country

Resident

non-national

EU citizens

Resident non-national EU

citizens on electoral roll in

resident country

Proportion of

non-national

EU residents to

national

residents on

roll

Proportion of

resident non-

national EU

citizens on

electoral roll (of all

resident non-

national EU

citizens)

9,04%

Belgium

Bulgaria

Czechia

Denmark

Germany

Estonia

Ireland

Greece

Spain

France

Croatia

Italy

Cyprus

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembour

Hungary

8.359.908

8.208.687

4.283.496

61.760.719

980.014

3.510.970

581.075

35.361.672

47.667.283

3.515.07

49.552.399

683.981

1.362.341

2.410.924

288.883

7.672.167

845.687

76.464

3.498

0,91%

0,04%

0,36%

0,33%

0,18%

1,16%

2,24%

0,86%

0,56%

0,17%

1.73%

0,00%

0,01%

10,59%

0,06%

229.890

3.848.716

136

15.602

202.301

1.753

40.660

13.023

6,79%

5,26%

1.989.947

1.221.770

302.991

269.127

83.438

11.840

15,23%

22,03%

16681

7162

171.713

137.201

340

30.605

4.635

0,28%

4,75%

17,82%

3,38%

135

136

3498 mobile EU citizens registered for the elections in Czechia, while 2084 voted.

Based on the population as of 31 December 2023 as determined by the 2011 Census.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

Malta

Netherland

Austria

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

Finland

Sweden

355.082

13.452.006

6.281.282

9.262.075

18.025.329

1.581.304

4.377.093

4.293.213

7.708.624

269.554

18.865

648.622

15.102

67.766

45.186

11.255

9.699

1.151

7.945

7680

43.189

4,25%

0,50%

0,72%

0,12%

0,05%

0,07%

0,18%

0,56%

16,02%

6,10%

10,45%

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024

On the basis of data available, 135 mobile EU citizens exercised their right to

stand as a candidate in

the elections

in 15 Member States. The overall number of mobile EU citizens candidates would be

roughly consistent compared to 168 candidates in 2019 and 170 in 2014, as mobile EU citizens continue

to represent approximately 1% of the total number of candidates that stood in the elections. A notable

change from 2019 is the reduction in the number of Member States where mobile EU citizens stood as

candidates, decreasing from 21 Member States in 2019 to 15 in 2024, due to the absence of mobile EU

candidates for these elections in Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania and Portugal.

In certain Member States, while the overall number of candidates increased compared to 2019, a drop

is observed for mobile EU citizens candidates (Germany, France, Latvia). In other Member States, the

number remained stable (Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia). Conversely, other Member States

experienced an increase in mobile EU citizens standing as candidates (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, the

Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria).

Two MEPs were elected (one in France and one in The Netherlands). This could be considered

consistent compared to 2019, when three MEPs were elected in France and two in the United Kingdom.

Table 2: national and non-national (‘mobile’) EU citizens candidates in EP elections 2024

Member

State

Belgium

Bulgaria

Czechia

Denmark

Germany

Estonia

Ireland

Greece

Spain

France

Croatia

Italy

Cyprus

Latvia

671

167

1413

1168

2250

3078

300

784

270

Own

National

candidates

280

Non-

national

EU citizen

candidates

Non-national EU citizens

elected

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Lithuania

Luxembourg

Hungary

Malta

Netherlands

Austria

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

Finland

Sweden

Total

319

137

306

493

234

478

542

310

231

1333

11912

135

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024

Measures reported by Member States

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

calls on Member States to take appropriate measures to

increase mobile EU citizens awareness of their electoral rights and obligations, both as voters and

candidates. It encourages Member States to create conditions in which mobile EU citizens can easily

access information about the progress and status of their registration. Where local authorities are

competent to enter mobile EU citizens on the electoral rolls, it encourages Member States to take the

necessary steps to support those authorities, including via administrative guidance, in their actions

to inform mobile EU citizens about their electoral rights under EU law. It further encourages

Member States, in line with their electoral rules, to equally take measures to inform their citizens

living in third countries on how and where they can exercise their right to vote.

20 Member States

138

conducted targeted information campaigns to increase awareness of electoral rights

and obligations among mobile EU citizens. Member States also used a variety of languages to

communicate with mobile EU citizens, including English, the official language of the country, and other

languages such as French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Finland provided information in 17 languages,

while Sweden provided information in 41 languages, both Member States including non-EU languages

such as Arabic, Russian, Somali, Northern Sami, Inari Sami, Skolt Sami, Albanian, Chinese, Karelian,

Sorani, Turkish, Vietnamese.

Ireland and Malta published information leaflets on the electoral process, which were made available

in multiple languages, organized events and meetings with mobile EU citizens and partnered with

organizations to provide them with information on the electoral process.

137

Luxembourg informed that, of the 76 candidates having the Luxembourg nationality, 9 also have a second

EU nationality. 1 candidate with a double nationality (Luxembourg & Portugal) has been elected. We do not

have such information from other Member States so candidates with double nationality are not explicitly

reflected in this table.

138

Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

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Some Member States

139

have digital supports and online platforms to provide information and facilitate

the registration of mobile EU citizens and offer ‘online self-check’ tools and portals for registration and

information access where citizens can verify their electoral registration status and receive updates

140

Direct communication with eligible voters through individual letters or emails is used in half of the

Member States

141

about their registration status and how to register or deregister, where relevant. As

explained in Section 2.2, Ministries and electoral commissions provide support via email, telephone,

and municipal offices to assist citizens with queries related to registration and voting procedures.

Electoral observers

142

in particular highlighted Belgium’s dedicated elections website

143

that took into

account mobile EU citizens and provided information in all EU official languages.

Several Member States took measures to support local authorities in informing mobile EU citizens about

their rights and the procedures of registration on electoral rolls. Various ministries and departments

provided guidelines, handbooks, circulars, and digital materials to assist municipalities. Training for

local officials, hotlines for queries, and templates for registration were also offered. Online registration

options and federal or ministerial support for technical and organizational questions were available in

some instances, alongside written or digital guidance provided through government websites.

In the Netherlands, municipalities handle the registration of mobile EU citizens wishing to vote, guided

by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Ministry provided a registration form (Y

32 form), translations in several languages, and advised municipalities to actively inform citizens. They

also developed flyers and web text examples. All information was shared with municipalities and made

publicly available online.

In Ireland, significant electoral reforms have led to rolling or continuous registration, replacing annual

canvassing. The Department supported local authorities with workshops and made administrative

process improvements to handle the expected increase in European Parliament election applications.

In Italy, the Central Directorate for Electoral Services has issued circulars addressed to the

municipalities for the dissemination of information on the arrangements for access to voting by

particular categories of voters, including mobile EU citizens; some of these circulars and other

information to facilitate voting were published on the Ministry’s website, in particular in the form of

FAQs.

EU citizens residing in third countries

Concerning

EU citizens abroad,

all Member States

144

that allow their citizens to vote from third

countries have reported measures to inform them about how and where they can exercise their right to

vote. These measures include the creation of dedicated official resources

145

like Electoral Commission’s

websites, social media pages and press releases providing information on registration and voting

procedures with information available in multiple languages. Ministries of Foreign Affairs and

embassies played a crucial role, disseminating information through their official platforms

146

139

140

Finland and Sweden.

Greece and Spain.

141

Hungary and Slovenia.

142

Election-Watch.eu

143

https://europeanelections.belgium.be/node/111322.

144

21 Member States.

145

Spain, France, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden.

146

Czechia, Croatia, Latvia and Slovakia.

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Various media campaigns, including TV spots

147

, radio programs

148

, and social media initiatives, have

also been deployed to ensure timely communication to voters abroad of all necessary information,

including on when and how to register.

Personalized letters

149

or emails

150

have been sent to citizens abroad to inform them of their voting rights

and/or registration status. In Spain, electoral reforms concluded in 2022 have ensured that electoral

documentation is now sent automatically to registered citizens abroad without the need for an

application. In Austria, legal obligations require municipalities to notify citizens listed in electoral

Information on electoral processes and procedures in third countries has also been shared through

diaspora organizations to reach wider audiences

151

. Sweden highlighted the cooperation with Swedish

Armed Forces to ensure that material was distributed to soldiers as well as contacts with shipping

companies to reach voters on board vessels on foreign water.

Dual nationals

EU citizens can be nationals of more than one Member State, one or all of which may use compulsory

voting for the European Parliament elections. Where a Member State of nationality of a dual national

imposes an obligation to vote, they may be prevented from voting in the other Member State of

nationality even if they wish so, and even if they reside there. Currently, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece and

Luxembourg have laws which require citizens to vote and punish the failure to vote without a valid

excuse. The specific conditions and penalties vary.

2.3.6.

Other groups

The 2023

Recommendation on elections

calls on Member States to foster broad and inclusive

democratic participation in elections in the EU and to offer accessible and user-friendly registration

tools for candidates and voters, taking into account the needs of different groups. Inclusiveness of

elections and participation of all groups can be supported by Member States and political parties

through specific actions and measures, which consider the needs and challenges of different groups

(e.g., demographic background, geographical location, etc.).

The EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025

152

points out the Commission’s intention to work with

European political parties, the European Cooperation Network on Elections and civil society to improve

participation of groups susceptible to marginalisation, such as people with a racial or ethnic background.

As highlighted in the 2020-2030 EU Roma Strategic framework

153

, the participation of Roma people to

the political life should be encouraged in Member States, in particular some with a significant Roma

population, including their registration as candidates and voters. During the high-level event on

elections held on 23 and 24 October 2023

154

, a session was dedicated to measures fostering inclusive

political representation of different groups, which addressed the participation of Roma people in

particular.

147

148

Greece and Hungary.

Greece and Portugal.

149

Belgium, Hungary, Finland (so called ‘notice on the right to vote’) and Sweden (so called ‘voting card).

150

Greece and Lithuania.

151

Latvia and Portugal.

152

European Commission,

EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025,

18 September 2020.

153

European Commission,

The new EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (full

package),

07 October 2020.

154

European Commission,

High-level event on Elections,

23/24 October 2023.

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Measures were implemented in some Member States to foster electoral inclusion and representation

among underrepresented groups including minorities. Slovenia and Sweden reported offering ballots

and other electoral materials in minority languages. Ireland reported having introduced targeted

communication measures to specific groups (such as traveller communities) to support and encourage

to register to vote (e.g., Ireland’s national Migrant Integration Strategy).

About 14% of the almost 60 national political parties that replied to a Commission’s questionnaire on

the 2024 elections, indicated that they had candidates from national minorities

155

. While the specific

minorities were mostly not detailed, two parties mentioned a Roma candidate

156

In the absence of official data, civil society organisations have published their own analyses.

They have

reported on challenges faced by specific groups, including on the basis of demographic background or

geographical location, such as people with a minority racial or ethnic background. For example, the

civil society organization Election-Watch.EU reported that, during the previous mandate, the European

Parliament included 4 out of 705 members of Roma origin (0,5% in total) from Spain, Germany,

Hungary and Slovakia. Of the eight known Roma candidates to the 2024 elections to the European

Parliament, none was elected

157

OOPERATION IN SUPPORT OF FREE

FAIR AND RESILIENT ELECTIONS

The Commission has actively supported Member States’ authorities by organising regular meetings of

the European Cooperation Network on Elections since early 2019. ECNE consists of national contact

points appointed by Member States to represent their national networks on elections and serve as a

liaison point between national and European levels of coordination.

All Member States have appointed contact points for ECNE. The contact points vary across Member

States in terms of the functions of nominated individuals or bodies, and can include (representatives of)

electoral authorities, ministries of the Interior, Justice, Public administration, or the State Chancellery.

Many representatives have remained the same for several years, which has helped build relations and

foster collaboration also beyond the meetings of the Network.

The Network has organised more than 25 meetings since 2019.

The 2023

Recommendation on elections

calls on Member States to strengthen cooperation on

election-related matters in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections,

including through operational work streams addressing covert funding from third countries, and on

awareness raising activities and strategies, among other issues. The Recommendation also refers to

cooperation of this Network with other relevant European networks including the Rapid Alert System

and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services. Member States have been

encouraged to continue exchanging best practices and perspectives on promoting the exercise of

electoral rights and supporting democratic conduct of elections and a high turnout in the 2024

elections to the European Parliament and beyond.

ECNE discussions were held in close cooperation with other relevant structures such as the Rapid Alert

System

158

, in relation to FIMI, and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services

155

156

Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden.

Czechia and Italy.

157

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

158

The Rapid Alert System is set up among the EU institutions and Member States to facilitate the sharing of

insights related to disinformation campaigns and coordinate responses. It consists of a dedicated digital platform

and a network of 28 national contact points.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

(ERGA) in relation to the issues within its remit

159

. The European Data Protection Board also

participated in meetings on issues related to the application of EU data protection law in the electoral

context.

Interactions were also fostered with international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

In the lead-up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the work of the European Cooperation

Network on Elections intensified. In October 2023, the Commission organized a High-Level Event on

Elections with the membership of the Network. In November 2023, the Network took part in a joint

tabletop exercise on cyber security of elections (see Section 4.5).

In addition to regular meetings, in the run-up to the elections eight thematic sessions were organised in

the framework of the Network, including on inclusive participation and communication, countering

disinformation and ensuring cyber security, the smooth organisation of voting for different groups of

voters, and candidate safety.

Examples of meetings of the European Cooperation Network leading up to and after the 2024

elections, and topics covered

Meeting

Topics (non-exhaustive)

12 meeting –

E-voting; election accessibility for persons with disabilities; high election

January 2022

standards during pandemics

13 meeting –

Strategic lawsuits against public participation (anti-SLAPP); e-voting; parity

May 2022

of treatment and balanced media coverage during elections

14 meeting –

E-voting; election accessibility for persons with disabilities; joint

September 2022

mechanism of electoral resilience; preparation of the 2024 elections to the

European Parliament including Code of Practice on Disinformation and

tabletop exercise

meeting –

Joint sessions with expert group on electoral matters; preparation of the 2024

November 2022

elections to the European Parliament including election observation; crypto

tool

16 meeting –

Preparation of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including

January 2023

inclusive democratic participation and gender balance; Defence of

Democracy

17 meeting –

Cybersecurity and disinformation; Defence of Democracy

March 2023

meeting –

Preparation of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including

June 2023

supporting turnout and inclusive participation; cyber security; electoral

participation of persons with disabilities; absentee voters abroad; protecting

the information environment

19 meeting –

Preparation of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including

September 2023

presentation by the European Data Protection Board; turnout and inclusive

participation (including women); cybersecurity; voting in third countries; AI

and disinformation

meeting –

Joint session with expert group on electoral matters; Preparation of the 2024

December 2023

elections to the European Parliament including communication and support

to high turnout; election observation; youth participation; cybersecurity and

feedback from tabletop exercise; EU Citizenship Package

159

A new independent European Board for Media Services, composed of representatives from the national media

authorities or bodies and assisted by a Commission secretariat, will be set up and will start operating in February

2025. The Board will replace the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) that was

established under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

meeting –

February 2024

meeting –

March 2024

meeting –

May 2024

meeting –

July 2024

meeting –

October 2024

Preparation of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including

electoral disputes and election information systems; protection information

environment including from disinformation; voter turnout; cybersecurity;

election observation; campaign funding and awareness raising on electoral

integrity; European Political Parties; data collection for post-election report

Preparation of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including

exchange on recent developments and best practices; women’s participation:

resilient ICT systems in elections including AI and deepfakes in electoral

context; encouraging election integrity and fair campaigning

Preparation of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including

exchange on recent developments and best practices; the media and

information environment around elections; mutual support to address

threats; measures regarding funding from third countries

First experiences of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including

exchange on recent developments and best practices; political advertising

Experiences of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, including a

keynote intervention by Vice-President Jourová; feedback discussion and

exchange on recent developments and best practices; inclusiveness and

resilience of elections; participation in elections and politics including by

women. First participation of certain candidate countries.

Cooperation between Member States’ authorities was facilitated among others through a collaborative

space, a mapping of the roles and responsibilities of different EU networks and bodies that support the

organisation of free, fair and resilient elections to the European Parliament and contact lists to support

operational exchanges during elections.

In December 2023, the Commission presented a Guide of good electoral practices in Member States

addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral process (see also above in

Section 2.3.4), and a Compendium of e-voting and other ICT practices in December 2023 (see also

further below in Section 4.5). Both tools were prepared in close cooperation with the Network.

Several Member States

160

reported having taken into account the 2023 Recommendation in the context

of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. For instance, 2 months before the elections, in Croatia,

the National Election Cooperation Network (NECN) established on February 2019

161

held a meeting to

ensure its full compliance with the 2023 Commission’s Recommendation.

Elections networks are formally established in 10 Member States

162

. 12 Member States indicated that

Digital Services Coordinators had been integrated to their elections network or consulted in the context

of the 2024 elections

163

. A broad majority of Member States noted their engagement with stakeholders

such as researchers and academia, elections observer, media platforms

164

160

161

Czechia, Germany, France, Croatia, Malta and Portugal.

In compliance, values and objectives of the 2018 Commission’s Recommendation on election cooperation

networks, online transparency, protection against cybersecurity incidents and fighting disinformation campaigns

in the context of elections to the European Parliament.

162

Czechia, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

163

Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Austria, Romania and

Slovenia.

164

Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

The final report of Election-Watch.EU

165

notes that ECNE has become a valuable forum for facilitating

contacts between Member States, mutual learning, and inspiring improvements, with national

representatives increasingly coordinating and exchanging on good electoral practices.

ROTECTING THE INTEGRITY AND RESILIENCE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

4.1. Preparedness, monitoring and response

Leading up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the Commission and other EU institutions

launched several key actions to strengthen the EU’s preparedness and ability to respond to challenges

to the integrity of the electoral process, in close collaboration and coordination with Member States and

different entities such as the media, fact-checkers and civil society organisations. This effort allowed

those involved to share insights, exchange experiences and best practices and coordinate responses to

FIMI and disinformation, as well as cyberattacks, the inappropriate use of AI and other threats.

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

includes different recommendations on protecting the integrity

and resilience of the electoral process. For example, it encourages Member States to take measures to

protect the information environment around elections and ensure that voters receive correct

information. It recommends building resilience and developing public awareness, media literacy and

critical thinking to address information manipulation, interference and disinformation related to

elections. It also calls on Member States to develop training to relevant authorities and to facilitate

cooperation among relevant stakeholders to tackle the information manipulation risks. It also

encourages European and national political parties to consider making their political advertising

available with information about the identity of the political party which sponsors it and where

applicable, meaningful information about the targeting of the advertising and on the use of AI systems.

The Recommendation also encourages Member States to take several measures to protect the election-

related infrastructure and ensure resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats.

On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the EU activated the

Integrated Political Crisis Response

(IPCR)

arrangements in information-sharing mode in relation to foreign interference in the 2024

elections to the European Parliament

166

. Under the coordination of the Commission, this facilitated the

exchange of information among Member States and EU institutions.

Monitoring and response were ensured also through the Commission’s Network against Disinformation

(NaD), in association with the Parliament and EEAS, including through a specific subgroup ensuring

swift exchange of information and response.

The Vice-President of the Commission responsible for values and transparency visited several Member

States to support preparedness for the 2024 elections as part of a Democracy Tour

167

Member States had continued to come together in the framework of the

European Cooperation

Network on Elections

to discuss practical solutions to a wide range of threats. One of the operational

tools that the Commission has made available to support Member States’ authorities in building their

capacity to detect and react appropriately to threats in the context of elections is the

joint election

165

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

166

Council of the European Union,

Foreign interference: Presidency reinforces exchange of information ahead

of the June 2024 European elections,

24 April 2024.

167

After the elections, the Vice-President presented an

initial assessment

of known interference operations

during the June 2024 elections for the European Parliament which was presented to the European Cooperation

Network on Elections.

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resilience mechanism

168

. That mechanism supports exchanges among Member State experts, which

several Member States used in the run-up to the elections.

Use of the Joint Resilience Mechanism by Member States

11-12 December 2023, Helsinki –

Cybersecurity and Elections; Disinformation and Election

Interference. The Finnish Ministry of Justice invited ECNE Member States to participate in an expert

exchange meeting to discuss election security related issues. Experts from Estonian State Electoral

Office, Estonian Information System Authority, The Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania and

National Cyber and Information Security Agency (Czech Republic) responded to the activity request.

12-13 January 2023, Stockholm

– the Swedish Election Authority organized an expert exchange

visit for the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania. Focus for the meeting was election security

and protection of electoral infrastructure, cybersecurity and IT-systems, national election cooperation

network as well as postal voting from abroad.

6-7 October 2022, Vilnius

- Expert exchange of the electoral management bodies from Croatia and

Lithuania to strengthen cooperation in elections. During the meeting the experts from electoral

management bodies exchanged experience on the topics on voting technologies, political finance,

electoral communication, and training.

16 May 2022, Bucharest

- The first visit of a joint expert team under the mechanism on election

resilience, organised in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, brought

to Bucharest experts from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, between 16 and 20 May 2022. The agenda

of the visit spanned a variety of topics such as new technologies and cybersecurity in elections,

countering electoral threats and protection of electoral infrastructure, and oversight of online political

advertising.

The

European Parliament

also stepped up its activities in this area and strengthened networks both

internally and with other EU institutions, Member State authorities and external partners. For example,

in December 2023, the European Parliament hosted an elections-themed meeting of the Rapid Alert

System, with the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the Council Horizontal Working

Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats (ERCHT). In November 2023, the

European parliament hosted a three-day conference “Fact-checking and beyond“, organised in

collaboration with pan-European fact-checking organisations European Fact-Checking Standards

Network (EFCSN) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). EU institutions and fact-

checkers from across the EU and beyond exchanged views on how to counter disinformation ahead of

the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. The EE24 website included a section dedicated to

integrity, providing practical tips.

The

Digital Services Act

(DSA)

169

is a horizontal regulatory framework which seeks to ensure a safe

digital space for recipients of intermediary services, while ensuring that fundamental rights are

respected. It does so by imposing obligations on providers of intermediary services in the Union and by

taking a tiered approach to the regulation of such services. Obligations apply asymmetrically, with the

strictest due diligence obligations applying to providers of very large online platforms (‘VLOPs’) and

of very large online search engines (‘VLOSEs’)

170

. This includes assessing and mitigating systemic

risks stemming from the design, functioning or use made of their designated services related to civic

168

169

European Commission,

European cooperation network on elections,

last accessed 18 February 2025.

Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single

Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act),

OJ L 277, 27.10.2022.

170

European Commission,

Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under

DSA.

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discourse and electoral processes, including through disinformation, intentional and, oftentimes,

coordinated manipulation and use of their services or tactics involving artificially generated content. It

has been a critical step in ensuring that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs uphold higher standards of

transparency and accountability on their services, as it requires them to adopt a risk-based approach,

conduct yearly risk assessments and independent audits and address illegal and harmful content and

behaviour on their services, including disinformation. In connection to the

Digital Services Act,

specific actions were taken for election preparedness

171

In this regard, the Commission issued

guidelines on recommended risk mitigation measures

providers of VLOPs) and VLOSEs should take to mitigate systemic risks related to elections

172

. As a

follow-up to these guidelines, the Commission organised a stress test in the form of a tabletop exercise

to prepare providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs, civil society organisations, Digital Services Coordinators

(DSCs) from the Member States and other stakeholders for information manipulation scenarios, and

exercise coordinated responses within the framework of the DSA.

At the time of the elections to the European Parliament, the Commission had also initiated formal

proceedings under the DSA against Meta and X for matters related to platforms manipulation,

coordinated inauthentic behaviour and deceptive advertisements used to disseminate disinformation

campaigns

173

. The Commission also sent several Requests for Information (RFIs) to designated

providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs about election risk mitigation measures and disinformation

174

During the first meeting of the

European Board for Digital Services

(EBDS) on 19 February 2024,

an ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Elections’ was established, with the aim of gathering expertise of DSCs

and competent authorities on electoral issues at the national level falling within the scope of the DSA.

The Working Group on Elections has proven to be a successful collaborative effort by the Commission

and DSCs to engage in dialogue, learn of country- and context-specific challenges and support efforts

to curb systemic risks to civic discourse and electoral processes

175

The

Code of Practice on Disinformation,

the first worldwide industry-led framework in the digital

field and source of industry best practices to limit the spread of online disinformation, also played a key

role in supporting preparedness for the elections. It constitutes a comprehensive multistakeholder

framework established through consensus among online platforms, fact-checkers, researchers, civil

society organisations (CSOs), advertisers and other specialised players. The Code sets out detailed

commitments by major online platforms and other players (ad industry, factcheckers, CSOs, smaller

platforms etc) to addresses online disinformation from key angles: demonetisation, transparency of

political advertising, integrity of services, empowering users, researchers and factcheckers.

Under the Code, online platforms signatories (Meta, TikTok, Google and Microsoft) made a series of

commitments to tackle disinformation including in the context of elections. Signatories have

implemented a series of actions to ensure preparedness during the electoral period, including enhanced

cooperation with other civil society and factcheckers signatories.

171

European Commission,

European Board for Digital Services publishes post-election report on the EU

elections,

29 July 2024.

172

European Commission,

Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for

electoral processes,

26 April 2024.

173

Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under DSA | Shaping Europe’s

digital future.

174

Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under DSA | Shaping Europe’s

digital future.

175

The Ad Hoc Working group has since been integrated into one of the permanent working groups of the

EBDS., Working Group 4 – Integrity of the information space. See

Working Group 4 of the European Board

for Digital Services – Integrity of the information space | Shaping Europe’s digital future.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

The signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation committed to collaborate during special

situations such as elections and, as foreseen in the Code, set up a

Rapid Response System

(RRS) for

elections in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. The system ensured a streamlined

exchange of information between civil society organisations, fact-checkers and online platforms to

ensure rapid and effective cooperation between them ahead and during the election period. This

collaborative initiative allowed non-platform signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content,

accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and

discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies.

Signatories of the Code also published – ahead of and after the European elections – reporting on the

measures put in place to reduce the spread of disinformation in relation to the European elections, based

on the Code’s commitments.

The Code also comes with a solid monitoring framework and since 13 February 2025 when the

Commission issued its positive assessment (following a formal request by its signatories), it is under

the DSA regulatory framework, offering pertinent risk mitigation measures to its signatories in the

context of their legal obligations under the DSA.

The

European Digital Media Observatory

(EDMO), which is an independent network of fact-

checkers, researchers and media literacy practitioners covering all EU Member States set up a Taskforce

dedicated to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament to monitor the European information space

during the electoral period

176

. The Task Force played an important role in exposing disinformation

during the elections. EDMO issued daily briefs, weekly insights, early warnings and targeted

investigations during the electoral period. It also ran a dedicated EU-wide media literacy campaign

#BeElectionsSmart, to raise awareness about the risks of disinformation around the 2024 elections to

the European Parliament. It also provided training series for journalists and other stakeholders dedicated

to election integrity.

In April 2024, a new

Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising

entered

partially into application. The regulation will make it easier for citizens to recognise political

advertisements, understand who is behind them and know whether they have received a targeted

advertisement, so that they are better placed to make informed choices. It will also ensure that online

targeting and ad delivery of political advertising are subject to strengthened requirements, which will

limit abusive use of personal data to potentially manipulate voters. All online political advertisements

will be available in a European repository of online political advertisements. Sponsoring political

advertising from outside the EU will be prohibited three months before elections.

While most of the provisions of the new

Regulation on transparency and targeting of political

advertising

177

will take effect as of 10 October 2025, within the scope of application of this Regulation,

Article 3 (definitions) and Article 5 (provision of political advertising services in the Union), paragraph

1 were already applicable during the elections to the European Parliament, ensuring in particular that

political advertisement services would not be restricted to a ‘European political party’ or a political

group in the European Parliament, solely on the basis of its place of establishment.

A series of actions were taken by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The

Rapid Alert

System

(RAS) coordinated by the EEAS, supported cooperation across Member States, including

during the elections to the European Parliament. Updates were regularly provided to the European

Cooperation Network on Elections, which provides a wider scope for cooperation regarding issues

related to electoral processes.

176

177

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

EDMO Taskforce on 2024 European Elections.

Regulation (EU) 2024/900

of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the

transparency and targeting of political advertising,

OJ L, 2024/900.

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Finally, in 2022 the Council had adopted the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence

178

, which

features an

EU Hybrid Toolbox

bringing together all the relevant instruments to tackle hybrid threats

to elections, including the

FIMI Toolbox

179

4.2. Foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation

Introduction and preparedness at EU level

According to the Eurobarometer, 81% of the EU citizens agree that news or information that

misrepresent reality or is even false is a problem for democracy. At the same time, it remains difficult

to understand exactly how and if such disinformation impacts voting behaviour

180

Foreign interference in the information domain, often part of a broader hybrid operation, may be carried

out by a foreign state or its agents as part of coercive and deceptive efforts to disrupt the free formation

and expression of individuals’ democratic choice

181

. FIMI is a pattern of behaviour that threatens or has

the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is

manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity

can be state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory

182

The Commission, the Parliament and the EEAS, closely monitored the foreign information

manipulation and interference and disinformation threats before and during the elections and

coordinated responses, actively intervening to support a fair electoral space. The activation of the IPCR

arrangements contributed to ensuring swift situational awareness updates and to detect and counter

FIMI.

The three institutions have cooperated in the setting of the Tripartite, consisting of a series of

coordination meetings to share situational awareness and inform each other about counter-

disinformation activities during the elections.

As of 8 April 2024, the EDMO Taskforce dedicated to the 2024 European elections

183

issued daily and

weekly briefs describing disinformation narratives being spread in the EU, with the inputs of its 14

regional hubs (covering 100% of the EU)

184

. It conducted in-depth investigations, for example by

analysing election-related risks based on 1000 fact-checking articles published in the context of past

elections

185

, and another uncovering FIMI operations such as the Pravda network

186

Providers of online platforms reported under the Code of Practice on Disinformation on the measures

taken to protect the integrity of electoral processes based on the Code’s commitments, and under the

DSA’s transparency database

187

on the number of content moderation decisions taken. Platforms have

multiple policies, which are reflected in their terms and conditions, to mitigate risks for electoral

processes and civic discourse. In addition, these policies can differ per platform, depending on the

specificities of their service. Therefore, a precise comparison cross-service on the scale of

178

Council of the EU,

A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade,

21 March

2022.

179

EEAS,

Tackling Disinformation, Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference,

14 November 2024.

180

See for example: Misinformation Review,

Misinformed about misinformation: On the polarizing discourse on

misinformation and its consequences for the field,

03 October 2024.

181

Communication

from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and

Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European democracy action plan, COM/2020/790

final, 3 December 2020.

182

European External Action Service,

2021 Stratcom Activity Report,

24 March 2022.

183

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

EDMO Taskforce on 2024 European Elections.

184

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

EU election Disinfo Bulletin.

185

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

Second edition (March 2024): Disinformation narratives

during the 2023 elections in Europe.

186

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

Russian disinformation network “Pravda” grew bigger in the

EU, even after its uncovering

187

European Commission,

DSA Transparency Database.

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disinformation spread is difficult to make. The reports from signatories of the Code of Practice on

Disinformation show that the cooperation under the Code was seen as successful by all actors involved.

The EUvsDisinfo website

188

and social media, run by EEAS and supported by their situational analysis

capability and strategic communication, reported regularly about attempts of election interference by

Russia and its proxies.

A dedicated series of articles

189

and social media products were published in the months leading up to

the elections to analyse, expose and pre-bunk Kremlin/ Russian state-affiliated actors’ deceptive

narratives as well as tactics, techniques and procedures. The Russian malign activity focused on creating

or stimulating splits and division in societies by spreading false information or flooding the information

space with inauthentic content. Other tactics include smearing political leaders, sowing distrust and

undermining public authorities

190

. This outreach helped raise public awareness including among

journalists, academia and civil society.

Observations

While there was an increase in the volume of information manipulation around the elections

191

, no large-

scale disinformation or information manipulation incident or campaign was detected during elections

days.

According to EDMO’s estimates, EU-related disinformation increased from 5% in January to 15% in

May 2024

192

According to the EDMO, the main disinformation narratives about the EU encountered on social

media platforms were:

•

False stories questioning election integrity.

193

False narratives alleging the escalation of the war in Ukraine and direct involvement of EU

countries in the conflict.

194

Recurring false narratives on climate change.

False content portraying migrants as “seizing power” in the EU.

Disinformation questioning election integrity suggested that EU voting procedures were unfair or

raising fears about rigged elections, manipulated outcomes and invalid ballots. There were significant

disinformation stories aimed at reducing participation in the elections or pushing citizens towards

practices that would invalidate their votes. For example, in Italy, false claims circulated regarding how

low voter turnout could trigger a withdrawal from the EU. In Germany, false stories suggested that

voting in the EU elections could be considered a crime or that ballots with holes or corners cut are

invalid when in fact these were put in place to help blind and visually impaired citizens to vote. In

188

189

EUvsDisinfo.

https://euvsdisinfo.eu/european-elections/.

190

The product material saw a very good pick-up which is in line with the trend of increased growth of users of

EUvsDisinfo material (cfr. at least 38 million users reached in 2024 vs. ca. 25 million in 2023.

191

As confirmed by the activation of the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements for addressing foreign

interference. Council of the European Union,

Foreign interference: Presidency reinforces exchange of

information ahead of the June 2024 European elections,

24 April 2024.

192

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

Final Report – Outputs and outcomes of a community-wide

effort,

24 July 2024.

193

study

carried out to assess the structural indicators under the Code of Practice on Disinformation showed

that only 5% of the disinformation posts detected in the sample were directly referring to civic and election

integrity.

194

For instance, the Commission’s Representation in Berlin and the German Ministry of Finance debunked a false

narrative about the EU introducing a solidarity levy to finance support or Ukraine.

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Bulgaria, social media, websites and traditional media were used to spread disinformation around fake

polls.

Disinformation also targeted political figures and parties. False narratives portrayed the Slovak

opposition leader as a foreign agent, alleging his involvement in planning a coup. In Spain, false

allegations were made that Volt, a registered political party since 2019, was a fake and was created to

divert votes from the political party Vox

195

Disinformation also deployed general anti-EU narratives, political hate and other deceitful narratives.

Russian narratives on social media in Germany

196

, France

197

, Italy

198

, and Poland

199

aimed to discredit

Western governments and criticized support for Ukraine, while also trying to boost support for far-right

political parties in the EU. In the Netherlands, messages on social media falsely alleged how the EU’s

Green Deal was destroying Europe’s food supply

200

. Further disinformation to discredit the EU has been

circulating in the Baltic States, claiming falsely that the EU mandated the immediate adoption of electric

cars, banning repairs of older vehicles and prohibiting the use of firewood for heating

201

. Other well

know narratives were re-tailored specifically for the elections to build false stories around EU

policies

202

EDMO’s reporting showed that most narratives have cross-border spillovers. It also shows that they are

often adapted to the specific national contexts. This matches the experiences of Member States as

reported in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, where they informed of

measures to taken to protect the information environment around the 2024 European elections and

described disinformation narratives identified during the electoral period.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Special Election

Assessment Mission found that disinformation, especially online and in social networks, including the

use of deep fake videos discrediting politicians, was used across Member States, often in connection

with negative campaigning and reportedly as foreign interference.

203

Beyond online platforms, the automated clustering of articles from a list of websites repeatedly found

by fact-checkers to be publishing disinformation shows that the main topics covered by such websites

are similar to those covered by disinformation narratives on social media. The peak in the production

of articles on such websites was found to have happened in the period from two weeks ahead of the

ballots until election days. This is an indication of efforts to influence the elections. The same pattern

was recognised in the case of national elections in some of the Member States in 2023

204

A handful of major Kremlin-linked operations that remained active during the elections period have

been exposed by the EEAS.

EDMO Task Force on 2024 European Elections,

Disinfo Bulletin – Issue n.43.

Reuters,

Russia-lined propaganda campaign pushes to undercut German support for Ukraine,

18 February

2025.

197

France24,

Russia behind dozens of disinformation campaigns targeting Ukraine and allies,

France says,

7 May

2025.

198

The Guardian,

Disinformation networks ‘flooded’ X before EU elections, report says,

12 July 2024.

199

Reuters,

Poland says Russia is trying to interference in presidential election,

06 May 2025.

200

Euronews,

Conspiracy theorists have turned from COVID to climate. How will it impact the EU elections?,

April 2024.

201

European Digital Media Observatory,

Disinfo Bulletin-Issue n.44;

European Digital Media Observatory,

Old

cars, immigrants and war-how EU related misinformation is spread in the Baltics,

07 June 2024.

202

Global Disinformation Index,

Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections: Analysis and Policy

Context,

08 July 2024.

203

OSCE/ODIHR,

Special Election Assessment Mission, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 2024,

November 2024, Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, preliminary conclusions.

204

European Commission, Vera Jourova Memo,

Known information interference operations during the June 2024

elections for the European Parliament,

October 2024.

195

196

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According to the 3

EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats

205

the EEAS detected 42 incidents linked to Russian FIMI activity around the 2024 elections to the

European Parliament, which escalated in the weeks leading up to the vote, peaking between 6 and 9

June, and continuing well beyond that. The pattern used was not new: setting up the FIMI infrastructure

well in advance, attacks on the democratic process, cyber-enabled interference, a surge in activity just

before the vote, and post-election efforts to undermine trust in the results.

According to internal documents assessed in an extensive FBI affidavit as well as by a consortium of

independent media outlets

206

, the Russian Social Design Agency (‘SDA’) is responsible for a range of

Kremlin led information interference operations around the world, including in EU countries.

Operations Doppelganger, Matryochka, Overload, and Portal Kombat share characteristics of SDA’s

strategies, though the exact boundaries between operations is at present unclear.

Doppelganger

207

activities targeting the European Parliament elections were detected in France,

Germany, Poland, Italy and Spain. This was the most notorious case of FIMI in the context of the 2024

European Parliament elections. The EEASinvestigation found that 7 legitimate media outlets were

impersonated, while 47 other inauthentic news outlets were used to promote FIMI about the elections

208

Thousands of inauthentic accounts on X and Facebook were used to drive traffic to over 100 articles

that mentioned the elections. Over 1 200 posts were discovered on X during June 2024 that appear to

follow the sharing pattern associated with Doppelganger

209

. The focus of the posts was to cease support

for Ukraine, discredit Western governments and political parties, and to generate fear around the decline

of the West. Those posts generated over 4 million views.

Another Russian campaign named Operation Matrioska attempted to manipulate fact-checkers globally,

creating numerous social media accounts and sending fake emails to distract media and fact-checkers

from real disinformation. The campaign operated since at least August 2023

210

The Counter Disinformation Network

211

reported, among other cases a pro-Russian disinformation

campaign “Operation Overload”, targeting fact-checkers, newsrooms, and researchers worldwide,

aiming to deplete their resources and encourage them to amplify false narratives. The actors operate

through a coordinated email campaign, an ecosystem of popular Russia-aligned websites, and networks

of Telegram channels and inauthentic accounts on X. They also reported violations of bans on Russian

media entities and individuals, which were accessible on TikTok: early June 2024 at least 29 TikTok

channels of Russian media entities banned by the EU or posing as such, were accessible to EU

audiences, including the official Spanish-language account of Russia Today with 2.9 million followers.

Measures reported by Member States

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages Member States to take measures to protect the

information environment around elections and ensure that voters receive correct information. It aims

EEAS,

EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, Exposing the

architecture of FIMI operations,

March 2025.

206

United States of America v Certain Domains,

Case No.: 24-mj-1395.

207

Doppelganger is an operation attributed to two Russian companies that initially produced clone websites of

trusted entities, such as established media sites and governmental websites. Their content was primarily distributed

through posts and comments by coordinated and inauthentic profiles on Facebook and X. The techniques of the

operation have evolved, likely due to measures taken on the affected platforms, such as domain blocking.

Recently, the operation distributes image-based content, such as cartoons, through paid advertising published by

inauthentic accounts and pages, particularly on Facebook.

208

European External Action Service,

Doppelganger strikes back: FIMI activities in the context of the EE24,

June

2024.

209

European External Action Service,

Doppelganger strikes back: FIMI activities in the context of the EE24,

June

2024.

210

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

EDMO Taskforce on 2024 European Elections.

211

The Counter Disinformation Network gathered 40 organisations and independent researchers, and monitored

information manipulation in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections.

205

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among others to build resilience and develop public awareness, media literacy and critical thinking

to address information manipulation, interference and disinformation related to elections, including

the 2024 European elections. The Recommendation encourages Member States to support projects

building resilience and developing public awareness, media literacy and critical thinking, including

by promoting EU funding opportunities such as the CERV Programme. Training of election and

other relevant authorities on how to efficiently pre-bunk and debunk information manipulation,

interference and disinformation, online and offline, about election procedures is particularly

relevant in this context. One of the operational tools that the Commission has been using to support

Member States’ authorities to build their capacity to detect and react appropriately to disinformation

in the context of elections is the

joint election resilience mechanism,

which several Member States

used to prior to the elections.

Member States

also took various measures to protect the information environment around the 2024

elections to the European Parliament from disinformation and foreign information manipulation and

interference.

In response to the Commission survey, 15 Member States reported that they had taken measures to

support or facilitate the transmission of swift messages and responses to protect the information

environment (such as message pre-bunking or debunking information manipulation and

disinformation)

212

. 14 Member States reported that the had provided specific support for independent

media and factchecking organisations

213

, while 13 developed training for election or other relevant

authorities

214

. 10 Member States reported specifically to have made use of tools such as actions

contained in the FIMI toolbox or the Rapid Alert System

215

. Regular meetings and information sharing

with Member States were organised within the Rapid Alert System before and during the election

period.

Some examples of measures taken are as follows: Austria raised public awareness, held awareness

classes and security briefings, set up a network against disinformation and organised a tabletop exercise

regarding the interministerial cooperation in cases of election related disinformation. In order to

guarantee proper coordination and preparedness among the different departments involved in the

detection, analysis and response to disinformation campaigns, Spain put in place a special coordination

plan in the framework of the Standing Committee against disinformation, which was integrated in the

national election network for the security of elections. The Plan led to a joint risk analysis report, a

protocol for information exchange and periodical reports on the evaluation of threats that were shared

among the departments involved. Ireland published a Framework on Online Electoral Process

information, Political Advertising and Deceptive AI Content

216

. The Framework was developed in

response to concerns and evidence from a range of international bodies and actors including the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Institute for Democracy and

Electoral Affairs and the European Digital Media Observatory regarding the potential for

disinformation, deceptive use of artificial intelligence and other online activity to compromise the

integrity of electoral processes and undermine democratic values and principles. The Netherlands

developed a reactive approach, also based on analysis of media early reports and fact checkers’ reports

on possible disinformation about the electoral process. In Portugal, the National Electoral Commission

(CNE) has signed a collaboration protocol with ISCTE - University Institute of Lisbon, through its

MediaLab CIES-ISCTE research project, for the monitoring and screening of political disinformation

212

Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,

Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

213

Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal,

Romania, Slovenia and Sweden.

214

Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, France, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia

and Sweden.

215

Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Spain, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

216

Irish Legal News,

Electoral commission tackling ‘deceptive use of AI’ ahead of elections,

24 April 2024.

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in the context of the electoral campaign. In Slovenia authorities organised training with public officials

on disinformation. There is a task force dedicated to counter disinformation and FIMI. Anti-

disinformation campaign under slogan “stop the disinformation, read, think, check” was launched as

well as awareness-raising campaign on 20th EU accession anniversary.

Media literacy

To support people navigating the information space around the elections, a specific emphasis was

placed on measures aimed at improving societal resilience and preparedness. This included support for

digital and media literacy and critical thinking.

Specific initiatives taken by the EU institutions to improve societal resilience

•

A dedicated joint multi-channel and multi-lingual awareness-raising campaign on risks

related to information manipulation and the importance of developing critical thinking was

carried out by the Commission and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media

Services (ERGA) and broadcast in the Member States. The campaign video

217

generated 217

million impressions on social media, 7 million YouTube views as well as reaching 53 radio

and TV channels in 17 countries whose population total 330 million.

The Commission’s toolkit on how to spot disinformation

218

was updated, encouraging

secondary school teachers to equip their students with the essential skills to navigate the

online landscape. A new webpage

219

provided a single access point to all useful information

and resources on strategic communication and combating information manipulation,

including short videos and factsheet.

The statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) launched a data and fact checking

service for the European elections which facilitated journalists and fact-checkers’ access to

data and statistics on the EU

220

The European Parliament produced and distributed written and audio-visual material for the

public. The European Parliament published on Meta, LinkedIn, YouTube, X and TikTok

with content giving users tips to counter disinformation in the two months prior to EE24.

This led to a total of 2,3 million video views. This included for instance a video series ”How

to spot disinformation: the tactics used to trick you - 435,000 organic view, and a series of

TikTok/Instagram videos with tips on how to spot disinformation - 426,000 organic views.

For together.eu volunteers, the youth and general audiences, the European Parliament

produced a leaflet “10 ways to tackle disinformation”, completed by an interactive quiz to

learn about disinformation.

The EEAS produced a dedicated series of articles and insights on foreign information

manipulation and interference

221

•

On media literacy, it can also be noted that the EU-funded projects (EACEA open call for cross-border

media literacy projects) and the Media Literacy Expert Group met to discuss the European elections

222

The meeting was very successful in mobilizing the media literacy community ahead of the European

elections, inform about relevant EU initiatives, as well as exchanging best practices from Member States

in preparing for elections.

217

https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-256994.

218

https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/learning-materials/spot-and-fight-disinformation_en.

219

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strategic-communication-and-tackling-disinformation_en.

220

Eurostat,

Eurostat launches data and fact-checking service for the European elections,

10 May 2024.

221

European Commission,

European elections: EU institutions prepared to counter disinformation,

05 June 2024.

222

A meeting of the Media Literacy Expert Group, held on 26/02/2024 in Brussels, which had a special focus on

elections.

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4.3. Use of AI

Introduction

The 2024 elections also brought AI increasingly into focus. Artificial intelligence has the potential to

improve the efficiency, precision, and openness of election processes by positively changing voter

interaction and the administration of elections. AI-driven solutions, like interactive virtual assistants,

can deliver tailored communication, offering up-to-the-minute details about polling sites, candidates’

policies, and how to vote, thus making the voting process easier for the public to navigate. In addition,

AI can help optimise the management of electoral data by enabling the precise gathering, storage, and

evaluation of large datasets, helping election authorities make better decisions, swiftly recognize

patterns, and minimize human error. AI can also improve election security by strengthening

cybersecurity defences, spotting irregularities, and uncovering possible fraudulent activity, thereby

protecting the integrity of electoral systems

223

However, AI also presents challenges, notably in the context of disinformation and FIMI, and the use

of generative AI. When misused, AI-based tools can be used to undermine electoral integrity, erode

trust in democratic processes and polarize entire societies. Sometimes these attempts to deceive consist

of flooding the information space with an abundance of false and misleading information, all with the

aim of hijacking the public debate. Often top politicians and leaders are targeted by information

manipulation campaigns.

Observations

In the weeks before the vote, the amount of fact-checked disinformation containing AI-generated

content detected by EDMO remained constant, at around 4% of the overall amount of fact-checked

disinformation (5% during the months before)

224

. AI was used both as a tool for disinformation and

FIMI, and part of the domestic political communication.

Civil society, researchers, and fact-checkers uncovered at least 131 instances of undeclared generative

AI content during the election campaign especially from parties at national level (i.e. five different

political parties in France, Belgium, and Italy)

225

With limited exceptions, highly-manipulative ‘deepfakes’ were not prominent during the 2024

elections. Instead, AI was used to produce ‘shallowfakes’, combining out-of-context captions with

images of politicians or events, and ‘cheapfakes’, with rather obvious manipulation of video and

image

226

. EDMO points to a case where a deepfake audio was used to target a political leader,

223

United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe,

Can artificial intelligence (AI) influence

decisions?,

07 June 2024.

224

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

Final Report – Outputs and outcomes of a community-wide

effort,

24 July 2024.

225

In the context of domestic political communication, investigations by DFRLab, Alliance4Europe and AI

Forensics collected 131 instances of unlabelled generative-AI content shared by European and national political

parties on platforms such as Instagram, X, Facebook, Vkontakte and Telegram. The DFR Lab reported that far-

right parties such as Rassemblement National and Lega used AI-generated content to spread misleading and

inflammatory messages. According to Alliance4Europe, Salvini’s Lega party used AI-generated images to deepen

societal divisions and promote false narratives, such as the "Muslim Great Replacement." Using AI-generated

images without watermarks is not in line with commitment 3.b of the 2024 European Parliament Elections Code

of Conduct signed by all European political groups.

226

European Commission, Vera Jourova Memo,

Known information interference operations during the June 2024

elections for the European Parliament,

October 2024.

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demonstrating how easily and cheaply false information can be spread to discredit candidates and

undermine the integrity of the entire election process

227

A satirical video featuring Chancellor Olaf Scholz was created with deep fake technology by activist

group the Centre for Political Beauty (ZPS). In the video, Scholz appears to announce a ban on the far-

right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party at the Federal Constitutional Court on the fifth anniversary

of the death of Walter Lübcke. The video was part of a wider campaign by ZPS that includes a website

collecting "incriminating information" about the AfD and an installation outside the chancellery in

Berlin. This has prompted the German government to consider legal action and review its approach to

deepfake technology

228

In the context of FIMI, AI was used in influence operations from Russia, including Doppelganger

229

. In

a report published on May 30, OpenAI, the company that owns ChatGPT, disclosed that its AI tools

were exploited by state actors from Russia, China, Iran, and Israel in covert online influence campaigns.

However, the campaigns struggled to gain significant traction, according to OpenAI

230

. This marked

the first disclosure by a major AI company of its tools being used in FIMI operations, highlighting

concerns about AI’s role in online disinformation

231

Another risk AI poses to elections is using generative AI, particularly in large search engines. These

systems can discourage users from checking original sources, instead promoting AI-generated

responses that may contain errors or biases. This limits access to reliable, fact-checked information, a

key component of informed decision-making

232

An experiment by

Correctiv

– an investigative and fact-checking organization part of the EDMO

network – revealed that three of the most used chatbots (Google Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, and

ChatGPT) fail to provide accurate answers to political questions, especially about the upcoming EU

elections. The chatbots either fabricate information, recommend non-existent Telegram channels, or

provide incorrect details about candidates. For instance, none of them correctly identified the German

front-runners for the EU elections, and in some cases, they even suggested content from far-right

sources.

Preparedness and EU legislation

Europe is leading the way in making AI safer and more trustworthy, while ambitiously addressing the

risks posed by its misuse. Important new legislative tools in this regard, including the AI Act

233

and the

Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising were not yet, however, fully in

application for the 2024 elections.

At the same time, providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large search engines

(VLOSEs) are already subject to a clear obligation to assess and mitigate systemic risks to electoral

processes and civic discourse, including when linked to the spread of manipulated content. In this

227

Vera.ai, AI4Trust, AI4media, Titan,

Generative AI and Disinformation: Recent Advances, Challenges, and

Opportunities,

February 2024.

228

Vera.ai, AI4Trust, AI4media, Titan,

Generative AI and Disinformation: Recent Advances, Challenges, and

Opportunities,

February 2024.

229

Meta,

2024 European Parliament Post-Elections Report Digital Services Act - Elections Guidelines,

November 2024.

230

European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),

EU election Disinfo Bulletin,

issue no 38.

231

OpenAI,

Disrupting deceptive uses of AI by covert influence operations,

30 May 2024.

232

AI Forensics, Algorithm Watch,

Generative AI and elections: Are chatbots a reliable source of information

for voters?,

December 2023.

233

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689

of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down

harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU)

No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797

and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 12.7.2024.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

context, the DSA Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks

for Electoral Processes therefore also recommend mitigation measures linked to generative AI that

providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs should take. This includes recommendations in the area of

watermarking, labelling AI-generated content, but also testing such systems and the input data and

sources used to generate content. In view of the elections, the Commission sent requests for information

on generative AI risks to six Very Large Online Platforms and two Very Large Online Search

Engines

234

In addition, the Permanent Taskforce of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, composed of

representatives of signatories, the European Regulators' Group for Audiovisual Media Services, EDMO

and the EEAS, includes a specific AI subgroup for signatories to reflect on and address the challenges

raised by AI in the context of disinformation, including in the context of elections.

To support the identification of AI related issues, the EDMO Task Force was assisted by a pool of AI

experts to swiftly detect and expose deceptive or misleading AI-generated content.

The European Cooperation Network on elections also tackled the topic of AI in the context of

disinformation in a plenary session on 27 September 2023. Member States highlighted the future of

threats emerging in the cyber and information areas and discussed the benefits, threats, and risks of AI.

They also discussed the possibility of promoting voter turnout with AI and using machine learning to

predict different voter patterns. Additionally, AI can simplify voter registration processes, and AI

powered language translation can help reduce language barriers and improve accessibility of elections

for voters with disabilities.

In addition, the 2023 Recommendation on elections encouraged political parties to adopt campaign

pledges and codes of conduct on election integrity, which should encompass in particular the pledge to

refrain from manipulative behaviour, in particular producing, using or disseminating falsified,

fabricated, doxed or stolen data or material, including deep fakes generated by AI systems. Political

parties should also provide information about the use of AI systems in election campaigns. The

Recommendation also led to a joint Code of Conduct for political parties (see Section 4.6.1). The AI

Act, whose provisions will apply as of August 2026

235

, aims to ensure trustworthy development and use

of AI in the EU. It categorises AI systems by risk levels: minimal risk systems face no obligations,

specific transparency risk systems (like chatbots) must disclose their nature, and high-risk systems (like

those used in recruitment) must comply with strict requirements. Unacceptable risk systems, such as

those manipulating behaviour or enabling social scoring, are banned. The use of generative AI and deep

fakes is regulated by the AI Act, including as regards labelling by the content creator, and risk

management obligations.

The Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (most of its provisions will

take effect as of 10 October 2025) will ensure that all political advertising is labelled as such and that

additional information is provided with the ad or from it (e.g., with a link) about the sponsor, the money

used for the ad and its sources, and, where relevant, the linked elections, referendum, legislative or

regulatory process, and the use of targeting and ad-delivery techniques, including the use of AI systems

in the targeting.

234

European Commission,

Commission sends requests for information on generative AI risks to 6 Very Large

Online Platforms and 2 Very Large Online Search Engines under the Digital Services Act,

14 March 2024.

235

The AI Act entered into force on 1 August 2024, and will be fully applicable 2 years later on 2 August 2026,

with some exceptions: prohibitions and AI literacy obligations entered into application from 2 February 2025, the

governance rules and the obligations for general-purpose AI models become applicable on 2 August 2025, and

the rules for high-risk AI systems - embedded into regulated products - have an extended transition period until 2

August 2027.

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Measures reported by political parties

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

stresses that AI can be used to generate or manipulate

image, audio or video content that appreciably resembles existing persons, places or events and

would falsely appear to a person to be authentic (so called ‘deep fakes’). It highlights the role of civil

society, media organisations, research institutions and academia in developing public awareness,

media literacy skills and critical thinking, which are key to equipping citizens with the skills required

to exercise judgment in complex realities affecting the democratic sphere, particularly in the context

of the increasing role of AI, including in election campaigns for instance when citizens use AI systems

to inform their electoral choices. It encourages European and national political parties to consider

making their political advertising available with information about the identity of the political party

which sponsors it and where applicable, meaningful information about the targeting of the

advertising and on the use of AI systems. Competent national authorities are invited to further

develop and update practices on the identification, mitigation and management of risks to the

electoral process, including by making use of AI detection tools. It also encourages political parties

adopt campaign pledges and codes of conduct on election integrity, which should encompass in

particular the pledge to refrain from manipulative behaviour, in particular producing, using or

disseminating falsified, fabricated, doxed or stolen data or material, including deep fakes generated

by artificial intelligence systems.

The 2023 Recommendation on elections also led to a joint Code of Conduct for political parties

which addresses AI (see Section 4.6.1).

In the Commission survey for political parties, only a few respondents mentioned that they had refrained

from using AI-generated content

236

, labelled it accordingly

237

, or even shared a specific code of conduct

for AI and social media platforms like TikTok

238

. Most national respondents did not provide details on

their use of such new technologies.

4.4. Data protection

Introduction

The 2024 elections were the second European elections to which the General Data Protection

Regulation (GDPR)

239

applied. In 2018, the Commission had published specific guidance

240

on the

application of EU data protection law in the electoral context which remained relevant for the 2024

elections

241

. In this context, the national data protection authorities (DPAs) were called on to make full

use of their strengthened powers to address possible infringements, in particular those relating to the

micro-targeting of voters.

236

237

Finland.

European Free Alliance.

238

European Green Party.

239

Regulation (EU) 2016/679

of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection

of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and

repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),

OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88.

240

European Commission,

Guidance on the application of Union data protection law in the electoral Context—

contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders' meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018,

COM(2018) 638 final, 12 September 2018.

241

The guidance provides clarity to those actors involved in election processes - national electoral authorities,

political parties, data brokers and data analytics companies, social media platforms and online advertising

networks on the principles and obligations of GDPR regarding the lawfulness of processing of personal data

(including sensitive data such as political opinions), transparency requirements, automated decision-making and

micro-targeting. It called on the national data protection authorities, as enforcers of the GDPR, to make full use

of their strengthened powers to monitor the situation and address possible data protection breaches.

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Observations and measures taken by data protection authorities

In the context of the 2024 elections, the European Data Protection Board, composed of Member States’

data protection authorities (DPAs), sent questions by DG Justice and Consumer Protection, inquiring

about

the DPAs' involvement in national election networks, specific measures taken to ensure

compliance with data protection rules, potential infringements identified, and any engagement with

social media platforms or other actors, particularly regarding the use of new technologies such as

artificial intelligence in the electoral context. Fourteen DPAs responded

242

They reported varying levels of involvement in election-related activities as enforcers of the GDPR.

While some DPAs were indeed involved in the work of national election networks, other DPAs reported

limited to no involvement in that work

243

Various DPAs took proactive measures to address data protection issues and ensure compliance with

data protection rules in the electoral process. Belgium’s

Data Protection Authority

244

issued

recommendations on the provision of copies of voters’ registers to political parties and candidates for

the purposes of carrying out electoral advertising activities by mail. It also issued info notes on data

processing in the context of electoral communication, and two opinions (no 160/2023, no 61/2024) on

relevant draft legislation. Croatia’s

Personal Data Protection Agency

245

promoted compliance with data

protection rules by issuing recommendations on the processing of personal data during the electoral

campaign. In Cyprus, the

Commissioner for Personal Data Protection

246

issued instructions to the

Ministry of Interior and candidates before the elections and conducted audits on election day to monitor

compliance. In France, the

CNIL

247

engaged in several meetings with political parties to raise awareness

about data protection. It sent letters to top candidates, party leaders and service providers to remind

them of their responsibilities and updated its guidelines for political communication. The CNIL also

updated its guidelines on political canvassing and examined the impact of AI on electoral processes

through a detailed study. The Irish

Data Protection Commission

provided guidance for campaigners on

canvassing and elections. In Luxembourg, the CNDP

248

updated its electoral campaign guidelines and

raised awareness about data protection as well as fair and free elections. Malta’s

Office of the

Information and Data Protection Commissioner

249

published guidance on data protection for political

campaigns. In Poland, the

Personal Data Protection Office

250

reviewed an amendment to the Election

Code and updated its election data protection guide. Other DPAs reported no specific measures to

monitor compliance with data protection rules in the context of the 2024 elections

251

242

Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Malta,

Poland and Romania.

243

While Croatia and Ireland reported that their national data protection authorities had been involved in the work

of the national election network, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Malta reported no involvement with this work.

The Data State Inspectorate of Latvia (DSI) was not directly involved in the election network but consulted

occasionally with the national electoral authority upon its request. In Estonia, a data security expert participated

as an observer in the e-voting process. In Romania, the Romanian Supervisory Authority was involved in the

approval procedure of several normative acts initiated by the Permanent Electoral Authority and participated in a

workshop on ‘Digitalization to increase the level of transparency, ethics and integrity of electoral management

activities and financing of political parties and of electoral campaigns’. In France, meetings were set up with the

CNIL and several national authorities and state departments during the election period.

244

Autorité de la protection des données - Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit (APD-GBA).

245

Agencija za zaštitu osobnih podataka.

246

Γραφείο Επιτρόπου Δεδομέ�½ω�½ Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα.

247

Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés.

248

Commission Nationale pour la Protection des Données.

249

Kummissarju għall-Informazzjoni u l-Protezzjoni tad-Data.

250

Urząd Ochrony Danych Osobowych.

251

Estonia, Croatia and Austria.

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Several DPAs conducted investigations based on information on suspected non-compliance reported to

them and on complaints submitted under Article 77 GDPR

252

Most DPAs had limited or no engagement with social media platforms or other actors in this context

253

In France, no major engagement with social media platforms was reported, though the DPA worked

with the Audiovisual and Digital Regulation Authority (Arcom) to ensure that the major online

platforms and major search engines comply with relevant obligations. The Irish DPA reported no

specific social media engagement related to elections. At the same time, it reported significant ongoing

engagement with many of the leading social media and internet platforms as EU Lead Supervisory

Authority on a broad range of matters concerning those entities’ compliance with the GDPR. In Spain,

there was significant engagement with social media platforms, in particular to prevent potential data

misuse and AI-driven targeting practices.

Measures taken by political parties

A survey conducted among national

political parties

to assess how they ensured compliance with data

protection rules in the context of the elections provided only limited insights. A number of national

parties have declared their compliance with the GDPR, but they did not provide further specifics in the

questionnaire on how they are implementing it in practice

254

. Although detailed reports on data

protection measures from national parties were limited, several national parties report that they had

adopted comprehensive data protection strategies, employed a dedicated data protection officer for

campaign activities, implemented specific technical security measures such as encryption, developed a

data delivery process or reviewed data breach incident response plans

255

. One party highlighted their

data protection plan, which includes information and consent forms, secure data processing, staff

training, and cooperation with data protection authorities

256

4.5. Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring cyber resilience

Introduction and preparedness at EU level

Voter registration databases, e-voting systems and other information systems used to manage electoral

operations such as the counting, auditing, and displaying of election results, and post-election reporting

to certify and validate results, could be at risk of cyberattack. The physical security of polling stations

252

Estonia, Ireland, Austria and Romania did not report on complaints. The Litigation Chamber of the Belgian

SA issued three decisions related to personal data processing by Belgian political parties. The French CNIL

received 167 alerts resulting in reprimands to four different political parties, focusing on practices like SMS and

email campaigns without the consent of the concerned persons. In Cyprus, two complaints regarding political

messages were received, but no issues related to processing of personal data with new technologies, such as AI,

were reported. In Germany, two complaints were submitted at Länderlevel and none at federal level. In Latvia,

several complaints were received, including on concerns about the personal data of election candidates and issues

involving the national electoral authority’s processing of personal data. None related to AI technologies or new

forms of data processing. In Luxembourg, several complaints were received regarding data processing of personal

data but no significant issues related to AI or new technologies were identified. In Malta, few complaints were

received, mainly concerning unsolicited campaign messages. In Poland, the DPA received three complaints

related to data protection in the electoral process, including on improper data sharing and SMS campaigns. One

alleged data breach concerning a voter list was reported, but no corrective administrative proceedings followed.

In Spain, the DPA handled several complaints related to electoral data processing, including high-profile cases

involving Meta’s electoral applications. A precautionary measure was issued to halt Meta’s plans for new electoral

functionalities in Spain.

253

Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria and Poland reported no

engagement with social media platforms.

254

Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

255

Greece, Spain, Austria and Poland.

256

Greece.

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and counting places, and facilities, assets and systems for the printing, transportation and storage of

ballots and other relevant election materials, such as specifically secured ballot boxes or stamps must

also be ensured.

Several

networks for cyber and hybrid action

have been set up to address these risks (e.g. the NIS

Cooperation Group, the Joint Mechanism for Electoral Resilience, the Computer Security Incident

Response Team Network, and the EU Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network).

The Commission worked with Member State authorities to manage such risks also in the context of the

2024 elections.

The Commission, with the support of the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and in cooperation

with the European Parliament, organised a

tabletop exercise on cybersecurity

involving the

membership of the European Cooperation Network on Elections. The exercise was funded by the

Commission through the joint electoral resilience mechanism. It sought to test and support preparedness

of Member States against cyberattacks and hybrid threats, including in the framework of information

manipulation and disinformation campaigns.

Also following up on the 2023 Recommendation on elections and the tabletop exercise is the update of

the

Compendium on the Cybersecurity of Election Technology

by the Network and Information

System (NIS) Cooperation Group supported by the Commission, ECNE and ENISA. It lays out

recommendations to Member States, steps to take and useful guidance in managing potential cyber

incidents throughout the election processes. Amongst the proposed measures are best practices on

information sharing, awareness raising and trainings together with risk management, cybersecurity

support for campaigns, parties and candidates, as well e-voting technology.

In addition, as part of the measures announced in the European Democracy Action Plan, the

Commission also presented a

Compendium of e-voting and other information and communication

technology practices.

This Compendium was developed in cooperation with Member States in the

framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the Council of Europe. The

compendium highlighted the importance of robust measures addressing cyber risks, such as hack-and-

leak operations to gain access to voter information and interfere with the electoral process, or distributed

denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, preventing voters from accessing connected online voting services

and websites.

The

European Cooperation Network on Elections

frequently discussed cybersecurity risks in its

works. The Commission provided a mapping on the roles and responsibilities of different networks and

bodies supporting the organisation of free, fair and resilient elections to the European Parliament, to

facilitate cooperation of different authorities and networks in Member States and at EU level, ensuring

that authorities and networks were aware of each other and could, where necessary, contact each other

in the course of carrying out their tasks.

The

NIS Cooperation Group, the Computer Security Incident Response Team Network, and the

EU Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network

also strengthened their cooperation ahead of the

elections. Cyber-preparedness exercises were organised with Member States and European institutions.

An inter-institutional Cyber Crisis Task Force, involving Commission services, EEAS, ENISA, Europol

and CERT-EU was also set up.

Measures reported by Member States and political parties

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages Member States to take several measures to

protect the election-related infrastructure and ensure resilience against cyber and other hybrid

threats. This includes, among others, promoting awareness of and planning for all contingencies that

could have significant disruptive effects on the smooth running of elections; identifying the entities

operating election-related infrastructure that are critical for the organisation and conduct of

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

elections, and taking the necessary measures to enhance the resilience of those entities and helping

them address the risks inherent in their operations. It also calls on Member States to take measures

ensuring preparedness for, responsiveness to and recovery from cybersecurity incidents related to

elections, and in particular, ensuring that technology used in elections is designed, developed and

produced to ensure a high level of cybersecurity; to cooperate with private entities involved in the

cybersecurity of elections; to increase awareness on cyber hygiene of political parties, candidates,

election officials and other entities related to elections; to carry out or update risk assessments

regarding the resilience of election-related infrastructure and of entities operating it, and collect and

aggregate data resulting from such risk assessments.

Some Member States protect physical election infrastructure by restricting access to certain facilities to

accredited personnel, sealing off certain areas from public access, conducting regular assessments and

setting up contingency plans for the interruption of voting, increasing security and surveillance of

polling stations. For instance, in some cases extra voting locations are set up as back up for physical

election-related infrastructure issues. Specific training and cooperation with police are also in focus.

Some Member States identified as critical entities public and private stakeholders, such as

telecommunications providers, energy suppliers, cloud services, police authorities, cybersecurity teams,

regulators, government IT and cybersecurity organisations. Measures to enhance resilience include

multi-entity collaboration, audits, evaluations, and workflow definitions with precise response times.

One Member State reported that evaluation, auditing, and testing are periodic, phased, and adapted

based on lessons learned from previous elections.

Most Member States reported that they had carried out or updated risk assessments of the infrastructure

and took measures to ensure a high level of security. Almost all Member States reported that they had

conducted test crisis managements and contingency plans, offered support and training to all relevant

stakeholders.

Several Member States reported that they had cooperated with private entities to ensure a high level of

cybersecurity

257

, while a majority noted that the authority responsible for cyber security had been

involved in their national electoral network. Portugal indicated that creation of a permanent an

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) dedicated to elections cybersecurity was being

discussed. Ireland reported its collaboration with the European Centre of Excellence of Coutering

Hybrid Threats.

Many Member States also made efforts to increase awareness of the online safety of political parties,

candidates and elections officials

258

Member States also reported on the extent to which they took specific measures described in the revised

Compendium on the Cybersecurity of Election Technology and the Compendium of e-voting and other

information and communication technology practices. A large majority of Member States reported to

have ensured effective testing and auditing (24 out of 25 replying Member States), ensuring that

elections officials receive appropriate training (20 Member States), and relying on secure digital

identification (16 Member States). Other common measures to protect election-related infrastructure

and ensure cyber resilience included using state of the art ICT (15 Member States), including

cybersecurity requirements in procurement and outsourcing contracts (14 Member States) or ensuring

that no state, region or municipality is in a situation of long-term electoral dependency on a specific

private provider (9 Member States).

257

258

Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and

Slovenia.

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While not directly related to the elections, it is also relevant to mention Operation Endgame

259

. This

operation, coordinated from Europol’s headquarters between 27 and 29 May 2024, targeted droppers

including, IcedID, SystemBC, Pikabot, Smokeloader, Bumblebee and Trickbot. The actions focused on

disrupting criminal services through arresting High Value Targets, taking down the criminal

infrastructures and freezing illegal proceeds. This approach had a global impact on the dropper

ecosystem. The malware, whose infrastructure was taken down during the action days, facilitated

attacks with ransomware and other malicious software. Following the action days, eight fugitives linked

to these criminal activities, wanted by Germany, were added to Europe’s Most Wanted list on 30 May

2024. The individuals are wanted for their involvement in serious cybercrime activities.

This was the largest ever operation against botnets, which play a major role in the deployment of

ransomware. The operation, initiated and led by France, Germany and the Netherlands was also

supported by Eurojust and involved Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition,

Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland and Ukraine also supported the

operation with different actions, such as arrests, interviewing suspects, searches, and seizures or

takedowns of servers and domains. The operation was also supported by a number of private partners

at national and international level including Bitdefender, Cryptolaemus, Sekoia, Shadowserver, Team

Cymru, Prodaft, Proofpoint, NFIR, Computest, Northwave, Fox-IT, HaveIBeenPwned, Spamhaus,

DIVD, abuse.ch and Zscaler.

The survey addressed to European and national

political parties

reveals that national political parties

across Member States have taken different approaches to addressing cybersecurity risks during their

campaigns in the 2024 European Parliament elections. These approaches vary in terms of efforts and

precautions taken.

Among all national political parties surveyed, about half reported that they had taken cybersecurity

measures of some sort. Of these, almost 30% had adopted more advanced practices such as risk

assessments, training, and penetration testing.

Some parties took significant steps to secure their digital infrastructure. For example, one party

implemented two-factor authentication (2FA), introduced a secure password manager, and conducted a

post-election penetration test

260

. The party also received assistance from IT companies and GDPR

advisors, encountering no cyber incidents. Another party maintained regular briefings with the national

parliament’s IT department and security services and regularly modernized its IT infrastructure. It also

migrated their servers to a high-security location before the European Parliament election and optimized

its firewall, utilizing external service providers to monitor IT security. It reported no significant cyber

incidents either

261

. Another surveyed party also implemented comparably extensive cybersecurity

measures including vulnerability analysis, threat assessment, log file monitoring, patch management,

regular backups, firewalls, VPNs, cybersecurity training, and prevention strategies such as antivirus

software, spam filters, encryption, Cloudflare usage, secure passwords, and SSL/TLS certificates.

262

Another implemented cybersecurity protocols, risk assessments, and provided unspecified training,

with no cyber incidents reported

263

. One surveyed party had proactively conducted a comprehensive

risk assessment, provided cybersecurity training, implemented secure communication tools, and

collaborated with experts for penetration testing

264

. Reportedly, it faced several unsuccessful hacking

attempts. IT teams were assigned by one party to prevent cyberattacks and it introduced internal rules

259

260

Europol,

Largest ever operation against botnets hits dropper malware ecosystem,

last updated 30 May 2024.

Austria.

261

Austria.

262

Italy.

263

Croatia.

264

Slovenia.

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for online safety, with no incidents reported

265

. Another party participated in events organized by the

national Security and Intelligence Service and maintained contact with the agency during the campaign,

though no other specific cybersecurity steps were reported

266

In contrast, for or some national parties, including smaller parties, cybersecurity efforts were expressly

limited. One party did not report any specific cybersecurity measures but acknowledged general

warnings from the national Federal Electoral Authority about hacking risks

267

. Another party expressed

limited concern over cybersecurity threats, believing that its exposure to cyberattacks was limited to

“state entities and social networks”

268

. Some national parties from different EU countries did not report

on cyber measures at all in this questionnaire

269

Compared to national political parties, European political parties reported a higher level of

cybersecurity preparedness. Among the European political parties surveyed, around 83% implemented

advanced cybersecurity measures.

Observations

In the last report on the conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, it was reported that

distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the websites of public authorities offering advice

about the elections were observed in a number of Member States, but at the same time that detection

and recovery were very prompt.

Such attacks continued during the 2024 elections in a few Member States. At the same time, mitigation

and contingency measures were in place to prevent impact on the conduct on elections. In Bulgaria, two

DDoS attacks against state private cloud infrastructures were neutralised during election days. Czechia

experienced three cyber-attacks during elections, although not directed to election infrastructure. In

Spain, DDoS against regional parliament webpages were detected. Also, airport websites were

concerned. The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service published a report indicating that

Russian hacktivists had launched DDoS attacks against websites of political parties and public transport

companies in the Netherlands, among other things, in an attempt to make it difficult for Dutch people

to vote in the European elections

270

On 1 March 2024 a false dispatch was published twice on the Polish Press Agency’s website regarding

a "partial mobilization" allegedly announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk. It was quickly established

that this was not true, and that the publication was the result of a cyberattack on the servers of the largest

state news agency

271

This illustrates how much of the malicious cyber activity had minimal impact and emphasized the need

for clear and consistent public communications among EU entities and Member States, in order to avoid

low impact incidents like DDOS being exploited for propaganda or disinformation purposes.

265

266

Slovenia.

Finland.

267

Austria.

268

Czechia.

269

Belgium, Czechia, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia and Sweden.

270

Dutch Military and Intelligence Service, Public Annual report 2024, 22 April 2025 (‘Openbaar

jaarverslag

2024 Militaire Inlichtingen-en VeiligheidsDienst’).

271

Wiadomości,

"Zaplanowany atak", "duże nasilenie". Wicepremier zabrał głos ws. fałszywej depeszy PAP,

June 2024.

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4.6. Fair campaigning and funding of the election campaign

4.6.1.

Fair campaigning

The 2023

Recommendation on elections

calls on political parties to promote election integrity and

fair campaigning. While not legally binding, it encourages political parties and campaign

organizations to develop and adhere to voluntary codes of conduct or campaign pledges that support

free, fair, and resilient elections. These commitments should uphold high democratic standards,

including rejecting financial contributions in exchange for political advantages and refraining from

promoting stereotypes or discriminatory statements based on gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion

or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.

Based on this recommendation, on 8 April 2024, all European political parties signed the Code of

Conduct for the 2024 European Parliament elections at a ceremony hosted by the Commission.

272

The

Code was also signed by a limited number of national political parties.

The Code of Conduct promotes core values such as transparency, fairness, and truthfulness in

communication, while actively countering disinformation and AI-driven manipulation. For example,

signatories commit to ensuring an ethical and transparent use of campaign tools and technologies,

including AI, by avoiding misleading content, such as falsified data, while clearly labelling AI-

generated content. The Code also sets ethical standards for both online and offline campaign activities,

enhancing public trust by improving cybersecurity and providing better access to campaign information.

Parties are encouraged to promote these commitments within their ranks, with the Code available online

for public monitoring and accountability.

Measures reported by political parties

European and national political parties reportedly also adopted diverse approaches to integrity and fair

campaigning, with varying levels of adherence to the Code of Conduct and other campaign-related

pledges.

European political parties have implemented various measures to comply with the Code of Conduct and

its campaign standards

273

. Notable good practices include: raising awareness through internal briefings

and promoting the code to member and aspiring parties; translating commitments into internal rules,

reviewing them with the general assembly, and publishing them in user-friendly formats; organizing

post-election reviews and discussions between parties; and being open to mutual discussions and

recommendations with other political groups

274

. Three European political parties reported publishing

information on their websites about online political advertising, including details on usage, spending

amounts, and funding sources

275

At the same time, as indicated in Section 4.3 on Artificial Intelligence above, there were some instances

of using non-watermarked AI images going against the commitments made on the basis of the Code.

In a reply to the dedicated survey, one national party confirmed full adherence to the Code of Conduct

and introduced additional pledges focused on transparency in financing, equal representation,

responsible communication, protection of personal data, and youth engagement

276

. It also conducted

272

International Idea,

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS,

April 2024.

273

International IDEA,

Advisory note Implementation of the Code of conduct for the 2024 European Parliament

elections – Takeaways from survey responses,

2024.

274

European Democratic Party, European Conservatives and Reformists, European Free Alliance, Party of

European Socialists, European Green Party, European People's Party.

275

European Democratic Party, Party of European Socialists, European People’s Party.

276

Croatia.

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post-election reviews, including internal assessments and feedback collection. Another party also

explicitly confirmed their adherence to the Code but had not yet conducted a post-election review

277

Moreover, it signed the Luxembourg Election Treaty, ensuring that the pledge was circulated internally

among staff, politicians, and candidates. Certain parties took an even more active role in establishing

their ethical guidelines. For instance, one created and monitored a "Commitment to Tolerance" and

conducted a post-election review. Another carried out an internal post-election analysis but did not

adopt formal pledges

278

. Finally, some parties gave unclear responses regarding their adherence to the

Code. Although they did not appear to follow it, one party had their own ethics commission and

candidate’s charter, reflecting a proactive stance on integrity and fairness

279

. Moreover, another decided

not to follow the Code

280

. Meanwhile, others adhered to its own code of conduct, focusing on “decency

and national pride”

281

Furthermore, out of almost 60 national parties surveyed, 16 confirmed that they had publicly provided

information on their use of political advertising ahead of the 2024 elections to the European parliament

(around 32%). This included details, oftentimes in form of a weblink, on the amounts spent on political

advertising and the sources of funding used

282

Political Capital, one of the main members of EDMO’s Hungarian hub (HDMO), published new

research

283

analysing pre-election campaign spending on Meta and Google ads in Hungary. The study

points to concerns about political pluralism on Meta and Google’s services due to highly asymmetric

spending on political ads in Hungary. The pro-government camp spent EUR 4.3 million on Meta and

Google ads (EUR 2.0 million spent by Fidesz and its politicians and EUR 2.3 million spent by third

party proxies), while all 14 opposition parties and their proxies spent less than a fifth of that, EUR

839,000.

Measures reported by Member States

For their part, Member States adopted a variety of approaches to support election integrity and fair

campaigning in preparation for the elections.

In response to a Commission questionnaire, some Member States reported that they had robust

legislative provisions to ensure election integrity and fair campaigning. For example, in Greece, national

legislation codifies standards aligned with international guidelines, ensuring compliance by political

parties and campaign organizations. Similarly, Italy reported to have several laws governing electoral

propaganda, equal media access, and public administration and communication in place. Luxembourg

stands out with a gentleman’s agreement signed by several political parties to conduct fair campaigns.

In another example, Croatia also highlights adherence to integrity pledges and data protection

regulations for digital campaigning, reinforcing democratic principles. Voluntary ethical codes are also

observed in some Member States. For instance, Slovakia reported that a voluntary ethical code for

electoral campaigning is available online, offering guidance to participants despite its lack of

association with official authorities.

277

278

Luxembourg.

Slovenia.

279

France.

280

Sweden.

281

Czechia.

282

Czechia, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

283

Political Capital,

Fidesz & Co. flood social media with anti-Western hostile disinformation in Hungary’s

election campaign,

reaching EU spending records, 08 June 2024.

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4.6.2.

Funding of the election campaign

The integrity of elections is dependent on many factors, including transparency in party financing,

which helps to maintain trust, prevent undue influence, and ensure accountability, particularly regarding

donations from third countries or undisclosed sources.

Situation in Member States

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages Member States to identify possible gaps in their

legislation related to donations and other funding from third countries to national political parties,

political foundations, political candidates and campaign organisations; and to address such gaps by

promoting transparency and by limiting donations up to a certain amount or prohibiting such

donations when they come from third countries and entities based in third countries or from third-

country nationals who are not entitled to vote in elections to the European Parliament or national

elections.

The rules and frameworks on political funding are rather diverse among the Member States. Several

Member States have adopted or are considering measures to increase transparency and oversight for

political party financing, also with a view to supporting democratic accountability and prevent foreign

interference

284

. For instance, Germany has adopted new political party financing rules, regulating party

sponsoring and hidden party campaign finance by other persons. In Denmark, a new law on public

financing of political parties has entered into force, and a proposal for increased transparency for private

financing of political parties is pending. In Slovenia, new rules should lead to more frequent audits of

the largest political parties and of a larger proportion of state funding. In Czechia, a reform strengthened

the office supervising political parties financing, with further reforms to close gaps on the funding of

presidential candidates and eligible donors being contemplated.

Funding from third countries

Some Member States have reported that they allow donations from natural persons from third countries,

with limits in certain cases. Others allow funding from third countries for both natural and legal persons,

but under specific conditions. Several others such as the Netherlands, Romania and Poland have

introduced or are considering funding’s bans from third countries altogether.

For instance, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg allow political parties and candidates to be funded

by way of donations by individuals from third countries.

In Denmark, funding from third countries is allowed, except for funding from physical and legal persons

that are on a public prohibition list.

285

Austria bans donations from entities from third countries exceeding 500 EUR. Cyprus also prohibits

donations to a party exceeding 5 000 EUR from third countries.

284

285

European Commission,

2024 Rule of Law report,

24 July 2024.

The Danish Minister of Integration (Udlændinge – og integrationsministeren) can decide to record physical

and legal persons that counter work and undermine democracy and fundamental freedom and human rights on a

public prohibition list if there is a certain probability that the person has the intention of donating to one of more

recipients in Denmark. Physical and legal persons are included on the Prohibition list for a 4-year period with the

possibility of extending the period 4 years at the time. See

public prohibition list.

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Other Member States, such as Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy or Spain, have introduced specific

exceptions related to the donors

286

and the type of support

287

Political parties

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages political parties and their affiliated entities to

assess risks stemming from donations from third countries and donations potentially linked to criminal

activity including corruption, money laundering and organised crime.

The Code of Conduct referred to the need to for political parties to ensure transparency of received

financial contributions, including benefits in kind such as gifts and hospitality received, loans,

donations, campaign contributions and expenditure to be in line with the applicable European and

national legislation. It also referred to the need to ensure transparency of political advertising and

campaign messages, including by providing information on sponsors, sources of funding and amounts

spent.

Rules applying to European political parties and their affiliated foundations are laid down in Regulation

(EU) 1141/2014, which is currently under revision, in particular to clarify the funding provisions (see

Section 5.2).

In the survey for national political parties, it can be observed that the issue of funding from third

countries was approached with caution, with rather few parties conducting thorough risk assessments

to prevent inappropriate or unwanted donations

288

Some parties reported strict compliance with national rules, including a ban on foreign donations above

a certain threshold and the requirement to report all donations exceeding €150 to the national Court of

Audit

289

. Several other parties also reported conducting risk assessments regarding third country

donations but did not identify significant threats

290

. However, many other national parties reported that

they had taken no action in this area at all

291

4.7. Safety: protection of candidates and elected representatives

Introduction

Politicians and political candidates can face undue pressures and threats to their security, which has

negative spill-over effect on inclusive democratic representation. Ensuring their safety emerged as a

topic of discussion during the 2024 elections.

Findings

In their replies to the Commission survey, several European (about 67%) and national (about 36%)

political parties

292

reported that they were aware of incidents of harassment and violence, both online

For instance, Finland bans donations from from third countries to political parties, but a party may receive

contributions from individuals and from international associations and foundations that represent the party’s

ideology (the definition is not specified in the law)

287

For instance, in Spain, it is forbidden to receive electoral funding (for “electoral costs”) from from third

countries, but it is possible for political parties to receive funding “without a concrete purpose”, only from

individuals from third countries and up to EUR 50,000 per person per year. Loans from private persons or

companies from third countries are also allowed.

288

Czechia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

289

Austria.

290

Slovenia.

291

Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland, Portugal,

Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.

292

This discrepancy could potentially be explained because of the fact that national political parties are smaller

with less information available on this matter.

286

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and offline, with women candidates and minorities being more frequently targeted, proportionately.

Around 41% of the national parties surveyed had put in place measures to prevent or combat online

violence or threats against candidates. Examples of some measures against violence include social

media monitoring, content moderation, specific guidelines, police reporting, as well as education of

candidates on preventative measures.

The European Green Party reported accounts of physical violence towards their politicians in Germany

during the election period, as well as digital violence, such as smear campaigns or attempts to

deplatform

293

. They also reported that violence, physical and digital, towards politicians is increasing,

especially towards women candidates and ethnic minorities. The Party of European Socialists reported

that one of their candidates for the European Parliament, was physically attacked while campaigning in

Dresden, and just days later, a female Senator was also attacked. The European Free Alliance reported

that their members and candidates frequently receive harassment, insults and occasionally violence,

usually based on their belonging to a national minority and their advocacy of minority interests. They

also reported harassing comments online including sexist or ageist comments directed towards one of

their female candidates.

At national level, online violence against candidates was also reported

294

, including notably against

women and ethnic minorities, as well as instances of physical threats and violence

295

. For instance, an

Austrian party reported a smear campaign against a female leading candidate which spread across social

media and e-mail channels. In Belgium, a leading female candidate’s car was damaged by unknown

perpetrators. A national Czech party reported that candidates were frequently targeted by online abuse

via social media, with women being proportionately more affected. In Finland, a national party reported

3-4 instances of physical threats against female candidates; with frequent but underreported online

violence as well. A Swedish party reported having a ‘security action plan’ in place. In Slovenia, a top

candidate was physically attacked by a man after a local event, leaving the candidate slightly injured.

Reports by electoral observers

296

also highlight alarming incidents of violence, harassment, and

intimidation in several Member States, creating a hostile environment for those who seek public office.

For example:

•

On 12 May 2024, in Ireland, a Councillor and her husband were assaulted by an individual

probing her immigration stance during their campaign activities in West Dublin.

On 17 May 2024, a Fine Gael candidate faced harassment and racist abuse while posting

election posters, forcing him to remove them.

On 20 May 2024 in Lisbon, a confrontation involving the Ergue-te party was documented on

video and corroborated by ODIHR SEAM interlocutors.

On 8 June 2024, the Prime Minister of Denmark was victim of an attack.

Reports by electoral observers also note that political polarisation, mis- and disinformation, and specific

incidents of harassment and violence contributed to an ‘antagonistic environment’ for politicians and

candidates, media outlets, and journalists in Member States, most significantly targeting women,

LGBTI, and immigrant communities

297

. Election-Watch.EU further notices that “acts of violence

293

Deplatforming, also called no-platforming, is a form of Internet censorship of an individual or group by

preventing them from posting on the platforms they use to share their information/ideas.

294

Czechia, Greece, Austria, Finland and Sweden.

295

Slovenia and Finland.

296

OSCE/ODIHR,

Special Election Assessment Mission, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 2024,

November 2024; and Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament

Elections 6-9 June 2024,

September 2024.

297

OSCE/ODIHR,

Special Election Assessment Mission, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 2024,

November 2024.

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against politicians in some Member States were a pronounced sign of a growing societal polarisation,

compounded by fears of a wider political rift and concerns about foreign interference”

298

The Global Information Index also observed

299

that female politicians in Europe face a disproportionate

amount of gendered disinformation, next to harassment and hate, particularly during elections. These

attacks often involve misogynistic, racist, and xenophobic narratives aimed at undermining women's

credibility and discouraging their participation in politics. Prominent figures like Ursula von der Leyen

are frequent targets, with narratives questioning their competence and legitimacy.

The OSCE/ODIHR election assessment also highlights the violence against women in the campaign to

be an issue and recommended that “Violence against women in the campaign should be recognised by

political parties and institutions as a barrier to women’s active political participation. Consideration

should be given to introducing or strengthening existing proactive and preventive measures against such

actions”

300

UROPEAN DIMENSION AND THE EXERCISE OF

ELECTORAL RIGHTS

5.1. The European dimension

The outcome of elections to the European Parliament has direct implications for citizens. It has an

impact for instance on how policies are shaped and what laws are passed at European level and

implemented across the EU. Citizens need to know what is at stake at European level if they are to make

informed choices. However, the political debate and campaign for the 2024 elections in the Member

States remained dominated by national and local issues, with the link to the European level being less

well discussed and understood.

The European Parliament actively promoted the European dimension of the elections by organising an

election night, providing the media with real-time updates on turnout and composition of the Parliament.

Promoting the European dimension of the elections strengthens the link between citizens and the

European institutions and therefore the democratic legitimacy of European decision-making.

Regulation (EU) 1141/2014 establishes a specific legal, financial and regulatory system for European

political parties and European political foundations. In 2021 the Commission proposed a recast of this

Regulation with amendments to facilitate European political parties’ interactions with their national

member parties and across borders, increase transparency, in particular in relation to political

advertisement and donations, cut excessive administrative burden and increase the financial viability of

European political parties and foundations. This proposal remains under negotiation.

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages Member States to take measures to enhance

the European nature of the elections to the European Parliament, including to help European

political parties and political groups of the European Parliament conduct their campaigns in the

context of the elections to the European Parliament. It calls on Member States to enable the

announcement of candidates and the start of campaigning in elections to the European Parliament

at least 6 weeks prior to the election day. It encourages giving information to the public on the

affiliation between national political parties and European political parties before and during the

298

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

299

Global Disinformation Index,

Gendered Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections,

June 10

2024.

300

OSCE/ODIHR,

Special Election Assessment Mission, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 2024,

November 2024.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

elections to the European Parliament. This could be done for instance by indicating such an

affiliation on the ballots and by supporting the distribution of such information by the relevant

competent authorities.

The 2023 Recommendation on elections also encourages national political parties participating in

elections to the European Parliament to make publicly known before the start of the electoral

campaign, which European political party they are affiliated with or in the process of affiliating with

and to promote measures aimed at increasing the knowledge of their members about the elections to

the European Parliament.

Member States apply a range of timeframes for the announcement of candidates and campaigning

timelines for the European Parliament elections. For example, in Germany, Portugal, and Sweden,

campaigning can begin more than nine months before election day, offering extended periods for

political engagement. In Finland, campaigning starts between six and nine months before the elections,

while in countries such as Belgium, Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia, campaigns typically begin

three to six months ahead. In a majority of countries

301

, the announcement of candidates and the start

of campaigning was only permitted within three months of the elections

Several

Member States

have taken steps to enhance transparency regarding affiliations between

national and European political parties. For instance, Italy facilitates public access to this information

through its Central Directorate for Electoral Services, publishing detailed instructions referencing EU

rules and ensuring that affiliations are indicated on ballots. Similarly, Lithuania highlights these

affiliations on ballots and encourages public awareness efforts. Affiliations were indicated on ballots in

four Member States

302

, while in seven Member States

303

such information is disseminated by the

relevant authorities on institutional websites.

No measures were taken by any Member States to facilitate the conduct of cross-border campaigns by

actors at Union level (such as European political parties) or multi-national political parties in the context

of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. Four Member States

304

underlined that such measures

were not of competence of national authorities, who should maintain a neutral role and respect the

principle of autonomy of political parties. In Slovenia and Estonia, during electoral campaigns, only

national parties and candidates can participate to the campaign; support (including financial one) from

foreign persons or entities, including European political parties, is not allowed.

In response to the Commission survey, many national

political parties

across all political spectrums

reported that they had publicly declared their European political party affiliations before the start of the

European electoral campaign.

One national political party not only proactively declared its affiliation with a European political party

but also prominently displayed their logo on their website and materials, while keeping members

informed through multiple channels about the EU elections

305

. In addition, another national political

party boosted members' knowledge through numerous training sessions and launched a dedicated

campaign to emphasize the European dimension of the elections

306

301

Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria,

Romania and Slovenia.

302

Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Lithuania.

303

Czechia, Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland.

304

Czechia, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden.

305

Austria.

306

Austria.

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Many surveyed parties publicly acknowledged their European political affiliation particularly through

social media, email, brochures, and educational sessions to inform and engage members

307

. Meanwhile,

another national political party published the European Political Party’s Manifesto on its website, and

parties conducted ongoing training and online sessions for members, and even showcased a Ukrainian

artist and a foreign EU Minister in their campaign to increase visibility of the European dimension

308

Another national party held election congresses to educate its members, and prioritized EU issues in its

manifesto

309

However, not all the national parties surveyed chose to emphasize the European dimension. Several

parties did not use European party logos on their materials, and it occurred that some parties did not

disclose any European political party affiliation at all

310

Campaign obstacles were reported across various Member States, primarily affecting smaller, less

established parties. These challenges often impacted minority-focused or niche groups that struggle

with media access and visibility compared to larger mainstream parties. Some smaller national parties

reported media access issues or encountered "media incorrectness"

311

. Other parties reportedly faced

delays in social network ad approvals, while others reported media blockades and allegedly falsified

statistics by specific media outlets in the run-up to the elections

312

. One national party faced obstacles

by not being given time to present on media broadcasting

313

. Additionally, small parties noted that it

was particularly difficult to campaign due to lack of media attention and exclusion from electoral

debates

314

. One national party noted that they had been prohibited from campaigning in a third language,

namely Russian

315

and another reported that their candidates were even subjected to plainclothes police

checks

316

5.2. Monitoring and enforcement of EU electoral rights and electoral law

5.2.1.

Introduction

The elections to the European Parliament are unique. The Member States, each with their national

campaigns, national lists and distinctive rules and traditions, contribute to a collective result, with

elected MEPs representing all EU citizens.

It is the competence and the responsibility of the Member States to lay down the specific conditions for

the conduct of elections, subject to the respect of certain basic principles, such as those laid down in

Articles 2 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union, and their international commitments. Additionally,

it is the responsibility of the competent national administrative and judicial authorities to ensure

compliance with applicable law and relevant international standards.

Certain common principles and procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act and

the rules enabling mobile EU citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the

European Parliament in their country of residence.

307

308

Czechia, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia.

Czechia, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden.

309

Luxembourg.

310

Czechia, Greece, France, Croatia and Sweden.

311

Czechia.

312

Slovenia.

313

France.

314

Czechia, France, Italy and Luxembourg.

315

Latvia.

316

Greece.

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5.2.2.

Electoral Act

As regards the elections to the European Parliament, national electoral procedures must comply with

the principles set out in the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by

direct universal suffrage (1976 Electoral Act)

317

, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC,

Euratom of 20 September 1976. Under Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act, elections must be by

direct universal suffrage and shall be free and secret. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 8 of the 1976

Electoral Act, subject to the provisions of the 1976 Electoral Act, the electoral procedure is to be

governed in each Member State by its national provisions. These national provisions, which may if

appropriate take account of the specific situation in the Member States, must not affect the essentially

proportional nature of the voting system.

Under the special legislative procedure envisaged by Article 223 of the TFEU, it is up to the European

Parliament to draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions necessary for the election of its members

by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in

accordance with principles common to all Member States. The Council, acting unanimously in

accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European

Parliament, which would act based on a majority of its component Members, would lay down the

necessary provisions. These provisions would enter into force following their approval by the Member

States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The Commission does not have

a formal role in this process.

In 2015, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the reform of the EU’s electoral law,

suggesting certain targeted amendments to enhance the democratic dimension of the European elections

and the legitimacy of the EU’s decision-making process. On 7 June 2018, the Council approved a draft

decision amending the Electoral Act (Council Decision 2018/994). Ratification of this decision has

advanced but is not yet concluded.

On 3 May 2022 the European Parliament adopted its proposal for a new Council Regulation on the

election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, aiming at repealing

the existing Electoral Act

318

. It proposes a comprehensive reform and extension of the electoral rules

laid down at EU level for the organisation of the elections to the European Parliament, including a

European constituency to allow for the election of an additional 28 MEPs from EU-wide lists (in

addition to the national lists). The proposal also includes provisions on common campaigning rules,

administrative deadlines, a single Election Day on 9 May, common voting and candidacy periods,

compulsory access to postal voting and support for other methods, provisions to strengthen the

participation of citizens with disabilities and to promote gender equality in the candidates standing for

elections, and other measures. Discussions on this proposal did not progress in the Council.

5.2.3.

Electoral rights

EU electoral rights include the rights provided to all citizens under the Treaties to participate in the

democratic life of the Union, and to elect the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal

suffrage in a free and secret ballot.

317

Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage,

OJ L 218,

8.10.1976.

318

European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the

election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision

(76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament

by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision (2020/2220(INL) –

2022/0902(APP))

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-05-03_EN.html

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They also include the rights provided to EU citizens which exercise their right to move freely to another

Member State, to vote and stand in the European elections in their Member State of residence. These

rights are enshrined in the Treaties and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and

are elaborated in the 1976 Electoral Act, Directive 93/109/EC and the relevant case law of the Court of

Justice.

The 2021 package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections, adopted

by the Commission, included two legislative proposals to recast the Directives on the right to vote and

stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and municipal elections by EU citizens

residing in a Member State other than their country of origin

319

. These initiatives aim to update, clarify

and strengthen the existing rules in order to address the difficulties faced by mobile EU citizens, and to

ensure broad and inclusive participation in elections to the European Parliament, support mobile EU

citizens in the exercise of their rights and protect the integrity of elections.

The European Parliament adopted its opinions on these proposals on 14 February 2023. The discussions

in the Council have progressed significantly on both files

320

. An agreement in Council was found in

April 2024 on the Directive on European Parliament elections and the text is currently with the

European Parliament for a consultation process.

5.2.4.

Introduction

Prevention of multiple voting

Article 9 of the 1976 Electoral Act prohibits voting more than once. It is also restated in Article 4(1) of

Directive 93/109/EC, which states that no person may vote more than once at the same election.

Council Decision 2018/994

321

amending the 1976 Electoral Act provides that in accordance with their

national electoral procedures, Member States are required to take measures necessary to ensure that

double voting in elections to the European Parliament is subject to effective, proportionate, and

dissuasive penalties. The foregoing Decision has not yet entered into force yet as approval has not been

given by all Member States, but most Member States have sanctions in place.

In line with Directive 93/109/EC, Member States have to exchange information on EU citizens who

plan to vote or be candidates in their Member State of residence to prevent multiple voting and double

candidacies. Member States exchange voter roll data and check for duplicates. Given the sensitivity of

the personal data exchanged it is crucial that this is done in a secure manner.

Measures taken to prevent multiple voting

The Commission supports this exchange of information by providing Member States with a crypto tool

to encrypt the data exchanged

322

, a secure platform to perform the exchange (Commission’s

319

Proposal

for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and

stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of

which they are not nationals (recast), COM/2021/732 final;

Proposal

for a Council Directive laying down

detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by

Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast), COM(2021)733 final.

320

The discussions on the Directive on municipal elections are still ongoing.

321

Council Decision

(EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act concerning the election of the

members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage,

OJ L 178, 16.7.2018, 13 July 2018.

322

European Commission,

Crypto Tool for the European Parliament Elections and for the European Citizens'

Initiative | Interoperable Europe Portal,,

last accessed 14 April 2025.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

collaborative platform S-CIRCABC) and supports the process to achieve this efficiently

323

, which is

coordinated with Member States’ experts in the framework of the Expert Group on Electoral Matters

324

By means of technical updates, the Commission improved the crypto tool and the secure platform for

data encryption of mobile EU citizen voters and candidates, supporting exchanges between Member

States. In the context of the Expert Group on electoral matters, it also organised testing and provided

updated guidelines on the crypto tools and secure platform to support Member States in the efficient

use of these tools. This facilitated secure data exchange between Member States in order to prevent

multiple voting and double candidacies, among mobile EU citizens.

Building on the best practices developed ahead of the 2019 elections, the Commission also continued

to support the Member States by compiling an overview of the relevant procedural deadlines in the run-

up to the elections with information on the date of opening and closing of the electoral register, period

of the exchange , and on date of the closure of the polls in the different Member States. The Commission

also encouraged the use of a multilingual form developed in 2019 to facilitate the prompt exchange of

information on candidates, which was used by 10 Member States

325

. Member States’ replies to the

survey confirm that this support provided by the Commission in the framework of Expert Group on

electoral matters was useful, well organised and efficient.

The process runs smoothly from the technical point of view, and it has improved both in terms of its

security and efficiency.

On this basis, between January and June 2024, Member States encrypted more than 1 600 voters and

candidates list files and exchanged data on around 1 million voters and 135 candidates. This exchange

resulted in the identification of over 300 000 multiple registrations of citizens.

Challenges resulting from incompatible national laws and procedures remain and were signalled by

Member States in their replies to the survey. Although the uniformity of the data was improved by some

Member States, the diversity of the national electoral processes, including incompatible national

deadlines to prepare and close the electoral roll remained. This diversity in the types of data exchanged

and the timetables to which the data was being collected affected its quality and its usability. This is

also acknowledged by electoral observers reports which recommend harmonising the deadline for voter

registration across Member States with the view to strengthen the data exchange mechanism.

Reports by electoral observers such as OSCE/OIDHR highlight the substantial efforts by the

Commission and Member States to curb multiple voting, stating that the practice of multiple voting

does not appear to be widespread.. At the same time, OSCE/ODHIR considers that there is no ‘sufficient

mechanism to prevent double voting’

326

323

Every country creates a file for each Member State whose nationals are registered to vote there as mobile EU

citizens, encrypts them using the crypto-tool (which can also perform some basic validation) and uploads them

onto the secure platform according to the specified process. Once the encrypted files are uploaded, every Member

State downloads its relevant files, including data about its own-national voters registered in another country, so

as to match them to its own electoral roll and take the necessary measures to remove them from the home country

electoral roll, as well as taking other necessary steps including to inform citizens of this step, when possible.

Member States need to set up a contact point, connect the administration in charge of the European Parliament

elections electoral roll to the crypto tool, send, receive, process and match the data received through the

information exchange, and provide for the necessary actions.

324

European Commission,

Expert group on electoral matters - Right to vote and to stand as a candidate in

elections for the EP and in municipal elections

(E00617).

325

Several Member States reported to not have the need to use the form because there were no mobile EU citizens

candidates in their countries.

326

OSCE/ODIHR,

Special Election Assessment Mission, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 2024,

November 2024, p.2.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

The entry into application of the Council Decision 2018/994 amending the Electoral Law

327

and the

adoption of the recast of the Directive 93/109/EC

328

would reinforce tools available to Member States

to address double voting.

Table 3: Data exchange to help prevent multiple voting of mobile EU citizens

Member

States

Belgium

Bulgaria

Czechia

Denmark

Germany

Estonia

Ireland

Greece

Spain

France

Croatia

Italy

Cyprus

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Hungary

Malta

Netherlands

Austria

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

Finland

Sweden

n/a

11.255

121

4.275

235

7730

43.101

139.253

139.845

2.681

10.075

14057

11296

4807

80,35%

892

33.27%

51745

37.15%

n/a

yes

n/a

yes

n/a

yes

n/a

yes

202.301

1.753

2.139

13.023

229.834

269.126

83.438

11.698

340

81.869

4.693

15.102

67.766

45.376

119.427

2.995

10.450

23.486

61.700

111.498

11.738

173.619

1909

2.991

6.095

4.232

13.044

540

70.127

16.614

7.956

956

11.34%

5.75%

6.525

50.0%

2442

1780

81.6%

29.2%

116.556

67.1%

37.067

89.591

60,08%

80,35%

1.249

1,04%

Used

multilingual

form

yes

3.498

8.158

3.266

40.0%

Records sent

76.337

Records

received

Duplicate

records

identified

identification

rate

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024. Different Member States highlighted that the

data is not complete.

Complementary measures

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

encourages Member States to provide mobile EU citizens

with information on the rules and sanctions related to multiple voting in due time ahead of the

elections to the European Parliament. Where, in the context of the elections to the European

327

Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act concerning the election of the

members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC,

EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, OJ L 178, 16.7.2018, p. 1–3.

328

Proposal for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and

to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are

not nationals (recast), COM(2021) 733 final.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

Parliament, a citizen was removed from the electoral roll of a Member State in order to vote in

another Member State, the Recommendation encourages the former Member State to time consider

taking measures to avoid that such a removal affects the registration of that citizen in electoral rolls

for national elections.

For the 2024 elections, the Commission, together with other EU institutions, raised awareness about

the prohibition of multiple voting as part of the joint interinstitutional campaign.

Most Member States that replied to the survey launched by the Commission reported having provided

information on the prohibition of multiple voting, including potential sanctions, as integral part of their

efforts in raising awareness of electoral procedures applying to mobile EU citizens: government

websites, Electoral Commission channels, press releases, and social media to reach a broad audience.

When the Member States used personalized letters or emails to inform mobile EU citizens, these

included information on the legal implications of multiple voting.

In the meantime, Member States are gradually implementing several measures to ensure that the

removal of a citizen from the electoral roll for European Parliament elections does not affect their

registration for national elections. Many countries maintain separate electoral rolls for different types

of elections. For instance, Czechia, Malta, Spain, Luxembourg, Sweden and Austria have distinct

registers for elections to the European Parliament and national elections, ensuring that removal from

one does not affect the other. Greece, Slovenia, France, Hungary and the Netherlands use centralized

databases that distinguish between different voting rights. These systems allow election officials to

manage individual voting rights without impacting other electoral registrations. For some Member

States like Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Portugal the electoral roll is produced before each election.

5.2.5.

Oversight by the Commission and evolution of relevant EU case-law

National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with

national legislation, EU law and relevant international standards applicable to the conduct and

organisation of elections.

As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission took various actions to ensure that EU law was being

implemented and to eliminate potential obstacles to the exercise of EU citizens’ electoral rights. The

Commission is in regular dialogue with Member States and provides support to citizens.

On 13 November 2024, in a case brought by the Commission against Czechia and Poland regarding

restrictions on joining domestic political parties for mobile EU citizens

329

, the Court of Justice of the

EU ruled that if the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in local and European elections is to be

exercised effectively, mobile EU citizens must be afforded equal access to the means available to

nationals of that Member State for the purpose of exercising that right. Given that membership of a

political party contributes significantly to the exercise of the electoral rights conferred by EU law, the

Court of Justice found that the Czech Republic and Poland infringed EU law by denying mobile EU

citizens the right to become members of a political party

330

Between the period of 2019 to 2024, no other infringement cases or EU Pilot procedures have been

initiated concerning the exercise of EU citizens’ electoral rights under Council Directive 93/109/EC.

European Commission – Press release,

EU citizens' electoral rights: Commission decides to refer CZECHIA

and POLAND to the Court of Justice,

09 June 2021.

330

Cases C-808/21 and C-814/21.

329

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The Commission received several letters from EU citizens raising specific issues in different Member

States, including voting by dual nationals, deadlines for candidate registration, available remedies,

electoral rights of specific groups or voting from a third country.

With regard to the right to be informed about the right to vote and stand as candidate in the elections to

the European Parliament, Article 12 of Council Directive 93/109/EC states that the Member State of

residence must inform EU voters in good time and in an appropriate manner of the conditions and

detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections in that

State. The responsibility of informing mobile EU citizens about their voting rights lies with the Member

States, which are granted a certain autonomy to determine the most effective methods to fulfil this

obligation. This includes deciding on the appropriate means of communication and strategies to ensure

that mobile EU citizens are adequately informed. The obligation can be met through a wide variety of

methods, including publishing relevant information on official websites, conducting awareness

campaigns, and distributing informational materials.

Details on the implementation of Article 13 of Council Directive 93/109/EC are instead provided in

Section 5.2.4 on the prevention of multiple voting.

Finally, as parts of its obligation under Article 14(3) of Council Directive 93/109/EC, on 7 November

2023, the Commission adopted a report

331

 on granting a derogation under Article 22(2) of Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union to Luxembourg, in accordance with Article 14(1) of Council

Directive 93/109/EC

332

. In its conclusions, the Commission welcomed the fact that Luxembourg has

stopped making mobile EU citizens’ right to vote or stand as candidates in the elections to the European

Parliament conditional on a minimum period of residence in Luxembourg, it acknowledged that, based

on the fact that the proportion of mobile EU citizens of voting age resident in Luxembourg remains

significantly higher than the threshold of 20% referred to in Article 14(1), the granting of a derogation

is still warranted and encouraged Luxembourg to continue taking measures fostering the integration of

mobile EU citizens, including as regards the composition of lists of candidates.

There is not much information available regarding issues encountered by mobile EU citizens voters and

candidates. It was however reported that some mobile EU citizens voters faced difficulties during the

registration process in certain EU countries. For example, some voters were unaware that regional

election registration also applied to EU elections

333

, while in other cases, voters and candidates missed

the deadline to register

334

. One party noted that it had not collected data on these issues

335

The majority of Member States

336

that replied to the survey were not aware of their citizens having

difficulties with registration formalities when seeking to vote and stand in the 2024 elections to the

European Parliament in other Member States. Those that reported to be aware of certain difficulties,

they mainly concerned:

331

Report

From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on granting a derogation under

Article 22(2) on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, presented under Article 14(3) of Directive

93/109/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament, COM/2023/688

final, 7 November 2023.

332

Article 14(1) states that if, in a given Member State, the proportion of mobile EU citizens of voting age exceeds

20% of the total number of EU citizens of voting age resident there, that Member State may, by way of derogation

from Articles 3, 9 and 10: (a) restrict the right to vote to mobile EU citizens who have resided in that Member

State for a minimum period (which may not exceed five years);(b) restrict the right to stand as a candidate to

mobile EU citizen who have resided in that Member State for a minimum period (which may not exceed 10 years).

Luxembourg is the only Member State that applies a derogation under the Directive.

333

Austria.

334

Czechia.

335

Greece.

336

18 Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Ireland, France, Croatia, Italy,

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Finland).

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

•

Returning nationals (citizens who moved back to their country of origin from other Member

States) who were not aware of having to take steps to be deleted from the electoral roll of the

Member State of previous residence or not able to apply for removal from the electoral roll

after a certain deadline:

citizens who were not aware of their EU citizenship right to vote for candidates of the

Member State of residence instead of the Member State of origin:

citizens who were not aware of the formalities and deadlines for submitting applications to be

registered in the electoral roll in the Member State of residence and for postal voting:

citizens not being aware of their registration status (whether they are in the electoral roll in the

Member State of origin or in the Member State of residence).

Electoral observers also reported several problems of mobile EU citizens when exercising their rights

in their Member States of residence, including lack of interest, low level of awareness about the

possibility to vote in the Member States of residence, cumbersome or unclear procedures, language

barriers to register to vote

337

The early registration requirement for mobile EU citizens to be added on the electoral rolls in the

Member State of residence is also considered not helpful to increase the participation of mobile EU

citizens

338

. Finally, the fact that Member States like Denmark uses predominantly digital interfaces,

could be a challenge for mobile EU citizens without computer skills to register

339

As indicated in Section 2.2, the Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC) acted as citizens’ helpline for

the 2024 elections at EU level and answered 2 797 questions related to the elections between September

2023 and June 2024. The questions received by EDCC regarded multiples topics. These included

registration procedures and electoral rights, including digital and remote voting from citizens living in

the EU or abroad (around 65%); perceived missing information from Member States and administrative

obstacles to voting (approx. 10%); candidates and national political parties, their positions and

affiliations with the European political parties and groups (approx. 10%); expressions of opinions about

the EU and its political leaders (approx. 10%); communication and promotional materials to inform and

mobilise voters (approx. 5%) and alleged disinformation/FIMI, hybrid incidents, threats (very few).

Individual incidents related to disinformation/FIMI, cyber-attacks, electoral fraud and potential security

threats were immediately brought to the attention of the competent services.

337

EU-Election Watch reported especially in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland and

Romania.

338

EU-Election Watch reported in particular Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Croatia.

339

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

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Figure 11: European elections related questions answered by the EDCC between 6-9 June 2024

per channel

Source: EDCC

The EDCC answered an average of 94 cases per day. The day on which the most cases were closed was

Sunday 9 June 2024, with 120 cases, corresponding to 32% of the total cases of the election days.

Figure 12: European elections related questions answered by the EDCC between 6-9 June 2024

Source: EDCC

The EU countries with the highest share of questions were Germany with 19% (71 questions), followed

by Spain with 10% (36 questions), Belgium with 7% (26 questions) and France with 7% (26 questions).

As the election days vary from country to country, the following figure shows the number of cases

closed by country during the respective election day(s).

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

Figure 13: Number of cases closed by country during the respective election day(s)

Source: EDCC

Approximately 60% of cases related to electoral rights and formalities. Most citizens contacted the

EDCC with questions about practicalities, such as the locations and opening times of polling stations

and which documents they should bring. Some citizens asked for advice when they had misplaced the

voting documents that had been sent to them. Throughout the voting period, EU citizens living in non-

EU countries continued to ask about their voting rights or complain about their country of nationality

not allowing them to vote from outside the EU. Over the course of the four voting days, these enquiries

came from the United Kingdom (3), Switzerland (2), Norway (2) Australia (1), Singapore (1), and

Russia (1). Next to enquiries from EU citizens, the EDCC received messages from UK citizens who

expressed their disappointment at no longer being able to vote.

Approximately 20% of cases related to perceived missing information from Member States and

perceived obstacles and incidents preventing citizens from voting during the election days. Several

citizens reported obstacles or not receiving adequate information about registration deadlines and voting

procedures from their home countries, leading to missed opportunities to vote. Most enquiries about

administrative issues concerned citizens not receiving their voting documents or not being on the

electoral roll. In some cases, this may not have been an administrative error, but due to the citizen not

registering (on time) to vote (meaning that they were clearly unaware of the necessity).

The EDCC received a total of two reports of alleged electoral fraud. This included one citizen alleging

irregularities in relation to Romanian voter rolls and one claiming that an Estonian MEP is engaged in

fraud. These cases were handled in line with the established procedures involving the competent

Commission services. The EDCC received two cases referring to security threats

340

. These cases were

handled in line with the established procedures involving the competent Commission services.

Approximately 20% of cases related to other matters related to the elections

341

340

One was a message in which the citizen alleged being attacked at a polling station, although no further

information was given when asked. The second was a warning of a terror attack at Pride events in Paris and

Vienna.

341

This included citizens sharing their opinions on various candidates. Many citizens provided their feedback on

the European Parliament’s website on the elections, often stating that more information about candidates should

be available, expressing their disapproval of the inclusive writing used in the French version, and addressing

translation mistakes or signalling technical issues. Some citizens asked for information about the political group

affiliations of national parties, whether they could vote for candidates from other member states, the number of

potential voters, or specific issues about constituencies in their countries. There were also fewer citizens

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5.3. Publication of results (officials and polls)

Article 10 (2) of the 1976 Act prohibits publication of definitive electoral results of an entire Member

State, but also of any preliminary, partial or regional results by central or local authorities until all

polling station across the EU are closed. This prohibition is addressed exclusively to electoral

authorities of the Member States, not to polling institutes which conduct exit polls or to media (whether

public or private) which publish estimates based on such polls.

From February 2024 onwards, to ensure the coordination among Member States of the process of

publication of the results, the Commission collected from electoral authorities and shared information

in the European Cooperation Network on Elections of voting hours and opening and closing of polling

stations for the elections to the European Parliament. The last polling stations closed in Italy at 23:00

CET on 9 June 2024, after which Member States could publish the results.

No incidents of early publication of results were reported to the Commission. Some Member States

have called for the earlier publication of election results, referring to the need to mitigate the risk of

disinformation, suggesting results should be released without waiting for all polling stations across the

EU to close

342

LECTION OBSERVATION

Elections observation supports the integrity of electoral processes. The Commission actively engaged

with electoral observers in the context of the follow-up to its Recommendation on elections and the

invitation addressed to Member States to encourage and facilitate independent election observation.

The

2023 Recommendation on elections

promotes election observation including by citizens as it is

an efficient way to engage citizens with the electoral process and improve public trust in elections.

It calls on Member States to encourage and facilitate impartial and independent election observation

including by citizens as well as international organisations, at all the stages of the electoral process,

taking into account their legal frameworks and international commitments. This should include, in

particular, observation of voter registration, counting of ballots, participation of specific groups, the

monitoring of political advertising and financing, and the application of electoral rules online.

Member States are invited support the development of capacity and expertise in election observation,

including by supporting training for election observers, drawing on the knowledge shared within the

European Cooperation Network on Elections and international standards and best practices.

Specific training could be provided to younger election observers. Supporting the participation of

young citizens, including first time voters, may include actions such as encouraging students to

become election observers.

Member States

discussed measures to promote election observation in several meetings of the

European Cooperation Network on Elections and in the High-Level Event on Elections that took place

in October 2023. Both Election-Watch.EU and OSCE/ODIHR took part in various meetings of ECNE

that facilitated observation activities and contacts between election observers and election authorities.

In response to the Commission survey, almost 70% of Member States confirmed that they had taken

specific steps to facilitate observation of the 2024 elections by citizens and international organisations.

Regarding the cooperation through national election networks or with election observers, responses

varied as multiple answers were allowed. Ten Member States reportedly did not cooperate with election

expressing their personal opinions or requesting communication materials. Several citizens contacted the EDCC

with questions about what would happen after the election days, including when the results would be published,

when the new MEPs would take their seats, and when the new Commission would be voted on. Some who had

been selected as poll workers asked for information on how they could avoid this duty.

342

As reported for example by Latvia in the ECNE meeting of 11 October 2024.

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observer organisations, while 12 selected "Other", stating that they had for example cooperated with

the OCSE-ODHIR.

Some practices reported include:

•

Training provided for e-voting observers and opportunities for observers to attend training for

precinct committee members (Estonia);

Observation opportunities for OSCE-ODIHR, political party representatives, and candidates

during elections, with legal provisions to submit objections (Greece);

Issuance of certificates for international observers to access electoral offices and observe

operations (Italy);

Training and promotion of election observation opportunities for NGOs and political parties

(Latvia);

facilitating election observation by accrediting 102 national NGOs as election observers

(Romania);

Robust citizen observation system involving all eligible voters as randomly selected polling

station members (mandatory participation), ensuring diverse representation, including women

and persons with disabilities (Spain).

Approximately 40% of almost 60 national

political parties

that replied to the Commission survey

reported some form of collaboration with election observers. In this regard, multiple parties reported

having cooperated with the OSCE/ODIHR observation work

343

. In addition, one party reportedly

coordinated with their election observation association

344

or another with local municipal authorities

345

One national party also designated observers to monitor the vote-counting process

346

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed a special election

assessment mission (SEAM) consisting of a core team of seven international experts based in Brussels

and 10 regional analysts deployed across EU Member States. The final report issued by OSCE/ODIHR

indicates that the elections were genuinely competitive, professionally organized and inclusive. Some

areas identified for more attention concerned accessibility for persons with disabilities, inconsistencies

in electoral regulations, and the need to address threats and intimidation including towards journalists

347

The civil society organisation Election-Watch.EU conducted its second election assessment mission to

the European Parliament elections

348

in all 27 EU Member States with 77 election experts and observers

and 10 like-minded citizen election observer organisations. The mission covered a variety of topics

from equality of participation and representation and inclusion of underrepresented groups to

transparency and accountability and from integrity of electoral conduct to resilience to risks and threats

growing societal polarisation.

The final report of Election-Watch.EU

349

included 21 recommendations. The recommendations focused

on harmonisation of rules and procedures at EU level, intensifying collaborative efforts to advance the

pending electoral reforms and harmonising different aspects of elections, including voter registration,

conditions for candidacy and electoral campaign regulations across all Member States. The lack of

uniformity in national electoral regulations and the differing timelines for key electoral processes

343

344

France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

Slovenia and Sweden.

345

Sweden.

346

Spain.

347

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,

European Parliament Elections, 6-9 June

2024: Final Report,

28 November 2024.

348

Election-Watch.eu, Election Assessment Mission to the 2024 European Parliament Elections, 10 June 2024.

349

Election-Watch.EU,

Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June

2024,

September 2024.

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

impact adversely the equality of rights and opportunities. Advance and alternative voting methods

should be uniformly available, and that could enable participation of persons with disabilities.

Recommendations also highlight civic and voter education to young and first-time voters and increasing

participation and representation of women.

Election-Watch.EU also addressed among others inclusivity, including of persons with disabilities,

highlighting the importance of the following measures: ensure physical accessibility of polling stations,

provide election information in multiple accessible formats, train election staff, deploy assistive tools

and technologies, and engage with Disabled Persons Organisations.

For inclusion of disadvantaged communities, increased awareness raising for electoral participation of

national minorities, including the Roma, and of other underprivileged groups, Election-Watch EU

highlighted that further special measures for their participation, would be needed, as well as the use of

minority languages for electoral materials and voter information.

Other recommendations of Election-Watch cover topics such as limitations to election observation and

judicial redress, campaign finance oversight and oversight authorities and bodies, media pluralism and

freedom, implementation of online rules freedom of expression and journalistic freedom including

protection from false defamation accusations. In addition, detailed election results should be

consistently published, including polling station data, the number of invalid votes, and data on voter

demographics such as double citizens.

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ANNEX

Respondents to European Commission Survey

Questionnaire on the conduct of the 2024 European Parliament Elections - For political parties

European Political Parties

•

European Conservatives and Reformists

•

European Democratic Party

•

European Free Alliance

•

European Green Party

•

European People's Party

•

Party of European Socialists

National Political Parties

Country

Austria

Belgium

Croatia

Czechia

Estonia

Finland

France

Greece

Italy

Luxembourg

Latvia

Netherlands

Party

Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative

Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs

NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum

Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)

Voor U

Pokret za modernu Hrvatsku

HRVATSKA SOCIJALNO-LIBERALNA STRANKA (HSLS)

PRAVEDNA HRVATSKA

Social Democratic Party of Croatia

ALIANCE NÁRODNÍCH SIL

ČSSD - Česká suverenita sociální demokracie

Mimozemstani

Starostové a nezávislí - STAN

Social Democrats

Vasemmistoliitto

Vihreä liitto r.p.

Swedish People's Party of Finland

Pour Une Autre Europe

Europe Démocratie Espéranto

Patriots.eu

DIMOKRATES ANDREAS LOVERDOS

PATRIOTES - PRODROMOS EMFIETZOGLOU

ΚΙΝΗΜΑ ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΕΞΑΡΤΗΣΙΑΣ

Friendship Equality and Peace Party (Κόμμα Ισότητας και

Φιλίας)

PASOK - Kinima Allagis

ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟ ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΙΚΟ ΚΙΝΗΜΑ "ΝΙΚI"

Rassemblement Valdôtain

SINISTRA ITALIANA (AVS - ALLEAZA VERDI

SINISTRA)

Partito Democratico

ALTERNATIVA POPOLARE

Demokratesch Partei - DP

CSV - Chrëschtlech-Sozial Vollekspartei

Déi gréng

Déi Lénk

Sociāldemokrātiskā partija "Saskaņa"

European Christian Political Movement

kom (2025) 0287 - Ingen titel

Poland

Portugal

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Nós, Cidadãos!

Gibanje Svoboda

Levica

NIČ OD TEGA

Nova Slovenija - krščanski demokrati

Dobra država

SLOVENSKA LJUDSKA STRANKA

Vesna - zelena stranka

CEUS-Coalición por una Europa solidaria / EAJ-PNV

Volt España

Kristna Värdepartiet

Valsamverkanspartiet

Moderata Samlingspartiet (Moderaterna)

Värdigt Liv

Willy Tiger

Liberalerna

Socialdemokraterna