kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

Europaudvalget 2025
KOM (2025) 0828
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EUROPEAN

COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 17.6.2025

COM(2025) 828 final

2025/0180 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy

dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

{SWD(2025) 830 final}

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

•

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 has

revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian gas imports on

markets and security, leading to significant negative impacts on the Union's economy. The

conflict has severely disrupted global supply chains, triggered substantial increases in energy

prices, and introduced considerable volatility into the markets. As a result, the Union's trade

relations with Russia have been substantially impaired.

The energy sector has been profoundly affected. Indeed, Russia exploited the Union’s

dependence on its energy exports to the Union as a means of exerting coercion and

manipulation. The reliance on Russian energy imports rendered the Union and Member States

vulnerable to disruptions and price fluctuations, which have had a far-reaching impact on the

entire economy. The elevated energy prices eroded the competitiveness of EU industries,

ultimately undermining the Union's economic stability and growth prospects.

Russia has a history of threatening the Union’s security of supply by unilaterally cutting gas

flows to Europe, as set out in detail in the Staff Working Document accompanying this

legislative proposal. The Staff Working Document outlines how Russia, has systematically

abused supply dependencies to the detriment of the Union’s economy and economic security.

This is evidenced by several competition investigations, and notably by Russian gas supply

reductions or interruptions in 2006, 2009 and 2014, as well as by the intentional reduction of

gas flows and storage filling levels ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian

Federation in the autumn of 2021. After the beginning of the Russian Federation’s war of

aggression against Ukraine, Russia used the Union’s dependency to expose the Union to a

severe energy and economic security crisis, cutting or reducing supplies strategically to keep

energy prices up

Russia’s State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom has been subject to numerous

competition investigations, dealing with issues such as prohibitions to contract partners to sell

on gas (‘destination clauses’), price abuses or attempts to coerce contract partners. The

Russian Federation and its energy companies can therefore not be considered reliable energy

trading partners by the Union.

The supply interruptions led to very seriously problems for the security of energy supply in

the Union and forced eleven Member States to declare an energy crisis level under Article 11

of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 in 2022. The impact on prices was unprecedented, with the

average gas spot price in 2022 at 125 EUR/MWh, 6 to 8 times higher than pre-crisis. The

effects of the crisis were felt across the Union, as even Member States not affected by a direct

disruption of gas flows from Russia were impacted by the spike in energy prices. The

consequences of the gas crisis spun as well to the electricity sector, as gas generation often

See in detail Commission Staff Working Document

“Assessing the impact of measures to phase out

Russian gas imports and improve the monitoring of potential energy dependencies”

of 17 June 2025

(hereinafter ‘Assessment

of Impacts’)

(SWD(2025) 830 final), accompanying the proposal for this

Regulation, pages 1 to 15.

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

represents the price setting technology in electricity wholesale markets. Electricity wholesale

prices in Europe skyrocketed in August 2022 to an average of more than 400 EUR/MWh,

with short-lived peaks of few days in most Member States well above 500 EUR/MWh. As a

result, the Union energy system suffered serious repercussions, which trickled down to the

retail markets and final consumers as the Union's economy is reliant on stable and predictable

energy supplies.

The impact of Russia’s weaponisation of energy goes beyond energy security of supply and

seriously harmed the Union’s economy as a whole. Energy prices were the most important

driver of inflation, which at its peak reached levels above 10% in 2022. The recent crisis

provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners supplying energy products are

crucial to preserve market stability, to protect human life and health, as well as the essential

security interests of the Union.

In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 and in line with the

Versailles Declaration of Heads of State and Government on 11 March 2022, the Commission

launched the REPowerEU Plan

on 18 May 2022 to allow the full diversification away from

Russian energy imports in a safe, affordable and sustainable manner. The plan built on a long-

standing diversification policy also outlined in the European Energy Security Strategy of

2014

and in the Energy Union Strategy of 2015

. Since 2022 the EU and its Member States

have worked implementing the REPowerEU Plan to save energy, accelerate the clean energy

transition, boost domestic production of energy, finalising key infrastructure enabling further

diversification of gas supplies, and enhancing the EU’s energy diplomacy. Consequently, the

Union was able to reduce Russian gas imports from 2021 to 2023 by over 70% from 150 bcm

to 43 bcm, and energy prices have significantly gone down from the 2022 peaks.

Despite the significant progress and the halt of Russian gas transit through Ukraine at the end

of 2024, Russian gas imports remain in the Union. It is estimated that these represent around

13% of the Union’s overall gas imports in 2025. As the remaining volumes of Russian natural

gas entering the Union are still significant, the Commission announced in the Roadmap

towards ending Russian energy imports of 6 May 2025

a legislative proposal to fully phase

out Russian gas imports and to improve the existing framework for energy dependencies.

Moreover, a significant portion of LNG import capacity is controlled by Russian companies

in certain Member States, creating a risk that these capacity rights could be used to obstruct

imports from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices. In the past, instances of

gas storage hoarding have led to substantial market distortions, increased prices and threats to

critical security measures

For more than a decade, the Russian Federation has systematically proven to be an unreliable

partner, weaponising gas and manipulating energy markets, to the detriment of the Union’s

essential international security interests. Hence, the remaining Russian gas imports pose

significant risks to the Union’s economic security and notably to security of energy supply,

with harmful economic and societal consequences. Against this background and considering

that further payments more than EUR 15 billion per year for Russian gas imports endanger the

Union’s security, it is necessary to take additional measures to eliminate these imports,

COM(2022) 230 final.

COM(2014) 330 final.

COM(2015) 80 final.

See in detail Assessment of Impacts, page 36.

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

recognising that a complete phase out of energy supplies from the Russian Federation has to

be a gradual process, bearing in mind security of supply and market considerations. Given the

essential role that LNG is expected to play in securing alternative energy supplies in Europe,

it is also crucial to supplement any gas imports prohibition with a measure that limits the

provision of LNG terminal services to certain entities.

As outlined in the Roadmap of 6 May 2025, the Commission shall put forward systematic

actions to remove the remaining imports of gas, oil and nuclear energy from the Russian

Federation.

The Commission has carefully assessed the impact of a possible prohibition of Russian

imports of natural gas and the provision of LNG terminal services to Russian entities. In fact,

preparatory work and several detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase out of

Russian have been conducted and published since 2022

, and the Commission could also rely

on a multitude of studies from external experts and agencies. Building on the assessment of

impacts

undertaken by the Commission as outlined in the Staff Working Document, the

purpose of the proposed Regulation is to effectively contribute to removing the Union’s

dependencies and exposure to the significant risks for trade and energy security resulting from

imports of gas and oil from the Russian Federation. The current remaining dependencies, if

not addressed, could render the Union particularly vulnerable to potential unpredictable

coercive actions of the Russian Federation.

The proposed Regulation seeks to decisively phase out pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas

(LNG) originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, thereby

preventing their access to the Union market.

Considering that since 2022 most Member States and market participants have finalised their

supply relations with the Russian Federation, the proposal for this Regulation entails a

prohibition of gas imports under

new contracts

concluded after 17 June 2025 as of 1 January

2026. By the end of 2027, this Regulation imposes a complete cessation of imports under

existing contracts.

As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas volumes can

then be phased out without significant economic impact or risks for security of supply, due to

the availability of sufficient alternative suppliers on the gas world market, a well-

interconnected Union gas market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure.

Therefore, this Regulation takes into account the complexity in phasing out imports under

different types of contracts and proposes that the prohibition of imports under new contracts

applies after entry into force of this Regulation.

Short-term contracts, that is contracts on individual or multiple natural gas supplies of a

duration of less than one year, concern smaller volumes than the large multi-year supply

contracts importers hold with Russian companies. These existing contracts will in any event

be close to expiration when this Regulation will enter into force. Accordingly, the risk for

economic security resulting from existing short term-contracts appears to be low. It is

See for example Commission Staff Working Document Implementing the REPower EU Action Plan:

Investment Needs, Hydrogen Accelerator and Achieving the Bio-Methane Targets, SWD(2022) 230

final, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the

European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of

the Regions, REPowerEU Plan, COM(2022) 230 final, 18 May 2022; and ENTSOG simulation

(Security

of Supply Simulation | ENTSOG).

Which considers potential economic and security risks, and an analysis of legal considerations.

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term contracts from the immediate application

of the import prohibition, allowing for phase out until 17 June 2026. Importers holding long-

term contracts may need more time to find alternative supply routes and sources, also as these

usually concern significantly larger volumes than short-term contracts. A transition time is

therefore introduced before the import prohibition will apply.

To effectively ensure the successful delivery of LNG imports from alternative reliable

sources, it is crucial that LNG terminals within the Union make corresponding import

capacity available to these suppliers. As a significant portion of LNG capacity in Europe is

controlled by Russian entities, there is a risk that Russia may obstruct alternative imports from

non-Russian suppliers through not releasing booked capacities even in case they are not used

(‘hoarding’), or other anti-competitive practices. To reinforce the ban on Russian natural gas

imports, the proposed Regulation is making accessible the corresponding import capacity

within LNG terminals to alternative suppliers by prohibiting the provision of LNG terminal

services to customers from Russia or customers controlled by Russian undertakings from 1

January 2028. This measure will redirect terminal capacity to alternative suppliers, enhance

energy market resilience, and address past issues of market distortion, price increases, and

threats to security.

Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in large

volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level. For an effective

implementation of the ban on Russian natural gas imports, the proposed Regulation introduces

mechanisms to enhance the transparency, monitoring, and traceability of Russian gas within

Union markets. Given the particular complexity of tracing the origin of natural gas, and with a

view to the incentives Russian suppliers may have to circumvent the provisions of the

proposed Regulation, importers of Russian gas would be obliged to provide customs

authorities with all the necessary information to enable the application of the restrictions on

gas imports from the Russian Federation. This Regulation should provide for an effective

framework to establish the actual origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into

the Union.

To bolster these efforts, customs authorities should foster an exchange of information with

regulatory authorities, competent authorities, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy

Regulators (ACER) and the Commission to implement the provisions of this Regulation. Such

cooperation would enable the effective monitoring of the implementation and compliance

with the phase-out objectives. ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of

monitoring the implementation of this Regulation and publish a report providing an overview

of contracts on the of Russian gas, and assessing the impact of diversification on energy

markets.

The proposed Regulation sets a new transparency and monitoring framework through

amendments to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, requiring importers of Russian-

origin natural gas to provide detailed contractual information to the Commission and national

competent authorities. Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 showed that

comprehensive information on supply dependencies is crucial to assess security of gas supply

in the Union in respect of gas from Russia. This Regulation therefore obliges importers of

natural gas from Russia to submit all information to the Commission which is necessary to

effectively evaluate possible risks for gas trade and supply security. This information should

include key parameters of the relevant gas supply contracts, or even whole text parts,

excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of certain

clauses or references to other provisions in the contract. Importers must report changes in

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contract terms immediately after regulatory adoption to facilitate accurate monitoring of

Russian gas entering the Union. When monitoring gas security of supply in the Union, the

Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by customs

authorities and information included in Member States' national diversification plans.

Together with the enhanced cooperation with national customs authorities, this

comprehensive dataset will enable the Commission to have all necessary information

concerning the details of Russian supply contracts.

Experience with the announced phase out of natural gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that

good preparation and coordination, in a spirit of solidarity, can effectively avoid market

disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from changing natural gas

suppliers. To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2028 in a coordinated manner

and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes involved without risk for

security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy prices, the proposed Regulation

compels Member States to undertake a proactive role by developing and implementing

national diversification plans geared towards phasing out Russian natural gas. These plans

must delineate precise measures and establish milestones for the gradual elimination of direct

or indirect Russian gas imports. The national diversification plans will allow the Commission

to coordinate, and, where necessary, provide advice on diversification measures. The

Commission's analysis of national diversification plans should culminate in a report and, if

needed, recommendations for EU-wide measures to accelerate the reduction of dependence on

Russian gas.

In addition to targeting gas imports, the proposed Regulation mandates that Member States

also draft diversification plans to phase out Russian oil imports, aiming for information and

coordination concerning the complete cessation of oil supplies by the end of 2027, as

envisaged by the Versailles Declaration.

This unified approach signifies a comprehensive and common strategy, based on the principle

of solidarity, aimed at severing energy dependencies from the Russian Federation in a

coordinated way, thereby affirming the Union's commitment to an independent and resilient

energy system.

•

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

This proposal builds on the REPowerEU Communication of May 2022

and the Versailles

Declaration of Heads of State and Government

, which called for ending Europe’s

dependency on Russian energy by enhancing energy efficiency and accelerating the

deployment of renewable energy and diversifying supplies, and on the previous measures

taken by the Union and its Member States on that basis. This proposal was announced in the

Commission Communication on the Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports of 6

May 2025 (‘REPower Roadmap’)

Given the weaponised reductions in gas supplies and market manipulations by Russia, and the

use of natural gas revenues to fund Russia's war efforts, pursuant to Articles 6(7) and 8(7) of

Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 on the internal markets for natural gas, renewable gas and

hydrogen, Member States may implement temporary, proportionate measures to restrict

COM(2022) 230 final.

Versailles Declaration,

10 and 11 March 2022.

COM(2025) 440 final.

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bidding capacity at gas entry points and LNG terminals by any single network user,

specifically for deliveries from Russia and Belarus. These measures aim to protect essential

security interests and can be renewed as needed but must align with international obligations,

including Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Such measures should support the Union 's objectives to reduce dependency on Russian fossil

fuels, as outlined in the REPowerEU plan. Prior to implementation, Member States must

consult the Commission and other Member States liable to be affected, considering in

particular possible impacts on security of supply at the EU level as well as for other Member

States liable to be affected, in conformity with the principle of energy solidarity. The

approach ensures an adequate and well-coordinated response to threats and continuity towards

energy independence.

The proposed Regulation builds on these provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 and

removes existing deficits of those provisions. However, such individual measures by Member

States appear insufficient to address the overall problem of dependency on Russian gas

imports. Therefore, the proposed Regulation should impose a better coordinated import ban at

EU level. Indeed, while Articles 6(7) and 8(7) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 allow Member

States to take certain individual actions to prevent LNG or pipeline imports of Russian gas

into their territory, the provisions do not provide for a common and coordinated framework of

such measures. National measures to limit Russian are different in scope and content, notably

with respect to the applicable measures to prevent circumvention. This lack of coordination

involves risks for fragmentation of the internal market. This proposal should remove these

risks by providing clear rules on obligations for importers and exchange of information

between all involved authorities.

Dependencies on Russia do not only exist in the field of gas imports. As set out in detail in the

REPower Roadmap, Russia also supplies various nuclear materials to the Union, which

exposes the sector of nuclear energy production and other nuclear sectors to similar economic

security risks as the as in the field of natural gas. However, products supplied by Russia in the

nuclear sector are technically complex, covering natural, converted and enriched uranium,

nuclear fuel assemblies, spare parts and maintenance services and medical radioisotopes. Also

the legal basis for measures in the nuclear sector is partly different from the legal basis of this

Regulation. It is therefore appropriate to decouple the legislative proposals for gas/oil

measures and for measures in the nuclear sector.

This proposal is also aligned with the Commission’s proposal presented on 28 January 2025,

and recently endorsed by the European Parliament, to impose tariffs on fertilisers and certain

agricultural products originating in Russia and Belarus, seeking to reduce the Union’s

dependency on those imports

. The proposed measures pertaining to the Union’s common

commercial policy, aim at significantly reducing Union imports of the goods concerned,

whether they originate in Russia and Belarus, or are exported directly or indirectly by them. It

is expected that the imposition of import tariffs will result in further diversification of Union

fertiliser production.

More generally, the proposed Regulation pursues the objective of enhancing, in the field of

energy supply, the Union’s economic security. Thus, it is consistent with and builds on the

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the modification of

customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the

Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, COM(2025) 34 final 2025/0021 (COD).

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European Economic Security Strategy

and measures taken in that framework, in particular

the Commission’s proposals to:

further strengthen the protection of the Union security and public order by proposing

improved screening of foreign investment into the Union

;

stimulate discussions and action for more European coordination in the area of export

controls, in full respect of existing multilateral regimes and Member States' prerogatives

;

consult Member States and stakeholders to identify potential risks stemming from outbound

investments in a narrow set of technologies

;

promote further discussions on how to better support research and development involving

technologies with dual-use potential

;

a Council recommendation for measures aimed at enhancing research security at national and

sector level

•

Consistency with other Union policies

The proposed import ban of natural gas originating in or exported directly or indirectly from

the Russian Federation, and accompanying measures in the proposal on the better monitoring

of Russian energy imports, are consistent with the restrictive measures taken by the Union

following the Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, the import ban of

natural gas and the accompanying measures in the proposed Regulation for both natural gas

and oil comply with Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union that requires consistency

between different areas of the Union’s external action and between these and its other

policies. It is also compliant with Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (TFEU) that provides that the common commercial policy is to be conducted

in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action.

•

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

Legal basis

The legal bases for the proposal are Article 207and 194(2) TFEU. Article 207 TFEU is the

legal basis for the proposed trade measures under the Union’s common commercial policy

prohibiting natural gas imports originating in or exported directly or indirectly from the

Russian Federation as well as prohibiting to provide services in EU LNG terminals to

customers from the Russian Federation or controlled by persons of the Russian Federation.

The measures listed in this proposal concerning (i) the submission of relevant information by

natural gas importers and exchange of that information among relevant national authorities in

Member States and the Commission, (ii) the establishment by Member States of

diversification plans to phase out Russian natural gas and oil, and (iii) the enhancement of

transparency on supply contracts for Russian natural gas, by amending Regulation (EU)

2017/1938, have Article 194(2) TFEU as a legal basis.

JOIN(2024) 20 final.

COM(2024) 23 final.

COM(2024) 25 final.

COM(2024) 24 final.

COM(2024) 27 final.

COM(2024) 26 final.

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•

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

The common commercial policy is, in accordance with Article 3(1), point (e), TFEU, defined

as an exclusive Union competence, therefore the subsidiarity principle does not apply.

The other measures in this proposed Regulation concerning natural gas, that are to be adopted

under Article 194(2) TFEU, such as (i) the submission of relevant information by natural gas

importers and exchange of that information among relevant national authorities in Member

States and the Commission, (ii) the establishment by Member States of diversification plans

to phase out Russian natural gas, and (iii) the enhancement of transparency on supply

contracts for Russian natural gas, are necessary to for the effective implementation of the EU

import ban on Russian natural gas. The same applies to the establishment and monitoring of

national diversification plans for oil also to be adopted under Article 194(2) TFEU, which

need to be coordinated at Union level to achieve the objective of phasing out Russian oil in an

effective and coordinated manner.

•

Proportionality

This proposal complies with the principle of proportionality. The proposed measures are

suitable and necessary to achieve the objectives pursued and do not impose any burden on

businesses and Member States that is out of proportion with these objectives.

The core measure proposed is a prohibition of gas imports based on new contracts concluded

after 17 June 2025 by 1 January 2026, and a ban of the remaining imports based on existing

contracts by 17 June 2026 for gas under short-term contracts and by the end of 2027 for those

under long-term contracts. A complete ban on Russian natural gas imports clearly is suitable

to achieve the objective of ending the Union’s dependency on such imports. As outlined in

this explanatory memorandum, all other measures taken so far by the Union and its Member

States since February 2022, while having successfully mitigated some of the effects of the

energy crisis caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have proven not to be

sufficient to fully achieve that objective, as evidenced by the still significant volumes of

Russian natural gas imported into the Union. A full import ban is therefore necessary to

achieve the objective of ending the Union’s dependency on Russian gas imports. Given the

serious risks for the Union’s security of energy supply and, ultimately, the overall economic

security and autonomy of the Union, the measure’s impact on the affected Member States and

gas undertakings is also not out of proportion to that objective. In addition, those impacts are

mitigated by the phasing-in of the import ban, which initially only affects new contracts,

while imports based on existing long-term contracts are allowed to continue until the end of

2027.

The prohibition to provide services in Union LNG terminals to customers from the Russian

Federation as of 1 January 2026 is suitable and necessary to achieve the objective of ensuring

that LNG terminals within the Union make corresponding import capacity available to

alternative suppliers, enhance market resilience and address past issues of market distortion,

price increases and threats to security. Given the importance of those objectives, this

measure’s impact on LNG terminal providers and customers is also not out of proportion to

those objectives.

The accompanying measures:

(i) the submission of relevant information by natural gas importers and exchange of that

information among relevant national authorities in Member States and the Commission,

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(ii) the establishment by Member States of diversification plans to phase out Russian

natural gas, and

(iii) the enhancement of transparency on supply contracts for Russian natural gas,

are suitable and necessary for an effective implementation and monitoring of the gas import

ban from Russia and, given the above-described stakes involved, do not impose burdens on

Member States and gas undertakings that are out of proportion to the objective pursued.

Finally, the proposed obligation for Member States to develop and present national

diversification plans for the phase out of Russian oil imports by the end of 2027 is a suitable,

necessary and proportionate means to facilitate the phase out in those Member States

benefiting from derogations to existing EU sanctions on Russian oil imports.

•

Choice of the instrument

Given the need for a binding, directly applicable act, as well as the necessity to act swiftly in

response to an imminent threat to the Union’s security of energy supply, a regulation is the

only adequate instrument to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed measures

aiming to phase out Russian gas imports to the Union in a coordinated Union-wide manner.

•

RESULTS

EX-POST

EVALUATIONS,

CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

STAKEHOLDER

Not applicable.

•

Stakeholder consultations

Not applicable.

•

Collection and use of expertise

Not applicable.

•

Impact assessment

The impact of a phase out of Russian gas on EU energy markets and the wider economy has

been analysed intensively by the Commission since the first supply interruptions by Russia.

The results of the comprehensive analyses concerning the measures listed in the proposed

Regulation are summarised in Assessment of Impacts accompanying this proposal.

•

Regulatory fitness and simplification

Not applicable.

•

Fundamental rights

This proposal may affect certain fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental

Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to conduct a business (Article 16) and

the right to property (Article 17). However, as explained above, the proposed limitations of

those fundamental rights are necessary and proportionate in view of the objective of general

interest pursued and respect the essence of those rights. The measures therefore comply with

the requirements for such limitations set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter.

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BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

The legislative financial statement sets out the budgetary implications of the proposed

Regulation in greater detail.

•

OTHER ELEMENTS

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

By 1 March 2026, Member States should develop national diversification plans with concrete

actions and timelines for ceasing imports of Russian natural gas and oil supplies in

accordance with the proposed Regulation.

Customs authorities and involved national competent authorities should monitor the

implementation of the import prohibition of Russian natural gas and obligations set out under

the proposed Regulation. They should exchange all information necessary to assess whether

the import ban and related obligations are complied with.

The Commission shall assess the implementation of this Regulation and progress in the phase

out of gas from the Russian Federation based on the information received. Such assessment

should be published in an annual report.

•

Explanatory documents (for directives)

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

Not applicable.

Article 1

outlines the subject matter and scope of the proposed Regulation.

Article 2

defines the terms used throughout the text, thus supporting the clarity of the

measures outlined in the proposed Regulation.

Article 3

establishes a prohibition on natural pipeline gas imports as well as on LNG imports

from the Russian Federation as of 1 January 2026. The prohibition is applicable to such goods

originating in or exported, directly or indirectly, from the Russian Federation.

Article 4

allows for exceptions from the immediate prohibition as of 1 January 2026. For

short-term supply contracts concluded before 17 June 2025 the prohibition shall apply only as

of 17 June 2026. In the case of gas quantities under long-term supply contracts concluded

before 17 June 2025, the prohibition is applicable as of 1 January 2028. The volumes subject

to the transition phase are limited to the contracted quantities.

Article 5

establishes a prohibition to provide long-term terminal services in EU LNG

terminals to entities from the Russian Federation or controlled by persons from the Russian

Federation as of 1 January 2026. The prohibition applies to LNG terminal services concluded

or amended after 17 June 2025.

Article 6

establishes a transition phase of the prohibition for long-term LNG terminal services

contracts concluded before 17 June 2025. In the case of services provided under these long-

term contracts, the prohibition is applicable as of 1 January 2028.

Article 7

sets an obligation for importers of gas from the Russian Federation to provide

Member States customs authorities all the necessary information for the implementation of

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Articles 3 and 4 of the proposed Regulation. The Article includes a list of elements that

should be provided, although customs authorities are entitled to request further information.

The Article also establishes a rebuttable presumption on the Russian origin of imports by a list

of interconnection points.

Article 8

establishes an obligation for providers of LNG terminal services to share

information with customs authorities to enable the implementation of Articles 5 and 6 of the

proposed Regulation.

Article 9

establishes an obligation for customs authorities involved competent authorities and

regulatory authorities to monitor the implementation of Articles 3 to 6 of the proposed

Regulation. It requires cooperation among authorities of different Member States, ACER or

the Commission where necessary.

Article 10

defines the obligation of customs authorities to exchange information received

from the importers of gas from the Russian Federation with the Commission and other

Member States’ authorities. Such cooperation would allow the assessment of the

implementation of Articles 3 to 6 of the proposed Regulation.

Article 11

requires Member States to establish a diversification plan in view of the phase out

of all gas imports from the Russian Federation by 31 December 2027. The national

diversification plans shall include information on (i) the volumes of gas imports under

existing contracts and the LNG terminal services booked by companies from the Russian

Federation, (ii) measures in place or planned to replace remaining Russian gas imports,

including alternative supplies and supply routes, and (iii) potential technical or regulatory

barriers for the phase out and options to overcome those.

The national diversification plans should be communicated to the Commission by 1 March

2026, at the latest, on the basis of the template provided for in Annex I.

Article 12

requires those Member States importing oil from the Russian Federation to

establish a diversification plan in view of a phase out of oil imports from the Russian

Federation by 31 December 2027. The national diversification plans shall include information

on (i) the volumes of direct or indirect oil imports from the Russian Federation under existing

contracts, (ii) measures in place or planned to steer the phase out, and (iii) potential technical

or regulatory barriers for the phase out and options to overcome those.

The national diversification plans should be communicated to the Commission by 1 March

2026, at the latest, on the basis of the template provided for in Annex II. The Commission

may issue a recommendation, after an assessment, to the relevant Member State in the case a

risk of not achieving the deadline for the phase out is identified.

Article 13

strengthens the existing monitoring framework of security of gas supply by

amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. It requires importers of gas from the Russian

Federation to provide detailed contractual information to the Commission and national

competent authorities. The information should include quantities to be supplied and taken,

including flexibilities under take-or-pay or deliver-or-pay provisions, the conclusion date,

contract duration, contracted gas quantities with upward or downward flexibility rights, and

the identities of the contract partners, gas producer, and country of production. For LNG

imports, the port of first loading should be noted, along with delivery points and possible

flexibilities regarding these points. Additionally, delivery schedules or nominations, possible

contractual flexibilities concerning annual quantities, and conditions for suspension or

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

termination of deliveries, including force majeure provisions, should be outlined. The

governing law and chosen arbitration mechanism should also be specified, as well as key

elements of other relevant commercial agreements.

The Article sets an obligation for providers of LNG terminals to communicate the

Commission with relevant information concerning the services booked by customers from the

Russian Federation.

The Commission shall assess the implementation of the proposed Regulation and progress in

the phase out of gas from the Russian Federation based on the information received, including

the national diversification plans pursuant Article 11 of the proposed Regulation. Such

assessment should be published in an annual report.

Article 14

subjects any confidential information received under the proposed Regulation to be

treated under a standard of professional secrecy, notably to ensure the confidentiality,

integrity and protection of the information received.

Article 15

establishes an obligation for the Commission to effectively monitor the

development of the energy market and any security of supply risks in relation to imports from

the Russian Federation. In case a risk occur, appropriate action shall be taken, including by

amending the Regulation.

Article 16

sets the date of the entry into force of the proposed Regulation.

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

2025/0180 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy

dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular

Articles 194(2) and 207 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1)

The unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February

2022 revealed the dramatic consequences of the existing dependencies on Russian

natural gas on markets and security. In their Versailles Declaration of 11 March

2022, Heads of States therefore agreed to gradually decrease and eventually fully

remove the dependency on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Communication of 8

March 2022

and the REPowerEU Plan of 18 May 2022

proposed concrete

measures to allow the full diversification away from Russian energy imports in a

safe, affordable and sustainable manner. Significant progress in the process to

diversify gas supplies away from Russia was achieved since then. As the remaining

volumes of Russian natural gas entering the Union are still significant, the

Commission announced in its REPower Roadmap towards ending Russian energy

imports of 6 May 2025 a legislative proposal to fully phase out Russian gas imports

and to improve the existing framework for energy dependencies.

Multiple examples of unannounced and unjustified supply reductions and

interruptions already before the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the

weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation since then, show that the Russian

Federation systematically used existing dependencies on Russian gas supplies to

OJ C, …

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council,

the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, REPowerEU: Joint

European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy, COM(2022) 108 final, 8 March

2022.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council,

the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, REPowerEU Plan,

COM(2022) 230 final, 18 May 2022.

(2)

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harm the Union’s economy. This leads to serious negative effects on Member States

and the Union’s economic security in general. The Russian Federation and its energy

companies can therefore no longer be considered reliable energy trading partners by

the Union.

(3)

In January 2006, Russia stopped its natural gas supplies to Bulgaria and other

countries in South East Europe in the middle of a cold spell, driving up prices

increases and causing or threatening harm to citizens. On 6 January 2009, Russia

again fully cut off gas transiting through Ukraine, affecting 18 Member States,

especially those in Central and Eastern Europe. The supply disruption led to serious

disturbances of gas markets in the region and the whole of the Union. Some Member

States had zero natural gas flows for nearly 14 days, forcing lasting shutdowns of

heating in schools and factories, and requiring them to declare the state of

emergency. In 2014, the Russian Federation invaded and illegally annexed Crimea,

ceased Ukrainian gas production assets in Crimea and reduced gas supplies to several

Member States which had announced to supply Ukraine with gas, leading to market

disturbances and price increases and harming economic security. In the past, Russia’s

State-controlled monopoly exporter Gazprom has been the subject to several

Commission investigations for a possible breach of the EU competition rules and has

subsequently modified its conduct on the market to address the Commission’s

competition concerns.

Gazprom. The competition issues at stake concerned, in

several cases, so-called ‘territorial restrictions’ in Gazprom’s gas supply contracts,

prohibiting the resale of gas outside the own country

, as well as evidence that

Gazprom was engaged in unfair pricing practices and made energy supplies

dependent on political concessions from participation in Russian pipeline projects or

acquiring control over Union energy assets.

Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine since February 2022 and

subsequent weaponised reductions of gas supplies in conjunction with the

manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have laid

bare vulnerabilities and dependencies in the Union and its Member States, with the

clear potential of a direct and serious impact on the functioning of the Union gas

market, the Union’s economy and its essential security interests, as well as direct

harm to Union citizens because energy supply disruptions can harm citizens’ health

or life. Evidence shows that the State-controlled company Gazprom intentionally

manipulated the Union’s energy markets in order to drive up energy prices. Large

underground storages in the Union controlled by Gazprom were left at an

unprecedent low level, and Russian companies reduced sales at Union gas hubs

and

fully discontinued the use of their own sales platform before the invasion, affecting

see Commission Decision C(2018) 3106 final of 24 May 2018 relating to a proceeding under Article

102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 54 of the EEA

Agreement, Case AT.39816 – Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe;

https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39816/39816_10148_3.pdf.

See for the competition investigations concerning territorial restrictions between 2003 and 2005 see:

ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_710;

ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_03_1345;

ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_05_195;

for the investigation in the Gazprom II case, see Commission Decision C(2018) 3106 final of 24 May

2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

(TFEU) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, Case AT.39816 – Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and

Eastern Europe.

ACER “European gas market trends and price drivers 2023 - Market Monitoring Report” (para. 28).

(4)

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short-term markets and aggravating the already tight supply situation after Russia’s

unlawful invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2022, Russia systematically halted or

reduced deliveries of natural gas to Member States, leading to significant

disturbances on the Union gas market. This affected notably the supplies to the

Union via the Yamal pipeline, the supplies to Finland as well as the Nord Stream 1

pipeline, where Gazprom first reduced flows and eventually shut supplies via the

pipeline entirely.

(5)

Russia’s weaponisation of gas supply and market manipulation through intentional

disruptions of gas flows led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, reaching

unprecedented levels, up to eight times above the average of previous years, in 2022.

The resulting need to find alternative gas supply sources, to change supply routes, to

fill storages for the winter, and to find solutions for congestion problems in the

Union’s gas infrastructure contributed to high price volatility and the unprecedented

price hikes in 2022.

The exceptionally high gas prices translated into high electricity prices and price

increases for other energy products, leading to sustained high inflation. A deep

economic crisis with negative growth rates in many Member States, caused by the

high energy prices, endangered the economy of the Union, undermined consumer

purchasing power and raised the cost of manufacturing, particularly in energy,

leading to risks for social cohesion and stability, and even to human life or health.

The supply interruptions also led to very seriously problems for the security of

energy supply in the Union and forced eleven Member States to declare an energy

crisis level under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the

Council

. Benefitting from the Union’s dependency during that crisis, Russia’s

manipulations of the market allowed it to achieve record-high profits from remaining

energy trade with Europe, with revenues from gas imports accounting still for EUR

15bn in 2024. Those revenues could be used to finance further economic attacks

against the Union, undermining economic security. They could also be used to

finance the war of aggression against the Ukraine which constitutes a major threat to

political and economic stability in Europe.

The recent crisis provided evidence that trustful trade relations with partners

supplying energy products are crucial to preserve market stability, to protect human

life and health as well as the essential security interests of the Union, not the least

because the Union depends to a large extent on energy imports from third countries.

Maintaining energy supplies from Russia would expose the Union to continued

economic and security risks; it would therefore not increase but decrease its supply

security. Even dependencies on smaller import volumes of Russian gas can, if abused

by Russia, significantly distort the price dynamic, even if just temporarily, and

disrupt energy markets, especially in those regions which are still significantly reliant

on imports from Russia. Taking into account the long standing and consistent pattern

of market manipulations and supply disruptions, and the fact that the Russian

government has consistently used gas trade as a weapon to achieve policy instead of

trade goals, it is therefore appropriate to take measures to address the continued

vulnerability of the Union resulting from natural gas imports both via pipelines and

liquified natural gas (LNG) with the Russian Federation.

Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017

concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No

994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj).

(6)

(7)

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(8)

The restrictions on international transactions provided for in Articles 3 and 5 of this

Regulation are consistent with the Union’s external action in other areas, as required

by Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The state of relations

between the Union and the Russian Federation has greatly deteriorated in recent

years and particularly since 2022. That deterioration of relations is due to the Russian

Federation’s blatant disregard for international law and, in particular, its unprovoked

and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. Since July 2014, the Union has

progressively imposed restrictive measures on trade with the Russian Federation in

response to the Russian Federation’s actions against Ukraine. The Union is allowed,

by virtue of the exceptions that apply under the Agreement Establishing the World

Trade Organization, and in particular Article XXI of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade 1994 (security exceptions) and analogous exceptions under the

Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the Russian Federation, not to

accord to goods imported from the Russian Federation the advantages granted to like

products imported from other countries (most-favoured-nation treatment). Therefore,

the Union is not prevented from imposing prohibitions or restrictions on the import

of goods of the territory of the Russian Federation, if the Union considers such

measures, taken in time of the existing emergency in international relations between

the Union and the Russian Federation, to be necessary for the protection of the

Union’s essential security interests.

Diversifying LNG import capacity is essential for strengthening and maintaining

energy security within the Union. A significant portion of that capacity is controlled

by Russian companies via long-term contracts of more than 10 years, creating a risk

that the capacity rights reserved in those contracts could be used to obstruct imports

from alternative sources through capacity hoarding practices. Similar practices could

make Union energy markets subject to the prolonged influence of Russian

companies, which have previously demonstrated a significant capacity to distort

markets in the Union, using existing dependencies. Past instances of gas storage

hoarding have further led to substantial market distortions, increased prices, and

threats to critical security measures

. Given the essential role that LNG is expected

to play in securing alternative energy supplies in the it is essential to complement the

gas import ban with a prohibition on providing LNG terminal services to Russian

entities. To assist Member States in ending their dependency on Russian gas

supplies, and to ensure the effective delivery of LNG imports from alternative

sources, it is important to avoid that the necessary import infrastructure can be

blocked by Russian customers of LNG terminal services. The provision of long-term

LNG terminal services to entities from Russia or controlled by Russian should be

therefore prohibited as of 1 January 2026. Those provided under a contract

concluded before 17 June 2025, should be prohibited as of 1 January 2028. This

should enable the reallocation of terminal capacity to alternative LNG suppliers and

strengthen the resilience of the energy market in the Union.

The Commission has carefully assessed the impact on the Union and on its Member

States of a possible prohibition of Russian imports of natural gas and of the provision

of LNG terminal services to Russian entities. In fact, preparatory work and several

detailed analyses of the consequences of a total phase out of Russian gas have been

(9)

(10)

See Assessment of Impact, page 4.

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

conducted and published since 2022

, and the Commission could also draw upon a

multitude of consultations with stakeholders, external experts and agencies, and

studies on the effects of the phase out of Russian gas. The Commission’s analysis

showed that a phase out of Russian natural gas imports, if introduced in a stepwise,

coordinated and well-prepared manner in a spirit of solidarity, is likely to have

limited impact on energy prices in the Union, and that it will enhance and not

endanger the Union’s security of supply, due to the exit of an unreliable trading

partner from the Union markets. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the

implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already reduced supply dependencies

from Russia, for instance by measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the

deployment of renewable energy sources, as well as active support to diversification

of energy supplies and the increase of the EU bargaining power via Joint gas

purchasing. The Assessment of Impact also showed that upfront coordination of

diversification policies can avoid harmful effects on prices or supplies

(11)

The proposed Regulation is fully compatible with the Union’s strategy to reduce its

reliance on fossil fuels imports by enhancing decarbonisation and rapidly expanding

domestically produced clean energy. As set out in the REPower Roadmap, the

implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has already resulted in substantial gas

savings of more than 60 billion cubic meters annually in gas imports between 2022

and 2024, allowing the Union to reduce supply dependencies from Russia. This

could be achieved by measures to reduce gas demand or to accelerate the green

transition by an accelerated deployment of wind and solar generation capacity, which

significantly increased the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as by active

support to diversification of energy supplies and the increase of the EU bargaining

power via joint gas purchasing. Moreover, the full implementation of the energy

transition, the recent Action Plan for Affordable Energy and other measures, notably

investments in the production of low-carbon alternatives for energy intensive

products, such as fertilisers, are expected to replace up to 100 bcm of natural gas by

2030. This will facilitate the phase out of gas imports from the Russian Federation.

In line with the Versailles Declaration and the REPowerEU Communication, a large

number of gas importers have already terminated or significantly reduced their gas

supplies from Russia. As set out in the Assessment of Impacts, the remaining gas

volumes under

existing

supply contracts can, be phased out without significant

economic impact or risks for security of supply, due to the availability of sufficient

alternative suppliers on the gas world market, a well-interconnected Union gas

market and the availability of sufficient import infrastructure

Short-term contracts, that is contracts on individual or multiple natural gas supplies

of a duration of less than one year, concern smaller volumes than the large multi-year

supply contracts importers hold with Russian companies. These existing contracts

will in any event be close to expiration when this Regulation will enter into force.

Accordingly, the risk for economic security resulting from existing short term-

(12)

(13)

See, for example, Commission Staff Working Document Implementing the REPower EU Action Plan:

Investment Needs, Hydrogen Accelerator and Achieving the Bio-Methane Targets, SWD(2022) 230 final,

accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the

Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, REPowerEU Plan,

COM(2022) 230 final, 18 May 2022.

See Assessment of Impacts, page 35.

See Assessment of Impact, pages 15 to 36.

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

contracts appears to be low. It is therefore appropriate to exempt existing short-term

contracts from the immediate application of the import allowing for a transition

phase until 17 June 2026.

(14)

An exemption from the prohibition of gas imports as of 1 January 2026 should also

be granted for existing long term supply contracts. Indeed, importers holding long-

term contracts will usually need more time to find alternative supply routes and

sources than short-term contract holders, also as long-term contracts usually concern

significantly larger volumes over time than short-term contracts. A transition time

should therefore be introduced to give holders of long-term contracts sufficient time

to diversify their supplies in an orderly manner.

Some landlocked countries which are currently still supplied under existing long-

term supply contracts for Russian pipeline gas are specifically affected by recent

changes of supply routes from the Russian Federation, due to limited or no

alternative routes for the transport of the contracted gas to them. To remedy the

situation, suppliers from other Member States currently ensure the delivery of

pipeline gas under short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian

Federation via uncongested interconnection points. Due to this very specific

situation, the transition time necessary to find new suppliers should also apply to

those short-term supply contracts with suppliers from the Russian Federation which

serve to supply landlock countries affected by changes of supply routes for Russian

gas.

While it appears justified to exempt existing “legacy” contracts from the immediate

application, not all contracts entered into before the entry into force of this

Regulation should benefit from such exemption. Indeed, there may be an incentive

by Russian suppliers to use the time between the publication of this proposal until the

entry into force of the ban to increase current supplies, by concluding new contracts,

increasing volumes by changing existing contracts or using flexibilities under

existing contracts. In order to ensure that imports from Russia do not increase but

decrease as a result of the proposed Regulation, measures should be included in the

Regulation to avoid a “rush” for new Russian gas imports in the time between the

adoption of this proposal and the entry into force of the ban. Indeed, the commitment

from Heads of State to phase out gas supplies was already made in March 2022; it

was renewed in the REPowerEU Strategy, the REPowerEU Plan and the

REPowerEU Roadmap. At the latest with the publication of the proposal for this

Regulation, it is no longer appropriate consider contracts concluded after that date as

“legacy” contracts. Contracts concluded after 17 June 2025 should therefore not

benefit from the exceptional transition provisions for existing short and long-term

contracts.

In order to avoid that import volumes provided for in existing supply contracts are

increased and not decreased, amendments to existing supply contracts should be

considered as new contracts for the purposes of this Regulation, and increases of

import volumes by using contractual flexibilities should not benefit from the

transition period.

This Regulation creates a clear legal prohibition to import Russian natural gas,

constituting a sovereign act of the Union beyond the control of gas importers and

rendering the performance of natural gas imports from Russia unlawful, with direct

legal effect and without any discretion for Member States concerning its application.

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

kom (2025) 0828 - Ingen titel

(19)

Unlike other goods, natural gas is a homogeneous commodity which is traded in

large volumes and often resold multiple times between traders at wholesale level.

Taking into account the particular complexity of tracing the origin of natural gas, and

bearing in mind that Russian suppliers might seek to circumvent this Regulation, for

example by sales via intermediaries, via transshipments or transport through other

countries, this Regulation should provide for an effective framework to establish the

actual origin and the point of export of natural gas imported into the Union.

In particular, importers of natural gas should be obliged to provide customs

authorities with all information necessary to establish the origin and the point of

export of natural gas imported into the Union and to decide whether the imported gas

falls under the general prohibition or one of its exceptions. As the contractual

conditions determining the elements relevant for the assessment of the customs

authorities are often complex, customs authorities should be given the power to ask

importers for detailed contract information, including entire supply contracts,

excluding price information, where this is necessary to understand the context of

certain clauses or references to other contractual provisions. The Regulation should

include rules to ensure an effective protection of business secrets of concerned

undertakings.

Customs authorities should cooperate with regulatory authorities, competent

authorities, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the

Commission to implement the provisions of this Regulation and exchange relevant

information, notably when it comes to the assessment of exemptions allowing

imports of Russian natural gas after 1.1.2026. Customs authorities, regulatory

authorities, competent authorities and ACER should have the necessary tools and

databases in place to ensure that relevant information can be exchanged between

national authorities and authorities in different Member States where necessary.

ACER should contribute with its expertise to the process of monitoring the

implementation. To facilitate the creation of the necessary interoperable joint

information systems, the Commission and Member States may explore possibilities

to make use of budget under the Internal Security Fund (ISF). Customs authorities

should notify regulatory authorities, the national competent authority and the

Commission on a monthly basis regarding key elements concerning the development

of imports of Russian gas (such as quantities imported under long-term or short-term

contracts, entry points, or contract partners).

Russia is a major gas exporter and has not played any noticeable role as gas transit

country in the past. This is due to several factors, such as the lack of regasification

infrastructure, the organisation of gas trade in Russia via a pipeline export monopoly,

business models of Russian gas companies which are not based on organising

transits, or Russia’s geographical location. Therefore, imports of natural gas arriving

via interconnection points between the Russian Federation and the Union are usually

originating in, or exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation. The

same consideration applies to gas imported via interconnection points between the

Union and Serbia, as Serbia can, for technical reasons, only export gas of Russian

origin towards the Union. Therefore, and taking into account incentives of Russian

suppliers to circumvent the import ban, customs authorities should, where gas is

imported via Russian or Serbian entry points, require clear and unambiguous

equivocal evidence to prove the non-Russian origin or the point of export of the gas.

The submitted documents should allow the traceability of the imported gas up to the

place of production.

(20)

(21)

(22)

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(23)

Experience with the announced phase out of gas supplies via Ukraine has shown that

good preparation and coordination in a spirit of solidarity can effectively avoid

market disruptions or security of supply problems potentially resulting from

changing gas suppliers. To prepare for the full phase out of Russian gas in 2028 in a

coordinated manner and to give the market sufficient time to anticipate the changes

involved without risk for security of gas supply or a significant impact on energy

prices, Member States should prepare national diversification plans and present them

by 1 March 2026. Those plans should describe intended measures at national or

regional level to reduce demand, foster renewable energy production and ensure

alternative supplies, as well as possible technical or regulatory barriers which may

complicate the diversification process. As the diversification process may require

coordination of measures at national, regional or Union level, the Commission

should assess the national diversification plans, with the possibility to issue

recommendations suggesting adaptations where necessary.

In their Versailles Declaration, the Heads of Member States committed not only to

phase out natural gas supplies from Russia, but also other energy supplies, notably

oil supplies. While restrictive measures to ensure the phase out of oil imports from

Russia are already in place, and oil imports have decreased significantly, a further

phase out of Russian oil may require specific preparatory steps and coordination with

neighbours. Member States should therefore prepare national diversification plans

also for oil, with a possibility for the Commission to provide recommendations on

those plans.

Experience during the gas crisis of 2022 and 2023 has shown that showed that

comprehensive information on the supply situation and possible supply dependencies

is crucial to monitor gas supply in the Union. Therefore importers of Russian gas

making use of the exemptions laid down in this Regulation should submit to the

Commission all information which is necessary to effectively evaluate possible risks

for gas trade. That information should include key parameters, or even whole text

parts, of the relevant gas supply contracts, excluding price information, where this is

necessary to understand the context of certain clauses or references to other

provisions in the contract. When monitoring gas supply in the Union, the

Commission should also take into account information on imports provided by

customs authorities and information included in national diversification plans. The

Commission should regularly inform the Gas Coordination Group established by

Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 about the phase-out process at the Union level and

submit an annual report on the Russian gas phase-out, which may be accompanied by

specific Union recommendations and actions to accelerate the phase-out process.

Member States and Union should cooperate closely in the implementation of this

Regulation. With a view to the recent practice of the Russian Federation to

unilaterally change agreed court and arbitration procedures in a manner not

compatible with international customary law or bilateral investment treaties entered

between Member States and Russia, it follows from international law that affected

companies and Member States cannot be held liable for any judgments, arbitral

awards, including investor-State arbitral awards, or other judicial decisions adopted

under procedures which are illegal under international customary law or under a

bilateral investment treaty, and against which the person or Member State concerned

does not have effective access to the remedies under the relevant jurisdiction. With

respect to financial responsibilities concerning possible investor-to-state dispute

(24)

(25)

(26)

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settlement resolution cases, reference is made, to Regulation (EU) 912/2014

, where

applicable.

(27)

The Union has created a robust legal framework to ensure security of gas supply at

all times, and to deal with possible supply crises in a coordinated manner, including

obligations on Member States to provide for effective and operational solidarity to

neighbours in need of gas. The Commission should constantly monitor the

development of market risks for gas supply resulting from gas trade with Russia at

Union, regional and Member State level. In case of sudden and significant

developments, which seriously threaten the security of supply of one or more

Member States, it is appropriate to empower the Commission to take the necessary

emergency measures by authorising one or more Member States not to apply the

import prohibitions concerning natural gas or LNG imports set out in this Regulation.

Such an authorisation should be limited in time and the Commission implementing

decision may impose certain additional conditions, to ensure that any suspension is

strictly limited to addressing the threat. The Commission should closely monitor the

application of any such temporary authorisation.

The proposed measures fully reflect the principle of energy solidarity. Indeed, the

level of exposure to Russian gas imports differs between Member States, and many

Member States have already taken measures to phase out Russian gas. The proposal

for this Regulation will ensure an EU-wide harmonised approach to the phase out of

Russian gas, preserving solidarity between Member States.

Since the objectives of this Regulation relating to the monitoring of possible gas

dependencies cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in a coordinated

manner and without risk of market fragmentation, but can be better and more

efficiently achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance

with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European

Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article,

this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that

objective.

In view of the importance for the Union to phase out further economic dependence of

the Union on gas imports from the Russian Federation without any delay, this

Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the

Official Journal of the European Union,

(28)

(29)

(30)

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014

establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute

settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party,

OJ L

257, 28.8.2014, p. 121.

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CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Subject matter

This Regulation provides a framework for effectively removing the Union’s exposure to the

significant risks for trade and security, resulting from gas trade with the Russian Federation

by laying down:

(a) a stepwise prohibition of imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation and of the

provision of LNG terminal services;

(b) rules to effectively implement and monitor that prohibition as well as the phase out of oil

imports from Russia;

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

(1)

‘natural gas’ means natural gas as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Directive

(EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council

and as

referred to in Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes 2711 11 00 and 2711 21 00;

‘LNG’ means liquefied natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711 11 00;

‘natural gas in gaseous state’ means natural gas as referred to in CN code 2711

21 00;

‘long-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas,

excluding a natural gas derivative, exceeding one year;

‘short-term supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas,

excluding a natural gas derivative, not exceeding one year;

‘landlocked country’ means a country that is entirely surrounded by land and

has not direct access to the sea;

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common

rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Directive (EU)

2023/1791 and repealing Directive 2009/73/EC (OJ L, 2024/1788, 15.7.2024, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1788/oj).

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(7)

‘importer’ means a natural or legal person who has the power to determine and

has determined that natural gas from a third country is to be brought into the

customs territory of or otherwise placed on the Union market;

‘customs authority’ means a customs authority as defined in Article 5, point

(1), of

Regulation

(EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the

Council

;

‘competent authority’ means a competent authority as defined in Article 2,

point (7), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the

Council

;

(8)

(9)

(10) ‘regulatory authority’ means a regulatory authority designated in accordance

with Article 76(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(11) ‘control’ means control as defined in

Article 2,

point (55),

of Directive (EU)

2024/1788;

(12) ‘long-term LNG terminal services’ means services provided by LNG system

operators to customers, in particular offloading, storage, sending out, berthing

(loading and unloading), regassification, backhaul liquefaction, truck loading,

bunkering of LNG, and including ancillary services and temporary storage

necessary for the re-gasification process and subsequent delivery to the

transmission system under contracts with a duration of more than one year;

(13) ‘interconnection point’ means an interconnection point as defined in Article 2,

point (63), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(14) ‘entry point’ means an entry point as defined in Article 2, point (61), of

Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(15) ‘virtual trading point’ means virtual trading point as defined in Article 2, point

(59), of Directive (EU) 2024/1788;

(16) ’contracted quantities’ means the quantities of natural gas that the buyer or the

importer is obligated to purchase and the seller or the exporter is obligated to

provide, as specified in the supply contract, excluding volumes arising from

adjustments to the contract, such as make-up quantities, shortfall recoveries, or

other volumetric modifications under the terms of the contract; for long-term

supply contracts, it means the annual contracted quantities;

(17) ‘make-up quantities’ mean the volumes of natural gas which a purchaser or the

importer is entitled or obligated to take delivery of and pay for in subsequent

periods, in compliance with minimum take-or-pay requirements and in order to

compensate for any shortfall in the quantities contracted but not taken in prior

periods, as provided for in a long-term supply contract;

(18) ‘delivery schedule’ means the timetable or plan agreed between the parties to a

gas supply contract, specifying the quantities of gas to be delivered by the

seller or the exporter and received by the buyer or the importer over defined

Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying

down

the

Union

Customs

Code

(OJ

269,

10.10.2013,

ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/952/oj).

Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017

concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No

994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj).

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time intervals, including the timing, location, and conditions of delivery, as set

forth in a supply contract or any related operational procedures;

(19) ‘nomination’ means a nomination as defined in Article 2, point (8), of

Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council

;

(20) ‘oil’ means crude oil, natural gas liquids, refinery feedstocks, additives and

oxygenates and other hydrocarbons and oil products falling under CN codes

2709 and 2710.

CHAPTER II

STEPWISE BAN OF NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION

Article 3

Prohibition of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation

The import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines, which originates in or is

exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January

2026 unless one of the exceptions in Article 4 applies.

The import of LNG, which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the

Russian Federation, shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026, unless one of the exceptions in

Article 4 applies.

Article 4

Transition phase for existing supply contracts

Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas

referred to in Article 3 are executed under a short-term supply contract concluded before

17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 17 June 2026.

Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas

referred to in Article 3 are:

(a)

executed under a short-term supply contract with delivery to an interconnection point

with a landlocked country and,

Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the

internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, amending Regulations (EU) No

1227/2011, (EU) 2017/1938, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2022/869 and Decision (EU) 2017/684 and

repealing

Regulation

(EC)

715/2009

(OJ

2024/1789,

15.7.2024,

ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1789/oj);

ENTSOG,

Security of Supply Simulation | ENTSOG.

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(b)

that a long-term supply contract with delivery at the virtual trading point of that

landlocked country for the import of natural gas in gaseous state via pipelines exists, which

originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and which was

concluded before 17 June 2025 and not amended thereafter,

Article 3 shall apply as of 1 January 2028.

Where the importer can demonstrate to customs authorities that imports of natural gas

referred to in Article 3 are executed under a long-term supply contract concluded before

17 June 2025, and not amended thereafter, Article 3 shall apply as of 1 January 2028.

The quantities of imports made in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not

exceed the contracted quantities.

Article 5

Prohibition to provide LNG long-term terminal services to Russian customers

The provision of long-term LNG terminal services in the EU to entities established in the

Russian Federation or entities controlled by natural persons or legal entities established in the

Russian Federation shall be prohibited as of 1 January 2026.

Article 6

Transition phase for LNG terminal services under existing contracts

Where the provider of long-term LNG terminal services can demonstrate to customs

authorities that those services are provided under a contract concluded before 17 June 2025

and not amended thereafter, Article 5 shall apply as of 1 January 2028.

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CHAPTER III

SUBMISSION AND EXCHANGE OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

Article 7

Submission of relevant information by importers

1. Importers of natural gas shall provide customs authorities with all relevant information

necessary to implement Articles 3 and 4, in particular appropriate evidence to verify whether

the natural gas originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation.

For the purposes of application of Article 4, importers of natural gas shall provide customs

authorities and other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9 and 10, with

appropriate evidence to assess whether the conditions set out in that Article are met.

2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least all of the following:

(a) the date of the conclusion of the gas supply contract;

(b) the duration of the gas supply contract;

(d) the identity of the parties to the gas supply contract, including, for parties registered in the

EU, the Economic Operator Registration and Identification (EORI) number;

(e) the producer of the gas and the country of production, and, as appropriate, the country

where the gas was further processed;

(f) for LNG imports, the port of first loading;

(g) the delivery points, including possible flexibilities concerning the delivery point.

(h) any modification of the gas supply contract, indicating content and date of the

modification, with the exception of modifications which relate solely to the gas price;

Customs authorities or other authorities involved in the monitoring pursuant to Article 9

and 10, may request more detailed information, except price information, if the required

information is necessary to assess whether the conditions set out in Article 3 and 4 are

fulfilled. Customs authorities may, in particular, require importers to submit the text of certain

provisions of the gas supply contract in full or the text of entire gas supply contract, except

price information, especially where certain contractual provisions are interrelated, or where

the full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the

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assessment. In case customs authorities consider that the evidence provided is not conclusive,

they may refuse the release for free circulation of the goods.

Natural gas entering to the Union through the following interconnection points shall be

presumed to be exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, unless the

importer can provide unambiguous evidence to customs authorities that the imported natural

gas originates in a country other than the Russian Federation that has been in transit through

the Russian Federation.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

(j)

(k)

(l)

(m)

(n)

(o)

(p)

Imatra (FI/RU);

Narva (EE/RU);

Värska (EE/RU);

Luhamaa (LV/RU);

Šakiai (LT/RU);

Kotlovka (LT/BY);

Kondratki (PL/BY);

Wysokoje (PL/BY);

Tieterowka (PL/BY);

Kobryń (PL/BY);

Greifswald (DE/RU);

Strandzha 2 (BG)/Malkoclar (TR) – TurkStream

Kiskundorozsma-2 (HU) / Horgos (RS)

Kiskundorozsma (HU/RS)

Kireevo (BG) / Zaychar (RS)

Kalotina (BG)/ Dimitrovgrad (RS)

Article 8

Submission of relevant information by providers of LNG terminal services

Providers of LNG terminal services to customers established in the Russian Federation or

controlled by natural persons or legal entities established in the Russian Federation shall

provide customs authorities with relevant information for the implementation of Articles 5

and 6.

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Article 9

Effective monitoring

Customs authorities, and, where relevant, competent authorities and regulatory authorities and

the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), shall ensure effective

monitoring of the provisions in Chapter II, if necessary by making full use of their

enforcement powers, and cooperate closely with relevant national authorities, authorities from

other Member States, ACER or the Commission.

Article 10

Exchange of information

Customs authorities shall exchange the information received from natural gas importers with

regulatory authorities, competent authorities, ACER and the Commission to the extent

necessary to ensure effective assessment whether the conditions set out in Articles 3 to 6 of

this Regulation are fulfilled. Customs authorities from different Member States shall

exchange information received from natural gas importers to the extent necessary, and

cooperate with each other in order to avoid circumvention. They shall make use of existing

tools and databases allowing that relevant information can be effectively exchanged between

national authorities in their Member State and authorities in other Member States, or put such

tools in place where necessary.

By 31 August 2026 and 31 August 2027, ACER shall, based on the data received under this

Regulation and own information, publish a report providing an overview of contracts on the

supply of gas originating in or directly or indirectly exported from Russia, and assessing the

impact of diversification on energy markets.

The Commission and ACER shall share relevant information on contracts on the import of

Russian gas in their possession with customs authorities where appropriate to facilitate the

enforcement of this Regulation.

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CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION PLANS

Article 11

National diversification plans for natural gas

Member States shall establish a diversification plan describing measures, milestones

and potential barriers to diversify their gas supplies, to discontinue all imports of natural gas

which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation within the

deadline for the full prohibition of Russian imports on 1 January 2028.

The national diversification plan for natural gas shall include all the following:

(a) available information on the volume of imports of natural gas which originates in or is

exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation under existing supply contracts, as

well as on LNG terminal services contracted by natural or legal persons established in the

Russian Federation, where applicable;

(b) a clear description of measures in place and planned at national level to replace natural gas

which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including

the quantities expected to be phased out, milestones and timeline of implementation and,

insofar as available, envisaged options for alternative supplies and supply routes. Such

measures may notably include the use of the Aggregate EU Platform pursuant to Article 43 of

Directive (EU) 2024/718, support measures for diversification efforts of energy companies,

cooperation in regional groups such as the CESEC High-Level Group, identifying alternatives

to natural gas imports via electrification, energy efficiency measures, boosting the production

of biogas, biomethane and clean hydrogen, renewable energy deployment or voluntary

demand reduction measures;

natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from the Russian

Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

By 1 March 2026, Member States shall notify the Commission of their national

diversification plans using the template set out in Annex I.

The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national

diversification plans for natural gas where appropriate. Member States shall report regularly

to the Gas Coordination Group established by Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on the

progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those plans. On the

basis of the national diversification plans, the Commission shall assess the implementation of

the phase out of Russian gas and report it to the Gas Coordination Group, as per Article 13 of

this Regulation.

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Article 12

National diversification plans for oil

Where Member States receive imports of oil originating in or exported directly or

indirectly from the Russian federation, they shall establish a diversification plan describing

measures, milestones and potential barriers to diversify their oil supplies, to discontinue, by

1 January 2028, imports of oil which originates in or is exported directly or indirectly from

the Russian Federation.

The national diversification plan for oil shall include all the following:

(a) available information on the volume of direct or indirect imports of oil imports from

Russia under existing supply contracts;

(b) measures planned at national level to replace oil which originates in or is exported directly

or indirectly from the Russian Federation, including the quantities expected to be phased out,

milestones and timeline of implementation, and options for alternative supplies and supply

routes;

directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation, and options to overcome those barriers.

By 1 March 2026, Member States shall notify the Commission of their national

diversification plans in accordance with / using the template set out in Annex II.

The Commission shall facilitate the preparation and implementation of the national

diversification plans for oil where appropriate. Member States shall report regularly to the Oil

Coordination Group established by Article 17 of Council Directive 2009/119/EC

on the

progress achieved with the preparation, adoption and implementation of those national

diversification plans.

Where the national diversification plan for oil identifies a risk that the objective of

phasing out Russian oil by 1 January 2028 may not be achieved, the Commission may issue a

recommendation, after assessing the plan, to the respective Member State on how to achieve

the phase out in a timely manner. Following that recommendation, the Member State shall

update its diversification plan within three months, taking into consideration the

Commission’s recommendation.

Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to

maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9, ELI:

http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/119/oj).

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CHAPTER V

MONITORING OF SECURITY OF GAS SUPPLY

Article 13

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938

Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is amended as follows:

(1) in Article 2, the following points (32) and (33) are added:

‘(33) ‘take-or-pay provision’ means a contractual provision which obliges the buyer to either

take delivery of, or alternatively pay for a specified minimum quantity of gas within a given

period, regardless of whether the gas is actually received;

(34) deliver-or-pay provisions’ means a contractual provision which obliges the seller to pay a

contractual fine in case of non-delivery of gas.’;

(2) Article 14(6) is amended as follows:

(a) in the first subparagraph, the following point (c) is added:

‘(c) to the Commission and to the concerned competent authority the following information

relating to supply contracts for natural gas which originates in or is exported directly or

indirectly from the Russian Federation:

(i)

Regulation;

the information referred to in Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) XX/2025 - this

(ii)

information on quantities to be supplied and taken, including possible

flexibilities under

take-or-pay

provisions or deliver-or-pay provisions;

(iii)

delivery schedules (LNG) or nominations (pipeline gas);

(iv)

possible contractual flexibilities concerning the annual contracted quantities,

including make-up quantities;

(v)

conditions for the suspension or termination of gas deliveries, including force

majeure provisions;

(vi)

information on which law is governing the contract and which arbitration

mechanism is chosen;

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(vii) key elements of other commercial agreements that are relevant for the

execution of the gas supply contract, excluding price information.’;

(b) the following third and fourth subparagraphs are added:

‘The information referred to in point (c) shall be provided for each contract in a disaggregated

format, including the full relevant text parts, excluding price information, notably where the

full knowledge of the formulation of the contractual provisions is crucial for the security of

supply assessment or where certain contractual provisions are interrelated.

Providers of LNG terminal services shall provide the Commission with information

concerning services booked by customers from the Russian Federation,’ customers controlled

by undertakings from the Russian Federation, including contracted services, affected

quantities and contract duration.’;

(3) in Article 17, the second paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission shall carry a continuous monitoring of an exposure of the Union’s energy

system to Russian gas supplies, notably on the basis of information notified to competent

authorities pursuant to Article 14(6), point (c).

The Commission shall assess the implementation of the phase out of Russian gas pursuant to

Regulation (EU) XX/2025 at national, regional and Union level on the basis of the national

diversification plans pursuant to Article 11 of that Regulation. This assessment shall be

reported to the Gas Coordination Group.

On the basis of the conclusions of the assessment referred to in the third paragraph, the

Commission shall publish an annual report, which shall provide a comprehensive overview of

the progress achieved by Member States in implementing their national diversification plans.

Where relevant, the report referred to in the fourth paragraph may be accompanied by a

Commission recommendation which identifies possible actions and measures to ensure secure

supply diversification and a timely phase out of Russian gas.

The Member States concerned shall update their national diversification plan within three

months, taking into consideration the Commission’s recommendation.’.

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CHAPTER VI

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 14

Professional secrecy

1. Any confidential information received, exchanged, or transmitted pursuant to this

Regulation shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in this Article.

2. The obligation of professional secrecy shall apply to all persons who work or who have

worked for authorities involved in the implementation of this Regulation or any natural or

legal person to whom the relevant authorities have delegated its powers, including auditors

and experts contracted by the competent authorities.

3. Information covered by professional secrecy shall not be disclosed to any other person or

authority except by virtue of provisions laid down by Union or national law.

4. All information exchanged between the relevant authorities under this Regulation that

concerns business or operational conditions, and other economic or personal affairs shall be

considered confidential and shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy,

except where the competent authority states at the time of communication that such

information may be disclosed or where such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings.

Article 15

Monitoring and review

The Commission shall continuously monitor the development of the Union’s energy market,

notably with respect to potential gas supply dependencies or other security of supply risks in

relation to energy imports from the Russian Federation. In the case of sudden and significant

developments, seriously threatening the security of supply of one or more Member States, the

Commission may authorise one or more Member States to temporarily suspend the

application of Chapter Two of this Regulation, in whole or in part. The Commission decision

may contain certain conditions, in particular, to ensure that any suspension is strictly limited

to addressing the threat.

Article 16

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the

Official Journal of the European Union.

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This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Strasbourg,

The President