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EUU, Alm.del - 2011-12 - Bilag 264: Invitation til Interparlamentarisk møde om det europæiske semester EUU, Alm.del - 2011-12 - Bilag 264: Invitation til Interparlamentarisk møde om det europæiske semester
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DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS
 
 
HOW EFFECTIVE AND LEGITIMATE IS
THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER?
INCREASING THE ROLE OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
BRIEFING PAPER
 
 
Abstract
The European Semester is a new institutional process that provides Member
States with
ex-ante
guidance on fiscal and structural objectives. The
Semester’s goals are ambitious and it is still uncertain how it will fit into the
new EU economic governance framework. We find that Member States are
only slowly internalising the new procedure. Furthermore, the Semester has so
far lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the European
Parliament, the marginal involvement of National Parliaments and the lack of
transparency of the process at some stages. Finally, there remains room to
clarify the implications from a unified legal text. In fact, diluting the legal
separation of recommendations on National Reform Programmes and Council
opinions on Stability and Convergence Programmes may compromise effective
surveillance and governance. The European Parliament has an important role
to play. It needs hold the Commission and the Council accountable. This and
the overall objective of enhancing the new procedure’s effectiveness and
legitimacy can be done by means of a regular Economic Dialogue on the
Semester.
 
 
IP/A/ECON/NT/2010-24
PE 464.443
AUGUST 2011
EN
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This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs
AUTHORS
Mr Mark HALLERBERG, Professor of Public Management and Political Economy, Hertie
School of Governance, Berlin
Ms Benedicta MARZINOTTO, Research Fellow, Bruegel, Brussels, corresponding author
Mr Guntram B. WOLFF, Deputy Director, Bruegel, Brussels
with research assistance of Lucia GRANELLI and Silvia MERLER
RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR
Rudolf MAIER
Policy Department Economic and Scientific Policy
European Parliament
B-1047 Brussels
E-mail:
[email protected]
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS
Original: EN
Executive summary: DE, FR
ABOUT THE EDITOR
To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its newsletter please write to:
[email protected]
Manuscript completed in August 2011.
Brussels, © European Parliament, 2011.
This document is available on the Internet at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the
source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.
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CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Semester’s Innovations
1.2. The Legal Architecture
2.
THE CHALLENGES: EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY
2.1. Effectiveness
2.1.1. The national level
2.1.2. The European level
5
6
6
7
8
8
10
12
12
12
12
2.2. Legitimacy
2.2.1. Input Legitimacy
2.2.2. Output Legitimacy
12
13
13
3.
4.
MEMBER STATE EXAMPLES
EFFECTIVENESS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: STABILITY/
CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES AND NATIONAL REFORM
PROGRAMMES
EFFECTIVENESS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL: CHALLENGES OF
INTEGRATED ANALYSIS AND POLICY FORMULATION
5.1. The choice of optimal fiscal and structural policy
5.2. Prioritisation across policy areas
5.3. Political and economic trade-offs
5.4. Prioritisation across countries
5.5. Interaction with the new economic governance framework
5.6. The challenges of an integrated legal text
15
17
5.
20
20
20
20
21
21
21
5.7. The Council acting on the basis of a Commission recommendation 22
6.
ONE ASPECT OF INPUT LEGITIMACY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL
PARLIAMENTS IN THE FIRST CYCLE
24
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
_________________________________________________________________________________________
7.
8.
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
28
30
32
34
35
36
REFERENCES
ANNEX I : ANNUAL GROWTH SURVEY
ANNEX II: SURVEY COUNTRIES - OVERVIEW
ANNEX III: QUESTIONAIRE
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AGS
Annual Growth Survey
BEPG
Broad Economic Policy Guideline
DG
Directorate-General of the European Commission
ECB
European Central Bank
EDP
Excessive Deficit Procedure
EG
Employment Guidelines
EIP
Excessive Imbalance Procedure
EMU
European Economic and Monetary Union
EP
European Parliament
ES
European Semester
ESRB
European Systemic Risk Board
EU
European Union
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
IG
Integrated Guideline
IMF
International Monetary Fund
MoF
Ministry of Finance
MTBF
Medium-term Budgetary Framework
MTFA
Medium-term Financial Assistance
MTFF
Medium-term Financial Framework
MTO
Medium-term Budgetary Objective
NRP
National Reform Programme
PR
Proportional Representation
SCP
Stability or Convergence Programme
SGP
Stability and Growth Pact
SME
Small and Medium Enterprises
TFEU
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Submission’s schedule ............................................................................ 17
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. The European Semester: timetable and governance ..................................... 9
Figure 2. The European Semester: Treaty base....................................................... 10
 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The European Semester is a new six-month cycle in economic policy coordination in the
European Union that starts in January and finishes in June/July. It is based on two
procedural innovations. The first is a shift in the timing of the budgetary process.
National Governments are asked to submit their Stability or Convergence Programmes
before they are discussed by National Parliaments and translated into national legislation.
The aim is to strengthen economic policy coordination across countries by providing ex-
ante guidance. The second institutional innovation is the alignment of the timing of fiscal
and structural reform plans. EU Member States are now asked to submit Stability or
Convergence Programmes at the same time as their National Reform Programmes,
implying that Member States should pay more attention to complementarities and spill-
over effects across policy areas.
The Semester’s objectives are ambitious and its interaction with the new emerging
economic governance framework is complicated and, to some extent, unpredictable. We
analyse here the main challenges ahead in differentiating between effectiveness, at
national and European level, and legitimacy challenges.
On the first issue, effectiveness, early evidence is that countries have adapted differently
to the new procedures depending on if they are ‘old’ or ‘new’ Member States; if their
economic interests lie exclusively with the EU or not; and if they have strong or weak
national fiscal frameworks. Second, it remains to be seen if an integrated legal text
containing recommendations to correct the course of fiscal policy and intervene in
individual markets through structural measures will end up strengthening or weakening
the overall economic-governance framework. The European Parliament should in this
context become a forum in which information is exchanged. Its role as guardian in the
relationship between the European Commission and the Council should be made more
visible and effective. Clearer involvement of the European Parliament would also reduce
legitimacy concerns.
To achieve these objectives, in this paper, we envisage a wider economic dialogue with
the European Semester playing a central role. We envisage an Economic Dialogue with
the Commission and the President of the European Council that largely mimics the
European Central Bank’s Monetary Dialogue. A strong role for the European Parliament
will increase the effectiveness of EU economic governance, even if we suggest that its
involvement is limited to specific stages along the Semester cycle. On the other hand, we
find mixed results as regards the possibility of an increased or new collaboration between
National Parliaments and the European Parliament. The present briefing paper is a first
investigation into the possible role of the European Parliament in the new emerging
economic governance framework. A full study surveying also evidence on the actual
experience of the first Semester cycle’s follow-up will be delivered in 2012.
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
_________________________________________________________________________________________
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1.
The Semester’s Innovations
The sovereign debt crises that some euro area countries have experienced during the last
fifteen months indicate that the current design of European economic governance is not
able to prevent crises from occurring and spreading. Along with the realisation that fiscal
rules were not biting enough, it has also been recognised that the public sector was not
solely responsible for countries’ indebtedness but that, especially in euro area Member
States like Portugal and Spain, the private sector also accumulated substantial debt in
order to finance both consumption and investment.
1
Thus, an important lesson to draw
from the crisis is a deeper understanding of the high level of interconnectedness between
euro area countries, some of which are borrowers and other lenders, and between policy
areas, with strong feedback effects operating between the public, the private and the
financial sectors.
2
Recent events generated momentum in favour of a reform of European economic
governance. The European Commission submitted the main lines of the new EU
governance framework on 12 May 2010
3
, with formal proposals in its comprehensive
package of 29 September 2010 organised into six legislative proposals, four of which are
to be approved by the Council and the European Parliament (EP) through the regular
legislative process.
4
Current proposals include measures to strengthen fiscal surveillance
by the Commission, enforcement through semi-automatic sanctions, and a completely
new regulation on surveillance and sanctioning of non-fiscal macroeconomic imbalances.
The emerging governance structure is anchored in the so-called European Semester.
First proposed in the Commission’s Communication of 12 May 2010 and then approved
by the Council on 7 September 2010, the European Semester is a new institutional
process with the ultimate aim of strengthening coordination between countries and of
macroeconomic and structural issues. It consists of a cycle of economic policy
coordination that lasts for about six months and is repeated every year. The cycle starts
in each January with the presentation of the Commission’s Annual Growth Survey (AGS).
The AGS sets a number of priorities for the EU as a whole and identifies objectives that
would serve the fulfilment of those priorities. The Spring European Council then endorses
the AGS after discussion in the Council and the European Parliament. The Spring
European Council explicitly invites EU Member States to take account of the AGS in the
drafting of their budgetary and structural reform plans, which they need to submit to the
EU already in the Spring. The Commission is set to deliver country-specific
recommendations on the basis of these documents, with the Council expected to adopt
them no later than July. Figure 1 summarises the timetable and the main elements of the
Semester’s governance structure. This process is based on two procedural innovations,
each supporting a specific objective. The first is a shift in the timing of the budgetary
process.
Altomonte and Marzinotto (2010).
Gerlach, Schulz, and Wolff (2010).
3
Commission (2010a), Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination, COM(2010) 250, 12 May.
4
The six legislative proposals are as follows: 1) Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) n.
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, 2) Proposal for a
Regulation amending Regulation (EC) n. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, 3) Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, 4)
Proposal for a Council Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, 5) Proposal
for a Regulation on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro-area, 6) Proposal for a
Regulation on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro-area.
2
1
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Since the late 1990s Member States have been required to submit Stability or
Convergence Programmes (SCPs) under Regulation 1466/97 as part of the Stability
Pact’s preventive arm. These documents typically contain multi-annual budgetary
projections and details of national fiscal consolidation strategies. Compared with practice
prior to 2011, the difference now is one of timing, as National Governments must submit
them before they are discussed in National Parliaments and translated into national
legislation. The aim is to strengthen economic policy coordination between countries in
the form of
ex-ante
guidance.
The second institutional innovation is the alignment of the timing of fiscal and structural
reform plans. EU Member States are now asked to submit their SCPs alongside their
National Reform Programmes (NRPs). Introduced in their current form in March 2005
under the revamped Lisbon Strategy, NRPs are used by Governments to inform the EU of
their multiannual commitments to structural interventions in the economy from pension
to product, labour and capital markets reforms. The Semester’s prescription is that they
should be submitted together with budgetary projections, implying that Member States
need to take greater account of complementarities and spill-over effects between policy
areas. Furthermore, the early announcement of EU priorities and objectives through the
AGS means that
ex-ante
guidance is exercised not only for countries’ fiscal policies but
also for their growth strategies, albeit with some differences in the strength and coercive
power of EU recommendations.
The European Council of 25 March 2011 introduced an additional tool to improve cross-
country coordination of growth policies: it invited EU Member States to include in their
upcoming reform plans reference to Euro-Plus Pact commitments. Initially suggested by
France and Germany in early 2011 and then adopted by the Spring European Council,
the Pact lists a number of priorities that largely mimic the content of the January AGS
(i.e. competitiveness, employment, fiscal sustainability and financial stability).
Figure 1. The European Semester: timetable and governance
Alert
mechanism
In-depth studies
Recommendation
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
European
Commission
Annual Growth
Survey
Policy guidance
including possible
recommendations
Finalisation
& adoption
of guidance
Council of
Ministers
Debate &
orientations
European
Parliament
European
Council
Annual
economic &
social summit
Adoption of National Reform
Programmes (NRPs) &
Stability and Convergence
Programmes (SCPs)
Endorsement
of guidance
Member
States
Source:
Based on DG ECFIN
 
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
_________________________________________________________________________________________
1.2.
The Legal Architecture
The legal architecture of the Semester is not free of ambiguities which – if not properly
addressed – may give rise to institutional conflicts. The European Semester is legally
enshrined in Articles 121 and 148 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU). The former commits EU Member States to economic policy coordination and
dissuades them from implementing policies that could endanger the proper functioning of
Economic and Monetary Union. The latter brings employment to the centre of EU
economic-policy and requires Member States to submit regular reports on their
employment situation. The Semester is thus underpinned by a Treaty-based system of
surveillance and
ex-post
monitoring that recognises specific roles for the European
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. The fact that it is Treaty-based is,
however, not sufficient to solve some legal ambiguities.
In practice, the European Semester builds on the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and
Jobs (IGs) adopted in March 2005, which combined the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
(BEPGs) and the Employment Guidelines (EGs) into a single document for the first time,
each one in fact regulated by Articles 121 and 148 TFEU respectively. In turn, just like
the IGs (BEPGs + EGs), part of the Semester’s overarching framework relies on non-
binding EU recommendations; this is indeed the case for measures that concern
structural reform for example in the areas of welfare and labour markets. Nevertheless,
the indications coming from the EU become binding and may lead eventually to sanctions
if a country is made subject of the Stability Pact’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and
the new Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP). Under the current framework, failure to
meet the Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit target in the coming years will indeed
activate the EDP and, with it, a legislative process in which adjustment by the
problematic Member States in question is mandatory.
Figure 2. The European Semester: Treaty base
Article 121:
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)
“(…) The Council shall inform the European Parliament of its
recommendation.” (paragraph 2)
non-binding
“(…) The President of the Council may be invited to appear before the
competent Committee of the European Parliament if the Council has
made its recommendations public.” (paragraph 5)
Article 148:
Employment Guidelines (EGs)
“(…) the Council, (…) after consulting the European Parliament, (…)
shall each year draw up guidelines which the Member States shall take
into account in their employment policies. (…)” (paragraph 2)
Integrated
Guidelines
for
Growth
and
Jobs (IGs)
Europe 2020
European Semester
Annual Growth Survey
National Reform Programmes &
Stability and Convergence Programmes
binding
Excessive
Deficit
Procedure
Excessive
Imbalance
Procedure
Source:
Authors
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At the same time, failure to address structural problems that cause persistent
macroeconomic imbalances will lead to the activation of the new EIP, which is expected
to rely on similar coercive methods to the EDP. The legal ambiguities derive thus from
the fact that the European Semester brings together two procedures (the Stability Pact’s
preventive arm and the IGs) that generate two different types of legislative acts. The
Commission recommendation on SCPs provides the basis for a binding Council opinion,
whereas its recommendation on NRPs informs a non-binding Council recommendation.
On 7 June 2011, however, the Commission submitted country-specific recommendations
in an integrated legal text merging recommendations for the two procedures in a single
document. It remains an open question whether overall surveillance in the EU will be
enhanced or not under this new procedure, a topic we will address below.
The rest of the contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 lists the challenges ahead.
Section 3 describes the case selection and the rationale behind it. Section 4 provides
preliminary evidence on the adaptation of a sample of EU countries to the first Semester
cycle. Section 5 discusses the problems associated with the integrated approach and the
position of the Commission in the legislative process. Section 6 looks at the involvement
of National Parliaments based on original survey-based evidence. Section 7 addresses
explicitly the question of the role of the European Parliament. Section 8 offers policy
recommendations relating to the involvement of the European Parliament, National
Parliaments, and the European Commission.
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
_________________________________________________________________________________________
2.
THE CHALLENGES: EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY
2.1.
Effectiveness
The Semester has ambitious objectives and how it will fit into the new emerging
economic governance framework is a complicated and, to some extent, ambiguous issue.
We analyse here the main challenges ahead, differentiating between effectiveness, at the
national and European levels, and legitimacy challenges.
A first question is if the European Semester is and will be effective. Typically, policy
effectiveness is defined as how well a particular instrument achieves a given policy
objective.
5
In a multi-level framework such as the EU, multiple actors employ similar or
dissimilar policy instruments to achieve the same overall policy objective. When it comes
to economic policy coordination, it is certainly necessary to distinguish between
developments at national and EU levels. We thus look at effectiveness from two
perspectives: national and European.
2.1.1.
The national level
A first question is to what extent national Governments have adapted to the new process
and rules, thereby creating the necessary conditions for enhanced coordination between
countries and policy areas. It is too early to draw definitive conclusions, but the
preliminary evidence shows that Member States have, in this first round, adapted
differently to the new process depending on their historical relationships with the EU,
their contribution to the launch of economic policy coordination initiatives (e.g. the Euro-
Plus Pact), the strength of their commitment to macroeconomic adjustment and their
national fiscal frameworks.
2.1.2.
The European level
The second question is if the new framework is able to deliver on surveillance, a result
that would depend on the Semester’s fit within the emerging economic governance
structure. The role of the Commission in the Semester is not assessed enough, and this
point is important — the effectiveness of the Semester is likely to depend not only on
Member States’ capacities to adapt to it, but also on the Commission’s ability to deliver
the required early and integrated surveillance. More precisely, we will explore here the
role of the Commission versus the Council, and the relative advantages of the integrated
approach in the preparation of country-specific recommendations.
2.2.
Legitimacy
Another key issue is the extent to which the process is legitimate. Political science
literature has devoted much attention to the role of legitimacy in policy-making
processes. Scharpf (1999) considers the issue of legitimacy in the EU, using the
classification developed in Scharpf (1970), which focuses on both input-oriented and
output-oriented legitimacy. Input-oriented legitimacy is the extent to which there is
Government by the people, that is, the extent to which the people participate directly in
decisions.
5
On the use of the concept of policy effectiveness in public policy analysis, see for example Heritier (2003).
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Output-oriented legitimacy, in turn, is the extent to which a decision is for the people,
that is, the extent to which a given decision is in the best general welfare interest of the
population. Scharpf (1999) discussed the role of the European Parliament, stating that
the institution by itself could not provide input-oriented legitimacy because of the lack of
a 'thick' common identity among EU Member State populations. National Government
involvement in decisions therefore remains important because national Governments
provide most of the input-oriented legitimacy. When it comes to output-oriented
legitimacy, there are several ways to increase it, according to Scharpf. Electoral
accountability that allows populations to replace Governments that act contrary to their
interests is one. A closely related feature is checks and balances on the actions of
Government. Independent bodies that make decisions in the common interests of the
population are appropriate and welcome in areas where direct electoral accountability
would be unsuited.
2.2.1.
Input Legitimacy
When considering the legitimacy of the European Semester, institutional features are
therefore important. On the input side, European Parliament and National Parliament
involvement in the process is important. However, there are two main reasons for
questioning whether input legitimacy exists under the new procedures.
First, the European Parliament plays a minor role in the European Semester process.
6
On
the basis of Article 121 TFEU and Article 148 TFEU, the Council shall inform the European
Parliament of the adopted country-specific recommendations around July. In the present
report, we look at if greater involvement and a more active role for the Parliament is
desirable to increase legitimacy, and, if yes, how it should be achieved.
Second, the early discussion of fiscal and reform plans and the short period that
countries have to finalise their SCPs and NRPs limit their capacity to involve National
Parliaments. This time issue inevitably poses legitimacy concerns, in this case at national
level. At the same time, however, a benign interpretation of this development is that
National Parliaments may be informed of economic policy plans early in the year before
the standard budgetary process has started. One could, of course, argue that national
Government involvement suffices, but national Governments alone may take steps that
are counter to the European interest. In these cases, independent bodies should play a
role to assure adequate output legitimacy. In the European context, the Commission is
the obvious player.
2.2.2.
Output Legitimacy
Transparency plays a key role and is a pre-condition for assessing the degree of output
legitimacy of any decision. Thus, for the European Semester to be legitimate it is
necessary that the issues at stake are clear and transparent. Unfortunately, the first
cycle of the European Semester is characterised by some grey areas. For example, in
general, our review of the evidence is that the Council’s country-specific documents at
the end of the cycle water down many of the Commission’s recommendations. This
undermines the credibility of the AGS upon which the Commission’s recommendations
are based and thus also the transparency of the European Semester, depriving the entire
process of the pre-conditions for output legitimacy. We believe that the European
Parliament may indeed play a stronger role in the dissemination and interpretation of the
priorities and objectives identified at the beginning of each year for the purpose of
transparency.
6
Similarly, the European Parliament’s impact on the BEPGs, upon which the Semester’s AGS is based, was also
minimal.
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The Parliament can serve as an institutional check to be sure that Council revisions to
Commission recommendations do not undermine the general welfare of European
citizens.
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3.
MEMBER STATE EXAMPLES
For the purposes of the present study, we have selected six EU countries: Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary and Ireland. They represent large and small Member
States; countries that joined the European Union at different times; countries that have
adopted the euro and countries that are still outside; countries whose main trading
partner is the rest of the EU and others whose economic interests lie also outside;
countries that are and are not under EU-IMF conditionality; and countries that vary in
their use of multi-annual fiscal frameworks in their domestic budget systems. Hallerberg,
Strauch, and von Hagen (2009) argue that there are two ways institutionally to centralise
the budget process to promote greater fiscal discipline. The first involves delegating
powers of decision to a strong Ministry of Finance (MoF). The second involves fiscal
contracts between parties in coalition. In the latter case, the 'contract' serves not only a
fiscal objective but also a political one. Multi-annual fiscal plans are more likely to be
detailed, and to be honoured, under a 'contract' form of fiscal governance. Moreover, as
Annett (2006) noted in his study for the IMF, Member States with contracts use the EU-
level rules to reinforce their own domestic rules. For this reason, one may expect that
'contract' fiscal governance countries would be more likely to integrate elements of the
European Semester into their domestic frameworks than would 'delegating' states. The
extent to which each country fits the theoretical ideal type varies, however, as we will
explain below. Annex II gives details for each of the six countries we have selected.
It is possible to assume that the features mentioned above partly explain countries’
approaches to the European Semester. 'New' Member States may be more inclined to
follow the new procedure as accurately as possible. Older Member States that have
demonstrated historically a strong interest in economic policy coordination, in whatever
form, may try to interpret the European Semester in a more original fashion; the Franco-
German initiative for a Euro-Plus Pact would support this hypothesis. Countries whose
sole trading partner is in the euro area or in the EU would be more committed to
ex ante
economic-policy coordination between countries and policy areas. For countries under
conditionality, the first European Semester cycle should not be relevant as their
economic policy strategy is in any case strictly defined by and designed according to their
individual adjustment programmes. Finally, stronger national fiscal frameworks would
adapt better and more promptly to the new framework than weak ones.
Estonia is a small Member State that joined the EU in 2004. It has a proportional
representation electoral system. It is a contract state in terms of fiscal governance. The
'contracts', however, are not that developed — while there is some basis for medium-
term fiscal planning and
ex ante
coordination with the aim of fixing fiscal targets, there is
little consistency between multi-annual and annual targets.
7
Finland is a small country that joined the EU in 1995. The Finnish electoral system is
based on proportional representation; and is characterised by many political parties, high
variance of ideological preferences, and relatively frequent Government changeovers. In
line with the contract approach, at the end of December of the previous year, individual
Ministries propose spending limits for the next three years to the Ministry of Finance;
quantitative limits are eventually agreed on in March; Ministries will exploit the time from
then to mid-September to specify and then negotiate with the MoF the contents of their
spending plans. The country enjoys a very strong Medium-term Budgetary Framework
(MTBF); there is a national multiannual plan that compounds the Stability Programmes
submitted to the EU and this is well coordinated with the annual budgetary process.
7
See the Commission’s Fiscal Governance Database.
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France and Germany are both large states and EU founding members. Both countries
also follow a delegated approach. In terms of electoral system, France has a form of
plurality while Germany has a two-ballot system, with the first ballot based on plurality
and the second proportional representation. The distribution of seats depends mostly on
the proportional representation ballot. In France, survey-based evidence provided by the
Commission points to the existence of a highly developed MTBF with the strong
involvement of Parliament
8
, but in fact our evidence specifically addressing the role of
National Parliaments shows a more nuanced picture. Parliament debated fiscal and
structural plans in 2010 but not in 2011, and there are no plans to do so in 2012 because
of scheduled elections. The German 'Medium Term Financial Plan' provides multi-annual
targets that are at times detailed, but they are indicative only and they do not structure
future spending to the extent found in Finland.
Hungary joined the EU in 2004 and is not yet part of the euro area. Given that it has a
one-party Government it should be a delegating state, although in practice the Finance
Minister is institutionally weak when compared to other EU countries (Hallerberg and
Yläoutinen 2010). In formal terms according to the Commission’s (2009) assessment of
medium-term frameworks, Hungary has a framework as strong as Finland’s, but in
practice the Government has not maintained the spending limits promised in those
frameworks to the same degree as Finland, and the MTFF in practice is indicative only
(Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 2010).
Ireland is a small country that joined the EU in 1973 and is the only country in our
sample that was under EU and IMF conditionality during the first Semester cycle. It has a
single transferable vote electoral system. It is would be a 'contract' county according to
the terminology of Hallerberg
et al.(2009),
although the nature of the 'contract' today
focuses on what the Government (both the previous and current) has promised the EU
and IMF.
In the following two sections, we assess the degree to which this set of Member States
have integrated the European Semester according to what they have submitted under
National Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes. We
also consider if and how National Parliaments have responded.
8
See above.
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4.
EFFECTIVENESS
AT
THE
NATIONAL
LEVEL:
STABILITY/
CONVERGENCE
PROGRAMMES
AND
NATIONAL REFORM PROGRAMMES
KEY FINDINGS
Member States have adapted differently to the European Semester.
Ownership of and adherence to the new economic policy coordination cycle
appears strongest in the new Member States (Estonia and Hungary); not relevant
in countries under programmes (Ireland); strong but more freely interpreted in
the larger old Member States (France and Germany) and weaker in small newish
Member States that entertain intensive economic relations with countries outside
the euro area or the EU (Finland).
We isolate three indicators that should provide insights into Member States’ adaptation to
the Semester: i) ownership of the cycle; ii) the relative strength of
ex ante
guidance; and
iii) the adoption of an integrated approach (i.e. the acknowledgment of spill-over effects
between fiscal actions and structural reforms). The analysis is based on an assessment of
national SCPs and NRPs. Table 1 contains information on the submission schedule.
Table 1: Submission’s schedule
SCP
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
29.04.2011
06.04.2011
03.05.2011
27.04.2011
15.04.2011
29.04.2011
NRP
29.04.2011
06.04.2011
03.05.2011
07.04.2011
15.04.2011
29.04.2011
COM Rec.
07.06.2011
07.06.2011
07.06.2011
07.06.2011
07.06.2011
07.06.2011
COUNCIL
Rec.
12.07.2011
12.07.2011
12.07.2011
12.07.2011
12.07.2011
12.07.2011
Source:
DGECFIN and national sources.
The level of ownership in each country is assessed by accounting for explicit references
to the European Semester cycle in national fiscal and structural plans. Member States
that explicitly mention the European Semester and/or provide details about their effort to
adjust to the new procedure are said to have a stronger sense of ownership than
countries in which the new procedure is not even explicitly referenced.
Second, we assess the success of
ex-ante
guidance. To do so, we focus on the contents
of the AGS and the extent to which national plans mirror both the priorities and the
objectives identified in the Commission’s documents. The first Semester cycle started
with the submission by the Commission of the first AGS on 12 January 2011. Annex I
provides a list of its policy priorities and objectives. The document identifies three policy
priorities: fiscal consolidation, labour market reform and growth-enhancing measures.
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In turn, the Commission identifies ten objectives that support these three priorities: i)
rigorous fiscal consolidation, ii) the correction of macroeconomic imbalances, iii) stability
in the financial sector, iv) higher labour market participation v) pension system reform,
vi) lower unemployment, vii) flexicurity, viii) the completion of the Single Market, ix)
greater use of private capital to finance growth, and x) cost-effective access to energy.
9
We assume that
ex ante
guidance in the form of the AGS is more successful the more
explicitly Member State endorse the AGS and adopt measures consistent with the AGS’
objectives.
Third, we evaluate the extent to which Governments in the selected countries have
adopted an integrated approach in the sense that they have acknowledged and possibly
quantified spill-over effects across macroeconomic and structural measures, ranging from
the fiscal consequences of reform to the incorporation of reform scenarios in budgetary
projections.
The French and German documents contain references to the European Semester and in
particular to the Franco-German initiative for a Euro-Plus Pact. They are thus
characterised by a strong political commitment to economic policy coordination in the
euro area. France recognises the role of the Semester especially in the area of structural
reforms, as in its NRP, while the Stability Programme builds on previous EU assessments
of French fiscal plans. The German Government, on the other hand, seems wary of
ex-
ante
coordination under the European Semester more in the fiscal arena than in the area
of structural reform.
10
In the French NRP, there is a high degree of adherence to the
AGS, with strong emphasis on the sustainability of public finances, pension reform,
labour market inclusion, flexicurity, more efficient use of resources to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, access to SMEs and stronger competition in post and telecommunications,
transport and electricity. The structural interventions identified in the German NRP relate
to increasing labour market participation, improving conditions for R&D and innovation,
reducing emissions and investing in cost-efficient renewable energies, improving
educational attainment and promoting social inclusion. Finally, with reference to the
recognition of complementarities between policy areas, the French Government
recognises the potential for spill-over effects across policy domains but these are
quantified only in the Stability Programme. The opposite occurs in the German
documents. Only the German NRP contains indications about spill-over effects, the size of
which is also quantified; on the other hand, there is less on the integrated approach in
the Stability Programme.
Estonia and Finland also have strong national specificities, though for different reasons.
The Estonian documents contain references to the European Semester, Europe 2020 and
the Euro-Plus Pact. By contrast, the Finnish documents do not make explicit reference to
the new logic of the European Semester in either document.
11
As to the strength of
ex-
ante
guidance, the Estonian NRPs emphasise the achievement of a medium-term
budgetary objective (MTO) of surplus, improving the sustainability of social expenditure,
continuing the gradual reduction of taxes on labour and profits, and increasing taxes on
consumption and energy, avoiding macroeconomic imbalances, even if precise
interventions are not identified, increasing youth employment, and implementing long-
term structural changes in the energy sector.
The first multiannual BEPGs of 2003-2005 – the natural precedent of the AGS - listed 27 guidelines. The
BEPGs for 2005-2008 reduced them to 16. By bringing them to 10, the AGS makes further progress into the
streamlining of economic policy guidelines.
10
“By pursuing the line of fiscal policy presented in this Stability Programme, Germany will fully comply with
these (i.e. excessive deficit procedure) requirements. The economic policy components of the consolidation
procedure are contained in the National Reform Programme, and the measures therein with financial impact are
simultaneously covered by the fiscal strategy and projection for public finances that are contained in the
Stability Programme” (German Stability Programme).
11
The documents were put together before the general election.
9
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There is also awareness of the spill-over across the fiscal and the structural domains and
an indication of the cumulative impact of measures. In the Finnish NRP, there is an
emphasis on the need to guarantee the sustainability of public finances, support
employment and fix climate and energy targets. There is little acknowledgment of the
spill-over effects across the fiscal and other macroeconomic domains and no estimation
of the impact of the suggested measure.
Finally, both Hungary and Ireland are special cases, the former for not being a euro area
member, for having held the EU Presidency in the first Semester cycle and for being in
fact under post-programme surveillance after having received financial support from the
EU under the so-called Medium-Term Financial Assistance (MTFA) facility. Ireland, on the
other hand was under conditionality in the first Semester cycle. The Hungarian
documents suggest a very high level of commitment to the European Semester as well as
to the Euro-Plus Pact, to which non-euro area members can only commit on a voluntary
basis. The NRP is well-aligned with the AGS, including measures to increase the
sustainability of public finances, increase labour market participation, reform the pension
system and social protection, boost vocational training and incentivise the use of
renewables. There is also great attention devoted to spill–over effects both in the
Stability Programme and in the NRP. Submitted on 29 April, the Irish Stability
Programme and NRP largely mimic the commitments the country has taken on board
with the adjustment programme agreed with the EU and the IMF. For a country under
conditionality, in fact, the strong umbrella for coordination provided by the European
Semester has no relevance since the country is obliged to stick to the detailed fiscal and
reform plan. In turn, none of the documents explicitly refer to the new framework. The
listed measures are those of the adjustment plan, and the NRP is mostly developed along
EU 2020 guidelines rather than being explicitly tailored around the AGS. There is also no
attention to spill-over effects, but these may be implicit in the adjustment plan agreed
with EU authorities.
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5.
EFFECTIVENESS
AT
THE
EUROPEAN
LEVEL:
CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS AND POLICY
FORMULATION
KEY FINDINGS
EU Institutions need to adapt to the new economic policy coordination cycle. The
Commission will have to identify the optimal fiscal and structural stance early on
and prioritise across policy areas and countries.
The interaction between the European Semester and the new economic
governance is ambiguous. It is not clear how the use of an integrated legal text
will affect surveillance. Moreover, the Council’s rationale for departing from some
of the Commission’s country-specific recommendations is not transparent.
5.1.
The choice of optimal fiscal and structural policy
First, the European Semester requires the analysis and formulation of policies to be
integrated across countries and across policy areas. The alignment of the SCP and NRP in
Member States and the renewed emphasis on the relevance of complementarities
between fiscal policy and structural questions requires the identification and prioritisation
of policy measures. This is a challenging task for the Commission.
5.2.
Prioritisation across policy areas
Second, the
ex-ante
nature of the European Semester requires the Commission to come
to an assessment of optimal fiscal and structural policy earlier in the process. For this, it
needs to formulate earlier than under the old regime its view on the optimal fiscal stance
for the euro area as a whole and the corresponding optimal level of deficits in line with
Treaty obligations for the different Member States. This guidance needs to be grounded
in solid analysis to convince National Parliaments of the importance of keeping to the
proposed budget levels. Intervening early may also represent a risk in case economic
circumstances change rapidly, but this risk must be weighed against the cost of less
coordination and guidance. The AGS may be more effective in the area of structural
policy, where circumstances change less quickly, than in the area of fiscal policy, where
sudden macroeconomic shocks may require quick action.
5.3.
Political and economic trade-offs
Third, it will be challenging to prioritise across policy areas. For example, the European
Commission may highlight as it did in its first AGS that economic growth as well as high
employment are areas of key importance. After an endorsement and confirmation of
these overarching goals by the European Council, the Member State will then need to
translate these goals into concrete policy measures in their NRPs. The Commission
assesses these measures in a recommendation for a Council recommendation on the
NRPs. In this recommendation, the Commission prioritises the policy areas in which
action should be taken in the next year.
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This evidently involves a judgement by the Commission. In the recommendations
published on 7 June 2011, a prioritisation is made. However, it is not transparent how
and on what grounds this prioritisation was reached. While many of the
recommendations appear to be completely sensible, greater transparency would help
increase ownership and in turn foster effectiveness, also at the national level.
5.4.
Prioritisation across countries
Fourth, there are also cases in which policy recommendations may be subject to political
and economic trade-offs. For example, pension reform may be economically necessary
but may involve short-term economic costs in the introduction phase. Such a reform may
also incur significant political costs, which may prevent the Government from
undertaking equally important reforms of the labour market. While the Commission may
form a view on the relative political feasibility, ultimately it is a difficult exercise to
calibrate political and economic trade-offs. It therefore becomes all the more important
that economic prioritisation by the Commission in its recommendation for a Council
recommendation is well explained and justified.
5.5.
Interaction with the new economic governance framework
Fifth, the Commission chose to give policy recommendations to all 27 Member States,
treating them all, except for the countries receiving financial assistance in a programme,
on an equal footing. This policy decision may make more pertinent and biting
surveillance more difficult. So far, the Commission has not attempted to differentiate and
prioritise policy actions across countries; therefore it is difficult for the Council to
prioritise the urgency of policy actions across countries. Put differently, should a policy
recommendation given to a troubled country not be more urgent than a policy
recommendation to a country without major economic difficulties? The current way of
presenting recommendations suggests that all countries need to take policy actions in an
equally urgent way. It also remains to be seen how the analysis of cross-country spill-
overs can be improved in the current set-up, which focuses on individual economies.
Clearly it would be a task for the Commission to guide the Council on which countries
they should pay particular attention to.
5.6.
The challenges of an integrated legal text
Sixth, it remains to be seen how the European Semester will interact with the new EU
economic governance framework emerging from the reform of financial supervision, the
currently debated governance package and the Euro-Plus Pact. The currently debated
governance pact includes a regulation on the prevention and correction of
macroeconomic imbalances. This regulation has an overlapping Treaty base with the
BEPGs and the related NRPs, namely Article 121 TFEU. The Commission is designing an
early-warning mechanism to issue policy recommendations suitable to prevent
macroeconomic imbalances. Here, it will be important to draw a clear line between the
regular NRP process and the preventive arm of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure. This
could be done, for example, on the basis of the severity of the potential imbalance and
the extent of spill-overs arising from the imbalances. These two criteria will be all the
more important for the corrective arm of the EIP, which should kick in in case of severe
imbalances threatening the functioning of EMU.
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The corrective arm of the EIP is likely to be very intrusive in terms of economic policy
recommendations, and will ultimately lead to sanctions. In some policy areas, the EIP
and the newly founded European Systemic Risk Board are likely to overlap
12
. Here it will
be of great importance to avoid institutional conflict and benefit from the relative
strength of different institutions to reach an effective policy solution. Finally, the Euro-
Plus Pact is an important political-commitment device at the head of state and
Government level, even if monitoring stays in the Commission’s hands. Content-wise, it
overlaps significantly with the regular Treaty-based procedures. In sum, there is a
considerable number of different procedures emerging or already in place (see for
example Figure 2). Given the high number of procedures and the confusion that might
arise from it, political commitment and action on all fronts will be extremely important to
the success of the Semester process. Ideally, Member States should back the regular
Treaty-based surveillance by strengthening the Commission's independence and acting
decisively in the Council and at home once recommendations are issued.
5.7.
The Council acting on the basis of a Commission recommendation
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while the Commission states that the SCP and
NRP are legally separate, this does not appear to be the case. In fact, for each Member
State, on 7 June 2011 the Commission issued a 'Recommendation for a Council
Recommendation on the NRP of [country x] and delivering a Council opinion on the
updated Stability Programme of [country x]'. Previously, the Council opinion has been a
separate legal instrument to the Council recommendation on the NRP. By combining
them in one document, analysis and policy recommendations get integrated. What used
to be the Council opinion is no longer a separate legal instrument as required by
Regulation 1466/97 (the preventive arm of the SGP). It is included in the Council
recommendation as expression of the Council's view on the SCPs. This comes with
significant risks and it could ultimately undermine the effectiveness of fiscal surveillance
for a number of reasons: (a) within the Commission, the integration across policy areas
could lead to weakening of the analysis and the subsequent policy conclusions on fiscal
policy (aspects of fiscal discipline can be traded-off against other policy objectives). By
opening up the document to include both policy areas, it is possible that different
Directorates-General (DGs) might have a say on the overall messages of the document,
thereby undermining the stringency of analysis and leading to faulty compromises; (b)
by having one integrated document, several different Council formations will discuss the
same document, potentially leading to an overlap. Political horse-trading could further
undermine the stringency of recommendations issued by the Council in the area of fiscal
policy. On the other hand, it is of course also possible that the integration will help
finance ministers to convince other Ministries more easily of the necessity of addressing
fiscal policy sustainability. Overall, it will be important that fiscal discipline cannot be
traded-off against other policy objectives, and that structural reforms are not delayed
when the fiscal situation is benign.
12
Wolff (2011).
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A final and very important issue is the extent to which policy recommendations given by
the European Commission are watered down in the Council. In this note we have not
conducted a systematic evaluation of this but preliminary evidence suggests that the
recommendations become weaker in some cases in the Council.
13
This may be
legitimate. However, this should happen in a transparent way. The European Parliament
could play an important role in this regard by asking the Council to be transparent about
its decisions and justify its actions, a topic we will elaborate on further below.
For example, the Council recommendation on Italy: the Commission recommended that the process of
opening up the services sector to further competition should be extended 'in particular in the field of
professional services', while the Council recommendation changes 'in particular' to 'including', a significant
weakening in emphasis. Similarly, there is evidence for such weakening in Hungary and a number of other
countries of our sample.
13
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6.
ONE ASPECT OF INPUT LEGITIMACY: THE ROLE OF
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE FIRST CYCLE
KEY FINDINGS
The adaptation of National Parliaments to the European Semester is strongly
affected by the nature and strength of national fiscal frameworks
There is more scrutiny of SCP in Parliamentary Committees under the new
system, even if such scrutiny was mostly behind closed doors.
Weaker National Parliaments are those that are more strongly in favour of an
involvement of the European Parliament in the Semester cycle. But only an
involvement with the plenary would provide added value to such collaboration.
National Parliaments can play an important, and useful, role in the European Semester.
They already have mechanisms in place to scrutinise their country's annual budget
proposals, they have to approve that budget, and they all investigate
ex-post
how the
budget was executed. They represent the principle source of input legitimacy in Europe's
parliamentary democracies and must surely be one target audience for the European
Semester. The change in the calendar for when a Government writes and submits a SCP
may mean that the National Parliament receives more detailed information about its
Government’s plans earlier. Parliaments also have some ability to change the
Government’s budget. If the Government ignores the advice it gets under the European
Semester, it is possible that a Parliament may react on its own. In addition to the
domestic arena, we also explore if there might be useful interaction between National
Parliaments and the European Parliament under the European Semester.
For this preliminary report, we conducted a survey on the role National Parliaments play
in the six Member States under study (see Annex III).
14
Before discussing the details, it
is important to note that one country, Ireland, is generally not relevant for most of the
questions we asked. It abolishes its Committees after each election and creates new ones
under a new Government. The new Committees post the 25 February 2011 elections had
not been formed in time to be relevant for the first cycle of the European Semester. The
information we have is based on past behaviour only, and in general the Irish Parliament
(the Oireachtas) has been a weak player in any case. Government Ministers inform
Parliament of submissions to the EU, but there have not been planned debates. The main
role of the Irish Parliament has been to provide an
ex post
audit of the Government’s
budget, rather than to play a role in the initial formation of multi-annual plans or in the
design of budgets.
A first issue to explore is the relative power of a National Parliament to change the
Government’s budget. We expect actual changes of any significant magnitude to be rare;
party discipline is high in many Member States, which means that Governments with
majorities usually pass their budgets, and Governments have the ability to hold a vote of
confidence on the budget where necessary. Nevertheless, more powerful Parliaments
may have the ability to impress upon Governments their concerns, and there may be a
connection between their ability to change the budget, the amount of monitoring they
do, and whether the Government needs to pay attention to what the Members of
Parliament say.
14
The survey questions are reproduced in Annex III.
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We examine i) if a Parliament can propose a budget independently of Government; ii) if
it can propose amendments; iii) if those amendments are limited; iv) if amendments face
an offset rule so that increased spending must be matched with spending cuts; v) if they
are offsetting relative to the budget balance; and vi) if amendments can cause the fall of
a Government. One can create an ordinal score for the strength of Parliament on the
15
budget that ranges from 0 to 6 based on these questions. The strongest Parliament is
in Finland, with a score of 5, followed by Germany (4), Estonia (2), France (2), Hungary
16
(1) and Ireland (0).
The second theme to explore is the role Parliaments have played to date in multi-annual
planning. Is there a multi-annual fiscal plan the Government uses in addition to its SCP?
If so, does the general plenary debate the plan? Does it vote and approve a multi-annual
plan? We ask the same questions for a country’s SCP – does the Parliament discuss and
vote on a Government’s SCP? We assume that this type of scrutiny would be public and
most likely to receive any press attention. Finally, we are interested in the timing of any
debate. Does the timing suggest that the Government would be able to adjust its plans
and/or that the timing corresponds to the timing of the Semester, or does it come late in
the calendar so that the Government is essentially informing Parliament of its plans?
Within our sample, two countries – Finland and Germany – regularly have plenary
debates concerning their Government’s multi-annual fiscal plans. The timing of the
debate traditionally in Finland is in April, but this debate will take place in October this
year because of recent elections, and it is uncertain when the debate will take place next
year. In Germany, there are two debates, in September and in November. The Estonian
Parliament had a debate on the Government’s multi-annual fiscal plans in May 2011, but
this was exceptional – there was not a similar debate in 2010 and none is currently
planned for 2012. Similarly, the French Parliament debated the Government’s multi-
annual fiscal plans in 2010 but not in 2011, and there are no plans to do so in 2012.
Among our sample, Finland is the only country where the Parliament has a vote on the
Government’s multi-annual plans and where parliamentary approval is expected. Turning
to a Government’s SCP, in no country does the plenary debate or approve what the
Government submits to the European Commission, and in no country are there plans to
introduce any plenary consideration in 2012.
We then ask the same questions for parliamentary Committees. One finding is that the
new timing for when a SCP is to be submitted has led to more consideration of it in
parliamentary Committees. In 2010 in Germany, the Committee did not discuss the
German Stability Programme, but it did discuss the Programme in April 2011 and there is
17
anticipation that the next Programme will be discussed in April 2012. In France, the
Committee on Finance, the General Economy, and the Control of the Budget discussed
the Government’s Stability Programme in April 2011 and voted on it in June. Unlike in
Germany, however, in the other countries there are no plans to have the same practices
in place in 2012. In Hungary, the Committee on Audit Office and Budget briefly
considered it, while the Committee on European Affairs spent more time on it. Once
again, this was not the practice in 2010.
A Parliament receives a score of 1 if the answer to questions 1-2 and 6 are yes and if 3 and 4-5 are no.
The Finnish Parliament also has the right to vote on Finland’s contribution under the European Financial
Stability Facility when funds are dispersed to a given Member State.
17
Concerning the Government’s multi-annual fiscal plans, the Budget Committee discusses them twice, in July
and in November, but it holds no vote on them.
16
15
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These changes are in addition to regular discussions of Stability Programmes in
Committees in Estonia and Finland, which were held in 2010, but with changes in the
calendar to align timing with the deadline for submission to the EU. Like Hungary,
Estonia had its European Affairs Committee, in addition to its Budget Committee,
18
consider its SCP.
While the regular discussion of a country’s SCP in its Parliament opens up a possible
channel for communication and even coordination with the European Parliament and with
other EU institutions such as the Commission, there is a potential practical problem. In
the Budget Committees in Estonia, Finland, France and Germany the discussion are held
in private. This is intentional. The sense is that one can have honest discussions as to
whether the Government’s fiscal plans are realistic only if they are not for attribution.
One participant in the survey noted that public debates quickly turn into 'shopping
window politics', with members of Parliament instinctively saying whatever the party line
is if they know that their comments will appear somewhere else later. It is also
noteworthy that the country where these discussions are open, Hungary, also has one of
the weakest Parliaments in institutional terms.
Finally, there was a series of questions as to whether a given Parliament planned to
initiate reforms to coordinate with the Semester and if it would be useful for a National
Parliament to engage in a joint debate on the Semester. No respondent indicated that
reforms were forthcoming because of the introduction of the European Semester. There
was, however, an interesting split on whether a joint debate would be useful.
Respondents from Estonia, Hungary and France welcomed such a possibility. The
Estonian commented that 'it’s important to step-by-step increase the role of the
Parliament in a joint debate on the European Semester with the European Parliament',
the Hungarian noted that 'a joint meeting or debate with the National Parliaments and
European Parliament on the European Semester may pave the way for closer cooperation
on this issue', while the French person stated that 'the National Parliaments and the
European Parliament have a joint interest in exchanging views on the procedures of the
European Semester: calendars, objectives, and modalities of eventual sanctions'.
In Finland and Germany, however, there was not the same level of enthusiasm, with the
first insisting that this 'would be contrary to the treaties' while the second answered
cautiously that any such decision is a political one. The sample is small, but one can
speculate that the responses are due to the relative strength of the respective Parliament
given that the weaker ones welcome European Parliament participation.
Returning to the theme of whether the European Semester enhances legitimacy, the
results are decidedly mixed. There was more scrutiny of the SCP in Parliamentary
Committees under the new system. Given that Member of Parliaments are
representatives of the people, this enhances input-oriented legitimacy. Some countries
such as France, however, unfortunately do not plan to continue this practice. Most of this
additional scrutiny at Committee level was behind closed doors and the average citizen
did not have a chance to learn about it. While plenary sessions are generally open and
provide one possible forum, in no country was there a plenary debate on a given SCP.
The results on whether European Parliamentary involvement together with a National
Parliament is desirable are intriguing, given that weaker Parliaments would prefer such
involvement. They suggest that the European Parliament may be able to compensate for
some deficiencies at the national level were European Parliament to play such a role. But
once again the lack of transparency within Committees could be an issue.
One question also asked whether the respondent knew of any case where a Government proposed an
updated budget after receiving critical comments from the ECOFIN Council. No respondent could remember
such a case.
18
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It is hard to see how
ex-ante
coordination between the European Parliament and a
National Parliament could take place, let alone be effective, if they are held only at the
Committee level. They would have to involve the plenary, which given the lack of plenary
interest so far does not seem likely.
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
_________________________________________________________________________________________
7.
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
KEY FINDINGS
The European Parliament can play an important role as a forum for the exchange
of information and a watchdog in the relationship between the Commission and
the Council that would serve the purpose of increasing the European Semester’s
effectiveness and legitimacy.
We propose an Economic Dialogue on the European Semester that should mimic
the Monetary Dialogue.
As already mentioned, it is still not clear how the European Semester will fit into the
emerging new economic governance framework including the Euro-Plus Pact and the
governance package still under discussion. The role of the European Parliament may be
better defined once the overall governance framework becomes clearer. We will provide
a more detailed proposal on the exact role of the European Parliament in the full study to
be delivered in 2012. In the present paper, we propose a stronger role for the European
Parliament in more general terms. Still, we anticipate here some specific
recommendations, in the next section, on the points during the process when the
involvement of the European Parliament would be most appropriate.
The initial European Semester proposal foresaw a relatively minor role for the European
Parliament. The plenary held a discussion on the Commission’s AGS in February and was
informed by the Council of the agreed country-specific recommendations, as foreseen in
Article 121 TFEU.
The main challenges for the European Semester are to ensure its effectiveness and the
legitimacy of the process. As to its effectiveness, the preliminary evidence is that
countries have adapted differently to the new procedures depending on whether they are
'old' or 'new' Member States; if their economic interests lie exclusively with the EU or
not; and if they have strong or weak national fiscal frameworks. Secondly, it remains to
be seen if an integrated legal text containing recommendations to correct the course of
fiscal policy and intervene on individual markets through structural measures will end up
strengthening or weakening the overall economic-governance framework.
The European Parliament should in this context become a forum in which information is
exchanged and its role of watchdog for the relationship between the Commission and the
Council made more visible and effective. A clearer involvement of the European
Parliament would also offset current legitimacy concerns at the input and at the output
level.
To address both the effectiveness and legitimacy concerns, a wider Economic Dialogue
with the European Semester playing a central role should be put in place. We envisage
an Economic Dialogue with the Commission and the President of the European Council
that largely mimics the European Central Bank’s Monetary Dialogue. The President of the
European Council and the Trio-Presidencies should be required, in the framework of this
Dialogue, to inform the European Parliament of their own and other countries’ progress in
complying with the new procedures, to make sure that efforts are equally distributed and
the underlying conditions for successful coordination not compromised. At the end of
each Semester cycle, the European Parliament should have the power to hold both the
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Commission and the Council accountable for the final country-specific recommendations
that would be sent to each Member State.
The Dialogue’s format could be similar to that of the Monetary Dialogue with regular
discussions between the European Parliament, the Commission and the President of
ECOFIN on the preparation and follow-up of the AGS and the related country-specific and
horizontal recommendations. These discussions should be public in order to raise the
Semester’s public profile. However, the timing of such discussions cannot be random and
needs to be precisely defined. Moreover, the European Parliament also needs to adapt to
get the best out of the Economic Dialogue.
More detailed practical recommendations for the involvement of the European Parliament
are given in the next section.
After the Council has issued the policy recommendations to Member States, the
European Parliament should hold the Council and Commission accountable for their
actions. This should involve demanding a clear justification from the Council on why the
Commission's recommendations have been changed. This justification should be given in
a public hearing to the respective Committee of the Parliament. In the case of a euro
area country, the Eurogroup president should present the decision of the Council, while
in the case of a non-euro area country, the rotating presidency should appear before the
Committee. Moreover, the European Parliament should also hold the European
Commission accountable by calling on the responsible Commissioner to testify before the
Parliament (i) on the initial recommendations given and (ii) on whether the Council has
adopted these recommendations.
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
_________________________________________________________________________________________
8.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The experience of the first year with the European Semester indicates a number of areas
of improvement. First, preliminary evidence on compliance with the Semester’s new
procedures shows that the Member States in our sample have adapted differently to the
new process. If it is persistent, cross-country variation in the speed of institutional
adaptation may create political tensions in the Council. Second, at the level of national
Parliaments, the main impact of the European Semester so far has been on the level of
consideration of a Government’s SCPs, and on the timing of when discussions took place
within Parliamentary Committees. Overall, the Semester’s legitimacy remains rather
weak. Third, it will be of key importance that the integration of policy recommendations
does not come at the cost of diluting the stringency of fiscal and structural surveillance.
Fourth, also for the new governance set-up, political commitment remains of central
importance.
A more precise definition of the role of the European Parliament in the Semester process
will help to address at least some of the challenges outlined above. While we believe that
the European Parliament can make an important contribution to enhancing both the
effectiveness and the legitimacy of the Semester, we found that there is no room for
obtaining the same results by strengthening, let alone changing, the nature of the
collaboration between National Parliaments and the European Parliament. In detail, we
recommend the following:
As already happened this year, the European Parliament should have a discussion
about the AGS to influence the subsequent (European) Council discussions. The
President of the European Parliament should have a clear mandate from the
European Parliament when participating in the European Council.
The plenary debate on the AGS should be based on a report put together by a
newly established European Semester Parliamentary Committee. This Committee
could be composed of members from the Committee for Economic and Monetary
Affairs, the Employment Committee, the Budget Committee and the Regional
Policy Committee. The involvement of the Regional Policy Committee guarantees
representation of territorial interests in a process that touches significantly on
European regions’ future budgetary constraints and growth potential, but hardly
involves regional actors in the planning phase, especially in more centralised
countries. A rapporteur should be identified early on in the process.
After the Council has issued the policy recommendations to Member States, the
European Parliament should hold the Council and Commission accountable. Did
the Council follow the Commission recommendations? If not, why did the Council
deviate and how can this deviation be justified? In turn, did the Commission issue
pertinent and stringent recommendations or did the Council have to sharpen
messages? The legal basis for holding the Commission and Council accountable is
Article 121(5) TFEU.
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Such an
ex-post
accountability check of the European Parliament is preferable to
ex-ante
involvement of the European Parliament in the policy formulation process
for a number of reasons. One is that the European Parliament does not typically
have the technical expertise to delve into the deep economic issues underlying
policy recommendations. Moreover, many of the policy recommendations,
especially when they are part of the more stringent SGP and EIP, constitute
potentially problematic recommendations for Member States. In such situations,
fragmentation of the European Parliament along national lines is a risk. In
addition, countries subject to serious imbalances are likely to remain in the
different procedures for several years. In such a cyclical game, strong
accountability checks in one year will significantly shape the policy
recommendations in the following year thereby increasing the power of the
European Parliament.
In especially serious circumstances, the European Parliament should consider
asking National Ministers to testify before it on their obligations relative to the EU.
It is clear that National Ministers can be held accountable only to National
Parliaments. However, in the European Semester, they have an obligation also to
the EU, and the European Parliament could increase this obligation by calling on
them to testify. To be more effective, this should be done only in cases of severe
imbalance under the EDP or the EIP in case of serious breach of the Member
State’s obligation.
The European Commission faces the challenging task of integrating analysis and
policy recommendations across countries and policy areas while at the same time
coping with a difficult legal set-up. We recommend that the legal separation of
NRPs and Council opinions in the SCP should be maintained. Moreover, we
encourage the European Parliament to increase the resources available to the
European Commission to carry out effectively its surveillance mandate and to
ensure that cross-directorate collaboration is as effective as possible.
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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REFERENCES
Annett, A. (2006), "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy
Did and Did Not Change Under Europe’s Fiscal Framework”, IMF Working Paper No.
06/116. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Altomonte, C. and B. Marzinotto (2010), “Monitoring Macroeconomic Imbalances in
Europe: Proposal for a Refined Analytical Framework”. Policy Department A:
Economic And Scientific Policies. European Parliament.
 
European Commission, Database of Domestic Fiscal Governance, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/db_indicators/article16351_en.htm
European Commission (2005), Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005 –
2008), COM(2005) 141, 12 April.
European Commission (2009), “Public Finances in EMU. 2009, 10th edition.”
European Economy,
5(2009).
European Commission (2010a), Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination, COM(2010)
250, 12 May.
European Commission (2010b), Proposal for a Council Regulation amending
Regulation (EC) 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the
excessive deficit procedure, COM(2010) 522, 29 September.
European Commission (2010c), Proposal for a Council Directive on requirements for
the budgetary framework of the Member States, COM(2010) 523, 29 September.
European Commission (2010d), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro-
area, COM(2010) 524, 29 September.
European Commission (2010e), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic
imbalances in the euro-area, COM(2010) 525, 29 September.
European Commission (2010f), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) 1466/97 on the strengthening of the
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies, COM(2010) 526, 29 September.
European Commission (2010g), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances,
COM(2010) 527, 29 September.
European Commission (2011a), Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, Annual Growth Survey:
advancing the EU’s
comprehensive response to the crisis, COM(2011) 11, 12 January.
European Commission (2011b), Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on
the National Reform Programme 2011 of Italy and delivering a Council Opinion on the
updated Stability Programme of Italy, 2011-2014, SEC(2011) 810, 7 June.
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European Council (1997), Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, (EC) 1466/97 7 July.
European Council (2011), Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the National
Reform Programme of Italy and delivering a Council opinion on the updated Stability
Programme of Italy, 2011-2014, 12 July.
Gerlach, S., Schulz, A., and G. B. Wolff (2010), “Banking and sovereign risk in the
euro area”, CEPR Discussion Paper No 7833.
Hallerberg, M., Strauch, R., and J. von Hagen (2009),
Fiscal Governance: Evidence
from Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hallerberg, M. and S. Yläoutinen (2010), “Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and
Budgetary Outcomes in Central and East European Countries.”
Journal of Public
Policy,
30, pp. 45-62.
Hallerberg, M. (2010), “The Role of the European Parliament in the European
Semester: Increasing the Accountability of the Commission and Council”, European
Parliament, August.
Heritier, A. (2003), “New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political
Capacity and Policy Effectiveness”, in: Boerzel A. Tanja and Chicowski A. Rachel
(2003).
The State of the European Union, 6: Law, Politics, and Society,
Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 105-126.
Scharpf, F. W. (1970),
Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung.
Konstanz:
Universiitätsverlag.
Scharpf, F. W. (1999),
Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?,
Oxford
University Press.
Wolff, G. B. (2011), “The euro area’s macroeconomic balancing act”, Bruegel Policy
Contribution 2011/05.
 
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX I : ANNUAL GROWTH SURVEY
Three priorities:
1.
2.
3.
Fiscal consolidation
Labour Market Reforms
Growth enhancing measures
6.
5.
Reforming pension system
Link retirement age with life expectancy
Reduce early retirement schemes
Develop complementary private savings
Ten objectives:
1.
Implementing a rigorous fiscal consolidation
Annual adjustments of structural budget balance of 0.5% of GDP
Public expenditure growth below the rate of medium term trend
GDP growth
Set expenditure path
Front load structural budget deficits
Increase taxes (indirect, enlarge tax basis, eliminate subsidies)
Getting unemployed back to work
Design benefits to reward return to work
Ensure coherence between the level of income taxes and
unemployment benefits
Adapt unemployment insurance systems to business cycle
7.
Balancing security and flexibility
Introduce more open-ended contracts
Simplify the regimes for the recognition of professional
qualifications
2.
Correcting macroeconomic imbalances
Decrease current account if the country is in deficit
Increase the domestic demand if the country is in surplus
8.
Tapping the potential of the Single Market
Fully implement the service directive
Remove unjustified quotas on professional services
3.
Ensuring stability of the financial sector
Restructure indebted banks
Increase bank capital requirements
9.
Attracting private capital to finance growth
EU project bonds
Facilitate access to finance for SMEs
4.
Making work more attractive
Shift taxes from labour
Flexible work arrangements and childcare facilities to facilitate
participation of the second earner
10. Creating cost effective access to energy
Third internal market energy package
Step up energy efficiency policies
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How Effective and Legitimate Is the European Semester? Increasing the Role of the European Parliament
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ANNEX II: SURVEY COUNTRIES - OVERVIEW
Estonia
Population (million)
19
EU Membership
20
Euro area Membership
Under programme
Electoral System
21
Fiscal Governance
23
Duration of Government
Budget Proposal
Preparation
24
Fiscal Institutions:
Medium-Term Budgetary
Frameworks
25
Presentation of Proposal to
the National Parliament
26
Strength of Parliament in
the Budgetary Process
27
1.3
2004
2011
No
Proportional
Representation
Contract
Early-June to End-
September
Finland
5.4
1995
1999
No
Proportional
Representation
Contract
End-December to Mid-
September
France
65.1
Founding Member
1999
No
Plurality
Delegation
May-June to Early-
October
Germany
81.8
Founding Member
1999
No
2-tier Proportional
Representation,
adjustment seats.
22
Delegation
End-December to End-
June/Early-July
Hungary
10.0
2004
No
No but surveillance
Proportional
Representation
Delegation
Mid-April to End-
September
Ireland
4.5
1973
1999
Yes
Single Transferable Vote
Contract
April to Early-December
1.00
By the end of September
2
1.60
Mid-September
5
1.60
Before the 1
st
Tuesday of
October
2
1.40
Early-August
4
1.60
30
th
of September
1
0.60
1
st
Wednesday of
December
0
Population measured on the 1
st
of January 2011 – Total. Eurostat.
Year of EU entry. Http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm.
21
Hallerberg, Mark, Strauch, Rolf, and Jurgen von Hagen (2009),
Fiscal Governance in Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22
'A two-tiered electoral system is one where an upper level of seats is used to fill in the results at a lower level to make the overall distribution of seats more proportional'
(Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen, 2007. Table 1).
23
Author calculations.
24
Indications on the important steps in the budget preparation in the EU Member States. European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG
ECFIN), Country Desks.
25
Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks Index, median value, 2009. 'The index takes into account both the existence and properties of national medium-term budgetary
frameworks and the preparation and status of Stability and Convergence Programmes. The index captures the quality of the medium-term budgetary framework through five
criteria: (i) existence of a domestic medium-term framework, (ii) connectedness between the multi-annual budgetary targets and the preparation of the annual budget, (iii)
involvement of National Parliaments in the preparation of the medium-term budgetary plans, (iv) existence of coordination mechanisms between general Government layers
prior to setting the medium-term budgetary targets for all Government tiers, and (v) monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of multi annual budgetary targets.' European
Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), Fiscal Governance, Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks Database.
Http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/framework/index_en.htm.
26
Author Update.
27
Survey conducted for this paper. This indicator is an ordinal score ranging from 0 to 6 based on: i) whether a Parliament can propose a budget independently of
Government; ii) whether it can propose amendments; iii) whether those amendments are limited; iv) whether amendments face an offset rule so that increased spending must
be matched with spending cuts; v) whether they are offsetting relative to the budget balance; and vi) whether amendments can cause the fall of Government.
20
19
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ANNEX III: QUESTIONAIRE
 
2011
 
Questionnaire on Parliaments and the European Semester
Country: XXXX
Respondent: P1
This survey is intended to document the role that Member State Parliaments play in the preparation of documents for the European Union
on their economic policies under Economic and Monetary Union.
While we will use your survey in our study, we will not reveal the names of individuals who filled them out.
participation will be held in strictest confidence.
1. Planning Stage of the Budget Process
Member State Governments all formulate multi-annual economic plans for the European Union, which they traditionally have submitted to
the European Commission in December or January in the form of Convergence or Stability Programmes. Prior to 2011 this meant that the
European Commission would be evaluating budgets that Parliaments had already approved, rather than budget plans.
Under the European Semester, the calendar for the submission of Member State programmes has been moved to the spring before the
budget year. The expectation is that European consideration of a Member State’s fiscal plans will take place at the same time that a given
Government is evaluating its plans.
This section asks you to consider the role of your domestic Parliament in the formulation of your country’s fiscal plans both for the domestic
and European level. The second set of questions is for the main Budgetary Committee in the lower house of Parliament.
Your
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1.1Does your country use multi-annual budget programmes in addition to the Stability/Convergence Report it submits to
Brussels?
__Yes
__No
If the answer is yes, over how many years?
1.2Where are Government multi-annual government budget programmes formulated?
__Coalition Agreement
__Within the Ministry of Finance
__Within an intergovernmental body, such as a Council that brings together leaders of central and sub-national Governments (Please
explain the exact nature of the body in your country:________________________________________________________)
__Other (please explain):
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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1.3 The Role of Parliament in the Formation of Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans: Plenary
What role does the plenary (or full Parliament) play in the formulation of the Government’s multi-annual fiscal plans and its Stability or
Convergence Programme? Please check a box for each year. Please check the appropriate box. If the answer is “yes,” please indicate the
approximate month the event takes place.
2010
No
Plenary
Has a Public Debate on the
Government's Multi-Annual Fiscal
Plans
Plenary
Has a Vote on the
Government's Multi-Annual Fiscal
Plans
Plenary
Has a Public Debate on
Government's Stability/ Convergence
Programme
Plenary
Has a Vote on Government's
Stability/Convergence Programme
Yes
If yes, Which
Month?
2011
No
Yes
If yes, Which
Month?
Expected 2012
If yes, Which
No Yes Month?
1.4 Does the Plenary play any other role in evaluating the Stability or Convergence Programmes the Government sends to
Brussels?
__Yes
__No
If yes, please explain:
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1.5 The Role of Parliament in the Formation of Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans: Committee(s)
Which Committee (or Committees) considers the Government’s budget proposal in the lower house of Parliament? Budget Committee?
Finance Committee? Other? Please provide:
______________________________________________________
Are Committee meetings usually ____secret or are they ____open to the public? If both apply, please explain:
The following questions concern the role of this
Committee
in the setting of the country’s multi-annual plan and Stability or Convergence
Programme. Please check the appropriate box. If the answer is “yes,” please indicate the approximate month the event takes place.
2010
No
Committee Has a Debate on the
Government's Multi-Annual Fiscal
Plans
Committee Has a Vote on the
Government's Multi-Annual Fiscal
Plans
Committee Has a Debate on the
Government's Stability or
Convergence Programme
Committee Has a Vote on the
Government's Stability or
Convergence Programme
Does the relevant Committee play any other role in evaluating the Stability or Convergence Programmes the Government sends to Brussels?
Yes
If yes, Which
Month?
2011
No
Yes
If yes, Which
Month?
Expected 2012
If yes, Which
No Yes Month?
__Yes
__No
If yes, please explain:
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
2. The Role of Parliament in the Annual Domestic Budget Process
2.1. Can Parliament propose the annual budget
independently of the Government?
2.2. Can Parliament propose amendments to the
Government’s budget?
2.3. Are amendments to the Government’s budget
limited?
2.4. Are amendments offsetting in terms of
expenditures? That is, must additional spending be
matched with corresponding spending cuts?
2.5. Are amendments offsetting in terms of the
budget balance? That is, must additional spending
be matched with corresponding spending cuts or
revenue increases? (Difference from last questions:
revenue increases also possible.)
2.6. Can Parliamentary amendments cause the fall
of Government?
2.7. Is the treatment of expenditure and revenues
made separately or simultaneously within
Parliament?
2.8. Is there a time limit on the passage of the
budget in Parliament?
__Yes
__No
___Yes
__No
__Yes
__No
__Yes
__No
__Yes
__No
__Yes
__No
__Yes
__No
__Yes
__No
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2.9
Is there a general vote on the total budget within Parliament, and if so, when?
3. Monitoring the Implementation of the Budget
3.1What is the role of Parliament in monitoring the execution of the annual budget?
3.2 Does the Government inform the Parliament of outcomes mid-year? If so, how often?
4. Response to European Union Evaluation of Domestic Stability or Convergence Programmes
4.1 Do you know of any instance where the Government proposed a new budget after it received a critical review from the
Council of Ministers?
__Yes
__No
If yes, please provide details concerning what happened:
5.
Planned Changes/Reforms
5.1 The European Semester introduces a revised review of the multi-annual budget plans of Member States. There are more
details that Member States will have to report, and the calendar is meant to coincide with the domestic budget process.
Does your Parliament plan to revise procedures at the domestic level in response to these reforms?
__Yes
__No
If yes, please provide details:
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Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5.2 Would you think it useful for your Parliament to engage in a joint debate on the European Semester with the European
Parliament?
__Yes
__No
Please explain your answer:
 
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